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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Reproduced with with permission permission of the of copyright the copyright owner. owner.Further reproduction Further reproduction prohibited without prohibited permission. without permission. SURVEY RESEARCH IN PALESTINE: POLITICS AND ACADEMIA

Christina Zacharia Hawatmeh

Submitted to the

Faculty of the College of Arts and Sciences

of American University

in Partial Fulfillment of

the Requirement for the Degree

of Doctor of Philosophy

Sociology

Chair: Samih K. Farsoun

Mary Gray

Gay You

Dean of the College

n , 2 a o f Date

2001

American University 6 Washington, D.C. 20016 ANEMGMI WHVERSITl UBKAkj

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Christina Zacharia Hawatmeh

2001

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For

Hala Sara

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The Government are very keen on amassing statistics. They collect them, raise them to the nth power, take the cube root and prepare wonderful diagrams. But you must never forget that every one of these figures comes in the first instance from the village watchman, who just puts down what he damm pleases.

- Sir Josiah Stamp Inland Revenue Department (England) 1896-1919

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SURVEY RESEARCH IN PALESTINE: POLITICS & ACADEMIA

ABSTRACT

Christina Zacharia Hawatmeh

This dissertation seeks to put in sociological

perspective the recent introduction and usefulness of

public opinion polling in Palestine.

In tracing attempts, over several decades, by the

Palestinians to make themselves heard and understood and to

gain international recognition, the study recognizes both

the polls' significance as an extension of that cause and

their potential in building state institutions and

strengthening national development. When measured against

arguments that the surveys are a political by-product of

the faulty 1993 Oslo accord, however, it becomes evident

that the issue warrants a closer look by any serious study

on the Palestinians.

The dissertation analyzes the debates surrounding

the question of foreign funding for Palestinian NGOs,

especially those that conduct the polls. At the center of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. this debate is the contention that western support,

financial and otherwise, for Palestinian research centers

actually aims at weakening the grassroots organizations

that had served and kept together the West Bank and Gaza

Strip populations during the most difficult periods of the

occupation.

In particular this study examines the legitimacy of

the polls within the larger context of their credibility

and potential in serving the real needs of Palestinian

society. To this end, the methodology used in conducting

them and the issue of the representativeness of opinions

surveyed are discussed. The analysis places emphasis on

the effects of Palestinian culture, on the process itself

and its results, especially in a political atmosphere that

has been de-developed and charged with tension, insecurity

and continued conflict. This study further argues that in

the absence of a census of all Palestinians, including

those still living in exile, no sample can be truly

representative of what the entire population of

Palestinians thinks.

In trying to bridge the legitimacy gap in the

practice of public opinion polling in Palestine, this

dissertation offers recommendations to organizations

III

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. entering into the field of survey research, which if not

capable of contributing to their development as an integral

and dynamic part of Palestinian society, will at least form

a basis for further relevant research.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

There are many who deserve credit and thanks for

their help and effort on this dissertation. To begin, I

wish to thank my committee members: Professor Gay Young for

her valuable insights and comments and Professor Mary Gray

for the work and expertise she brought to the study. A

special thanks to the chair of the committee, my mentor and

friend, Professor Samih K. Farsoun.

I also wish to thank all at the Center for Palestine

Research and Studies, especially Professor Khalil Shikaki,

for allowing me to work so closely with them on their

opinion polls and their wonderful friendships. It was an

experience that I will never forget and one that was much

greater than put into the words of this dissertation.

This study would not have been possible without the

immense support that I have received from my family and

friends. Thank you mom, dad and Cathy. I also thank Dr.

Randa Hawatmeh and Alia Dugum for their constant

encouragement and love. And to George, my husband, I thank

you for your help, understanding and patience.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ...... II

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS...... V

LIST OF TABLES ...... VIII

Chapter

1. INTRODUCTION...... 1

2. PALESTINE AND THE PALESTINIANS: RESISTANCE, ORGANIZATION AND OPPOSITION ...... 20

Occupation for the Long Haul

The Prison of Occupation: Organized Resistance

Intifada Heralds New Era

The Oslo Accords

3. PALESTINE STUDIES: POLITICS & ACADEMIA ...... 106

Numbers: Power & Empowerment

In Palestine, Studies

Palestine Studies After Olso

4. SURVEY RESULTS AND THE PROCESS BEHIND THEM . . .165

Problems with Using and Understanding Survey Data

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 5. REPORTING THE SURVEY RESULTS ...... 191

Tests of Significance

Corrections

Further Reflections

5. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND ANALYSIS ...... 2 07

The Baby and the Bath Water

APPENDIX

1. Results of CPRS Public Opinion Poll #23 June 28-30, 1996 ...... 240

2. Results of CPRS Public Opinion Poll #24 September 26-October 17, 1996 ...... 263

3. Results of CPRS Public Opinion Poll #25 December 26-28, 1996 ...... 292

BIBLOGRAPGHY ...... 318

VII

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. LIST OF TABLES

Table 1 Distribution of Palestinians in The Labor Force, 1986 (numbers in Thousands) 4 5

Table 2 Comparison of Selected Indicators: Occupied Territories, Middle East, North Africa and Jordan, 1 9 9 1 ...... 47

Table 3 Five Types of Palestinians (1990/91 E s t i m a t e s ) ...... 118

Table 4 Comparison of the 1997 Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) Census Data and Israeli Estimates . . . .131

Table 5 Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Region (Poll # 2 3 ) ...... 195

Table 6 Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Gender (Poll # 2 3 ) ...... 195

Table 7 Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Education (Poll #23) .... 196

Table 8 Attitudes toward the Peace Process by Region (Poll # 2 4 ) ...... 196

Table 9 Attitudes toward the Peace Process by Gender (Poll # 2 4 ) ...... 197

Table 10 Attitudes toward the Peace Process by Education (Poll #24)...... 197

Table 11 Attitudes toward the Peace Process by Region (Poll # 2 5 ) ...... 198

VIII

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

The Palestinian people have become the object of

much political and academic attention. Especially in the

past fifty years, their history of exile, dispossession and

struggle has been documented in scholarly records, animated

in film, captured in photographs and retold countless times

in many other ways. 'Palestine' has become a popular

domain on the World-Wide-Web, and hardly a day passes by

without a story about Palestinians appearing in newspapers

and magazines around the world. In academia, thousands of

publications have been produced and scores of master or

doctoral students graduate each year with a thesis in the

area of Palestine Studies. Within the largest

international organization, the United Nations, hundreds of

resolutions have been proposed, debated and often passed in

regard to Palestinians.

Ironically, as the collective subject of real

historical processes and so much scholarly and media

attention, Palestinians have had very little opportunity to

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. represent their own views on issues that directly affect

their lives. Even as their history since 1948 is one of

dispersal and fragmentation throughout the world, very few

of these studies or portrayals reach beyond the views of

but a few Palestinians who symbolize the thinking and

experiences of the whole population. Since 1993, however,

with the introduction of regular public opinion surveys in

the West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestinian opinions are

becoming an increasing part of the question of Palestine.

This dissertation explores the main cultural,

political, social and economic conditions governing the

rise and development of survey research among Palestinians.

In particular, the thesis focuses on the introduction and

use of public opinion polling as an instrument to both help

shape political realities in Palestine and strengthen

social scientific studies on Palestinians.

The fact that polling of Palestinians on the West

Bank and Gaza Strip emerged at this particular point in

their history is the subject of heated debate throughout

the Arab World and among Arab intellectuals everywhere.

Proponents of survey research argue that despite the

cultural, political and methodological limitations to this

mode of inquiry, it can have many potentially positive

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. functions in the course of state-building in Palestine.

Mainly, the rationale behind the introduction of survey

research is to identify and address negative attitudes and

opinions among the population. Ideally this should be done

before they reach a level beyond which political crisis or

violent conflict could arise. This can be achieved as the

data can inform decision-makers on issues that affect the

direction of people's lives. Surveys not only allow the

general public an opportunity to express their views

regularly and systematically, but they also provide people

with information about national concerns. In other words,

survey data can act as a rational feedback mechanism

between the people who make decisions and the people

affected by them, proponents believe.1

Critics of survey research in Palestine argue that

even if the data are collected using controls and

randomness, giving them the quality of scientific

objectivity, the whole process1 application is still

premature at this stage of national development.2 They

1See also Mark A. Tessler, Monte Palmer, Tawfic E. Farah and Barbara Lethem Ibrahim, eds., The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

2Salim Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine: An Overview," Current Sociology 94 (Summer

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. further believe that the data have not been used by the

government, called the Palestinian Authority (PA), except

to target opponents to its leadership or as a facade of

democratic representation.3 Survey research, critics also

maintain, has been financially supported and politically

promoted by foreign organizations, particularly American,

in order to advance cultural normalization of Israeli

domination amid continuing fear, violence and hostility

between the two sides and among Palestinians themselves.4

To extend an argument that Samih K. Farsoun and I

began to develop as early as 1992, the importation and

adoption of public opinion surveys in Palestine can be

viewed as part of the larger process of political and

economic liberalization, which is being imposed on the

Middle East by the United States, following the collapse of

the Soviet Union and the defeat of Iraq in the 19 91 Gulf

war. Particularly weaker Arab parties, closely tied to the

1994) : 67-86.

3Samih K. Farsoun and Christina E. Zacharia, "Class, Economic Change and Democratization in the Arab World," in Rex Brynen, Bahart Korany and Paul Noble, eds., Political Liberalization and Democratization in the Arab World, vol. 1 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1995).

4Naseer Aruri, The Obstruction of Peace: The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1995).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Arab-Israeli conflict and without the lucrative natural

resource of oil, such as the Palestine Liberation

Organization (PLO), Jordan, Egypt, even Syria and Lebanon,

have had to radically restructure their relationship with

Israel. This restructuring ultimately led to the Madrid

Peace Conference, which the PLO agreed to attend under a

joint delegation with Jordan. The 1993 Oslo accords, which

were a secretly brokered offshoot of the Madrid formula,

finally led to mutual recognition between Israel and the

PLO and opened the door for other Arab states to recognize

and come to the negotiating table with the Jewish state.

In the bargain, these nations' governments and leaders have

had to ease their hold on political, social and economic

institutions (while strengthening internal police and

intelligence agencies) and open their countries to free-

market forces within controlled democratization processes.

Critics charge that by funding and extending other

means of support to Palestinian research centers carrying

out such projects as opinion polling, the U.S. intends to

plant a new fifth column and impose its cultural and

political systems on Palestinians. The Americans, and

their Israeli allies, also hope that these research centers

could become a logical alternative to grassroots

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organizations that sprang up during the occupation to serve

the real needs of the Palestinian people.

The dissertation discusses at length the evolution

of these grassroots organizations and the crucial role they

played in launching and sustaining the powerful uprising of

1987, the intifada, which fundamentally changed the course

of Palestinian struggle. History of that struggle, in as

far as it pertains to understanding the structure, findings

and shortcomings of Palestinian public opinion polls is

told in two extensive chapters of this thesis.

Chapter 2 analyzes the historical period of 1967-

1995, concentrating mainly on three themes, around which

most of the issues surrounding today's survey research in

Palestine revolve. The first theme examines the occupation

in relation to Israel's interest in the "territories'"

resources: land, labor and water. It also discusses how

and why Israel could maintain the occupation despite

international pressure to end it, through financial and

political support from its ally, the U.S., and the reasons

behind that relationship developing into a powerful

"strategic" partnership in the region.

The second theme documents the effects of occupation

on everyday life for Palestinians, as it has radically

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. restructured the politics, economy, culture, demography and

geography of their homeland. This history is important to

understanding present problems facing Palestinians and a

meaningful background to the rise of survey research under

such precarious conditions. For contrary to the high hopes

and expectations following the announcement of the Oslo

accords for a new era of peace and prosperity to take hold

in the region, there have been few diplomatic

breakthroughs. Actually, the financially bankrupt and

politically isolated Palestine Liberation Organization

(PLO), in return for recognition and a few symbolic

trappings of statehood in parts of the West Bank and Gaza

Strip, conceded to Israel much more than what it has gained

for Palestinians. In other words, rather than dismantling

the occupation through the negotiations, Israel has nearly

succeeded in consolidating, expanding and even legalizing

it through the Oslo accords and subsequent agreements.5

The third, and probably most important, focus of

Chapter 2 is on Palestinian resistance to the occupation,

which had become an enduring part of life for Palestinians.

5For elaboration of this argument see Naseer H. Aruri, "Early Empowerment: The Burden not the Responsibility," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995) : 33- 39 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Resistance efforts are examined both in relation to the

role of specific groups, such as Islamists, women, labor

and students, that worked to provide Palestinians with

essential social services and political direction during

the occupation and led a powerful mass-based movement, the

1987 intifada, which nearly toppled the Israeli hegemony in

the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Since 1993, however, these

grassroots organizations have been dying out from lack of

funding and personnel. They are being replaced with new

kinds of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as

research centers that conduct public opinion polls, with

political agendas designed to capitalize on whatever was

promised in Oslo.

Chapter 3 takes a closer look at the role of

intellectuals and the development of Palestine Studies in

Palestinian history of struggle and resistance against

Israeli domination and occupation that is central to

understanding and putting in perspective the development,

accuracy and efficacy of public opinion polling among

Palestinians. It traces the history of survey research in

Palestine from early Islamic eras to 1931, when the British

Mandate authorities conducted a census on the entire

population, until the present. After the dismemberment of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Arab majority in 134 8, no other census of the whole

Palestinian population has been conducted. Only scattered

surveys, each with its own sampling frames and concerns,

have served as an uneven database for understanding the

fragmented population. In the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

reliable and regular survey data are unavailable for the

period before 1993. This is mainly because the Israeli

occupation authorities did not permit independent studies

to be conducted and had never made public the results of a

census Israel conducted on the Palestinians remaining in

the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967.6 Furthermore,

Palestinians themselves have never conducted their own

census as a way to help formulate policy impacting those

who live in Palestine and the Diaspora.7 This lack of

6See also Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine"; Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," Middle East Journal 42 (Winter 1988) : 16-32; Palestine Bureau of Census, Demography of the Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Current Status Report Series no. 1 (Ramallah: December 1994) ; and Marianne Heiberg and Geir Gversen, Palestinian Society in Gaza West Bank and Arab Jerusalem.- A Survey of Living Conditions, FAFO-report 151 (Oslo: Falch Hurtigtrykk, 1993).

7In 1998, under the PA, Palestinians conducted their first census of households in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This study, however, draws a clear distinction between an international census that would attempt to count all Palestinians and counts of parts of the entire population.’

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. reliable and comprehensive aggregate data severely limits

the capability to make and test causal claims,

generalizations and predictions about the entire

population,8 at any given period of time.

The absence of an accurate record of Palestinian

public opinion throughout their tumultuous history

indicates that survey research currently conducted in the

West Bank and Gaza Strip represents no more than a partial

attempt to understand Palestinian society. Since this

research actually targets less than half of all

Palestinians, Chapter 3 of this dissertation highlights the

argument that until a census is conducted, which gives

numerical definition to all Palestinians wherever they

reside, generalizations have to be qualified or based on

direct experiences with particular groups of Palestinians.9

Despite the limitations created by the absence of a

3For a select few who make this point see Edward W. Said, Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1995); World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace (Washington, D.C.: September 1993); Janet Abu-Lughod, "Palestinians: Exiles at Home and Abroad," Current Sociology 36 (Summer 19S8): 61-69 and "Demographic Characteristics of the Palestinian Population," Palestine Open University Feasibility Study (Paris: UNESCO, June 30, 1980); and Allen F. Hill, "The Palestinian Population of the Middle East," Population and Development Review 9 (June 1983): 293-315.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. census, Palestinian research organizations conduct public

opinion polls. As mentioned earlier, these organizations

and the work they do are at the center of a heated debate.

The controversy, however, is not over the methodology or

the academic importance of survey research in Palestine

Studies. Rather, as outlined in Chapter 3, the issues

revolve around the fact that these organizations seek and

receive foreign funding in order to sustain their research

activities, which is creating a larger shift within

Palestine and Arab Studies and moving the discipline into

new subject areas such as survey research, collaborative

studies with Israelis and fellow Arabs.

While Chapter 3 discusses the political and economic

issues surrounding public opinion polling in Palestine,

Chapter 4 details the methodological problems in using this

mode of inquiry. These problems are mainly due not only to

the lack of reliable sampling frames and population

parameters obtained by census data but also to cultural

constraints to gathering opinion of Palestinians who have

lived through over thirty years of occupation.

