Policies of Mikhail Gorbachev between 1985-1991:

“How did the economy of the USSR change under perestroika and glasnost and with what consequences”

words: 3938 Research Question: “How did the economy of the USSR change under ​ ​ ​ perestroika and glasnost and with what consequences”

Introduction

Mikhail Gorbachev, the “architect” of perestroika1, attained the highest position of the

Soviet Union in 1985 and was bound to be the last leader of one of the greatest superpowers of the 20th century. My research question: “How did the economy of ​ the USSR change under perestroika and glasnost, and with what consequences” implicates an examination of the economic policies (perestroika) as ​ well with the accelerative policies (glasnost) and an evaluation of the impact of them.

My main secondary source is: “Perestroika - Process and Consequences” (2010, by ​ various contributors). This particular source has many components necessary for ​ this essay as the book is a selection of papers from the 7th Annual Aleksanteri

Conference which was held at University of Helsinki in 2007. In the conference, historians were gathered to discuss perestroika. From the source I am able to obtain many firmly different interpretations of the time and from different perspectives - many of the contributors are from different countries, with backgrounds of their own.

This source is quite perfect for this essay, helping with the rather complex analysis part and the method: trying to find components in the contemporary works and then analysing them with the help of the analysis we can access today. There is a minor flaw in its producing, because all of the articles are from the same conference.

I also used an overview on the soviet history: “The Land Of The Soviets” ​ ​ ​ (Neuvostojen maa, 2004, Arto Luukkanen), for personal understanding of the ​ ​

1 Neuvostojen maa, 2004, Arto Luukkanen, 313 1 development of the Soviet Union. This source is however quite simple in the language and tone, and it covers a long time period, thus it does not get very in depth on the topic. The author is an university lecturer at Helsinki University, specialized in the history of Russia and the eastern Europe, so the work is still carefully done with critical point of view, including perspectives. For my two primary sources I am going to use “Speeches and articles” (M. S. Gorbachev, 1987) and ​ ​ “Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World (M. S. Gorbachev,

1987). These two sources provide in a way similar view to my research question. ​ They both are great in the sense, particularly “Speeches and articles”, that they ​ address what the world and especially Soviet people were told at the time about the changes of the Soviet Union and why they were seen as necessary in the first place.

The sources are limited in the sense that they are the words of only Gorbachev and the date of publication implicated the policies up to 1987, not up to 1991.

This question is very interesting as the socialist policies had been in place for a very long time period, and the changes were quite drastic. I am very interested in the fact that why the introduction of the “capitalist-like” policies did not produce similar effects ​ ​ as in the west, and the democratization process did not function as planned. This study is valuable for me personally as I have grown under a western country and have possibly quite “western” point of view, which this study will further expand.

The Soviet Union’s past economic policies came to a drastical change in 1985-1991, with introduction of many economic reforms. Though defining historical concepts is rather complicated, it is even more of it for perestroika, which was a complex mix of

2 continuity and change. Perestroika can be simplified to the policies which aimed to reconstruct the socialist Soviet society, particularly the economy to be able to transfer into more democratic and modern to reduce its inefficiency.2 An important concept in this study is also glasnost (openness), which supported the acceptance by the public of the policies driven by perestroika.3

Gorbachev’s role in the advancement of perestroika and glasnost cannot be underestimated, even though he indeed had help from figures such as Abel

Aganbegyan, who was one of his advisors. His work: “New Directions in Soviet ​ Economics” (1987) is also part of my sources, which apply to an extent with the ​ same limitations and values as mentioned above in relation to the date of publication.4 Gorbachev can be described as charismatic and he was good with public speech, which was quite a new skill for an Soviet leader.5 For example, the former secretary Generals (1964-1984), Brezhnev, Andropov and Tshernenko did not benefit from appearing in television, compared to Gorbachev, who gave an unprepared speech about glasnost in a direct television broadcast (May 1985). By giving such a speech, he shocked people and “taboos” about Soviet leaders started to vanish.6 Overall, Gorbachev began his tenure with more energy and he actively

