Russia's Use of Force and Its Interplay with Ethnic

Russia’s Use of Force and its Interplay with Ethnic Identity in Post-Soviet States

By: Joseph Meyer

B.S. in International Relations, May 2014, Middle Tennessee State University B.A. in Global Studies, May 2014, Middle Tennessee State University

A Thesis submitted to

The Faculty of The Elliott School of International Affairs of The George Washington University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of International Affairs

May 15, 2016

Thesis directed by

Marlene Laruelle Professor of International Affairs

Acknowledgements

The author wishes to thank, Dr. Marlene Laruelle, Dr. Henry Hale, and Dr. Cory Welt for their advice, guidance, and support in completing this thesis.

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Abstract of Thesis

Russia’s Use of Force and its Interplay with Ethnic Identity in Post-Soviet States

This project examines Russia’s use of force in separatist conflicts in the former

Soviet Union revealing that, contrary to what some have suggested, Russia has not pursued master plan to rebuild the Russian Empire or Soviet Union, and has not pursued a foreign policy driven by ethnic nationalism or imperialism. While Russia has maintained military and foreign policy contingencies for engagement in these types of conflicts in the event of crisis, there is little evidence of extensive Russian pre-planning focused on generating “frozen conflicts,” as a central focus of Russian geostrategy.

Instead I find that Russia has used unplanned crises, often resulting from security dilemmas, to “freeze” these conflicts in order advance a number of geopolitical goals focused on ensuring the security of Russian state when the opportunity has arisen. The transformation of these conflicts can have the effect of creating a socio-psychological infrastructure that perpetuates gradual, but observable, change in the ethnic identity of separatist de facto states. Russia’s intervention in these conflicts has developed this infrastructure based on the concept of a “Russian World” to which these separatist groups are said to belong. The Russian World serves a tool of Russian foreign policy in that it has replaced the relationship Moscow had with these separatist entities during the Soviet period.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements ...... iii Abstract of Thesis ...... iv List of Russian Terms ...... vi List of Acronyms ...... vii Introduction ...... 1 Methodology ...... 5 Case Studies ...... 17 Chapter 1: Moldova ...... 17 Chapter 2: Georgia ...... 39 Chapter 3: Ukraine ...... 43 Discussion of Findings: ...... 55 Chapter 4: Drivers of Russian Foreign Policy ...... 55 Chapter 5: Intervention and Identity: The Effect on the Ground ...... 73 Chapter 6: Policy Implications ...... 87 Conclusions ...... 95 References ...... 100

List of Russian Terms

Glasnost: (Russian: openness) The Soviet policy of the open discussion of political and social issues instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980’s.

Korenizatsiia: (Russian: indigenization, literally: putting down roots) Refers to the Soviet nationalities policy of the 1920’s and 1930’s that promoted the ethnic identity of titular groups within union republics and national minorities at lower levels of administrative.

Novorossiya: (Russian: New Russia) A historical term denoting the region north of the Black Sea located in modern Ukraine, stretching roughly from Odessa in the west to Rostov in the east. Revived as a term referring to the political project of the separatists Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

Oblast: (Russian: oblast) A region or province within a union republic of the Soviet Union; term still used in the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

Rossiiskii Narod: (Russian: Russian people/citizens) A broad conception of what it means to be Russian, generally encompassing multiple nationalities that make of the people of the Russian Federation.

Russkii Narod: (Russian: Russian people) A term used to identify ethnic Russians. It is multifaceted in that it has been used narrowly to advance ethno-nationalist agendas, but has also been used to represent a broader sense of unity among eastern Slavic peoples in general.

Sovetskii Narod: (Russian: Soviet people) The demonym for citizens of the Soviet Union; also a political concept representing the coming together of the many ethnic groups and nationalities of the Soviet Union coming together as one.

Perestroika: (Russian: restructuring) The process of restructuring the Soviet political and economic system instituted by Mikhail Gorbachev in the late 1980’s.

List of Acronyms

ASSR: Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

CIS: Commonwealth of Independent States

CPSU: Communist Party of the Soviet Union

CSCE: Community for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Predecessor to the OSCE)

EEU: Eurasian Economic Union

EU: European Union

JCC: Joint Control Commission

KPRF: Communist Party of the Russian Federation

LDPR: Liberal Democratic Party of Russia

MFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs

MASSR: Moldovan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic

NATO: North Atlantic Treaty Organization

RSFSR: Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

SSR: Soviet Socialist Republic

OSCE: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe

UN: United Nations

USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

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Introduction

Winston Churchill’s often used quote describing Russia as “a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma” continues to define popular narratives about Russia over 70 years after he first uttered those words. The personality of Vladimir Putin and Russia’s return to great power politics under his leadership has captivated journalists, scholars, and politicians alike. Many have attempted to explain Russia’s actions as it navigates the first post-imperial stage in its history, often with the aim of predicting Russia’s future course and preparing appropriate responses. This thesis is my attempt to cut through some of the fog surrounding the discussion of Russia’s actions in the post-Soviet period, specifically focusing Russia’s use of military force abroad in the post-Soviet era, and the interplay of such use of force with ethnic identity in the separatist regions in which Russian took military action.

The February 2014 Euromaidan protests and subsequent overthrow of Ukrainian

President Viktor Yanukovych set in a motion a chain of events that has shaken the

European security architecture, challenged international norms about sovereignty, and seen Russia’s return to prominence in international politics. The conflict in Ukraine, which has seen the annexation of Crimea by the Russian Federation and the proclamation of separatist “people’s republics” in eastern Ukraine, has manifested itself in a form of

“hybrid warfare,” in which Russian forces have aided irregular separatist units in resisting the Ukrainian armed forces. An intense Russian information war campaign has accompanied the conflict as the Kremlin seeks to control the narrative about the conflict both inside Russia and Ukraine as well as around the world.

The conflict in Ukraine has led to renewed questions about Russia’s relationships with the former Soviet republics. Many observers have compared Russia’s intervention in

Ukraine, and the failure of the international community to confront Moscow’s actions, to the 1930’s concessions made by Western powers to Nazi Germany. Others have sought to explain Russia’s actions by situating them within the context of a long history of Russian imperialism or a desire by Russia’s leaders to rebuild the Soviet Union, referencing

Russia’s 2008 war with Georgia as further evidence. Still others have taken a more nuanced approach, pointing out the linguistic divide in Ukraine, Kremlin rhetoric about uniting the Russian Orthodox world, and nationalist rhetoric about protecting Russians living abroad.

The diversity of viewpoints and the continued public debate about Russia’s course of action in Ukraine demonstrates the need for an investigation into the dynamics of ethnic conflict in the former Soviet Union and how the Russian Federation has reacted to and manipulated this type of conflict. In addition to the ongoing debate about Russia’s foreign policy goals and objectives, numerous questions remain about the so-called

“logic” of separatist regions and states.1 Some former Soviet conflicts, such as the

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and the Russia-Georgia War of 2008, have received significant academic attention. Others, such as the Transnistrian War, have been obscured by the perception of their smaller impact on regional and global affairs.

A significant body of research exists concerning the nature of ethnic politics and conflict. Smaller, however, is the range of research covering the impact of foreign military intervention on previously internal (intrastate) wars. While a great deal of

1 Dov Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States. (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2004) 41.

foreign policy analysis has covered the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, as well as ongoing conflicts like those in Afghanistan and Syria, more research is needed about the interplay between modern military interventions and the development of ethnic identity and conflict. As the global community continues to confront the challenge of multiethnic states weakened by conflict and sectarian violence, a stronger foundation of research on the relationship between intervention and ethnic identity can inform future policy decisions surrounding these conflicts.

The Kremlin - both during the Soviet era and in the post-Soviet era - has been reluctant to use military force abroad. The invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia in

1956 and 1968 gained some global attention, but because they occurred within the Soviet

Eastern Bloc, provoked very limited international response. The 1979 Soviet invasion of

Afghanistan, however, drew international outrage and led to a long proxy war with the

United States, setting the stage for over three decades of conflict in that country. In the post-Soviet era, Russia has used military force abroad five times in 25 years, with all of those instances occurring inside the former Soviet Union until Russia’s September 2015 intervention in the Syrian Civil War. These four instances - the Transnistrian War of

1991-1992, the Georgian Civil War of 1992-1993, the August War of 2008 between

Russia and Georgia, and the Russian intervention in Ukraine beginning in 2014, are the subject of this study. This paper will be structured in a way that examines these cases by country - beginning with Moldova, moving to Georgia, and finally examining the recent conflict in Ukraine. After looking at each conflict individually, the second half of the paper will feature a comparison of the conflicts, delving into the search for an

explanation of Russia’s foreign policy vis-a-vis military intervention and how this may have affected ethnic identity in the regions impacted by Russian military action.

Methodology

A Framework for Ethnicity and Ethnic Politics

It is important to establish a baseline understanding of what ethnic identity is in order to approach the relationship between military intervention and perceptions of ethnic identity. Moving forward with an understanding of what ethnicity is and its usefulness as a measure of identity in the social world is crucial to any attempts to resolve “ethnic conflict.” How we define ethnicity will color our attempts to explain its impact on politics, as well as how violent conflict interacts with perceptions of the identity of the self and the other.

The theoretical debate about the nature of ethnicity has traditionally been characterized by two opposing views, “primordialism” and “constructivism.” In this spectrum of theoretical perspectives, primordialism holds that ethnic groups are determined by biological and geographic factors. Ethnicity is a rigid designator that does not change in meaningful ways over time. In this paradigm, ethnicity is an emergent quality of mankind, and an a priori component of human society. Constructivism, which in many ways has become the preeminent theory of ethnicity, holds that ethnicity is socially constructed over time, and is not inherent to human society. Henry Hale, in his examination of ethnic politics in the former Soviet Union, points out that even those who have self-identified as “primordialists” hold essentially constructivist views on ethnicity.

That is to say that at this stage in the development of research on ethnicity and ethnic conflict, few would deny that conceptions of ethnicity are socially constructed.

Acknowledging that ethnicity is socially constructed does not in and of itself explain the theoretical development of the concept of ethnicity, nor does it help us parse out the

divisions within the literature on ethnicity, which remain numerous despite the widespread acceptance of constructivist thought.2

In order to fill some of the gaps in the existing theory on ethnic politics and conflict, Hale proposes a social-psychological theory of ethnicity, which he calls a

“relational theory.” This understanding of ethnicity is relational in that it views ethnic identity as “a set of points of personal reference on which people rely to navigate the social world they inhabit.” In other words, identity is a type of “social radar” through which people can interpret the world around them. Moving from this definition, groups

“are defined by common relationships to points of reference.”3 Identity, then, serves as a means for humans to reduce uncertainty, which has been identified by social psychologists as “fundamental human motivation.” The division of humans into groups, such as ethnic groups, is a product of this drive to reduce uncertainty.

This set of conclusions leads us to another question; why are some aspects of identity more useful for this process of uncertainty reduction than others? To answer this question, Hale refers to “identity dimensions,” which represent one point of personal reference in the social world. These particular dimensions can become more important in a person’s identity based on events in the social world, described by Hale as the process of “thickening” identity dimensions. Certain dimensions of identity may have intrinsic importance, such as language, which is necessary for basic communication. Others, and indeed the majority, might have imposed importance, in that the broader social environment in which an individual is situated largely determines their importance.

Finally, the “thickness” of a third category of identity dimension is determined by a given

2 Henry Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics: Separatism of States and Nations in Eurasia and the World. (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2008) 15-17. 3 Id. 34.

dimension’s usefulness as a rule of thumb; in other words, the usefulness of the dimension for the process of determining whether or not someone belongs to a particular group.4 Ethnicity, then, is particularly useful means of uncertainty reduction for several reasons. There is a strong perception that members of the same ethnic group share a common fate. Ethnic divides also possess barriers to communication and interaction, namely in the form of linguistic and cultural differences. Ethnic groups also often have easily discernable visible differences, from skin color to eye color or stature.5

Hale goes on to emphasize, in the tradition of social psychology, that this process of group formation and perception as a means of uncertainty reduction occurs prior to utility-seeking. That is, “uncertainty reduction is primarily a mechanism, for making social action possible for the purpose of obtaining other ends.” Uncertainty reduction is therefore an important first step to utility maximization, giving a context to the eventual decision to pursue utility. Hale goes on to note that because of this, “there is no such thing as an inherently ethnic interest or ethnic preference.” Therefore, while ethnicity emerges as a result of uncertainty reduction, “ethnic politics” is concerned with the pursuit of interests, just as any other form of politics.6

When evaluating why regions choose separatism, Hale relies on a relatively simple calculus. The key factor determining whether a region will pursue separatism is whether or not the central government of the state is perceived as exploitative or peaceful. Separatism itself, then, centers on shaping regional beliefs about the nature of the central government.7 He states that, “the relational theory holds that where levels of

4 Id. 37. 5 Id. 42-44. 6 Id. 52. 7 Id. 72.

national consciousness are equal, variation in secessionism will depend first and foremost on the degree to which central state policies demonstrate credible commitments not to exploit minority regions and a willingness to use force to preserve the union.”8 The major driver of separatism, then, is

“A collective action problem in which ethnic distinctions influence how probabilities of exploitative and cooperative outcomes are assessed in a given union…where people are conscious of an ethnic divide with the central government, past and future central state actions will be crucial in shaping whether a given region sees the union as too likely to be 9 exploitive.”

This phenomenon emerges in all of the cases examined in this thesis, where regional elites, with help from media and the Kremlin, worked to mold feelings about the central governments of their states in a way that would create latent support for separatism. With ethnicity being a useful rule of thumb for navigating the social world, many of the narratives driving separatism focus on the relationship between ethnic groups, the separatist localities in question, and the central government of the state.

Russian intervention can undoubtedly play a role in the consciousness of these groups by altering the course of events between groups and the state and the course of the conflict as a whole. For evaluation of the long-term changes that might be caused by Russian intervention and the ultimate “freezing” of the conflicts in question, I turn to two closely related frameworks for the study of intractable conflict.

8 Id. 119. 9 Id. 140.

Two Frameworks for Intractable Conflict

The conflicts examined in my project each involve small de facto states, their larger parent state recognized by the international community as having sovereignty over them, and the Russian Federation as primary actors. There can be little doubt that the initial violent phases of these conflicts are existential for the de facto separatists regions, as defeat would mean a loss of autonomy and reincorporation into the parent state.

Moreover, even after the cessation of major violence and the creation of a the “frozen” period of the conflict, the ongoing dispute remains existential for the de facto state in that a potential resumption of violence or an unfavorable peaceful resolution could still lead to the destruction of the state.

Daniel Bar-Tal, in his research on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, notes that intractable conflicts are viewed as being “existential, irresolvable, and zero sum in nature.”10 These qualities are situated with the knowledge that intractable conflicts fluctuate over time and attempts at resolution may seem poised to succeed, only to stall out. This has certainly been the case in Moldova, where the Kozak Memorandum has seemed a potential path to resolution for greater than a decade, but has yet to be implemented. In his research on this type of conflict, Bar-Tal identifies a “socio- psychological infrastructure” that forms a prism through which individuals can interpret their situation. He states, “[socio-psychological infrastructure] helps to satisfy deprived needs, facilitates coping with stress, and is functional to withstanding the enemy.”11 This infrastructure resulting from intractability greatly affects the social identity of a given group, in our case ethnic groups. Bar-Tal notes that in situations of intractability,

10 Daniel Bar-Tal, “Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts.” American Behavioral Scientist Vol. 50 (2007) 1433. 11 Id. 1440.

members of a group may “increase their sense of identification with society to fulfill their need of belonging and security.” Furthermore, intractability enforces the sense of a shared common fate among a particular group while also providing the basis for the

“unity, solidarity, and coordination” needed to cope with the conflict.12

The development of this infrastructure can have serious consequences in a society while the conflict remains unresolved. It can lead to the selective intake of information as members omit information that is contradictory to the established infrastructure. An example might be a “new” history of the conflict, which contains significant derivations from the collective memory of the group. Even if such contradictory information is processed, it is “encoded and cognitively processed in accordance” with the existing infrastructure, leading to continued distortion. The socio-psychological infrastructure becomes a “prism through which society members construe their reality, collect new information, interpret their experiences, and then make decisions about their course of action.”13 In this way, the infrastructure of intractable conflict plays directly into how individuals and groups interpret the social world. The infrastructure in effect perpetuates the conflict by causing participants to interpret the world around them – and thus their points of reference – through the lens of the conflict. In this way, their identity can become tied to the conflict itself.

A final framework will be of use in deepening understanding of the dynamics at work in the frozen conflicts of the former Soviet Union. Analyzing the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Herbert Kelman describes what he calls “negative identity interdependence.”

This term focuses on the exclusiveness of two group identities. Relationship to a

12 Id. 1443. 13 Id. 1445-1446.

particular piece of land is key in Kelman’s framework; both groups claim exclusive ownership to the land, which is in turn tied to the identity of the groups. The negative interdependence of the groups is further exacerbated by the fact that “each side perceives the other as the source of its own negative identity elements.” Thus, the identity of the opposing group itself is seen as a threat to the group.14

In this model, the perceived intentions of the other group “arouse fears in each group about its own existence,” creating a zero-sum perception of identity. While this may not be the case in post-Soviet frozen conflicts for the parent states (i.e., the existence of Transnistria may not pose a threat to Moldova’s identity, and the same can be said for the Georgian and Ukrainian cases), it may be active in the identities of those in separatist states, as the conflict with parent states is existential in nature for these de facto entities.

Legitimacy attributed to the other party may be seen as a threat to the self. This rigidity helps to perpetuate the conflict by disincentivizing concessions.

A Note on International Politics

A key focus of this project is the underlying driver of Russian foreign policy towards post-Soviet states, particularly concerning Russia’s choice to intervene in separatist conflicts. As such, it is important here to briefly describe the international relations theories behind my analysis of Russian actions. The dominant school of international relations during the latter years of the Cold War and into the post-Cold War period has been the realist school, established by scholars such as E.H. Carr, Hans

Morgenthau, and Kenneth Waltz. The central principle of realism is that the international

14 Herbert C. Kelman, “The Interdependence of Israeli and Palestinian National Identities: The Role of the Other in Existential Conflicts.” Journal of Social Issues Vol. 55 No. 3: 588.

system is characterized by anarchy and that within this anarchic system, states pursue their interests based on a rational choice model. In this model, the most essential calculus in determining action of states is the interaction of interests and the relative power of states.15 Waltz, building on the work of previous realist scholars, posited that states actions are constrained by the structure of the international system, which is based on the distribution of power among states. States act in order to address the security dilemma, a situation in which states feel insecure relative to other states. Waltz described the effects of the security dilemma in relation to Russia, noting that the expansion of NATO contributed to Russia’s perception of instability by increasing feelings of isolation and encirclement.16 My examination of Russia’s actions with regard to separatist conflicts in the former Soviet space will draw upon this framework.

