sign in sign up
<<
Home , Bojinka plot, Domestic terrorism, Islamic Salvation Front, Jihadism

Transnational & Civil Wars

Martha Crenshaw

Abstract: When rebels also employ , civil wars can become more intractable. Since the 1980s, jihadism, a form of violent transnational activism, has mobilized civil war rebels, outside entrepreneurs,

foreign fighters, and organizers of transnational as well as . These activities are inte- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 gral to the jihadist trend, representing overlapping and conjoined strands of the same ideological current, which in turn reflects internal division and dissatisfaction within the Arab world and within . - ism, however, is neither unitary nor monolithic. It contains competing power centers and divergent ideo- logical orthodoxies. Different jihadist actors emphasize different priorities and strategies. They disagree, for example, on whether the “near” or the “far” enemy should take precedence. The relationship between jihadist terrorism and civil war is far from uniform or constant. This essay traces the trajectory of this evo- lution, beginning in the 1980s in the context of the Soviet invasion of .

Transnational violence in the name of jihadist ide- ology is intermingled with civil conflict in the Mid- dle East, Asia, and Africa. Jihadists are civil war ac- tors as well as transnational terrorists.1 According to James Fearon, in 1990, only 5 percent of civil conflicts featured jihadist rebels; by 2014, the proportion had increased to 40 percent.2 Since the 1980s, jihadism has incorporated a medley of civil war rebels, out- side entrepreneurs, trainers, funders, recruiters of foreign fighters, and organizers of transnational as well as domestic terrorism. Transnational coalitions MARTHA CRENSHAW is a Senior link distant local conflicts. These activities are inte- Fellow at the Center for Interna- gral to the jihadist trend that developed within Islam tional Security and Cooperation in the 1980s, representing overlapping and conjoined at the Freeman Spogli Institute strands derived from the same general ideological cur- for International Studies at Stan- rent, which in turn reflects dissatisfaction within the ford University, and Professor of Arab world and within Islam. Jihadists primarily seek Government Emerita at Wesleyan power in Muslim-majority countries or areas, and ter- University. Her recent publica- rorism against the West and neighboring states rep- tions include Countering Terrorism 3 (with Gary LaFree, 2017) and Ex- resents the spillover of that conflict. plaining Terrorism: Causes, Processes, Jihadism is a strain of violent, radical, and exclusiv- and Consequences (2010). ist Sunni . The central tenet of the

© 2017 by the American Academy of Arts & Sciences doi:10.1162/DAED_a_00459

59 Trans- and the narrative that supports it is the ur- gion or from distant countries. Rebellions national gent need to defend the worldwide Muslim can also inspire “homegrown” terrorists or Jihadism & Civil Wars community, the umma, from both foreign “lone wolves.” Jihadist affiliates who are lo- occupiers and domestic infidels and non- cal civil war rebels use terrorism to strike believers. As political scientist Thomas at hostile neighboring states. At the same Hegghammer has argued, jihadism is as time, jihadist terrorism, inside and out- much about national identity and imagined side of conflict zones, and influxes of for- community as about religion and faith.4 It is eign fighters can alter the course of civil a form of violent transnational activism that wars. Both terrorism and the involvement aims to mobilize worldwide to re- of foreign fighters can contribute to the es-

store a strict conception of political and re- calation and intensification of violence and Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 ligious order stemming from the early days make conflicts harder to resolve.6 Trans- of Islam. Many adherents fall into the cate- national terrorism provokes American gory of what Tanisha Fazal calls “religionist drone strikes against jihadist leaders and, rebels.”5 in general, terrorism may increase the likeli- This is not to say that jihadism is a unitary hood of foreign military intervention in civ- or monolithic movement. It encompasses il wars. Foreign intervention, in turn, sparks competing power centers and divergent terrorism against occupying forces, their lo- ideological orthodoxies, as exemplified in cal allies, and their home countries. Foreign the split between the (isis) fighters may return home to join the ranks and its former patron, Al Qaeda. Moreover, of rebels in ongoing conflicts or to orches- different jihadist actors emphasize different trate acts of terrorism in otherwise peaceful priorities and strategies. They disagree, for and stable environments. The ease of com- example, on whether the “near” or the “far” munication and travel in a globalized world enemy should take precedence and whether facilitates all of these interconnections. or not spectacular terrorist attacks against The ubiquity of and Internet civilians in the West are worthwhile or jus- communications promotes individual- tified. The majority of the victims of Isla- level “homegrown” mobilization across mist terrorism are Muslim, and different national borders. The fact that acts of ter- factions argue over whether Islam allows rorism against undefended civilian targets, or prohibits killing fellow Muslims. The Is- such as public transportation or crowded lamic State and Al Qaeda think different- markets, are relatively easy and cheap to ly about cooperating with local rebels and carry out further compounds the problem.7 trying to attract popular support in civil Despite the importance of these path in- conflicts. They diverge on the issue of es- tersections and interdependencies, it is still tablishing a in and . Is- rare to find systematic academic studies of lamic State doctrine is much more prone to the linkages between civil war, jihadism, sectarianism and attacks on Shia civilians, domestic terrorism, transnational terror- as well as publicized atrocities. ism, and foreign fighter recruitment. Most Finding distinct one-way causal mecha- typically, each subject is studied in isola- nisms in this complex tangle is difficult if tion from the others. Hegghammer has not impossible. Civil conflict may facilitate examined jihadist foreign fighter recruit- the export of terrorism by providing safe ha- ment, and some recent analyses have ex- vens for those organizing attacks, but sanc- plored the relationship between civil war tuary in failed states or ungoverned spaces and domestic terrorism. Political scientist is only part of the story. Civil conflicts are Page Fortna, for example, found that reb- attractions for foreign fighters from the re- els who used terrorism at home were less