2 https://www.jstor.org/stable/152568?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

3 “Perestroika: Process and consequences” Jukka Pietiläinen, 78 4 Medvedev, 247 5 Medvedev, 215 6 https://books.google.fi/books?id=rAYEwq45fioC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=Gorbachev+spee ch+without+script&source=bl&ots=2esVqIoRSy&sig=ni5Dlj70D37XRUZQPBXbTu2tpcI&hl=fi &sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjxnIuI7oTXAhXCC5oKHbkODv0Q6AEIPTAD#v=onepage&q=Gorbac hev%20speech%20without%20script&f=false (22.10.2017) ​ ​

3 planned and approved more decisions than any leader in the same time, and showed also a common sense about economics.7

Gorbachev’s works

”A conceptual and actor-oriented way of studying perestroika can be obtained by looking at the speeches and writings of its main actor, Mikhail Gorbachev”8 proposes

Katja Ruutu and I agree. The main objective of Gorbachev’s speech in the twenty-seventh (XXVII) party congress was that he declared that the better the people was informed, the more they would be willing to support the party, it’s plans and goals. He additionally stated:

“We have to deepen glasnost (openness) in the work of the party, soviet, state and ​ social organisations. Lenin said that the state is rich when its people are conscious.

Our experience has strengthened this conclusion.”9

This was the logic behind glasnost, which reduced effectively the control of the mass-media control mechanisms10 and opened even the Soviet Union history archives to the public - this freedom has been considered as radical in the aftermath of Leonid Brezhnev’s regime. Gorbachev contradicts himself - the social spontaneity of working class was actually something that created dangers for the party, argued

Lenin.11 By taking a look in depth to glasnost, we can see ironically that this argument had indeed some truth in it. In his diaries (1987) he focused more on his

7 Medvedev, 249 8 Ruutu, 62 9 M. S. Gorbachev, “Puheita ja Lausuntoja” (Speeches and articles) p. 32 ​ ​ 10 Pietiläinen, 79-80 11 Ruutu, 62 4 antagonism towards Brezhnev’s era and the stagnation created by it: the Soviet

Union was at a “turning point” (perelom) in its development and it was time to move to new era, away from the stagnation. “Uskorenie” (acceleration) was one of the new concepts that was launched and put forward against the challenge created by

“perelom” - this ambitious policy aimed to be the key to domestic and foreign problems as well with the spheres of economics, politics and ideology12. It would mean in practise the immediate actions to revise the Soviet economy and the concept provided the “perpetual dynamism” of Soviet life.13 Gorbachev was very determined with the introduction of these concepts, but they remained almost as

“compulsory, obedient and secure” due to their administrative nature to the more liberal willing intellectuals: this was the shock treatment to the economic problems rather than appealing to the people in democratic manner.14

Dissident movements had been criticising the regime for losing touch with its people, which was a significant factor contributing to the creation of the term ‘glasnost’.

Although the concept “uskorenie” was showing continuity with the leader of the

Soviet Union, Gorbachev had listened to the opposition, which was rather unique for the general secretary. He was taking his new way of ruling literally to the streets, asking people what was wrong in their life.15 “It has occurred to me during the first day of my ruling, that I have to ask the people, what they want”, stated Gorbachev in an interview. The change in the communist perspective was very satisfying for the most of the people and Gorbachev’s support came up to its prime in the mid 1980’s.

