1374-08_Anc_Soc38_06_Erdkamp 30-10-2008 15:01 Pagina 137 POLYBIUS II 24: ROMAN MANPOWER AND GREEK PROPAGANDA* Abstract: In his account of the Gallic wars of the 220s BC Polybius inludes a unique survey of troops and men able to bear arms in Italy. Polybius derived these figures from the work of Fabius Pictor. The Gallic digression, culminating in the battle of Telamon, should be seen against the background of contemporary Hellenistic propaganda. Succeeding the Persians, the Galatians served as archetypical enemies of Greece, and victories over these barbarians were exploited by Hellenistic kings to legitimize their rule. Fabius Pictor used the same propagandistic tool to present Rome as the saviour of the civilized world. Greek diplomatic discourse emphasized that only a united Greece could withstand its external enemies. Hence, there was a long tradition among Greek writers to present details on the coalitions that had defeated Persians and Galatians. In Polybius II 24 Italy is presented as united under its hegemon Rome. When including a survey of troops and manpower, Fabius Pictor was following the Greek example. The strength of Italy under Roman leadership is deliberately presented not as that of the aggressor threatening neighbouring states, but as the defender of prosperity and peace in Italy. 1. POLYBIUS II 24 The only detailed evidence for the population of Italy during the mid- republic is found in Polybius’ account of the invasion of the Gaesatae in 225 BC. Polybius II 24 offers truly unique figures — we have nothing comparable on the population of Italy (not even in the form of the cen- sus figures of the first century BC). However, in my view modern histo- rians discussing Polybius’ survey of Italian manpower do usually not pay attention to its purpose and background1. Let me first present the passage concerned. Polybius starts with enu- merating the various forces, consisting of infantry and cavalry, stationed * I wish to thank John Rich and Luuk de Ligt for their valuable comments on an ear- lier version of this article. I am also very grateful to Simon Northwood for improving the English text. 1 H. BELLEN, Metus Gallicus – metus Punicus. Zum Furchtmotiv in der römischen Republik, Mainz 1985, and J.H.C. WILLIAMS, Beyond the Rubicon. Romans and Gauls in Republican Italy, Oxford 2001, miss the implications of Fabius Pictor’s role as Polybius’ source for our interpretation of the Gallic digression. Roman terror of the Gauls is reduced to more plausible proportions by V. ROSENBERGER, The Gallic disaster, CW 96 (2003), p. 365-373. Ancient Society 38, 137-152. doi: 10.2143/AS.38.0.2033273 © 2008 by Ancient Society. All rights reserved. 1374-08_Anc_Soc38_06_Erdkamp 30-10-2008 15:01 Pagina 138 138 P. ERDKAMP in and around Italy. Then he gives manpower figures for the Romans, Campanians and southern allies. The lists of men capable of bearing arms that were supplied to the authorities read as follows. Latins, 80,000 infantry and 5,000 cavalry; Samnites, 70,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry; Iapygians and Messapians, 50,000 infantry and 16,000 cavalry; Lucanians, 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry; Marsi, Marrucini, Frentani and Vestini, 20,000 infantry and 4,000 cavalry. In Sicily and Tarentum there were two reserve legions, each consisting of about 4,200 infantry and 200 cavalry. The total num- ber of Romans and Campanians whose names appeared on the roll amounted to 250,000 infantry and 23,000 cavalry. Thus the number of Romans and their allies able to bear arms totalled more than 700,000 infantry and 70,000 cavalry (Polybius II 24.10-16). Polybius’ main source on the Gallic wars was Fabius Pictor, a Roman senator and contemporary of the events described, who wrote in Greek and probably even primarily for a Greek audience2. It is certain that Polybius derived the above figures from his Roman predecessor, because Orosius and Eutropius quote figures from Fabius Pictor that are very close to those of Polybius3. The manpower figures of Rome and its Italian allies, as preserved by Polybius, are unique, and not repeated in the extant historiography on ancient Rome. We are therefore justified in asking why Fabius Pictor included such a survey and, in particular, why he did so on this occasion. The availability of the figures is no answer, since they were surely available on many other occasions. The purpose of the present article is to show that, even though Poly- bius did not slavishly follow his Roman predecessor, Pictor’s involve- ment is crucial for our understanding of the purpose and background of 2 Thus M. GELZER, Römische Politik bei Fabius Pictor (orig. 1933), in: Kleine Schriften, vol. III, Wiesbaden 1964, p. 51. The idea that Pictor wrote in Greek because Latin