CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KACHIN CONFLICT GREAT POWERS AND THE CHANGING MYANMAR ISSUE BRIEF NO. 2 JANUARY 2014 China, the United States and the Kachin Conflict By Yun Sun This issue brief examines the development of the Kachin conflict in northern Myanmar’s Kachin and Shan states, the negotiations between the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the Myan- mar government, and the roles China and the United States have played in the conflict. KEY FINDINGS: 1 The prolonged Kachin conflict is a 3 The disagreements on terms have 5 Despite domestic and external major obstacle to Myanmar’s national hindered a formal cease-fire. In ad- pressure, the US has refrained from reconciliation and a challenging test dition, the existing economic inter- playing a formal and active role in the for the democratization process. est groups profiting from the armed Kachin conflict. The need to balance conflict have further undermined the the impact on domestic politics in 2 The KIO and the Myanmar prospect for progress. Myanmar and US-China relations are government differ on the priority factors in US policy. between the cease-fire and the political 4 China intervened in the Kachin ne- dialogue. Without addressing this gotiations in 2013 to protect its national 6 The US has attempted to discuss difference, the nationwide peace interests. A crucial motivation was a various options of cooperation with accord proposed by the government concern about the “internationaliza- China on the Kachin issue. So far, will most likely lack the KIO’s tion” of the Kachin issue and the poten- participation. tial US role along the Chinese border. such attempts have not been accepted by China. This is the second of a series of four issue briefs on the changes and challenges that Myanmar faces in its domestic and foreign policies since the beginning of democratization in the nation in 2011. These briefs will explore how external factors and forces influence and shape various aspects of Myanmar’s internal develop- ment, including economic growth, ethnic conflicts and national reconciliation. This brief examines the development of the ongoing Kachin conflict, the obstacles to the peace negotiations and how the process affects the political reform. In addition, it discusses the vested interests of the US and China in the issue and the roles they have played. The third and the fourth briefs will explore the US-China dynamism in Myanmar and Myanmar and the ASEAN. YUN SUN STIMSON CENTER 1 94 96 98 J 100 102 ° ° Indian ° i ° ° 28 n ° Line s Xichang Chinese h a MYANMAR Line J MYANMAR i a n Tinsukia g BHUTAN Putao Lijiang aputra Jorhat Shingbwiyang M hm e ra k Dukou B KACHIN o Guwahati Makaw n 26 26 g ° ° INDI STATE A n Shillong Lumding i w d Dali in Myitkyina h Kunming C Baoshan Imphal Hopin Tengchong BANGLADE SH IN A Bhamo C H 24° 24° SAGAING Dhaka Katha Lincang Mawlaik L Namhkam a n DIVISION c Y a uan Gejiu Kalemya n (R Falam g ed I ) Barisal r ( r Lashio M a S e w k a o a Hakha l n Shwebo w d g d e ) Chittagong y e n 22 22 Monywa ° ° CHIN Maymyo Jinghong NAM Sagaing Mandalay VIET STATE SHAN STATE Pongsali Pakokku Myingyan Ta-kaw- Kengtung MANDALAY Muang Xai Chauk Meiktila MAGWAY Taunggyi DIVISION Möng-Pan PEOPLE'S Minbu Magway Houayxay LAO 20° 20° Sittwe (Akyab) Taungdwingyi DEMOCRATIC DIVISION y d EPUBLIC RAKHINE d R Ramree I. a Naypyitaw Loikaw w a KAYAH STATE r r Cheduba I. I Prome (Pye) STATE e Bay Chiang Mai M kong of Bengal Vientiane Sandoway (Viangchan) BAGO Lampang 18 18° ° DIVISION M a e Henzada N Bago a m YANGON P i f n n o aThaton Pathein g DIVISION f b l a u t Pa-an r G a A M Khon Kaen YEYARWARDY YangonBilugyin I. KAYIN ATE 16 16 DIVISION Mawlamyine ST ° ° Pyapon Amherst AI L AN D M TH o ut dy MON hs o wad Nakhon f the Irra STATE Sawan Nakhon Preparis Island Ratchasima (MYANMAR) Ye Coco Islands 92 (MYANMAR) 94 Bangkok 14° 14° ° ° Dawei (Krung Thep) National capital Launglon Bok Islands Division or state capital Andaman Sea CAMBODIA Town, village TANINTHARYI Major airport DIVISION Mergui International boundary 12° Division or state boundary 12° Main road Mergui n d Secondary road Archipelago G u l f o f T h a i l a Railroad 0 100 200 300 km Chumphon The boundaries and names shown and the designations Kawthuang 10 used on this map do not imply official endorsement or ° acceptance by the United Nations. 