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Palestinian Factions Announce Deal on Unity Government Palestinian factions announce deal on unity government Posted: Wednesday, April 23, 2014 12:15 pm By Fares Akram and Isabel Kershner The New York Times GAZA CITY, Gaza Strip — The two main Palestinian factions announced an agreement Wednesday to heal a seven-year schism and form a unity government within five weeks that would prepare for Palestinian elections six months later. The two groups — the Palestine Liberation Organization, which runs the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank, and Hamas, the militant Islamist group that controls the Gaza Strip — have reached similar accords before that were never carried out. But the latest deal comes as the fragile U.S.-brokered peace efforts between the Palestinians and Israel are approaching an April 29 deadline without a resolution in sight. People familiar with the discussions have said the Israeli and Palestinian sides were far apart even on how to extend the talks past the deadline. Ismail Haniya, the prime minister of the Hamas government in Gaza, said at a news conference here, “I announce to our people the news that the years of split are over.” Israel responded to the announcement by canceling a meeting among the peace negotiators that was scheduled for Wednesday night. An Israeli with knowledge of the talks said that though it was not yet clear how the reconciliation would ultimately affect the talks, “it introduces a huge complication” at a critical juncture and “takes the winds out of the sails.” Before the announcement, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel warned Mahmoud Abbas, the president of the Palestinian Authority and leader of Fatah, the main group in the PLO, against reconciling with Hamas, which refuses to recognize Israel and which Israel considers a terrorist group. “Does he want peace with Hamas, or peace with Israel?” Netanyahu asked. “You can have one but not the other. I hope he chooses peace. So far he hasn’t done so.” Adding to the volatile atmosphere, Israel carried out an airstrike in the northern Gaza Strip on Wednesday, around the time the deal was being announced. The Health Ministry in Gaza said that 12 Palestinians were wounded, including two children. Al-Aksa Martyrs Brigades, the armed wing of Fatah, said a group of its members in the town of Beit Lahiya were the target. The Israeli military said it had mounted a “counterterrorism operation” but gave no specifics about the target. Analysts remained skeptical about whether the Palestinian reconciliation efforts would lead to tangible changes on the ground, because neither Fatah nor Hamas has shown interest in genuine power-sharing in the past, and they have deep differences over how to deal with Israel. Even so, some experts said the latest effort at reconciliation appeared more serious than past attempts, because both factions are under growing pressure. Gaza under Hamas has been severely weakened by an Egyptian crackdown on the smuggling tunnels along the Gaza-Egypt border and an Israeli blockade. And Abbas, for his part, has faced growing criticism from West Bank residents about the negotiations with Israel and his own legitimacy, with Palestinian elections long overdue. He has threatened to dissolve the Palestinian Authority, which exercises limited self-rule in the West Bank, if the talks with Israel end in failure. Haniya, the Hamas leader, read the text of the reconciliation agreement out loud to reporters in Gaza. Among other things, it calls for Abbas to begin talks immediately to form a joint Palestinian government and set a date for elections. A president, parliament and the PLO’s National Council are to be elected at the same time. Several other clauses reaffirmed the need to abide by the articles of the previous deals. The two factions also agreed to activate a temporary leadership committee of the PLO with the intention of opening the way for Hamas and another militant group, Islamic Jihad, to join the organization. The political schism between the factions has been deeply unpopular among ordinary Palestinians, not least because it split the West Bank from Gaza, the largely poor and isolated Palestinian coastal territory. The rivalry peaked after Hamas won the Palestinian elections of 2006, defeating Fatah. A year later, after a failed unity government and a brief but bloody factional war, Hamas took full control of Gaza, routing the forces loyal to Abbas, leaving him with authority only in the West Bank. “The president in Ramallah needs to unite his people,” said Ziad Abu Amr, a deputy prime minister of the Palestinian Authority government and a close aide to Abbas, in a telephone interview from Gaza. “It’s a psychological and national issue that Palestinians feel they are united. This split is hurting them.” Abu Amr, who was not participating in the reconciliation talks, dismissed Netanyahu’s warnings as a “double standard,” noting that Abbas had agreed to the current peace talks despite the extreme right-wing views of some members of the Israeli Cabinet. “This is arrogance, this is colonial, they should stop insulting the Palestinians and threatening them,” Abu Amr said. “Nobody has the right, including Netanyahu, to stop Palestinians from reuniting their people and their country.” He added that the Egyptian government was facilitating the current talks, and had allowed Moussa Abu Marzouk, a senior Hamas official, to enter Gaza from Egypt through the Rafah border crossing. The Palestinian unity government formed after the 2006 elections was short-lived, as Western nations cut off aid to it because Hamas, which is classified as a terrorist organization by the United States and the European Union as well as Israel, refused to meet international demands that it recognize Israel’s right to exist, renounce violence and accept previously signed agreements. The rival Palestinian factions tried to reconcile in Cairo in 2011 and again the following year in Doha, Qatar; those accords called for a joint interim government of technical experts to prepare for elections. But those efforts foundered over questions about who should lead the interim government, as well as broader issues like security coordination. Kobi Michael, a former head of the Palestinian desk at Israel’s strategic affairs ministry, told reporters he believed that this time, too, the “ideological gaps, the political gaps and the cultural gaps” between Hamas and Fatah remained too wide for any meaningful reconciliation. “I cannot find any sort of strategic bridge between these two players,” Michael, who is now a university lecturer and researcher. He said financial aid and diplomatic relations with Western countries would once again be put in jeopardy if Hamas joined a unity government. “The Palestinians will be in a very serious problem, not only with Israel but with the Americans and the Europeans as well,” he said in a conference call organized by the Israel Project, an advocacy group. Ghassan Khatib, a Palestinian political analyst based in Ramallah, observed on Tuesday, when the PLO delegation was on its way to Gaza, that a power-sharing deal would inevitably be lopsided, because Israel would never tolerate Hamas having a say in the West Bank, where Israel retains ultimate control. “The sides may be in need of a reconciliation process,” Khatib said of Fatah and Hamas, “but neither side can afford success.” http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/palestinian-factions-announce-deal-on-unity- government/article_4e39f8fd-da91-5cc0-958b-a94b9c0bf12a.html .
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