I also employ a second major theory of international relations – that of constructivism – which has more recently gained popularity in the field. Constructivism, as described by Alexander Wendt, holds that “the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces.”17 Constructivism acknowledges that the international system is anarchic, but places important emphasis on norms and values shared by states. Constructivists note that the history of relations between state actors shapes the foreign policy identity and interests of states themselves.

This nuanced acknowledgement of the importance of relations between states in shaping identity is important to my analysis of Russia’s use of force in former Soviet states and the relations between Moscow and the separatist entities it supports.

15 E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years’ Crisis (Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave MacMillan, 2001) 97-105. 16 Kenneth N. Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War.” International Security Vol. 25 No. 1: 22. 17 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999) 1.

Connecting Frameworks to Cases

The above frameworks for analysis provide useful lenses through which to view frozen conflict in the former Soviet Union. Although this study will focus more on how

Russian involvement has shaped these conflicts, rather than their initial origins, these frameworks will provide important context for analyzing how Russian intervention plays into the socio-psychological structures surrounding a conflict. Russian military intervention acts as a “critical juncture” in the history of a conflict. These junctures are events in which separatist groups’ perceptions of the world around them can change rapidly and drastically. While the intervention of Russian forces undoubtedly impacts the rational-choice decision calculus of a separatist group, it is unclear how such an event might interact with the uncertainty reducing process of identity formation. If Russian involvement in a conflict serves to further emphasize certain points of reference or minimize others, it may be that intervention can have a significant impact on the development of ethnic identity.

Furthermore, Russian involvement has also prolonged these conflicts beyond the initial stage of intense violence, allowing an infrastructure of conflict to set in, which serves as a prism through which members of participant groups interpret their relations with other groups. Russian hybrid war, which involves information war campaigns and propaganda beyond standard military operations, also plays into the development of perceptions within separatist regions, contributing a type of negative identity interdependence between the separatist ethnic group and the majority group of the parent state. Below, I will discuss the case selection and methodology I will employ to examine these interactions.

Research Design

The goal of this project is twofold; first, I seek to examine the impact, if any, that

Russian military intervention has had on the development of identities in separatist regions of post-Soviet states. Second, I will analyze Russian foreign policy through these instances of intervention in a comparative fashion. The two objectives are related in that many observers have postulated that Russia is motivated by a desire to build an irredentist state by reincorporating Russian minorities and other peoples perceived to be part of the “Russian world.” These claims will be addressed in the discussion section.

The case selection for this thesis includes Moldova, Georgia, and Ukraine. These cases have been selected because they are the clearest examples of Russian military involvement in the ethnic conflicts of its neighbors. Each of these cases presents an example of internal conflict mitigated in some way by ethnic identity. In these case studies, the Russian Federation chose to become involved by deploying its armed forces in that country through various means, both overtly and more covertly at different stages in the conflict. While the author notes that Russia has played a role in every major post-

Soviet conflict, these cases provide the most explicit examples of a Russian presence on the ground in the conflict zone. Russian intervention in Nagorno-Karabakh or the Tajik

Civil War, for instance was mainly limited to the involvement of smaller Russian units already present in the conflict zone, arms trade, and the use of political leverage to affect the outcome of the conflict. Only in Moldova, Georgia, and more recently in Ukraine has

Russia at some point engaged in an overt military intervention.

In order to analyze the impact of Russian intervention on the “thickening” of identity dimensions and subsequent hardening into a socio-psychological repertoire of

intractable conflict, I will examine each conflict in a case study format. Analysis will include a brief history of the state in question. Such a discussion is necessary in that it provides critical context to the methods through which Russia has sought to craft historical and political narratives in each country. Policies implemented during the Soviet period continued to have an impact on ethnic politics in modern post-Soviet states.

Relations between ethnic minorities, union republic government, and the Soviet center all play into the important and often-complicated histories of the conflicts examined in this thesis. With two of the cases – Moldova and Georgia – featuring Russian military intervention during and immediately after the fall of the USSR, a look at each region’s

Soviet history will provide an important point of reference for the pre- and post- conflict perceptions of ethnic identity in each country. A detailed examination of the course of each conflict will follow historical background, paying particular attention to the unique ways in which each ethnic group involved was affected and the Russian efforts to engage local actors. Survey and opinion data from both pre- and post- conflict research (where available) will be used as a proxy for opinions on ethnic politics and national identity.

Finally, this discussion should also illuminate the utility of “hybrid war,” as a tool of Russian foreign policy. Although hybrid war is not an exclusively 21st century concept, there can be no doubt that its successful use by Russia in Ukraine has raised concerns that Russia might deploy such tactics against other states in the former Soviet

Union, or that states around the globe could begin to incorporate hybrid war into their military doctrines. As the United States and its allies continue to confront security challenges and conflict around the world, building such knowledge of the impact of hybrid wars and the construction of identity will be critical to developing improved

policies and practices to respond to 21st century crises. This analysis should have important policy implications in that they will not only inform policymakers on confronting Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet space, but also elucidate on some more general consequences of military interventions in states with separatist conflicts.

Case Studies

Moldova: The Transnistrian War

Background: Moldova’s Complicated Soviet History

Of the three states that will be examined in this research project, Moldova has perhaps the most peculiar history of nationalism, particularly when compared to the other former Soviet Republics. Sandwiched between Romania and Ukraine, Moldova, formerly known as Bessarabia and Moldavia, was the site of one of the Soviet Union’s many nation-building building projects. Upon the creation of the USSR in 1922, the Soviet government began a propaganda campaign aimed at portraying the Moldovans as a separate and distinct nation from the Romanians, an assertion that had not previously been entertained in or outside of Moldova. In 1924, the USSR established the Moldovan

Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic as a means of legitimizing and institutionalizing the idea of the Moldovans as a unique national people.18 Notably, its capital was seated at

Tiraspol, the present-day capital of the self-proclaimed Pridnestrovian Moldavian

Republic, as the intended capital city - Chisinau (Moldova’s modern capital) - was

“occupied” by Romania at the time.

The Moldovanization campaign slowed to a crawl in the late 1920’s and early

1930’s, as fears grew among the Moldovan leaders of the effort that they might overstep the bounds of korenizatsiia as defined by the Soviet center.19 Although Soviet doctrine did dictate the “raising up” of certain nations on the path towards socialism, it opposed ethnic “chauvinism” and nationalism that could be perceived as counter to the socialist cause of eliminating class and other distinctions among the Soviet people. In 1932, the

18 Charles King, The Moldovans, 60-62. 19 Id. 79-81.

MASSR authorities replaced the Cyrillic alphabet - which had been implemented as part of Moldovanization - with the Latin alphabet used across the Dniester in Romania. A

Latinization campaign proceeded for the next six years, until Cyrillic was once again returned to prominence as part of the Russianization policies of Stalin in 1938.

After a number of border changes due to World War II, the new Moldavian Soviet

Socialist Republic was formed in 1948, including formerly Romanian territories south of the Dniester, but surrendering some land in the north to the Ukrainian SSR. The post-war period featured notable demographic changes in the post-war period, with Ukrainians and

Russians rising to a combined 26% of the population by 1989. Other ethnic groups from across the Soviet Union also migrated into the Moldavian SSR, integrating into the already multi-ethnic region with relative ease.20

Several linguistic developments unique to Moldavian SSR among the Soviet republics developed in the latter half of the 20th century. Despite the increased Slavic populations and the continued Russification under the Soviet regime, the Moldovan elite continued to use the Romanian language and preserved high Moldovan culture that was closely tied to Romania. On the other hand, Moldova had become the third most

Russified republic by the late 1980s, following only Ukraine and Belarus. Moreover, only

11.2% of ethnic Russians in Moldovan SSR reported fluent knowledge of Moldova as a second language. Despite the prevalence of Russian as a second language and the tendency of non-titular ethnic groups to retain their primary languages, the Moldovan language remained dominant, particularly in cities. Furthermore, distinctions between

20 Id. 101.

ethnic groups remained rigid, contrasting ethnic mixing in places such as eastern

Ukrainian SSR and Belarus.21

Late 1980’s Moldovan politics were characterized by a growing debate about future reunification with Romania as the Soviet Union began to deteriorate. The Popular

Front of Moldova, a social organization in pre-Perestroika Moldova, arose as the main opposition to the Community Party in mid 1989. Initially, the party was based on the

Baltic-model and was inclusive of all ethnic groups in Moldova opposed to the

Communists and generally in favor of Moldovan independence from the USSR.

However, the party increasingly became home to more radical pan-Romanianists and more nationalist Moldovan elements, causing minorities such as the Gaugaz to withdraw their support. After the party’s success in the 1989 Congress of People’s Deputies election, a pro-Soviet opposition camp formed, composed mainly of Russians and

Russian speakers, Transnistrians, and Gagauz.

Political divisions among ethnic groups began to rise in the 1990s, with one survey suggestion that while 54.8% of Moldovans supported independence from the

USSR, only 8.8% and 8.4% of Russians and Ukrainians, respectively, favored a split from the Soviet Union. The only major initiative with broad consensus was that of reunification with Romania, which was opposed by over 95% of Moldovans.The new

Moldovan government prepared to enact language laws elevating the status of the

Moldovan language, a move that further alienated minority groups, who saw this as an affront to the “internationalist” tone of Moscow and the remnants of the Communist

Party. As a result, the Gagauz declared the autonomous “Republic of Gagauzia” in

21 Id. 117.

August 1990, followed shortly thereafter by proclamation of the “Dniestr Moldovan

Republic” (DMR) in September 1990.22 Soviet authorities reacted with caution, and on

December 22, 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev issued a decree declaring the authorities established in Transnistria to be “null and void,” but took no action to return de facto control of the region to the Moldovan government.23

In 1991, Moldovan SSR elected Mircea Snegur as the first president of the republic. Snegur pursued a Moldovan nationalist policy, portraying himself as a guarantor of Moldovan independence - both from Romania and from the crumbling

Soviet Union. The rise of Moldovan nationalists concurrently with the fall of the Soviet

Union did not, however, lead to a great deal of anxiety among the Russian and Ukrainian minorities living in the Moldovan SSR. In fact, Moldova saw less than 25,000 Russians emigrated from the country between 1989 and 1993, the lowest number for any of the non-Slavic Soviet republics other than Armenia.24 Even Transnistria, populated by a significantly higher percentage of Russians and Ukrainians than other parts of Moldova, did not feature significant inter-ethnic violence in the months and weeks leading up to the highest intensity of violence. Nevertheless, tensions continued to rise between the authorities in Transnistria and their Moldovan counterparts throughout 1990 and 1991.

The Russian Foreign Policy Context at the Time of the Transnistrian War

While the official dissolution of the USSR came on December 25, 1991, the political process leading to this final declaration has been traced back to several points in time by

22 Id. 146-147. 23 Minorities At Risk, Timeline for Slavs in Moldova, 16 July 2010. 24 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority: Ethnicity and Nationalism in Soviet Successor States (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 165.

historians. For my purposes, a complex discussion of the factors contributing the collapse of the Soviet Union is not necessary here. Instead, it shall suffice to say that the events of

1989-1991, including Gorbachev’s perestroika and glasnost, provided the basis for the

Russian foreign policy context in the early 1990’s. Critical to the development of Russian foreign and domestic policy in the years prior to and after the fall of the Soviet Union was the feud between Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and RSFSR President Boris

Yeltsin.

Boris Yeltsin became President of the RSFSR on June 12th, 1991. As with his rise to power throughout the late 1980’s, his objectives were guided by a desire to strengthen the Russian republic in relation to the Soviet center. Just two months later, Communist

Party hardliners launched the now-infamous coup to oust Mikhail Gorbachev and preserve the Soviet Union. The coup was defeated when the people of Moscow obstructed military forces being rallied by the hardliners to assault the Russian White

House, under the control of Yeltsin and his supporters. The failed coup led to the final collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the assertion of Russian power over the crumbling Soviet center.

The next few months, which comprised of a series of follow-up blows to the

Soviet center, formed the basis for Yeltsin’s foreign policy as an independent Russia emerged for the first time since 1922. Just days after the failed August Coup, Ukraine declared its independence on August 24, 1991. Instead of being welcomed as another major blow to the Soviet center by the Russian authorities, many of Yeltsin’s close allies viewed Ukrainian independence as a betrayal of Russia. In what was left of the post-

August Soviet Union, the RSFSR had effectively taken control of the Union and was now

responsible for its administration and dismantlement; Ukrainian independence posed a challenge in that it represented a far more accelerated deterioration of the state than some in the Yeltsin camp were hoping for.25

Responding to Ukraine’s independence, Yeltsin’s press secretary Pavel

Voshchanov, prepared a statement that “if any republic breaks off Union relations with

Russia, then Russia has the right to raise the question of territorial claims.”26 This represented a major reversal of Russian policy from the preceding two years, which had more or less supported the independence of the Baltic states, as they were potential allies against the hardliners seeking to preserve to Soviet center. During a press conference after the statement, Voshchanov was asked to which territories did he refer, although he did not directly answer the question (he only listed Ukraine and Kazakhstan, presumably because of their large Russian populations), he later noted that he meant Crimea, the

Donetsk region, Abkhazia, and northern Kazakhstan.27 As the dispute between the

Yeltsin regime in the RSFSR and the emerging republics grew, Moscow Mayor Gavril

Popov, a close friend of Yeltsin, publicly stated that referenda should decide the fate of disputed regions, specifically Crimea and Odessa in Ukraine and Transnistria in

Moldova.28 The territorial conundrum was further complicated by the ironic fact that leaders in the disputed regions, particularly Transnistria, were conservative communists who had supported the August Coup and opposed the new RSFSR government.

As separatist conflicts erupted in Moldova and other republics (including Georgia, which will be discussed below), the Russian government initially supported these

25 Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire: The Final Days of the Soviet Union (New York, NY: Basic Books, 2014) 175. 26 Id. 176. 27 “Press Sekretar Prezidenta Ofitsial’no Zaiavliaet,” Rossiiskaia Gazeta, 27 August 1991. 28 Id. 177.

separatist movements in order to gain leverage over the emerging independent republics.

Despite providing material support for these separatist movements and taking little meaningful action to prevent these conflicts in 1990-1991, President Yeltsin reaffirmed

Russia’s commitment to the “legitimate” authorities and existing borders at the

Belavezha Accords in early December 1991. However, as we will see below, this public declaration did little to temper the flames of conflict at the time.

Events of the Conflict

Moldova formally declared its independence from the USSR on August 27, 1991.

Four days later, on August 31, the Moldovan government replaced Cyrillic with Latin as the official language of the state. Two days after this, Transnistrian authorities in Tiraspol rejected Moldovan sovereignty and in turn declared Transnistrian independence from

Moldova as the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR).

Soviet support for Transnistria prior to the August Coup can be seen as an effort to shore up a reservoir of loyalist support against an increasingly pro-independence

Moldova. From late 1990 to 1991, the Soviet center, first under Gorbachev and then under the de facto leadership of Yeltsin from August to December 1991, implicitly provided several levers of support to the Transnistrian authorities.. The Soviet government provided supplies to the 14th Army, which was stationed in southwestern

Ukraine and Transnistria, and established a Transnistrian bank which provided finances to the PMR. Some reports suggest that Soviet civil defense and paramilitary groups in the region provided material support to Transnistria during the war.29 After the August coup,

29 Nicole J. Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS: Theories, Debates, and Actions (London, UK: Routledge Books, 2003) 82-83.

support for Transnistria served as leverage against the Moldovan government, as

Yeltsin’s regime feared Moldova and other republics would fall outside the orbit of post-

Soviet Russia.

Although minor clashes between Moldovan authorities and Transnistria had occurred from 1989 on, the intensity of the conflict began to rise in late 1991. Major clashes broke out in the town of Dubossar in September of that year, resulting in numerous casualties. Moldovan authorities, seeking to gain an advantage over

Transnistria, sought to blockade major transit routes into Transnistria via western

Ukraine. As tensions escalated, the 14th Army under Major General Gennady Yakovlev used its logistical capacity to organize and develop Transnistrian paramilitary units comprised primarily of ethnic Russians and Ukrainians.

The importance of the 14th Army - one of the Soviet Army’s most prestigious units - in Transnistria should not be understated. As King notes, the presence of the army made Transnistria “one of the most Sovietized territories in the union.” He goes on to note that, “the 14th Army’s skilled officer corps, elite OMON troops, and weapons supplies provided critical support to the Transnistrians as the confrontation with Chisinau escalated.” 30 As clashes continued into late 1991 and 1992, Russian and Ukrainian cossacks arrived in support of Transnistria, while Moldova began receiving military aid from Romania. Fourteenth Army units became directly involved in the conflict during the spring of 1992, assisting Transnistrian forces in operations along the west bank of the

Dniester River. Fourteenth Army armored units took part in a major battle in the ethnically Russian town of Bender, on the west bank, in mid-June 1992. Russian Vice

30 Charles King, The Moldovans, 184.

President Alexander Ruskoy stated that the 14th Army had been provoked to intervene in the battle by the Moldovan forces committing a “bloody slaughter” against Russians living in the town. Regardless of the true circumstances, the battle proved a major blow to Moldovan forces in their attempt to stem the tide of Transnistrian separatism.

The rapid escalation of violence in the summer of 1992 led the Russian government to overtly acknowledge Russia’s direct involvement in the conflict and push for a ceasefire agreement. Numerous ceasefires had been attempted in the first half of

1992, but the Kremlin, which had provided little instruction to the 14th Army up to this point - either out of indifference due to the low-intensity of the conflict or the

Transnistrian victories, or the inability to communicate with the army (Citation here), made little effort to push for a more durable ceasefire agreement.