was inadequate as a literary language is contradicted by the fact that Livius Andron- icus and Naevius wrote in Latin at the time. On Pictor’s audience, see S. NORTHWOOD, Quintus Fabius Pictor. Was he an Annalist?, in: N.V. SEKUNDA, Corolla Cosmo Roden- wald, 2007. On Fabius Pictor as Polybius’ main source on the Gallic wars: H. BELLEN (n. 1), p. 11; A.M. ECKSTEIN, Senate and General. Individual Decision Making and Roman Foreign Relations, 264-194 BC, Berkeley 1987, p. 4. P. BRUNT, Italian Manpower, Oxford 1971, p. 185, points out that Pictor must have been Polybius’ source on various figures concerning Gallic strength, casualties, captives etc. Officer in 225 BC: Eutropius, Brev. 3.5; Orosius IV 13.6. Also Pliny, H.N. X 71. G.P. VERBRUGGHE, Three Notes on Fabius Pictor and his History, in Miscellanea di studi classici in onore di Eugenio Manni. Vol. 6, Rome 1980, p. 2161, 2163. 3 Eutr. 3.5 (F19b Peter; FRH 30a); Oros. IV 13.6-7 (F 23 Peter; FRH 30b). 1374-08_Anc_Soc38_06_Erdkamp 30-10-2008 15:01 Pagina 139 POLYBIUS II 24: ROMAN MANPOWER AND GREEK PROPAGANDA 139 Polybius’ ‘catalogue of forces’, which was not part of a dry, matter-of- fact account of war, but closely fitted a contemporary propagandistic context. The digression reflects contemporary propaganda, in which we may distinguish the contemporary ideal of a Greece united in the face of outside powers and Fabius Pictor’s attempt to liken Rome to the Hel- lenistic monarchies. 2. THE GAULS: ARCH-ENEMIES OF ROME The Gallic invasion is treated in the first half of Polybius’ book II, the second half being concerned with Greek affairs. I have argued elsewhere that the account of the Gallic invasion is deliberately distorted when claiming that the Gallic threat dominated Roman policy for years and hampered Rome from making an adequate response to the expansion of Punic power in Spain. In fact, the Gallic invasion came as a surprise to Rome at a most inopportune moment. Rome had started a more aggres- sive policy towards Carthage, but in 225 BC had to take a step back when confronted with this unexpected enemy. The result was the Ebro treaty (which therefore has to be dated to 225 BC, probably at some time before the battle of Telamon)4. The digression on the Gauls culminates in the invasion of 225 BC and it is stressed that the alliance facing Rome in this year was a formidable one. The two largest Cisalpine tribes, Polybius (II 22.1-2) writes, united themselves with the Gauls «who are called Gaesatae because they serve for hire, this being the proper meaning of the word». [Their kings] became so eager for the expedition that on no occasion has that district of Gaul sent out so large a force or one composed of men so distinguished or so warlike. (Polybius II 22.6) The Gauls are depicted as fierce and experienced warriors, but also as typ- ical barbarians, lacking in stamina, discipline, and planning ability. It was these typically Roman virtues that in the end gave Rome the upper hand in the struggle with the Gauls5. Polybius emphasizes that Transalpine Gauls had invaded northern Italy on previous occasions and that Rome had every reason to be aware of the 4 P. ERDKAMP, Polybius, the Ebro Treaty and the Gallic Invasion of 225 BC, CPh (forthcoming). 5 E.g. C.B. CHAMPION, Polybian Demagogues in Political Context, HSPh 102 (2004), p. 114ff. 1374-08_Anc_Soc38_06_Erdkamp 30-10-2008 15:01 Pagina 140 140 P. ERDKAMP threat of war in the north. His account of the wars of 225-222 BC is preceded by a brief history of the Gallic occupation of the Po plain and their wars with neighbours and with Rome (from II 17 onwards). In 237 BC Rome was alarmed when Alpine Gauls arrived in the territory of the Boii. However, fighting broke out between the newcomers and the Boii and thus the invasion came to naught. The plans for a common invasion of Italy were revived when in 232 BC the Romans decided to distribute land amongst their citizens that had been taken from the Senones some fifty years earlier. Polybius alleges that Flaminius’ measure convinced the neighbouring Insubres and Boii that Rome intended the extermination of all Gauls (II 21.9). The Cisalpine peoples concluded an alliance and again sent envoys to the northern Gauls to invite them to make war on Rome. Polybius stresses that the thought of masses of warlike Gauls streaming across the Alps struck absolute terror into the hearts of Romans and allies alike. The image that Polybius conveys is one of a prolonged threat of war, terror in Italy, and frantic preparation. When the Gaesatae finally crossed the Alps, Rome and its allies prepared themselves for war on an unprecedented scale: All their subjects in general were commanded to supply lists of men able to bear arms, as they wished to know what their total forces amounted to.