A Paranoid State: the American Public, Military Surveillance and the Espionage Act of 1917
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A Paranoid State: The American Public, Military Surveillance and the Espionage Act of 1917 By: ©2012 Lon J. Strauss Submitted to the graduate degree program in History and the Graduate Faculty of the University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ____________________ Theodore Wilson (Chairperson) ____________________ Roger Spiller ____________________ Jonathan Earle ____________________ Sheyda Jahanbani ____________________ Brent Steele Date Defended: April 9, 2012 The Dissertation Committee for Lon J. Strauss Certifies that this is the approved version of the following dissertation: A Paranoid State: The American Public, Military Surveillance and the Espionage Act of 1917 _____________________________ Chairperson Dr. Theodore Wilson Date Approved: April 9, 2012 ii Abstract “A Paranoid State” examines the influence of middle to upper class anxieties through military intelligence officers’ investigations of the American public in the First World War. Products of their past, Military Intelligence Department officers built upon a history of espionage activities in the Philippines and in episodes of strikebreaking at the turn of the century. On a massive scale for the first time in U.S. history, agents of military intelligence conducted a campaign of surveillance upon American citizens. These military officers were influenced by a larger movement in American society during the First World War, as evidenced by Congress’ passage of the Espionage and Sedition Acts and thriving vigilante organizations such as the American Protective League. While historians argue that the Wilson administration took advantage of the war-induced anxieties to eliminate major socialist and radical groups, such as the Wobblies, the argument offered here is that without the political paranoia that was pervasive among American elites and the middle-class those extreme actions may not have been successful. iii Acknowledgements Here marks the end of the beginning. As an afterthought as an undergraduate at Indiana University, I added history for a triple major in my junior year. I had no idea at that time, or even upon graduation in 1999, that I would head to graduate school for history, especially since I authoritatively exclaimed that “I would never go to graduate school.” However, in 2002, I did just that at California State University, Northridge. My intention was to study the Second World War. In the three years since my undergraduate education ended, I had voraciously read veterans’ memoirs. I was fascinated with Paul Boesch’s Road to Huertgen: Forest in Hell and intended to study that tragic battle. I was extremely interested in the human experience in war. I am grateful for Steve Bourque’s suggestion that I focus on the First World War instead. I am even more grateful that he introduced me to Pete Kindsvatter, who I have pestered every year at the annual conference of the Society for Military History since 2003. I am very appreciative of Pete’s advice and the influence he has had on me as an historian for almost a decade now. This project was made possible through a number of research fellowships and awards, including the U.S. Army Center of Military History Dissertation Fellowship, the Sherman and Irene Dreiseszun Scholarship for International Studies (The Harry S. Truman Good Neighbor Foundation), and the Rebecca Robinson Graduate Research Award (Department of History at the University of Kansas). In addition, I presented portions of my dissertation at the annual conferences of the Organization of American Historians, the Society for Military History, and Peace, War, and Global Change Seminar at the Hall Center for the Humanities (Lawrence, Kansas). I gained a great deal of iv support and insight from those presentations. To that end, I would like to especially thank the following people for their comments, support, and advice: Nancy Gentile Ford, Jennifer Keene, Michael Neiberg, David Silbey, Steve Trout, and Hal Wert. I especially owe a debt to Mark Stout for not only referring me to the official and unpublished “History of Military Intelligence Division,” but providing me with copies of the bulk of it. I would be remiss if I did not express my immense gratitude to Tim Nenninger at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA II) in College Park, Maryland. Tim was kind enough to lend me books, offer advice, and take me into the stacks on several occasions. He also witnessed the demise of my first dissertation topic, famously (in my mind) announcing, “It’s been a long time since someone’s dissertation has fallen apart in front of me like this.” I would also like to thank Mitch Yokelson, also at NARA II, who so graciously assisted me with my Master’s thesis research and provided advice on my several trips to College Park throughout the years. Brian Linn and his lovely wife Diane were kind enough to lunch with me daily for a