Chapter 5 tests the significance of the relationship

between attitudes toward negotiations with Israel and three

sSaid, Peace and Its Discontents, 18.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. independent demographic variables (region, gender and

education of respondents). It also discusses errors found

in the results of three opinion polls published by the

Nablus-based, research-oriented NGO, Center for Palestine

Research and Studies (CPRS). (Appendices 1, 2 and 3

contain reproductions of the original reports: CPRS Poll

#23 [June 28-30, 1996], CPRS Poll #24 [September 26-17,

October 1996] and CPRS Poll #25 [December 26-28, 1996] ,

respectively. ) Chapter 5 also further reflects on the

process, analysis and results of three polls conducted by

the CPRS, in which this researcher directly participated,

as a fieldworker and analyst.

I worked as a Fellow at the CPRS from May 1996 to

February 1997. During that period I participated in most

stages of three survey cycles--from designing the

questionnaires to accompanying the field workers as they

administered the polls. I was also the primary author of

three statistical analyses of these data, which were

subsequently published under the Center's name and are

placed in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3 in their

original form, in this dissertation.

By participating in and analyzing the surveys, I

could examine both the process and its outcome in two

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. complementary ways. First, the quantitative analysis of

the survey results allows this study to focus on political

attitudes of Palestinians toward engaging in negotiations

with Israel within the framework of the Oslo accords and

subsequent bilateral agreements within a specific time

period. (This subject is of much interest to those who use

and follow the polls in their work.) Second, the study

explores some influences and constraints of socio-cultural

factors (such as gender and education level) on the survey

process, not just the results, which are commonly ignored

or elided in the increasing number of statistical studies

on Palestinians and other Arab populations throughout the

Middle East.

To my knowledge, this is the first independent

study, which combines a statistical analysis of survey data

on Palestinians with a thorough examination of the

methodology used to obtain them. The combination has not

only helped illuminate inconsistencies and errors in the

data, which could not be detected statistically, it has

also better explained the results, which could otherwise

only be analyzed at a descriptive level.

A major finding since the CPRS began to consistently

ask this question in 1994 is that a vast majority of

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians supported the continuation of negotiations

with Israel. This finding does not in itself signify a

sociological research problem, since the question is fairly

straightforward and the finding had been replicated in

almost every survey. Placed within its immediate social,

political and economic as well as historical context,

however, such high support for the negotiations did not

sound extremely logical. This was the case in September

1996, when a survey found that 70 percent of all

Palestinians supported the continuation of negotiations

with Israel when at the same time Palestinian civilians and

the newly established Palestinian police force were

involved in intense and violent clashes with the Israeli

army and Israeli settlers in the occupied territories.

During that survey period, direct talks between

Palestinians and Israelis broke down, as the Israeli

military moved tanks and troops to surround six major urban

centers, positioning itself for a re-occupation of the

limited autonomous areas under the nominal control of the

Palestinian Authority.

CPRS field workers administered the survey in a

virtual war zone. Still, the finding of high support for

continuing negotiations belied conventional wisdom and what

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. is understood to be a basic premise of a peace process:

peace implies the absence of violence. To me it seemed

that the population's high support for continuing the

negotiations with Israel, especially at a time when it

should have been apparent that they were not producing

positive results, was at best contradictory and as such

indicated an important sociological research question.

That is, why do the survey data tell a story so different

from the facts on the ground?

After analyzing the data with this question in mind,

I found that this apparent contradiction could be better

understood within the surveys and further confirmed by my

field observations. Specifically, support for or

opposition to continuing negotiations with Israel was

largely conditional on several factors. Primarily, on the

hope and expectation that the talks would lead to the

creation of an independent Palestinian state in the near

future. Short of achieving that goal, the data suggested,

Palestinian backing for the peace process would falter or

altogether collapse. Conversely, the data showed that

Palestinian opposition to the peace process was also

dependent on its eventual outcome. The difference between

the two positions was that the opposition did not expect a

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. favorable outcome for Palestinians whereas the supporters

did. Simply put, these camps' opposite expectations for

the future largely explained their different attitudes

toward the negotiations.10

The experience of collecting these data in the field

added another dimension to the analysis of Palestinian

support or opposition to continuing negotiations with

Israel. Most respondents, but especially women, gave

explanations to their positions that were not captured in

the dichotomous, close-ended question design. They were

instead coaxed and sometimes prodded by the field workers

into limited and structured responses. This "spill-over”

problem, as it might be called, has several significant

effects on the survey results. One, it dilutes the

validity of a single finding--underscoring the point that

in Palestinian society, existing political divisions toward

continuing negotiations and its own leadership are more

10As discussed in Chapter 4, Leila Dabdoub summarized and explained CPRS data in a 19 95 article and reached similar conclusions, but based on different findings. The data available to her was from 1993-1995 when the Center used different wording to the question on support for negotiations. In those earlier surveys the CPRS tied certain conditions to the questions on support or opposition to negotiations. When those political conditions were part of the question, support for the process is reduced. "Palestinian Public Opinion Polls on

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. complex than can be understood from the results of these

surveys alone. Two, respondents who might have feared

openly expressing their opinions to the field workers told

them a socially acceptable answer, instead of facing

reprisal by the PA or even Israel. Three, attitudes toward

major issues are not just dependent on respondents'

opinions on current issues but are also deeply rooted in

the social political and cultural life in Palestine.

Although the survey data show clear divisions in opinions

among men and women, West Bankers and Gazans, as well as

respondents with different educational levels, there was

widespread agreement on some key issues. On top of which

is the need for a democratic system of government, based on

respecting civil and human rights, freedom of express and

stamping out corruption.

The process of researching and analyzing Palestinian

society using this new method of inquiry has inevitably led

to conclusions, which are discussed and elaborated in

Chapter 6. The effort necessarily starts with attempting

to answer one of the most fundamental and crucial

questions: whether the polls are legitimate, given that

they emerged after the signing of the Oslo accord and have

the Peace Process," Palestine-Israel Journal II, no. I

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. been funded, by foreign organizations whose agenda is to

perpetuate the "capitulationist" demands on the

Palestinians. To this end, arguments for and against the

use of this new method of inquiry are re-visited and

analyzed carefully. And the whole debate over Palestinian

NGOs' role in national liberation and development is

examined, in light of not only the changing political and

academic landscapes but also in view of the findings of the

polls themselves. But in the search for a definitive

answer, it becomes increasingly clear that the question of

legitimacy of the surveys cannot be tackled in isolation of

the equally important issues of credibility and promise of

the whole survey research process.

The conclusion defines four areas in which the

credibility-over-legitimacy factor can be strengthened,

leading to increased confidence in the role of public

opinion polls as a scientific method of inquiry into

Palestinian thinking: By identifying change within

Palestine Studies, those NGOs that conduct polling can

carve out for a new niche for themselves; by striving to

improve methodology, the practitioners can strengthen the

validity and reliability of the polls; by promoting the

(Winter 1995): 60-63.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. informed use of the findings, the practitioners can gain

greater credibility for themselves and the work they do;

finally, in their drive to underline the importance and

relevance of their research, they should make serious

efforts to raise professional standards of their

organizations and observe ethics that would guide the work

of all those who are already in or joining the field.

This dissertation follows up on the conclusions

reached by elaborating this list of recommendations in

specific areas of study and practice. From the obvious and

immediate requirement to train field workers to the more

subtle and long-term need for encouraging secondary

readings of the polls' findings, the study outlines steps

that can be taken by the practitioners to consolidate their

work and achieve their goals.11

u Tessler et al., The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World, make similar recommendations, which are intended to strengthen survey research throughout the Arab World. At the time of their study, in the mid- 1980s, Palestinians had not begun to conduct polls of their own. Tessler et a l ., make no mention of this fact and instead concentrate on the Arab countries that permitted survey research, such as Tunis, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon and to a lesser extent Jordan and some Gulf states. This dissertation then adds a new dimension to that study by examining the rise and development of survey research in Palestine, which has its own particular political constraints and cultural influences.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 2

PALESTINE Sc THE PALESTINIANS: RESISTANCE,

ORGANIZATION AND OPPOSITION1

Throughout the long history of Palestine

international, regional and local events have been linked:

trade, invasion and pilgrimage routes have often put this

territory and its people at the center of world attention.

Palestinian modern history in particular stands out against

the backdrop of world events. Forced into exile by the

catastrophic wars of 1948 and 1967, Palestinians were

dispersed throughout the world or subjected to a brutal

occupation by the Israelis on the land that they have

cultivated and inhabited for centuries. Although no one

known exactly how many, by the end of the 1990s, less than

40 percent of the estimated 5-6.0 million Palestinians

still lived in historic Palestine. The rest have been

xThe basis of this chapter is from a chapter of a book I wrote with Samih K. Farsoun. It has been updated and used with permission from its publisher: Approximately 40 pages from Palestine and the Palestinians by Samih K. Farsoun and Christina Zacharia. Copyright (c) 1997 by Westview Press. Reprinted by permission of Westview Press.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. scattered throughout the Arab World, with significant

presence in Jordan and Lebanon, and abroad. Despite their

physical fragmentation, and in the absence of an effective

diplomatic resolution to the question of Palestine,

Palestinians have engaged in various forms of resistance

against Israel at critical historical periods and in

everyday life.

These resistance efforts climbed to new highs with

the eruption in late 1987 of an unarmed uprising against

the occupiers, the intifada. This chapter examines the

political, economic and social conditions that gave rise to

the intifada and the uprising itself as a watershed in the

history of the Palestinian struggle against Israeli

occupation and domination. Specifically, it traces

resistance efforts by Palestinians--led by mass-based

political, cultural and religious organizations--that

became an integral part of a strategy to survive in

Palestine since the early days of the Israeli occupation of

the West Bank and Gaza Strip until the Oslo accord was

signed in 1993. The chapter further argues that these

organizations developed despite and because Israel de

developed nearly all productive sectors and social

institutions in the occupied territories. With policies

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and practices designed to cripple and crush, Palestinians

had little alternative then to organize themselves into

groups with a twin aim: one, to survive the occupation, and

two, to overthrow it.

This chapter also argues that the dynamic tension

between survival and resistance within Palestinian society

and between them and the Israelis was briefly interrupted

by the announcement of the secretly brokered Oslo accord of

1993. After discussing the political context that led to

the kind of compromise reached in Oslo, this study examines

its impact on Palestinians, inside and outside Palestine.

It does so by tracing the new political, economic and legal

constraints placed upon Palestinians living in the West

Bank and Gaza Strip and the new organizations that arose to

replace the battle-worn, mass-based movements that had held

together Palestinian society since 1967.

This historical background is necessary to

understanding not just the results of survey research in

Palestine, but also the meaning behind them for several

reasons. One, for the agreements to hold, Palestinian

attitudes toward the Oslo accord should be close to the sum

total of public opinion concerning each of its constituent

parts. This chapter gives historical background to major

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. individual issues between Israel and the Palestinians, that

have yet to be resolved but have been put on the

negotiating table at Oslo. The status of Jerusalem is

discussed within the framework of Israeli attempts to annex

parts of the occupied territories against international

legality and numerous United Nations resolutions

prescribing a land-for-peace formula. Likewise included

are Israeli settlements, whose building and expansion

entail not only appropriation of occupied land and water

resources but also the imposition of illegal and heavy

taxes against the occupied Palestinian population. And,

the status of millions of Palestinians who were forced from

their homes, but have the right to return under

international law, is also covered.

As will be argued in this and subsequent chapters,

and confirmed by facts on the ground, public opinion will

support the Oslo process only if it addresses such major

concerns as Jerusalem, settlements, refugees in a way that

allows Palestinians to achieve economic and social

independence in which to build a viable and fruitful

society again. Short of that, Palestinians are unwilling

to accept a process or its outcome that does not meet their

aspirations for self-determination and statehood. At that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. point, this study argues, Palestinians will have no other

viable alternative than to continue to view Israel as a

mortal threat and actively resist its domination.

In that scenario, currently being played out, the

historical relationship between Palestinians and Israelis

becomes important to understanding present and future

realities. In other words, this study suggests that the

Oslo accord has been far from being a diplomatic or

political breakthrough in the conflict that the

Palestinians had aimed to achieve. Rather, the study

considers the agreements as an extension of Israeli

domination, in which history will be allowed to repeat

itself endlessly, requiring continued Palestinian

resistance, but with new and different constraints that are

outlined in this chapter and detailed in the following

ones .

The second reason why a historical examination of

life on the West Bank and Gaza Strip is important within

this study of Palestinian public opinion polling is that it

is necessary to defining and analyzing the attitudinal and

even demographic variables measured in the surveys. This

is the case because not only are studies of Palestinian

opinion before 1993 rare, but also because it can be argued

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. that the past continues to influence the present in

significant ways. Jerusalem, settlements and refugees have

a long history that have yet to be resolved--although their

hoped for outcome is clearly established within Palestinian

public opinion. This outcome entails a reversal of past

and current Israeli practices and policies for peace and

stability to replace violence and conflict in the region.

Occupation for the Long Haul

When, in the first week of June 1967, the Israeli

army moved across the 1948 armistice lines, into the

eastern interior and soutnern most costal strip of historic

Palestine, its commanders wasted little time in trying to

make their occupation of more Arab land accepted as a new

way of life. No sooner had they occupied the West Bank and

Gaza Strip and Syria's Golan Heights than they began to

restructure the legal, political, social and economic

structures that existed there in a manner tantamount to

annexation. Three weeks after the outbreak of what the

Israelis called the six-day war, their Knesset added to the

Jordanian law that had governed the "West Bank" of the

Jordan River and Egyptian law in the Gaza Strip, the so-

called law of "Administrative Ordinance." This legislation

enabled Israel to extend its control over these

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. territories, affecting nearly every aspect of life for over

2 million Palestinians living there.

During the first week of occupation, the entire West

Bank and Gaza Strip was put under a strict military curfew

at which time the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics

(ICBS) conducted its first and last census. Based on these

counts, which have not been made entirely public to this

day, the Israeli military developed a registration system

whereby all Palestinians 15-years or older were issued a

hawiyya, an identity card written in Hebrew and Arabic.

Unified under a system of collective and individual state

control and surveillance, the people of the West Bank and

Gaza Strip were kept separate by the Israeli Ministry of

Defense. Eventually, this divide-and-rule tactic, so

quickly employed after the start of the occupation, made

the newly conquered territories and their captive

population nearly completely dependent on Israel.

Jerusalem, which between 1948 and 1967 was a divided

city with over 100,000 Palestinian Arabs living in the

eastern part at the time of the occupation, was declared

the "eternal" capital of Israel on June 28, 1967. By 1968

the Israeli government had seized 1,000 acres of privately

owned Palestinian property, by 1970 another 3,500 acres,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and began to build and populate a belt of settlements

around "greater Jerusalem" with Jewish citizens.2

The annexation of Jerusalem has been one of the few

acts repeatedly condemned by both the United Nations

General Assembly and Security Council. On July 4, 1967,

the General Assembly unanimously passed Resolution 2253

(ES-V), urging Israel to "rescind all measures taken [and]

to desist forthwith, from taking action which would alter

the status of Jerusalem." On September 25, 1971, the UN

Security Council also passed a resolution deploring

Israel's actions on Jerusalem, labeling them invalid, and

called on Israel to rescind all actions that change the

status of the city. On Jerusalem, as with nearly all other

outstanding issues surrounding the question of Palestine,

Israel has ignored international law and pressure.

As for the rest of the occupied territories Israel

left their status open to direct negotiations with Arab

states: Jordan, Egypt and Syria. At the same time,

2Michael T. Dumper puts the question of demography and politics aside in a timely article and instead focuses on the problem of integrated water, electricity and sewage systems of East and West Jerusalem. He finds "no overwhelming functional and technical obstacles" to reversing annexation. "Jerusalem's Infrastructure: Is Annexation Irreversible?" Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 3 (Spring 1993): 93.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. however, there were calls for de jure annexation of the

territories by a new movement within the Knesset, the

Greater Land of Israel, led by prominent military and

political figures who later formed the Likud party

coalition in 1969. Meachem Begin, supported by the then

Minister of Defense, General Moshe Dayan, argued for the

creation of strategic Jewish settlements. These "created

facts" (similar to the Zionist infiltration of Mandatory

Palestine) were intended to close out the possibility of

returning the land to Arab control.3 That summer the first

Jewish settlements were built throughout the occupied

territories, again ignoring international law and opinion.

