Transnational Jihadism & Civil Wars Martha Crenshaw Abstract: When rebels also employ terrorism, civil wars can become more intractable. Since the 1980s, jihadism, a form of violent transnational activism, has mobilized civil war rebels, outside entrepreneurs, foreign fighters, and organizers of transnational as well as domestic terrorism. These activities are inte- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 gral to the jihadist trend, representing overlapping and conjoined strands of the same ideological current, which in turn reflects internal division and dissatisfaction within the Arab world and within Islam. Jihad- ism, however, is neither unitary nor monolithic. It contains competing power centers and divergent ideo- logical orthodoxies. Different jihadist actors emphasize different priorities and strategies. They disagree, for example, on whether the “near” or the “far” enemy should take precedence. The relationship between jihadist terrorism and civil war is far from uniform or constant. This essay traces the trajectory of this evo- lution, beginning in the 1980s in the context of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Transnational violence in the name of jihadist ide- ology is intermingled with civil conflict in the Mid- dle East, Asia, and Africa. Jihadists are civil war ac- tors as well as transnational terrorists.1 According to James Fearon, in 1990, only 5 percent of civil conflicts featured jihadist rebels; by 2014, the proportion had increased to 40 percent.2 Since the 1980s, jihadism has incorporated a medley of civil war rebels, out- side entrepreneurs, trainers, funders, recruiters of foreign fighters, and organizers of transnational as well as domestic terrorism. Transnational coalitions MARTHA CRENSHAW is a Senior link distant local conflicts. These activities are inte- Fellow at the Center for Interna- gral to the jihadist trend that developed within Islam tional Security and Cooperation in the 1980s, representing overlapping and conjoined at the Freeman Spogli Institute strands derived from the same general ideological cur- for International Studies at Stan- rent, which in turn reflects dissatisfaction within the ford University, and Professor of Arab world and within Islam. Jihadists primarily seek Government Emerita at Wesleyan power in Muslim-majority countries or areas, and ter- University. Her recent publica- rorism against the West and neighboring states rep- tions include Countering Terrorism 3 (with Gary LaFree, 2017) and Ex- resents the spillover of that conflict. plaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, Jihadism is a strain of violent, radical, and exclusiv- and Consequences (2010). ist Sunni Islamism. The central tenet of the ideology © 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00459 59 Trans- and the narrative that supports it is the ur- gion or from distant countries. Rebellions national gent need to defend the worldwide Muslim can also inspire “homegrown” terrorists or Jihadism & Civil Wars community, the umma, from both foreign “lone wolves.” Jihadist affiliates who are lo- occupiers and domestic infidels and non- cal civil war rebels use terrorism to strike believers. As political scientist Thomas at hostile neighboring states. At the same Hegghammer has argued, jihadism is as time, jihadist terrorism, inside and out- much about national identity and imagined side of conflict zones, and influxes of for- community as about religion and faith.4 It is eign fighters can alter the course of civil a form of violent transnational activism that wars. Both terrorism and the involvement aims to mobilize Muslims worldwide to re- of foreign fighters can contribute to the es- store a strict conception of political and re- calation and intensification of violence and Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 ligious order stemming from the early days make conflicts harder to resolve.6 Trans- of Islam. Many adherents fall into the cate- national terrorism provokes American gory of what Tanisha Fazal calls “religionist drone strikes against jihadist leaders and, rebels.”5 in general, terrorism may increase the likeli- This is not to say that jihadism is a unitary hood of foreign military intervention in civ- or monolithic movement. It encompasses il wars. Foreign intervention, in turn, sparks competing power centers and divergent terrorism against occupying forces, their lo- ideological orthodoxies, as exemplified in cal allies, and their home countries. Foreign the split between the Islamic State (isis) fighters may return home to join the ranks and its former patron, Al Qaeda. Moreover, of rebels in ongoing conflicts or to orches- different jihadist actors emphasize different trate acts of terrorism in otherwise peaceful priorities and strategies. They disagree, for and stable environments. The ease of com- example, on whether the “near” or the “far” munication and travel in a globalized world enemy should take precedence and whether