Assembly of Western European Union F

Assembly of Western European Union

DOCUMENT 1667 9 November 1999

FORTY-FIFTH SESSION

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The future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORT

submitted onbehalf ofthe Political Committee ts by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur Nt $CO ASSEMBLY OF WESTERN EUROPEAN TINION 43, avenue du Pr6sident-Wilson, 75775 Paris Cedex 16 Tel. 01.53.67.22.00 - Fax: 01.53.67.22.01 E-mail : [email protected] Internet: http://www weu.int/assembly'welcome.htnl Document 1667 9 November 1999

The future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the Council

REPORTl

submitted on behalf of the Politicul Committed by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur

TABLE OF CONTENTS

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION on the future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the Council

EXPLANATORY MEMORANDI.IN4

submrtted by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur

I. lntroduction il. Cologne: was a solution found for defining Europe's mrssion and for the measures needed to achieve it? ru. The conditions to be met for giving proper effect to the Cologne project ry. The task facing WEU and its Assembly V. Conclusions

1 Adopted unanimously by the Committee. 2 lulembers of the Commtttee'. Mr Baumel (Chairman); Mr Blaauw, N... (Vice-Chairmen); MM de Assis, Bianchi, Behrendt, Brancati, Sir Sydney Chapman, MM Clerfal't, Cusimano (Alternate: Amoruso), Dias, Mrs Dumont, Mrs Durrieu, MM Ehrmann, Evangelisti. Eyskens, Fayot (G/esener),Haack, Hornhues, Lord Ktrkhill, MM Lemoine, Liapis, Marshall, Martinez Casaft, Mrcheloyianrls, Mrs Nagy, Lord Ponsonby, lvtvl Puche Rodriguez, Recoder (Alternate: Arnau Navarro), Roseta, Schmitz, Skoularikis, Sterzing, Timmermans, Van der Linden, Volcic, Wruy, Yaftez Barnuevo.

A ss o q at e memb er s'. lvftt| G un der s e n, Ko smo. N.B. Tlre names of those takmg part m the vote are pnnted m italics.

t-l 47 z \'^-/ DOCT]MENT 1667

Draft Recommendation

on the future of European defence and its democratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the Council The Assembly,

(i) Recalling Recommendation 653, Order 108 and its Message to the Governments and Parlia- ments of Europe. which concern secunt-v and defence: the challenge for Europe after Cologne and which were adopted on 19 October 1999:

(ii) Welcoming the speed wrth which the Council transmitted the first part of its 45th annual report to the Assembh'on the Council's actrvities,

0u) Surprised- nonetheless, that the annual report does not contain anv reference to the impact on WEU of the decisions taken on 3 and 4 June 1999 in Cologne by the European Union heads of state and government with a view to formulating a European secunt_v and defence policv (ESDP) and takrng responsibilrty for WEU's Petersberg missions;

(w) Recalhng that WEU at 28 is rvell ahead of the European Union and NATO rn having the mak- ings of a secunty and defence Europe encompassing all the European countries rvhich are both ready for it and qualif,' to be part of it, and thereby bnngs a considerably enhanced drmension to security and stability m Europe;

(") Recalling that the effect of the determination of the European Umon governments to take re- sponsibilrtv for WEU's cnsis-management functions, rvhich will henceforth be consigned to the single framework of the second pillar, rvill be to reduce the number of particrpants in this project to fifteen countries, five of whrch are still expressing major reservations about it:

(v) Feanng that the arangements currently being drscussed by the European Uruon member states rvith a vie*'to involvrrg WEU's associate member and associate partners in the EU's securit_v and defence policy wrll result in those countries berng sidelined, which wrll undermine all WEU has achieved as a forerunner of secunq' and defence Europe;

(vtr) Reaffirming, therefore, the vrtal imporLance of WEU's mission, uhrch allows all the European countries which do not 1'et qualif, for admission to all the EU pillars and/or to NATO to avail themselves of a framework in which they can participate in the construction of European defence,

(viri) Consrdenng the position of the United States, which has fundamental reservations about any inclination on Europe's part to develop a capacitl,for autonomous militan'action, while many Ameri- cans rlant Europe to make a greater effort to ensure its oun secunry:

(tx) Noting with disappointment that there is virrually no rvill in the European Union to have recourse to WEU in the event of a cnsis or for any matters with defence rmplications:

(x) Fearing that the arrangements for enhanced cooperation betlveen the European Union and WEU in pursuance of the Protocol on Article i7 of the Treaty on European Umon rnill prove too complex to be rmplemented, particularly in the event of the sudden outbreak of an unforeseen crisis;

(xt) Stressing that it is therefore crucial to maintain all the decrsion-making and operational capabilities available rn WEU and under its Treaty throughout the current interim penod and for as long is the new structures it is planned to create in the European Union are not operational;

(ni) Recalling the importance of WEU's mission, w'hich is to cooperate closely wrth NATO and, indeed, to ensure that any transfer of WEU's responsibilities to the European Union is not damaging to transatlantic cohesion: DOCLMENT 1667

(xttt) Reminding all WEU member countries that it rs therefore up to them. as members of the European Union, to ensure that the decisions to be taken by the European Council in Helsinki should be thought out rvrthout rushrng ard rvith all due care;

(xtv) Stressing once again that WEU will continue to be extremely rmportant for as long as it has to oversee the application of Articles V, MII, IX and XI of the modified Brussels Treatl' and its protocols, and the proper operation ofthe Council's subsidiary bodies;

(*) Stressing the importance of the development of WEAG as an essential forum for giving political impetus to armaments cooperation, lnth the full participation of all the interested nations in the WEU family; (m) Convinced that the separation of crisis-management functions from collective defence removes all justification for WEU's current enlargement policl' accordrng to u,hich a country must be both a member of NATO and the European Union to qualifr for accession to the modified Brussels Treaty; (mi) Recalling that Article VIII of the modified Brussels Treatv created the Council wrthout defining the institutional framework for its organisation. (wiii) Reaffirmrng the importance of the democratic dimension of the European secunq' and defence policl,and welcoming the value the Council attaches in its annual report to the contnbution of the WEU Assembl1, and its Committees to the Orgamsation's work and the ongorng reflection on European securiq'and defence,

RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.NCIL

1 . tnclude in its annual report a detailed study of the progress in negotiations among the European Union member states and the drrection they follolv rn the rvake of the Cologne Declaration, together with an assessment of the consequences this entails for future activities of the Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembll'; 2. Urge the WEU member countries, as members of the European Union, to ensure that the decisions to be taken at the Helsinkr Summit are prepared rvithout rushing, while taking account of the need to:

improve existing capabilities ; adopt an inclusive approach; and preserve the indivisibiliq, of European security; 3. Examrne in detail hos' it henceforth intends to fuIfil its obligations under the modified Brussels Treatv. and particularlv under Article VIII, and inform the Assembly accordingly; 4. Renegotiate and simplifi.the arrangements and procedures for enhanced cooperation betrveen the European Union and WEU under the Protocol on Article 17 of the Treaty'on European Union with a vrew to giving WEU a more important role in the decision-makrng process; 5. Presen.e all the decision-maliing and operational capabilities it has to react in a crisis and apply Article VIII.3 of the modified Brussels Treatv in full for as long as the European Union does not avail rtself of WEU and does not have the capaciq'to take action on ils ox'n. 6. Study'the possibility, in the light of the neu, situation. of inviting the associate member countries to accede to the modified Brussels Treat1,, and of extending the application of the 11 May 1955 Agree- ment on the status of WEU to all countnes participating in the activities of WEAG and WEAO;

7 . Enhance the status rvrthin WEU of the Organisation s new Secretary-General, along the lines of the proposals made by the French President and German Chancellor in connection rvith the role in the European Union of the Secretarv-General of the EU Council and High Representative for the CFSP; DOCUMENT 766'7

8. Explarn any differences between the CFSP, ESDP and ESDI, and the most appropnate way of harmomsrng these three concepts;

9. Bring to the notice of the EU authonties the WEU Council's obligations towards the Assembly and the terms of their relations under Article IX of the modified Brussels Treaty, stressing that it is important not to damage the quality and nature of those relations and that the Assembly, wluch as a WEU body is an integral part of the development of the European Uruon, is prepared to establish appropnate cooperation arrangements wrth the European Parliament, on the basis of the complementanty of the remrts of both assemblies. DOCLMENT 166'7

Explanatory Memoran du m

(submitted by Mr Marshall, Rapporteur)

I. Introduction lively debate and concluded with the adoption by the Standing Commiuee of Recommendation 653 l. In adoptrng its Plan for Action on 16 and Order 108 on the basis of the report entitled March 1999, the Assembly's purpose rvas to take "Security and defence: the challenge for Europe a qualitative leap forward rn order to give the after Cologne" which your Rapporteur submitted European Union a political and operational de- on behalf of the Political Committee2. The As- fence capability, without making further assembly also adopted a Message to the Govern- sumptions about the rnstitutional shape of things ments and Parliaments of Europe to urge them to come. To that end it proposed proceedrng in not to abandon the project of a European com- stages and beginning by placing all WEU's cap- mon defence subject to democratic scrutiny. abilities under the authority of the European Council. Yet at the Cologne Summit the Euro- 5. The special session provided an opporil- pean Council announced more far-reaching am- nity to highlight a number of aspects of the bitions and set itself a very short space of time rn problems to be resolved following the decisions which to achieve them. Tlus presents the gov- taken by the Cologne European Council, aspects ernments concerned with a huge challenge since which need to be examined in more detail in this failure to do so could result in a serious setback report. The content of the first part of the 45th with major consequences for political develop- annual report of the Council3 can also be taken ments in Europe. rnto account. Tlus is the first occasion in a long time that the Council has transmitted its report 2. After makrng a preliminary assessment of sufficiently early for the Assembly's committees the Washington and Cologne decisions in the to be able to study and respond to it in their re- report submitted on 10 June i999 by Mr Baumel ports. The Assembly is also gratefrrl to the on behalf of the Political Committeel, the As- Council for the speed with which it replied to sembly decided to mstruct the Commrttee to Recommendations 644 to 652 adopted at the carr)' out a more detarled analysis for the De- June 1999 session. cember session by prepanng a report entitled "The future of European defence and its demo- 6. Conversely, a reading of the Council's cratic scrutiny - reply to the annual report of the reply to Recommendatiot 642 on "WEU and Council". But since then there have been a num- European defence: beyond Amsterdam", which ber of important developments. was adopted by the Standing Committee on 16 March 1999, makes it is difficult to see rvhy it 3. As a result, the Presidential Committee did not reach the Assembly until July. considered it essential for the Assembly to ex- press its views on the impact of the new drrection II. Cologne: was o solution found for deJining being taken in European security and defence Europe's mission and for the meosures needed policy well before its ordinary session to be held to achieve it? in Paris from 29 November to 2 December. It therefore organised a special session of the As- 7. A study of the European Council's Col- sembly in Luxembourg on 18-19 October on the ogne Declaration suggests that thrngs are clear: it theme "Security and defence: the challenge for is the European Union's mission to become an Europe after Cologne". independent and credrble plal'er in the field of crisis management whereas collective defence session, which parliamentarians 4. This in remains the exclusive prerogative of the Atlantic from national foreign affairs and defence com- Alliance. There is no longer anytalk of framing a mittees and a delegation from the European Parl- cornmon defence as envisaged in the Maastncht participated, gave rise yery iament also to a and Amsterdam Treaties. The statement in the

