KURDISH LIBRARY) MAINTIENT VIV ANTE LA CULTURE DES KURDES SANS NATION (Gazette Telegraph 27.10.88)

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KURDISH LIBRARY) MAINTIENT VIV ANTE LA CULTURE DES KURDES SANS NATION (Gazette Telegraph 27.10.88) • ." INSTITUT URD DE PARIS OCTOBRE-NOVEMBRE-DECEMBRE 1988 f • Ce bulletin paraît en français, allemand, anglais, kurde, italien, espagnol et turc. Prix au numéro: (France) 25 FF, (Etranger): 30 FF Abonnement annuel (12 numéros) France: 240 FF, (Etranger) 265 FF Périodique mensuel Directeur de la publication: Mohamad HASSAN numéro de la Commission Paritaire: 659 15 A.S. ISSN 0761 1285 INSTITUT KURDE 106, rue La Fayette - 75010 PARIS Tél.: (1) 48 246464 - LA MORT DE NOUREDDINE ZAZA - CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE: LA RECONNAISSANCE DES LANGUES MINORITAIRES DIVISE LES PARLEMENTAIRES TURCS - LE PARLEMENT EUROPEEN CONDAMNE L'UTILISATION DES ARMES CHIMIQUES CONTRE LES KURDES - PARIS: APPEL DE SAKHAROV EN FAVEUR DES KURDES - U.S.A. : LE SOUS-SECRETAIRE D'ETAT PARLE DE «PATRIE KURDE EN TURQUIE». - BONN: DEBAT AU BUNDESTAG SUR LA QUESTION DES DROITS DE L'HOMME EN TURQUIE. - TURQUIE: LA DETRESSE DES REFUGIES KURDES - PARIS: BERNARD KOUCHNER REND VISITE AUX GREVISTES KURDES DE LA FAIM - BERLIN : COLLOQUE LINGUISTIQUE KURDE - DIYARBAKIR :NOUVELLE GREVE DE LA FAIM DANS LA PRISON MILITAIRE - U.R.S.S :LETTRE D'UN VIEUX COMMUNISTE KURDE SOVIETIQUE A GORBATCHEV - EN BREF, LA REVUE DE PRESSE. LA MORT DE NOUREDDINE ZAZA Dr. Noureddine Zaza, membre fondateur de notre Institut s'est éteint le 7.10.1988, à l'âge de 69 ans, dans un hôpital de Lausanne des suites d'une longue maladie. Son corps fut inhumé, selon la volonté de sa famille, dans l'intimité familiale en présence de ses amis les plus proches et du président de l'Institut Kurde. Né en 1919 à Maden, au Kurdistan de Turquie, dans une famille aisée et patriote Noureddine Zaza mènera une vie faite de lutte, de résistance, de nombreux séjours en prison et d'une série d'exils. Sa famille fut disséminée à la suite des révoltes kurdes de cheikh Saïd et d'Agri (1925-1930). Il passera son enfance auprès de son frère aîné, médecin, réfugié en Syrie, alors sous mandat français. Durant ses études au Lycée français de Damas il fréquenta les patriotes kurdes notamment les frères Bedirkhan, initiateurs de la renaissance culturelle kurde. Alors qu'il voulait rejoindre le mouvement de e 2 Barzani, en 1944, il sera arrêté par les autorités irakiennes et emprisonné pendant un an. Cela sera le premier d'une longue série de séjours dans les geôles du Proche-Orient " Après des études en Sciences politiques à l'Université de Beyrouth, Zaza part à Lausanne, en 1947, pour faire son doctorat en Sciences sociales et pédagogiques. il y créa la première Association des Etudiants Kurdes en Europe (K.S.S.E.) et fut l'un des porte-parole éloquents de son peuple. De retour à Damas en 1956 il enseignera à l'Université. En 1957, il créa le Parti démocratique kurde de Syrie et sera arrêté et condamné à mort en 1960. Ce n'est que grâce à une campagne internationale qu'il échappera à la potence et sera libéré au bout de 18 mois de réclusion. Mais le coup d'Etat baassiste du 8 mars 1963 transforme à nouveau sa vie. TIest contraint à se réfugier au Liban où ses activités en faveur du mouvement kurde irakien lui valent une expulsion vers la Jordanie. La' police hachémite le remet à la Syrie qui l'emprisonne à nouveau. Elargi à la suite d'un nouveau coup d'Etat, il quitte ce pays et au terme d'une longue pérégrination, en 1970, il se réfugie en Suisse, pays de sa jeunesse et sa "seconde patrie" dont il admire les vertus démocratiques. Quelque temps après, il y épousera Gilberte Favre, journaliste et écrivain. Naturalisé suisse, il continuera jusqu'à ses derniers jours, son combat en faveur de la liberté du peuple kurde, grâce notamment à ses interventions et ses articles dans les médias helvétiques. Pour assurer une coordination des efforts menés pour la sauvegarde de la culture kurde et pour la sensibilisation de l'opinion publique, il avait, en 1982, pris une part active à la fondation de l'Institut Kurde de Paris. Par ses écrits Noureddine Zaza a apporté une contribution éminente au renouveau de la littérature kurde. Il a également publié, en français, un récit autobiographique émouvant "Ma vie de Kurde" ainsi qu'un recueil de poèmes et légendes kurdes. CONSEIL DE L'EUROPE : LA RECONNAISSANCE DES LANGUES MINORITAIRES DIVISE LES PARLEMENTAIRES TURCS: L'Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l'Europe a adopté le 5 octobre un "pacte sur les langues minoritaires". Ce document a été transmis au Conseil des Ministres aux fms de ratification par les pays membres, dont la Turquie. Ce pacte prévoit notamment