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Intelligence and the Cognitive Unconscious P1:PHB Trim:7in × 10in Top: 0.5in Gutter: 0.875in CUUS1280-22 cuus1280/Sternberg ISBN: 978 0 521 51806 2 February 11, 2011 17:57 CHAPTER 22 Intelligence and the Cognitive Unconscious Scott Barry Kaufman The definition of genius is that it acts that have explicit instructions and require unconsciously; and those who have effortful concentration is administered to a produced immortal works, have done so diverse group of people, all of the tests tend without knowing how or why. The greatest to be positively correlated with one another, power operates unseen, and executes its a finding often referred to as a “positive man- appointed task with as little ostentation as ifold.” Spearman labeled the factor on which difficulty. all individual tests loaded g, for general intel- ligence. – William Hazlitt1 Over the past 100 years, the existence of g as a statistical phenomenon is one of the Intelligence tests were originally created most replicable findings in all of psychology with the practical goal of identifying stu- (Carroll, 1993; Chabris, 2007; Jensen, 1998). dents in need of alternative education Nonetheless, there is still work to be done to 1916 (Binet & Simon, ). Because intelligence determine what explains the positive man- tests were originally devised to predict ifold (see Maas et al., 2006), the cognitive school grades, the items were intention- mechanisms that support g (see Chapter 20, ally designed to measure a general ability Working Memory and Intelligence, this vol- to profit from explicit instruction, concen- ume; Kaufman, DeYoung, Gray, Brown, & trate on a task, and engage in intellectual Mackintosh, 2009; Sternberg & Pretz, 2005), material. Indeed, research shows that such and whether there are other forms of cog- a general ability does seem to exist. Over nition that display meaningful individual 1904 a century ago, Spearman ( ) discovered differences and predict intelligent behavior that when a wide range of cognitive tests above and beyond g and the cognitive mech- anisms that support g. 1 William Hazlitt (1846), “Essay IV. Whether Genius This chapter presents evidence that Is Conscious of Its Powers?” in Table Talk: Opinions on Books, Men, and Things, Second Series, Part I mechanisms relating to the cognitive uncon- (pp. 37–49). New York, NY: Wiley & Putnam. scious – “mental structures, processes, and 442 P1:PHB Trim:7in × 10in Top: 0.5in Gutter: 0.875in CUUS1280-22 cuus1280/Sternberg ISBN: 978 0 521 51806 2 February 11, 2011 17:57 INTELLIGENCE AND THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS 443 states2 that can influence experience, Integrating Two Research Traditions thought, and actions outside phenomenal awareness and voluntary control” (Dorf- The 20th century witnessed at least two man, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996,p.259) major paradigm shifts within psychological also make an important contribution to science. One major shift was from behav- intelligent behavior. Although intelligence iorism to the “cognitive revolution,” which testers have done a remarkable job devel- brought along with it a shift in focus from oping tests that measure individual dif- learning and conditioning toward investigat- ferences in explicit, controlled cognitive ing the mental processes involved in con- processes, the investigation of individual dif- scious thought, including memory, think- ferences in implicit, nonconscious processes ing, and problem solving (Miller, 2003). This has not received nearly as much attention shift has had an enduring effect on concep- (Kaufman, 2009a, b). tualizations of human intelligence as well Furthermore, researchers have created as research methodology. Indeed, one of clever experiments to probe the nature the earliest investigators of the develop- of the cognitive unconscious by looking ment of intelligence in children was Jean at implicit memory, implicit perception, Piaget (1952), whose focus was on conscious and other forms of implicit cognition and higher order reasoning and how children thought3 (for reviews, see Kihlstrom, 1987, at different ages think. This emphasis on and Litman & Reber, 2005), but they age differences in thought as well as the have focused primarily on group-level data, notion that intelligence involves conscious, ignoring individual differences (see Cron- deliberate reasoning also underlies the logic bach, 1957). Additionally, some researchers behind the first widely administered intel- have downplayed the existence of continu- ligence test, the Binet-Simon Scale (Binet ous individual differences in the cognitive & Simon, 1916). Furthermore, the discovery unconscious that are meaningfully related that performances on diverse tests of explicit to important life outcomes (Reber, 1993; cognitive ability tend to correlate with one Stanovich, 2009). another – Spearman’s (1904) so-called pos- There have been some recent studies, itive manifold – further supported the idea however, that look at individual differences that intelligence tests are tapping into a “gen- in the cognitive unconscious. This chap- eral cognitive ability.” ter focuses on individual differences and Around the same time the shift from reviews recent empirical work on relations behaviorism to the cognitive revolution was among the cognitive processes underlying taking place, another dramatic shift in psy- psychometric intelligence and the cognitive chology was occurring. The conceptual- processes underlying the cognitive uncon- ization of the unconscious that was pre- scious, attempting to bridge two major dominant with psychodynamic theories of research programs that, until recently, have personality was slowly being transformed traveled on separate but parallel paths. into an unconscious recognized to serve many adaptive functions among both modern-day humans and our evolutionary 2 I include “implicit thought” in this definition as well, ancestry (Epstein, 1991; Hassin, Uleman, & although Kihlstrom tends to refer to “implicit cog- Bargh, 2005; Wilson, 2004). Over 30 years nition” differently from the “cognitive unconscious” (Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996). of research in cognitive science reveals that 3 I assume in this chapter that intelligent “thought” a considerable amount of information pro- can operate either with or without awareness of cessing takes place on a daily basis automat- that thought. As Dorfman, Shames, and Kihlstrom (1996) astutely note, the idea of “implicit thought” ically – without our intent, awareness, and is a difficult concept because the notion of think- deliberate encoding – and plays an impor- ing has traditionally been equated with notions of 1890 tant role in structuring our skills, percep- consciousness. For instance, William James ( ) 1991 thought the notion of “unconscious thought” was a tions, and behavior (Epstein, ; Hassin contradiction in terms! et al., 2005; Kihlstrom, 1987; Lewicki & Hill, P1:PHB Trim:7in × 10in Top: 0.5in Gutter: 0.875in CUUS1280-22 cuus1280/Sternberg ISBN: 978 0 521 51806 2 February 11, 2011 17:57 444 SCOTT BARRY KAUFMAN 1987; Reber, 1993; Stadler & Frensch, 1997) Psychology that the key to consciousness is as well as facilitating problem solving and self-reference: creativity (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Dorfman, Shames, & Kihlstrom, 1996;Lit- In order for ongoing experience, thought, and action to become conscious, a link man & Reber, 2005). 1987 must be made between its mental repre- Kihlstrom ( ) distinguishes between sentation and some mental representation three types of nonconscious mental struc- of the self as agent or experiencer – as well, tures that together constitute the domain perhaps, as some representation of the envi- of the “cognitive unconscious.” Unconscious ronment in which these events take place. representations fit within the domain of pro- These episodic representations of the self cedural knowledge and are inaccessible to and context reside in working memory, but introspection under any circumstances. “By apparently the links in question are nei- virtue of routinization (or perhaps because ther automatic nor permanent, and must they are innate), such procedures operate be actively forged . without such linkages on declarative knowledge without either certain aspects of mental life are dissoci- ated from awareness, and are not accom- conscious intent or conscious awareness, panied by the experience of consciousness. in order to construct the person’s ongoing (Kihlstrom, 1987,p.1451) experience, thought, and action” (p. 1450; also see Anderson, 1982). Subliminal percep- A great deal of research has demonstrated tion, implicit memory, and implicit learn- the sophisticated and intelligent nature of ing fit the category of preconscious declar- the cognitive unconscious (Epstein, 2001; ative knowledge structures. In contrast to Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992; Loftus & unconscious representations, preconscious Klinger, 1992). For instance, after reviewing structures can be available to phenomenal the literature on the nonconscious acqui- awareness and can be introspected upon, but sition of information, Lewicki, Hill, and they can also influence ongoing experience, Czyzewska (1992) asked, “Is the noncon- thought, and action without ever entering scious information-processing system ‘intel- into working memory. Finally, Kihlstrom ligent’?” – to which they concluded: describes subconscious declarative knowl- The answer to the question about intelli- edge mental representations such as those gence would be affirmative if intelligence is activated during hypnosis, which can be understood as “equipped to efficiently pro- quite available to introspection
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