1 See Recommendation 644 orWEU after the Wash- 2 ington and Cologne Summits repl-v_. to the annual See Assembly Document 7662, 19 October 1999. - 3 report ofthe Council. See Assembly Document l66t.20 September 1999 DOCUMENT 1667

EU Presrdency report to the efFect that the appropnate. What is troubling is that the Col- commitments under Article V of the modified ogne Declaration refers only to the first part of Brussels Treaty wrll in any event be preserved that arlicle and not to the second. lrhich mentions for the member states parf,v to the Treat_v does the possibility'of a common defence. not change anything in that respect. I L All the information in our possession 8. This nerv dimension for the European rvould suggest that rvhat we are seetng is a real Union marks a fundamental change of direction shift in longer-term policy arvay from the spint in the course the relevant governments have and letter of the Maastncht and Amsterdam mapped out since starting to pursue a Common Treaties. The clearest proof of this uas the replr', Foreign and Secun[- Policy' (CFSP) in the given in response to a questron from Mr Beh- Union. Despite major differences of view be- rendt, bv Mr Verheugen *'hen he u'as Germany's tween the various political actors involved, most Depu[,Minister for Forergn Affairs, in which he European govemments, the WEU Assembh'and said that collective defence was not artd would the European Parliament u,ere agreed on one not become a task for the European Union. point: mutual the assistance obligation should, in lZ. The Assemblv has of course taken due one form or another, become parl of the Treaty note of the comments made by Mr Santer, former on European Uruon. The Assembly has ahvay's President of the European Commission and been aware that this u,ould be a difficult process member of the European Parliament, at its spe- which u,ould take trme and this rvas why it pro- cial session m Luxembourg in response to the posed proceeding in stages that would culminate concerns the Assembly'had expressed about the rn the achievement of a common defence rvithin fact that the Fifteen are at present no longer the European Union. Its position on this matter thinking rn terms of building a common defence perfectly plan rvas consistent lrrth the for a series wrthin the European Union as envisaged in the of phases wrth a new to WEU's gradual integra- Maastncht and Amsterdam Treatiesa. tion into the European Union, whrch was put forward in March 1997 by six countries at the 13. In this connection Mr Santer said the fol- Intergovernmental Conference that resulted in the lou'ing: Amsterdam Treaty. "Having attended the European Council in Cologne ex offuo, I must point out that 9. Accordrng to some sources, the decision to this may be misleading The members of give up tryrng to make mutual assistance an obli- the European Council certainll' never in- gation rn the European Union, even in the form of tended to go against the provisions of the a separate protocol, was not merely a concession Maastncht or Amsterdam Treaties. On the to the refusal by the non-allied countries to enter contrary, I do not think rve should exag- into a collective defence commrtment but also re- gerate the importance of the Cologne flected concern that the incorporation of such an Declaration, especialll, since it is an rn- obligation mrght create drfficulties in the EU's tenm declaration. as you will have realised future relations with Russia. If that is true. it uhen you read it. ( ) [The CFSP] was not rvould be tantamountto de faclo recognition that the marn item on the European Council's Russia has a say in the rvay,the EU applies the agenda on that occasion". prousions of Article l7 of the Amsterdam Treaty which authonses the European Council to build a 14. Horvever, even though the Cologne Dec- common defence urthur the European Union. laration is only an mterim one, it reflects a situa- 10. Any argument to the effect that it is too tion that looks unlikely to change for some time early to expect the European Council to take a to come, as implied b1'the following comment decrsion to that end is justifiable and rndeed the from Mr Lekberg (an observer from Srveden m Assembly has always maintarned that such a step the WEU Assemblv and Chairman of the Euro- could not be taken until the very end of the process. One could also be content nith the fact that a See recital fir) inthe preamble to Recommendation Article 17.i of the Amsterdam Treaty is norv in 653 on "securifi, and defence: the challenge for force and that the European Umon could avail Europe after Cologne", adopted by the Standing itself of its provisions uhenever it considered it Committee in Luxembourg on 19 October 1999. DOCUMENT 1667

pean Af[airs Committee in the Su'edish Parlia- those functions of the WEU ivhich will be neces- ment) at the Assembll"s special session in Lux- sary for the EU to fulfil its nex,responsibilities in embourg: the area of the Petersberg tasks''. But most important from the political point of vierv is the fact "It is rmportart to clanfr the difference that in Cologne the European Council did away' betiveen cnsis management and common wrth the correlation betrveen thc framing of a defence. European Union contributions ap- common defence in the European Uruon and ply to peace support and the issue is not WEU's rntegration into the Union, rvhen it used one of creating a common defence. Su'eden that puzzling phrase statrng that "WEU as all cannot therefore accept a solution in which organisation x'ould have completed its purpose" Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty once the European Union rvas in a position to is integrated into the European Umon". take responsibilitl' for Petersberg tasks. 15 Furthermore, 1n an address to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French National As- 18. According to the Agreement on the status 'the sembly on 27 October 1999 in Pans. Mrs Hal- of WEU signed on 11May'1955, Organisa- onen, the Firmish Minister for Foreign Affairs tion" means WEU comprising the Council. its and representative of the Presrdencl, of the EU subsidiarl'bodies and the Assembly. The Council Council, confirmed that: rvas created by virrue of Article VIII of the modified Brussels Trealv primanl1. 'to consider "the member states have unanimously de- matters concerning the execution of ttus Treaty cided to leave issues related to common and of its Protocols and their Annexes". It is defence (Article outside the list of items $ therefore clear that the WEU Council is respon- on the agenda''. sible, for instance, for the application of Article 16 In this connection it is rvorth beanng in IV governing cooperation with NATO, ffid mind the correlation that exists betrveen the pro- above all for Article V wluch concerns mutual vision of the Amsterdam Treaty that authonses assistance in the event of an armed attack. It rs the European Councrl to decide to establish a also responsible for the application of Articles common defence x'ithin the European Union and VIII, IX and XI of the Treat_v, all of which con- the provision authonsmg it to decide on the pos- tinue to have fu1l effect sibilitt' of WEU's integration into the EU. Here again, it is interesting to note the posrilon the: 19. The Cologne Declaration, holever, openll' Swedish representative expressed in Lurem- gives the rmpression that WEU as an organisa- bourg: tion has only one function: this concerns the execution of Petersberg tasks. to the exclusion of all "Finally, question happen the of u'hat xill the other functions for uhich it rvas created. This European followrng Col- to Western Union false impression is extremely dangerous because a matter its member ogne is of course for of its considerable rmpact on political decision- comes European states. When it to the makers, who infer from it that WEU is no longer absolutely Union, the decision-making is necessary to monitor comphance wrth the com- to 17 of the Trea- clear - accordrng Article mitment contained in Article V. The wording of European integration of f' on Union, the the phrase about WEU completing its purpose is WEU into the Union is a decision u'hich therefore not onll' unrvise but irresponsible as made b1'the European Council. should be rvell. Horvever, given the area of competence of the fi.rll It should therefore be done rvith the European Council, it is unthinkable that it agreement of and I repeat all. the mem- all, u'ould have wanted to take a decision on the issue ber states". of hou' the relevant bodies should henceforth 17. However. rt has become clear that the appll' the provisions of the modified Brussels European Council has altered the drrectron taken Treaty, or on the future of the Trea5.. The in the Amsterdam Treatl', since in Cologne it authoritl, of the European Council, u'hose roisrn abandoned any idea of WEU's integration even d'Atre is to be found exclusivelv m the Treatl' on though the introduction to the Presidencv report European Union, u,as confined to taking deci- still refers to that possibilrtl'. Instead, the Euro- sions only on the mrssions that Treaty assigns to pean Council is non'envisaging "the inclusion of WEU rn rts relations rvith the European Uruon. DOCLMENT 1667

Under Article 17 of the Treat!', WEU's purpose practice of a threat to the territonal rntegntl, of is to. member countries in the foreseeable future, tt may u'ell be acceptable to retarn Article provide the European Union u'ith ac- V, which would exrst alongside the European cess to an operational capability, and Union, rvithout being concerned about who might oversee its support the Union in framrng the de- application. One school of thought is that it fence aspects of the Common Foreign would be sufficient for the govemments to hon- and Secunty Policv. our their commitments as members of the Atlan- 20. In contrast, Article 17.3 puts the European tic Alliance. But such an approach would have Union under an obligation to avail itself of WEU very far-reaching consequences for the objective European to elaborate and implement decisions of the of construction, which u,ould as a re- Union ufuch have defence implications. The sult remarn unfimshed in terms of defence and phrase stating that "WEU as an organisation rvould continue to leave Europe dependent on the goodwill u'ould have completed its purpose" can therefore of the United States in this particular apply only to working relations between the EU area. There are some x'ho rvant such a situation and WEU as descnbed in Article 17. To put an to continue but your Rapporteur considers that end to WEU's purpose would require an amend- the Assemblv, as guardian of the modified Brus- ment to the Amsterdam Treatl. However, the sels TreaW, cannot advocate tlus as the proper course negotiations between the Frfteen are bound to be ofaction since it does not seem appropn- exlremely difficult u'hen it comes to making all ate for strengthening European security, which the arrangements necessary for the European was one of the main reasons for the creation of Union to be capable of taking action in the field WEU. of cnsis management without the assistance of 23. The Assembly should therefore continue to WEU. While France has sent its partners an ac- support - as rt did wrth its Plan for Action - a tion plan proposing the creation without delay of policy designed to mainta:n Europe's collective new bodies in the EU, and other member coun- defence commitment as part of the objective of tries are preparing their contributions for the European construction, ensuring that it is fully implementation of the Cologne decisions, noises complementary to the transatlantic commiunent are once again comrng from NATO rvarnrng in the framework of the North Atlantic Treaty - Europeans about the danger of creating struc- as stipulated rn the Amsterdam Treaty. It would tures parallel to those of NATO. ln view of this be unacceptable if a minority of nerv European srtuation one may wonder what pushed the heads Union members were able at the end of the day to of state and government of the Fifteen into in- make the majority pursue a course different to cludrng in a public declaration a hypothetical the one to which thev subscnbed by becoming phrase about the completion of WEU's purpose, members of the Union. especially when it is usual practice in politics for 24. The European Union's most governments not to reply, and nghtly so, to objective in secu- hyp othetical questions. nty and defence matters rvill have to be clanfied before it enlarges further. It is already to be 2).. In any event the phrase m question is giv- feared that countries seeking membership are ing nse to all sorts of misunderstanding not only receiving the wrong message about what awaits in public oprnion but also in political circles. But them in this area as a result of the Cologne Dec- even more seriously, it is causing great darnage laration. to the cause of European secunty instead of 25. For as long as the project for achieving a helping to strengthen it, whereas this should be common defence the ambition of all the interested parties. in the European Union remains in abeyance, WEU will continue to be vitalll, 22. Should the Assembly accept the new dir- important and its Council should continue to take ection taken by the European Council? Those fuIl responsibility for the application of Article V who consider that Europe no longer needs to and the other provisions of the modified Brussels concern itself wrth collective defence are grorving Treaty rvhich are in force. To that end it is es- in number. If that vierv were justified, on the ba- sential for WEU, as an organisation, to continue sis of an assessment rulurg out any likelihood in its work. DOCUMENT 1667

