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Interview of FBI Counterterrorism Analyst

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Interview of FBI Counterterrorism Analyst Withheld from public release E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) by National Archives and * Records Administration under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.58 MEMORANDUMFORTHERECORD DECLASSIFIED UNDER AUTHORITY OF THE Event: Interview o fl~....____.::*.:....__ ____J INTERAGENCY SECURITY CLASSIFICATION APPEALS PANEL, Date: February 11, 2004 E.O. 13526, SECTION 5.3(b)(3) Special Access Issues: ~SCI Prepared by: Sarah Webb Linden ISCAP APPEAL NO. 2012-048, document no. 6 DECLASSIFICATION DATE: July 8, 2015 Reviewed by: Yoel Tobin Team Numbers : One Location: FBI Headquarters Participants: 9-11 Comm ission: Yoel Tobin, Thomas Dowling, Sarah Linden Federal Bureau of Investigation: Robert Sinton Interviewee Background (U) ~has worked for the FBI for 17 years. He has been an analyst within the Counterterrorism Division since 1992. Initially he worked Iran and Hezbollah matters; in 1993, . after the first World Trade Center bombing, he transferred to the Sunni Islamic Extremist unit. In 1996 he was temporarily assigned to the Khobar Towers bombing investigation . With the exception of the year he spent working on Khobar Towers, ~has focuseld primjrily on Southeast Asia fundamentalists such as Ramzi Yousef and the Bojinka plot. * is currently assigned to the FBI's Counterterrorism Division, International Terrorism Operations Section, Extraterritorial Investigations Unit. Khobar Towers (U) ~did not recall many details ofthe Khobar Towers bombing investigation. He left the investigative team prior to the U.S. indictment of subjects. On the specific subject of Al Qaeda involvement with the plot, []LJcommented that they investigated all available Al Qaeda sources and connections and realized that the facts did not support Al Qaeda involvement. '---'-----"*.:......~had never been part of an investigation as heavily compartmentalized as Khobar. Case information was highly restricted, with as few as 20 people initially allowed access. Because the FBI agents on-scene were not allowed to conduct any unilateral interviews or investi ations on Saudi soil I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) I Khalid Sheikh Mohammed ~~worked on matters concerning Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) from 1995 through 2003. He read some, though not all, ofKSM's post-capture interrogation reports. ~ ~stated that in 1996 KSM was in Doha, Qatar. He had been there since at least 1993 , working for the Ministry of Water and Electricity. After the U.S. indicted KSM for his involvement in the Manila Air case, the FBI sent a rendition team to the Gulf. Part ofthe team I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) TOPSECRET~I--------~ Withheld from public release by National Archives and 2 * Records Administration under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.58 dvanced to Doha, Qatar in preparation for his capture. The remainder of the team waited in with a plane, ready to travel to Qatar and pick up KSM and his captors. After L-----:--:----:-' several days the Qatari government informed the U.S . that KSM had been under surveillance and had somehow escaped . .k8} ~did not know exactly who funded KSM's travel while he was working for the Qatar Ministry of Water and Electricity. He speculated that Qatar's Ministry for Religious Endowment paid KSM to travel around and distribute c.ash to organizations and Islamic charities. [i]did not feel that UBL was the likely source ofKSM's travel monies . .k8} c:::!J believed that KSM did not join AI Qaeda until after the 1998 East Africa bombings . As late as 1997, KSM was aligned with Abdul Rasul Sayef, who was one ofUBL 's adversaries . Even after he joined AI Qaeda, KSM was not considered a significant player in the organization until after 09/ 11 /2001. Immediately following the attacks, a variety of U.S . intelligence sources pointed to KSM (or "Ramzi Yousefs cousin") as the source of the operation. E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) Bojinka 2 Withheld from public release by National Archives and 3 * Records Administration under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.58 TOP SECRETj______.ll E.0. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) I who had trained in Al Qaeda camps but were not Al Qaeda operatives. As for Khalifa, there was no evidence he funded or knew of the plot, despite his close association with Wali Khan. Ramzi Yousefwas brought in by Wali Khan, and had no prior affiliation with Khalifa or UBL. -tSJ[I]did not see thousands ofdollars moving to support Bojinka and considered it a fairly low-cost operation. There was no requirement for casing flights, since flight schedules could be obtained from the airlines. ~was certain the operatives had little funding because Wali Khan onl ot bailed out of prison I I E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)( d) I 1-----------'Khan in the Philippines. CDstated that no money came from Riduan Isomuddin's/Hambali's Malaysian company Konsijoya, which had at that point only conducted one (failed) business transaction. ~knew of only five operatives involved in Bojinka: KSM, Abdul Hakim Murad, Ramzi Y ousef, Wali Khan and with the rest because the FBI had on the .-1r-p-er-:i-p1he_r_y_o-;f;-;t-;-h-e-;:B:-o-:-0i:-nk~a-g-ro_u_p_:_l"'ik'e"""VK"h-a"'li7fa-,'h-e'k_n_e_w~th:;-e-p'la_y_e-rs-,bu-t:-n-o-:t-:t'e-p,.o"7t-._ ___J TOP SECitET~ E.O. 13526, section 1.4(c)(d) 13 TJ~If trl Withheld from public release ,.- ~ t - .( 0 i~f·:-.. f by Na tional Archives and ~ I (Y ~ ~ I Records Administration (..U ~ Ul under 36 C.F.R. § 1256.58 - ~ ~ ~ f' r­ N >-· '>.: ~~ ).. 0 ~ t~ ....» -# C""-..~~- 1 - I§ F - :p ~ f ? ~ ~, ~ r rs- 1.$\ { f t. ~ ~f ~ ~ ;;;-- ' r - L_ ~ ~ ~ 1" I'~!': - r r r t ~ ~ ~ ~ ; ; r t l_~ ~ -t l !~~- ~ ~ ~ t, -\ ~ . ~ ~ '"'1 r I ~ ~ ~ ........... ).' ~ ~ C)­ t ~ ~ (\ "'- ~ s l r 1 ~ U ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ I:· ; ¥ ~ ~ a ........... t { -· ~ r ~ ~ 1 ~ r ~ ~~ t> ~ ~ ! ~ ~ ~ F [; 3 f ~ - j \ i ~ i . ~ . !-j ~ ~ f .... ~rt;.. ~ 'r~~ ~- t· ~cf ~¢" r. 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