60 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences likely to win.8 These studies typically con- tered the course of the civil war in Syria. The Martha clude by calling for an end to the neglect of Islamic State became the focus of American Crenshaw the subject.9 How transnational terrorism military intervention, while Iran support- and civil war are linked and how these link- ed Assad, who was later assisted by Russian ages change over time are questions that re- intervention. became involved mil- main largely uncharted territory. How ter- itarily and, by 2016, Turkey was also drawn rorism relates to foreign military interven- in. All of these external parties have been the tion in civil wars is also an open question. targets of transnational jihadist terrorism. This essay proceeds to trace the trajec- But there is a distinction between assist- tory of this evolution, beginning in the ing local parties and intervening directly,

1980s in the context of the Soviet inva- and between air power and soldiers on the Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 sion of Afghanistan. After this launch pe- ground. By 2017, the Islamic State’s caliph- riod, the collapse of the Soviet Union, the ate was on the verge of collapse, but the end victory of the in Afghanistan, of the caliphate will not mean the end of ji- the Balkan Wars of the , and violent hadism. In fact, in the long run, the prima- discontent in Egypt contributed to the ex- ry benefactor of the civil war in Syria and ji- pansion of Al Qaeda’s version of jihadism. hadist involvement may be Al Qaeda. The shock of the 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and marked the In the 1980s, civil war served as inspiration start of a new era dominated by the global and validation for the burgeoning jihadist war on terrorism and American and West- project. Political scientist has ern military involvement in civil conflicts, traced radical Islamism to the , with its beginning with Afghanistan. The invasion rise cemented by the victory of Khomeini in of Iraq in 2003 led to another shift in trajec- 1979.11 Violence by small Islamist conspir- tory as jihadists became key actors in the acies, marked by the seizure of the Grand conflict between Sunni insurgents, coali- in in 1979 and the assassina- tion forces, and the new Shia-dominated tion of Egypt’s Anwar Sadat in 1981, was an regime. From that point on, jihadists be- early signal of confrontation between Sunni came active participants in an expanding Arab regimes and jihadists with revolution- number of civil wars, either through the ary aspirations. But the crucible for the birth insertion of operatives from global orga- of jihadism as both ideology and practice nizations (for example, Al Qaeda in Ye- that linked civil war and transnational ter- men and later the Islamic State in Libya) rorism was the Soviet invasion of Afghani- or when local rebels signed onto the glob- stan and resistance by the mujahideen. The al movement’s agenda (for example, there framing of the war as a struggle pitting Is- are jihadist affiliates and clients in , lam against the foreign invader was key to Mali, , and Nigeria).10 The upris- Abdullah Azzam’s appeal, announced in ing against the Assad regime in Syria and 1984 with a fatwa titled Defence of Muslim the ensuing civil war provided another Lands. It called for defensive jihad–to fight opening, which led to a decisive split with- on behalf of the Afghans–as the individu- in jihadism as the organization that was Al al as well as collective responsibility of all Qaeda in Iraq transformed itself into the Muslims.12 However, Azzam’s ambition independent Islamic State and declared a went beyond liberating Afghanistan from caliphate under its governance in Iraq and Soviet occupation; in 1985, he announced Syria in 2014. Its seizure of substantial ar- that his own homeland of Palestine would eas of both countries changed the stakes for be next on the path of great battles for Is- both jihadists and their adversaries and al- lam, followed by Arab regimes that re-