26. As regards achieving the European 30. ln choosing this approach for improving Council's ambitions of providrng the European the EU's decision-making capacrty, the European Uruon with a capacrt-v for action to lead crisis- Council has reopened the question of institutional management tasks as defined in the Amsterdam reforms which, as experience has long shown, are Treaty, it should be remembered that the run-up particularly difficult to achieve. A closer look at to the Cologne Summit sarv a number of different these proposals makes it clear that the European approaches as to the most appropriate way of Union is planmng to create bodies that already attaining ths obj ective. exist rn a srmrlar form in WEU. 27. Some countries notably the United 31. But before studying the Cologne Declara- Kingdom - took the view that the main problem tion in more detail, there is a fundamental polrt was how to strengthen military capabilities and to be clanfied with the WEU Council: the Euro- that institutional issues should not be the top pn- pean Council tasked the EU General Affairs onty. In the Cologne texts the word "capability" Council to prepare the institutional decisions that appears no less that 19 times (!) in the English are to be taken by the end of the year 2000. Go- version but it is interesting to note that it is used lng on information the Assembly has received in different contexts. There are references to from the WEU Presidency and Secretary-Gen- military-, operational or, more generally, defence eral, the view in WEU is that the Assembly is not capabilities as well as to a capacit-v for action, involved in the institutional debate even though it which implies improving the decision-making directly concerns its future. Accordrng to the process ur times of cnsis. same sources, the only task remaining for WEU is for it to concem itself n{th enhancing the leg- 28. The Cologne documents, a substantial part acy it rvill one day wish to transfer to the Euro- of which are devoted to the latter problem, pro- pean Union. pose as a solution setting up cerLain bodies *rthrn the European Union to ensure the political 32. Your Rapporteur is convinced that there is control and strategic direction of EU-led Peters- nothing in the Cologne Declaration to prevent berg operations so that the Union can at the same WEU, and in particular its Assembly, from time decide on and conduct such operations ef- submitting appropriate proposals to the Euro- fectively. pean Union for achievrng the arnbitions the Un- ion has set in an area rvhich, after all, is the re- 29. In order to generate this capacrty for ac- sponsibiliry of WEU. On the contrary, there is all tion, the European Council envisages inter aha'. the more justification for tlunking that all WEU regular (or ad hoc) meettngs of the bodies should take part in the general debate that General Affairs Council, as appropriate is only beginning now that the basic decisions including Defence Ministers; have been taken by the European Council. WEU, EU, a permanent body rn Brussels (Political as an integral part of the development of the and Security Commiuee) consistrng of is responsible for implementing the obligations representatives wrth politico-military stemming from the modified Brussels Treatv and expertise; cannot be left on the sidelines. This being so, the Assembly cannot urge the Council too strongly to an EU Military Committee consisting cast off the passive auitude which it has a ten- of military representatives making re- dency to adopt and which, moreover, conflicts commendations to the Political and Se- rvith its stated intention to pursue its informal curiry Committee, refleoion on the future of security and defence an EU Military Staff including a Europe. What is the point of such reflection if rt Situation Centre; does not lead to concrete proposals? other resources such as a Satellite 33. If it is the Council's concern, and one that Centre, Institute for Securitv Studies. is rvholly shared by the Assembly, to transfer to The Cologne Declaration does not mention the the European Union a defence culture that is problem of democratic scrutiny but acknow- lackrng in the institutions at 15, it must do a ledges that "firrther institutional queshons may great deal more than enhance WEU's legacy. The need to be addressed". Fifteen will never acquire that culture in those DOCUV{ENT 7667 institutions if thel' are left to make the necessary 37. The procedures the Assembly proposed preparations on their own for taking on tasks in rvould have made it possible for the WEU Coun- an area in which they still have little experience. cil to be directly' answerable to the European Council and would have avoided the need to 31. Regarding the measures to be taken so that create new decision-making bodres witlun the the European Union can assume its new respon- EU. The Assembly's approach also fits in with sibilities, agreement w-ill first have to be reached the rationale of giving Mr Solana a dual remit as on the correct interpretatron to be given to the High Representative for the CFSP and Secretary- proposals made by the EU Presidency'. As for the General of WEU, utlch is now the most likely arrangements to be made for providrng the scenario. sources necessary for military decision-makrng, it 38. The question is rvhether the way forward would appear that as far as the instruments are proposed in Cologne is really the last word on the concerned in areas such as situation analysis, matter or whether Cologne was merely the pre- intelligence and strategic planning, the EU Presi- lude to an institutional debate that has only just dency chose wording that wrll make it possible to begun. view the proposals France has transfer the relevant WEU bodies to the Euro- ln of submitted on this matter, it pean Umon. Thrs could apply to the Military would appear that the debate is wide open and no solutron has been Committee, Militarl' Staff, Situation Centre, Sat- ruled out yet. It is therefore important to take on ellite Centre and/or Institute for Secunq. Studies board the fact that, in spite of the Cologne Decla- even though the Cologne document does not ration, some member goverrunents have not given specifically mention '.'WEU" in this conte*. up the idea of integrating WEU into the Euro- 35. If the Cologne proposals rvere interpreted pean Uruon, as envisaged in the Amsterdam in that way, it q'ould be tantamount to an incor- Treatys. poration of those bodies rnto the European 39. Nevertheless, the action plan President Union. They would then be in perfect harmony Chirac sent the EU member states in late July uith both the Amsterdam Treaty' and the As- does appear to go in the direction drscussed in sembll"s Plan for Action uhich among other Cologne and even goes further in that France is thrngs suggests that the rvav forward is to "build proposing to its partners that the Political and a defence instrument in the European Uruon by Secunty Committee (COPS) and the Military drawrng on what already exists". The problem Commrttee should be set up in parallel to Mr that mll arise following such a transfer is how to Solana taking office as Secretary-General of the involve the representatives of the associate mem- EU Council and High Representative for the ber and associate partner countries in vierv ofthe CFSP. France's proposal is that Mr Solana fact that they currentll,participate in the rvork of should chair the COPS, which u'ould take on the the vanous WEU bodies. role currently assigned to the Political Committee for which provision is made in Article 25 of the 36. Things are more complicated when it Amsterdam Treaty. comes to the political decision-making bodies in the EU. There is a hnk betu'een the proposal to 40. The French action plan also proposes that COPS hold meetings of a General Affairs Council also the rvould be made up of Permanent Rep- deahng rvith security issues and the creation of resentatives holding the rank of ambassador but new structures intended to replace those currently who would not be the Permanent Representa- existing in WEU, namely the Council of Minis- fives to the North Allantic Counul. France is "double- ters and the Permanent Council. But in Recom- therefore not rn favour of EUA{ATO mendalon 642 andthe Plan for Action it adopted 5 on 16 March this 1,ear, the Assembly proposed See for instance the address the German Chan- pursuing the course mapped out in the Amster- cellor, Gerhard Schrdder, gave to the German for- dam Treatv and making preparations for the eign affairs association in Berlin on 2 September gradual integration of all WEU's functions rnto 1999. In an address on 22 October in Paris to the Institut the European Union - the first step being to place des Hautes Etudes de Defense Nationale, the French Pnme Minister, Mr Jospin, spoke in favour WEU under the authoriq, of the European of integrating WEU rn the European and Councrl. Uniot transferring its functions to the EU.

l0 DOCTIN4ENT 1667

hatting" in the COPS, as is currently the case for used, that the ESDP rvill encompass the rvhole some members of the WEU Permanent Council range of Petersberg missions rvhile not being vis-ir-vis NATO. In contrast the French proposal confined to them. However it is defined. the does not exclude double-hatting for members of ESDP covers activities rvhich the European Un- the Military Committee. Pendrng the establish- ion can at present undertake only bv havurg re- ment of a militar1, staff, for wluch the Cologne course to WEU and for u'hich in future it rvill Summit also made provision, France suggests have to take sole responsibilitv. that for a transitional period the COPS should draw on the resources of the WEU Milrtarl, 45. Accordmg to proposals submitted by France endorsed Germany the form Staff. and by in of a joint letter of 13 October 1999 from Mr Chirac 41. The COPS would also be responsible for and Mr Schroder to the Firurish Presidency of the managing all matters concerning the CFSP in- European Union, Mr Solana - the new Secretary- cludrng those with defence rmplications. Under General of the EU Council and High Represen- the Council's authority it would also ensure the tative for the CFSP - should chair the Political political control and strategic direction of EU-led and Securit-v Commrttee (COPS) that is to be set operations. But to begin with its main task would up. However, this suggestion was not approved be to propose solutions for: by the Fifteen at their informal summit in Tam- the inclusion of WEU functions in the pere on 15-16 October, since it rvould mean a European Union: deparhrre from the pnnciple of rotating committee charrmanship by u,hich the smaller member the rnvolvement and participation of states set great store. They fear that if the1, WEU associate members and associate agreed to the new arrargement, they rvould have parhers in the European Union's new even less rnfluence than they do at present. missions: relations betrveen the European Union 46. Given that creation of the COPS would andNATO. requrre a revision of the Treaties and that a trme- frame rvould have to be set for completing the 42. Despite the reservations of countries such necessary ratification process, the majonty' of as Italy and the Netherlands about achieving member states appear to favour an rntenm solu- Europe's ambition of havrng a crisis-manage- tion compatible with the existing texts, u'hich the ment capabilrty that is wholly autonomous vis-i- heads of state and government could agree at vis the United States and NATO, it would seem their nerl summit meeting on 10-11 December that a broad consensus is emerging about the 1999 in Helsinki. The main task of an interim need to set up a high-level Permanent Committee committee in Brussels should be to make ar- invested wlth authority' for the political control rangements for implementing the decisions taken and strategic direction of Petersberg mrssions. b1'the Cologne European Council. 43. Most member states consider that the Treaty on European Union will have to be re- 47. It would appear that differences have come vised to give such a committee the necessary to light about certain details regardrng matters powers. They are in broad agreement that it such as the COPS' relations with COREPER and should have competence for all matters under the the European Commission, double-hatting and so CFSP, which primarily covers non-military as- on. Where there is unlikely to be unanlmous pects, and that a single institutional framework agreement among the Fifteen is on the French should be maintarned for any action. proposal to create an EU body rvhich would be roughly equivalent to the permanent North At- 44. ln this connection it is important to note lantic Council and drrectlv ansrverable to the EU (srnce that the WEU Council Bremen) and the Council. European Council (since Cologne) are lookrng to establish a common European security and de- 48. Another problem to be settled concems the fence policy (ESDP) which they have yet to drf- participation of defence mhisters in future work ferentiate clearly from the CFSP as defined in the of the General Affairs Council on the CFSP, to Amsterdam Treatl'. Holever, it car be inferred whrch the ESDP u'ould add a further dimension. from the context in which this nerv term is being Some countries consider that the model used in