The UN Security Council had passed a document that

became a key legal reference for control of the occupied

territories on November 22, 1967. Resolution 242, commonly

called the "land-for-peace" formula, is based on three

principles: 1) states have territorial integrity; 2) the

acquisition of territory by force is inadmissible; and 3)

Israel withdraw from territories occupied in the recent

conflict. To Israel's advantage, the language of the last

phrase is ambiguous. Purposely omitted was the definite

3For a detailed summary of this debate see Charles D. Smith, Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1988).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. article "the" from the resolution, as originally intended

by the United States and the Soviet Union in their July

1967 draft version of this resolution. The omission of

this single word reinforced Israel's position that the

"territories" were indeed indefinite and therefore open to

political interpretation and negotiation. The only mention

of Palestinians is in reference to "a just solution to the

refugee problem"--an echo of the 1917 Balfour Declaration,

in which the British Mandate promised the land of Palestine

to Jews, but urged the early Zionists not to "prejudice the

civil and religious rights of the non-Jewish communities in

Palestine," who then constituted over 90 percent of the

population. Moreover, the 1967 reference to refugees in

that document meant all Arab refugees, including Egyptian

and Syrian.

Following the 1967 war, Israel's military enveloped

an estimated 1.3 million Palestinians, created over 400,000

new refugees and added 20,000 to the camps.4 Numerous

international treaties, conventions and charters, as

4Peter Dodd and Halim Barakat surveyed 1967 refugees as they crossed into Jordan. Their study captured an interesting profile of the reasons and consequences of their exodus. River without Bridges: A Study of the Exodus of the 1967 Palestinian Arab Refugees (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1969).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. civilian inhabitants in territories acquired by war define

Palestinian rights. The most essential of these are the

Hague Regulation of 1907 and the fourth Geneva Convention

"Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of

War" of 1949. Each is founded on a broad conception of

human rights under which Palestinians would be regarded as

"protected persons." Article 3 of the fourth Geneva

Convention states that "the following acts shall be

prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever with

respect to persons: a) violence to life and person, in

particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel treatment

and torture...[and] willfully causing great suffering or

serious injury to body or health" of protected persons.5

Israel contests these conventions, even as a

signatory of the Charter and member of the United Nations,

arguing that the Arab parties to the conflict rejected the

1948 partition plan that would have granted independent

statehood to Palestinians in 32 percent of British Mandate

sFor further discussion see Naseer H. Aruri, ed. , Occupation: Israel Over Palestine, 2nd ed. (Belmont: Association of Arab-American University Graduates, Inc., 1989); W. Thomas Mailison and Sally V. Mailison, The Palestine Problem in International Law and World Order (New York: Longman, 1986); and Meron Benvenisti with Ziad Abu- Zayed and Danny Rubinstein, The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon (Boulder: Westview Press, 1986) .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestine. As this argument goes, Jordan, Egypt and Syria

did not constitute a "legitimate sovereign" over the

conquered lands and therefore applicable international

conventions and laws simply do not apply to this case.

Israel overruled them with Military Order 144, effectively

barring international human rights observers from the

territories (except by special Israeli high court

permission). Aruri points out an irony in this logic,

"this occupation is uniquely distinguished by the claim

that it does not constitute an occupation."6 A claim

repeatedly contradicted by Israel's precondition to

negotiation with Arab states, and later the PLO, to accept

UN Resolution 242 and 338 (which affirms the earlier

Security Council Resolution 242 and calls upon the parties

to negotiate a "just and durable peace" immediately).

Regarding the conduct of the occupier in relation to

administrating the conquered territories, Regulation 43 of

the Hague Convention (1907) forbids the occupier to

significantly alter existing legislation of the occupied

territory, unless it is "absolutely impossible" to abide by

the established law. An Israeli scholar, Meron Benvenisti,

documented repeated violations of this principle by Israel:

6Aruri, Occupation, 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. During the years the military government has been in existence [1967-1986], more than 1,500 orders and amendments have been issued, divided by subject as follows: agriculture--29; banks--14; business--66; commerce--48 ; currency--55 ,- education--26 ; censorship and freedom of expression--14; health--20; institutions (including Israeli institutions and municipalities)--173; insurance--16; judiciary--197; land--97; legislation--24; public order--239; security--304; taxes--85; traffic--96; a total of 1,503 legislative acts (including repeals) .7

Israeli military law is taken from four independent legal

traditions: Ottoman, especially in regard to land

appropriation and taxation; British Mandate Defense

Emergency regulations (passed in 194 5), invoked primarily

to justify curfew, censorship and house demolition;

Jordanian and Egyptian civil laws to regulate criminal and

landlord-tenant disputes; and Israeli civil law, under the

jurisdiction of the military courts, which is often derived

from secret state "security" considerations. All combine

to create a "complex web of legal traditions" of which only

part had been consistently enforced, legitimate or even

clear to Palestinians, who in turn tend to practice

customary law (urf) in order to settle civil disputes

outside of the official civil or religious courts.8 As Lisa

7Benvenisti, et al., The West Bank Handbook: A Political Lexicon, 196.

8Adrien Katherine Wing, "Legitimacy and Coercion: Legal Traditions and Legal Rules During the Intifada," Middle

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Hajjar argues, this tangle of laws applied in the military

court had the politico-legal function of maintaining

control over Palestinians under Israeli rule.9

Economic Subordination: Policies & Practices

Onward from the post-1967 war period, Israel's

staggering economy boomed because of an enormous influx of

financial and military transfers, mainly from the U.S.

According to Naseer Aruri1s well documented estimates,

Since 1976, Israel has been the largest annual recipient of U.S. foreign assistance and it is the largest recipient on a cumulative basis. From 1949 through 1965, U.S. aid to Israel averaged about $63 million per year. It increased to an average of $102 million annually between 1966 and 1970, and then jumped to about $1 billion annually during the next five years. From 1976 to 1984, it averaged about $2.5 billion, then with the upgrading of the special relationship to a strategic alliance during the Reagan period, U.S. aid began to escalate reaching to more than $5 billion annually at present, over one-third of the total U.S. foreign aid budget.10

In the late 1990s, Israel and Egypt (reward for signing the

East Policy 2, no. 3 (1993) : 87-103.

9A study of the structure and application of Israeli military law and court system was conducted by Lisa Hajjar, "Authority, Resistance and the Law: A Study of the Israeli Military Courts in the Occupied Territories" (Ph.D. Diss., American University, Washington, D.C., 1995).

10Naseer H. Aruri, The Obstruction of Peace: The U.S., Israel and the Palestinians (Monroe: Common Courage Press, 1995) , 85 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Camp David agreement in 1979) received 45 percent of all

U.S. foreign aid. Moreover, Israel collects about $1

billion annually in tax-deductible contributions from

Zionist organizations based in the U.S. Since 1949,

American aid to Israel totals over $7 9 billion.

United States 1 aid and other revenue to Israel have

been invested primarily in three sectors: industry, tourism

and the military. Moving away from an agricultural

economic base, the large inputs of capital and industrial

technology triggered a structural shift. It reoriented

Jewish labor toward high-paid technical service sectors and

created a demand for low-skilled and cheap labor,

especially in construction and agriculture, which was met

by Palestinians from the newly conquered territories.11 The

Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS) recorded a

steady increase of Palestinian daily labor migration into

Israel since 1968 (but especially after 1970), in terms of

absolute numbers and percent of population. These figures

i:iJoost R. Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada: Labor and Women's Movements in the Occupied Territories (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991), 17-18. For further insight see Shimishon Bichler, who analyzed Israeli political groups in terms of their economic interests in the territories, in "The New Political Economy of Israel," al-Siyasa al-Filastiniyya (Palestine Policy, in Arabic): 3, no. 12 (Fall 1996): 26-39.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. exclude undocumented labor, which was estimated to be as

high as 50 percent of the total Palestinian work force in

Israel (numbers varied by year and season) .12

Part of the explanation for the high rate of

undocumented labor is that Palestinian employment

opportunities were (and continues to be) strictly regulated

by several mechanisms tied to economic and political

considerations of the Israeli state. Palestinians must

apply for a work permit, gained only after obtaining

security clearance from the military administration, and

present proof of potential employment by an Israeli. These

permits must be renewed periodically for a fee and are

limited to employment in what Israel deems "non-strategic"

sectors. Very often, Israeli employers prefer to hire

undocumented workers in order to avoid paying benefits to

Israelis who have trade union protection.

Although data are sparse, several independent

studies show that after 1970, Palestinian women

increasingly entered the non-domestic work force as migrant

and undocumented laborers in Israel and the occupied

12Mohammed K. Shadid, "Israeli Policy Toward Economic Development in the West Bank and Gaza," in George T. Abed, ed., The Palestinian Economy: Studies in Development under Prolonged Occupation (New York: Routledge, 1988), 127.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. territories. Representing at least 5-10 percent of the

total Palestinian work force, most are unmarried or widowed

women drawn into the formal labor sector in order to

supplement their families' incomes, not to achieve economic

independence (although that can become an unintended

outcome). With no real effective recourse to prevent or

take action against individual and collective exploitation,

Palestinians constitute a "reserve army" of labor in the

Israeli economy.lj Women, says Hiltermann, are the most

exploited sector of this labor force.14

The possibility of gaining membership and benefits

in the Histadrut, Israel's largest and oldest trade union

federation, is slim for both Palestinians living inside

Israel and the occupied territories. This is basically

because there is a historical preference to protect and

privilege Jewish labor. According the Hiltermann,

The Histadrut has not acted to protect West Bank and Gaza workers from exploitation by the Israeli government. From its establishment in 1920, the Histadrut has systematically favored Jewish over Arab labor, while attempting to co-opt Arab labor without, however, fully integrating it.15

13Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada, 25.

14Ibid. , 30

15Ibid. , 23.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Moreover, not only are Palestinians limited to lower-wage

jobs, without union protection they are also discriminated

against in terms of benefits and wages for comparable

positions. . relative to Jewish Israeli workers. , 16

Efforts to organize workers into Palestinian labor

unions had been targeted as subversive, "terrorist"

activity by the military regime. The Gaza Strip had a

short history of trade unionism under occupation. After

the start of the occupation, in the West Bank, under a

military order outlawing trade union activity throughout

the occupied territories until 1979, initially communists

resumed activities in the major urban centers and re

established links with Jordan's unions and professional

associations. Before 1967, Jerusalem, the Palestinian

capital, housed thirteen out of twenty-four unions that

were immediately shutdown in the "reunification" of the

city under Israeli rule. From then on, the center of union

activity shifted to Nablus.

As Israel tried to break Palestinian unions, they

became informal and hidden. Restrictions on printing and

lsMoshe Semyonv and Noah Lewin Epstein, Hewers of Wood and Drawers of Water: Noncitizen Arabs in the Israeli Labor Market, report number 13 (New York: Cornell International

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. distributing written material, public meetings, recruiting

and registering new members, and establishing new unions--

as well as other national organizations--forced activists

to circumvent the authorities in order to reach the masses.

They accomplished this directly and indirectly by two

means. One, encouraging democratic participation within

the union structure, which enlarged the pool of potential

leaders, who were often criminalized by the military and

put under town or house arrest, deported and imprisoned.

And, two, organizing unions by trade, geographic location

and political affiliation. Although decentralization and

dispersion weakened the numerical strength of a particular

group, it allowed for tighter coordination and for members

to more easily elude the Israeli authorities.

Unions transcended organizational difficulties by

networking through political blocs between regions. Unions

could basically provide their members with social rather

than economic protection and services. They were

particularly successful in administering health care and

medicine at a minimum cost to members and their families.

Unions also tried to provide legal aid and counsel,

education and recreational facilities.

Industrial and Labor Relations, 1987), 115.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Settlers for a Small Fee

Under the right-wing Likud party, which controlled

the Israeli parliament from 1977-1992, Israel aggressively

sought to gain control of the occupied land and its

resources without formally incorporating the Palestinian

people into Israel as citizens of its parliamentary

political system. This goal had three strategic prongs,

supported more or less by both the Israeli political right

and left: one, to extend Israel's control of the

territories by establishing Jewish settlements with

administrative links only to Israel, which was officially

sanctioned in the Israeli Knesset on March 6, 1980; two, to

restrict, control, even de-develop the Palestinian economy;

and three, to suppress resistance movements by coercive

methods, such as prolonged incarceration or deportation of

leaders, censorship of the Palestinian press and collective

punishment tactics. These methods of dealing with

Palestinians under occupation were intended to force

migration or submission by narrowing the opportunities for

political, economic and social development.

The Likud party had been successful in its efforts,

as reflected by the increase in numbers and expenditures

for settler activity. Benvenisti reports that

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Between 1978 and 1987, the average growth was 5,960 Jewish settlers a year, as against 770 during the years of Labour rule. Under Labour, $750 million of public money was invested, compared with $1.67 billion spent by the Likud.17

In terms of absolute numbers, in 1976 there were 3,17 6

Jewish settlers in the West Bank, bur by 1986 there were

60,500 amid a Palestinian population of 938,000 (including

125, 000 in East Jerusalem) .18 The majority of settlers were

enticed by the generous state subsidies attached to the

development projects. In the mid-1980s, an Israeli (Jew)

could purchase an apartment only 3 0-45 minutes from

Jerusalem for a cash payment of $2,000, which is only about

5 percent of the actual value of the land and also get the

infrastructure of the settlement free of charge.19

A slim but vocal minority, aligned politically with

rightist coalition governments, was ideologically driven to

settle in the occupied territories. Settler groups, such

as Gush Emunnin and Kach (Meir Kahane, an ultraorthodox

militant emigrant from Brooklyn, New York, had been its

leader), posed a mortal menace to the Palestinians living

17Meron Benvenisti, 1987 Report: Demographic, economic, legal, social and political developments in the West Bank (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 48.

18Ibid. , 55.

19Ibid. , 111.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. nearby these settlements.

On the eve of the intifada in 1987, 120 Jewish

settlements of various sizes and durability peppered the

West Bank. For example, Ma'aleh Adumim, located in a large

strip of land between Jerusalem and Jericho, could be

likened to Tel Aviv in terms of quality of construction,

whereas settlements deeper in the West Bank tended to be

made of flimsy, prefabricated materials. The majority of

all settlements were populated with fewer than fifty

families.20 In most cases, once a settlement is established

large tracks of land surrounding the compound were closed

off to Palestinians. Accounting for state/public, private

and security purposes, by 19 92 approximately 5 5 percent of

the total land area of the West Bank and 3 0 percent of the

Gaza Strip had been appropriated by the Israeli

government.21

20A U.S. report, compiled over several months of investigation, estimates that at least 25 percent of all homes in Jewish settlements in the West Bank are empty and the vacancy rate in the Gaza Strip is as high as 56 percent. "Netanyahu rejects US 'empty settlement' claim," Financial Times, 21 May 1997, 5.

21Salim Tamari, Professor of Sociology of Bir Zeit University, makes this important point about the rational behind the confiscation of Palestinian land. "There is an extra-territorial definition of public land in Israel so that it belongs to the Jews in totality and not the Israeli Jews in the State of Israel. Israeli citizens who are non-

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians Bear Occupation Costs

Israel's state apparatus--through administration and

expansion of settlements, which gave added justification

for increasing its military presence--has rapidly

encroached upon increasingly slimmer areas of possible

indigenous Palestinian economic and political development.

Moreover, in blatant disregard of international law, Israel

made Palestinians bear a significant part of the expense of

the occupation, including expanding settlements and

appropriation of land and water. It did so through heavy

direct and indirect taxation and by turning Palestinians

into a captive tariff-free export market, as well as a

cheap labor source. For example, in 1984,

[t]he military government's revenue from only two sources, income tax and net indirect taxes on local production, equaled 12 percent of the Occupied Territories' GNP. These two sources alone covered all of its budget expenses. As a result, budget revenues from all other sources were transferred to the Israeli government treasury, for a net gain of $150 million.22

Although prohibited under the fourth Geneva Convention,

Jews have no access to this land, but Jews who are not Israelis do have access." In "What the Uprising Means," Zachary Lockman and Joal Beinin, eds., Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising Against Israeli Occupation (Boston: South End Press, 1989), 130.

22United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, "The Palestinian Financial Sector Under Israeli Occupation," UNCTAD/ST/SEU/3 (Geneva: July 8, 1987), 101.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. large transfers of revenue from the occupied territories to

Israel became a permanent feature of the occupation.