Peace talks in Moscow, begun in early June and continuing through the Battle of

Bender, resulted in the preliminary framework for a ceasefire on June 25, 1992, just days after the violent conclusion of the fighting in Bender. On July 21, 1992, Russian

President Boris Yeltsin and Moldovan President Mircea Snegur reached an agreement for a permanent ceasefire. The peace agreement created a security zone following the

Dniester River as well as the three-party (Moldova, Transnistria, Russia) Joint Control

Commission (JCC) peacekeeping force. The peacekeeping force, although containing

Russian forces, was separate in command structure from the already present 14th Army.

Aftermath and Political Status

In the months and years immediately following the cessation of major violence in

Moldova, the situation rapidly stabilized. The Russian military proved a guarantor of the

status quo, to the extent that Moldovan authorities within the JCC accused Russia of supporting the continued de facto independence of Transnistria rather than serving as a neutral mediator to the conflict. In 1994, the Russian Federation began withdrawing elements of the 14th Army, but was reluctant to withdraw the entirety of the Russian forces deployed in Transnistria not under the control of the JCC. Economic and political conditions in Russia during the early to mid 1990’s, as well as the escalating conflict in

Chechnya, drew Russian focus elsewhere, but the Yeltsin regime was unwilling to completely relinquish Russia’s leverage over the region by completely withdrawing troops.

Yeltsin and the Russian Foreign Ministry maintained a moderate position on the

Transnistrian question throughout the mid-1990s, leading some Transnistrian elites to favor the election of the nationalist Liberal Democratic Party (LDPR) or the Communist

Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) in the 1996 Russian elections.31 Yeltsin eventually defeated his challengers in the election and remained in power as the Russian president. Although Transnistria remained a semi-regular concern of the Russian Duma, the Foreign and Defense Ministries, and indeed most of the Yeltsin regime, were far more concerned with separatism with Russia and the declining economic situation, leading to a stalemate in political negotiations over the status of Transnistria in the late 1990s.

While the 14th Army was downgraded to an “operational group,” (OGRF) the

Russian presence remained. Moldova called this an explicit violation of the neutrality clause contained within its constitution, which was interpreted to preclude the stationing of foreign troops on Moldovan soil. For their part, “withdrawal” for many of the soldiers

31 Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS, 108.

in the OGRF meant little more than returning to their homes in Transnistria, as most still thought of the region as their home. Despite the continued presence of Russian troops in

Transnistria, Russian interaction with the PRM was relatively limited. Having supported the August coup in 1991 and the Supreme Soviet in the 1993 Russian Constitutional

Crisis, the Yeltsin regime was reluctant to develop closer ties with a regime that had sided with its internal political enemies on more than one occasion.

The Organization for Security and Cooperation (OSCE) became involved in several rounds of negotiations in 1996-1997, leading to an agreement on the normalization of relations between Transnistria and Moldova and the facilitation of trade and transit across the de facto border. However, the two sides failed to agree on what the agreement implied for the permanent status of Transnistria, with the PMR authorities advocating for Transnistria to be an equal component of a federation with Moldova, while Moldova offered only a limited version of “special status” for Transnistria. The

PMR had little motivation to engage in concessions to Moldova, having been the military victor in the 1992 war. This, combined with little interest from Russia and western powers, kept the Transnistrian conflict frozen into the 21st century.

The events of Euromaidan and the beginning of the War in Ukraine in 2014 (to be discussed in detail later in this thesis) renewed interest in Transnistria as a potential point of conflict. Many noted Transnistria’s proximity to Odessa, on the Black Sea coast of

Ukraine, which also saw riots during the initial stages of the post-Maidan unrest in

Ukraine. After Russia began supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine, the new Ukrainian government severed ties with Moscow, including an agreement that allowed Russia to

transit personnel and supplies across Ukrainian soil to Transnistria, leaving the Russian

Operational Group effectively cut off from Russia.

At the outset of the conflict and the initial victories of separatist forces in Ukraine over the Ukrainian military, many feared that Russia would seize the advantage and drive west across Ukraine towards Transnistria.32 As Russia’s annexation of Crimea unfolded, members of Transnistria’s parliament, supported by some popular protests, called upon

Russia to draft a law that would allow Transnistria to join the Russian Federation.33

Summary Analysis of the Case - Moldova

There is little evidence to suggest that it was the policy of the Russian Federation to play a major role in the construction of political and ethnic identity in Transnistria during or immediately after the hostilities. Although some Russian politicians, such as

Vice President Alexander Rutskoy and Sergei Stankevich, a Yeltsin advisor, routinely spoke of protecting fellow Russians abroad, the extent of the impact on this rhetoric on actual Russian policy is questionable. Although the Russian nationalists had greater power in early post-Soviet Russia than in the later 1990’s and early 2000’s, Yeltsin’s victory in the standoff with the Russian Supreme Soviet in 1993 assured that the

Presidency would be the ultimate source of power - in foreign policy and otherwise - in post-Soviet Russia.

Moving onward from the conflict into the late 1990’s and into the 21st century, it is clear that the PMR regime relies heavily on Russian subsidies. Studies have noted that

32 The Guardian, “Russia Ready to Annex Moldova Region, NATO Commander Claims.” 23 March 2014. Web. Accessed: 8 February 2016. 33 BBC, “Moldova’s Trans-Dniester Region Pleads to Join Russia.” 18 March 2014. Web. Accessed: 8 February 2016.

unlike Moldova, which remains the site of a ferocious debate about whether the country should align towards the West or Russia,34 Transnistria’s people and government are more firmly aligned towards the Russian world.35 However, analysis of survey data in both Moldova and Transnistria have noted that economic conditions, mistrust of government, and nostalgia for the more stable conditions of the Soviet period are shared by people on both banks of the Dniester River. While the role of a more unified,

“Russophilic” national identity in Transnistria should not be understated, research indicates that economic conditions remain the primary driver in people’s feelings about their country.

There is little question, however, that Russia’s involvement in the conflict, and subsequent reluctance to reduce its role in the peace process, has created the political conditions to maintain the divisions between Moldova and Transnistria. As Moldova continues to confront significant economic challenges into the present day, leading to a possible resurgence of Romanian nationalism, we can expect Transnistrian leaders to continue to express concerns about the status of Transnistrians in any hypothetical union between the two. In this sense, the relational aspect of ethnicity, in that certain events and actors can emphasize the Romanian aspects of Moldovan culture and political life, illustrates how a “thickening” of identity might occur in Transnistria. Just as

Transnistrians and Gaugaz feared oppression in a new Moldova at the fall of the USSR, the continued importance (thickness) of Romanian ties in Moldova will continue to challenge attempts to reunite Moldova and Transnistria.

34 Daniel Schearf, “Political Crisis Boosts Moldova’s Pro-Russians, But Corruption Real Threat.” Voice of America. 4 February 2016. Web. Accessed: 13 February 2016. 35 John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Rebecca Chamberlian-Creanga, “Divided Space, Divided Attitudes? Comparing the Republics of Moldova and Pridnestrovie Using Simultaneous Surveys.” Eurasian Geography and Economics Vol. 52 No. 2 (2013) 23.

Georgia: The Civil War and the August War

Background: The Collapse of the USSR and the Georgian Civil War

The origins of the violent Georgian Civil War can be traced back through the history of the Soviet Union to the development of relations between Georgia, its large minorities - the Abkahzians and Ossetians - and the Russian interplay with these relations. During the Russian Civil War, the Red Army used a largely Ossetian force to launch its initial invasion of Georgia in 1920. After the Soviet victory over the

Menshevik Georgian government, South Ossetia was given the status of Autonomous

Oblast. Abkhazia, for its part, was granted the status of “Socialist Soviet Republic” in

1921, a unique and somewhat ambiguous status greater than that of an ASSR but not reaching the union-level constituent status of Georgia within the Soviet Union. Ten years later under Stalin, SSR Abkhazia was absorbed into the Georgian Soviet Socialist

Republic as an Autonomous SSR, a downgrade from its previous status.

Throughout the Soviet period, Abkhaz leaders called for various forms of increased autonomy from Georgia as well as attempts to join the RSFSR. Each time, the

Soviet government declined this request and instead delivered packages of economic aid and political benefits to the Abkhaz, helping to build their political capital in the Abkhaz region, despite being outnumbered by Georgians. This caused resentment to build among the Georgians, who saw Soviet policies as favoring the Abkhaz despite Georgia being of the superior level of Union Republic.36

As the Soviet Union stagnated in the l970’s and 1980’s, Georgian nationalism began to rise as a replacement for the failed Marxism-Leninism of the Soviet Union.

36 Vincent M. Artman, “‘Passport Politics:’ Passportization and Territoriality in the De Facto States of Georgia.” 2011. 36.

Unlike Moldova, Georgia could trace its history as a nation back thousands of years, long before the arrival of the Russians and the Soviet Union. Nationalist tensions in Georgia reached a boiling point in April 1989, when Soviet troops killed 20 people and wounded thousands during a protest in Tblisi. Georgian elites, including the local Communist

Party, began agitating for Georgian independence from the Soviet Union.

Georgia’s president, Zviad Gamaskhurdia, led a political coalition that defeated the Georgian communists in 1990, taking control of the Georgian government. A referendum in March 1991 showed over 90% support for independence from the Soviet

Union, and Georgia declared independence shortly thereafter on April 9, 1991. As in other Soviet republics declaring independence, national minorities began to fear for their status under a new Georgian state. In August 1991, the Georgian Supreme Soviet decreed that Georgian would be the sole language spoken by the Georgian government, sparking a harsh reaction from the Abkhazian leadership.37 As Nalbandov notes in his discussion of ethnic conflicts,

“The mere fact of existence of Abkhazian autonomy gave Georgian authorities sufficient grounds to consider these ethnic minorities as threatening their right to self- determination as nations…Hence, the zero-sum nature of the forthcoming conflict: while Georgian were concerned with the territorial integrity of their nation-state, Abkhazians were fighting for their very existence as a nation.”38

Gamaskhurdia proved a controversial leader in Georgia, with strong opposition building against him in the Georgian Supreme Soviet and the national guard. After several instances of violence against opposition protesters and raids against the offices

37 Alexei Arbatov et al, Managing Conflict in the Former Soviet Union: Russian and American Perspectives. (Cambridge, MA: Center for Science and International Affairs, 1997) 374-375. 38 Robert Nalbandov, Foreign Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts. (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2009) 85-86.

opposition leaders, Gamaskhurdia was overthrown by the national guard in December

1991. The new government, eventually headed by former Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard

Shevarnadze, faced the immediate challenge of resistance from Gamaskhurida supporters, as well as growing tensions in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Yeltsin, for his part, largely supported Gamsakhurdia’s initial rise to power; he saw Gamsakhurdia as a potential ally in his ongoing political struggle against Gorbachev and the Soviet center. This support may have emboldened the Georgia leader into believing he would not face resistance in his nationalist policies and sometimes harsh tactics to force South Ossetia and Abkhazia to remain within Georgia. As with

Transnistria, Vice President Alexander Rutskoy began expressing solidarity with the

South Ossetian cause against the Georgians, going as far as to call the Georgian actions genocide.39 As the conflict in Russia’s Chechnya escalated (drawing the majority of

Russian political and military resources and attention) and as it became clear that Russia might be able to use separatism in former union republics as leverage against new states,

Yeltsin began to shift his position towards a more favorable policy concerning the South

Ossetian and especially Abkhazian separatist movements.

Violence in South Ossetia continued from early 1991 through June 1992. The

Georgian government accused Russia of aiding both separatist factions by sending arms and allowing volunteers from Russia to join the separatists. The small South Ossetian militias acquired weapons from military depots across the border in North Ossetia, part of the RSFSR. Although small, the boost from the Russian side of the border was enough to prevent the disorganized Georgian forces from regaining control of the South Ossetian

39 Id. 366-367.

capital of Tskhinvali, leading to a ceasefire on June 24, 1992. The war had resulted in the displacement of over 20,000 Georgians from South Ossetia and - by some estimates - the flight of over 100,000 South Ossetians into North Ossetia in Russia.

The height of the conflict in Abkhazia ranged from August 1992, when Abkhazia declared its independence from Georgia, to late 1993. Unlike South Ossetia, Abkhazia benefited significantly from Russian military intervention. Russian equipment was supplied to the Abkhazian forces, and Russian aircraft bombed Georgian positions.

Volunteers from Russia, including several cossack battalions, rushed to Abkhazia to join the separatist ranks. However, as in Transnistria, the chain of command and the autonomy of individual Russian army units still stationed in Abkhazia at this time remained nebulous, and thus Russian military support of Abkhazia can hardly be described as being part of a calculated campaign.

Although the Georgian military had initial success in driving back Abkhaz forces in mid 1992, a temporary ceasefire negotiated in Moscow allowed Abkhaz forces to regroup and launch a series of devastating counterattacks in the winter of 1992. The resurgence of pro-Gamsakhurdia rebels, known as Zviadists, further complicated the situation for the Georgian government, turning the conflict into a multi-front war for

Tblisi. With Russian air support overhead, Abkhaz forces took Sukhumi, the capital of

Abkhazia, in late 1992, destroying the Georgian forces there and reportedly committing numerous atrocities against Georgians in the city.40 The fall of Sukhumi effectively ended the conflict in Abkhazia’s favor, although sporadic fighting continued.

40 United States Department of State, Country Report on Human Rights Practices, 1993, pg. 887-891.

Russian troops entered the region in late 1993 and 1994 under the auspices of a peacekeeping mission directed by the newly formed Commonwealth of Independent

States. While Georgia accused the Russian force of being essentially an occupying army that only served to further propagate the violation of Georgia’s territory, it could do little to dislodge the Russian presence. While Yeltsin’s regime refrained from recognizing the independence of Abkhazia or South Ossetia from Georgia - in a manner similar to its treatment of Transnistria - there can be little doubt that the Russian military’s involvement in the conflict generated the conditions that made de facto independence possible for the two regions.

Between the Wars

Tensions between the two separatist regions, Georgia, and Russia remained low from 1993 until the August War in 2008, with three notable exceptions. In 1998,

Abkhazian forces confronted Georgian militias in Gali District of Abkhazia. The brief war led to the expulsion of another 30,000 to 40,000 Georgians from Abkhazia, dwindling the Georgian population in the region to near zero. Georgian President

Shevardnadze refrained from deploying regular Georgian forces for fear of escalation, causing more nationalist elements in Georgian politics to grow angry with the regime’s acquiescence to what was effectively Abkhazian ethnic cleansing. Just a few years later in 2001, Georgian insurgents (backed by Chechen militants who had been displaced by

Russia’s victory in the Second Chechen War) again confronted Abkhazian forces, but were defeated in the outskirts of Sukhumi by Abkhazian and Russian troops.

After the Rose Revolution in 2003 that brought Mikheil Saakashvili to power, the

Georgian government began a series of attempts to bring the separatist regions back under the control of Tblisi. Bolstered by success against separatists in Adjara (a southwestern region of the country), Saakashvili turned his attention to South Ossetia in

2004. Georgian troops entered the region in an attempt to crackdown on illegal trafficking, but were detained by South Ossetian forces. The Georgians were eventually released and withdrew, but President Saakashvili blamed the ongoing tensions on Russia.

The Russian Duma responded by blaming Georgia for the escalation and stated that

Russia had the right to protect Russian citizens in the breakaway regions of Abkhazia and

South Ossetia if they felt threatened by Georgia.41

During the 1990’s and 2000’s, Russia began issuing passports to Russians living outside the Russian Federation. This process, later described as “passportization,” has played an increasing role in Russia’s policy towards Russian diaspora and other

“compatriot” populations in former Soviet republics. Initially, this process only involved ethnic Russians who found themselves living outside the boundaries of the Russian

Federation at the fall of the Soviet Union. Russia’s later passportization campaign - in the years and months leading up to the 2008 August War, granted Russian passports to

Ossetians and Abkhazians in Georgia, and was heavily criticized by the Georgian government from 2002 onward.42

41 О ЗАЯВЛЕНИИ ГОСУДАРСТВЕННОЙ ДУМЫ ФЕДЕРАЛЬНОГО СОБРАНИЯ РОССИЙСКОЙ ФЕДЕРАЦИИ “О СИТУАЦИИ НА КАВКАЗЕ." 5 August 2004. Web. Accessed: 7 March 2016. 42 Artman, “Passport Politics,” 52-53.

The August 2008 War

By the year 2008, the vast majority of South Ossetians held Russian-issued passports.43 Throughout the period leading up to the 2008 War, Georgian President

Saakashvili had warned of Russian provocations and artificial roadblocks preventing the peaceful reintegration of South Ossetia (and to a lesser extent, Abkhazia) into Georgia proper. Russia, while still maintaining a small military presence within Georgia's borders as part of the peacekeeping force created after the Georgian Civil War, saw its ability to use military strength to affect Georgian policy decline throughout the early 2000’s. As a remedy to this problem, the passportization of Ossetians and Abkhazians living in

Georgia provided Russia with personal jurisdiction over a large body of people living inside Georgia.44 It should be noted that the tactic of using control of political identity as a means of projecting power over people has its origins in the Soviet Union; David

Shearer notes that “Despite the existence of other means of documenting identity, the passport system became the primary means by which Soviet officials defined the social and ethnic composition of Soviet society, the degree of loyalty of different populations, and the geographic distribution of these populations.”45

Diaspora politics are often complicated, involving critical questions of population transfer, repatriation, and even territorial integrity. Post-Soviet Russia has been uniquely positioned to use the political identity of Russian diaspora populations as a tool of political power over its former Soviet neighbors. Russia’s status as a “federative” republic of the USSR - the acknowledgement that it was unique among the 15 constituent

43 Reuters, “Factbox: Scenarios for Georgia’s South Ossetia Crisis.” 11 August 2008. Web. Accessed: 15 December 2016. 44 Artman, Passport Politics, 105. 45 David Shearer, Policing Stalin’s Socialism: Repression and Social Order in the Soviet Union, 1924- 1953. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2009) 245.

state in that it was home to numerous national groups rather than just a few - has allowed it to manipulate the boundaries of the “Russian World” in a way that is politically advantageous. Furthermore, the presence of North Ossetia just across the Georgian border in the Russian Federation helped build a Russian case for the granting of passports to South Ossetians. In the Georgian Civil War, Russian volunteers and cossacks associated with the Confederation of Mountain Peoples of the Caucasus also played a role in linking the fates of Abkhazia and South Ossetia to Russia.

