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Policies of Mikhail Gorbachev Between 1985-1991

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Policies of Mikhail Gorbachev Between 1985-1991 Policies of Mikhail Gorbachev between 1985-1991: “How did the economy of the USSR change under perestroika and glasnost and with what consequences” words: 3938 Research Question: “How did the economy of the USSR change under ​ ​ ​ perestroika and glasnost and with what consequences” Introduction Mikhail Gorbachev, the “architect” of perestroika1, attained the highest position of the Soviet Union in 1985 and was bound to be the last leader of one of the greatest superpowers of the 20th century. My research question: “How did the economy of ​ the USSR change under perestroika and glasnost, and with what consequences” implicates an examination of the economic policies (perestroika) as ​ well with the accelerative policies (glasnost) and an evaluation of the impact of them. My main secondary source is: “Perestroika - Process and Consequences” (2010, by ​ various contributors). This particular source has many components necessary for ​ this essay as the book is a selection of papers from the 7th Annual Aleksanteri Conference which was held at University of Helsinki in 2007. In the conference, historians were gathered to discuss perestroika. From the source I am able to obtain many firmly different interpretations of the time and from different perspectives - many of the contributors are from different countries, with backgrounds of their own. This source is quite perfect for this essay, helping with the rather complex analysis part and the method: trying to find components in the contemporary works and then analysing them with the help of the analysis we can access today. There is a minor flaw in its producing, because all of the articles are from the same conference. I also used an overview on the soviet history: “The Land Of The Soviets” ​ ​ ​ (Neuvostojen maa, 2004, Arto Luukkanen), for personal understanding of the ​ ​ 1 Neuvostojen maa, 2004, Arto Luukkanen, 313 1 development of the Soviet Union. This source is however quite simple in the language and tone, and it covers a long time period, thus it does not get very in depth on the topic. The author is an university lecturer at Helsinki University, specialized in the history of Russia and the eastern Europe, so the work is still carefully done with critical point of view, including perspectives. For my two primary sources I am going to use “Speeches and articles” (M. S. Gorbachev, 1987) and ​ ​ “Perestroika and New Thinking for Our Country and the World (M. S. Gorbachev, 1987). These two sources provide in a way similar view to my research question. ​ They both are great in the sense, particularly “Speeches and articles”, that they ​ address what the world and especially Soviet people were told at the time about the changes of the Soviet Union and why they were seen as necessary in the first place. The sources are limited in the sense that they are the words of only Gorbachev and the date of publication implicated the policies up to 1987, not up to 1991. This question is very interesting as the socialist policies had been in place for a very long time period, and the changes were quite drastic. I am very interested in the fact that why the introduction of the “capitalist-like” policies did not produce similar effects ​ ​ as in the west, and the democratization process did not function as planned. This study is valuable for me personally as I have grown under a western country and have possibly quite “western” point of view, which this study will further expand. The Soviet Union’s past economic policies came to a drastical change in 1985-1991, with introduction of many economic reforms. Though defining historical concepts is rather complicated, it is even more of it for perestroika, which was a complex mix of 2 continuity and change. Perestroika can be simplified to the policies which aimed to reconstruct the socialist Soviet society, particularly the economy to be able to transfer into more democratic and modern to reduce its inefficiency.2 An important concept in this study is also glasnost (openness), which supported the acceptance by the public of the policies driven by perestroika.3 Gorbachev’s role in the advancement of perestroika and glasnost cannot be underestimated, even though he indeed had help from figures such as Abel Aganbegyan, who was one of his advisors. His work: “New Directions in Soviet ​ Economics” (1987) is also part of my sources, which apply to an extent with the ​ same limitations and values as mentioned above in relation to the date of publication.4 Gorbachev can be described as charismatic and he was good with public speech, which was quite a new skill for an Soviet leader.5 For example, the former secretary Generals (1964-1984), Brezhnev, Andropov and Tshernenko did not benefit from appearing in television, compared to Gorbachev, who gave an unprepared speech about glasnost in a direct television broadcast (May 1985). By giving such a speech, he shocked people and “taboos” about Soviet leaders started to vanish.6 Overall, Gorbachev began his tenure with more energy and he actively 2 https://www.jstor.org/stable/152568?