Furthermore, there has been a deliberate attempt to stifle

and curtail Palestinian development, which in turn

strengthened the Israeli economy. This strategy was summed

up by Defense Minister Rabin, who, in 1984, bluntly stated:

"There will be no development initiated by the Israeli

government, and no permits will be given for expanding

[Palestinian] industry and agriculture which may compete

with the state of Israel."23 By the time Rabin made that

statement, Israeli products accounted for 90 percent of all

imports into the West Bank and Gaza Strip, or 11 percent of

all Israeli exports. Most of the exports into the

Palestinian economy were substandard manufactured consumer

goods. As Sheila Ryan states, the Palestinian market

became "a convenient dumping ground for shoddy Israeli

industrial products which could not compete with the local

manufactures of the industrialized countries of Europe and

North America."24

At first, Israeli military rule in the West Bank and

23Ibid. , 25.

24Shelia Ryan, "The West Bank and Gaza: Political Consequences of the Intifada," Middle East Report 74 (January 1979): 3.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gaza Strip had an uneven impact on the Palestinian class

structure. The hardest hit were the 844,000 Palestinians

in the twenty-seven refugee camps because they had very few

sources of employment but in Israel. This problem was most

acute in Gaza Strip, where the population's density is

nearly ten times as that in the West Bank, and refugees

compose more than 66 percent of the population compared

with 40 percent in the West Bank. Of the total Palestinian

labor force, approximately 51,3 00 (31 percent) from the

West Bank and 53,900 (46.1 percent) from Gaza worked in

Israel, mostly in low-paid industry and construction

sectors without social benefits or job security. Table 1

summarizes the distribution of the labor force by sector in

the occupied territories and Israel in 1986.

The service sector dominates the Palestinian

economy. It makes up about 85 percent of gross domestic

product (GDP)25 and employs 47.3 percent of the work force.

Not shown in Table 1 are Palestinians from the occupied

territories employed in Israel in professional, technical

25Compare the dominance of the service sector to others: agriculture accounts for roughly 3 0 percent of GDP, industry about 8 percent and construction approximately 12 percent. Ibid., viii.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 1

Distribution of Palestinians in the Labor Force, 1986 (Numbers in thousands)

West B an k GazaStrip Total Number Percent N u m b e r P e r c e n t Number Percent Israel Agriculture 5.5 10 .7 9.4 21.6 14 . 9 15 .7 Industry 9.1 17 . 7 7.4 17 . 1 16.5 17 .4 Construction 26.0 50 . 7 19 .4 44 . 7 45 .4 48.0 S e r v i c e s 10 . 7 20 . 9 7 . 7 16 . 6 17 . 9 18 . 9 Total (Israel) 51.3 30.7 43 . 1 46 . 1 94 . 7 36.6

West Bank & Gaza St rip Agriculture 33 . 0 28 . 3 8.5 16 . 8 41.5 24 . 9 Industry 18 .2 15 .7 9 . 0 17 . 8 27.2 16.4 Construction 14 .7 12 . 7 4 . 2 8 . 3 18 . 9 11.4 S e r vi ces 49 . 8 43 . 1 29 . 0 57 . 1 78 . 8 47.3 Total (WB&GS) 117.5 69.3 50 . 8 53 . 9 116. 5 63 .4

Total of Both Agriculture 38.5 23 .1 18 . 0 19 .4 56.5 27.2 Industry 27.2 16.3 16.5 17 . 5 43 . 7 16 . 7 Construction 40.8 24 .4 23 .5 25 . 0 64 . 3 24 . 6 S e r v i c e s 60.5 36.2 36.2 38.4 96. 7 37.0 Total (both) 167 . 0 100 . 0 94 .2 100 . 0 216.2 100 . 0

Source: Meron Benvenisti, 1987 Report : Demographic, Economic, Legal, Social and Political Development in the West Bank (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), 19.

negligible, at around 2 percent.25 This pattern is repeated

in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, where the top-level or

clerical occupations because the percentage is governing

powers are held by Israelis. The Civil Administration

(CA), which was under the military Area Commanders, had

25World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace, vol. I : Overview (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, September 1993), 5.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. been responsible for all matters regarding Palestinian-

life. The World Bank reports that "currently the CA has

about 22,000 employees, of which approximately 95 percent

are Palestinian. Most policy-makers and senior

administrative positions in the CA are, however, staffed by

Israelis . 1,27

Merchants, professionals, educators, wage-workers

and so forth were over time greatly disadvantaged by

Israeli policies. Consequently the occupied territories

fell far below its neighboring country of Jordan--

especially public infrastructure such as roads, telephones,

electricity, schools and hospitals, which facilitate the

distribution and production of goods and services, are

underdeveloped in the cities, villages and camps alike.

Table 2 provides a comparison of selected indicators in the

occupied territories, the Middle East and North Africa and

Jordan. The costs of inadequate facilities, particularly

in the area of infrastructure compared to Jordan, result in

higher prices and inferior products for Palestinians.

Agricultural goods were undersold by Israeli farmers

because Palestinians were not permitted to purchase

advanced machinery or were outright prohibited from growing

27Ibid. , viii .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 2

Comparison of Selected Indicators: Occupied Territories, Middle East and North Africa and Jordan, 1991

Occupied Middle East & Territories North Africaa Jordan GNP per capita (US$) 1, 715 1, 940 1,050 GDP per capita (US$) 1, 275 -- 1, 13 0 Primary (% school age population) 102 97 94 Secondary (% school age population) 80 60 65 Pupil-teacher ratio (primary school) 30 26 17 Illiteracy (% of population age 15+) 40 45 20 Persons per physician 847 1, 668 767 Persons per hospital bed 658 653 526 Age dependency ratiob 1 .08 0 .87 0 .92 Total fertility ratec 7.3 5 .3 5 . 3 Infant mortality (per 1,000 births) 42 60 29 Life expectancy (years) 66 64 69 Households with potable water (%) 90 83 96 Urban water supply (liters per capita) 60 -- 137 Households with electricity (%) 85 -- 98 Electricity consumption (kwh/capita) 680 -- 1, 130 Teleohone subscribers 22 -- 67 aIncludes eighteen countries extending from Algeria to Iran. bDefined as the ratio of dependent population (under fifteen and over sixty-four) to the working-age population. cAverage number of live births per woman.

Source: World Bank, Developing the Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace, vol. I: Overview (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1993).

and selling certain crops. For example, it was illegal to

pick zatar (thyme), an herb used in preparing many Arabic

dishes, because it competed with the Kibbutzim's monopoly

on the product. A more significant case is the Gaza

Strip's citrus production, which before 1967 employed 25

percent of the total work force, took up 2 0 percent of the

land area, and was sold for $150 a ton on the western

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. European market. Joan Mandeil traced the decline of this

sector from 1967 to the mid-1980s.28 First in 1968 Israel

banned independent Palestinian export to European markets

but continued to allow export to the Arab World in order to

circumvent the Arab boycott of Israeli goods. The

initiation of widespread use of mechanical irrigation

systems, fertilizers, as well as other technical devices

increased total crop output per dunum (about one-quarter of

an acre) over the course of Israeli occupation of the West

Bank and Gaza Strip. Accompanying these changes, however,

were the processes of arable land expropriation and

proietarization of the rural and refugee labor force, which

both reduced the percentage of the total population and the

percentage of Gross National Product (GNP) of Palestinians

in agriculture.

Water, shared unequally by Israelis and

Palestinians, was capped at pre-1967 levels. Restrictions

included access to surface water sources and wells. In the

Gaza Strip, the imbalance was most severe: 750,000

Palestinians consumed on average 3 0 percent of the water,

while the rest was allotted to 4,000 Israeli settlers.

28Joan Mandeil, "Gaza: Israel's Soweto," Middle East Report 136/137 (October-December 1985): 12.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Gaza's water, used by Palestinians for agriculture and

drinking, became contaminated by raw sewage that flowed

through open sewers in the camps and by high saline levels

from the inflow of seawater. The contaminated water was

neither tested nor monitored and treated only with

chlorine.29 Also, only settlers were allowed to sink deeper

wells into fresh water sources, contributing to lower water

tables in Palestinian wells. In the words of Sharif

Elmusa, "On the whole, Israel, when it comes to the water

sources of the area, acts like a great sponge."30

While the Israeli assault on Palestinian resources

and infrastructure had been heavy overall, Sara Roy argues

that the Gaza Strip has undergone a unique process of "de

development. " This concept, adapted from the literature on

dependency and modernization theories, is defined as the

total regression of political institutions and social

structures necessary to facilitate economic growth and

independence. A distinguishing characteristic of this

process is that it is not spontaneous or due to internal

29United Nations, "Prospects for sustained development of the Palestinian economy," 29.

30Sharif S. Elmusa, "The Water Issue and the Palestinian- Israeli Conflict," Informational Paper no. 2 (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1993), 7 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. constraints within a society. Rather, as in this case of

the Gaza Strip, de-development is intentionally "shaped and

advanced by a range of policies, themselves a reflection of

the ideological imperatives of the Zionist movement"31 that

aim to displace Palestinians from their land. In Roy's

analysis, the Gaza Strip has become a separate cultural,

economic and political entity from the West Bank. It is

marked by a culture torn apart by an inescapable violence

of everyday life, virtually complete economic dependence on

Israel, and a chaotic political system based on groups

often with incompatible methods and aims.

Such conditions had been fostered by the Israeli

military authorities in the enclosed, narrow and densely

populated Strip. Industrial de-development offers a prime

illustration of the effect of Israeli policies as well as

the deep divide between the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

In 1S87, total industrial revenue was $7,005,000, or $961 per worker [in the Gaza Strip], compared with $1,650 per worker in the West Bank. The relative contribution of branches of revenue has remained largely unchanged since 1967, indicating little flexibility, vertical integration, and growth. These factors are also evident in low productivity rates and the character of industrial revenue.32

31Roy, The Gaza Strip, 23 6.

32Ibid. , 272

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. De-development keeps necessary infrastructual supports for

economic sectors such as industry, agriculture and private

business from performing essential functions. For example,

in 1981, Israel allowed one branch of the Bank of Palestine

to open in the Gaza Strip, mainly to cash checks from

earnings in Israel. As Roy points out, "One of the bank's

greatest handicaps has been its inability to issue letters

of credit. Thus, although it has been the only bank in an

area of over 800,000 people, it has not been able to

support local enterprises."33 Productive sectors are forced

to turn toward commercial banks outside of the occupied

territories, international donor agencies, moneychangers or

family and friends. None of these sources effectively

strengthens the domestic savings or investment potential of

the Gaza Strip, making investment a high-risk venture,

which in turn hinders growth and self-reliance.

The Palestinian economy, vulnerable to external

shocks, was squeezed even tighter by the 1980s'

international recessionary period. Regional and local

growth due to the sharp rise in oil prices prior to that

period shriveled when oil revenues and the subsequent

demand for expatriate workers in the Gulf fell

33Ibid. , 186.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. dramatically. During the oil boom, between 1973 and 1982,

the emigration rate of mostly skilled young men averaged

seventeen per 1,000. After 1985 the Bank of Israel

officially reported that the emigration rate fell to three

per 1,000. This decline meant a serious drop in the

standard of living afforded by the extra revenue generated

by work in the Gulf: "remittances into Jordan, much of

which were destined for the Occupied Territories, dropped

from $1.5 billion in 1982 to $887 million in 1988. "34 The

added revenue and ladder of employment opportunity made

life under occupation more viable. Palestinians could

create alternative institutions to supplement the meager

social services provided by the Israeli occupation.

As the income level from employment in the Gulf and

the local economy fell, Palestinian youths in particular

perceived and experienced the structural constraints of the

occupation. Their individual and collective futures looked

bleak. Families, villages, towns and cities turned inward

to meet the daily needs of their members in the areas of

food production, health services and job training. Local

34Samih K. Farsoun and Jean Landis, "The Sociology of an Uprising: The Roots of the Intifada, 11 in Jamil R. Nassar and Roger Heacock, eds., Intifada: Palestine at the Crossroads (New York: Praegar, 1990), 24.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. developmental projects organized (for the most part)

separately by the four main PLO parties gave the

participants a feeling of personal self-worth infused with

national aspirations. Most significantly, a sense of

interdependence, community and cooperation emerged during

the period of structural economic crisis in the mid-1980s.

The Prison of Occupation: Organized Resistance

The impact of a heavy legal apparatus, combined with

a re-structuring of the economy toward a dependency-labor

market arrangement with Israel, dramatically changed the

broad contours of the economic class structure and the

inner character of the traditional political hierarchies

within Palestinian society. The traditional landed

notables and interlocked urban elite, who presided over the

Arab Higher Committee, were challenged by an emergent class

of professionals and intellectuals (lawyers, medical

doctors, professors, students, poets and artists).

The new leaders tended to direct their political

concerns toward organizing merchants, manufactures, clerks

and teachers, including in the effort fallahin (peasants)

and wage laborers. Aruri summarizes the various interests

of the reformed alliances that tied socioeconomic conflicts

to the national question.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Landowners, traditionally a pillar of the status quo, because their land has been steadily confiscated, businessmen because they have to endure the highest taxes ever levied in Palestine and operated in a market totally controlled by Israel; professionals because they are subject to regulations intended to create despair and encourage emigration. And women, who together with relatives are herded to jail or subjected to exorbitant fines.35

Charitable societies, often affiliated with religious

groups, also contributed to local resistance efforts. With

time, these organizations became institutionalized and

closely tied to the political party structure of the PLO.

By the 1980s they formed both a political challenge and

substitute to the Israeli military apparatus.

Their aim, according to Hiltermann, was to

"outadminister" instead of "outfight" the occupier by

establishing a parallel hierarchy within the territories

and hence undercut its ability to effectively rule.30 In

Gramscian terms, they engaged Israel in a war of position

by attempting to surround the dominant state apparatus

through the establishment of counter institutions. Their

aim was to transform the existing institutions within

society by building and eventually challenging the state

with an alternative ideological and material base. The

35Aruri, Occupation, 19.

36Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. state and its functions were to be won in the final moment,

in the War of Maneuver, which could be run by a new

hegemonic bloc with its vectors of authority and control

firmly extended in the transformed social formation. The

explanatory brilliance of Antonio Gramsci's concept is that

revolutionary change is not an automatic outcome of

economic exploitation--it must accompany a crisis in the

belief that the state can effectively rule.37

The application of Gramsci1s theory, even in its

abstracted form, to the Palestinian case is useful in

understanding perhaps why resistance and non-compliance to

the occupation remained a constant feature in the

Palestinian-Israeli relationship in two major respects.

First, Israel relied mostly on coercive military

power in order to secure its hegemony. What few

concessions the state offered to Palestinians were limited

not only by the pursuit of profit but also by the strong

tendency to favor all strata of Jewish labor over the

cheaper and less protected Palestinian workforce. Even

though Israel made political attempts to co-opt

Palestinians, it could gain the compliance from only a few

37Summary based on readings of Antonio Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (New York: International Publishers, 1971).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. who were willing to undermine the larger cause in exchange

for personal protection and privilege.38

Second, Israel had to try to assert its dominance

over a fragmented Palestinian community with a leadership

that acted as a material and ideological counterweight to

Israeli rule inside the territories from over a thousand

miles away. Israel did make several attempts to gain the

acceptance of at least certain sectors of Palestinian

society under occupation. By intermittently offering

municipal elections and autonomy, and then consenting to

full autonomy in the 1978 Camp David accords with Egypt,

the Israelis did what they could to preempt Palestinian

aspirations for self-determination and statehood. But

whenever these attempts failed, Israel resorted to its

draconian power of coercion.

In their efforts to resist Israeli hegemony,

especially in the early period of the occupation, the

Palestinians sought to organize themselves at the local

level in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. In 1973 they formed

a semi-clandestine umbrella group, the Palestine National

Front (PNF), to spearhead those efforts. The leaders of

the PNF represented various student, labor and women

38Tamari, "Israel's Search for a Native Pillar: The Village

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. organizations from a wide political spectrum under the

banner of the PLO. Although its leaders were deported

shortly after the PNF was founded, it did manage to

organize protests against Israeli land confiscation,

deportation of political leaders and treatment of political

prisoners.39 One of its most successful efforts was the

Arab boycott of municipal elections in Jerusalem that

threatened to legitimize Israeli annexation.

Outside of the occupied territories, throughout the

early 1970s, a series of events made a primarily political

rather than military strategy more feasible to the

Palestinian leadership. The PLO, at a Palestinian National

Council (PNC) meeting held on June 12, 1974, replaced the

vision of a democratic secular state in all of Palestine

with the goal of an "independent Palestinian state" in any

liberated territory. Implicit in this revision was the

recognition of Israel, as required by Resolution 242. This

move was affirmed later that year at the seventh Arab

Leagues," in Aruri, ed., Occupation, 603-618.

39Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada, 44. For a full discussion of nonviolent strategies of civil disobedience, see Souad R. Dajani, Eyes Without Country: Searching for a Palestinian Strategy of Liberation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994); and my review of it in Contemporary Sociology: A Journal of Reviews 25, no. 1 (January 1996): 54-55.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. summit meeting in Rabat, Morocco. One month after that

Yasir Arafat, chairman of the PLO, addressed the

international community at the United Nations, in New York,

with a gun in one hand and an olive branch in another and

this new vision for conflict resolution. The UN General

Assembly passed Resolution 323 6, which reaffirmed "the

inaliable rights of the Palestinian people in Palestine" to

self-determination and national independence. Furthermore,

the UN granted the PLO special observer status in its

General Assembly.

These moves invigorated local activists in the West

Bank and Gaza Strip, promoting widespread demonstration of

support throughout the occupied territories that spilled

over into Palestinian areas inside Israel. The Israeli

military arrested over 200 Palestinian activists and

deported five leaders, among them the president of Bier

Zeit University, the largest educational institution in the

West Bank. In 1976, Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin initiated

municipal elections in the West Bank, and for the first

time women voted. Rabin expected a nationalist boycott, as

in the earlier elections in Jerusalem, which would then

have "democratically" install Israeli sympathizers. His

strategy, however, backfired and openly pro-PLO/PNF

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. candidates swept eighteen of the twenty-four councils by an

overwhelming majority. Most of the other seats were won by

conservative, traditional leaders who were either

independent or loyal to the Jordanian monarchy, not Israeli

collaborators.40

The victory of the PNF was dampened the next year by

the Likud's rise to power in the Israeli parliamentary

elections of 1977. In October 1978 the PNF was declared

illegal, but by then it had become reorganized and enlarged

under the mainstream, Fatah-dominated National Guidance

Committee (NGC). The NGC's first major challenge was to

counter plans to grant Palestinians autonomy but not

statehood, as intended in the 1978 Camp David accords

signed by Begin and Sadat and witnessed by U.S. President

Jimmy Carter. Palestinians from the entire political

spectrum (Islamists, nationalists and communists)

resoundingly rejected the plan on the basis that it

"condemned the West Bank and Gaza to a permanent exile,

with less real authority than a [South African]

Bantustan. 1,41 Fayez Sayegh characterized the Camp David

40Lisa Hajjar, Mouin Rabbani and Joel Beinin, "Palestine and the Arab-Israeli Conflict for Beginners," in Lockman and Beinin, eds., Intifada, 109.

41Aruri, "Dialectics of Dispossession," in Occupation, 26.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agreement "as seductive and destructive as a siren's

call."42 On the day the accords were signed (September 17),

the entire West Bank and Gaza Strip was put under strict

curfew. Widespread protest demonstrations ensued

nevertheless.

Beginning in the early 1980s, the largest party of

the PLO, Fatah, with support from Jordan, formed a Joint

Committee in coordination with the people of the West Bank

and Gaza Strip. A "steadfast fund" channeled up to $100-

150 million annually to the occupied territories from

mainly the oil-producing Arab Gulf states in the form of

direct money transfers, medical supplies, communication

technology and qualified personnel. Its aim was to

organize and build grassroots institutions.

The national Palestinian movement in the occupied

territories was then divided into two ideological camps: a

leftist grouping composed of the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), Democratic Front for the

Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestinian Communist

Party (PCP) and progressive elements from Fatah, on the one

hand, and the conservative and dominant members of Fatah

42Aruri quoting Dr. Fayez A. Sayegh to whom he dedicated his edited book. Ibid., v i .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and the Muslim Brothers, on the other.

At the beginning of the occupation the Muslim

Brotherhood, the largest Islamic organization in Palestine,

focused less on resisting the Israelis and more on

countering prevailing secular behavior and beliefs among

Palestinians.43 Because the group's central ideology was

not to directly confront the occupation before a total

Islamization of Palestinian society, Israel allowed (even

encouraged) it to proliferate. The Brotherhood established

libraries, religious and nursery schools, sports and social

clubs with funding from Muslims worldwide, but particularly

from the Gulf states. It distributed zakat (alms to the

poor, one of the five pillars of Islam) to thousands in the

Gaza Strip and West Bank. Nearly 10 percent of all real

estate in the Gaza Strip is waqf land (religious

endowments), which is exempt from taxation. According to

Abu-Amr, between 1967 and 1987, "the number of mosques in

the West Bank rose from 400 to 750, in the Gaza Strip from

200 to 600. 1,44 These sites allowed the Brotherhood to do

43The discussion of the Palestinian Islamic movement is based on Ziad Abu-Amr, "Hamas: A Historical Political Background," Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993): 5-19.

44Ibid. , 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. political work with little interference from the Israelis.

During the 1970s, especially after the 1979 Iranian

Revolution, an important division within the Brotherhood

occurred. Two 1948 refugees from Gaza, Fathi al-Shiqaqi45

and 'Abd al 'Aziz Adud, formed al-Jihad al Islami (Islamic

Jihad), which retained an emphasis on the formation of an

Islamic state but by more militant means. It believed that

Islamization of Palestinians comes in the process and after

the liberation of Palestine, not before. Islamic Jihad

neither gained wide political support nor did it manage to

sway many of the Brothers, whose popularity rested in their

organization's ability to provide social services through

its institutions.

Each of the Palestinian groups competed for members

by offering a political ideology that at some level

countered Zionism and provided social welfare and cultural

activities that provided an alternative to Israeli programs

for governing life in the occupied territories. Voluntary

work committees (the first founded in 1972) and student

federations (in the secondary and tertiary levels)

organized projects that fused nationalist ideology with

45His brother Khalil Shikaki, received his Ph.D. from Columbia University and later founded and directed the Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. localized social activity. Guided by a small core of

leaders, as few as twenty or as many as thousands of

participants would join together at a particular location

and engage in tree planting, harvesting, road building or

clean-up efforts in villages or refugee camps. It is

estimated that shortly before 1987 there were "more than

400 local organizations, institutions, associations and

committees operating in virtually all Palestinian towns

villages and refugee camps."46

From the start of the occupation to the late 1980s,

nearly every person in every sector of society could find

some outlet to vent political and social frustration

through nonviolent and often productive means toward a

common end. The formation of these alternative

organizations provided a buffer between the intrusive

encroachments of the Israeli military, economic and

political systems into the increasingly more vulnerable

Palestinian society.

Between each group, however, there was pronounced

tension over the expenditures of the steadfast fund that

had been established to counter the Camp David accords.

The conservative forces tend[ed] to organize

46Abed, The Palestinian Economy, 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. resistance along the lines of traditional institutions.... The left. . . tr [ied] either to build new organizations or to radicalize the rank and file of existing organization.47

This competition, heated as it got to be, was not crippling

the resistance movement as a whole. In fact, it may be

argued that it had led to greater politicalization and

mobilization of Palestinians under occupation. Ultimately

it increased the political influence of the Palestinians of

the occupied territories (known as those of al-dakhel, or

the inside) over those living in exile (al-kharej, the

outside). This created tensions between the two sides of

the national movement. After 1993 the division becomes

more apparent and the tension all the more obvious.

Intifada Heralds New Era

Within the occupied territories, sentiments of

solidarity were cemented by a perception of isolation from

internal pressures and external political forces. In 1985,

Rabin, then defense minister, announced Iron Fist II. This

program stepped up the presence and power of the military

in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. It was designed to crush,

once and for all, Palestinian resistance. Within one month

a dozen political leaders were deported without formal

47Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada, 48.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. trial, sixty-two activists were placed under administrative

detention, and the military killed five people. Documented

reports of human rights violations, including collective

punishment, arrests and killings rose dramatically from

1984 onward. Israeli repression reached more people and in

turn raised the collective stakes against the occupation.

But the unintended consequences of Iron Fist II were to

toughen the Palestinians' resolve against the occupation

and drive political organization further underground.

Regional and international political events also

contributed to the sense of isolation and stagnation--even

abandonment--of the Palestinian struggle. The PLO was

becoming an ineffective player on the Arab and

international scenes. The Israeli government objected to

and the Reagan administration in the U.S. rejected the 1985

Hussein-Arafat initiative, which offered land for peace

(based on UN Resolution 242), and a Jordanian-Palestinian

confederation. Also in 1985 Israel bombed the PLO1s

headquarters in Tunis, killing more than seven officials.

One year later, Jordan's government ordered the closure of

all twenty-five PLO offices in Amman and deported its top

leader, Khalil al-Wazir (also known as Abu-Jihad).48

48He was assassinated in his home in Tunis on April 16,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinian leadership became increasingly

marginalized regionally and internationally. The sense of

stagnation, however, was offset by an important

restructuring of the PLO from within the organization.

After nearly five years of divisive fragmentation, the four

principal constituents of the PLO regrouped at a PNC

meeting in Algiers in April 1987. United for the first

time ever was the popularly supported Palestine Communist

Party (PCP) the PFLP, the DFLP and Fatah. In the occupied

territories, the factions that once competed for popular

support among the general population began to coordinate

their efforts and resources. Ann Mosely Lesch describes

first-hand the impact of these changes:

The effect of the rapprochement among the key groups was already evident by June 1987. When I visited the West Bank that month, I found that the social unionists organizations sponsored by the different movements were beginning to work together and that a common sense of purpose was beginning to emerge. The organizational basis for the intifada was, in fact, being established. Moreover, the Islamic movement began to participate alongside the nationalist groups, for the first time...they construed the primary enemy as Israel, not their fellow Palestinians.49

1988. Glenn Frankel, in "High Backing for Assassination: Top Israelis Reportedly Approved Slaying of PLO Aid Wazir," Washington Post (21 April 1988) : A5, reported that the operation was executed by the Mossad (the Israeli secret intelligence service) and after being approved by the Israeli cabinet.

49Ann Mosely Lesch, "The Palestinian Uprising-Causes and

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. These reinvigorated, determined activists found promise in

grassroots models of resistance. They were particularly

inspired by the effective strategies practiced by the Shi'a

resistance organization of southern Lebanon (1983-1985).

The key to their success was collective mobilization, which

could sustain and promote individual sacrifice for the

common good in the face of a common threat. With time, the

moral determination of the Lebanese Shi'a combined with

mass resistance efforts against the Israeli occupation of

Southern Lebanon created deep political divisions within

Israeli society. With political will lost, Israel's

military was compelled to withdraw from most of Lebanon to

the so-called "security zone" along the borders with

Lebanon.

Daring operations, perpetrated sometimes by

individuals, also intrigued Palestinians. For example, in

November 1987, a single Palestinian guerrilla from southern

Lebanon flew into an Israeli military compound on a hang-

glider in the Galilee. Before he was overwhelmed, he had

killed six soldiers. The operation captured the attention

of the international media and became an embarrassment to

Consequences," UFSI report 1 (Washington, D.C.: Universities Field Staff International Reports, 1988-1989), 4 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Israeli army, presumed to be an impenetrable military

force in the region. The experience in Lebanon and

individual actions such as this one both exposed and

created further cracks in the Israeli military hegemony.

The event that finally crystallized the realization

that the Palestinian struggle had lost its prominence for

Arab leadership occurred at the November 1987 Arab Summit

in Amman. Those who attended the meeting declared that the

Arab enemy was Iran, 1,000 miles to the east. In the

communique that resulted from the summit, mention of

Palestine, contrary to custom, had been relegated to the

end, almost as an afterthought. Furthermore, Jordan

proposed that Arab states normalize relations with Egypt

(ostracized since it signed the Camp David accords and a

peace treaty with Israel) in order to throw strategic

weight on the side of Iraq in its war with Iran. In

January of that year, for the first time since the 1979

Camp David accords, Egypt attended the Organization of

Islamic States' conference (an umbrella group comprised of

thirty-one states that represents 1.5 billion Muslims

worldwide) held in Kuwait. To Palestinians, these moves

toward regional reconciliation with Egypt were sobering.

In retrospect, they signified an end to Palestinian hopes

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. for settling the conflict within the larger Arab-Islamic

context. They also solidified a strategy of material self-

reliance between Palestinians. An ideology of unification

finally replaced dependence on the diplomacy of Arab

leadership and the hoped-for reasonableness of the U.S. and

Israel.

The often-recounted incident that sparked the

intifada on December 8, 1987, was actually sadly common in

daily life under occupation. On a narrow and congested

road in Gaza, weary Palestinian men waited to cross a

military checkpoint, the only entrance into the territory,

after a day of low-paid work in Israel. Unexpectedly, a

military tank swerved into a line of cars: four men died

upon impact and seven sustained serious injuries. A rumor

that the crash was deliberated, in retaliation for the

death of a relative of an Israeli soldier, quickly spread

throughout the densely populated towns and refugee camps.

According to Israeli reports, brake failure caused the

crash. To Palestinians the rumor was more credible. More

than 6,000 people from all over Gaza joined the people of

Jabalya refugee camp, were three of the four killed had

lived, to bury their dead. The funeral erupted into a

massive spontaneous demonstration that continued the next

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. day. The Israeli military, as usual, used live ammunition,

beatings, arrests and tear gas to try to disperse the angry

protestors. In the clash scores were injured and twenty-

year-old Hatem al-Sisi became the first martyr of intifada

against the brutal Israeli occupation.

Although the media failed to report the incident,

through well-established grassroots channels of

communications, the news was disseminated and

demonstrations fanned into the West Bank, Jerusalem and

among Palestinians inside Israel. On December 10 another

youth was killed by the Israeli occupation forces at Balata

refugee camps, nearby Nablus. Again, people poured into

the streets to protest, and this in turn prompted a violent

response from the military. Few initially suspected that

the increasingly organized demonstrations would last beyond

a few days or weeks. Men, women and children armed with

the most readily available materials--stones, slingshots,

burning debris and makeshift barricades--were facing one of

the most advanced military forces in the world, one

accustomed to dealing with more limited demonstrations.

The defense minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin, refused to

cut short his trip in the U.S. When he did return, he

pledged that "the disturbances in the territories will not

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. occur again.... Even if we are forced to use massive force,

under no circumstances will we allow last week's events to

repeat themselves."50

Surprise I Trouble Inside "Israel"

The initial outbreak of the intifada--mass

demonstrations, confrontations with soldiers, labor and

merchant strikes--occurred unexpectedly to the PLO, the

Israeli public, the Israeli army and the world that

watched. The harsh response of the Israeli army and the

courage displayed by the Palestinians are often explained

by the lack of readiness of the military. It was, however,

the strength of the masses mobilized for direct

confrontation with their occupiers that overwhelmed the

Israeli political, economic and military state structures,

at least initially.

The brutal actions of the Israeli army--beatings,

tear-gassing, house demolitions and point-blank shooting of

lethal rubber bullets and live ammunition--were not

uncommon and had been on the rise over the prior years.

What distinguished the intifada from past resistance

efforts was its level of inclusion of nearly all sectors of

50John Kifner, "Israel Vows to Stress Riot Training," New York Times (30 December 1987): A 6 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinian society and that the media captured the

horrifying images of their everyday life and the heroic

struggle of an unarmed population against a vicious army.

The beginning the intifada dramatically rearranged

what seemed to be an immutable power relationship built

over the twenty years of occupation. The major structural

pillars of coercion and domination nearly toppled, and the

Palestinians turned what had been liabilities into their

assets. This is not to say that the Israelis suddenly

became passive or even victims of the stones thrown by

Palestinians. If the strength of the intifada was measured

by the level of violence inflicted on the other side, then

the Israelis would certainly be the victors. Defense

Minister Rabin deployed more than 10,000 troops in the Gaza

area--three times as many used to occupy the Strip in 1967

and ten times as many as those who patrolled it before the

uprising. In the West Bank, according to a United Nations

report, the number of soldiers grew from 700 to 8,000 in

response to the intifada.51 During the first three months

of the uprising, with license from their commanding

officers, troops killed more than 100 Palestinian

demonstrators and bystanders, wounded hundreds, and placed

51Ibid. , 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. thousands under military detention (imprisonment for up to

six months without trial, subject to indefinite renewal).52

Supplementing the army, vigilante settlers roamed

throughout Palestinian areas, taunting and harassing the

local population. On many occasions settlers opened fire,

killing or wounding Palestinians in retaliation for a

stone-throwing incident or less.53 Over time the Israeli

military implemented sophisticated "anti-riot devices":

night-vision equipment, television cameras in strategic

locations, reinforced jeeps and stone-hurling machines.54

Palestinians could have been overwhelmed by the

Israel military, but they mobilized efforts on the

economic, political and social fronts. Within one month,

al-quiyada al-wataniyya al-muwahhada lil-intifada (the

Unified National Leadership of the Uprising, or UNLU),

created by the five major political groups represented in

52Penny Johnson and Lee O'Brien with Joost R. Hiltermann, "The West Bank Rises Up," Lockman and Beinin, eds., Intifada, 2 9.