146 (4) Fall 2017 61 Trans- fused to assist in jihad. Ayman al-Zawahiri, bia to , where the National Islamic national the leader of the or- Front had assumed power in 1989. Jihadism & Civil Wars ganization who joined in Al Qaeda’s leaders may have seen the Afghanistan in 1985 after his release from an American intervention in Somalia as a new Egyptian prison, also emphasized the over- opportunity to strike a blow against foreign throw of apostate Arab regimes. Afghani- occupiers of Muslim lands. But when the stan was to be a springboard to revolution withdrew in 1994, Al Qaeda in the . turned its attention again to overthrow- Having failed to defeat the American- ing Arab regimes.14 The Arabian Penin- assisted , the Soviet Union with- sula remained central to the leadership’s

drew in 1989. Thus, in the 1990s, with suc- thinking. The Saudi crackdown on dissent Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 cess in hand, the foreign fighters dispersed, was further incentive for challenging the and Bin Laden returned to . monarchy. The organization of Arab volunteers estab- By the mid-1990s, Al Qaeda was active lished for Afghanistan, the “Afghan ,” in both Sudan and Afghanistan, which had became the core of Al Qaeda under Bin Lad- drifted into civil war. Training camps there en’s leadership. Egyptians played key roles sheltered recruits from Egypt, , in the military command. The perceived Uzbekistan, and Palestine. Egyptian Islam- victory of the mujahideen in Afghanistan, ic Jihad , driven out of Egypt fol- embellished by a mythology that exagger- lowing an assassination attempt against ated the contribution of what was actually the prime minister, moved to Sudan. After a relatively small number of Arab foreign the 1995 Dayton Accords, Bosnian fighters fighters, endowed jihadism with even more also returned. Al Qaeda was now thorough- prestige. The collapse of the Soviet Union ly transnational in terms of organization, further enhanced the significance of the tri- location, membership, and ambitions for umph in jihadist eyes, and it also left in its jihad. It was also part of a broader transfor- wake new Muslim-majority countries and mation of nationalist conflicts into Islamist powerful separatist movements, for exam- struggles, as in the case of Chechnya. Po- ple, in Chechnya. litical scientist Kristin Bakke has attribut- The question now was the next step. As ed this shift to the influence of transna- political scientist Kim Cragin has observed, tional insurgents, or foreign fighters, espe- Bin Laden did not immediately turn to ter- cially the Arab contingent, which brought rorist attacks against the United States.13 recruits, weapons, experience, and access Instead, he expressed interest in joining to funding. She also noted that the Islamist the ongoing conflicts in Kashmir and Ye- framing of the war coincided with the adop- men. The Iraqi invasion of in Au- tion of the new tactics of suicide attacks and gust 1990 led the Saudi regime to invite the cross-border terrorism.15 United States to station troops on its soil, a In 1996, Bin Laden moved back to Af- move that Bin Laden vehemently rejected. ghanistan, on the eve of the ’s sei- Still, in the early 1990s, Al Qaeda focused zure of power. It was at this point that Al on assisting local Muslim militants, includ- Qaeda declared war against the United ing rebels in Egypt, Afghanistan, , States and its “Judeo-Christian alliance,” Yemen, and then Somalia, Bosnia, Tajiki- which announced the beginning of the de- stan, Chechnya, and the . As- cades-long campaign of terrorism against sistance included military training as well jihadism’s Western enemies and their allies. as religious indoctrination and funding. In Al Qaeda thus benefitted from sanctuary, 1991, Bin Laden relocated from Saudi Ara- not in ungoverned spaces, lawless zones, or

62 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences territories unsettled by civil wars, but where elections that the Martha sympathetic regimes held power. was poised to win. The Front was banned, Crenshaw The idea of attacking the United States at and its members were arrested by the thou- home was not new, as reflected in the first sands. Several armed groups formed, some bombing of the World Trade Center in 1993. linked to the Front, others independent and The perpetrators included Khalid Sheikh more extreme, and bloody fighting contin- Mohammed’s nephew , who ued through the decade. claimed to be acting to punish the United Civil conflict spilled over in two ways: States for its support of . Yousef was One was . The Armed also instrumental in the 1995 Bojinka plot, Islamic Group, known by its French ac-