12 Ruutu, 70 13 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World 1987, 34 14 Medvedev, 239 15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBOZOPS3G4w (4:10 min) (25.9.2017) 5

In Gorbachev’s view the core of Perestroika was that it united socialism with democracy and revived the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and practise. It represented an addition to socialism, in the shape of the most modern social developments. The view was heavily influenced by the idea that this was the type of socialism that was still developing from the Bolshevik Revolution - ​ ​ perestroika would merely assist in the further development of socialism’s potential and its implementations. In other words, socialism was yet to fulfill its potential. It was emphasized with enthusiasm that the type of political system was not changing - perestroika was for more progressive, moral and liberal form of socialism.16 This view was not supported by the more conservative side of the communist party17 and the power of the Communist Party was to be reduced in effect to implement the reforms of perestroika. The ideas of radical change for the system were in verbal sense true, if not always in practise.18

The change

The economy, during the final years of Brezhnev's leadership was going downhill by all accounts. The declining of growth rate was to fairly great extent hammered by ​ ​ declining productivity of resources. This included lack of motivation from the workforce and deteriorate of natural resources such as coal and ores. The adoption of new technologies was scanty and it was a real fear that the USSR could cease to be a non-superpower - the reforms proposed by Gorbachev were to save socialism.

16 Ruutu, 63-64 17 Ibid. 18 Why Perestroika Failed - Peter J. Boettke p. 39 ​ ​ 6 19 Another factor hampering down the Soviet economy was also that the “reds”

(USSR troops) were occupying areas from Elbe to Afghanistan.20 “Perestroika is more of action, rather than theory. Acting is building, and it is only possible in the time of peace.” This statement by Abel Agabegyan (in 1987) concludes a few goals for perestroika: to act in practise and end wars such as the one ongoing in

Afghanistan at the time, and ease the Cold War tensions with the US.21

However, during the initial phase of perestroika, in 1985-1987, the speed of reforms were rather slow and the ideas progressive, the growth was positive, the unemployment remained minimal and inflation low. The only major policy implemented was the Anti-alcohol campaign, beginning from 1985, which had reduced the tax revenues and hence actually proved to be very limiting in the economic perspective22, but the according to Gorbachev, alcohol was “the number one enemy”23 of the Soviet people. It would be after 1987 when the Soviets passed the Law on State Enterprise24, the Law on Cooperatives25, and “the second phase of glasnost”26 which had initiated the start of the fundamental changes in the Soviet press and the view of their own history and caused polarization of the public.27 This

19 Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform, 48 (29.8.2017) ​ ​ https://books.google.fi/books?hl=fi&lr=&id=AA0ABAAAQBAJ&oi=fnd&pg=PP1&dq=Perestroika+in+Pe rspective:+The+Design+and+Dilemmas+of+Soviet+Reform&ots=Mj4F-GySpe&sig=p0oRis3fOyIeyGx eY4SdfDE_yQQ&redir_esc=y#v=onepage&q=Perestroika%20in%20Perspective%3A%20The%20Des ign%20and%20Dilemmas%20of%20Soviet%20Reform&f=false

20 “The Land Of The Soviets”, Arto Luukkanen, 329 21 Abel Aganbegyan, Uusi ja Parempi Neuvostoliitto (The New and Better Soviet Union), 190 22 Pietiläinen, 85 23 Medvedev, 242 24 http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/04/world/new-struggle-in-the-kremlin-how-to-change-t he-economy.html?pagewanted=1 (30.8.2017) ​ 25 http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/13265/1/p88-29.pdf ​ 26 Pietiläinen, 80 27 Jutta Scherr, 56 7 awakening of the public led quickly to almost revolutionary change in the attitudes of the Soviet people, it was only then that many realized the reality of their past, for example the terrors and collectivisation during Stalin’s era and the historically manipulated economic statistics of the Soviet Union.28

The Anti-alcohol campaign

Drinking had become a national catastrophe in the Soviet Union, similarly to the

Tsarist Russia29 and the costs of increasing crime, unproductivity, absence from work, health problems and the reduced life expectancy, began to outweigh the tax revenues of alcohol.30 Getting alcohol was made difficult with changes such as change in the legal age of buying alcohol from 18 to 21 and limiting the time of the day during which it could be bought. After some time, new and specialized liquor stores were established and these shops often had long lines for them and the lines forming in circles an nickname in the public: “Gorbachev’s hangman’s noose”.31