53Until 1987 an Israeli kibbutz, Beth-Alf, supplied water cannons to the apartheid state of South Africa. This fact raises the question of why live ammunition and lethal rubber bullets were so readily used against Palestinian protestors. Jane Hunter, "Israel and South Africa: Sidestepping Sanctions," Middle East International (February 20, 1988): 16.

54Bernard E. Trainor, "Israelis vs. Palestinians: Tactics

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the PLO, captured the spontaneous momentum of the people

and began to channel it into coordinated action through the

already established popular committees and the

institutionalized charitable, professional and volunteer

organizations (the latter of which were declared illegal on

August 18, 1988). There is no completely accurate profile

of individual members.55 For like the shabab (young men)

masked with kaffiyyas (traditional Arab checkered

headdress) who confronted the army, the leadership's

effective strategy was for members to remain elusive,

mobile and interchangeable.

Parallel to the UNLU, and in coordination with it,

the leaders of the mainstream Muslim Brotherhood organized

a militant wing to join the uprising, drawing members from

the younger Muslim Brothers and those in the Islamic Jihad.

Based in Gaza, Hamas, which literally means "zeal" and is

an acronym for Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya (the

Are Refined," New York Times (30 March 1989) : A9 .

55Based on a sample of 330 people under administrative detention, one study found that on average a leader was between twenty-one and thirty years old and had completed at least seven to eleven years of education. This study was conducted by the Israel Bar Association and presented to the Knesset by member Dedi Zucker of the Citizen Rights Movement. Cited in Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), 65.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Islamic Resistance Movement) made its presence known in its

first leaflet issued in January 1988 . Hamas put forth its

ideology, aim and strategy in its charter on August 18,

1988. The main thrust of the text was guided by an

ideology that attempts to "cleanse" Palestinian society of

both secular and Zionist influences "toward raising the

banner of Allah on every inch of Palestine."56 In the text

Hamas explicitly rejected direct confrontation with the PLO

but implicitly positioned itself as an alternative, even a

rival, to the organization's political leadership and

social programs.

Women also began to articulate and play a greater

role in the struggle than they had done before the

intifada. But as Islah Jad points out, "women's role in

the popular committees became an extension of what it

traditionally had been in society: teaching and rendering

services"57 across the political spectrum. There was,

however, a rural-urban divide, such that urban women's

political activity and productive work were imbued with a

56Special Document, "Charter of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) of Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies XXII, no. 4 (Summer 1993) : 124.

57Islah Jad, "From Salons to the Popular Committees: Palestinian Women 1919-1989," Nassar and Heacock, Intifada, 135 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. greater progressive social content, whereas rural women's

roles were more constricted by the traditional division of

labor (albeit one with a nationalist flavor). During the

intifada, many women carved out a significant and fresh

presence in the public arena. They were on the front

lines, in direct confrontation with soldiers (nearly all of

whom were men, even though Israeli women are required to

serve in the military). Yet the "woman question" became

subsumed by the "nationalist question" in the sexually

segregated mosques, cafes and prisons where political

strategizing was being done.58

Because participation was so high and from such a

wide cross-section of the population, the Israeli army

targeted nearly everyone who participated in the intifada

as a possible leader. Space in existing prison facilities

became inadequate to hold as many as 9,000-10,000

Palestinians in detention at a given time.59 For mass

arrests, involving all of the males in a village or camp

who were fourteen to sixty years old and were suspected of

"terrorism," the Israeli army turned local schools into

58Ibid. , 135.

59A1-Haq, Punishing a Nation: Israeli Human Right Violation During the Palestinian Uprising, December 1987-1988 (Boston: South End Press, 1989) : 346.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. impromptu detention and interrogation centers. For more

lengthy detention, the army hastily built tent camps that

were "often the scene of brutal treatment of detainees."60

The most notorious of these were Ansar II in the Gaza area

and Ansar III in the Negev Desert.

The prisons were so overcrowded with detainees and

the courts so overloaded with cases that the system

practically broke down. Families and international

agencies, such as the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC), are entitled to know the whereabouts and

health of prisoners but often did not. Military Orders 29

(in the West Bank) and 410 (in the Gaza Strip) revoked the

right of legal counsel, unless it was deemed necessary by

the Prison Commander.61 Inhumane treatment of prisoners

went beyond the individuals directly involved; whole

families and villages feared for the prisoner, who most

likely would be subjected to "some form of physical ill-

treatment or torture" by the Israeli secret service, Shin

Bet, during interrogation.62 Like the schools that the

Israeli army turned into jails, it is said that the

60Ibid. , 348.

61Ibid. , 338.

62Ibid. , 341.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. prisoners turned jails into schools of the intifada.

Inside the overcrowded detention centers, prisoners got

together to exchange information about the events of the

intifada, maintain their familial and political connections

with the outside and strategize for the future.

The intifada was triggered in a Gaza refugee camp,

but it soon spread throughout the Strip to the main urban

centers and 500 villages (many of them, especially in the

north, are isolated and remote) in the West Bank. It was

virtually impossible for the Israeli military to subdue all

areas continuously or target key individuals effectively.

Instead, it dealt out collective punishment in order to

quell resistance, area by area. Al-Haq group documented

the increase in curfews, which are in clear violation of

several articles of both the Fourth Geneva Convention and

The Hague Regulations:

In the period between 9 December 1987 and 9 December 1988, the military government in the Occupied Territories imposed a minimum of 1,60 0 curfews on various locations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Of these, an estimated minimum of 400 were prolonged curfews which were in force 24 hours a day and lasted from 3 to 4 0 days.... The scope of the measure has meant that almost every one of the estimated 1.7 million Palestinian residents of these regions has been forcibly confined to their home on at least one occasion during the past year.... The effect has been not only a complete disruption of daily life and near- catastrophic economic losses, but widespread hunger and medical emergency.... With few exceptions, on any

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. given day at least 25,000 Palestinians have been involuntarily confined to their homes, and this figure reached into the hundreds of thousands with persistent regularity. 63

Palestinians realized that the collective struggle required

individual sacrifices. More and more people became

directly involved with the intifada. Continuing the

struggle by escalating the fight and advancing the cause,

became a priority and necessity for survival.

Economic Resistance Begins

The UNLU's first bayan (communique), issued one

month after the intifada began, extolled the Palestinian

people's struggle as a whole. A more important aspect of

the bayan is that it horizontally linked vertically

positioned class actors to the wider movement, pointing out

the immediate and long-term interests and sacrifices of

each class against Israel as the greater economic and

political enemy:

In the name of God, the merciful, the compassionate... All Sectors of our heroic people in every location should abide by the calls for a general and comprehensive strike... Brother workers, your abidance by the strike by not going to work and to plants is real support for the glorious uprising, a sanctioning of the pure blood of our martyrs, a support for the call to liberate our prisoners, and an act that will keep our brother

63Ibid. , 255.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. deportees in their homeland. Brother businessmen and grocers, you must fully abide by the call for a comprehensive strike.... We will do our best to protect the interests of our honest businessmen against measures the Zionist occupation force may resort to against you. We warn against the consequences of becoming involved with some of the occupation authorities' henchmen who will seek to make you open your businesses. We promise to punish such traitor businessmen in the not too distant future. Let us proceed united to achieve victory. Brother owners of taxi companies.... [w]e pin our hopes on you to support and make the comprehensive strike a success.... Brother doctors and pharmacists, you must be on call to offer assistance to those kinfolk who are ill .... Let us proceed united and loudly chant: Down with occupation; long live Palestine as a free and Arab country.54

People complied with the directives immediately because of

the legitimacy of the UNLU. The Israeli army tried to

issue false bayans but could be easily detected because

their demands were unfeasible or divisive. Few wished to

ignore the calls of the leaders and began to "shape their

daily lives around the announcements."65 Moreover,

according to Tamari, the Village Leagues, once the cradle

of collaborators and bastion of Israeli hegemony, "publicly

recanted their former roles," and many who were employed by

64A11 references to the text of communiques are from Lockman and Beinin, eds., Intifada, Appendix II, 327-3 94.

65This observation is from an eye-witness account of the intifada by Johnson and O'Brien with Hiltermann, "The West Bank Rises Up," 30.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the civil administration as tax collectors joined a mass

resignation in the summer of 1988.ss

With the economic sector mobilized, the UNLU pressed

for Palestinian withdrawal from the Israeli economy. Most

effective was a boycott of Israeli products that were

either unessential (such as beer, cigarettes and clothing)

or had a Palestinian-produced equivalent (such as soap,

soft drinks, eggs, meat and candy). Second, general

strikes against Israeli employers, with an emphasis on

construction in settlements, were observed by an estimated

4 0-60 percent of the migrant work force. Third was revolt

against taxes and licenses, accompanied by mass resignation

of tax collectors. One of the most successful efforts came

from the town of Beit Sahur.67 By the end of 1988, the sum

cost of the intifada in terms of loss of revenue from the

territories, the increase in military spending, property

damage and the slowdown of tourism was estimated to be

°sTamari, "Israel's Search for a Native Pillar," 617. Communique Six (February 2, 1988) explicitly calls upon "the municipal and local committees and the committees in the camps which have been appointed by the Zionist occupation authorities to resign immediately."

S7See the study of the town of Beit Sahur during the intifada by Michael J. Nojeim, "Planting Olive Trees: Palestinian Non-Violent Resistance" (Ph.D. Diss., American University Washington, D.C., 1993).

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. around $2-3 billion, equivalent to 4.5 to 5 percent of the

Israeli GNP.58

The initial impact of the intifada was overall more

devastating to the Palestinian economy than to the Israeli

economy. Strikes, curfews and the high rate of

imprisonment and wounding of wage-earners meant a steep

decline in real wages for entire families and villages.

Moreover, where military might had failed to suppress the

uprising, the Israeli army began meting out economic

punishment by sector--an extension of pre-intifada

practices. In West Bank cities, phone, electricity and

fuel supplies were often cut as a form of collective

punishment. Everywhere, from the start, merchants' shops

were forced open during strike hours or welded shut if they

disobeyed military orders. Another crude and widespread

tactic Israel used against merchants was to wantonly

destroy foodstuff and equipment. Al-Haq recorded many

instances where "soldiers entered shops and spoiled the

goods, mixing bleach with flour, trampling on bread,

smashing eggs, breaking a refrigerator full of meat and up

turning stalls."®9

S8Peretz, Intifada, 77 and 150.

69A1-Haq, Punishing a Nation, 388.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Prolonged curfews particularly disrupted

agricultural production in the villages. Farmers lost

entire crops because they were prohibited to spray,

irrigate or harvest their fields. When the Israeli

military lifted a curfew or siege, collective efforts were

made to do the necessary work to save the crops, but often

it was too late. Additional constraints were placed on

village farmers to prevent them from processing and

exporting their produce. Military Order 1252, "Order

Concerning the Transportation of Goods (Judea and Samaria)

1988," prohibited the export of olive oil products to

Jordan and Israel. There were prohibitions on other

products such as quarry stones, sage, eggs, antiques,

medicine and gasoline. But no ban was as devastating to

the local economy as that on olive oil, which represented

approximately 14.5 percent of total agricultural production

and roughly 5 percent (but as high as 12 percent in a good

year) of total West Bank GNP.70 Obtaining a license to

export permitted products and operate processing machines

was contingent upon payment of taxes and fines.71 The

restriction applied not just to the individual applying for

70Ibid., 406-407.

71Ibid., 405.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a permit or license, the applicant's entire family had to

have a clear record as well.

Another coercive tactic used by the Israeli army to

corner participants in the intifada and undermine general

support for its continuation was the reissuing of the

hawiyya. Operation Plastic Card, launched on June 6, 198 8,

required all Gazans who worked in Israel to obtain a new,

brightly colored identity card. In order to qualify to

purchase this card (which cost about ten dollars), the

applicant had to have a clear prison record and to have had

paid taxes that they or their relatives owed. The UNLU

immediately called for a boycott, and local activists

attempted to confiscate and destroy as many of what the

Israeli military called "honesty cards" as possible.

Nevertheless, by the fall of that year the army managed to

win this battle and isolate some of the core activists.72

World Shows Support

One feature that sets the intifada apart from

previous resistance efforts was the material and political

support it received internationally. Demonstrations of

solidarity, involving thousands of protestors, erupted

72Hiltermann, Behind the Intifada, 185.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. throughout the world, in West Germany, Italy, Canada, the

United States, the Netherlands and Japan.'3 All Arab

regimes, regardless of their reservations about the PLO or

fears that the intifada could become a model of

insurrection against their own governments, were compelled

to pledge moral and financial support to ensure the

continuation of the Palestinian uprising.74 This is partly

for these reasons that the intifada continued well beyond

its predicted demise.

Shortly after the intifada began, Jordan pledged to

continue to pay the salaries of teachers and civil servants

regardless of strikes, curfews or resignations. Jordan

also offered pensions to families of those who were

disabled or killed in the intifada. As a symbolic gesture,

"Iraq began paying pensions to the families of those killed

in the intifada equivalent to the pensions given to the

families of its own soldiers killed in the [Iran-Iraq] Gulf

73For example, Lamis Andoni reports that "between December 1987 and August 1988 the security and police departments dealt with 117 demonstrations of anywhere between 100 and 2,500 people organized in Jordan in support of the Intifada." In "Jordan," Rex Brynen, ed., Echos of the Intifada: Regional Repercussions of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict (Boulder: Westview Press, Special Studies on the Middle East, 1991), 173.

74Lamis Andoni, "Solid Arab backing," Middle East International (February 6, 1988) : 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. war. 1,75 At an emergency Arab summit meeting in Algiers six

months after the intifada began, Chairman Arafat played an

active role in securing money, medicine and foodstuffs for

the people of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Unofficial

sources reported that the Gulf States of Saudi Arabia,

Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates together pledged

$118 million for the first year of the uprising. The

summit also reaffirmed its annual $150 million payment to

the PLO and extended the annual $10 0 million contribution

to the PLO-Jordanian Joint Committee beyond the ten-year

period established at the 1978 Baghdad summit.

In the U.S., the world's greatest ideological and

financial ally of Israel, the images of Israeli brutality

stirred a general outcry from the American public. Until

then it had for the most part been ignorant of the

Palestinians' condition under occupation and it was shocked

at the unprecedented intensity of the conflict. Israel's

image was marred by the repeated acts of brutality reported

in the newspapers and television reports. Throughout the

major cities of the U.S., Israel's Ministry of Tourism had

launched a promotion during the religious holiday season.

75Michael Jansen, "The funds which help the intifada," Middle East International (June 24, 1988): 6.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Billboards featured a panoramic view of the old city of

Jerusalem. Under it a caption read, "Jerusalem, Just a

Stone's Throw Away from Tel Aviv." The campaign was

quickly retracted. Israel was to go on to the defensive in

public relations, for a change.

Opinion polls tapping into the U.S. public's

attitudes toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict showed a

significant decline in the high level of support usually

accorded to Israel. A 1988 Gallop survey, confirmed by

numerous others, found that about 3 0 percent of Americans

"view Israel less favorably" than prior to the intifada.

Surveys also revealed a sharp difference between public

opinion and U.S. government policies. Another Gallop

survey conducted early in 1988 asked respondents: "As you

may know, the United States does not currently deal

directly with the PLO. So do you favor or oppose direct

talks between the U.S. and the PLO as a way to help resolve

the conflict over Gaza and the West Bank?" Despite the use

of such direct language, 53 percent answered favorably and

only 26 supported official U.S. policies.75 A substantial

majority, 70 percent, of Americans became weary of

75For a thorough and interesting discussion see Fouad Mourghrabi, "The Intifada in American Public Opinion," in Nassar and Heacock, eds. , Intifada, 247.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. providing Israel with $3 billion in (official) funding each

year. Gallup surveys found that 41 percent thought that

U.S. aid to Israel should be decreased, and 19 percent

believed that it should be stopped completely.'7

Israeli public opinion was almost opposite to that

of American. Surveys showed 69 percent of Israelis favored

taking a "tougher stand" in quelling (what was then labeled

as) "the disturbances." Twenty-three percent believed the

level of response was appropriate, while only 7 percent

thought it should be softened.78 These attitudes were

reflected in the Knesset, where even before the intifada,

calls for a "transfer" solution to the Palestinian-Israeli

conflict were made from right-of-center political figures.