facilitates all of these interconnections. or not spectacular terrorist attacks against The ubiquity of social media and Internet civilians in the West are worthwhile or jus- communications promotes individual- tified. The majority of the victims of Isla- level “homegrown” mobilization across mist terrorism are Muslim, and different national borders. The fact that acts of ter- factions argue over whether Islam allows rorism against undefended civilian targets, or prohibits killing fellow Muslims. The Is- such as public transportation or crowded lamic State and Al Qaeda think different- markets, are relatively easy and cheap to ly about cooperating with local rebels and carry out further compounds the problem.7 trying to attract popular support in civil Despite the importance of these path in- conflicts. They diverge on the issue of es- tersections and interdependencies, it is still tablishing a caliphate in Syria and Iraq. Is- rare to find systematic academic studies of lamic State doctrine is much more prone to the linkages between civil war, jihadism, sectarianism and attacks on Shia civilians, domestic terrorism, transnational terror- as well as publicized atrocities. ism, and foreign fighter recruitment. Most Finding distinct one-way causal mecha- typically, each subject is studied in isola- nisms in this complex tangle is difficult if tion from the others. Hegghammer has not impossible. Civil conflict may facilitate examined jihadist foreign fighter recruit- the export of terrorism by providing safe ha- ment, and some recent analyses have ex- vens for those organizing attacks, but sanc- plored the relationship between civil war tuary in failed states or ungoverned spaces and domestic terrorism. Political scientist is only part of the story. Civil conflicts are Page Fortna, for example, found that reb- attractions for foreign fighters from the re- els who used terrorism at home were less 60 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences likely to win.8 These studies typically con- tered the course of the civil war in Syria. The Martha clude by calling for an end to the neglect of Islamic State became the focus of American Crenshaw the subject.9 How transnational terrorism military intervention, while Iran support- and civil war are linked and how these link- ed Assad, who was later assisted by Russian ages change over time are questions that re- intervention. France became involved mil- main largely uncharted territory. How ter- itarily and, by 2016, Turkey was also drawn rorism relates to foreign military interven- in. All of these external parties have been the tion in civil wars is also an open question. targets of transnational jihadist terrorism. This essay proceeds to trace the trajec- But there is a distinction between assist- tory of this evolution, beginning in the ing local parties and intervening directly, 1980s in the context of the Soviet inva- and between air power and soldiers on the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 sion of Afghanistan. After this launch pe- ground. By 2017, the Islamic State’s caliph- riod, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ate was on the verge of collapse, but the end victory of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, of the caliphate will not mean the end of ji- the Balkan Wars of the 1990s, and violent hadism. In fact, in the long run, the prima- discontent in Egypt contributed to the ex- ry benefactor of the civil war in Syria and ji- pansion of Al Qaeda’s version of jihadism. hadist involvement may be Al Qaeda. The shock of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon marked the In the 1980s, civil war served as inspiration start of a new era dominated by the global and validation for the burgeoning jihadist war on terrorism and American and West- project. Political scientist Gilles Kepel has ern military involvement in civil conflicts, traced radical Islamism to the 1970s, with its beginning with Afghanistan. The invasion rise cemented by the victory of Khomeini in of Iraq in 2003 led to another shift in trajec- 1979.11 Violence by small Islamist conspir- tory as jihadists became key actors in the acies, marked by the seizure of the Grand conflict between Sunni insurgents, coali- Mosque in Mecca in 1979 and the assassina- tion forces, and the new Shia-dominated tion of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981, was an regime. From that point on, jihadists be- early signal of confrontation between Sunni came active participants in an expanding Arab regimes and jihadists with revolution- number of civil wars, either through the ary aspirations. But the crucible for the birth insertion of operatives from global orga- of jihadism as both ideology and practice nizations (for example, Al Qaeda in Ye- that linked civil war and transnational ter- men and later the Islamic State in Libya) rorism was the Soviet invasion of Afghani- or when local rebels signed onto the glob- stan and resistance by the mujahideen.