Many people were left without their bonuses in wage, due to the reduced incomes in the stores and wine and vodka factories lacked the necessary equipment to produce the new recommended juices and soft drinks.32 The limitations provided increases in the health of the people but also created an unnecessary blackmarket in which there could be even trebled price of the the official prices due to the difficult access to the product.33 “Alcohol consumption declined markedly, and Russia’s crude death rate ​

28 29 Medvedev, 242 30 243 31 244 32 245 33 244-245 8 fell by an average of 24% per year, implying roughly 1.61 million fewer deaths during the latter 1980s.”34

The campaign was, apart from its short term decrease in mortality, a rather catastrophic in its own: the unpopularity and the public finance impact led to its repeal shortly before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Russian death rate subsequently climbed rapidly – and the increase associated with the campaign’s end explains a large share of the Russia’s Mortality Crisis (roughly 2.15 million deaths). With their exposure to the Anti-Alcohol Campaign the former Soviet States and the rest of Eastern Europe also experienced similar temporal patterns of mortality commensurate.

The Law on State Enterprise

The Law on State Enterprise was put forth in 1987. The main idea of the reform was to an extent degree, free the State enterprises in the field of their budget allocation as no more commands would be given from Moscow. The aim of this action would be that the enterprises would then on continue improving their performance and profitability, also actively looking for their suppliers and subcontractors.35 The Law received some resistance even its draft state about its moving away from original communism and onto having characteristics of capitalism.36

34 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3818525/ (29.10.2017): ​ ​ The Gorbachev Anti-Alcohol Campaign and Russia’s Mortality Crisis, Jay Bhattacharya, Christina Gathmann, and Grant Miller, 2013

35 http://www.allrussias.com/soviet_russia/perestroika_5.asp (22.8.2017) ​ ​ 36 http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/04/world/new-struggle-in-the-kremlin-how-to-change-the-econo my.html?pagewanted=1 (30.8.2017) ​ ​

9

Gorbachev argued that by the reform there would be further increase in the competition, and work against the stagnated economy. What often actually happened was that the new independent managers were not familiar with their new tasks and exploited this new law. The wages of the workers were increased with the productivity; little focus was on the quality and restructuring of the production37, which was completely the opposite of Gorbachev’s aims: the policy was supposed to increase the Soviet capability in the foreign markets.38 The economic policy was ​ ​ exploited and reached very superficially its aims39 and was not as effective as

Gorbachev had planned.

The Law on Cooperatives

Something in major role in the move towards more democratic and “capitalist” society was The Law on Cooperatives in 198840. “Socialist cooperatives are a ​ constantly developing and progressive form of socially useful activity”41, is the first statement from the actual document by USSR Supreme Soviet, Law on

Cooperatives in May 26, 1988. “Similar to Stolypin’s reforms of 1906-1911, the aim ​ ​ of this reform was to allow enterprising “peasants” (in this case workers) to alienate from the state limits that would have to be acquired.42 For the first time since Lenin's

NEP, the law allowed private ownership of businesses in the services,

37 http://www.allrussias.com/soviet_russia/perestroika_5.asp (22.8.2017) ​ ​ 38 ? 39 Ibid. 40 USSR Supreme Soviet, Law on Cooperatives. May 26, 1988, ​ http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/cooperatives/cooperatives-texts/law-on-cooperatives/ (28.9.2017) ​ ​ 41 Scherr, 56 42 Karen M. Brooks, p.1, University of Minnesota Institute of Agriculture, Forestry and Home ​ Economics 10 manufacturing, and foreign-trade sectors. Initially the law imposed high taxes and employment restrictions, but it later revised these to avoid discouraging private-sector activity. Under this provision, co-operative restaurants, shops, and manufacturers became part of the Soviet scene.43 “The financial burden of agriculture on the state budget had been heavy and it grew since the price increase of January 1, 1983”44, this further undermines that the soviet agriculture had its problems even though it also grew marginally by 1987.45 While Gorbachev had his focus on the industry, the agriculture would have also needed to be reformed. This was a question asked by western economists and perhaps Gorbachev was afraid of implementing “agriculture first” strategy similar to China46, as he had failed earlier in his career (1978 onwards) in a particularly responsible agricultural reform47 and rather put his focus on industry.