The immediate series of events leading up to the August War in 2008 remains a major source of dispute between the combatants as well as international observers. The

Russian version of events is relatively simple - Georgian troops attempted to regain control of South Ossetia through military force and fired indiscriminately at civilians and

Russian peacekeepers in the region. Russia was then forced to react by sending in regular military forces to protect the population - most of whom now had Russian passports - and

Russian peacekeepers who were badly outmatched by Georgian forces. Russia described it’s actions using the language of humanitarian intervention which had become quite popular in the post-Cold War world, seeking to draw parallels to prior NATO actions in

Kosovo, among other locations. Georgia’s version of events reveals a more nuanced perception of the conflict triggers and catalysts; South Ossetian militias had intensified their activities in the days leading up to the war, setting off car bombs and attacking

Georgian troops and police. Georgia then responded by launching a military operation towards the South Ossetian capital of Tskhinvali in order to quell the violence.46

46 Vicken Cheterian, “The August 2008 War in Georgia: From Ethnic Conflict to Border Wars.” Central Asian Survey Vol. 28 No. 2: 161-162.

After the disputed beginning of the conflict on the night of August 7th/8th, the situation became clearer. Russia responded with overwhelming force, pushing Georgian troops out of South Ossetia. Russian forces also landed in western Georgia along the

Black Sea coast, supported by Abkhazian paramilitaries. Russian troops occupied the

Georgian city of Poti, while Abkhazian troops ejected the last Georgians from the Kodori

Gorge area of Abkhazia. Moving south from South Ossetia, Russian forces pressed onward into Georgia-proper, occupying the Georgian city of Gori and pressed east along the road towards the Georgian capital of Tblisi. Russian President Medvedev and

Saakashvili agreed upon a ceasefire on August 12, under the auspices of the European

Union, ending the brief but violent confrontation.

The August War featured a major Russian information- and cyber-war campaign in the days leading up to, during, and after the violence had abated. Russia sought to use misinformation to slow down the Georgian and international reaction to the conflict and assign blame for the conflict to Georgia. The use of this type of information warfare reflected a new dimension to Russian military action in the former Soviet space. While the events of the Transnistria occurred prior to the Internet age and in the context of the process of the Soviet Union’s collapse, the August War in 2008 was covered on an up-to- the-minute basis by international media. Russia’s actions were largely condemned by the international community, and its subsequent recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia as sovereign and independent states were rejected by all by a handful of states. The international community rejected Russia’s claim of a humanitarian intervention and largely recognized the passportization campaign as an egregious overstep of the

customary right to protect citizens abroad.47 However, the information campaign was successful in that Russia exercised significant control of the narrative regarding blame for the hostilities. Georgian president Saakashvili received criticism for launching a reckless campaign to re-establish Georgian control of South Ossetia by force, and post-war reports on the conflict by the EU, Human Rights Watch, and others laid blame on both sides for human rights violations.4849

Aftermath and Political Status

The peace plan agreed upon by Russia and Georgia included a provisions for the withdrawal of Russian and Georgian forces to their pre-war bases and positions and discussions on the “lasting security” of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Russian forces slowly withdrew from Georgian territory, but significant Russian forces remained in the territory of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, now completely free of Georgian authority.

Russia recognized the two separatist regions as independent states on August 25, 2008 and proceeded to conclude bilateral agreements with them that allowed Russian forces to remain on a permanent basis. Georgia, the European Union, and most states around the world continue to consider the two regions as Russian-occupied territories within the internationally recognized boundaries of Georgia.50

47 Francis Grimal and Graham Melling, “British Action in Libya 2011: The Lawful Protection of Nationals Abroad?” The Denning Law Journal Vol. 23 (2011): 174. 48 European Union, “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.” Volume I. September 2009. 49 Human Rights Watch, “Up in Flames: Humanitarian Law Violations and Civilian Victims in the Conflict over South Ossetia.” 2009. 50 Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin, “Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State.” 6- 7.

International monitoring of the post-war situation has been difficult due to

Russian obstruction. Russia vetoed the continuation of the OSCE mission in Georgia, its mandate expiring in January 2009. In June of that year, Russia vetoed the extension of the United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia, which had been in place since the end of the Georgian Civil War. The European Union Monitoring Mission, deployed to monitor the EU sponsored ceasefire, has continued to operate in Georgia since 2008 but has not been granted access to Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Exemplifying continued concerns about human rights violations, particularly related to the expulsion of Georgians from Abkhazia and South Ossetia during and after the war, the International Criminal

Court (ICC) in January 2016 authorized an investigation into crimes committed against civilians. The investigation is significant in that it is the ICC’s first investigation launched outside of Africa.51 Crucially, although Georgia is party to the ICC’s founding Rome

Statute, Russia is not. The ICC is thus only legally authorized to investigate crimes committed on Georgian soil. Given Russia’s claims that Abkhazia and South Ossetia are now independent states, and Russia’s past obstruction to international monitoring in the region, it remains to be seen how the ICC will proceed.

In late 2014, the Russian Federation and South Ossetia agreed to a “Treaty of

Alliance and Integration, which serves as the current legal basis for the eventual accession of South Ossetia to Russia.52 Ossetian leaders have expressed a desire to integrate their region into the Russian Federation on numerous occasions, drawing on a narrative that the Ossetian people are a “divided” nation, thus the solution would be for

51 International Justice Resource Center, “International Criminal Court Authorizes Investigation of 2008 Georgia-Russia Conflict.” 3 February 2016. Web. Accessed 15 February 2016. 52 Maia Otarashvili, “Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia.” Foreign Policy Research Institute. February 2015. Web. Accessed 15 February 2016.

South Ossetia to join with Russia and form a united “Republic of Ossetia-Alania” within the Russian Federation. A referendum has been slated for April 2017 for the South

Ossetian people to decide on the issue.53

Summary Analysis of the Case – Georgia

While the official reports of numerous organizations tend to spread the blame to multiple parties to the conflict, there are many that claim the August War was the result of a longstanding and premeditated Russian strategy to invade Georgia.54 Those asserting this viewpoint point out that the Russian presence in Abkhazia and South Ossetia between the

Georgian Civil War and the August War served to maintain the status quo until Russian leaders felt the time was right to make a more assertive push. They also point out the numerous incidents between Russia and Georgia in the early 2000’s, from airspace violations to allegations of spying and economic warfare. What is clear is that – as in the conflict in Transnistria – the use of Russian forces fundamentally changed the balance of power, particularly with regard to the Georgia-South Ossetia theatre. Russian forces not only prevented Georgia from re-establishing control over the breakaway regions, but also defeated the Georgian military in a way that destabilized the regime and led to the downfall of Mikheil Saakashvili.

After the reopening of trade between the two countries in 2013, prospects for rapprochement seemed to expand greatly. Even in light of the Ukrainian conflict, which will be discussed below, Georgians have shown decreasing hostility towards Russia in

53 “Breakaway Tskhinvali Proposes Name Change: New Name Emphasis South Ossetia as Part of Russia.” The Agenda. 29 December 2015. Web. Accessed 15 February 2016. 54 Marcel H. Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism (Plymouth, United Kingdom: Bowman and Littlefield, 2014) 205-218.

recent years. Although Russo-Georgian relations are by no means restored to pre-war levels, survey data shows that Georgians have warmer feelings towards political parties that favor rapprochement with Russia.55 This shift, although not yet impacting Georgian politics in a major way, represents the continuation of Russia’s media and information campaigns in Georgia after the August War.56 As in Moldova, Russia appears to have succeeded both in acquiring a client breakaway state, as well as continuing to retain influence over the politics and geopolitical orientation of the parent state in the years after the cessation of armed conflict.

55 Michael Hikare Cecire, “Yes, Putin may be starting to win Georgia away from the West. Here’s why that matters.” The Washington Post. Web. 25 January 2016. Accessed: 15 February 2016. 56 Michael Hikare Cecire, “It’s time for the West to stop taking Tbilisi for granted.” Foreign Policy. Web. 9 March 2015. Accessed: 15 February 2016.

Ukraine: Unexpected Crisis

Background: Soviet Ukraine, the Search for Identity, and Euromaidan

Along with the Russian, Byelorussian, and Transcaucasian Soviet Socialist

Republics, Ukraine was one of the founding members of the USSR in 1922. Ukraine served as the agricultural heartland of the Soviet Union, providing the majority of the

Union’s grain resources. During the 1930’s, Ukraine was subject to the Holodomor, a severe famine resulting from Soviet collectivization policies under Stalin. While few reliable estimates from the time period exist, modern experts believe anywhere between 2 and 8 million died during the famine, with at least 1 million deported from Ukraine to

Siberia or the Central Asian regions of the Soviet Union. The famine vastly changed the demographic makeup of Ukraine, effectively destroying the rural agrarian peasantry.

During the Soviet period, Ukrainian SSR saw its borders change multiple times, at first losing its western regions in the treaty of Brest-Litovsk that saw Soviet Russia’s withdrawal from World War I only to gain these lands back in the Molotov-Ribbentrop that preceded World War II. Ukraine gained further western territories after the Soviet victory in World War II, gaining nearly 11 million new inhabitants who had previously lived in Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Romania. Ukraine received its final territorial addition in 1954 when the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, backed by Nikita Khrushchev, transferred the Crimean Peninsula from the RSFSR to Ukraine. At the time, the transfer was largely an administrative matter, however it did increase Ukrainian SSR’s ethnic

Russian population by over 1,000,000 and placed the critical Soviet Black Sea Fleet within Ukrainian territory. Just a few years earlier over 200,000 Crimean Tatars had been deported from Crimea to Uzbek SSR in Central Asia, further homogenizing the peninsula

as a sphere of Russian dominance, with the population having changed from 33%

Russian in 1897 to 71% Russian in 1959.

Like the rest of the Soviet Union, Ukraine was subject to the Soviet nationality policies of the 1960’s aimed at building one unified Soviet people (Sovetskii narod). The

Khrushchev regime and those that followed into the 1980’s emphasized the Soviet

Union’s approach to the final stage of communism, in which all of the Soviet people would be united and equal, without class or national distinctions. During the 1980’s,

Ukraine was deep in Soviet stagnation and was only reached by Gorbachev’s perestroika policies near the end of the decade. Ukraine’s conservative communist leaders opposed

Gorbachev’s reforms, but were unable to stem the tide of Ukrainian nationalist demonstrations originating from Lviv in the west. The more conservative Ukrainian east, however, remained relatively quiet.57 In 1990, Leonid Kravchuk ascended to the

Ukrainian Rada chairmanship. Kravchuk, hailing from Ukraine’s west, pursued a moderate policy towards Ukraine’s non-communist opposition groups. As the economy continued to stagnate, support for nationalist movements increased and was not met with the traditional repression experienced in Ukraine’s Soviet past.

In 1991, over 92% of Ukrainians voted for Ukraine’s independence from the

Soviet Union, dealing what many see as the final death knell to the 70 year old state.58

This strong message from Ukraine, the second most populous republic of the Union, made it clear that the USSR’s days were numbered. As the Soviet center crumbled,

Kravchuk played a key role in the political dissolution of the Union, working with

Russian President Yeltsin and Belarusian President Lukashenko to facilitate the

57 Rajan Menon and Eugen Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine: The Unwinding of the Post-Cold War Order (Boston, MA: MIT Press, 2015) 13-14. 58 Serhii Plokhy, The Last Empire, 292-294.

dismantling of the USSR. The three leaders met in Belavezha, Belarus in December

1991, where they agreed dissolve the Soviet Union and form the Commonwealth of

Independent States.

Although Ukrainians were nearly unanimous in their desire for independence from the crumbling Soviet Union, the country struggled to develop a strong national identity during the years immediately after its independence. As Korostelina notes,

“independent Ukraine inherited an unfinished process of nation-building complicated by historic, cultural ethnic, and linguistic differences between regions.”59 The underlying contestation and ambiguity of Ukraine’s national identity deeply affected its domestic and foreign policies during the 1990’s and 2000’s. While Ukraine’s first two presidents -

Leonid Kravchuk and Leonid Kuchma - sought to balance Ukraine between Europe and

Russia, the country’s third president, Viktor Yushchenko, sought to orient Ukraine firmly towards the west. Yushchenko rose to power as a result of the Orange Revolution, a series of protests and strikes that resulted from allegations of vote rigging and corruption surrounding the 2004 presidential elections. After the initial vote, pro-Russian Viktor

Yanukovych finished with a narrow plurality, defeating Yushchenko by around 3%. The protests eventually led to calls for a re-vote, this time with a major international monitoring presence, in which Yushchenko received a majority vote of 52%. The Orange

Revolution received a negative reaction in eastern Ukraine - which largely favored

Yanukovych - as well as in neighboring Russia, which had expended considerable resources in attempting to secure the presidency for Yanukovych.

59 Karina V. Korostelina, Constructing the Narratives of Identity and Power (Plymouth, UK: Lexington Books, 2014) 68.

Yushchenko sought to root out the corruption that many Ukrainians perceived as the primary issue facing the country in the post-Soviet era. Other contentious issues also needed resolution, including the status of Russia’s naval base at Sevastopol in Crimea, the home of the Russian Black Sea fleet, a holdover from the Soviet era. Although

Crimeans, like the rest of Ukraine, had voted for independence from the USSR in 1991, the region was home to the largest percentage of Russians in the country and maintained deep and meaningful ties to Russia. Sorting out the status of the lease on the base, which in 1997 had been extended for an additional 20 years to 2017, remained a sensitive issue for Ukraine-Russia relations.

Yushchenko also sought to develop a true national identity for Ukraine while maintaining positive relations with both Europe and Russia. Yushchenko pursued better relations with the European Union and openly discussed the future possibility of NATO membership, something deeply concerning to not only Russia, but also many eastern

Ukrainians and Crimeans, who were not part of Yushchenko's traditional base of support in western and central Ukraine.60 The divisions between eastern and western Ukraine extended beyond the realm of political parties, but also into linguistic, socioeconomic, and cultural affairs. The Donbass region of eastern Ukraine had a higher percentage of

Russian speakers, was more industrial than western Ukraine and thus had deep ties to

Russia through exports, and generally observed more Russian and Soviet-style holidays than those in western Ukraine, where cultural affinity to Poland and central Europe was more common.61

60 Rajan Menon and Eugen Rumer, Conflict in Ukraine, 39-41. 61 Korostelina, Identity and Power, 72-73.

By 2010, the economic and political change Ukrainians had hoped would result from the Orange Revolution failed to materialize and Viktor Yanukovych was elected - this time in free and fair elections - largely due to strong support in eastern Ukraine and

Crimea. Yanukovych pursued much warmer relations with Russia, elevating the status of the Russian language and renewing Russia’s lease on the naval base at Sevastopol another 25 years to 2042. Meanwhile, corruption continued in Kiev and many Ukrainians became disillusioned with the political process entirely as the economy continued to stagnate.

Despite developing closer ties with Russia, Yanukovych initially tried to maintain positive relations with Europe. His administration continued talks with the European

Union regarding an Association Agreement - a series of trade deals that were considered very preliminary steps towards eventual European Union membership. Moscow was deeply opposed to the possibility of Ukraine joining the EU and flooding Russia, through its bilateral agreements with Ukraine, with European goods. Instead, Moscow pressed

Ukraine to join its Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, the nascent stage of the developing Eurasian Economic Union (EEU).62

After years of difficult negotiations, Ukraine seemed on pace to sign the series of agreements with the European Union in late November 2013. However, President

Yanukovych abruptly changed course on November 21, suspending talks with the EU, and less than a month later accepted a massive aid package from Russia to address

Ukraine’s impending budgetary crisis. Menon and Rumor note that the size of the aid package - 15 billion US dollar in addition to highly favorable rates on Russian gas -

62 Menon and Rumor, Conflict in Ukraine, 63-64.

seems to indicate that Moscow was serious about resolving the issue of Russia-Ukraine relations and Ukraine’s overall status in terms of westward or eastward orientation.63

The abrupt about-face from Yanukovych “shocked the people of Ukraine out of their political apathy and brought them out into the streets.”64 The protests, named

Euromaidan as they were based in Kiev’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti, the site of the 2004

Orange Revolution protests, attracted hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians from all over the country, though most protesters were from Kiev and the western regions. The government responded with force, deploying heavily armed police and special forces personnel to deter and break up the protests. Culminating in mid-February 2014, the violence claimed the lives of over 100 civilians, with thousands more injured. As the situation deteriorated, the Yanukovych administration agreed to new elections later in the year and a restoration of the 2004 Constitution, which significantly diminished the powers of the president. However, continued violence and the increasing momentum of the protestors led Yanukovych to flee Ukraine on February 21, 2014. Yanukovych’s

Party of Regions ruling coalition collapsed, and a new government was formed, pledging to carry out the demands of the Euromaidan protesters.

From Protest to War: Crimea and Donbass

One of the first acts of the new Ukrainian government was to propose a bill to repeal a Yanukovych-era law that permitted individual regions in Ukraine to declare

Russian as their second official language alongside Ukrainian. Many ethnic Russians in eastern Ukraine and particularly Crimea perceived this negatively, fearing that the new

63 Id. 78. 64 Ibid.

government would favor those who spoke Ukrainian as their favored language and begin promoting a type of Ukrainian nationalism that would be incompatible with their values.

Anti-Maidan protests erupted in Crimea on February 25, while paramilitary forces began to seize key locations across the peninsula. Protests and counter-protests continued in

Sevastopol and Simferopol throughout the next week, eventually resulting in the formation of a new Crimean government with heavy influence of political parties favoring a union with the Russian Federation.

Earlier that week, on the night of February 23, Russian President Vladimir Putin and his military staff held an emergency meeting in which they formulated plans to

“return Crimea to Russia.” Although the details remain unclear, it is likely that Russian military forces began working with local paramilitary groups to seize control of

Ukrainian military positions on the peninsula during the following week. By March 1,

2014, the Ukrainian government in Kiev had effectively lost control of the Crimean

Peninsula.65

The new Crimean government organized a referendum on the status of the region, giving voters only two choices; returning to the 1992 Crimean Constitution (essentially declaring the peninsula an independent state) or acceding to the Russian Federation.

Voters were not giving a choice to maintain the status quo. The referendum, held on

March 14, 2014, was highly contested and lacked robust international oversight.