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents 3 “Perestroika: Process and consequences” Jukka Pietiläinen, 78 4 Medvedev, 247 5 Medvedev, 215 6 https://books.google.fi/books?id=rAYEwq45fioC&pg=PA30&lpg=PA30&dq=Gorbachev+spee ch+without+script&source=bl&ots=2esVqIoRSy&sig=ni5Dlj70D37XRUZQPBXbTu2tpcI&hl=fi &sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjxnIuI7oTXAhXCC5oKHbkODv0Q6AEIPTAD#v=onepage&q=Gorbac hev%20speech%20without%20script&f=false (22.10.2017) ​ ​ 3 planned and approved more decisions than any leader in the same time, and showed also a common sense about economics.7 Gorbachev’s works ”A conceptual and actor-oriented way of studying perestroika can be obtained by looking at the speeches and writings of its main actor, Mikhail Gorbachev”8 proposes Katja Ruutu and I agree. The main objective of Gorbachev’s speech in the twenty-seventh (XXVII) party congress was that he declared that the better the people was informed, the more they would be willing to support the party, it’s plans and goals. He additionally stated: “We have to deepen glasnost (openness) in the work of the party, soviet, state and ​ social organisations. Lenin said that the state is rich when its people are conscious. Our experience has strengthened this conclusion.”9 This was the logic behind glasnost, which reduced effectively the control of the mass-media control mechanisms10 and opened even the Soviet Union history archives to the public - this freedom has been considered as radical in the aftermath of Leonid Brezhnev’s regime. Gorbachev contradicts himself - the social spontaneity of working class was actually something that created dangers for the party, argued Lenin.11 By taking a look in depth to glasnost, we can see ironically that this argument had indeed some truth in it. In his diaries (1987) he focused more on his 7 Medvedev, 249 8 Ruutu, 62 9 M. S. Gorbachev, “Puheita ja Lausuntoja” (Speeches and articles) p. 32 ​ ​ 10 Pietiläinen, 79-80 11 Ruutu, 62 4 antagonism towards Brezhnev’s era and the stagnation created by it: the Soviet Union was at a “turning point” (perelom) in its development and it was time to move to new era, away from the stagnation. “Uskorenie” (acceleration) was one of the new concepts that was launched and put forward against the challenge created by “perelom” - this ambitious policy aimed to be the key to domestic and foreign problems as well with the spheres of economics, politics and ideology12. It would mean in practise the immediate actions to revise the Soviet economy and the concept provided the “perpetual dynamism” of Soviet life.13 Gorbachev was very determined with the introduction of these concepts, but they remained almost as “compulsory, obedient and secure” due to their administrative nature to the more liberal willing intellectuals: this was the shock treatment to the economic problems rather than appealing to the people in democratic manner.14 Dissident movements had been criticising the regime for losing touch with its people, which was a significant factor contributing to the creation of the term ‘glasnost’. Although the concept “uskorenie” was showing continuity with the leader of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev had listened to the opposition, which was rather unique for the general secretary. He was taking his new way of ruling literally to the streets, asking people what was wrong in their life.15 “It has occurred to me during the first day of my ruling, that I have to ask the people, what they want”, stated Gorbachev in an interview. The change in the communist perspective was very satisfying for the most of the people and Gorbachev’s support came up to its prime in the mid 1980’s. 12 Ruutu, 70 13 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika: New Thinking for Our Country and the World 1987, 34 14 Medvedev, 239 15 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UBOZOPS3G4w (4:10 min) (25.9.2017) 5 In Gorbachev’s view the core of Perestroika was that it united socialism with democracy and revived the Leninist concept of socialist construction both in theory and practise. It represented an addition to socialism, in the shape of the most modern social developments. The view was heavily influenced by the idea that this was the type of socialism that was still developing from the Bolshevik Revolution - ​ ​ perestroika would merely assist in the further development of socialism’s potential and its implementations. In other words, socialism was yet to fulfill its potential. It was emphasized with enthusiasm that the type of political system was not changing - perestroika was for more progressive, moral and liberal form of socialism.16 This view was not supported by the more conservative side of the communist party17 and the power of the Communist Party was to be reduced in effect to implement the reforms of perestroika.
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