Military industrial complex in the USSR

The Soviet economy was very dependent on military spending during the Cold War.

48Similar to the nations which were involved in the Cold War, The Soviet Union also was hampered in the late Cold War period, from the military-industrial-complex

(MIC). The logic behind this problem was that military spending was demanded for the availability of the workplaces and the state could also make money by exporting the military-industrial goods to the foreign nations, for which an example is the defense production. In 1955-1968 the Soviet Union provided armaments and

43 http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/gorbachev-perestroika.htm 44 Brooks, 2 45 Ibid., 3 46 Ibid., 1 47 Luukkanen, 334 48 http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/julkaisut/tiedostot/ap_2-2011.pdf 11 military-technical equipment to these countries in the sum of 4,5 billion dollars, in

1966-1975 – 9,2 billion, in 1978-1982 – 34,4 billion.49 This huge spending on the

“third-world” communist countries was rather an assistance than a favourable “war trade” benefiting the economy. However the spending on armaments had changed and lowered during Gorbachev’s period and perestroika. “The defense expenditures were cut down in 1, 5 - 2 times.”50 The MIC of the Soviet Union was very severe and the reforms implemented by Gorbachev, that tried to decentralize the economy and increase the productivity, were not able to sustain the communist dependence of the military industry - a peaceful foreign policy for example reduced in itself the profit from this particular field. The military “aid” was still considerably high and it was reduced critically late, causing it to become one of the main factors of the long term ​ ​ collapse of Soviet economy in 1991.

Consequences and perspectives

Through years 1986-1988, perestroika had to fight for its spot as the major reform in the Soviet society.51 In 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev had lost part of the support towards his reforms, a fear of “anti-perestroika” was real for him and his Party was not absolutely trustful. He had to further put his trust on the media and the people52 and as consequence, the chambers of the Soviet history were opened in 1987. In summer 1987, Gorbachev’s speech commented: “Glasnost, including critique, publicity and self critique is progressing healthily. It is utterly powerful in the centralization of the resources behind perestroika, its principles, for the people and

49 Irina, 9 50 Ibid., 7 51 Luukkanen, 337 52 Ibid., 339 12 the greater good of socialism.”53 The Gorbachev’s first two years in power had started to produce results of not economic sort, but giving the people some room for freedom, which they had lacked for decades54 - he tried to get approval as a trustworthy politician and include new, more open minded ministers to his government.55 He also opened relations through the Orthodox church due to losing his reliability in the more radical reformers as a “protector” of authoritarian-like rule.

On the other hand, to the conservatives he was a traitor who began the process of destroying communism. Nikolay Ryzhkov, an advisor of Gorbachev, who actually resigned from his job in 1990, commented that “We have to stop all (economic changes) that. We will lose the country.”56 Gorbachev was in a utterly chaotic situation even as early as 1987, which can be further argued to reduce the effectiveness of his ability to focus on the economic reforms.57 Already in

Gorbachev’s speech for propaganda- and mass media instruments (1987), he talked about the journalist approaches to the complexity of perestroika and its necessity for their nation.58 “Everybody has to re-evaluate their taking of stand.” He further criticised the continuous targeting of the Communist Party for even the smallest problems such as lack of nails and thrashing.59 News articles analysed in 1991 by

Boyko noted that up to 75% of the articles had not mentioned the reasons for news about such troubles - rather blame the CP.60 A major effect hit the Soviet journalism in 1989: “Everything was as before, there were no goods and no discipline.” The