Nevertheless, Crimean and Russian media reported that an overwhelming majority - over

90% of voters - had voted to join the Russian Federation. An accession treaty was signed on March 18 and ratified three days later. Throughout the annexation process, numerous

65 Id. 83.

Ukrainian units and even some high ranking military officials in Crimea defected to the

Russian Federation, with some notable exceptions of Ukrainian units refusing to stand down in the face of Crimean militias backed up by Russian troops.66 Although the annexation was bloodless, it further destabilized the provisional government in Kiev and stoked fears of further confrontation as tensions rose in eastern Ukraine, where anti-

Maidan protesters had gained some momentum.

The situation in Ukraine’s easternmost provinces - Donetsk and Luhansk - continued to deteriorate in late March and into April, 2014. While anti-Maidan protests had occurred in a wide swath of cities stretching from Odessa in the southwest to Kharkiv in the northeast, the anti-government activities in the eastern regions were more organized and featured increasing violence. Militant groups, possibly supplemented by

Russian paramilitary forces, seized government buildings in Donetsk and Luhansk in late

March. By early April, the militant groups had established control of significant portions of the provinces and were pushing westward towards Sloviansk, in northern Donetsk province. The Ukrainian provisional government initiated an “anti-terror operation,” deploying regular military forces to the east, eventually halting the militant advance. The

Ukrainian army gained momentum through the early months of summer, but were halted in their advance eastward as Russia increased its supported for the separatists, who had organized themselves into the “Union of People’s Republics,” or Novorossiya, a confederation of the self-declared Donetsk and Luhansk People’s Republics.

In August 2014, numerous Russians, declared by Moscow to be “volunteers,” as well as cossacks and Russian servicemen on leave, entered Ukraine, supported by

66 BBC News, “New Head of Ukraine’s Navy Defects in Crimea.” 2 March 2014. Web. Accessed: 20 February 2016.

Russian artillery and armor from the Rostov military district. The Russian intervention had the effect of reversing the Ukrainian effort to regain control of the region. Morale in the Ukrainian forces was dangerously low, with several Ukrainian military units sent east as part of the “anti-terrorist” operation defecting to the separatists.67 Russian support allowed the separatists to reach a stalemate with the Ukrainian military, leading to the first Minsk Protocol, a ceasefire signed on September 5, 2014. The Protocol, which also called for OSCE monitoring of the Russia-Ukraine border and elections in the separatist regions in accordance with Ukrainian law, largely failed to stem the tide of violence and quickly collapsed during the winter of 2014-2015. The agreement was replaced by the

Minsk II protocol on February 11, 2015.

The days immediately following Minsk II saw a brutal separatist assault close a

Ukrainian salient at the town of Debaltseve in clear violation of the agreement. But after the conclusion of fighting around Debaltseve, the intensity of the conflict saw a significant decrease. Minsk II, which called for the removal of heavy weaponry from the frontlines and the restoration of Ukrainian control of the border, thus proved to be more effective than the first Minsk agreement. War weariness and the continued stalemate over the winter had slowed down momentum on both sides of the conflict. Furthermore, the

Novorossiya political project initiated by the leaders of Donetsk and Luhansk had failed to develop into the type of proto-state that formed in other separatist regions of the former Soviet Union such as Transnistria or Abkhazia.

While the Minsk II agreement has notably decreased the intensity of violence, regular ceasefire violations continue on an almost daily basis. The conflict has produced

67 Alexander Marquardt, “Ukraine’s Offensive Falters as Elite Units Defect to Pro-Russia Side.” ABC News. 16 April 2014. Web. Accessed 20 February 2016.

nearly 1,300,000 internally displaced persons, over 300,000 refugees, and claimed nearly

10,000 as of January 2016.6869 Citing Russia’s annexation of Crimea and continued support of separatists in eastern Ukraine, the United States and European have introduced several rounds of sanctions on Russia’s economy and key Russian officials. The sanctions have had a measurable impact on the Russian economy, decreasing Russian access to foreign capital and exposing weaknesses in the lack of diversity in the Russian economy, but have yet to result in any significant changes of the facts on the ground in

Ukraine.70

Summary Analysis of the Case – Ukraine

Few could have predicted in the winter of 2013, as Viktor Yanukovych prepared to change the course of Ukrainian foreign and trade policy, that Ukraine would soon head down a course leading to revolution and war. The confluence of numerous socioeconomic, political, and sociological processes created the circumstances necessary for Russia’s intervention and successful annexation of Crimea as well as the de facto independence of the small section of eastern Ukraine governed by separatists. Ukraine’s west was in fact uniquely divided from Crimea and the east before Euromaidan, but this divide was much more nuanced than was often reported in the western media.

Many observers have chosen to focus on the “linguistic divide” between

Ukraine’s northwest, where Ukrainian is most commonly identified as a first language

68 European Commission Humanitarian Aid Fact Sheet: Ukraine. December 2015. 69 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Operational Update: 20 January - 9 February, 2016. 70 Richard Connolly et al, “Sanctions on Russia: Economic Effects and Political Rationales.” Chatham House Russia and Eurasia Programme Summary. 30 June 2015, 2.

and the southeast, where Russian is usually the language of choice for Ukrainians.71

However, opinion survey data collected after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the War in Donbass reveal a more nuanced view of attitudes in Ukraine. In a survey taken in April 2014, eastern Ukrainians displayed the least trust in the Kiev government, with

67% saying the government had a “bad influence” on the way things were going in

Ukraine at the time, while 60% of those in the western regions of Ukraine said the government was in fact a “good influence.” Further, 40% of people and 61% of Russian speakers in the east believed that Kiev should recognize the results of the independence referendum in Crimea, compared to only 11% of the population in the west. This data seems to illustrate the stark divide between east and west that many have spoken of.

However, when it comes to separatism, Ukrainians are largely united. Results showed that 93% of western Ukrainians and 70% of eastern Ukrainians wanted Ukraine to remain united. Only in Crimea did a majority (54%) want Kiev to allow regions to secede.

Notably, 91% of Crimeans surveyed thought the independence referendum was free and fair and 92% felt that Russia was playing a positive role in Crimea.72

Research conducted in all regions of Ukraine except for separatist Donetsk,

Luhansk, and Crimea further supports the contention that although Russian-speaking and eastern Ukrainians have less trust in government than their western compatriots, support for Russia’s intervention and a more Russian-oriented Ukraine remains low. A plurality of eastern Ukrainians blame Russia for the conflict (33%) and fully 70% of eastern

Ukrainians view Russia as a threat. On the issue of Donbass independence, 51% believe

71 Max Fisher, “This is the one map you need to understand Ukraine’s crisis.” The Washington Post. 24 January 2014. Web. Accessed: 20 February 2016. 72 Pew Research Center. “Despite Concerns About Governance, Ukrainians Want to Remain One Country.” Global Attitudes and Trends. 8 May 2014.

the separatist regions should remain part of Ukraine as they were before the crisis, with another 33% saying they should be granted greater autonomy within a reformed Ukraine.

Only 6% of Ukrainians surveyed supported the two separatist regions becoming independent or acceding to Russia.73 Further survey research, performed by the

International Republican Institute in the Donbass regions not occupied by separatists, found 75% of respondents in favor of the region remaining part of Ukraine, with only

10% favoring any form of union with Russia for all or parts of the region.74

Though the conflict remains ongoing, it remains unlikely that Russian-backed separatist forces will be able to make major inroads into the areas of Donbass remaining under Ukrainian government control. However, options remain limited for the Ukrainian government in terms of returning the separatist regions to Ukrainian control. Unable to match Russian military might and lacking commitments from western powers, Ukraine has largely been forced to pursue a stalemate with Russia and the separatists it backs in

Donetsk and Luhansk.

73 Pew Research Center. “NATO Publics Blame Russia for Ukrainian, but Reluctant to Provide Military Aid.” Chapter 3: Ukrainian Public Opinion. 10 June 2015. 74 International Republican Institute, “Public Opinion Survey: Residents of Ukraine, November 19-30 2015.”

Discussion of Findings

Drivers of Russian Foreign Policy

The examination of cases above has demonstrated that Russian military intervention in post-Soviet has had a decisive impact on the course of conflict and subsequent attempts at reconciliation. Russia’s use of force in former Soviet republics has led to a great deal of speculation over the past two decades about the true motives of Russian leaders with regard to Russia’s regional and global ambitions. Below I will examine ethno-nationalism as a possible explanation for Russian military intervention in post-Soviet states.

Nationalism

Russia’s intervention in Ukraine beginning in 2014 has often been described by observers in nationalist terms.75 Russian rhetoric about protecting ethnic Russians living in Ukraine from rising Ukrainian nationalist seems to many to be confirmation of this. Russian rhetoric from Putin’s Kremlin has also led to evaluation of Russia’s previous foreign policy under Putin as being decidedly nationalist. Many have also pointed to Russia’s internal wars in the North Caucasus, where Putin’s regime used overwhelming military force against Islamist separatists in Chechnya, as an example of the Kremlin’s pursuit of ethnic nationalism through the use of force. Commentators have often attempted to tie this supposed nationalistic influence on Russian foreign policy with a desire of post-

Soviet Russian leaders to rebuild either the Russian Empire or the Soviet Union, in a form of “new Russian imperialism,” driven by nationalist, or even neo-fascist

75 Paul Goode, “How Russian Nationalism Explains - And Does Not Explain - the Crimean Crisis.” The Washington Post. 3 March 2014. Web. Accessed: 26 February 2016.

ideologies.76 However, an examination of Russian foreign policy decision making surrounding the three cases featured in this paper reveals that this is not the case.

Moldova

Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian

Federation, Russian leaders were forced to invent an entirely new foreign policy for a new state. As seen in the case study of the Transnistrian War, this led to often confused and conflicting messages from the Kremlin regarding Russia’s foreign policy course.

Indeed, several leading figures, including Vice President Alexander Rutskoy openly espoused nationalist views on Russian foreign policy. Rutskoy urged the Supreme Soviet to pass a resolution effectively calling for Transnistria’s independence and made public statements about reuniting restive Crimea with the Russian Federation.77

In addition to major public figures like Rutskoy, the early post-Soviet period saw strong nationalist tendencies from both the LDRP and the KPRF, two groups that formed what Jackson calls a loose coalition of “fundamentalist nationalists” in the first years of

Russian Federation foreign policy.78 This group viewed the collapse of the Soviet Union as negative, was concerned that Russia was surrounded by enemies, and focused on taking steps to build a “greater Russia” that more accurately reflected Russia’s historical cultural aspirations. Along with the fundamentalist nationalists, Jackson also identifies

“pragmatic nationalists” as another early group in Russian foreign policy thought. This group had less radical views about the creation of a greater Russia, but strongly

76 Van Herpen, Putin’s Wars: The Rise of Russia’s New Imperialism, 1-6. 77 Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS, 96. 78 Id. 35.

advocated for the protection of the Russian diaspora population and the importance of

Russia’s continued status as a great power. These two groups, while certainly not monolithic, roughly align with Tsygankov’s “nationalist hardliners” and “balancers,” respectively.79

During the initial stages of the Transnistrian War, President Yeltsin and the

Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) took a largely neutral approach. Unprepared to confront a major escalation of the conflict and far more concerned with the deteriorating situation in Chechnya, the Yeltsin administration attempted to refrain from stoking tensions in Moldova. The Russian MFA even attempted to reprimand Alexander

Rutskoy for his nationalist comments on Transnistria. However, the increasing entanglement of the 14th Army in the conflict, particularly the escalation at Bendery, led to a more nationalistic tone gaining at least some traction, even in the cautious MFA. The

Supreme Soviet supported active Russian involvement in the conflict and placed blame on the MFA for not taking stronger action to support the Transnistrians. In the weeks after Bender, Rutskoy openly stated that Transnistria could be absorbed into Russia and the Supreme Soviet even sent a complaint to the CSCE that genocide against the

Transnistrians might be taking place in Moldova.80

The appointment of Alexander Lebed to command the 14th Army in Transnistria in June 1992 also expanded the nationalist influence on the discourse surrounding the conflict. Lebed actively campaigned to maintain and increase the Russian military presence in Moldova, and openly spoke of the need for Russia to build a new form of the

Russian Empire or Soviet Union. Although Lebed moderated his tone as the violent phase

79 Andrey Tsygankov, Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity (London, UK: Rowman & Littlfield, 2016). 80 Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS, 98.

of the conflict came to an end, his influence on the foreign policy discourse was significant in that it shifted the narrative away from the cautious and gradual escalation favored by Yeltsin and closer to the more aggressive perspective of Rutskoy and the

Supreme Soviet.

Although Lebed’s often aggressive tone seemed at first to bolster those in

Moscow who advocated for aggressive policies of reintegration with former

Russian/Soviet domains, Author Edward Ozhiganov points to a more nuanced view of

Lebed’s role. He notes that Lebed’s initial actions - and strong nationalist rhetoric - were linked to two key audiences; the Moldovan government and his own officer corps. Lebed demonstrated to the Moldovan leadership that the 14th Army would respond with overwhelming force if attacked in Transnistria. On the other hand, Lebed demonstrated to his officer corps - the vast majority of whom were inhabitants of Transnistria as mentioned above - that he was firmly in command of the situation and would defend their interests in the conflict. Lebed’s strong leadership and aggressive rhetoric legitimized him in the eyes of the Transnistrians; somewhat counter intuitively, this actually led to stabilization of the conflict as the 14th Army ensured that the flow of weapons to

Transnistrian provocateurs diminished and the Moldovan forces became reluctant to launch attacks that might invoke the 14th Army’s response.81

While it is clear that the nationalists did have some influence on Russian foreign policy during the Transnistrian War, it is important to note that much of the nationalist rhetoric veiled more rational-interest concerns. As Jackson notes, “many Russian politicians began to believe that the emotional issue of Russian-speakers in the near

81 Arbatov, Managing Conflict in the former Soviet Union, 182.

abroad could be used to score points domestically, and this was combined with a growing current of dislike for Yeltsin and his overall policies,” which were seen as too liberal and in support of Western (and therefore anti-Russian) worldviews, particularly by the communists and members of the LDPR.82 Indeed, Alexander Lebed’s success in

Transnistria led him to enter politics, eventually running against Yeltsin in the 1996

Russian presidential election.

Georgia

With regard to Russia’s involvement in the military conflicts in Georgia - both the

Civil War and the 2008 August War – some nationalist discourse was present in foreign policy discussions, but the presence of nationalism in the foreign policy dialogue was not as strong as it was during the discussion on Russian action than in the Transnistrian War.

The presence of a Russian diaspora population in Georgia in 1992 was very limited.

Moreover, although the Russian units based in Georgia at the outset of the conflict had ties to the local populace, these ties were comparatively not as strong as those of the 14th

Army to Transnistrian society.83 Abkhazia did have historically close ties with the

Russian/Soviet center, as discussed in the case study above, however the linkages between Russia and Abkhazia were more economic and geostrategic than ethno- nationalist. The small Russian diaspora in Abkhazia was not a dominant group, nor was it at risk by rising nationalism of another group that might result in perceptions of anti-

Russianism. Russian fundamentalist nationalists such as Gennady Zyuganov of the KPRF did express public support for the Abkhazians, but discussions in Moscow focused on

82 Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS, 97. 83 Id. 114.

Russia’s strategic interest in the security of the Caucasus region as a whole, particularly in light of the rising violence across the border in Chechnya and Ingushetia.84

The communist controlled Supreme Soviet also advocated for Russian support of the South Ossetian cause, again drawing contrast with the more neutral line of the Yeltsin administration. During the collapse of the Soviet Union and the transformation of the political center in Moscow from a Soviet to a Russian one, Yeltsin feared close association with South Ossetia, which he viewed as a communist stronghold similar to

Transnistria. In his efforts to destroy the Soviet Union from 1990-1991, Yeltsin had allied with Georgian President Gamsakhurdia against Gorbachev, who had been using the prospect of Ossetian secession as leverage to keep Georgia in the union. However as the conflict in Georgia spiraled, especially after Gamsakhurdia’s replacement by

Shevardnadze, Yeltsin was forced to shift towards tacit support greater Ossetian and

Abkhazian autonomy, if not outright secession.85 This change reflected pressure from nationalist elements in the administration and the Supreme Soviet, but was more likely the result of growing security concerns in the Caucasus region as a whole. The importance of the North Ossetians as allies against the separatism of Chechnya caused

Yeltsin to take a softer tone towards South Ossetia. Although the Russian Federation’s official position was that Georgia’s sovereign territory included both Abkhazia and South

Ossetia, it continued to support greater autonomy for the two regions within Georgia until the 2008 war.

Russia’s rhetoric surrounding the 2008 war focused on self-determination,

Georgia aggressiveness, and an appeal to principles of human rights. While appeals to

84 Id. 115. 85 Arbatov, Managing Conflict in the former Soviet Union, 367.

these concepts were generally rejected by the international community (with the possible exception of Georgian aggressiveness, which has been demonstrated in post-conflict analysis86), it is important to consider how nationalism may have played into Russia’s foreign policy calculus leading up to the conflict. In the years preceding the conflict,

Russia officially supported Georgia’s territorial integrity, but through the passportization campaign Russia began to include Abkhazians and Ossetians in the universe of peoples considered “compatriots” and even Russian citizens. March calls this a result of

“civilizational nationalism,” an aggressive form of ethno-nationalism. While acknowledging the security concerns of Russia related to Georgia at the time of the conflict, March contends that:

“Russian domestic discourse had increasingly framed the conflict in such a way that Moscow felt it had no option but to respond with such a hard line. In this, Russian civilizational nationalism played a direct role in provoking domestic sentiments which the Kremlin felt it had to respond.”