11 DOCLMENT 1667

WEU, with foreign affairs and defence ministers read)'to "define and adopt the necessary ar- holding joint meetings, has not proved a success rangements for ready access by the European and they x'ould therefore prefer to see ministers Union to the collective assets and capabilitres of holdurg separate meeturgs according to their port- the Alliance, for operations in rvhich the Alliance folios, as is customary in NATO. as a rvhole r not engaged mrlitanly ...". 49. Then there is a need to work out affange- 52. The ongin of the arangements that rvere ments for setting up an EU mrlitarv committee. finally agreed in Washington goes back to Berlin q,hich Srveden would prefer to call a "Petersberg in 1996 rvhen the Alliance took the decision to Commrttee", and integratlng a mrhtarv staff in allorv WEU to have recourse to Alliance assets the EU Council General Secretanat. A study of for operations under the political control and the most appropnate intenm solutions is also strategic direction of the WEU Council. It was in necessary. Some countnes are in favour of ad- Waslungton that an agreement was finalised be- opting the WEU model without going so far as bveen WEU and NATO on a framework docu- envisaging a wholesale transfer of its various ment for making Alliance assets available to bodres to the European Union. WEU

50. As the Fifteen have stated their determina- 53. As things stand, this arrangement enables tion that the objectives set in Cologne should at WEU associate members to be firlly rnvolved all costs be achieved in the single framework of from the outset in a WEU-led crisis-management the CFSP, the EU member states have embarked operation using Alliance assets. ln other words, on a fairly complex institutional debate rvhich is for as long as WEU is responsible for conducting unlikely to produce results quickly. But the in- such an operation, all the associate members take terim arrangements will also give rise to consid- part in it on w'hat is virnrally an equal footing erable problems as it will be particularly difficult rvith full members. The countries concerned are to find appropriate and acceptable solutions for Iceland, Nonval', Turkey, the Czech Republic, WEU's associate members to participate rn any Hungary and Poland. future cnsis-management action the European 54. However, this might no longer be the case Union takes. On this point y'our Rapporteur full1' once the Alliance starts deahng with the Euro- shares the position the WEU Secretary-General pean Union: expressed on 19 October 1999 in his address to the Assembly's special session rn Luxembourg (a) the WEU associate members fear that rvhen he said: "I believe it rvould be simplistic to therr effectrve "operational" status will be thrnk that tlus only entails avoiding potential ob- weakened: as they are not members of the stacles to good relations rvith NATO, where EU, they wrll no longer be able, as they these countries have an equal say to other Euro- are in WEU, to be rnvolved from the be- giruring in European decisions; peans. No - something qurte different is at stake. this could The European Union has to demonstrate that it is lead to a future arangement with the Alli- ready to cooperate wrth other players in its en- ance in which the EU rvould have recourse deavours to develop European security". It will to NATO assets and capabilities x,hich be remembered that two possibilities are open to also belong to the non-EU members of the the EU: Alliance; - it can either carry out operations q.ith (b) where WEU requests such recourse to the support of the Atlantic Alliance, NATO assets, those non-EU members of usrng the latter's assets, or the Alliance will be involved from the beginning in the decision to make such a re- it can carry out operations on its own. quest and will therefore have no reason to 51. The first possibilitl' rs closelv linked to the block it in the Alliance. However, follorv- decision taken by the Atlantic Alliance at the ing Waslungton and Cologne, it rvould Washington Summit in Apnl this year on the seem that their participation in the initial establishment of direct relations between NATO decision is no longer assured, since it will and the European Union. It rvas there that the become a CFSP decision to be taken Alliance declared for the first time that it was uithin the European Union;

t2 DOCLMENT 1667

k) if, in a specific cnsis, the associate rangements will be put in place to allorv them to members disagree wrth the EU havrng re- take part in crisis-management operations to the course to Alliance - hence also their - as- fullest possible extent. Thus the Declaration sets, the only place in which they will be draws no distinction at a1l between WEU's cur- able to state their objections will be within rent associate members and its associate part- the Alliance itself, where it wrll be much ners, rvhereas in WEU's ministerial organs a more difficult and politically delicate to clear distinction ls made between them, particu- take a lone decision or break with a con- larly with regard to operations or missions. sensus than is currently the case within 58. It is therefore understandable that the WEU; terms of the Cologne Declaration, wluch put (d) the pill is made even harder to swal- WEU associate member and associate partner low by the fact that those EU members countries on a virtually equal footing, should wluch are not members of the Alliance, have been viewed wrth distrust by the associate and whose observer status withrn WEU for members. Such distrust pervaded the atmosphere cnsis-management operations is consid- during work in the Alliance and WEU on "Berlin erably less favourable than that of the as- plus". sociate members, now be able to par- will 59. However, it has to be said that the German ticipate fully and on an equal footrng in all Presidency's report, which is part of the Cologne "European" decisions wluch could lead to Declaration, considerably' qualifies the language an EU request to use Alliance assets. used in the Declaration itself. Indeed, that report 55. The Cologne decisions will therefore result states that '-the successful creation of a European in a considerable shift of balance between the policy on security, and defence wrll require (...) current WEU associate members and observers satisfactory arangements for European NATO in favour of the latter in terms of the weight they members who are not EU member states to en- bring to bear in the decision-making process. sure their firllest possible involvement in EU-led However, it should not be forgotten that the operations, building on exrsting consultation ar- Washington Communique attaches the utmost rangements within'WEU". "the importance to ensunng fullest possible in- 60. The terms used in Washington: "fullest volvement of non-EU European allies in EU-led possible involvement" and Cologne: "take part to crisis-response operations, building on existing the fullest possible exlent" do not mean exactly consultation arrangements u.ithin the WEU". the same thing. The countries concerned are 56. Furthermore, the Washington Commu- therefore rvary and prepared to seize every op- nique tasked the Council in Permanent Session to portunit_v to ensure that the institutional decisions "address these measures on an ongorng basis, to be taken eventually by the Union are as much takrng into account the evolution of relevant ar- in line as possible with the language used in rangements in the EU". This shou's that the Alli- Washington, everlthing it imphed and the expec- ance did not write a blank cheque. lndeed the tations it has given rise to, or even confirmed. q'hat NAC was to "make recommendations to the next This problem is a major part of is com- ministerial meeting for its consideration". Thus, monly called WEU's acquis. the last word on the matter has by no means been 61. In this connection it is worth refernng sard. It remains to be seen whether the European back to the concems expressed in Mr Baumel's Union will have to adjust to NATO's rules and report on "WEU after the Washington and Col- whether NATO rvill henceforth have to adapt to ogne Summits" in which the Rapporteur said that developments in the EU. neither the Washington nor the Cologne formula 57. The Europeal Council's Cologne Declar- contained a guarantee to the effect that the coun- ation envrsages that all EU member states, re- tries in question would preserve all the rights of gardless of rvhether or not they are members of participation they currenfly enloy in the WEU NATO, will be able to participate fully and on an Council, its subsidiary bodies and the Assembly. equal footing rn EU operations. In respect ofnon- It is therefore up to the Council and the Assem- EU allies and partners, the Declaration says ar- bly to make strong representations to the Euro-

13 DOCUMENT 1667

pean Union to ensure that tlus rmportant WEU call. as Mr Guido Lenzi did u,hen speakurg at a acquis is preserved conference in Stockholm on 29 September 1999 62. This problem also concerns the second as the then Director of the Instrtute for Secunw possibilit)' the EU has for operations that could Studies. that: be carried out under its responsibility, namelv "As far back as 1994, the then foreign those it could now undertake on its own x'ithout ministers of Itall' and the United Krngdom. having recourse to Alliance assets. Until norv the Mr Andreatta and Mr Hurd, referred to the associate members have been part)' to arrange- need to invite non-EU countnes to con- ments gor erning their participation in operations tribute to emerging "second pillar" activi- undertaken independentll, bv WEU. ties rvell before thev could meet the much 63. On this point it is lvorth referring back to more stringent "first pillar" criteria. Wrth the Declaration of the WEU Council of Mrmsters the entrv into force ofthe provisions ofthe of 22 JrtJy 1997, which is an integral part of the Amsterdam Treaty, the issue has become Amsterdam Treatv since it is attached to the even more relevant". Final Act adopted b1'the Intergovernmental Con- 66. It should also be remembered that the As- ference of the fifteen EU member statos in Am- sembly produced a number of reports and re- sterdam on 2 October 1997. Accordrng to that commendations on this subject6. But it norv looks Declaration. and w'ith reference to operations hrghly unlikelv that the EU member states are carried out autonomously or usrng NATO assets prepared to take the WEU model for participa- "associate and capabilities, members take part on tion by the assocrate members and transpose it as the same basis as full members in operations to such to the European Union. In any event they which the1, contnbute, as rvell as in relevant ex- are not going to agree to those countries being ercises and planning". Fufthermore, the Declar- involved in the CFSP on a general basis. Nerther ation says that WEU rrrll also "examine ... the is there anv reason to thmk they rvill agree to possibilities for maximum participation rn rts them taking part in meetings of the General Af- activities bv associate members ... in accordance farrs Council or the COPS rn the same way as with their status". they currently attend meetrngs of the WEU 64. Holever, it can generally be said that the Council of Mimsters and Permanent Council. nerv formula proposed by, the European Council 67. In vierv of the fact that the EU member x'ill result in a substantial enhancement of the states are determrned to continue to rvork rvithin po\\'ers and rights of WEU observer countries the configuration of the Fifteen, all that can be compared to those of the associate members. But hoped for at the present stage is that the associate it would be odd if that w'ere to lead to a situation member countries will be allorved to participate, in which countries refusrng to subscribe to col- possibl1, on at ad hoc basis, rn meetings of the lective defence rvere relarded s,hrle those com- COPS as soon as the EU starts making prepara- miued to it or prepared to enter into such a tions to take a decision on carryrng out a Peters- commitment were penalised. That is why it is berg mrssion in the framervork of the ESDP. absolutely' essential to find a solution that treats Problems will also arise when it comes to rl'ork- the latter category of countries farrly. Accordrng ing out the practical arrangements for staff from to unofficial information, discussions on the fu- such countries to take part in the European ture Ueatment of associate members are alreadl, Military Staff. under rvay. It rvould appear that some members are seeking to improve those counties' acqurs 68. It is also reported that the possrbrlrfl, is within WEU pnor to the transfer of the Organi- being studied of establishing relations betrveen sation's functions to the European Union, where- the European Uruon and the countnes concerned joint as others would prefer to see them reduced. Some along the lines of Schengen, b1, creating people even think that the associate members commrttees lvluch could meet on an ad hoc basis should henceforth be content n'ith a status in the as soon as a specific crisis arose. However, grven EU similar to that currentlv held bv the observ-er 6 countries in WEU. See Recommendation 626 ot "securitl in a wider Europe - repl1'to the annual report ofthe Council", 65 In thrs connection it is appropriate to re- adopted on 18 Ma1' 1998.

t4 DOCUMENT 166?