53 Gorbachev, 169 54 http://www.allrussias.com/soviet_russia/perestroika_5.asp (22.8.2017) ​ ​ 55 Beyond Perestroika: Choices and Challenges Facing Gorbachev, M. L. Sondhi ​ ​ ​ 56 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBOZOPS3G4w ​ 57 Luukkanen, 344 58 Gorbachev, 291 59 Gorbachev, 292 60 Ruutu, 81 13 press had become openly demoralizing and the Communist Party was continuously seen more and more the responsible one for the shortages.61 The press highlighted the fallacies of the past, including the centralized economy and its authoritarian implementers. Gorbachev’s reforms were something of that but at least on the theoretical side he had different aims - the reduced dependency of the entrepreneurs on the state and allowed differing opinions. His aim of letting the people be informed well, as a part of the goal of becoming the most supported party in the Soviet society that was moving towards even free elections, was causing major upheaval and confusion in the Soviet Union. The policy that he first aimed to be an “aid to economic acceleration”62, would now even grind down his own position as he would himself receive strict criticism, for example, from academic Sakharov (who was exiled internally). In December 23. 1989, the open parlamentar discussion (television broadcasted) was held for the first time in the Soviet history and it meant open criticism, creating discussion in the public.63

According to Peter J. Boettke, Gorbachev's economic reforms remained very ambiguous through 1985-1991.64 “Alice Gorlin upon examining the original

Gorbachev strategy concluded that his efforts would have only marginal impact because they did not address the real problems with the system”65. On the other hand, Gorbachev emphasized continuously the importance of perestroika in almost ​ ​ all of his speeches. His economic policies were rather focused on the dissolving the

61 Pietiläinen, 90 62 Pietiläinen, 78 63 Luukkanen, 340 64 Boettke 39. ​ 65 Ibid. ​ 14 solid position of Moscow as the commander of the economy, which further reduced the absolute power that the Party had held onto for over seven decades. The reconstructing was justified by the Soviet economy which was in such a trouble.

Alex Chubarov agrees in the sense that Gorbachev’s economic policies are largely to blame for the “disappointing” record of the perestroika. He continues that even the

Soviet leaders themselves had not a clear picture of the economy of theirs due to years of falsified statistics, beginning from late 1930’s66 under Stalin and up to

Brezhnev’s era, further proposing that the similar reforms in the past had failed due to the very similar reasons.67 This argument may indeed propose one of the reasons that the reforms made by Gorbachev couldn’t reach the goals that he declared continuously so important.

Glasnost had taught, and let, the public to think again: visions of a different nation, something of a non-Soviet country were rising in late 1990’s. The Soviet people’s imagination was further provoked by Boris Yeltsin and his opposition’s demands.68

The preservation of the system, which had now provided acute problems had completely lost its support because a different form of government, full-scale democracy would be mostly in favour of the people.69 It was around 1990 that

Gorbachev, the “liberal” reformer of the mid 1980’s would inevitably make his own era an example of the “conservative” and outdated style of governmenting, paving the way for the rise of Boris Yeltsin.70 People started to even welcome the collapse of

66 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JHF1_fFIGws Apocalypse - Stalin, 2015 (30.10.2017) ​ ​ 67 Brooks, Karen M. (1988). The Law on Cooperatives, Retail Food Prices, and the Farm Financial Crisis in ​ ​ the U.S.S.R. University of Minnesota. Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics. Retrieved on 14 ​ August 2009. 68 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBOZOPS3G4w (30.10.2017) ​ ​ 69 Pietiläinen, 96 70 Pietiläinen, 96 15 the USSR, as no real solutions was proposed by Gorbachev’s government. The conditions in which economic issues are combined with a promotion of criticism proved to be quite accurate with the words of Paasilinna: “the glasnost medication has failed; the patient overdosed and died”.71

Conclusion

The situation of the Soviet Union in the time during which Mikhail S. Gorbachev was selected as the Secretary General of the Communist Party, was very critical as the years of Cold War, arms race, space race, the fight for ideological superiority, and clumsy leading in the economic policies had put the Soviet Economy in a impossible position. To answer the question: “How did the economy of the USSR change ​ under perestroika and glasnost and with what consequences”, the changes ​ were significant and proposing many forms and sides of the USSR. Further, after the permanent consequences, the society was in a stage of a total economic breakdown, with deficits and social upheavals. However, it is necessary to note that