Deputy Defense Minister Michael Dekel of the Likud party

openly endorsed the policies advocated by the Kach party,

which had been banned by the Israeli Supreme Court for its

racist platform in 1986. In a speech to Israeli settlers

on April 1, 1988, Prime Minister Shamir compared

Palestinians to "grasshoppers" that would be crushed. To

further this point, the minister of industry and trade and

77Ibid. , 248.

78John Kifner, "Arrests of Palestinians Approach 1,000," New York Times, 26 December 1987, A7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. former defense minster, Ariel Sharon, moved with his family

into the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem's Old City.79

Intifada Brings about Change

In less than one year, the intifada not only upset

the power relations inside Israel and within the structure

of the occupation but also began to reorder them. On July

31, 1988, in a historic televised speech, King Hussein

reversed four decades of Hashemite policy regarding

Jordan's administrative responsibility for the West Bank

and its claim to represent the Palestinians of the

territories as a legitimate substitute to the PLO. The

king severed these links without consulting the PLO

beforehand. Lamis Andoni speculated that he hoped to catch

the PLO off-guard in order to demonstrate the

organization's inability to "handle the responsibility it

had always sought."80 The Jordanian government immediately

followed through on its new position. The next day it

began to disentangle itself by revoking the Jordanian

79"Home for Sharon Amid Arabs," New York Times (17 December 1987): A14.

80Lamis Andoni "Jordan," 170. In this article she gives a detailed overview of this historic transition in Jordanian- Palestinian relations as well as the intifada's impact on Jordanian politics.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. citizenship of West Bankers (reducing it to two-year travel

documents) and stopping salaries of most of the 24,000

government employees (except those of the department of

awqaf, religious endowments).

Four months later, the PNC held its nineteenth

session in Algiers (November 12-15, 1988) in order to

cement its new position in view of these rapid and profound

changes. This historic session brought forth the

Declaration of Independence of Palestine with Jerusalem as

its capital. No less significant was Arafat's address to

the 43rd session of the United Nations General Assembly, in

Geneva on December 13, 1988,31 where he formally and

unequivocally recognized Israel's right to exist, renounced

terrorism and accepted territorial concessions. His speech

reiterated the main points of the resolution passed at the

PNC session. It made clear that the PLO "rejects threats

of force of violence or terrorism or the use of these

against its territorial integrity and political

81Arafat was denied a visa to enter the U.S. in order to address the United Nations' headquarters in New York, on the grounds that he belonged to a "terrorist organization." On December 1, 1988, the UN General Assembly voted 151-2, with one abstention by Great Britain, to condemn the U.S. for violating a 194 7 Headquarter Agreement that requires the U.S. not to obstruct persons with legitimate business at the UN.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. independence or the territorial integrity of any other

state, without prejudice to its natural right to defend its

territory and independence." 8 2

Both the U.S. and Israel boycotted the UN session,

even as more than one hundred states recognized the State

of Palestine.83 Israeli Prime Minister Shamir described the

Palestinian peace proposal as a "monumental act of

deception," while the United States government insisted on

clarification of what it claimed was ambiguous language.

Arafat complied with the demands, as he along with many

others in the PNC believed that only the U.S. could mount

the necessary pressure to get Israel to accept the offer.

The day after the Geneva event, President Ronald Reagan

announced at a White House press conference that the U.S.

would open a dialogue with the PLO. The Ambassador to

Tunisia, Robert Pelletreau was appointed to initiate the

direct talks, which carefully avoided the involvement of

high-level U.S. State Department officials.

Palestinians inside the occupied territories

82For a full reproduction of the document produced at the November 198 8 PNC meeting see Journal of Palestine Studies XVII, 2 (Winter 1989) .

83In mid-January 198 9 the president of the United Nations Security Council accepted the PLO's request for the right to speak directly to the Council as "Palestine" (the same

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. celebrated their National Independence Day with

demonstrations in widespread support of the PNC statement.

The resolutions, however, drove a deeper wedge between

Hamas and the UNLU. Hamas issued an appeal to the PNC in

Algeria that restated their position: "We condemn all the

attitudes calling for ending the j ihad [holy war] and

struggle, and for establishing peace with the murderers,

and the attitudes which call for acceptance of the Jewish

entity on any part of our land. 1,84 Nonetheless, Palestinian

leaders believed that opening dialogue between the U.S. and

their sole and legitimate representative was indeed "an

achievement of the Intifada" (UNLU Bayan 31). It was a

greatly needed political victory, as the Palestinian

economy was being badly hurt in the struggle against

Israeli occupation.

The Oslo Accords: Beginning of the End?

The optimism among Palestinians that the intifada

would produce a negotiated settlement with Israel to

finally end the occupation, with the U.S. as the mediator,

basis as all UN member nations).

84A s cited by Abu-Amr, "The Politics of the Intifada," in Michael C. Hudson, ed., The Palestinians: New Directions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1990), 9.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. never materialized. Backed by the U.S., Israel remained

intransigent, offering its own version of a peace

agreement, that of Palestinian autonomy over civilian

affairs, not the land or resources. Such a proposal

resembled the provisions of the Camp David accords and did

not include the PLO or an independent Palestinian state.

American and Israeli opposition to any peace except on

their own terms (demeaning to Palestinians through the

denial of Palestinian national rights) had completely

undermined all past Palestinian diplomatic initiatives.

The Israeli-U.S. counter proposal stunted the Palestinian

diplomatic initiative. Moreover, it outraged the

Palestinians under occupation and in the Diaspora, all of

whom overwhelmingly rejected it, as did the PLO. Thus, the

parties reached another deadlock.

In 1990 Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and in 1991 the

U.S.-led Gulf war against Baghdad introduced a dramatic and

strategically tranformative dimension into the Middle East.

The war quickly redirected attention away from the ongoing

uprising and realigned the regional balance of political

power to the disadvantage of the Palestinians. Although

the Gulf crisis overshadowed the intifada and the Palestine

question and reduced significantly Arab support for them,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it nevertheless gave the PLO leadership under Arafat and

his loyalists a new window of opportunity to move the

Palestinian issue once again onto the international

political agenda. The ill-considered actions of Arafat, in

actuality siding with Saddam Hussien of Iraq but

rhetorically claiming otherwise, isolated and delegitimized

the PLO and with it the Palestinian cause. This hurt them

not only in the international arena but also among a large

number of Arab states and peoples, especially the wealthy

oil-exporting states and the politically influential ones

such as Egypt and Syria. Thus, in the context of Israel-

U.S. obstructionism to a just peace in the Middle East,

Arafat's incompetent and inept actions squandered the

achievements of the intifada and set the stage for the

precipitous decline of the PLO in the 1990s.

Israel and the U.S. seized the moment, engaging in

both the inconclusive Madrid "peace process," initiated by

the U.S. Government, and the secret negotiations with

Israel which led to the Declaration of Principles (DoP) and

culminated in the Oslo accords in 1993. With no real

counter-strategy the politically and economically weakened

Palestinian leadership accepted the DoP and subsequent

agreements that barely address the essence of the conflict.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Edward Said, expressing the sentiments for many

Palestinians and Arabs, characterizes the agreements as a

"betrayal of our history and our people."85 Israeli foreign

minister, Shimon Peres, explains the asymmetries inherent

in the agreements as, "In some ways we are negotiating with

ourselves."86 In other words, it was not the U.S. and

Israel that changed, but it was their alliance that helped

reconstruct the global conditions in such a way that was

conducive to the realization of their past, present and

future strategic objectives.

When the DoP was first announced, the U.S.

government immediately embraced it. It was the kind of

agreement that both Israel and the U.S. had always sought,

but Palestinians had resisted. The DoP redefined the

problem as a conflict between two parties, both with claims

to the same territory. The agreement also set new

parameters for the conflict's resolution. Within the

agreement, the answer to the question of Palestine sits

85Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994 (New York: Pantheon, 1994), xxxii.

86Ha-aretz (February 14, 1994), as cited in E. Murphy, "Stacking the Deck: The Economics of the Israel-PLO Accords," Middle East Report 194/195 (May-June/July-August 1995) : 38 .

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. squarely outside of the area of international law, which

had given Palestinians not only the right to resist the

appropriation of their land and violation of their human

rights, but also importantly their right to exist as a

sovereign nation. Instead, the DoP and subsequent

agreements cement an American and Israeli vision for the

region.

Packaged under euphemistic programs of expanding

"market democracies" throughout the "new world order," the

real aim of the Palestinian-Israeli agreements is to gain

unrestricted access to Arab labor and consumer markets, and

most importantly, oil supplies. This vision for the region

excludes a state of Palestine, with the right to return for

more than half of all Palestinians displaced by two wars,

sovereign and contiguous boarders, self-determination and

an independent economy.

These objectives are embodied in the letter and the

spirit of the DoP and subsequent agreements. Take as a

starting point the U.S.'s introduction of the language to

refer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip as "disputed," rather

than "occupied," territories in June 1993, toward the end

of Madrid-Washington talks. Far from reversing this

political stance, the DoP expands control of the land, its

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. people and its resources, in the name of Israeli "security"

in three significant ways.87

One, the DoP (Article VII) allows for the continuing

occupation of Palestinian territories in the West Bank and

Gaza Strip by the fact that all military laws remain in

force and Israel has veto power over any amendments

introduced by the Palestinian Authority (PA). This

provision encompasses the work of the Palestinian

Legislative Council (PLC), which was elected in 1996 to

draft a Basic Law (covering forty designated areas) for the

autonomous areas. Written into the DoP, article XVIII,

section 4.a, are explicit restrictions on the PLC's

mission. The most important, and ultimately binding,

decisions are made in the Joint Civil Affairs Coordination

and Cooperation Committee. Run by Israelis and

Palestinians, decisions affecting vital aspects of

Palestinian life such as water, land, telecommunications

and electricity are made through consensus, giving Israel

absolute power through its veto. In this way the DoP

preserves and legitimizes an apartheid system of separate

87For an examination of the DoP see Laura Drake, "Between the Lines: A Textual Analysis of the Gaza-Jericho Agreements," Arab Studies Quarterly 16, no. 4 (Fall 1994): 1-36.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. but not equal laws, restricting Palestinian development in

the strategically vital areas of trade, banking, taxation,

human rights and so on.

Ironically phrased as "cooperation," Palestinians

are strapped into a severely imbalanced economic

relationship with Israel--one that had been well

established through over twenty years of military

occupation. Palestinians are left with autonomy, but only

to the extent that the run-down public infrastructure

(schools, hospitals, electricity, garbage) has been

transferred to the PA, to administer and collect some

taxes. Beyond certain public services, however, Israel

directly controls virtually all else. As Peres puts it to

the Israeli public: "The deal [specifically, the September

1995 Taba or Oslo II accords] kept the following in Israeli

hands: 73% of the lands of the territories, 97% of security

and 8 0% of the water."88

The most damaging concession the PLO granted through

the agreements is that Israel gained exemption from "all

liabilities, obligations and omission with regard to acts

occurring prior to the transfer" of authority to

88D. Makosky, "PM: Oslo II Is 'Blow to Greater Israel, 1,1 Jerusalem Post (26 August 1995): 7.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians as provided for in the Cairo agreement of May

4, 1994. Moreover, all grievances must now be "referred to

the Palestinian Authority" (Article IX, 1-a and b), as

stipulated in the Cairo Agreement.

With virtually all the control and decision-making

power granted to Israel through the accords, and the fact

that the main representatives of the Palestinians accepted

these conditions, life on the ground was left much the same

as during the occupation and in many significant ways

worse. First of all, the territory under Palestinian

Authority (PA, as it is referred to in agreements, but

renamed the Palestinian National Authority, PNA, by Arafat

and his supporters), has been divided into small areas

around five major cities in the West Bank and less than one

percent of Gaza Strip. The primary and secondary roads

connecting these cities are patrolled by the Israeli

military, making closure of these cities, from even the

surrounding areas, or into Israel, a permanent feature of

life after Oslo.89 Moreover, there is not yet a "safe

passage" between cities on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as

89Sara Roy, "De-Development Revisited: Palestinian Economy and Society Since Oslo," Journal of Palestine Studies 28, no. 3 (Spring 1999): 69; also see her article "The Palestinian Economy after Oslo," Current History (January 1998): 19-25.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. stipulated in the agreements. Jerusalem, once the

commercial heart of Palestine, has been completely off

limits except to less than four percent of Palestinians who

have residences there. Cut-off trade and labor flows have

made the West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem more isolated

from each other and more dependent on their common neighbor

Israel.

The effect of closures from Israel and within the

West Bank and Gaza Strip has been extremely costly in terms

of three major areas: labor, trade and income. On the

whole, according to Sara Roy, "In 1996, closure resulted in

losses that amounted to 3 9.6 percent of Gaza's GNP and 18.2

percent of the West Bank's."90 Especially in the Gaza

Strip, because of its heavy dependence on work in Israel

(nearly 70 percent of its labor force prior to the 1991

Gulf war), the effect of closures has been the worst. The

unemployment rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip has

nearly tripled since 1993, from 11 percent to 28 percent,

with highs of 66 percent during prolonged total closures.

(These rates are among the highest in the world.)

Of those Palestinians who hailed the agreement,

joining in the euphoria created by the U.S., one of the few

90Roy, "De-Development Revisited," 69.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. merits they could point out to its critics was the issue of

trade. The vision for the newly created Palestinian entity

was that of the Middle Eastern Singapore or Hong Kong, with

an export-oriented economy that would generate domestic

growth, and importantly support for the agreements.

According to Roy, however, this vision is highly unlikely

to materialize.

Palestinian trade relations after Oslo are strikingly similar to its trade relations before: Israeli dominance as a trading partner; the preservation of the one-way trade structure that insures unimpeded Israeli access to Palestinian markets while blocking Palestinian access to Israeli markets; an excess of imports over exports; and limited access to international export market.91

All of this is compounded by the deterious effects of

economic closures. The World Bank estimates that the

frequent closures have cost Palestinians at least $2.8

billion between 1993-1996, nearly twice as much as the $1.5

billion in donor aid received in the same period.92

With loss in revenue brought into the West Bank and

Gaza Strip from trade and labor, income levels per person

and household have fallen dramatically since 1993. Real

wage rates, between 1992 and 1994, dropped by 3 8 percent

91Ibid. , 72.

92Ibid. , 72.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and by another 15 percent between 1995 and the end of 1997.

Between the latter period, the number of poor (defined as a

person with an income of less than $650 a year) doubled to

40 percent of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

With that came a rise in child labor rates. By 1996,

approximately 18,500 children, ages twelve to sixteen years

old, were working full-time in order to supplement their

families' incomes.93 In stark contrast to the swelling

ranks of poor is the new class of rich created by the

Palestinian Authority. Those few who belong to the upper-

ranks of the PA command high salaries, imported luxury

cars, cellular phones and many other privileges such as

permits to enter Jerusalem.

A substantial part of the money generated inside the

autonomous areas and received from donors is being spent on

police and four to nine security forces. These forces are

made-up of Palestinians (usually loyalists to Arafat) to

handle the population in four vaguely defined operational

divisions--civil, public security, emergency and

intelligence.94 Numbering over 30,000, the salaries for the

93Ibid. , 76.

94Graham Usher, "The Politics of Internal Security: The PA's New Intelligence Services," Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 2 (Winter 1996): 22.

102

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. police and intelligence forces drain the public coffers of

international donor money that trickle into the autonomous

areas each year, taking resources away from development

projects. Graham Usher explains a major problem arising

from the relationship between the police and national

development as one that perpetuates itself.

Very simply, the PA does not need a 30,000 strong police force to facilitate the economic and social development of the 2.2 million Palestinians under its rule. A police force of this size is needed to keep the lid on a people in the absence of such development.95

Yet, the use of money spent on maintaining the police and

intelligence forces and the fact that their numbers have

swelled beyond the 12,000 originally permitted in the

agreements, "is one of the few unequivocal powers the PA is

granted. " 96

Palestinian police were a welcomed sight over

Israeli soldiers patrolling the streets of the West Bank

and Gaza Strip, especially in handling civil matters and

even in times of confrontation with the Israeli military.

95Ibid., 32. An interesting endnote is contained in that quote: "Raja Sourani noted that with 20,000 security personnel for about 1 million people, Gaza's police to population ratio works out to 1:50, the highest in the world. By way of comparison, the police to population ratio in London is 1:3,200; in Los Angeles, it is 1:2,800."

96Ibid. , 22.