which was intended to blow up multiple air- ronym gia, had attacked widely and in- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 liners flying from Asia to the United States. discriminately within Algeria, targeting When the plot was discovered in the Philip- not just the government but also the Al- pines, Yousef was apprehended in Pakistan gerian political and cultural elite, unveiled and tried, convicted, and sentenced to life women, journalists, insufficiently Islamist in prison by American courts for his roles in schools, and foreigners, among other civil- both the 1993 bombing and the failed 1995 ians. In December 1994, the gia famously plot. Sheikh Omar Abdel Rahman, a prom- hijacked a plane from to France, a inent Islamist cleric from Egypt, was also crisis that ended with a French comman- indicted for his involvement in the World do rescue. In 1995, there were bombings Trade Center bombing. He received a life and bombing plots in Paris and Lyon, often sentence for a linked plot to bomb a series against the metro and the regional train of New York landmarks and died in pris- network. The strategic logic of these at- on in 2017. tacks may have been coercive, to compel Al Qaeda opened its campaign of ter- the French to halt their support of the Al- rorism against the United States with the gerian government, but competition on bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and the rebel side and the prospect of ascen- Tanzania in 1998, and the United States re- dancy over the rival might taliated with cruise missile strikes in Su- have also been a motive. dan and Afghanistan. In the build-up to The second spillover was a regional trans- the 9/11 attacks, the embassy bombings fer of jihadist militancy outside Algeria’s were followed by the bombing of the USS borders into the Sahel region, in part caused Cole in Yemen as well as a series of poten- by high levels of domestic terrorism. In 1997 tially deadly but intercepted plots, includ- and 1998, Algeria suffered a series of terrible ing an attempt to bomb Los Angeles Inter- civilian massacres when entire villages were national Airport. The operative in question brutally and indiscriminately attacked. Re- in the lax plot was an Algerian trained in sponsibility is still disputed, but the gia Afghanistan who entered the United States was widely blamed. As a result, the Islamic from . Front’s armed units announced a cease-fire, This connection highlights another point and the gia began to splinter. One faction of overlap between jihadism, civil war, and broke away to become the Salafist Group transnational terrorism in the 1990s: Alge- for Preaching and Combat, which soon ex- ria. Here, violent confrontation grew from panded its reach across Algeria’s borders a failed effort by Islamist political parties into Mali, Niger, and Chad. This expan- to take power through the democratic pro- sion was probably a displacement of activ- cess. In December 1991, the Algerian mil- ity due to the Algerian government’s suc- itary stepped in to cancel parliamentary cess in ending the civil war, which included

146 (4) Fall 2017 63 Trans- a controversial amnesty program for for- al attacks to punish the United States and national mer combatants that eventually weakened its allies and mobilize worldwide support, Jihadism & Civil Wars the groups. In the end, the excess- including by attracting foreign fighters. Al es of the most violent militants discredited Qaeda was hardly passive between the fall Islamism, and this distrust combined with of 2001 and the invasion of Iraq in spring fear of instability also discouraged popular 2003. It is likely that many attacks were al- uprisings during the . By 2007, ready in the planning and implementation the Salafist Group was formally allied with stages as follow-ons to 9/11.16 In late 2001, Al Qaeda and became Al Qaeda in the Is- the famous “shoe bomber” tried to bring lamic Maghreb (aqim). aqim brought down an American Airlines flight over the

wealth and local contacts to the alliance, Atlantic. In 2002, Al Qaeda operatives ex- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 while Al Qaeda central brought the pres- ploded a truck carrying natural gas at a his- tige of a global brand and access to com- toric synagogue on the Tunisian island of munications networks. aqim’s allegiance Djerba, killing mostly German tourists. was announced by an attack on the United Al Qaeda’s Indonesian affiliate Jemaah Is- Nations headquarters in Algiers. lamiya organized the bombings of tourist sites in Bali, killing over two hundred peo- The stunning shock of the 2001 attacks ple, with apparently the main tar- launched a new era dominated by the global get. Israeli tourists were similarly targeted and the subsequent invasions in Kenya. of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. In The jihadist leader poised to seize the op- the case of Afghanistan, transnational ter- portunity on the ground in Iraq was Abu rorism provoked military intervention that Musab al-Zarqawi.17 Zarqawi was a Jorda- led to a return to civil war. After 2001, Al nian who had fought in Afghanistan inde- Qaeda was constrained by American mil- pendently of Bin Laden’s organization. He itary pressure, the defeat of the host Tali- returned to in 1993 to challenge the ban, and the necessity of shifting its center monarchy and was promptly caught and of gravity from Afghanistan to Pakistan, but sentenced to prison, where he gained a the invasion of Iraq provided a critical new loyal following. In 1999, he was released in opportunity for jihadists who were waiting the general amnesty that accompanied King in the wings–the origin story of the Islamic Abdullah’s accession to the throne. Before State. In retrospect, jihadists could probably returning to Afghanistan, he may have not have hoped for a more propitious devel- played a role in the “millennium plots” that opment. The United States now occupied targeted Jordanian hotels and alarmed the a country at the heart of the Arab Middle United States. In Afghanistan, he met Bin East, and its Sunni population was in open Laden, who apparently funded his training rebellion. Ironically, the United States had camp in western Afghanistan. In late 2001, removed an apostate Arab ruler generally Zarqawi left for Iran, basing himself there hated by jihadists, but the replacement was and in Iraqi Kurdistan. In 2002, he directed an even more despised Shia government. the assassination of an American diplomat Jihadists now sought an active role as reb- in Jordan. By August 2003, he had moved els in Iraq, but transnational terrorism con- into Iraq, where he organized the bombings tinued as well. Why both? Different jihad- of the Jordanian embassy and the un head- ist actors were the agents, and perhaps it quarters. The bombing of a Shia shrine in also seemed reasonable to act as a combined Najaf introduced his strategy of provoking terrorist and insurgent force in Iraq while a sectarian civil war, which intensified af- keeping up the pressure with transnation- ter the bombing of the Golden Mosque in