Gorbachev was also right in the middle of an collapse of communist ideology at the time. The reforms democratized the economy, providing freedom in the market but failed miserably to provide the efficiency which it was aimed for. Opening and restructuring the Soviet Union and the economy, proved to be dysfunctional and the leader himself realized the difficulty of his aims. One of the biggest empires was not able to follow the ideas implemented by Mikhail Gorbachev within the lines that he wanted. Though the world saw Gorbachev as a friendly ally, the people in the USSR grew unsatisfied to him and perestroika: he was seen as a obsessed with the

71 Ibid., 95 16 policies that did not benefit the “consumers”. For the first time in the history of USSR, there was someone else to choose a leader from - the people decided to use the new freedom.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Primary sources

“Speeches and articles” (M. S. Gorbachev, 1987)

“Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World (M. S. Gorbachev,

1987). ​

Secondary sources

“The Land Of The Soviets” (Neuvostojen maa, 2004, Arto Luukkanen) ​ ​ ​ “Perestroika - Process and Consequences” (2010, by various contributors).

“Gorbachev” (Zhores Medvedev, 1987)

“The New and Better Soviet Union” (Uusi ja Parempi Neuvostoliitto, ​ Abel Aganbegyan, 1987)

17 Internet links http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/sovietcollapse.htm (1.9.2017) ​

Brooks, Karen M. (1988). The Law on Cooperatives, Retail Food Prices, and the ​ Farm Financial Crisis in the U.S.S.R. University of Minnesota. Department of ​ Agricultural and Applied Economics. Retrieved on 14 August 2009: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/13265/1/p88-29.pdf (29.8.2017) ​

https://books.google.fi/books?id=4y6IAgAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=inauthor:

%22Peter+J.+Boettke%22&hl=fi&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwie69vcjJnXAhXhA5oKHRDV

BSsQ6AEILTAB#v=onepage&q&f=false

Why Perestroika Failed, Peter J Boettke (20.8.2017) ​

http://www.nytimes.com/1987/06/04/world/new-struggle-in-the-kremlin-how-to-chang e-the-economy.html?pagewanted=1 (30.8.2017) ​

Perestroika: Theoretical and political problems of economic reforms in the USSR: https://www.jstor.org/stable/152568?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Part of Gorbachev’s interview: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBOZOPS3G4w (4:10 min) (25.9.2017)

Perestroika in Perspective: The Design and Dilemmas of Soviet Reform (29.8.2017)

18 http://www.allrussias.com/soviet_russia/perestroika_5.asp (22.8.2017) ​

USSR Supreme Soviet, Law on Cooperatives. May 26, 1988: http://soviethistory.msu.edu/1985-2/cooperatives/cooperatives-texts/law-on-cooperati ves/ (28.9.2017)

http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/gorbachev-perestroika.htm

(27.8.2017)

http://www.helsinki.fi/aleksanteri/julkaisut/tiedostot/ap_2-2011.pdf (19.9.2017) ​

Russia's Capitalist Revolution: Why Market Reform Succeeded and Democracy

Failed https://books.google.fi/books?id=rAYEwq45fioC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=Gorbachev+spee ch+without+script&source=bl&ots=2esVqIoRSy&sig=ni5Dlj70D37XRUZQPBXbTu2tpcI&hl=fi &sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjxnIuI7oTXAhXCC5oKHbkODv0Q6AEIPTAD#v=onepage&q=Gorbac hev%20speech%20without%20script&f=false (22.10.2017) ​ ​

The Gorbachev Anti-Alcohol Campaign and Russia’s Mortality Crisis, Jay Bhattacharya, Christina Gathmann, and Grant Miller, 2010 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3818525/ (29.10.2017) ​

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