Despite the emphasis March places on the role of nationalism in the 2008, he caveats this by later stating that “historically extreme nationalism has rarely directly driven Russian conduct; rather the elite attempts to manipulate it for its own ends and to suppress it when it becomes destabilizing,” further noting that, “Since 2008, Russia has once again tried to move its foreign policy towards a more pragmatic, interested-based policy.87 This contextualization of nationalism compliments Laruelle’s analysis. She notes the major limits of the cooptation of nationalism into foreign policy, identifying that nationalist groups can gain “entry” into the foreign policy discourse as the Kremlin is

86 European Union, “Independent International Fact-Finding Mission on the Conflict in Georgia.” Volume I. September 2009. 87 Luke March, “Is Nationalism Rising in Russian Foreign Policy.” Demokratizatsiya 2011, 187.

forced to consider Russia’s role as a “regional hegemon, its strategic security, and its domestic scene.” But as we will continue to see below with the Ukrainian crisis, Laruelle points out that these nationalist narratives are “often produced simultaneously or a posteriori, and therefore are more a product than a cause of foreign policy action.”88

Ukraine

Nationalism has been one of the most common narratives used to explain the

Ukrainian crisis from the outset of Russian intervention in early 2014. As early as March

2014, Paul Goode identified three main narratives about Russia’s intervention in Ukraine that focused on nationalism. He noted that the dominant narrative focused on Russian

President Vladimir Putin’s “irrational” behavior as being motivated by Russian national and primordial ties to Russians in Ukraine and specifically Crimea. Goode points out the weakness of this explanation in that Russia has never intervened explicitly on behalf of

Russian diaspora populations in the post-Soviet area. As demonstrated above, while nationalist rhetoric was present in both the Transnistrian and Georgian conflicts, these interventions were ultimately not framed in terms of protecting diaspora populations by the Russian leadership. A deeper look into the events leading up to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, we can see that Putin’s request to the Federal Assembly used the term

“compatriots” to describe the people of Crimea, in a similar fashion to the legal documentation on the war in Ukraine.89 The Federation Council’s resolution on intervention used the term rossiiskii narod, a more broad conception of what it means to

88 Marlene Laruelle, “Russia as a ‘Divided Nation,’ from Compatriots to Crimea: A Contribution to the Discussion on Nationalism and Foreign Policy.” Problems of Post-Communism Vol. 62 (2015) 96. 89 “Владимир Пытин Внёс Обращение в Совет Федарации.” 1 March 2014. Kremlin.ru. Web. Accessed: 28 February 2016.

be “Russian,” rather than russkii, which has been used frequently (but not exclusively) to refer to ethnic Russians.

The second major narrative surrounding Russian nationalism in Ukraine focuses on Russian imperial revision, tied to the ideology of “Eurasianism,” promoted by

Alexander Dugin, Alexander Lukin, and others. However, both Goode and Laruelle note that we should not overstate the influence of Eurasianism on official Russian policy.

Dugin and other Eurasianist thinkers do not have major influence in the Kremlin and we have not seen Eurasianism codified in any Russian policies or referenced in Russia’s justifications of its actions in Ukraine.90 Eurasianism also fails to account for Russia’s lack of intervention in other post-Soviet states in attempts to rebuild the Russian Empire or Soviet Union. The Eurasian Economic Union, as well, remains nebulous in its goals and faces challenges in integration.

A third narrative about nationalism in the Ukrainian crisis, favored by Goode as a partial explanation over the first two, involves the concept of Ukraine as a “nationalizing state.” In parallel with Hale’s emphasis on “points of personal reference” in the development of identity, Ukraine’s nationalization, through the events of Euromaidan, brings new relevance to the role of Crimean (and to a lesser extent, Donbass) Russians as national minorities. Throughout the conflict, Russian press emphasized the nationalist elements of the Euromaidan revolution, such as the militant Azov Brigades and the role of the Ukrainian nationalist Svoboda party in the new Ukrainian government. By identifying the new government in Kiev as radical, Russia could then perpetuate the

90 Marlene Laruelle, “Eurasia, Eurasianism, and the Eurasian Union: Terminological Gaps and Overlaps.” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 366 July 2015.

narrative that Russians in Ukraine would be subject to abuses by the state and were in need of protection.91

However, as Laruelle points out, the mere fact that there were Russians in

Ukraine was not the driving factor behind Russia’s actions in Ukraine. She states;

“As seen from the Kremlin’s perspective, it was because of Maidan that Ukraine lost Crimea and faced civil war, not because it hosts part of the divided Russian ‘cultural body.’ Kazakhstan, too, hosts important Russian minorities, but so long as the Nazarbayev regime plays according to Moscow’s rules, the nationalist argument will not apply to it.”

The case of Kazakhstan - as well as Estonia and Latvia - the other former Soviet states hosting key Russian minorities - will be examined later in this discussion. Here it is simply important to demonstrate that the use of nationalism has been employed by Russia during or after the onset of conflict the cases examined in this study as a post hoc explanation rather than an underlying motivator of Russian action.

The Geopolitics of Security Dilemmas: Driver of Russian Foreign Policy

If Russian foreign policy has not been motivated by nationalism or purely domestic concerns in these situations, what then has driven Russian involvement in these conflicts? As we have seen, Russia has largely refrained from large-scale military operations outside of its borders and only in 2015 in Syria did Russian forces venture outside of the former Soviet Union in a significant combat role for the first time since the fall of the USSR.

91 Paul Goode, “How Russian Nationalism Explains - and not explain - the Crimean Crisis.” The Washington Post. 3 March 2014. Web. Accessed 28 February 2016.

An important consideration in this section is the temporal gap between the conflicts in question; Russia’s involvement in Transnistria and the Georgian Civil War took place as the Soviet Union was collapsing as these conflicts were frozen by the mid

1990’s. A gap of nearly 15 years followed until the 2008 Russia-Georgia War, which was followed six years later by Russia’s intervention in Ukraine. Looking at the first two wars, Russia already had forces on the ground in both Moldova and Georgia. These conflicts took place in the context of the new Russian state’s initial development of a foreign policy posture. Former enemies of the Yeltsin administration in Transnistria and

South Ossetia soon became potential allies when it became evident that these groups could be used to gain leverage over their parent countries. This approach was largely pragmatic, but it also allowed Yeltsin to co-opt some of the more nationalist elites in

Moscow who were advocating for a more proactive approach to Russian diaspora populations. As Laruelle has noted, the Kremlin has appropriated “topics that were previously considered the domain of nationalist circles and coopted them into its official narrative.”92 Therefore, Russian foreign policy may incorporate nationalist narratives in an instrumental way; this serves two key purposes, one of which has already been alluded to. First, it is effective in containing potential domestic nationalist opposition to the regime. This has been the case in the Yeltsin and Putin regimes; nationalists have remained marginalized from Russia’s the discourse and have largely acquiesced to

Russia’s foreign policy direction. Secondly, incorporating nationalist narratives is an effective after-the-fact explanation of Russian action.

92 Laruelle, “Russia As A Divided Nation,” 95-96.

Furthermore, the nationalist undertones – specifically relating to protecting

Russian diaspora populations or even other members of the “Russian World” of ethnic groups – represent an attempt to tie Russian military intervention to modern norms in the international system. The Russian media narrative surrounding the 2008 war in Georgia focused on making the “Kosovo connection” on two major prongs. First, the Russian position was that the Kosovo intervention carried out by NATO against the Federal

Republic of Yugoslavia set a precedent not only for military intervention to protect civilians from atrocity, but also that it established a precedent for the forcible detachment of a territory associated with civilians of a particular ethnic group from a threatening parent state. In a 2006 statement directed at the Georgian government, Russian Foreign

Minister Sergei Lavrov stated, “The right to self-identity is part of international law that is exercised via the expression of will.”93 Russian leaders appealed to the United Nations

Charter and the vaguely articulated “responsibility to protect” principle that was at the time developing as a result of a largely Western-driven norm-building process. Russian

President Medvedev, seeking to situate Russia’s military intervention and eventual recognition of South Ossetia and Abkhazia as independent, stated in August 2008 that,

“There was a special situation in Kosovo, there is a special situation in South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. Speaking about our situation, it is obvious that our decision is aimed at preventing genocide, the elimination of a people, and helping them get on their feet.”

Being careful not to articulate a precedent that might threaten Russia’s territorial integrity, Foreign Minister Lavrov followed up with a statement that, because regions

93 Alexei Makarkin, “How is South Ossetia Different from Kosov?” RIA Novosti. 9 June 2006. Web. Accessed: 5 March 2016.

such as Chechnya and Dagestan had welcomed international terrorists, they did not merit the same opportunity for independence.94

Russia employed similar rhetoric with regard to the conflict in Ukraine, again linking its actions to established norms of humanitarian intervention and self- determination. More specifically, President Putin stated that Russia had a responsibility to protect its “compatriots” in the Crimean Peninsula. He also emphasized that Russia had not intention of seizing more Ukrainian land but would act to protect Russians in

Ukraine, thus attempting to draw a connection between the possibility for any future action and Russia’s responsibility to protect. In his address to the Russian people on

March 18, 2014, President Putin referred to Russia’s responsibilities both to “Russian citizens” and “Russian speakers in Ukraine.”95 In another public statement, he declared that the Crimean government had requested Russian forces to “ensure the safety…of

Russian citizens living on Crimean territory.”96 In these statements, Putin attempts to couch the protection of Russian citizens abroad inside the norm of responsibility to protect and the general prohibition on crimes against humanity based on ethnicity, race, or nationality. Finally, Putin stated that Russia had conducted an “emergency public opinion poll” prior to the Crimean referendum to ascertain the will of the Crimean people.97 This statement again ties Russia’s actions to international norms regarding separatist movements, with Putin attempting to demonstrate that Russian action was the

94 Clifford C. Levy, “Russia Backs Independence of Georgian Enclaves.” The New York Times. 26 August 2008. Web. Accessed 5 March 2016. 95 “Address by the President of the Russian Federation.” 18 March 2014. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/20603. Accessed: 5 March 2016. 96 “Putin: Russian Citizens, Troops Threatened in Ukraine, Need Armed Protection.” RT News 1 March 2014. Accessed: 16 December 2015. 97 Carol J. William, “In Film, Putin Justifies Russia’s Seizure of Crimea Last Year.” The Los Angeles Times. 15 March 2015. Web. Accessed: 5 March 2016.

result of a process of self-determination rather than an aggressive attempt to alter the situation in Ukraine.

In addition to these appeals to legitimacy, Russia had issued numerous passports to Russian speakers in Crimea, echoing its previous policy towards Ossetians in Georgia.

Aside from a lack of evidence that any real threat existed, and the fact that a “request” from a sub-national government does not reach the standard for consent to use force in international law, Russia’s response – to annex territory – was clearly a violation of the proportionality principle that has been demonstrated as being part of the right to protect citizens abroad.

The extensive justification and legitimization campaigns conducted by Russia surrounding the 2008 war in Georgia and its 2014 intervention in Ukraine reveal that

Russian leaders felt compelled to couch Russian action in the terms of international norms about sovereignty and human rights. These norms, particularly those regarding humanitarian intervention, have only developed since the mid to late 1990s. Thus, we did not see similar legitimization campaigns during Russia’s interventions in Moldova and

Georgia in the early 1990’s. Moreover, western powers were less concerned about

Russia’s power in the international system during the early 1990’s and expressed far less apprehension about Russia’s involvement in post-Soviet conflicts at the time. Western concerns about nuclear proliferation and further instability in the former USSR also led to a general acquiescence to Russian involvement post-Soviet conflicts, as it was seen as a potentially stabilizing force. Thus, in the early 1990’s Russian action in the former Soviet

Union was generally ignored or only given lip service by the international community.

Finally, the Russian military’s success in contributing to the freezing of the conflicts in

Moldova and Georgia in ways that served Russian interests in the former Soviet Union seemed to confirm to the Russian elite that using military force could prove an effective tool in the future.98

Given the preconditions established in the 1990’s and Russia’s greatpowerness reassertion under Vladimir Putin, the Russian leadership had a formula to implement when opportunities arose in Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014. The importance of the

Russian elite’s “learning process” in the early 1990’s conflicts and the overall pragmatic approach to pursuing Russian interests in the former Soviet Union should not be understated when considering Russian actions in 2008 and 2014. As demonstrated by

Jackson, dominant ideas about Russian foreign policy “matter significantly in ‘non- routine’ situations.”99 In each of the cases examined in this project, Russian policymakers were forced to adapt to rapidly changing and ambiguous situations, confronting unanticipated events on the ground in each country.

In each of these cases, Russian military intervention forced a situation in which

Russia would be directly involved with the resolution of the underlying conflict. The

Russian interventions in these countries ensured that the separatist conflicts in question would not be resolved but would instead become frozen, allowing Russia to “activate” them in the future if opportunities arose. In this strategy, Russia can use nationalist narratives such as the protection of Russians abroad to legitimize military campaigns that are actually directed at changing the behavior of parent state governments. Therefore, we can say that three key elements are necessary to establish the conditions for Russian military intervention.

98 Jackson, Russian Foreign Policy and the CIS, 175-176. 99 Id. 180.

Latent Support Among a “Russian World” Population

Russia has only used military force in the former Soviet Union in regions of states that have populations with at least some latent support for Russian intervention. With the possible exception of the Donbass in Ukraine, support for greater autonomy was clearly present in the separatist regions in each of the countries examined in this study prior to the onset of the most intense violence. The latent support among the population contributes to each of the other two factors as well; support among a “Russian World” population allows for the opportunity to provoke a crisis and also decreases the amount of resources the Russian military must devote to operations on the ground through the use of local militias and paramilitaries.100 Processes such as passportization help to manufacture the baseline level of latent support, creating what Artman calls “Russian spaces” within the internationally recognized boundaries of other states.101 As Hale states, “the politics of separatism is fundamentally about shaping regional beliefs regarding the nature of the

(potential) Central government.”102 Russia is most likely to have influence over these beliefs in areas where there is already a latent connection – primarily through a Russian world identity but also economic and political connections.

Potential Entry Point for Russian Intervention

President Putin stated that Russian leaders were developing the plan to seize

Crimea in the days prior to the abdication of Viktor Yanukovich, indicating that there was at least some measure of pre-planning. However, it is likely that while Russia had

100 Alexander Lanoszka, “Russian Hybrid Warfare and Extended Deterrence in Eastern Europe.” International Affairs Vol. 92 No. 1: 182-183. 101 Armtan, “Passport Politics,” 122. 102 Hale, Foundations of Ethnic Politics, 72.

contingencies in place to seize the peninsula, Russia would not have acted upon them in the absence of a crisis in Ukraine.103 In the other cases, an existing separatist conflict provided a pre-existing opportunity to manufacture an entry point. In Moldova and

Georgia in the early 1990’s, the Russian military was already present in the conflict zones. Significant Russian involvement in these conflicts also began after the outbreak of hostilities. In the 2008 war, one of the arguments made by Russian officials was that

Russian peacekeepers had been killed by Georgian bombardments.

Opportunity Cost

Finally, each of these conflicts has featured a relatively low opportunity cost for

Russia. The cost of military involvement has been relatively inexpensive, partially through the employment of local militias and smaller units, key elements of the hybrid warfare strategy. By entering the conflict during times of crisis in the parent state, Russia has limited the amount of force it needed to apply to effect major change on the situation on the ground. Russia’s initial involvement in Transnistria and the Georgian Civil War involved units already deployed to the region, the 2008 war in Georgia ended in a decisive defeat of the Georgian military at the hands of a relatively modest Russian deployment, and the annexation of Crimea in 2014 was completed without firing a shot.

Even the War in Donbass, which has featured significant casualties and destruction to infrastructure, has required such a minimal commitment of Russian forces that international observers still struggle to verify the presence of Russian troops in the region.

103 Menon and Rumor, Conflict in Ukraine, 83.

A More Comprehensive Picture of Russian Military Intervention

With these three factors present, Russia can then engage in a military intervention in former Soviet states with minimal costs and a high probability of success. As we have seen in the cases examined in this study, Russia has been able to engineer ethnic separatist conflicts in former Soviet states in a way that limit the universe of foreign policy options for parent states – such as precluding the accession of Ukraine or Georgia to NATO. Russia can also use these conflicts during future crises for leverage both against the parent state in question and against the state’s international backers and allies.

Finally, Russia’s success in achieving significant leverage for minimal cost in these conflicts represents a geopolitical victory over its western adversaries, contributing to

Russia’s greatpowerness reassertion.

The frozen nature of these conflicts and the creation of a socio-psychological infrastructure of conflict that can reinforce ethnic prejudices against the titular population of the parent state is a useful side-affect of Russian action. As Russia strengthens ties between the separatist enclaves and Russia-proper, the populations become increasingly dependent on Russian economic and political support. Thus, the existential conflict with the parent state becomes tied to Russian involvement, further strengthening the separatist population’s identity ties to Russia. One’s position on Russian involvement and Russia’s role in preventing reintegration with the parent state can then become an important point of reference in determining identity.

Intervention and Identity: The Effect on the Ground

While we have seen through an examination of case studies and Russia’s foreign policy context that nationalism remains a marginal driver of Russian foreign policy, how have Russian interventions affected nationalism and identity in the countries in which

Russian forces have played an active role in conflict? Returning to Henry Hale’s discussion of ethnicity in The Foundations of Ethnic Politics, we find that ethnicity serves a series of personal points of reference on which humans rely on to make sense of the social world.104 Groups, such as ethnic groups, are thus defined by their collective relationship to these points of reference. Moving on to the interaction between these points of reference and events taking place in the social world, Hale states, “Personal points of reference, groups, or categorizations, therefore, become “thicker” when they come to have greater importance in people’s lives, when people’s lives are seen to be affected in more significant ways by the referent.” In other words, when events occur that highlight the importance of a particular point of reference, such as language, home locale, or socioeconomic status, to name a few, these points become more meaningful.105

Further, given that ethnic group politics are driven by calculations of self-interest, we must ask how Russian military intervention, or a change in the nature of Russia’s involvement in a conflict, might affect the decisions made by ethnic groups.106 Russian intervention can serve as a powerful “critical juncture” for ethnic groups. Drawing from constructivist literature on identity, “critical junctures” are defined as situations that pose

“significant political challenges to a group that is likely to undermine beliefs in other

104 Hale, The Foundations of Ethnic Politics, 34. 105 Id. 36. 106 Id. 52.

sectors an, ultimately, impose an internal debate on the basic elements of a groups identity.” Although ethnic elites make rational-choice decisions at these junctures that, as

Hale states are not “inherently ethnic,” these decisions can have a lasting impact on the set of preferences defining the identity of groups.107 Russian intervention and the information warfare often associated with Russian hybrid war tactics plays into the internal process of group identity formation. A visible Russian presence on the ground and constant Russian propaganda through the media can reorder the reference points that people use to determine identity; on a large scale this can have a potentially major impact on the identity perceptions of a group.108

Moldova

With these crucial aspects of ethnicity in mind, we can now ask how might

Russian military intervention play into the development of these personal points of reference, thus altering a group’s perception of its own identity. In Moldova, we saw the critical role of the connections between the Soviet/Russian 14th Army in the

Transnistrian community. Interestingly, even if the 14th Army’s complicated participation in the Transnistrian War was partially the result of the personnel’s close ties to the region, its participation in the conflict from Bender onwards created the perception of overt Russian support for Transnistria. However, General Alexander Lebed’s efforts to reign in the activities of the 14th Army, particularly in preventing the flow of weapons to

107 Joseph Meyer, “Ethnic Conflict in the former Soviet Union: Ethnic Demography and its Influence on Conflict Behavior.” Scientia et Humanitas (Spring 2015). 108 Else Tulmets, East Central European Foreign Policy Identity in Perspective (New York, NY: Palgrave MacMillian, 2014) 26-27.