64 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Samarra in 2006. Videotaped beheadings merged with Al Qaeda in Yemen, thus form- Martha of hostages began in 2004, with the first ing Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, or Crenshaw victim an American. Zarqawi also contin- aqap. One of its first moves was a thwart- ued his campaign against Jordan with an at- ed attempt to assassinate Saudi Prince tempt on military intelligence headquar- Mohammed Bin Nayef. The group moved ters in Amman. swiftly outside the region to attempt to de- In fall 2004, Zarqawi pledged allegiance to stroy a flight from Am- Al Qaeda, and his group became Al Qaeda sterdam to Detroit, in the famous 2009 “un- in Iraq, or aqi. It was a tactical alliance derwear bomber” case involving a Nigeri- based on expediency, and disagreements an recruit trained in Yemen. In 2010, bombs

broke out almost immediately over Zarqa- were placed on cargo planes flying from Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 wi’s brutality and sectarian violence against Yemen to the United States, although the Shia, including attacks on religious institu- plot was foiled. But an added concern was tions such as , pilgrimages, and fu- aqap’s proficiency in online propaganda, neral processions. Suicide bombings of ho- especially in the English language, as exem- tels in Amman that killed large numbers of plified by itsInspire and the call for Muslims did not improve relations. Yet par- supporters in the West to act independent- adoxically, at the same time, Al Qaeda and ly at home. For example, the 2009 shooting its other affiliates were organizing bomb- at the Little Rock military recruiting office ings in Riyadh, Casablanca, Jakarta, Istan- by Carlos Bledsoe, an American convert to bul, and again Bali, as well as bombings Islam, was linked to aqap. American-born against public transportation targets that leader Anwar al-Awlaki was an influential caused mass casualties in Western capitals, ideologue as well as operational planner. first in Madrid in 2004 and then in He inspired Major Nidal Hassan, the 2009 in 2005. There were more attempts to bring shooter, for example. But in an down . era of drone warfare, terrorist leaders are In 2006, an American bomb killed hard-pressed to find safe havens, and an Zarqawi. His successor, an Egyptian, re- American drone strike killed Awlaki in 2011. named aqi the “,” or The death of Osama Bin Laden in an isi, possibly in an effort to legitimize an American raid in Pakistan in 2011 was a organization that was suspected locally of blow to worldwide jihadism but did not being too foreign, or perhaps simply out of slow the movement’s momentum. The year ambition and zeal. He also named an Iraqi 2011 also marked two major but unexpect- as nominal head of the “new” organiza- ed changes in the context for jihadist vio- tion. In 2007, the United States increased lence. The first event was the withdrawal troop levels in Iraq, and Sunni tribal lead- of American and coalition forces from Iraq ers united to reject isi and, in many cas- at the end of the year. The second was the es, to ally with coalition forces. In 2010, Arab Spring. the two isi leaders were killed by Ameri- When the United States left Iraq, the Is- can bombs; the replacement was lamic State of Iraq was in decline. It could al-Baghdadi. When he assumed power, the still organize domestic terrorist attacks future of the organization looked bleak. against undefended civilian targets, but its However, Al Qaeda had affiliates be- potential as an insurgent force that could yond Iraq. The organization had not aban- threaten internal stability had waned. Its doned its goal of overthrowing the Saudi re- fortunes improved when the Iraqi govern- gime, but terrorism provoked severe repres- ment failed either to provide security or to sion. In 2009, the remaining Saudi branch incorporate Sunnis into political and secu-