10 0 100 200 mi ° 96° 98° 100° 102° Map No. 4168 Rev. 3 UNITED NATIONS Department of Field Support June 2012 Cartographic Section CHINA, THE UNITED STATES AND THE KACHIN CONFLICT 94 96 98 J 100 102 ° ° Indian ° i ° ° 28 n ° Line s Xichang Chinese h a MYANMAR Line J MYANMAR i a n Tinsukia g BHUTAN Putao Overview Lijiang M Since 2011, Myanmar has made substantial progress in its political democratiza- aputra Jorhat Shingbwiyang hm e The Kachin conflict ra k Dukou B KACHIN o tion. The reconciliation with the democratic opposition — especially with Aung San Guwahati Makaw n 26 has been a policy chal- 26 g ° ° INDI STATE Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy under her leadership — has won lenge for both China A n Myanmar applause from the international community. As a result, Western countries Shillong Lumding i and the United States. w d Dali in Myitkyina have lifted most of their financial sanctions. Among the remaining uncertainties, the h Kunming C Baoshan peace process with the country’s ethnic minorities has arisen as a crucial challenge. Imphal Hopin Tengchong BANGLADE Currently, among all ethnic groups, only the Kachin Independence Army (KIA) is SH IN A Bhamo C H 24° engaged in ongoing armed conflict with the Tatmadaw (the government military) 24° SAGAING Dhaka Katha Lincang and has yet to reach a cease-fire agreement. The Kachin conflict, therefore, has been Mawlaik L Namhkam a n a key obstacle in the peace process. DIVISION c Y a uan Gejiu Kalemya n (R Falam g ed I ) Barisal r ( r Lashio M a S e w k a o More than a dozen rounds of dialogue have taken place since 2011 but have failed to a Hakha l n Shwebo w d g d e ) Chittagong y e lead to a formal cease-fire. The underlying reasons for the failure lie in the inability of n 22 22 Monywa ° ° CHIN Maymyo Jinghong NAM the two sides to reach a compromise on power-sharing and profit-sharing, the long- Sagaing Mandalay VIET STATE SHAN STATE Pongsali term mutual distrust and hostility as well as the existence of vested interests. Most Pakokku Myingyan Ta-kaw- Kengtung immediately, the Kachin Independence Organization and the Myanmar government MANDALAY Muang Xai have disagreed on the sequence between a cease-fire agreement and a political so- Chauk Meiktila MAGWAY Taunggyi lution. While the government sees a cease-fire agreement as the precondition for DIVISION Möng-Pan PEOPLE'S Minbu Magway Houayxay LAO 20° 20° Sittwe substantive political negotiation, the Kachin worry that a cease-fire will be the end of (Akyab) Taungdwingyi DEMOCRATIC DIVISION y any dialogue. For the Kachin, a ceasefire agreement will generate more conflicts if d EPUBLIC RAKHINE d R Ramree I. a Naypyitaw Loikaw it does not address their political and economic grievances. In addition, the momen- w a KAYAH STATE r r Cheduba I. I tum of the conflict is reinforced by vested interest groups from both sides that engage Prome (Pye) STATE Chiang Mai Mekon Bay of Bengal Vientiane g in illegal trade of jade and timber from the Kachin state to China. Sandoway (Viangchan) BAGO Lampang 18 18° ° DIVISION M a The Kachin conflict has been a policy challenge for both China and the United States. e Henzada N Bago a m For China, border tranquility, the protection of Chinese investments and the pre- YANGON P i f n n vention of expanding US influence are the top three considerations for all border o aThaton Pathein g DIVISION f b l a u t Pa-an r G a regions. The Kachin conflict has disrupted China’s border security and jeopardized A M Khon Kaen YEYARWARDY YangonBilugyin I. KAYIN ATE 16 its economic investments in the region. More importantly, Beijing’s strategic concern 16 DIVISION Mawlamyine ST ° ° Pyapon Amherst AI L AN D M TH centers on Washington’s interest and potential role in the issue. This made the so- o ut dy MON hs o wad Nakhon f the Irra STATE Sawan Nakhon called “internationalization of the Kachin conflict” China’s gravest policy concern Preparis Island Ratchasima (MYANMAR) Ye in Myanmar in 2013. For Washington, the ongoing conflict affects the US because it raises questions about whether lifting sanctions has removed incentives for Myan- Coco Islands mar to improve its ethnic relations. However, due to the need to balance a potential 92 (MYANMAR) 94 Bangkok 14° 14° ° ° Dawei (Krung Thep) backlash from the Tatmadaw and strong reaction from China, the US has opted to National capital Launglon Bok play a low-profile role in the Kachin conflict. Islands Division or state capital Andaman Sea CAMBODIA Town, village TANINTHARYI Major airport DIVISION Mergui International boundary 12° Division or state boundary 12° Main road Mergui n d Secondary road Archipelago G u l f o f T h a i l a Railroad 0 100 200 300 km Chumphon The boundaries and names shown and the designations Kawthuang 10 used on this map do not imply official endorsement or ° acceptance by the United Nations.