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Persson, Tomas; Gärdenfors, Peter Bodily mimesisas “the missing link” in human cognitive evolution Zlatev, Jordan; Persson, Tomas; Gärdenfors, Peter Published in: LUCS: Lund University Cognitive Studies 2005 Link to publication Citation for published version (APA): Zlatev, J., Persson, T., & Gärdenfors, P. (2005). Bodily mimesisas “the missing link” in human cognitive evolution. LUCS: Lund University Cognitive Studies, 121. http://www.lucs.lu.se/LUCS/121/LUCS.121.pdf Total number of authors: 3 General rights Unless other specific re-use rights are stated the following general rights apply: Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal Read more about Creative commons licenses: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/ Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. LUND UNIVERSITY PO Box 117 221 00 Lund +46 46-222 00 00 Jordan Zlatev, Tomas Persson and Peter Gärdenfors, Lund University Cognitive Studies, 121, (2005). Bodily mimesis as “the missing link” in human cognitive evolution Jordan Zlatev1, Tomas Persson2 and Peter Gärdenfors2 [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] 1Department of Linguistics, Lund University, 2Cognitive Science, Department of Philosophy, Lund University 1. Introduction definition permits the formulation of a mimesis hierarchy consisting of four evolutionary stages. It is fairly uncontroversial that there is a large While the first two stages are shown to be within gap between the communicative and cognitive the capacities of non-human apes (henceforth, systems of non-human animals and those of simply apes), and the fourth merges with lan- human beings. There is much less consensus, guage, the third stage, or what we call triadic however, on what the nature of this gap is, and mimesis constitutes a “missing link” that can help even less on how it was bridged in evolution. A us explain the emergence of human uniqueness common view is that it is language that constitutes as well as the origins of language. the quintessential human feature, and if we could In the main part of the article – Sections 4 to only explain the origins of language, we would 6 – we proceed to apply the mimesis hierarchy also have the answer to the nature and source of to three cognitive-communicative domains human uniqueness (Christiansen and Kirby closely connected to bodily mimesis: imitation, 2003). Our view is in some respects contrary to intersubjectivity (“theory of mind”) and gesture. Our this. We agree that human language is qualita- main method will be to analyze evidence from tively different from animal communication, and primatology (and to a lesser degree from child in Section 2 we outline what we find to be the development) and attempt to identify levels essential differences between the two. However, within these domains that correlate with or are precisely because the gap between animal com- even constituted by the levels of the mimesis munication and language is so large, it is ex- hierarchy. By investigating three socio-cognitive tremely difficult to see how one could “evolve” domains in parallel – imitation, intersubjectivity into the other. Therefore, despite much current and gesture – our intention is to suggest evi- enthusiasm and a variety of conflicting theories, dence for the most likely source of human we can at present only offer more or less com- uniqueness. To preempt our conclusions in Sec- pelling “narratives” (Landau 1991) or, somewhat tion 7, our analysis suggests that capacities such more scientifically, “constraints” (Johansson as the understanding of others’ intentions 2005) for a theory of language origins. (Tomasello 1999) or even the sharing of inten- In this article, we hope to add an important tions (Tomasello et al. in press) are not the cru- piece to the puzzle by arguing that there is a cial characteristic that differentiates human be- semiotic capacity that is more basic than lan- ings and apes. Rather we will suggest that it is guage that distinguishes us from other animals: the combination of spontaneous detailed imita- bodily mimesis. In Section 3 we define the concept, tion of actions leading to the formation of mi- following the lead of Donald (1991), but elabo- metic schemas, and the understanding of the semi- rating it in a way that makes it more precise and otic potential of gestures, or what we will call the less susceptible to criticism. Furthermore, our communicative sign function. We will suggest that the Lund University Cognitive Science-LUCS 121 ISSN 1101 – 8453 © 2005 by the authors 2 Bodily mimesis as “the missing link” in human cognitive evolution co-evolutionary cycle between imitation and lar circumstances and are produced more or less gesture (as well as intersubjectivity) paved