146 (4) Fall 2017 65 Trans- rity institutions. The combination of Sun- fighters. By the end of 2015, estimates were national ni dissatisfaction and general insecurity was that between 27,000 and 31,000 foreign Jihadism & Civil Wars conducive to a revival of isi, which began to fighters from eighty-six different coun- reassert itself through domestic terrorism tries had gone to Syria and Iraq, most of against Shia civilians and against the Bagh- them from Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and Rus- dad government. isi also attracted support sia.19 Out of the five thousand total from from nonjihadist Sunni opposition groups, Europe, large numbers came from France, some with useful military expertise. , and . Foreigners includ- Simultaneously, in Syria, opportunities ed supporters as well as opponents of As- opened. In early 2011, protests broke out sad; for example, Iraq’s Shia militias were

against the authoritarian regime of Bashir drawn into the conflict, as was . Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 al-Assad. When the state responded with The formal break between Al Qaeda unexpected repressiveness, violence es- and isi came in 2013 as a result of a dis- calated. Factions from all sides, includ- pute over who would represent Al Qae- ing democrats, jihadists, nonjihadist Isla- da in Syria. The outcome was that the Al mists, Kurds, and others joined the rebel- Nusra Front, which was established as a lion, which was generally favored in the Syrian outpost in 2011, became Al Qae- West.18 Nevertheless, the regime, support- da’s main branch, and the Islamic State ed by Iran and its client Hezbollah, exhib- struck out on its own. Having picked up ited surprising staying power. Estimates momentum in Syria, isis swept back into vary, but by April 2016, the United Nations Iraq and, in 2014, seized Mosul, Iraq’s sec- Special Envoy concluded that the civil war ond largest city, and declared a caliphate had cost 470,000 lives. Around five million with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi as the caliph. Syrians had fled the country, contributing As it consolidated its control, the caliphate to a refugee crisis in Europe, and over six was now a state within a state in significant million were internally displaced. The civ- areas of both Syria and Iraq. Its reign was il war also led to direct military interven- harshly intolerant, punishing the slight- tion by outside actors, including the Unit- est deviation from strict Islamic law and ed States, France, , Iran, Jordan, and brutal to the point of genocide against reli- Turkey (which deployed ground troops in gious minorities. The reliance on violence 2016), and indirect involvement from the that is extreme even by terrorist standards Gulf monarchies. distinguished it from other rebel groups, The formation of the Islamic State of even other jihadists. Taken by surprise, the Iraq and al Sham, thus isis, or of Iraq and United States began air strikes against the the Levant, thus isil, began when both caliphate soon after and was increasingly Al Qaeda central and the Islamic State of drawn into the conflict as the war unfold- Iraq were drawn to fighting in Syria. Com- ed in both Syria and Iraq. bat against a secular Arab dictator was a perfect occasion for jihadists, especially Political scientist Daniel Byman argues since, from their perspective, Assad was that terrorism is an integral part of the Is- doubly apostate, being both secular and lamic State’s civil war strategy.20 Terrorism Shia. The fact that Assad was not an ally of can disconcert and distract enemies, even the United States and indeed that the Unit- deter them, create security vacuums by in- ed States strongly opposed him was incon- timidating local security forces, and attract sequential. Syria was a rallying cry for ji- recruits who are anti-Western or sectarian. hadists around the world, and as the civil It is a powerful propaganda tool. Terrorism war spread, it became a magnet for foreign also permitted isis to strike distant West-

66 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences ern targets that would be completely be- sponsible for external operations and pro- Martha yond the reach of its local military fighting paganda. The Islamic State’s credibility and Crenshaw capabilities, not that this strategy was new ideological appeal may decline. to isis. It is worth noting that cross-border Within and beyond the Iraq-Syria the- terrorism did not begin until the fall of 2015. ater, the deepening global rivalry between Beginning in 2014, however, isis publicized the Islamic State and Al Qaeda increas- horrible executions of foreigners captured ingly dominated jihadist politics. Attacks in Iraq, including a Jordanian pilot. Perhaps against Western targets could reflect in- the moves outside isis territories in the fall ternecine struggles, indicating a form of of 2015 were a reaction to pressure on the outbidding in extremism. For example, the