month while we conducted research at NARA II one summer. And my longtime best friend, Jeff Abbate, allowed me to crash at his apartment in Virginia. I have formed many friendships over this long journey. Tai Edwards and Kim Schutte have been good friends, officemates, and, without a second thought, willingly offered significant criticisms and advice on this work, which is immensely better thanks to them. Near the end, Kim took time out of her overburdened schedule to read every word I had written. Her comments helped me refine some still-rough patches. Special thanks to Jeremy Byers (for the time he was around), Andrew Hargreaves, Martin v Hubley, Dave Livingstone, Karl Rubis, Debra Sheffer, John Schneiderwind, and Josh Wolf for their friendship and support. I am especially grateful for the guidance and counsel of my adviser, Ted Wilson, who has done so much for my development as a scholar. Without Dr. Wilson, I may not have had the courage to pursue my first topic, which led to the topic I ultimately researched and wrote about. I would also like to thank Roger Spiller and Jonathan Earle who have been major influences upon how I approach and think about history. Special thanks also go to Jennifer Weber, Don Worster, and Nathan Wood who helped me become a better writer, and introduced me to great works and ideas. I will always be eternally grateful to Sheyda Jahanbani and Brent Steele for joining my committee at the last minute. Last—but certainly not least—I am indebted to my family for their love and care. I could not have done this without the support of my parents, Dan and Peggy Strauss, especially over this final year. I also owe a great deal to my grandparents, Irene and Robert Marnfield, who were a major influence in my life and have constantly been in my thoughts throughout this process. My father-in-law Steve Oberg has been a source of encouragement and assistance, understanding the process all too well from firsthand experience. I can honestly say that this would not have been possible if not for my wife, Hannah Oberg. As my Editor-in-Chief, she read every word and heard every idea worth mentioning, and many that were not. This culmination of my graduate work is as much hers as it is mine. I am also grateful to both our children, Soren and Aaliyah, who joined us in the middle of this difficult process. They have been extremely patient with Daddy working in the office and an immense source of encouragement. Their smiling faces vi often infused me with much-needed motivation. Now I can expend that energy playing outside with them and not just bouncing the youngest to sleep. vii Table of Contents Introduction 1 Chapter One: Lacking Intelligence 17 Chapter Two: Appreciating Intelligence 45 Chapter Three: Faith and Fear 74 Chapter Four: A Matter of Conscience 115 Chapter Five: Crashing the Party 172 Chapter Six: The Threat from Within 231 Conclusion 286 Bibliography 297 viii Introduction On the rainy evening of April 2, 1917, President Woodrow Wilson addressed a joint session of Congress to request a declaration of war against Imperial Germany. A little over a month later, the president signed the Selective Service Act into law. The president explained that he was confident that the entire nation desired to do whatever was required to win the war, but in the new war of the 20th Century, not all could go fight the Germans. Conscription offered a way to manage the people’s contributions by retaining skilled workers in factories and weeding out the physically and mentally unfit from those who would don a military uniform. Not all Americans were willing to have the federal government manage them in this war. Whether pacifists (religious or otherwise), socialists, advocates for women’s rights or the civil rights of African- Americans, some Americans did not agree with fighting a war against Germany Fearing their power to persuade others and to wreck the mobilization machinery, Congress passed the Espionage Act in June 1917. Legislators were especially concerned about protecting the healthy fighting spirit of the nation’s young men. They specifically decreed it to be unlawful to “cause disloyalty” or to “obstruct the draft.”1 Disloyalty, though, was often in the eye of the beholder. When socialists espoused a philosophy of international equality—that workers had no reason to kill each other—many in Congress, the Wilson administration, and military authorities claimed they were being disloyal. When a fringe religion such as the International Bible Students Association claimed conscientious objection and preached against war, military 1 Robert H. Ferrell, Woodrow Wilson and World War I 1917-1921 (New York: Harper & Row, 1985), 1. 1 authorities declared them to be disloyal. In order to stop groups deemed disloyal from influencing draft-age men, military intelligence officers investigated them, kept them under watch, broke into their offices, seized their documents and literature—sometimes with warrants, sometimes not, sometime openly or often covertly in the dead of night.