that such a systcm rvouid concern bilateral rcla- Minister had rn mtnd rvas \\lEU as berng onc tions onl1,, it u'ould constitute a step backwards organisatron too many'. Such statements always compared to the nghts the associate membcrs go dorvn u,cll urth public opiruon, whrch fails to havc acquired in WEU. Turkcy rn particular is recognise that sccuntv and defence decistons are said to have made it quite clear to the European not taken by the institutions as such but rather by, Union that it wishes to maintain the status it en- the member governments. In fact the uxtitutions joys inWEU. are a reflection of the progress Europeans have made so far rn cooperation in various areas. 69. The problem of the future role of WEU's Besides which, it is not WEU as an organisation associate parhers rvhen the European Union which is preventrng the mcmber governments takes responsibility for the rvhole question of from taking the necessary decisions. managing crises merits special attention. The Assembly will be lookrng into this matter in a 72. On this point your Rapporteur agrees rvith report to be submiued on behalf of the Political Mr Barnier, the European Commissioner re- Commiuee by Mr Martinez Casafl and Mr Han- sponsible for reform of the irutitutions, who has cock. For the time being your Rapporteur will expressed the vierv that one should "beware of confine himself to pomtmg out that the EU Presi- those who argue in favow of a simple Europe, dency report adopted by the Cologne European because that would mcan a uniform Europe. A Council does no more than offer the seven coun- certain degree of complexitl' has to be both ac- tries concerned a study of ways to enable them to cepted and advocated"T. parlicipate in EU action, rvithout even taliing as a 73. ln the case of VIEU, it has succeeded in basis the arrangements currently made for them b.t gg together 28 European counries through rn WEU. Moreover, the EU governments do not very close cooperation on security and defence appear to want to give any pnority to solving this matters, and i6 of thern ten firll members and particular problern. - six associate members - are already rvholly '10. One idea being floated is that an arrange- commiued to collectlve defence, whether this bc ment similar to the Partnership for Peace might in WEU and NATO, or solely in NATO. Seven suffice but there again it would only concern bi- central and eastem European countries which are lateral relations with the countries concerned and currently associate partners in WEU are pre- this rvould clearly amount to a watering donn of pared to take part unreservedly in all aspects of the righa the associate parmers enjoy in WEU. It Europe's security and defence system. But be- can be seen from all tlnt has been said that, cause of the restrictions the member countries notrvithstandrng the majority view according to themselves laid doxn in WEU's enlargement which institutional matters are easier to settle policy (even though they rvere under no obliga- than the problem ofhorv to strengthen European tion to do so under the modified Brussels Trea- military capabilities, the insututional path map- ty), they lct slip the oppornrniti'to give Europe a ped out by the European Council has so many security and defence dimension u"ithin the frame- rmplications tlrat one ma1'u'ell ask rvhsther the work of WEU without warting for completion of underlf ing objective of improving the decision- the extremely length1, and complex process of EU maling procedure in Europe, could not be ach- and/or NATO enlargement. ieved by takrng a less complicated approach. 74. The positron rn the European Union, horvever, is different. Because of its membership, the 7 | . There is no doubt that one of the intentions Union which includes five countries that still of those who drafted the Cologne Declaratron - have fundamental reservations about an EU se- was to srnplify the process of buildrng Europe curity and defence dimension continues to ex- by reducing the number of organisations. A tlpi- - perience great difficulty in implementing a Com- cal example of this approach can be seen in the mon Foreign and Secunty Policy (CFSP). There comments made by Mr Schalping, thc German are tlree rcasons u'hv Europe has so far been Mrnister for Defence, at the press conference incapablc of taking action. given at the close of the WEU Ministerial Coun- cil meeting in Bremen on 10-11 May 1999, n'hen he sard there were 'too many institutions and too 1 Iittle action". It rvas clear that the urstitution the Le i[onde, l4 October 1999

15 DOCUMENT 1667

- the first is that the EU member gov- cific arrangements. particularlv for srtuations rn emments do not want WEU to act wluch the EU rvishes to conduct operations using without a prior decision by the EU in NATO assets and capabilities, rvhere the practi- the context of the CFSP; cal arrangements still have to be decided. the second is that European - the Umon 78. But u'hat is important is the need to ensure is not capable of taking the appropriate that fruitful political cooperation in a general decisions: and sense develops betrveen the EU and NATO, - the third is that each time a crisrs be- rrhose cultures and working methods are very gins to emerge, it rvould seem that the different. With this rn mind the Atlantic Alliance majonty of governments prefer to act chose the follouing wording in Washington: ''... through the urtermediary of NATO, NATO and the EU should ensure the develop- ufuch alone up till now has proved that ment of effective mutual consultation, coopera- it has a proper decision-makmg cap- tion and transparency. burldrng on the mecha- abilrty and the means to take effective msms existing betrveen NATO and the WEU". action. If Mr Scharping's comments On the European Union side, however, it is not are justified, it would be logical to the Cologne Declaration proper but the Presi- leave all securitl, and defence problems, dency report attached to it which stresses "the including cnsis management, exclu- need to ensrue the del'elopment of effective mu- sively to NATO although this is not the tual consultation. cooperation and transparency objective beurg pursued by the Fifteen. bets.een NATO and the EU".

75. The British Government's change of atti- 79. Although it is true that the wording used tude in favour of a policl, designed to make the by the German Presidency is virtually identical to European Union capable of taking action in the that contained rn the Washington Communiqu6, it field of cnsis management does not alter its fun- does not mention NATO's desire to build on the damental reservations about any prospect of a arrangements that already exist between it and common defence or "European army". In fact its WEU in the context of its relations rvith the EU. effect is to bring the United Kingdom's position It is of course too early to delve further into the closer to that of the non-allied countries in the details, uhich wrll have to be negotiated betrveen EU even though their arguments are very differ- NATO and the European Uruon. Because EU ent. members include non-allied countries, special arrangements will have to be made for them to 76. This situation has therefore led to a new have access to confidential documents and to policv in the EU, wluch is trying to find a solu- participate on an equal footing in military plan- tion in the rapid dismemberment of WEU and its ning functions. But such an approach may well not Some anall,sts tlunk only weaken the basis of collective securitl. but 80. that the EU wished to avoid being obliged put also create new drviding lines across Europe. to its relations urth the Atlantic Alliance on the same technical level as III. The conditions to be met those s'luch currently exist betrveen WEU and for "But giving proper effect to the Cologne project NATO: nhat the European Union rvants is to operate on a political level u'here the militarv 77. If the Cologne documents are taken as a factors are onlv one component in decision-mak- starting pornt, they can be built on to develop a ing alongside political and economic aspects"8. prograrnme that will achieve the objective berng 81. If this assessment is correct, it is important sought. One of the main consequences of the to grasp the sigruficance, for transatlantic rela- European Council's projec! which is the logical tions in general and relatrons between the Euro- sequel to the decisions taken by the Atlantic Alli- pean Union and the United States in particular, ance in Washington, is that WEU wrll cease to be an important bridge betrveen the European Union and NATO and that those trvo organisatrons wrll 8 See Jacques Walch "Defence Europe after Wash- establish direct workrng relations. This means ington and Cologne" in Difense nafionale, 25 June they will need to rvork out and implement spe- 1999.

16 DOCL]MENT 1667 of the far greater repercussions that will result European side until WEU completes the second from the EU takurg over WEU functions. When phase of the audit of assets and capabilities it comes to international trade, the European available for European-led operations, which Umon and the United States are competitors could lead to agreement being reached on the rather than partners. As we saw recently, certain measures needed to strenglhen them. conflicts in trading interests senously damaged 84. If Europeans are not prepared to make an relations between them Up norv, securiq' and till effort in their own military budgets, the likely' defence matters have not been affected by outcome is that the tntentions announced in Col- transatlantic tussles over trade because they have ogne will go no further than that. It is for this been exclusive prerogative of NATO and the reason that the United Kingdom and Italy agreed, WEU at a bilateral summit held on 19-20 July this 82. But even if one looks at secunt-v and de- year, to propose to their European partners the fence policy alone, leavtng other considerations launch of a European defence capabilities initia- aside, there are some w'ho think that transferring tive. WEU's functrons to the European Union will put 85. Refemng to the objectives set by the Col- such pressure on a European security policy to ogne European Council, the United Kingdom and rvork successfully that it could become an urgent Italy therefore propose to set cnteria for im- European structures could grorv in pnonty and proved and strengthened European defence cap- stature compared with transatlantic structures. abilities and effective performance, to be dis- influence the European deci- The US desrre to cussed and agreed at the Luxembourg WEU grow in response sion-malong process could also mrnisterial meetrng and the Helsinki European formation of a to Amencan fears about the Council before the end of the year. Tlus ap- "caucus". Handling transatlantic rela- European proach will include a timetable to achieve, inter absence of the bridge provided by tions in the aha, the follorving: WEU would therefore require a great deal of diplomac1,e. "European-uide goals for enhanced military capabilities to undertake crisis importarrt questions the Euro- 83. One of the management, including peacemaking, pean Union rull have to settle wrth NATO is horv the EU intends to acquire the capacity for national capabilitv objectives to ach- autonomous action in the ways descnbed in ieve this European aim". horv paragraph 2 of the Cologne Declaration, and Although it would appear that the idea of defin- this will fit in with the efforts the Atlantic Alli- ing "convergence cnteria", a concept that was make vieu' of the fact that the gov- ance is to in applied in the creation ofthe single currency, has 19 member countries re- ernments of the NATO not been discussed in detail among the Fifteen, it new mis- cently adopted a vast programme of is an essential requirement for giving more crisis manage- sions for NATO rn the field of credibilrtl'to the European Union's stated inten- some of them consider should be the ment, which tions. main tasks of the 'herv" NATOlo. So that it can take on these responsibilrties, which supplement 86. Contrnuing and effective political rmpetus those of collective defence, the Washington in the field of armaments is another such re- Summit adopted a defence capabilities rrutiative quirement. The Cologne Declaration recognises containing a uhole senes of measures the mem- the need for closer industnal cooperation, the ber countries are to take in the NATO frame- harmonisauon of military requirements, and the work. Nothing comparable can be done on the planning and procurement of arms by the member states, but does not say rvho should be given responsibilrty for providing the impetus. In this connection the problem of the future place and e See also Matthias Dembinski: ''The strain on se- role of WEAG and the question of its member- curity policy relatrons between European and trans- ship is taking on increasing relevance. These is- atlantic structures" in HSFK Report, 111999. 10 sues are dealt rvith in detarl in the report on See the address given by the German Chancellor, "Armaments cooperation in the future construc- Gerhard Schroder, to the German foreign affairs tion of defence in Europe", to be submiued by association in Berltn on 2 September 1999.

t7 DOCUMENT 166'7

Mr O'Hara on behalf of the Technological and exrsting treaties and institutrons if the govern- Aerospace Committee. ments continue to follow the path mapped out in the Cologne Declaration. Under the Amsterdam 87. From the political angle, your Rapporteur Treaty, u'hich only recentlv entered into force, it would stress the importance of Mr O'Hara's re- seems clear that the signatorv states can create port and consrders it important to highlight the new bodies without berng obliged to amend the following points: Treaty.