Transnistrian militias, also had the effect of mitigating Transnistria’s ability to fight for its independence without Russian support.109

Turning to opinion research in Transnistria, surveys conducted in 2010 in

Moldova and Transnistria has revealed several interesting trends in public opinion about the current status and future of Transnistria. Research found that only about 15% of

Transnistrians favored joining Moldova, nearly 50% favored joining the Russian

Federation, with the remaining respondents supporting varying degrees of autonomy in

Moldova or total independence for Transnistria. In Moldova, over 50% supported the

Transnistria’s reintegration with Moldova, while less than 20% supported allowing it to join Russia.110 At first glance, this seems to reflect the presence of a stark divide between the two populations, dating back to the conflict. Continued Russian presence in the region, Russian subsidies and continued support for Transnistrian autonomy link the region strongly to Russia. Other scholars have also pointed to the efforts of elites in

Transnistria to promote Russian language and culture, drawing contrasts with Moldova.

Transnistrian culture puts important emphasis on military victories of the past, including the Soviet victory in World War II and the Transnistrian victory in the 1992 war. This has allowed the elites to craft a narrative of separation from Moldova that is tied to Russia.111

However, results of the 2010 survey also showed strong support for continued negotiations on the final status of Transnistria on both sides of the Dniester. Furthermore, the results of other questions - spanning from trust in government to outlook for the

109 Arbatov, Managing Conflict in the former Soviet Union, 182. 110 John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Rebecca Chamberlain-Creanga, “Divided Space, Divided Attitudes? comparing Moldova and Pridnestrovie Using Simultaneous Surveys.” Eurasian Geography and Economics Vol. 54 No. 2: 253. 111 Sebastian Muth, “Linguistic Landscapes on the other side of the border: Signs, Language, and the Construction of Cultural Identity in Transnistria.” International Journal of the Sociology of Language Vol. 5 (2014) Issue 227.

future - were strongly correlated not with ethnic identity but with socioeconomic status.

Lower income Moldovans and Transnistrians were more likely to share views on a broad set of question than they were with their wealthier counterparts of the same ethnicity.112

This reveals that two decades after the conflict in Transnistria, socioeconomic status may serve as a more useful rule of thumb in ordering people’s views about the world than ethnicity. Therefore, we can conclude that although Russian military intervention clearly had a decisive impact on the course of the conflict and the de facto independence of

Transnistria, the lasting impact on ethnic identity has been somewhat limited. Although

Transnistrian culture and society clearly displays an affinity to Russia, socioeconomic concerns remain the most meaningful predictor of preferences in both Moldova and

Transnistria.

Georgia

As in Transnistria, Russian military intervention had a decisive impact on the ability of the separatist regions Abkhazia and South Ossetia to proclaim de facto independence.

Unlike in Transnistria, recent (2010) survey results in South Ossetia reveal that ethnicity serves as a meaningful category in terms of predicting preferences. The history of forced migration in displacement in both South Ossetia and Abkhazia have led to deep-rooted negative feelings about Georgians. Furthermore, the borders between the two regions and

Georgia are militarized and nearly impermeable, in stark contrast to Transnistria’s border with Moldova, which sees regular commerce.113 The results show that regions that are

112 Id. 254-255. 113 John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal, “Inside the post-Soviet de facto states: A comparison of attitudes in Abkhazia, Nargorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.” Eurasian Geography and Economics Vol. 55 No. 5: 445-447.

ethnically mixed, such as Transnistria, feature generally more positive views of parent- state titular ethnic groups. Russian intervention can play an important role in this; the

2008 August War saw Abkhazia and South Ossetia effectively cleansed of the last remaining Georgian enclaves. Thus, Russia’s role in defeating the Georgian military and allowing Abkhazian and Ossetian forces to forcibly remove Georgians from their territory is likely to have a major impact on perceptions of Georgians in the two regions moving forward.

Research in Abkhazia has also shown that perceptions of internal legitimacy in de facto states are tied to the state’s state-building efforts. In particular, internal legitimacy is tied to perceptions of the state’s ability to “make it on their own in the international system.”114 This finding has significant ramifications for the implications of Russian military intervention. In states where the Russian military has been perceived as the only force capable of preventing a takeover by the original parent state, internal legitimacy may remain low. In South Ossetia, which was in danger of being overrun before Russian troops entered the region in support of local militias, support for integration with Russia remains high. When asked about attitudes towards the Russian presence in South Ossetia, over 80% of respondents answered that Russia was a key ally and must remain in South

Ossetia indefinitely.115 In Abkhazia we see much stronger support for independence rather than integration with Russia. In both the Georgian Civil War and the 2008 war,

Abkhazia held its own against Georgian forces (albeit with some Russian support). We see stronger perceptions of internal legitimacy and a unique identity in Abkhazia,

114 Kristin M. Bakke, John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Michael Ward. “Convincing State-Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia.” International Studies Quarterly Vol. 58 (2014) 602-603. 115 Gerard Toal and John O’Loughlin. “Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a de facto State.” Post-Soviet Affairs Vol. 29 No. 2: 164.

reflecting the perception that Abkhazia can operate more independently without the level of Russian support and influence present in South Ossetia. The relationship between

Russian military force, de facto state survival, and persisting legitimacy and identity is also relevant in Ukraine, discussed below, where the Donbass separatists were on the verge of total collapse before Russian intervention.

Ukraine

Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine operated in a similar way to that in South

Ossetia, in that it bolstered local armed groups that would have likely been defeated by the parent state. Also critical to Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has been the role of

Russian mass media in promoting particular narratives about the ongoing conflict.

Crimea and the Donbass have been effectively cut off from Ukrainian television stations and are now receiving broadcasts of Russian state media. These media stations promote the narrative of a corrupt, nationalist, and predatory Ukrainian government in Kiev. In this way, Russian media portrays Ukraine as an exploitative state that cannot be trusted by the citizens of Crimea and Donbass. Russia’s military intervention, which successfully detached Crimea from Ukraine and has prevented the Ukrainian military from reasserting control over the Donbass, has enabled the continued separation of the two regions from

Ukraine proper, a necessary condition for the perpetuation of narratives about the predatory nature of the regime in Kiev.

Researchers have noted that Russia’s ability to control the level of violence in the conflict could have a serious impact on social tolerance in both the separatist regions and

Ukraine proper. Survey research done in Ukraine after the onset of the crisis reveals that

xenophobic views hardened substantially in the separatist-controlled part of the Donbass region. Furthermore, acceptance of groups associated with Russia (Russians and Russian- speaking Ukrainians) has declined since 2013, representing the only group witnessing a decline in social acceptance. Moreover, more Orthodox Ukrainians have shifted their allegiance from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kiev Patriarchate since the beginning of the conflict.116 By fueling violence in Ukraine, Russia’s actions emphasize the importance of points of reference related to Russia, causing a thickening of these identity dimensions.

Although these changes have been observed in the two years since the

Euromaidan Revolution, it is difficult to predict how changes in the perception of ethnic identity will develop in the future, as the status of the conflict remains uncertain.

However, using the other two cases as a guide, we can make some predictions. Due to the present tensions, the borders between the separatist regions and Ukraine proper remain impassable, preventing the flow of people and information. If conflict resolution begins to gain traction, it is conceivable that the borders between Ukraine, the separatist regions, and Russia could become more porous. If border permeability increases, we should expect to see a decrease in the animosity between groups, as in Transnistria and Moldova.

With the economic and political situation in Ukraine remaining volatile, it is likely that socioeconomic concerns shared by Ukrainians living in the separatist regions and

Ukraine proper could become more useful as reference points than perceived ethnic or cultural affinity to Russia.

116 Mikhail Alexseev, “War and Sociopolitical Identities in Ukraine.” PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 392.

Connecting Russian Foreign Policy to Identity in the former Soviet Space

The discussion above has demonstrated that Russian foreign policy – motivated not by ethno-nationalism but by geopolitics – has driven interventions in post-Soviet states that allowed separatist regions to develop separately from their parent states in the post-Soviet era. This infrastructure of conflict, which likely would not have been constructed in the absence of Russian military forces. This important dynamic reveals a connection between Russia’s choice to intervene in these conflicts, however, notable differences between the separatist regions themselves remain. While Transnistrians,

Crimeans, and Donbass Russians speak Russian, participate in the reproduction of

Russian culture, and may consider themselves ethnically Russian, the Abkhaz and

Ossetians have distinct cultures and are clearly outside the boundaries of russkii narod, or ethnic Russians. The factor uniting these groups and making them successful targets for

Russian military intervention is a sense of connection to the “Russian world.” The

Russian world concept is critical both to the Kremlin as a tool of foreign policy and to separatists leaders as a medium to link their causes to Russia.

The “Russian World” In Russian Foreign Policy

It is important to emphasize here that the deployment of the Russian World concept by the Kremlin is not evidence of an ethno-nationalist strain in Russia’s foreign policy decision-making. While authors such as Agnia Grigas note that Russian policies towards compatriots abroad are “only means to a broader end,” many attempt to connect these policies to a sort of Russian nationalist, neo-imperialist revision.117 In her book

117 Agnia Grigas, Beyond Crimea: The New Russian Empire, (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press) 2016. 145.

Beyond Crimea, Grigas speaks of a process she describes as “Russian re-imperialization.”

Grigas identifies three factors whose presence increases the likelihood of Russian intervention that are similar to those discussed in this paper (1) a large and concentrated population of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians, (2) that population resides in territories bordering Russia, (3) the population is receptive to Russian influence.118 These criteria, while similar to mine, are too narrow in that they focus specifically on ethnic

Russians and Russian speakers. The focus on “Russianness” demonstrates that her criteria are drawn from an assumption that an ethno-nationalist or neo-imperialist narrative drives

Russian policy and influence in the former Soviet Union.

Grigas describes a seven-step process through which Russia executes its interventions in the former Soviet space, these steps are helpful in understand Russia’s efforts to gain leverage in post-Soviet states. She states that Moscow’s policy trajectory

“starts with (1) soft power and continues to (2) humanitarian policies, (3) compatriot policies, (4) information warfare, (5) ‘passportization,’ (6) protection, and finally (7) annexation.”119While this policy process is demonstrated in the case studies I have examined above, the analysis is driven by a perception that Russia is pursuing the reconstruction of its empire; Grigas states that “Moscow seems intent on uniting the

Russian diaspora and the territories where they reside under the flag of the Russian

Federation,” and that “reimperialization – either by regaining lost territories or by maintaining influence and sometimes regaining it where it has been lost – is the end-goal of Moscow’s policies.”120 While acknowledging that in a realist conception of

118 Id. 9. 119 Id. 10. 120 Id. 15-16.

international relations, states pursue maximization of power and resources, Grigas places too much emphasis on Moscow’s use of cultural and nationalist rhetoric, which, as I have demonstrated above, is used by the Kremlin only as a post hoc explanation of its actions in nearly all cases. Grigas accuses realists and constructivists of assigning the territory of

Soviet Union to Russia as a privileged sphere of interests, denying agency to states such as Ukraine as simply subject to Russian or western interests. However, Grigas’ view ignores the agency of actors on the ground in separatist states.121 The comprehensive analysis I have put forth acknowledges Russia’s perception of its own security dilemma, which is not to say that Russia has a privileged “sphere,” as much to say as it has a region of security concern. I also emphasize the importance of relationships between Moscow, former Soviet states, and separatist regions in the former Soviet Union as multidirectional.

While missing the mark on Russia’s use of nationalist rhetoric concerning compatriots, Grigas’ discussion of the universe of considerations that factor into Russian foreign policy – historical, internal political, economic, and otherwise – is a useful starting point for developing a more complete understanding of the way in which states operate. It reminds us that the realist school of international relations often does not explain the totality of circumstances contributing to state decision-making, pointing us in the direction of the international relations constructivism of Wendt and others.

Constructivism acknowledges that states act in pursuit of geopolitical interests, but declares that in order to understand a state’s conception of its own interests, we must

121 Id. 251.

understand the relationship between the state and external others.122 This relationship is what drives the connection between Moscow and separatist regions of post-Soviet states, creating a medium through which Russia can pursue its key interests of maintaining influence in the former Soviet Union and addressing its security dilemma. Although

Russia uses the concept of the Russian World in a flexible and instrumental way, the previous relationship the Kremlin had with the separatist entities examined in this project provide the basis for the transformation of the Soviet-era relations to the modern Russian

World relationship. Thus, we can acknowledge the importance of the pre-existing relationship in its utility as a tool to address Russia’s security dilemma.

Rather than exemplifying a drive to rebuild the Russian Empire, compatriot policies and the concept of the Russian World in Russian foreign policy serve the critical purpose of replacing the Soviet Union in Russian public diplomacy. As Laruelle notes, just months after the fall of the USSR in 1992, Russian politician Yevgeny Ambartsumov criticized the country’s lack of a clear policy for the former USSR, stating that, “as the internationally recognized successor to the USSR, the Russian Federation should base its foreign policy on a doctrine declaring the entire geopolitical space of the former Union be the sphere of its vital interests and should strive to achieve understanding recognition from the world community of its special interests in this space.”123 This quote exemplifies an approach in which the Russian World replaced the Soviet Union, conceptually, politically, and culturally. The Russian World provides an updated version of the relationship these separatist entities had with Moscow during the Soviet period.

122 Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics, 239-240. 123 Marlene Laruelle, “The ‘Russian World:’ Russia’s Soft Power and Geopolitical Imagination.” Center on Global Interests. May 2015. 9.

As shown above, Russia has approached peoples it includes in the Russian World pragmatically, rather than from a standpoint of ethno-nationalism. State organs executing

Russian foreign policy in the former Soviet spaces have rarely referenced the concept outright, instead speaking broadly about “Russian compatriots.”124 Russia’s approach therefore does not call for a restoration of a new Soviet Union and does not “call into question the independence of Russia’s neighbors per se, but rather their geopolitical orientations.” Russia has supported compatriots as “an instrument of securing leadership in the territory of the Soviet Union,” rather than as a means to the re-imperialization described by those such as Herpen, Grigas, and others.125 Drawing from Laruelle again,

“in all its definitions, the Russian World is not ethnic but encompasses the Soviet legacy, the Russian-speaking, and Russia’s fellow travelers.”126

Given the circumstances described above (entry point, latent, support, and opportunity cost), the Kremlin can deploy the Russian World concept as a means of transforming its influence in the former Soviet Union. As Laruelle states,

“Soft power is developed in order to avoid having to use hard power, but it can also be articulated along with it, precede, or justify it. The Russian World concept does not depart from this ambiguity, and it has been used to justify the annexation of Crimea. Putin advanced many legitimizing points for the annexation: geopolitical, historical, and ethnic…Russia’s soft power in the Near Abroad can thus become hard.”

124 Id. 12. 125 Igor Zevelev, “Russia’s Public Policy toward Compatriots in the Former Soviet Union.” Russia in Global Affairs March 2008. Web. Accessed: 29 April 2016. 126 Laruelle, “The Russian World.” 23-24.

The “Russian World” In Separatist States

The Russian World concept also has value to elites in separatist states. The

Russian World presents a worldview to which ethnic elites can link their efforts to guide the identity of the separatist region. Separatist leaders can use the Russian World concept to replace the old attachment to the Soviet center. Each of the regions affected by Russian intervention had important connections to the Soviet center both prior to and during the

Soviet collapse. Whether military – such as in Transnistria and Crimea – economic, such as in Donbass, or a patronage style relationship such as Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the connections these regions had with the Soviet center became increasingly important as the Soviet Union collapsed. These connections, which initially led to conflict between the

Yeltsin regime and the separatists due to their support for hardline communists in

Moscow, began to transform as the Kremlin realigned its policy towards the near abroad, replacing the Soviet Union with the Russian World concept. While some of these connections were tangible – such as the Soviet/Russian military forces stationed in

Transnistria, Abkhazia, and Crimea – others were more cultural, such as the ties of South

Ossetians to their ethnic kin in North Ossetia within the boundaries of the Russian

Federation.

Separatist elites have used these connections in order to impress upon Moscow the acquiescence of their regions to Russian involvement. It is important to note here that the commitment of separatist leaders in Transnistria and Abkhazia to the CPSU was related not to an ideological attachment to communism, but to an acknowledgement that their regions would be safer, and that they themselves would be more likely to remain in power, if the Soviet Union was preserved. When it became apparent that this would not

be the case, the Russian World concept became the vehicle through which separatist leaders could drive their attachment to Moscow. This attachment would serve the same purpose as it did during the Soviet era – to protect and empower the region against the parent state.

In the years after the end of the conflicts, the connection to Moscow has been maintained and reinforced. Each separatist region relies heavily on Russian subsidies to provide public services. Russian media reinforces the connection through Russian- language programming and news in each of these regions, and the Russian military presence is visible Transnistria and in Crimea, where the Russian Black Sea fleet is based in Sevastopol. Separatist leaders continue to invoke the connection with Russia in order to portray their regions as valuable and loyal to Moscow. In exchange for this commitment and deference to Moscow on issues of conflict resolution with parent states, the separatist regions receive de facto status as parts of the Russian Federation through passportization, Russian social services through subsidies, Russian media, and – in the case of Crimea and South Ossetia – outright annexation.127 The Russian World concept builds and reinforces the socio-psychological infrastructure of separatist conflicts by creating a set of boundaries through which ethnic groups can define themselves against the titular ethnic group of their parent state. Russian information warfare and public diplomacy builds conceptual boundaries, while the Russian military presence constructs real physical boundaries, separating the separatist population from the parent state and creating a clear boundary between the Russian World and the outside world.