l'usage des langues dites minoritaires dans les domaines de l'enseignement, de l'éducation et de la culture. Au cours du débat devant l'Assemblée de Strasbourg, les parlementaires turcs se sont montrés très divisés. Ceux du SHP (opposition social-démocrate) se sont prononcés en faveur du texte, tandis que les représentants des deux autres formations, l'A.N.A.P. (Parti de la Mètre Patrie) du Premier Ministre Ozal et le D.Y.P. (Le Parti de la Juste Voie) de l'ancien premier ministre DEMIREL ont voté contre. Appréciation de Mükerem Ta~çioglu, chef de la délégation parlementaire turque à Strasbourg sur les réfugiés kurdes irakiens : "Ils ne nous sont d'aucune utilité". Intervenant dans le débat sur la reconnaissance des langues minoritaires, il a qualifié de "délicate" cette question pour la Turquie. "Nous ne reconnaissons aucune minorité. Si nous ouvrons le voie avec le kurde, il y aura ensuite le tatare et le laz et la Turquie deviendra un patchwork à 70 pièces. Nous ne pouvons pas sacrifier notre unité nationale. La question kurde est un vrai casse-tête pour nous. En acceptant les Peshmergas sur notre sol, nous nous sommes créés d'autres soucis. fi se peut qu'il y ait même des terroristes infiltrés parmi ces Peshmergas". Le député espagnol Puig, qui est à l'origine de ce texte a répondu, à une question d'un journaliste turc lui demandant si les Kurdes étaient inclus parmi les 40 millions d'européens parlant une langue minoritaire, en disant notamment "je ne sais pas .... peut-être qu'ils y sont inclus, ce chiffre est global. Si la Turquie considère la langue kurde comme une langue minoritaire, il en serait ainsi ; je ne suis pas au fait de la question kurd,e. Seulement, nous protégeons non pas les langues des minorités, mais les langues minoritaires. Par exemple, le turc parlé par les Turcs de Grèce n'est pas considéré comme une langue minoritaire et n'a pas besoin de protection particulière. Je veux dire par là que notre but n'est pas de défendre les minorités ,':ethniques". 3 Que se passerait-il, si l'Allemagne et la France d6c1arent : "Nous reconnaissons et protégeons le kurde comme une langue minoritaire 1". Cette question tourmente dès à présent les autorités turques : "les langues parlées par les immigrés ne sont pas des langues minoritaires, mais le kurde peut l'être", dit-on çà et là. n n'est pas question de la défense, ni de l'enseignement, ni de l'utilisation auprès de l'administration de la langue turque, utili~ par les un million et demi d'immigrés en Allemagne Fédérale, mais la protection de la langue kurde, parlée par quelques centaines de milliers de personnes, "comme langue minoritaire", peut l'être Les opinions des députés turcs sont, à ce sujet, contradictoires. Le député du DYP, Irfan Demiralp prétend que "voter ce pacte, par oui ou par non, peut être utilisé contre nous par certains milieux. Le mieux est de s'abstenir. Pendant ce temps Ismail Cem, du SHP déclarait aux journalistes turcs. "n n'y a pas lieu d'accorder plus d'importance à cette affaire qu'elle n'en a. Depuis le XYlème siècle, nous avons reconnu la liberté à des diverses langues et religions. Nous n'avons pas à en être complexés, ni à recevoir de leçon de l'Europe". Un autre député turc Günes Taner, a pris la parole devant l'Assemblée du Conseil et a déclaré : "il y a tant de choses importantes qui restent à résoudre. Pourquoi discuter des langues minoritaires, alors qu'il y a un problème à résoudre en ce qui concerne les droits de l'homme, soyons réalistes". Le rapporteur, Puig, en répondant à Taner a dit notamment, "si ce pacte ne plaît pas à la Turquie, elle n'est pas tenue de le signer, mais n'empêchez pas les autres pays de le faire". Les représentants turcs sont unanimes pour dire que la Turquie ne signera jamais ce pacte, et tant qu'elle ne le signera pas elle ne sera pas tenue de l'appliquer. Tout le problème est de savoir si ce pacte peut être utilisé comme une monnaie d'échange (souvenons- nous de la Convention contre la torture signée par la Turquie ..). Ce pacte sur les langues minoritaires risque donc d'être utilisé, à tout moment contre la Turquie. La délégation turque pense que "s'il le faut, nous signerons ce pacte tout en précisant que nous ne reconnaissons pas le kurde comme une langue minoritaire, et nous en avons le droit. Mais cette attitude aussi n'empêchera pas les pressions sur la Turquie, et risque même de les augmenter. Commentaire du quotidien turc "Tercüman qui résume l'opinion des milieux dirigeants turcs : "Il y a une chose certaine: ceux qui disent aujourd'hui, qu'il y a 40 millions d'européens qui parlent une langue minoritaire diront, demain, qu'un quart d'entre eux sont des Kurdes et qu'il faut commencer par eux.
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