ground as forces mobilized against the ca- Charlie Hebdo attacks in Paris in January Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 liphate, but it is hard to know. The deadly 2015, linked to aqap, were perhaps intend- December 2015 attacks in Paris, for exam- ed as a challenge or reply to rival isis. ple, were in the planning stages before isis Spillover of civil conflict into transna- began to suffer defeats on the ground. There tional terrorism and external jihadist in- was also a downside for isis, since terror- volvement in local conflicts increased as ist strikes against Western targets provoke well. For example, aqap came to play a retaliation, and the military power of the more important role in the developing Islamic State’s enemies far exceeds that of civil war in Yemen. In fall 2011, the regime the caliphate. Turkey, for example, respond- in Yemen was collapsing, plagued by in- ed to the Islamic State’s terrorist attacks in ternal dissension as well as a rebellion by Turkey by intervening in Syria despite its Shia Houthis in northern Yemen, which, in greater antipathy toward the Kurdish ene- 2015, provoked intervention by Saudi Ara- mies of isis. Yet the states targeted by isis bia and the United Arab Emirates. The civil are vulnerable to the threat of returned for- war turned into a proxy war between Iran eign fighters, as seen in the coordinated ter- and the Sunni monarchies, with the Unit- rorist attacks in France and Belgium in 2015 ed States, France, and Britain supporting and 2016. the latter. In the turmoil, aqap acquired Byman concludes that the Islamic State’s a territorial base, and the Islamic State in resources were always concentrated on the turn established a province or wilayat. isis “near enemy,” whereas Al Qaeda targeted also established branches in the Sinai and the “far enemy.”21 This essay has argued in Libya after the fall of Gaddafi’s regime that, from the outset, Al Qaeda, too, had a in 2011. By 2017, isis had established a mixed strategy that included overthrowing foothold in Afghanistan. local, especially Arab, regimes, although it In Somalia, Al Shabaab (whose 2008 did not favor establishing a territorial ca- pledge of allegiance to Al Qaeda was only liphate until conditions were ripe. Never- formally accepted in 2012) adopted a strat- theless, isis was able to constitute a pow- egy of regional terrorism against civilians erful local fighting force that Al Qaeda was in Kenya and Uganda. Both countries were not able to muster. A critical question is members of the ’s peace- whether the eventual collapse of the ca- keeping mission supporting the Soma- liphate will weaken the Islamic State’s abil- li government against Al Shabaab, which ity to orchestrate transnational terrorist at- got its start in 2007 by attacking Ethiopi- tacks. Numbers of foreign fighters as well as an peacekeeping troops. In 2010, two sui- social media presence declined under mil- cide bombings struck crowds in Kampala, itary pressure, especially as American drone Uganda. In 2013, Al Shabaab attacked the strikes specifically targetedisis leaders re- Westgate shopping mall in Nairobi, Kenya.

146 (4) Fall 2017 67 Trans- In 2014 and 2015, there were more attacks in tribute to terrorism by providing safe havens national Kenya, including an assault on a college in for those organizing attacks against “far en- Jihadism & Civil Wars which non-Muslim students were singled emies,” but sanctuary may not be necessary out (147 victims were killed). Kenya’s estab- and it is more easily found on the territory lishment of buffer zones was a response to of stable sympathetic governments. Safe ha- such deadly cross-border terrorist attacks.22 vens have also become vulnerable with the Similarly, in 2014, moved advent of drone warfare. Second, civil wars outside its home base in northeastern Ni- can mobilize outside support, including re- geria to organize attacks in Cameroon, cruiting foreigners for local fighting and the Chad, and Niger, neighboring states that activation of “homegrown” terrorists. Ex-

were authorized by the African Union to perienced foreign fighters sometimes re- Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 contain the spread of violence. Boko Ha- turn home to commit acts of terrorism or ram began to rely increasingly on domestic to start or join rebels in local conflicts. An terrorism, such as the mass kidnapping of outside presence can “Islamize” nation- school girls. In 2015, Boko Haram pledged alist conflicts. Third, civil wars have spill- allegiance to the Islamic State, and a few over effects. Jihadist rebels can use terror- months later, suicide bombings hit Chad’s ism defensively to punish or deter hostile capital, N’Djamena. Two suicide bomb- neighboring states or distant foreign occu- ers also attacked a market in Cameroon in piers. Defeat at home can lead them to move February 2016. their operations across borders. Striking en- In addition, aqim exploited unrest in emy civilians at home can be initiated from to expand its influence first the outside (the 9/11 attacks) or the inside into Libya and then into Mali. It also con- (Orlando 2016). nected with aqap, Al Shabaab, and Boko At the same time, jihadist terrorism and Haram. In Mali, aqim formed an alliance the introduction of foreign fighters can with local Tuareg tribal militants as well as alter the course of civil wars. Both might indigenous jihadists to seize control of the contribute to the escalation of violence northern part of the country. This intrusion and complicate conflict resolution, espe- provoked French military intervention to cially if jihadists are absolutist religion- stabilize Mali’s government, and that set- ist rebels. Terrorism can be a useful pro- back split aqim and led to further violence, paganda tool for recruiting foreign fight- including a 2013 attack on the El Aminas gas ers as well as mobilizing support. Civil facility in Algeria and suicide bombings in wars in which Muslims appear to be op- Niger. aqim was apparently divided over posing non-Muslims are exploited as pro- whether to switch sides from Al Qaeda to paganda tools. It is possible that jihadists the Islamic State, but in the end, it stayed in are more prone to use terrorism in civ- the Al Qaeda orbit. In 2015, aqim publicly il wars than are nonjihadists, implying rebuked isis and also attacked un peace- that they are not likely to win. In addition, keepers in Mali. foreign fighters are not necessarily an as- set. In his own contribution to Dædalus, Civil war, domestic and transnational Stathis Kalyvas compares jihadists to the terrorism, and the involvement of foreign Marxist rebels of the and 1970s and fighters have been essential components of concludes that they are less of a threat, jihadist strategy since the 1980s. Much re- largely because they lack outside state sup- mains to be learned about these intercon- port. However, as jihadists suffer military nections. What vectors might lead from civ- defeats in civil wars, they may revert in- il war to terrorism? First, civil war can con- creasingly to transnational terrorism.23