- the decision taken by the WEAG de- 91. But the Treaty has to be amended if: fence ministers in November 1997 to (a) rntends open the Group's activities to any in- the EU to change the decision- making procedure terested WEU observer and associate that currently applies (includrng partner countnes; under the CFSP the ESDP);

the agreement of principle whereby the (b) the EU wishes to give the COPS observers and new associate members powers of decision: are accorded the status of fi.rll member @ the EU henceforth wishes to take ac- in WEAG; tion in the field of Petersberg missions the need for a forum with a political rvithout having recourse to WEU, and to drmension that would be under the di- decide on military aspects itself; rection of the relevant defence ministers (d) the EU wishes to exlend to the field of and open to all European countries in- secunt_v and defence the possibilities for volv'ed in the development of the Euro- closer cooperation for which Article 43 pean Secunty and Defence Identit_v makes provision; (ESDD @ the EU is tlunking in terms of adapt- 88. ln this respect, it is particularly important ing the current system of democratic scru- to ensure that it is the political question, forum in tiny to the new situation. operating in an intergovernmental framework, which takes decisions concerning militarl. re- It also has to be borne rn mind that, in its present quirements and the planrung and procurement of form, the Amsterdam Treaty does not contain arms, and also issues invitations to tender to the any provision goveming relations with NATO defence industry. ln its current form WEAG is that can be likened to Article IV of the modified perfect for carrying out this task, wlule the Euro- Brussels Treaty. pean Commission plays an imporfant role in 92. As far as the future of the modified Brus- strengtherung rndustrial cooperation. sels Treaty is concerned, the onl1, thing on wluch 89. Anv plan to transfer responsibility for ar- the EU member goverrments agreed was that the maments cooperation to the European Union commitments entered into under Article V will be must take on board the following criteria: preserved for the member states parff to the Treaty. Although no decision was taken on the decisions concerning military require- future of the Treaty as a whole, it appears from ments must be taken under the EU's the information your Rapporteur was able to intergovernmental pillar; obtain from various sources during the visits he care must be taken to ensure that made in preparation for the present report, that there is WEAG firll members c€ur continue to unlikely to be any denunciation or revision of the Treaty. enjoy all their current rights in the While the drscussioir is con- event of such a transfer to a new insti- tinuing on the possibility of transfemng certarn tutional structure. parts of the modified Brussels Treaty, such as Artrcle IV and even Article V, to the Treaty on 90. Given that WEAO is a subsidiary body of European Union, the most likely outcome - in the WEU Council rvithin the meaning of Article uew of the very different positions of the mem- VIII.2 of the modified Brussels Treaty, its future ber countries - is that the Treaty will remain in place and remit are part of the more general force in its present form. In ttris connection it is problem of deciding uhat is to become of the important to take note of paragraph I of the

l8 DOCTA4ENT 7667

Council's reply to Recommendation 644 on 96 In such a case the Council rvould be "WEU after the Washington and Cologne obliged to include in its annual report all the Summits" in which it say,s it is "of the opinion EU's activities under the CFSP in so far as they that the modrfied Brussels Treaty continues to formed part of the Council's area of competence form a valuable part of the European security in pursuance of Article MII of the modified architecture, ffid that the obligations ansing Brussels Treatl'. In this wa1'the WEU Assembly therein should continue to constitute an element would have a possibility, albeit an rndirect one, in the development of European security and de- of overseeing CFSP activities. It is true that such fence". a solution rvould not be ideal and a way of rn- volvrng the Assembly more directly in CFSP ac- 93. If one accepts this wordrng, which is nev- tivities will have to be sought. However, it would ertheless very vague and cautious, it could be be one way of ensuring that a transfer of WEU's argued from a legal point of view that the contin- functions to the European Union did not iead to ued existence of the Treaty would also mean the the Assembly berng totally excluded from the continuation of the WEU Council and Assembly nerv CFSP activities. and their activities. However, the Cologne approach tends to strengthen the viervs of those 97. But there is another aspect that cannot be who are convinced that once the institutional ar- overlooked rf the modified Brussels Trea[ - and rangements envisaged in the European Uruon are wrth it Article VIII - remain rn force. The rvord- in place, the modrfied Brussels Trealv could ing of that article is extremely flexible and gives continue to exist on paper but no organisation the High Contracting Parties everv latitude to will be required to oversee its applicatron. decide how and in what institutional framervork they wish to organise the WEU Council as long 94. It is important to know how the signatory as it is "so organised as to be able to exercise its states now intend to firlfil their obligations under functions contrnuously". There is therefore every paragraphs 1 to 4 of Article MII of the modified reason to think that the goverffnents u'ill decide Brussels Treat1,, on the basis of lvhich the WEU to go ahead with the transfer of certain functions Council was created If the Council continued to of WEU to the European Union, rvrth the possi- exist solely on paper without any specific activi- bilrty of members of the new Political and Secu- ties, there would be no point rn convening the riry- Commiuee and members of the WEU Per- Assembly to oversee them. It is certaurly con- manent Council wearing two hats. The COPS, in ceivable that certain subsidiary bodies of the WEU configuration, and the new General Affairs Council, one such being WEAO, rvill continue Council, in the same configuration, could thus be their activities outside the EU framework, but it given responsibilrtl' for rmplementing the provi- is difficult to imagine the WEU Assembly confin- sions of Article VIII of the modified Brussels ing itself to scrutinising a few residual activities Treat_v. and monitoring the application of an Article V that existed only on paper. What sort of annual 98. Such an arrangement would tie in neatly report could a Council w'hich no longer had any with the rationale of appornting Mr Solana, Sec- activities make to the Assembly in that sort of retary-General of the EU Council and High Rep- situation? resentative for the CFSP, to the post of WEU Secretary-General. However, there is no certainty 95 Agai, on the assumption that the modified that all the governments will wish to fall in rvrth Brussels Treaty will be presewed, it would be that rationale rn the present situation. perfectly feasible for the Council to decrde to transfer the exercise of the competence @ut not 99. Indeed, in his address to the June session the competence itself) it has for cnsis manage- of the Assembly, Mr Verheugen suggested that a ment as conferred upon it under Article MII to number of governments, rncluding the German the appropriate institutions that will henceforth Government were in favour of an arrangement come under the ESDP (it irrll be remembered whereby, since WEU's functions would be taken that the Council transferred the exercise of its over by the European Union under the CFSP, competence for social and cultural affairs to the they would be subject to scrutrny b1,the Euro- Council of Europe ln 1960, and for economic af- pean Parliament alone b1, virtue of the Amster- fairs to the European Community in 1970). dam Treaty provisions governing the Parha-

19 DOCLMENT 1667 ment's powers in the field of the CFSP. Under an)'more than the WEU Assembly can control those provisions, the European Parliament's those of the WEU Council. While both assem- powers in that area are more hmited than the pre- blies exist only to be rnformed and consulted and rogatives currentlv exercised by the WEU As- to formulate proposals, there are nonetheless im- sembly vis-ir-vis the Council on the basis of Art- portant differences betvveen them: icle lX of the modified Brussels Treat1,. Wlule it is true that the European Parliament has pre- the WEU Council is obliged to make an rogatives concerning budgetary control over the annual report on its activities to the As- EU's activities, thel' apply above all in the sembly rvhereas no such obligation ex- Commumt_v sphere although this could nonethe- ists rn the European Union; less give the Parliament some influence over - the European Parliament has no com- operations conducted rn the intergovemmental petence in the field of defence. As it sits sphere where these rvere funded out of the Com- exclusively at 15, it rvould be difficult munity budget. But that is not sufficient to claim for it to exert any influence uhere the (as Mr Verheugen did in his address to the As- EU decides to carry out a Petersberg sembly) that the European Parliament would mrssion using the assets of the Atlantic have more nghts in the field of the CFSP than the Alliance and/or where non-EU mem- Assembly in its relations with the WEU Council. bers of NATO take part in such a mis- i00. In vierv of the fact that some governments sion; are opposed to increasrng the European Parlia- the WEU Assembly is a forum rn ment's powers in the field of the CFSP, abolish- which, as a result of the intergovern- ing the WEU Assembly rvould clearly undermrne mental nature of defence policy, 28 democratic scrutiny of securiw and defence mat- European countries debate security and ters, rvhich is unacceptable. Moreover, when it defence issues; comes to monitoring European actilrties in rvhat Assemblv's is a strictly intergovernmental sphere, a transfer the members are elected parliamentanans in their of the Assembl-v-'s areas of competence to the own countries European Parliament would constitute an in- where they are able to exercise parliamentary control over military decisions. firngement of the fundamental pnnciple of de- mocrac)' representation, through accordrng to 103. But it is also true that the European Parl- which scrutrny European of activities based on iament urll not be content with the limited role sovereign decrsions of the member states should the Treatv on European Union assigns to it in the be exercised by a parliamentary body.made up of field of the CFSP and will certaml1, propose members parliaments of the of the states in ques- amendments to the Treaty during the Intergov- tion, as is the case in the Assembly of WEU. It is ernmental Conference, wrth a view to securing therefore essential, in working to achieve ob- the nider porvers. The questionnarre it sent to Mr jectives set in Cologne, to arrive at an equitable Solana prior to his hearing on 25 October 1999 arra.ngement for the parliamentary dimension of in Strasbourg before its Commrttee on Foreign Europe's future securiw and defence system. Affairs. Human Rrghts and the Common Secu- 101. The special session the Assembly held on nty'and Defence Policy, glves some indication as 18-19 October 1999 Luxembourg in and the to the Parliament's intentions. The last question adoption "the of Order 108 on parliamentary read as follows: dimension of European security and defence: the ''Once challenge for Europe after Cologne" provided an the WEU's tasks have been taken opporruruq,to give these problems a public focus over by the EU, will it not be necessar), to and dralv them to the attention of policy-makers have democratic control over this policy before the decision-making process on rvhich the by securing a clear role for the European governrnents have embarked moves too far Parliament rn morutoring the development ahead. which rvill affect it?"

102. It is true that at the present time the Euro- 104. At its special session in Luxembourg, in pean Parliament cannot exercise any democratic which a delegation from the European Parliament control as such over activities under the CFSP. took part. the Assembl), set itself the objective of

20 DOCIJ]UENT 1667 looking into appropnate arrangements for coop- 108. Improving the decisron-making process is eration wrth the European Parliament on the ba- a more complicated matter. In point of fact, it is sis of the complementant-v of their respective not the number of organisations that prevents the areas of competence. The EP representatives governments from taking the necessary decisions welcomed this approach but it is not yet known to handle a cnsis. The real problem will not be what the Parliament's reaction urll be. In any solved by transfemng WEU's decision-makrng event, the idea of collective participation by na- responsibilitl'to the CFSP. it wrll be no easier to tional parliaments, along the lines of the take decisions under the CFSP than it is in WEU, COSAC, for the purpose of exercising scrutiny given that both apply the pnnciple of unanimity, over the European security and defence policy requinng the agreement of all participants. would not seem to be a satisfactory solution. 109. In the absence ofany real leadership, such 105. The action the Assembll' decides to take as exists in the Atlantic Alliance rvhere the will depend on how the European Parliament sees United States plays a domrnant role, the Euro- its oun role in this area. If it considers it should pean Union will find that rvhen it rvishes to take have an exclusive prerogatlve as regards securitl' action under the CFSP, it wili have the same dif- and defence matters, then steps will have to be ficulty in obtaining the necessarl' consensus as taken to ensure that the Intergovernmental Con- WEU does at present. In view of the fact that ference takes account of the parliamentar)' di- there are more fulI members in the EU (15 as mension in its discussions in such a way as to against 10 in WEU), those difficulties could be accommodate the national parliaments' collective even greater. On the other hand, it must also be interest in monitoring government activities in the borne in mrnd that after WEU drsappears, the sphere ofsecurity and defence. To that end, pro- pressure from public opimon on EU bodies to vision rvould have to be made in the Trealv on prove the;'can act credibly could strengthen the European Union for the creation of a chamber member states' political resolve to meet that ex- made up of national parliamentanans. pectation.