127 Otarashvili, “Russia’s Quiet Annexation of South Ossetia.”

Policy Implications

Implications for Other Post-Soviet States

Russia’s hybrid war strategy and the frozen conflicts it creates and maintains pose a significant policy challenge for the United States and NATO. Because these conflicts are orchestrated at relatively low costs to Russia and occur within the former Soviet space in which Russia can easily project force, western powers have limited options for physical deterrence in the region. However, it is also important to consider Russia’s three conditions for engaging in these types of campaigns in order to contextualize the gravity of the Russian threat, particularly as it relates to the possibility that Russia might launch a similar campaign in other post-Soviet states. In the months and years after the onset of the Ukrainian crisis, many have expressed concern about three former Soviet states containing the largest Russian diaspora populations. These two areas – the Baltic States and Kazakhstan – all share land boundaries with Russia and would be outmatched in a military conflict with Russia. In the discussion below I will examine the susceptibility of these states to a Russian hybrid war campaign.

The Baltic States

Estonia’s population of over 300,000 Russians makes up about a quarter of the total population of the country. The Russian population is heavily concentrated in the country’s northern and eastern regions, with the city of Narva in the extreme northeast serving as the cultural center of Russians in Latvia. Over 90% of Narva’s population is

Russian-speaking and the city maintains important linkages with Ivangorod across the border in the Russian Federation. Estonia’s citizenship laws, which require knowledge

the Estonian language and a pledge of loyalty to Estonia, excluded most Russians living in the country when it left the USSR in 1991. Although many Russians have acquired

Estonian citizenship in the years since the fall of the USSR, estimates indicate that over

7% of the population remained legally stateless as late as 2013.128 The Russian government has repeatedly criticized Estonia for its strict citizenship laws and used unresolved border issues between the two states as leverage over the Estonian government. The two states eventually agreed to a border demarcation treaty in 2014, but neither country has ratified the treaty as of the completion of this thesis.

Latvia is home to more than 500,000 ethnic Russians comprising of nearly 27% of the total Latvian population. Latvia’s Russian population was not immediately granted

Latvian citizenship upon its independence in 1991, with emphasis being placed on knowledge of the Latvian language as a pathway to citizenship. However, after some political maneuvering and the realization that the Russian minority would be a significant force in politics, Latvian citizenship laws were relaxed.129 In 2012, Russian parties collected enough signatures to launch a national referendum on subject of altering the

Latvian constitution to include Russian as a second official language co-equal to Latvian in legal status. The eventual vote showed that the general population was heavily opposed to increasing the status of Russian, with only the majority-Russian districts supporting the proposed changes. Notable controversy surrounded the referendum, as a significant portion of Latvia’s Russian population was ineligible to vote because they still lacked

Latvian citizenship. Nevertheless, there have been no major instances of violence between Latvians and Russians since the country’s independence.

128 Amnesty International, “Annual Report: Estonia 2013.” 23 May 2013. 129 Latvian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Basic Facts about Citizenship and Language Policy of Latvia and some Sensitive History-Related Issues.” 12 November 2015. Web. Accessed: 8 March 2016.

Lithuania, which is home to a much smaller Russian population, making up less than 10% of its population, borders Russia’s strategic Kaliningrad exclave to the west.

Lithuania’s Russian population is highly urbanized and more integrated than the diaspora populations in Latvia and Estonia to the north. However, Lithuania’s geographic location makes it an important transit route for Russia. Lithuania remains relatively secure in the absence of a crisis, but rising tensions in the Baltics could put Lithuania at greater risk due to Russia’s security concerns about access to Kaliningrad.

The crisis in Ukraine stoked fears that Putin would deploy the hybrid war model in the Baltic States in an attempt to provoke a crisis.130 There are some reasons to believe that Russia might pursue such a course, beyond the large Russian populations and relative power disparity between Russia and the Baltic states. Creating a crisis in one of the Baltic states would force NATO to make difficult choices about how to respond. Russia is well positioned to deploy irregular forces in the region or even launch a more conventional invasion before NATO could prepare an adequate response.131 However, there are a few key reasons why the Baltic states are not optimal targets for Russia’s hybrid war strategy.

Recalling the criteria for a Russian hybrid war campaign, the baseline of latent support among local Russian populations is not present in the Baltic States. Many Baltic

Russians, such as those living in Narva, Estonia have close relations with Russians living just across the border; however the economic benefits of EU membership serve as a

130 Max Fisher and Javier Zarracina, “How a crisis in Estonia could lead to World War III.” Vox News. 29 June 2015. Web. Accessed: 7 March 2016. 131 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics.” Rand Corporation 2016.

mitigating factor. Baltic Russians have stronger cultural and economic ties to their home countries and to the European Union than Russians in Crimea or eastern Ukraine.132

Moreover, the Baltic states are more politically stable than Ukraine, do not have existing separatist conflicts like Georgia or Moldova, and are members of the NATO security architecture. Thus, Russia would likely be forced to manufacture a political opportunity, rather than capitalizing on events internal to the target country. Unlike in

Ukraine and Georgia, where Russia retains leverage and influence over major political actors, Russia is unlikely to gain major influence over Baltic politics, even through the use of Russian diaspora politics.133 Although Russia might have initial success in deploying irregular forces along its borders with Estonia and Latvia, risking a direct confrontation with NATO forces would be a great risk and carry grave consequences.

Russia can continue to use the existing frozen conflicts in the former Soviet space – particularly those in Ukraine and Georgia – to gain leverage over the west without provoking a new crisis in the Baltics. The combination of the protection of NATO security architecture and the unreceptiveness of Baltic Russians to hybrid war tactics make the Baltics a relatively unlikely target for Russian aggressiveness.

Kazakhstan

Kazakhstan’s Russian diaspora population, which is almost exclusively concentrated in the northern regions bordering Russia, is the second largest in the outside of Russia after Ukraine. With over 3.7 million people in total, the diaspora makes up

132 Robert Person, “Baltic Russians Aren’t Pawns in Strategic Game.” The Moscow Times. 26 October 2015. Web. Accessed: 7 March 2016. 133 Robert Person, “6 Reasons not to worry about Russia invading the Baltics.” The Washington Post. 12 November 2015. Accessed: 7 March 2016.

almost a quarter of the population of Kazakhstan. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has maintained positive relations with the Russian Federation throughout his tenure, however relations between the Kazakh government and the Russian diaspora population have not been without tension. Although Russian is legally an “official” language in Kazakhstan,

Kazakh has gradually replaced it in government and other public spaces since the fall of the USSR. The Russian population in Kazakhstan, which in 1989 numbered over 6 million and was nearly 40% of the total population, dropped to only 23% of the population in 2009, and continues to decline today.134135 In the early 1990’s, some

Russians felt disenfranchised as Kazakhs were represented disproportionately in government. Others saw more economic and educational opportunities in Russia and left

Kazakhstan for their mother country.136

Nazarbayev has led Kazakhstan into Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and has carefully positioned Kazakhstan between Russia and the rising influence of China in

Central Asia on issues from security to energy. However, Russian leaders, including

Vladimir Putin, have stirred fears in Kazakhstan by commenting on the status of Russians in Kazakhstan after the Ukraine crisis. President Putin insinuated that Kazakhstan was not a real state prior to the rule of Nazarbayev and hinted that Kazakhs would be wise to favor their continued membership in the “Greater Russian world.”137 Putin also called

Kazakhstan Russia’s “closest strategic ally and partner,” however his words seemed to

134 Jeff Chinn and Robert Kaiser, Russians as the New Minority. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996) 188-190. 135 Sebastien Peyrouse, “The Russian Minority in Central Asia: Migration, Politics, and Language.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Occasional Paper #297: 4. 136 Casey Michal, “Why are Russians leaving Kazakhstan?” The Diplomat. 23 February 2016. Web. Accessed: 8 March 2016. 137 Casey Michal. “Putin’s Chilling Kazakhstan Comments.” The Diplomat. 3 September 2014. Web. Accessed: 8 March 2016.

indicate that should Kazakh nationalism rise to the point of causing increased fear and consternation among Russians still living in Kazakhstan, Russia would take action to

“protect their interests” as it did in Ukraine. It is conceivable that Russia could use the diaspora population just across the border as a political tool if Kazakhstan were to suffer major instability during a potential succession crisis at the end of Nazarbayev’s rule. The

Russian population is highly concentrated in the north, giving Russia clear geographic parameters for a hybrid war campaign. Thus, we can conclude that with the possible entry point of a succession crisis, a disgruntled and easily accessible Russian population, and minimal threat of strong international reactions (Kazakhstan has no clear foreign alliances), Kazakhstan may be vulnerable to Russian hybrid war in the future if instability ensues, if not presently under Nazarbayev’s rule.

Policy Implications for Resisting Hybrid War and the Onset of “Ethnic” Frozen Conflict

The prospect of ethnic separatism in former Soviet states remains a challenge for states with populations susceptible to the Russian hybrid war strategy. Even the Baltic states, which I have demonstrated have a significantly lower risk from Russian aggressive action, must take steps to ensure their territorial security and integrity. In line with Hale’s theory of separatism, regions are more likely to seek autonomy if they feel the central state is likely to pursue an exploitative relationship. In order to mitigate this, it is important that states guarantee important minority rights, protect language and cultural practices, and ensure the fairness of elections and the political process. Steps must be taken to further integrate Russian diaspora populations into civil and political life in their parent countries in order to decrease the receptiveness of these populations to Russian

hybrid warfare. The framing of issues is critical in this matter; if a state frames a major political issue in a way that exacerbates perceived ethnic differences, a population might become more susceptible to separatism. As we have seen in Ukraine, there have been deep feelings of mistrust towards the central government across all geographic regions of the country. Combining these feelings with Russian information warfare, proximity to

Russia, and Russian irregular forces created a potent enough situation for conflict in

Donbass. When the new Ukrainian government attempted to pass language laws decreasing the status of Russian in some circumstances, it seemed to confirm to some

Russian-speakers that the new government in Kiev would seek a more exploitative relationship with Russian-speaking regions in the country. Beyond strengthening the responsiveness of institutions, states can develop strong civil society networks that will crosscut some of the cleavages that can be exploited by ethnic separatists. Civil society helps to reorient the points of personal reference that make up identity by tying diverse groups of people together, thus mitigating group differences and building a more national rather than ethnic or regional identity.138 Civil society can also fill an important gap in non-democratic regimes such as Kazakhstan, where formal institutions are unlikely to provide an avenue for diaspora Russians to express grievances.

Furthermore, traditional military deterrence can provide additional security against the possibility of hybrid campaign by Russia. A recent RAND Corporation study indicated that the Baltic states could be overwhelmed by a conventional Russian invasion force in less than 3 days. However, the report found that by deploying a rotating or permanent force of approximately seven brigades, including heavy armor, would

138 Lanoszka, “Hybrid War.” 185.

sufficiently raise the costs of a Russian assault as to make such an event extremely unlikely.139 However, while increasing conventional military capacity may deter a conventional attack or even a more large-scale hybrid campaign, it could have the adverse effect of actually incentivizing a low-scale hybrid warfare campaign, as we saw in the early stages of the conflict in Donbass. To mitigate this risk, Lanoszka suggests increasing intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities concurrently with the development of conventional military forces.

Another for the defense of the Baltic States is the use of counter-unconventional warfare tactics and increased civil defense. This strategy could be employed by the Baltic states themselves without major additional NATO involvement, potentially limited the chances of escalation with Russia. The Baltic States, whose militaries are outmatched and outnumbered by Russia on nearly every front, could develop a “Swiss approach” to defense - employing an expanded civil defense network, infrastructure denial, and decentralized resistance to Russian invaders. An effective counter - unconventional warfare infrastructure in each of the Baltic States could eliminate the need for additional

NATO deployment and avert the risk of fracturing the alliance over a response. Small units of special forces, trained by American and other NATO members, could be used to effectively combat Russian hybrid warfare in the eastern regions of each country, thus avoiding the escalation seen in Ukraine when Kiev deployed its “counter-terrorism” force against pro-Russian separatists.140

139 David A. Shlapak and Michael W. Johnson, “Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank: Wargaming the Defense of the Baltics.” Rand Corporation 2016. 140 Robert A. Newson, “Counter-Unconventional Warfare is the Way of the Future. How Can We Get There? Council on Foreign Relations. 23 October 2014. Web.

Conclusions

The collapse of the Soviet Union has often been hailed as remarkable success due to its relatively peaceful decline and fall. Few would have predicted that one of the world’s two superpowers, with thousands of nuclear weapons and a Communist Party willing to do anything to stay in power, would dismantle itself with minimal violence.

The fall of the USSR of course was not completely tranquil though, as several brief but intense conflicts broke out in the former republics and even in Russia itself. Being the largest and strongest of the union republics to emerge from the ashes of the Soviet Union,

Russia became involved in these conflicts almost immediately as they began. The international community largely ignored these conflicts and the role Russia played in them at the time they occurred. Russia was perceived as a weak actor by the United

States and the former Soviet Union was not perceived as a major security interest once the fear of “loose” nuclear weapons resided. A period of relative calm followed the conflicts in Moldova, Georgia, and elsewhere in the early 1990’s. Russia confronted a festering insurgency in its own South Caucasus region, and the conflicts in which Russia had become involved outside its borders remained in a frozen state. The rise of Vladimir

Putin the in 2000’s featured a new Russian assertiveness, reaching a crescendo in

Russia’s invasion of Georgia in 2008, cleaving off the regions of Abkhazia and South

Ossetia. Six years later in 2014, Russia again used military force outside of its borders, this time in Ukraine, where revolution had led to the fall of a regime friendly to Moscow.

Suddenly interest grew in the motives and tactics Russia employed against its neighbors in the former USSR.

There are important distinctions to make between the types of conflicts examined in this project; notably, the early wars in Moldova and Georgia began when Russian troops were still stationed in or near the conflict zones. In the 2008 war in Georgia, a small contingent of Russian peacekeepers was present within Georgian territory, but the main Russian military force crossed the border from Russia in the early hours of the conflict. In Ukraine, Russian forces based in Sevastopol may have participated in the early stages of annexation of the peninsula, but any Russian forces aiding the separatist militias in eastern Ukraine would have entered the country only after the Euromaidan

Revolution and the crisis in Crimea began to unfold. Russia’s geopolitical position was also much more secure by the time of the later conflicts; Russia’s nuclear arsenal was secure, the conflict in the North Caucasus region had settled down leaving no immediate threats to Russian sovereignty, and the potential threats to Russia were clearer than in the years immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

These differences, however, do not preclude the identification of trends across the

25 years since the fall of the Soviet Union. Taking the 21st century conflicts in Georgia and Ukraine into perspective with Russia’s earlier involvement in the post-Soviet conflicts in Moldova and Georgia reveals several important elements of Russian foreign policy, military intervention, and the construction of ethnic identity in frozen conflicts.

Analysis of the course of events leading to each conflict demonstrates that Russian military force was not pre-planned in the long-term, but was employed in response to an escalation of existing violence or a crisis situation. Moreover, Russia has shown that it is willing to use force in regions populated by Russian World ethnic groups that will provide at best latent support and at worst no resistance to Russian military action against

their parent country. In these cases, Russian foreign policy and military action has not been motivated by a nationalist desire to unite all Russian or rossisskii people, but has used these ethnic enclaves as a means to achieve geopolitical objectives in securing

Russia’s immediate perimeter and preventing the inclusion of their parent countries into the western security architecture. While it is likely that the Russian military had prepared contingency plans for operations in Georgia prior to the war in 2008, or in the Crimean

Peninsula prior to Euromaidan, Russia’s execution of these plans was only prompted by the creation of entry points within the parent states. Thus, I assert that Russia’s use of military force in the former Soviet Union has not been part of a larger strategy to rebuild the Soviet Union or establish a new, irredentist Russian state, but has been the result of

Russia’s initial success at impacting the course of the conflicts that developed immediately after the fall of the USSR by applying a relatively small amount of military force.

While Russia’s use of force has not been primarily directed at shaping ethnic identity within these separatist regions, the deployment of Russian forces and the subsequent creation of a frozen conflict in which these regions are unable to be reunited with their parent countries has had the effect of creating intractable divides between separatist groups and parent states. Russia’s involvement in these conflicts has often caused parent states to escalate their attempts to regain effective control of the separatist regions. In turn, this causes the elites, and to some extent the populations, of ethnic separatist regions to perceive the parent state as likely to pursue an exploitative policy in the future. As the conflict becomes frozen, an infrastructure of conflict begins to develop, particularly in situations in which cross-border contact with the parent state is extremely

limited, such as in Georgia and eastern Ukraine. This allows Russian information warfare fertile ground to spread narratives about the parent state, telling populaces that the host state is predatory and dangerous to the ethnic groups’ interests and even its very existence. Even in Transnistria, where contact with Moldova is unimpeded and frequent,

Russian media controls the narrative and polling continues to suggest that Transnistrians see themselves as firmly part of the Russian World. Moscow has used the concept of the

Russian World as a medium through which to facilitate its relations with ethnic separatist movements, as such, the Russian World concept has replaced the relationship these separatist regions had with the Kremlin during the Soviet era.

Russia’s use of small-scale irregular forces combined with local militias and its deployment of information warfare have created an effective tool Russia can deploy against its neighbors with separatist enclaves and populations that have had tenuous relations with their parent state governments in the post-Soviet era. While the Baltic

States may be protected by NATO’s mutual self-defense clause, other states such as

Kazakhstan may find themselves vulnerable to Russian hybrid war in the event of a crisis or catalyst allowing Russia to use force for geopolitical gain. Inclusive institutions and laws, effective information and counter-information war campaigns, and layered military and civil defense can be effective options against the tactics Russia has deployed in post-

Soviet conflicts to date. Outside of a few short days in central Georgia in 2008, the

Russian military has not operated in areas generally unfriendly or at least acquiescent to

Russian intervention in the post-Soviet era. This indicates that Russia’s neighbors should pursue policies that make retaining the status quo favorable to Russian World populations living within their borders. In the Baltics, this has primarily been made possible by

economic opportunity and democratic institutions. Absent economic opportunity and institutions through which ethnic minority populations feel they can effectively gain redress for their grievances, these populations may become susceptible to Russian hybrid war and inclusion into the Kremlin’s Russian World.

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