68 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences Last, there are dangerous feedback loops. cal allies, and their home countries. An im- Martha Terrorism against outside powers provokes portant question for the future is whether Crenshaw military intervention, which not only in- or not powerful states can resist terrorist tensifies civil war, but also sparks more ter- provocation. rorism against occupying forces, their lo-

endnotes 1 Stathis N. Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018).

2 James D. Fearon, “Civil War & the Current International System,” Dædalus 146 (4) (Fall 2017). Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 3 See Anthony H. Cordesman, Rethinking the Threat of : The Changes Needed in U.S. Strategy (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2016). Cordesman refers to a “clash within a civilization” as opposed to a “clash between civilizations.” See also Martha Crenshaw, “Why America? The Globalization of Civil War,” Current History 100 (650) (December 2001): 425–432. 4 Thomas Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters: Islam and the Globalization of Jihad,” International Security 35 (3) (Winter 2010/2011): 53–94. 5 Tanisha Fazal, “Religionist Rebels & the Sovereignty of the Divine,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 6 This is not to say that foreign fighters are necessarily an asset to civil war rebels. See Kristin M. Bakke, “Help Wanted? The Mixed Record of Foreign Fighters in Domestic ,” International Security 38 (4) (Spring 2014): 150–187. 7 The Marxist rebels of the 1960s and 1970s did not typically resort to indiscriminate attacks against civilians. 8 Page Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win? Rebels’ Use of Terrorism and Civil War Out- comes,” International Organization 69 (3) (2015): 519–556. 9 See Hegghammer, “The Rise of Muslim Foreign Fighters”; Fortna, “Do Terrorists Win?”; Michael G. Findley and Joseph K. Young, “Terrorism and Civil War: A Spatial and Tempo- ral Approach to a Conceptual Problem,” Perspectives on Politics 10 (2) (June 2012): 285–305; and Bridget L. Coggins, “Does State Failure Cause Terrorism? An Empirical Analysis (1999– 2008),” Journal of Conflict Resolution 59 (3) (2015): 455–483. 10 See the “maps” of the global isis and global Al Qaeda networks on Martha Crenshaw’s web- site, “Mapping Militant Organizations,” mappingmilitants.stanford.edu. These organizational diagrams are linked to detailed profiles of the groups in question and trace their evolution over time. 11 Gilles Kepel, Jihad: The Trail of (, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002). Although a Shia revolution, its outcome demonstrated to Sunni extremists that an Islamist rebellion could succeed against an ally of the West. 12 See R. Kim Cragin, “Early History of Al-Qa’ida,” The Historical Journal 51 (4) (2008): 1047–1067. This account, which covers the period 1984–1996, is based largely on primary documents. 13 Ibid., 1056–1057. 14 Ibid., 1060–1062. 15 Bakke, “Help Wanted?” 166–170, 172. 16 Observers have a tendency to attribute causality in short time frames, seeing terrorist attacks as immediate reactions to government actions, when many complex attacks take some time to plan.

146 (4) Fall 2017 69 Trans- 17 Mary Anne Weaver, “The Short, Violent Life of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,” The Atlantic, July– national August 2006, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2006/07/the-short-violent Jihadism & -life-of-abu-musab-al-zarqawi/304983/. See also Joby Warrick, Flags: The Rise of ISIS (New Civil Wars York: Doubleday, 2015). 18 See the maps of Syria and of Aleppo province and accompanying group profiles at Crenshaw, “Mapping Militant Organizations.” 19 The Soufan Group, Foreign Fighters: An Updated Assessment of the Flow of Foreign Fighters into Syria and Iraq (New York: The Soufan Group, 2015), http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf. 20 Daniel Byman, “Understanding the Islamic State–A Review Essay,” International Security 40 (4) (Spring 2016): 127–165, esp. 144–145. 21 Ibid., 153–155. Downloaded from http://direct.mit.edu/daed/article-pdf/146/4/59/1831094/daed_a_00459.pdf by guest on 01 October 2021 22 Seyoum Mesfin and Abdeta Beyene, “The Practicalities of Living with Failed States,” Dædalus 147 (1) (Winter 2018). 23 Kalyvas, “Jihadi Rebels in Civil War.”

70 Dædalus, the Journal of the American Academy of Arts & Sciences