1 10. But to be put under pressure to succeed is 106. ln order for the Cologne project as a whole no guarantee of success. Additional measures to be successful, it is important to note that the lrill be needed to increase the chances of that first step consists in achieving the following main happenrng The most difficult challenge is to re- objectives: open the debate on the introduction of rules on (a) strenglhening European military ca- qualified majorit_v voting in a decision-making pabilities; process. Germany is one of the most ardent sup- porters of such a change. So far no initiative rn (b) giving Europe a decision-makrng ca- this area has stood the slightest chance of being paclty enabling it to act quickly enough adopted. But even though this is a particularly when a crisis erupts. sensitive matter, it has to be realised that the 107. The solution to the problem of horv to more members there are in the European institu- strengthen mrlitary capabilities does not depend tions, the more urgent it will become to find a on the settlement of institutional issues and can solution to the problem of the votrng method. therefore be dealt rvrth in the frameworks created Any'change to the method that rs incorporated in for this purpose. In tlus respect the Cologne the Treatl' on European Union could easily be Declaration and the British-Italian Joint Declara- applied in WEU since Article VIII of the modi- tion could be very useful for giving the process a fied Brussels Treaty already makes provision for political impetus. It is not necessary to amend the voting procedures, other than that of unammiq', treaties to make Europe ''operational" ard auto- as mav have been or may be agreed. nomous in this area but llhat does need to be 111. In this connection it should also be noted done is to ensure there is a common political uill. that even in the field of defence, Article MII.4 of The lessons drawn from the Kosovo conflict the modified Brussels Treatl'makes provision for probably do a great deal more to generate that a number of rules on qualified ma1onty voting will than anl. speech advocating grand designs, where decisions are to be taken in application of or anv orgarusational project. the Protocols annexed to the Treaty These range

2l DOCLMENT 1667

from a vote by a simple maJont, to one by a two- highly expedrent to seek solutions that allow the thrrds majont-v In the European Umon the pos- objectives to be achieved while making as ferv sibilrty of constructive abstention already exists changes as possible to the treaties. The transi- but does not apply in the case of matters having tional period, during which intenm solutions mav military or defence implications. be applied, is an important opporfumt_v for the Assembly to float ideas and submit appropnate ll2. [n contrast, the principle of constructive proposals for the IGC discussions. abstention has already'been applied de facto n action taken by WEU during the first and second IV The tosk facing WEU and its Assembly Gulf wars, as a result of the flexibilrty of Article of the modified Brussels Treatv. However, VIII.3 116. A paticular feature of WEU as an organi- problem the voting is not the onlv one that has to sation is that it includes all those European There is problem be resolved. also the of the very countries prepared to commrt themselves u,ithout working methods hare developed in drfferent that reservation to the task of building securiq' and and the EU. an organisation act WEU If is to defence Europe, which is already becoming a rapidly and effectively rn the face of a crisis that reality that transcends the framervork of the member states, threatens the securitv of its it European Union as it is today. But the joint pol- must be extremely flexible. But all the EU rnsti- icy of WEU and the EU since the Maastricht tutions work on a very formal legal basis and Treatv has been to bring the trvo organisations seek solve problems drau'rng outline to by up closer together so that WEU becomes an integral prograrnmes procedures and together rvith direc- part of the development of the European Union legal provisions tives containing and wording. and in its own specific area a forerunner, as rt 113. This highly formal legal approach in the were, of tomorrow's European Union. EU institutions can be seen in the highly complex 117. Nevertheless, the fact that WEU has been procedure that has been follorved in the rare separate from the European Union until norv has cases to date where the European Uruon has had its advantages in that: availed itself of WEU to request it to elaborate and implement an EU decision havrng mrlitary it has been possible for WEU to be implications. The most stnkrng example is the used as an essential element of the de- complexity of the modus operandt and the flow- velopment of the European Securiq, chart for cooperation betw'een WEU and the and Defence Identrty (ESDD within the European Union in the event of a crisis, rvhich Alliance: are annexed to the arrangements concluded between WEU and the EU to lmprove cooperation it has made WEU - at least for an in- ''alternat- betrveen the trvo orgaru.sations. A study of those tenm penod - an important documents sometimes gir-es the impression that ive" or "staging post" for all those they were drau.n up with a clear intention to European countries rvhose accession to show that cooperation will never be feasible. the EU and/or NATO still poses major problems, by givrng them the possibil- 114. All this goes to shovv that the working rty of playing a full part in its rvork on methods in WEU and the European Union are securiw and defence matters; profoundly different. In this respect, WEU has an important responsibilrty to ensure that it transfers it has enabled EU countries pursuing a to the relevant EU bodies a method of rvork that policv of non-alignment to drarv closer ui1l enable them to react to a given cnsis urth the to NATO, and necessan' flexibilitv and speed. in doing so, it has created the right

1 1 5 . Finallv, account must be taken of the diffi- condrtions for building defence Europe culties that can be anticipated r,vhen it comes to with the full participation of all the in- amending the Amsterdam Treatv at the forthcom- terested countries, regardless ofthe fact rng Intergovernmental Conferencc. u,here secu- that thel' have to meet all the requisite nty and defence matters are not the main subject conditions before qualifring for admis- on the agenda. In order to keep the necessary sion to the EU's first, second and third amendments dorr,n to a minimum, it u'ould be pillars.

22 DOCLJMENT 166']

118. Follou'ing the Cologne decisions to de- I23. Such a policy would considerabll' streng- velop a common European secunt-v and defence then the ESDI and allow defence Europe to bring policy (ESDP) in the smgle frameu'ork of the more influence to bear in the Alliance. European Union- not including collective defence 124. WEU still has an important task to com- for the time being, the countries entitled to play a plete in its configuration at 28 since it lvould ap- full part in this project are automatically reduced pear that the enlargement of NATO on the one to the 15 EU member states. hand and the European Union on the other are 119. As only the 15 EU member states have a not going to proceed at the same pace or in the right of decision in the field of the CFSP, WEU same direction. Whereas NATO could open up to still has an important task ahead of it in order to south-eastern Europe, it looks as though the Bal- ensure that the ESDP develops in harmony' rvith tic states have a real chance ofjoining the Euro- the ESDI in the Alliance- in rvhich a number of pean Union. Grven tlus situation, the WEU non-EU countnes are tnvolved. Given the Euro- Council should conduct a studl- of the role the pean Umon's determination to preserve a single various components of the modified Brussels rnstitutional framervork in all its areas of activitl', Treatl' and WEU, as an organisation. can still it rvould be drfficult for it to replace WEU as an play in Europe's current securiry' architecture by essential element of the ESDI. If WEU as an or- identifi'ing, among other things, aw aspects that ganisation were to disappear, NATO q'ould take cannot be covered by either the European Union on sole responsibility for the ESDI as conceived or NATO. at present. Establishing direct relations betrveen the EU and NATO would not change tlus sirua- 125. Such a contribution is essential for the tlon. authorities considering how to implement the decisions taken in the Cologne Declaration to have 120. regards WEU's other missions, de- As a better grasp of the impact of those decisions scribed in paragraph ll8, the decision taken in and, rvhere appropriate, to seek other solutions Cologne to drarv a clear distinction bet*'een the common European Security and Defence Policy 126. As u,ell as assisting the European Union in (ESDP) and collectrve defence. in other words to that way. the WEU Council should immediately carve up WEU's various functtons, wrll probabll' draw up an inventory of the tasks that u'rll con- compromise once and for all an), chance there trnue to be its responsibility under the Treatl' was of aclueving defence Europe at 28 more once responsibiliq' for Petersberg tasks has been rapidll'than an enlarged European Union. From fully transferred to bodres in the EU. This will no\\, on, the pace rvrll be dictated b1' considera- entail workrng out the practical implications of tions that have nothing to do rvith secunty and the Council's reply to Recommendation 644, defence proper. which confirms that the modified Brussels Treaty continues to form a valuable part of the Euro- l2l. WEU as an "alternative" solution and a pean secunq, architecture and that the obliga- "staging post" will become far less attractive to tions arisrng therein should continue to constitute countries, such as Turkcl'. rvhich will not be able an element in the det'elopment of European se- to join the EU for a long time to come. Moreover. curity and defence. this nerv state of affairs has removed all 1ustifi- policy WEU has been cation for the enlargement 127 ln general terms, the member governments u'hich a coun- following untrl norv, according to of WEU should therefore consider the Treaty not EU and try had to be a member of both the merelv as a relic of the past that conttnues to ex- Brus- NATO in order to accede to the modified rst simply'because agreement cannot be reached sels Treatl. on puttrng an end to it. but as an instrument that I22. If the European Union refuses to become a may prove useful for setthng problems that can- mrlitan alliance and sees itself first and foremost not be settled elservhere. In this respect the pro- as a power for peace. there is now nothing to vision contained in Article XI on the conditions prevent WEU inviting all the European countries for enlargement could take on a new dimension in of the Atlantic Alliance (as WEU associate mem- relation to the problems that u'ill arise regarding bers) to accede to the modified Brussels Treatl' the associate members' and associate partners' and hence to subscnbe to Artrcle V. involvement rn the Cologne process.