the automatically, i.e. with very little volitional con- way for the evolution of language in an evolu- trol (Deacon 1997; Hauser 1996). In contrast, tionary process of human “self-enculturation” human utterances are largely independent from that parallels the Vygotskian notion of the inter- the physical context in which they are produced, nalization of social, interpsychological phenom- and usually refer to states and events that are not ena in ontogeny. currently present, thereby showing what Hockett (1960) called displacement, which also allows the speaker to inform the hearer of something he 2. From animal communication to human does not know. Furthermore, while not every language step in the construction of an utterance is under conscious control, the overall activity of human In comparing animal communication and human discourse would be impossible unless it was language it is not difficult to find striking differ- governed by a kind of “intermediate-term mem- ences on a number of cognitive dimensions: ory” that requires reflective consciousness First, the signals that constitute animal communi- (Donald 2001). cation are mostly predetermined by the genetic Looking at communication from the side of makeup of the organism. Even though it is clear the interpreter, the response to an animal signal that genes do not directly determine behavior is a behavioral pattern that is also relatively fixed, but set constraints on ontogenetic development, e.g. climbing up the tree in reaction to a specific and in this sense all development is epigenetic type of alarm call. In contrast, discourse inter- (Badcock 2000), it is still possible (and necessary) pretation is both individually flexible and collec- to distinguish the opposite poles of the endoge- tively negotiable (Vygotsky 1978; Sinha 2003). neous/exogenous continuum. In this respect, Moreover, even though animal signals can animal signals, be they the quacking of frogs or and do transmit information about the external the play-face of chimpanzees, can be regarded as environment to the interpreter of the signal (as by and large innate rather than learned. To the in the case of alarm calls) and such signals have extent that animal signals do involve learning – been called “referential” and even “symbolic” for example in fixing the group-specific “dialect” (Marler 1985), this is not the kind of referential of songbirds (Marler 1991) or determining the or representational relationship between expres- appropriate environmental trigger for the pro- sion and content that is involved in language. In duction of an innate alarm call in vervet mon- connection with context independence and voli- keys (Cheney and Seyfarth 1990) – this learning tional control, human reference can be intention- involves cognitively simpler (and better under- ally deceptive (“Wolf!”), while the calls of the stood) processes such as triggering, calibration vervet monkeys can at most be functionally so and inhibition (Hauser 1996). On the other (Whiten and Byrne 1988; Hauser 1996). One hand, neither the expression nor the meaning of way to summarize the difference is to say that linguistic signs is in any way genetically deter- human language is, in general, triadic – it is used mined, and the same may equally well apply to by one individual for explicitly representing an grammar (Tomasello 2003), though this is existing or imaginary state of affairs for another somewhat more controversial. Nevertheless, as a individual. On the other hand, animal signals are whole, it is clear that the learning of language is generally speaking dyadic: the animal responds to based on cultural processes of considerable a stimulus or cue in the environment, causing the cognitive complexity (Bloom 2000; Sinha 2003; emission of a particular signal directed to a con- Zlatev 2003), and arguably on reflective con- specific, without linking self, referent and ad- sciousness (Robinson 1996; Gärdenfors 2003; dressee into a referential triangle (Sinha 2003).1 Mandler 2004; Zlatev 2005b). Thus, despite the need for some qualifications, in general terms 1 The question of the referential status of animal animal signals are more or less innate, while signals may be debated, but it is significant that one language is learned, and culturally transmitted of those who most contributed to their rich interpre- across generations. tation as “symbols” is currently seeing them in a Another important difference compared to more modest light: “More recently, Marler’s ex- language is that animal signals are tied to particu- perimental approach and writings on the topic of signal meaning have moved away from high-level Zlatev, Persson and Gärdenfors, Lund University Cognitive Science 121, (2005).
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