23 DOCLMENT 1667

128. As far as armaments cooperation is con- 132. One partrcular problem that will arise concerned, it is to be noted that the WEAG mimsters cems the future place of Europe's arms export are already working on arrangements for opening policy'. wluch is currently restricted in practice to up this area to all those natlons in the WEU fam- the Fifteen. In the interests of consistency wrth ilv interested in participating. cooperation on a[nrlments. it is to be recom- mended that thrs problem be discussed 129. In tlus respect, vour Rapporteur uishes to in the wider framework of WEU and WEAG. stress that Recommendatron 626 on "secunty in a rvider Europe"ll Recommendation and 639 on 133. In the present post-Cologne interim situa- ''the political and legal consequences of WEU's tlon. appropriate arrangements must be found to enlargement take in non-signatory to countnes of prevent any weakening in WEU's capacity to act the modified Brussels Treat\,"lr remain as rele- as an operational instrument dunng the period of vant as ever. The need to a solid legal basis build negotiatrons leading up to the new structures en- for armaments cooperation. open to an)' inter- visaged by the European Council. In that context, ested nation belonging to the WEU famrly ard the WEU Secretary-6eneral is to be applauded given rmpetus by an effective political forum, has for his comments at the Luxembourg special greater become even followrng the Washrngton session to the effect that: "It is clear that WEU and Cologne Summits and the entry into force of still has an important part to plav, and it would the Amsterdam Trea['. be dangerous to empt_v of their substance the 130. In vierv of the number of countries inter- structures currentlv in existence at WEU, prema- ested in such cooperation - far more than the 15 turely, before effective permanent structures have EU member states - the legal basis rvtuch should been set up rvithin the European Union". be chosen for this purpose rs the modrfied Brus- 131. Tlus note of rvarmng is most apt at a time sels Treaty'and the 11 May 1955 Agreement on uhen the conflict rn East Trmor and the latest the status of WEU. This u'ould not only pro.i.rde war in Chechnya have served as a reminder to additional legal ammunition for the political mo- Europe that Kosovo xrll not be the last crisis and mentum rvhich should be generated by the rele- that it must be prepared to tackle other emergen- vant mimsters, but wouid also ensure that, on the cies. At the same time, American representatives parliamentary side, the process is morutored and have again rvarned Europe that the United States given a further fillip by the WEU Assembly. is becoming rncreasingly frustrated about having 131. This would not stand in the way of in- to bear the major share of the burden of ensuring creased activrt_v on the parr of the appropnate EU transatlantic security. authorities in those areas of armarnents cooperation w-hich affect Community aspects proper. 135. Whereas cooperation between WEU and WEU could even propose that the EU avail itself NATO with a view to making the necessary ar- of the instruments of the Trea[' on European rangements for European operations under the Union to develop a common strategy for Euro- political control and strategic drrection of WEU pean capabilities that are to be used for crisis- and using NATO assets appears to be fairly well management operations. Converselv, it has to be advanced, work on cooperation betrveen WEU realised that any ideas about a wholesale transfer and the European Union in the event of a crisis is of all the dimensions of armaments cooperation still proving exlremely, complicated and very to the second EU pillar, under the supervision of slow. The first part of the 45th annual report of a Council of Defence Ministers, is bound to the Council to the Assembly on the activities of throrv up the problem of the participation of the Council provides some rnterestrng informa- countries that are not members of the European tion in this respect. Union. 136. In the first place, the arrangements for enhanced cooperation bets'een the EU and WEU, in pursuance of the Protocol to Article 17 of the 11 Treaty on European Union, came rnto force at Adopted by the Assembly on 18 May 1998, see the same time as the Treaty itself. The Document 1602. flowchart 12 cooperation between Adopted by the Assembly on 2 December 1998, on the trvo organisations, see Document 1625. annexed to the document setting out the arrange-

24 DOCLMENT 1667 ments, is exlremely complicated as it is, even permit its various bodies to implement that deci- without takrng account of NATO's involvement sion. in the process. To make things worse, the docu- l4l. It is also clear from the arurual report of ment appears to be serving as an arbitrator rn the Council that the informal reflection on Euro- some sort of competition between the European pean secunq' and defence is continuing and that Umon and WEU on the subject of the "emer- it is not confined to an audit of existrng capabili- gence of a crisis situation and its evaluation". ties. The Assembly can but urge the Council to 137. For the first phase it states that: "In view take this reflection further and inform it of the of the broader scope of means of action available conclusions to be draun. It particularly rvel- to the EU, it is likely that the more comprehen- comes the Council's statement in its report re- sive assessment of the situation and, if needed, gardrng "the need for WEU to be operationally the development of a comprehensive approach effective, u'rth the involvement and participation for addressing the emergrng cnsis, will take place of all WEU nations in accordance wrth their in the EU". But at the same time it also states stafus". that: "The WEU Council may also take the ini- As far as the institutional changes to be tiative to seise the Council of the EU of a crisis I42. made in the European Umon are concerned, the situation and to provrde the EU uith assessments Council should, among other things, rede- and options for action as far as its oun area of WEU fine its own future and the tasks incumbent upon responsibilitl, is concerned". In the second phase, as a result of its obligations under Article MII the European Union becomes more closely in- it modified Brussels Treaty, particularly in volved in the matter, which it refers first to the of the respect the missions assigned to the EU Gen- Political Committee and COREPER, and possl- of eral Affairs Council and to the Political and Se- blv also the European Council, before the Gen- cunty Commrttee (COPS) w'hich is to be created. eral Affairs Council is able to take a decision. In carryrng out such an assessment, the Council i 3 8. In this connection, the first part of the 45th should concentrate on the future application of annual report ofthe Council refers to a decision Article \rIII.1 uhich refers to matters concerning it took concerning the EU document on an initial the execution of the Treaty. It would also be ex- list of types of situation in which the EU may pedient for it to study its future composition, avail itself of WEU and on the basis of wluch takrng account ofthe provisions of paragraph 2 meetings are held betrveen the relevant WEU and and the decision-makrng structures to be set up in EU bodies, among other thrngs for the purpose of the European Union. Particular thought u'ill need strengthening cooperation between the WEU to be given to the future application of para- Military Staff and the European Union. graph 3, u'hich will continue to be fully relevant 139. As the annual report does not provide any rn the event of a cnsis. information on the content of the relevant dis- 143 The Council may decide to alter the voting cussions, it is impossible to say whether the cur- procedure, as Article VIII.4 authorises it to do, rent arrangements have any chance of being ap- taking into account changes tlat have been made plied in the event of an unforeseeable crisis. The in other European bodies or even in anticipation discussions that are under way wrth a vierv to the of such changes. Furthermore, it should study EU taking drrect charge of all Petersberg opera- rval's of ensuring the application in the future of tions merely complicate matters further. Articles ry, V and, in particular, IX. It also 140. ln this transitional period it is once again needs to revise its current enlargement policy on necessary to make the point that, ut view of the the basis of Article XI. In this connection the difficulties the European Uruon currently has in Assembll, fully shares the opinion the Council avarllrg itself of WEU in a cnsis and the time it ex?resses in its reply to Recommendation 644. irt rvill take before the EU is able to take action on u'hich it states that "the modified Brussels Treaty its own, WEU must preserve all its operational continues to form a valuable part of the Euro- capabilrties that are based on the modified Brus- pean secunty architecture and that the obliga- sels Treaty (Article VIII.3) and on the procedures tions ansing therein should continue to constitute it has established to enable its Council to take an an element rn the development of European se- appropriate decisron in response to a crisis and to cunty and defence".

25 DOCLMENT 1667

144. When appointing Mr Solana as the neu, on the basis of the pnncrples of complementarity WEU Secretary-General. the Council should take and reciprocity. In view of the complextty and all the steps necessary to enhance the Secretary- importance of this matter, it u'ould be highly' de- General's status - rn the same wa-v as was pro- sirable for the WEU Assembll' and the European posed in the Chirac-Schroder letter for the post Parliament to reach agreement on joint proposals Mr Solana holds in the European Union. Estab- dunng the first half of 2000. The Assemblv's lishing close relations betu,een the Assembll' and prelimrnary contacts u,ith the nerv European Parlia- the nerv Secretan-General u'ill be beneficial for ment. the participatron of an EP delegatron in its the Organisation as a rvhole. special session and the presence of an Assembly deiegation at Mr Solana's hearing before the EP As Assembh', must and 145 for the it first Commiuee on Forergn Affarrs- Human Rigtrts foremost continue to fulfil all the tasks conferred and the Common Security' and Defence Policy upon it bv Article IX of the Treaq,. On this point are all to be seen as encouraging signs. the Council's statement in its reply to Recom- mendation 644 to the effect that it rs "conscious V Conclusions of the importance of the parliamentan, dimension The Bremen to the debate on European secunt_v and defence" 149. Washington. and Cologne de- is to be rvelcomed. For as long as the Treaw ex- clslons shorv that Europeans have reached a crossroads and have ists, the Assembh'must above all else continue to to choose betrr-een a number remind the Council of all its contractual obliga- of options. One of these. rvluch is currently pop- tions and must urge it to keep up all the activities ular with the heads of state and government of resulting from them. ln addition. the Assembly the Fifteen, is to achieve a European secunfi- and should continue to involve its associate members defence capabilitl' rn the srngle framework of the and associate partners more closely in its u'ork, European Uruon, leal,rng aside collective defence not to mention the delegations of the observer for the time being. The advantage of this option countries rvho should take advantage ofthe fact is that it strengthens the EU's umN of action, that their status has been considerably enhanced albeit at the risk of sidelinrng all those non-EU rn the frameu'ork of the Council's activities. countries alreadl'rnvolved in one way or another rn the prolect of defence Europe, and some of 146. For the time being, the Assembly's exis- which even participate rn collectrve defence tence is not being called rnto question but the proper. future impact of its work will dcpend on the role 150. Its disadvantage, however, is that it re- to be assigned to the Council in the neu, institu- quires new institutional arrangements and am- tional arrangements. That is rvhv the timc has endments to the Treatres, matters on rvhich rt will come to formulate open-ended options pointing not be eas\. to reach agreement. The desire to the governments in the right direcilon for build- maintain the European Union's single frame- ing the democratic drmension of secuntv and de- u'ork, u'ithin u'hich some member states still re- fence Europe. It is therefore lmportant not to rule fuse to discuss an\thing to do rvith mrlitary mat- out any arrangement for changing the Assem- ters, can onlv lead to unsatisfactory compronrises bl1"s composition and the x'av in uhich its mem- and ivr1l leave the business of European con- bers are appointed, as long as the]' continue to struction unfinished. come from the parhaments of the member countnes 151. But there is another option: a composite Europe able to act in a crisis and also capable of 147. The Assemblv intends to take its consid- defending itself x'ith the assistance of anv coun- erations on the future of the parliamentary di- tries prepared to be involved. Such a Europe is mension further. on the basis of the general rvav burit around the WEU family and is readv to fonvard it has alreadv descnbed rn Order 108, merge rvith the Europe of the Fifteen provided a adopted at the special session in Luxembourg. merger is not orchestrated in a hurn', does not 148. Its considerations must of necessity. rn- create vet another bureaucracy, does not abandon clude the European Parliament. x,ith xluch it u,ill anvone along the rvay, and on condition that the need to increase its contacts. it should also study structure it produces is full1' complementar)' to the possibilitv of cooperation xith the Parliament the Atlantic Alliance.

26 DOCLMENT 166'I

l5Z. The Intergovernmental Conference that is 153. In the meantime, it is essential for WEU to to open next 1'ear has a difficult agenda. It is continue its rvork to become a fully operational Europe's major shortcomings mthe area of mili- instrument avarlable to Europe's decision-makers. tary capabilities that are paralysing any action it Until all the EU member states are readv to part- might take in a crisis, so the first thing that needs icipate wrthout reservation in al1 aspects of the to be done is to look at the measures needed to secunty and defence dimension and for as long as make good those shortcomings. Institutional mat- the European Union rs not prepared for all the ters and the desire to act rn a single framework European non-EU members of the Atlantic Alli- should not become the priorit-v. The main prob- ance to play a frrll part in the project mapped out lem concerns Europe's political will to have a rn Cologne. it rvould be a serious mistake to try capabilit-v enabling it to respond to a crisis. The to rush things by adopting uniform and strict WEU Council of Ministers u'hich is to meet in legal formulas for secunq' and defence in the Luxembourg on 23 November 1999, and the EU framework of a revision of the Treat-v on Euro- summrt meetrng to be held in Helsinki on 10-11 pean Union. While mrlitar-v action mus! of course, December, are important milestones that wrll rest on a solid legal basis, u'hat it requires above provide an opporlunrty to give that political will all else is a very rvide measure of political flex- a fresh impetus. ibilrty - and that even extends to the structures rvhere decisions are made.

27 TMPRTMERTE i0 nleNgoNNArsE Rue Edouard-Belin : 3" tnmestre 1999 N' d'ordre : 11219

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