103

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The secret intelligence agents, on the other hand, are

feared for good reason. Namely, they operate outside of

the law and beyond the scope of judicial powers.97 The

intelligence agencies are supposed to cooperate with

Israel, which depends on their internal sources of

information, to track down people who oppose the

negotiations with Israel or are critical of Arafat's

regime. Their actions, in the name of enforcing "security"

(the only published definition given to the role of the

Palestinian Secret Forces, PSF), have been repeatedly

condemned by Palestinian, Israeli and international human

rights organizations since their arrival to the Palestinian

territories in 1993.

Also outside of the detailed scope of the accords,

are cultural, scientific and educational arrangements made

in relation to economic aid agreements and donor countries.

They are the only areas in which the PA is permitted to

conduct a form of foreign policy independent of Israel. As

will be discussed in the following chapter, it is the case

that the once strong and independent non-governmental

organization movement in Palestine that buffered the people

from the brutal occupation, helped launch and sustain a

97Ibid. , 23.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. powerful intifada, have been transformed into a different

kind of NGO. These post-Oslo NGOs have a new, relatively

tame agenda--to monitor and realize points of the

agreement--another extension of Israeli and American

interests and vision of conflict resolution.

105

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. C H A P T E R 3

PALESTINE STUDIES: POLITICS & ACADEMIA

Palestine Studies emerged as an academic and

political response to record and explain the Palestinian

experience--carrying with it several key assumptions,

positions and beliefs, which have been developed largely in

relation to the history of a conflict over and resistance

to Zionist claims to the land and culture of Palestine. As

an inter-disciplinary field of study, it is based on many

forms of political, moral, social and legal reasoning,

which over time has led scholars, activists and

intellectuals to build compelling case for Palestine and

the Palestinians. However credible, an essential element

has been largely missing from Palestine Studies.

Specifically, the availability of only a limited amount of

systematic, meaningful and current aggregate data on the

entire population has had a handicapping effect on efforts

to study more thoroughly and fully the nation of Palestine

and its people.

The problem stems from the fact that the last full

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. census of all Palestinian took place in 1931 during the

days of the British Mandate in Palestine.1 Since their

dispersion in 1948, only surveys, each with their own

sampling frames, biases and objectives provided an uneven

and incomplete database for understanding this complex,

fragmented and mobile people.

This chapter explores the problem of the absence of

census data not only because it effects survey research on

particular segments of the Palestinian population but also

because it is a hardly discussed outcome of the larger

AThe Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS), an agency created by the Palestinian Authority, published a short statement on the "History of Censuses in Palestine," Dissemination, Analysis and Training for Effective Utilization of Census Findings: Population, Housing and Establishment Census (1997) report on-line; available from http://www.pcbs.org/ inside/f_pophos.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 August 2001. This article begins the history with Ottoman registration records then the British Mandate census with its partial updates until 1944 . The PCBS also includes a housing census of the West Bank conducted by Jordan in 1952 and a census conducted in 1967 by the Israeli military shortly after the occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PCBS finally extols "his Excellency, Mr. President Yaser Arafat decree on 5/6/1997 in a historical decision to carry out a census" on Palestinians in areas under his control. As discussed more fully in this chapter, this study considers the 1944 census as the first and last because it attempted to enumerate the entire population of Palestinians. The subsequent counts do not fit this definition of a census of Palestinians because they only counted the population who happened to be physically present in Palestine at a particular point in time.

107

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. problem of statelessness.2 Its absence perpetuates the

relative powerlessness of Palestinians as they struggle to

create a national existence and sovereign order within an

international political system composed of nation-states

(even in this era of globalization). Survey research and

the 1997 census in Palestine has been explicitly undertaken

to strengthen the organizing mechanism and relationship

between state institutions and governing bodies and the

public they are supposed to serve and represent. In this

important way, as well as in several others discussed

throughout this chapter, censuses and surveys are essential

to each other.

Another, no less important challenge facing

Palestine Studies is extensively discussed in this chapter.

New directions that the field moved in post-Oslo are

identified, and the organizations carrying out research

projects in the West Bank and Gaza Strip are explored.

Since there have been no studies, at least to this

researcher's knowledge, devoted to examining change in

Palestine Studies after the signing of the Oslo agreement,

this study offers its own perspective. It identifies two

2The argument in this chapter about a Palestinian census had been first developed in an article I wrote, "Power in

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. new directions in which the field has moved, namely in the

area of regional academic cooperation and in the

introduction of survey research in Palestinian areas

controlled by the Palestinian Authority.

This chapter also presents and analyzes the debate

surrounding the Palestinian NGOs practicing and promoting

these new directions, with a particular emphasis on those

that conduct survey research. Interestingly, the debate

has not been about the soundness of the data, the validity

or quality of work of these NGOs. The discourse has

largely centered on the fact that these new research-

oriented Palestinian NGOs, some of which conduct opinion

polls regularly, have been sustained by foreign funding.3

Numbers: A Call for a Census of the Palestinian People," Arab Studies Quarterly 18 (Summer 1996): 37-52.

3Interestingly, a poll conducted by the Center for Palestine Research and Studies [Poll #47, 24-26 February 2000] asked about donor supported projects:

The results show that most Palestinians believe that the most important donors' support is the one invested in areas of education, health and water (26%, 20%, and 16% respectively). Areas of least importance to Palestinians are those related to women programs, police and security, roads, democracy, and institution building. No significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza have been detected except in the areas of health, viewed as being important by more Gazans (23%) than West Bankers (17%), and sewage, viewed as being important by more Gazans (9%) than West Bankers (3%) .

109

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Further, these organizations that receive such funding are

believed to be under foreign political and cultural

influence inimical to Arabs and Palestinians.

While recognizing both sides of the argument to have

at least some validity, this study attempts to interject

new points into the debate, ones that are intended to

redirect it into more a constructive dialogue between the

government and NGOs, the public and NGOs and among NGOs

themselves. This study departs from the critics 1 main

argument that foreign funding of Palestinian organizations

is the problem. Like proponents in the debate, it assumes

that funding from practically any source that makes it

available is a necessity at this point in Palestinian

historical development. This study does argue, however,

that it is the actual work of NGOs that should be

evaluated, criticized or promoted based upon fairly

rigorous, yet culturally sensitive, academic criteria

developed by the NGOs themselves in an open dialogue with

the population they are supposed to serve.

These results are similar to those obtained in September 2000 and early 1999. The priorities are still the same, focusing on major traditional developmental needs, with less interest in socio-political issues such as those related to women and democracy, which are largely the focus of many of these new, Post-Oslo NGOs.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. To begin to try to disentangle politics from

academia, this study suggests that in the case of survey

research in Palestine, practitioners and critics alike need

to give greater attention to the methodology behind the

results of the polls. The methodology, as outlined in this

and the following chapter of the dissertation, is deeply

embedded in the political scene. What has been also

largely overlooked, this study points out, is that the

process of survey research is also influenced by social,

cultural and economic factors. This chapter presents an

overview of the history of Palestine Studies--with emphasis

placed on attempts to study Palestinians using survey data-

-which might help in developing more appropriate methods

for understanding Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip and perhaps everywhere.

Numbers: Power & Empowerment

For no matter what form of government, a census of

its population helps in guiding policies and practices of

the state's institutions. For example, a census does not

guarantee democratic representation,4 but for sizable

4Many have argued this point. Importantly, see George Gallup and Saul F. Rae, The Pulse of Democracy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1950) .

Ill

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. population, it is a necessary pre-condition. Census data

are used by institutions, which formally link members of

the population to the state. At the risk of over

simplifying this concept in its varied historical forms, it

is in this social, political and economic space where a

population constitutes a citizenry. Counting people could

lead to accountability to people because the whole

population's presence is defined and recognized. The census

is also a characteristic of a strong state but not

necessarily a democratic one. A good example is the

People's Republic of China, which has conducted a

sophisticated census since 1953, shortly after its

communist revolution.5

Carrying on a practice first developed by ’Umar

(634-644),6 the second khalifah (successor) of Prophet

Mohammed, the founder of Islam, the Ottomans especially

during their expansionist phase, used a semi-comprehensive

population registration system (which is not as complete as

5Ashawani Saith, "China's New Population Policies: Rationale and Some Implications," Development & Change 15 (1984) . The State Statistics Bureau of China has conducted a census about every decade since 1953 (1964, 1892, 1990 and 2000) .

6Philip K. Hitti, History of the Arabs: From the Earliest Times to the Present, 10tn ed. (London: MacMillan Education, Ltd. , [1937] 1970) , 169.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a census) for two main reasons: tax collection and

conscription into its military.7 Justin McCarthy, a

population historian, makes an apt observation about a

state's uses of a census, in regard to the Ottomans and

more generally.

Registration of population, as well as of land and taxes, is both a cause and a result of governmental power. The greater the degree of government control, the greater the effectiveness of registration. Conversely, accurate registration increases government power, because it allows the government to know whom it can tax and whom it can conscript.8

As an instrument of extending and consolidating state

control, a census is an effective tool. Worldwide it is a

common state practice, a hallmark of modernity.

Michel Foucault offers further insights into the

dual functions of the census as a mechanism for organizing

state power.9 He maintains that power/knowledge, or the

7For further discussion see also Beshara B. Doumani, "The Political Economy of Population Counts in Ottoman Palestine: Nablus, Circa 1850," International Journal of Middle East Studies 26 (1994): 1-17; Justin McCarthy, The Population of Palestine: Population History and Statistics of the Late Ottoman Period and the Mandate (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988) ; Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (New York: Warner Books, Inc., 1991); and David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East (New York: Avon Books, 198 9) .

8McCarthy, The Population of Palestine, 2

9Michel Faucault, Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews &

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. practice of categorizing, individualizing and disciplining

corporal bodies has become a modern instrument of

domination and liberation. State rule is extended through

abstract forms of personal identity--the civil servant, the

prisoner, the taxpayer--which marks the parameters of

interaction and permits certain modes of behavior within a

wide array of institutional settings. In this image of

modernity, there is a functional relationship between

politics and academia--each serves the other's ends and

helps the other develop into separate yet complementary

institutions of power, authority and control.

Timothy Mitchell and Roger Owen have applied this

image of state/societal relations in defining the creation

of modern Arab states and nations.

Whereas in the premodern period such identities [in the national political field] were multiple and contextual (that is, dependent on the particular situation), the colonial state sought to reconstitute them as fixed and singular categories by means of its control over certain means of enumeration, such as the holding of a census.10

The post-colonial state had to recreate its national

Other Writings, 1972-1977 (New York: Pantheon Books, 1980) .

10Timothy Mitchell and Roger Owen, "Defining the State in the Middle East: A Workshop Report," Middle East Studies Association Bulletin 24 (December 19 90) : 183 emphasis added.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. community upon and against the normalized categories

constructed through colonialism. Groups that were

resistant to the formation of the modern Arab state,

according to Mitchell and Owen, were labeled 'anti-

national1 or 'primordial' and targeted demographically to

be brought in line with state interests.*1

Survey data, when generated from a simple random,

cluster or stratified sample (whereby every member of the

population has a known, but not necessarily equal, chance

of selection into the sample), are more economical and

nearly as reliable as those data obtained through a

census.12 Methodologically this is the case for data that

record subjective dimensions of social life, such as

attitudes, opinions and beliefs or demographic

characteristics of a population.13 Reliability and economy

are the two main features of survey research that have made

11Ibid. , 183 .

12Sampling procedures are discussed by Norman M. Bradburn and Symour Sudman, Polls and Surveys: Understanding What They Tell Us (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1988) .

13The U.S. Census Bureau conducts many large surveys annually, but they usually focus on demographic or behavior characteristics of the population. The Bureau avoids attitudinal and conversational topics (including religion as a demographic variable) in its surveys and census, which is a major concern of many private survey research organizations. Ibid., 76.

115

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. it a common feature of modern life. (In fact, surveys,

with a random sample generated from established census

parameters, have become so reliable that there were even

congressional debates in the U.S. on whether or not a

census would be necessary to get an accurate statistical

profile of Americans in the year 2000 .) 1-1 For a large

population, such as a nation, only a census, which is the

most comprehensive survey, needs to be conducted first and

updated regularly as the population changes. As can be

seen in the Palestinian case, applying one method without

the other weakens the outcome of each.

Attempting Definition

In states that have institutionalized the practice

of social scientific research to understand their

populations, surveys are used to describe and predict

voting behavior, consumption preferences and attitudes

toward nearly any political, economic and social issue.

For Palestinians there are very basic logistical and

methodological obstacles to first enumerate, let alone

14For an outline of the debate see John J. Miller, "Numbers Crunch: Using Sampling in Year 2000 Census Is Mistake," National Review (July 20, 1998) : 20-23.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. survey, a population scattered throughout the world.15

Until about thirty years ago, ail Arab countries lacked an

adequate demographic base or a sufficiently comprehensive

civil registration system.16 This is a problem given that

by 1990s, an estimated 58 percent of all Palestinians were

located in the Arab World, making survey research difficult

to generalize beyond any particular group of Palestinians.

Janet Abu-Lughod produced the most authoritative

demographic work on Palestinians after their Diaspora, but

recognizes these difficulties.17 She compensated for these

apparent limitations by employing advanced statistical

15It should be noted that data on many groups--even as large as women in many developing countries--are unavailable, unreliable or spotty, according to Vidyamali Samarasinghe, "How Do You Count and Whom Do You Ask? Use of Statistical Data in Gender Research in the Global South," paper presented at the Fifth International Interdisciplinary Congress on Women (San Jose, Costa Rica: February 23-27, 1993) .

16United Nations Economic Commission for Western Asia, Statistical Abstract of the Study on the Economic and Social Situation and Potential of the Palestinian People in the Region of West Asia (New York: United Nations, 1983), 2-3. See also Mark A. Tessler, Monte Palmer, Tawfic E. Farah and Barbara Lethem Ibrahim, eds., The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World (Boulder: Westveiw Press, 1987), for an examination of this problem for survey research in Arab countries.

x7Janet Abu-Lughod, "Demographic Characteristics of the Palestinian Population," Palestine Open University Feasibility Study (Paris: UNESCO, June 30, 1980).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. techniques in order to derive working estimates of the

population. Yet, in her words,

It is virtually impossible to determine exactly how many persons of Palestinian birth or ancestry who exist today. Our best estimates, based on some fairly complex demographic studies conducted in 1980 and projected from that point, is that at least 5.2 million people now count their descent from the 1.4 million people who resided in Palestine in 1948, when Israel was established.18

This numerical profile is based on several independent data

sources (starting with the 1931 British Mandate census and

its partial up-dates until 1946) and then factored for a

relatively high, but consistent, birth rate of 3-3.5

percent. In defining the population, however, Abu-Lughod

later admits that her study "ignores" Palestinians who

voluntarily migrated before 1948 because "they are,

strictly speaking, neither refugees nor exiles."19 In other

words, she is concerned with those caught directly in the

conflict rather than those defined in a tradition sense: by

blood-lineage, linguistic heritage or self-definition.

Working within this definition of the target

18Janet Abu-Lughod, "A Rift in Their Souls: Palestinians in Exile," in Palestinians Under Occupation: Prospects for the Future, Peter F. Krogh and Mary C. McDavid, eds. (Washington, D.C.: The Center for Contemporary Arab Studies, Georgetown University, 1989): 3, emphasis added.

l9Janet Abu-Lughod, "Palestinians: At Home and Abroad," Current Sociology 3 6 (Summer 1988): 61 and 69.

118

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. population, Abu-Lughod divides Palestinians into five

sociological categories based on distinctive geographical,

economic and political characteristics. Table 3 summarizes

this useful conceptual scheme with updated 1990/91 figures.

Table 3

Five Types of Palestinians (1990/91 Estimates)

% of Five Types Estimated Numbers P o p . Status Israel Total: 622,016 12 .6 Legal Residents (1S49) Occupied West Eank:a 1,075,531 18 . 6 Refugees (1948), Present- Territories Gaza Strip: 622,061 10 . 8 Absentees (1967), Jordanians Adjacent Jordan: 1,842,179 31.6 Citizens (1948)/Refugees Arab States Lebanon: 271,434 5.7 Non-Citizens/Refugees Syria: 242,474 5 .2 Non-Citizens/Refugees Remaining Gulf: Non-citizens/Guest Arab States Total: 445,195 7 . 7 Workers U.S.,b Canadian and European Abroad Total: 7 . 8 Citizens or (il)legal 450,000 residents Total 5,780,422 100 . 0 aIncludes 125,000 Palestinians in (East) Jerusalem bINS did not recognize Palestinians as a category of Arabs until the late 1980s. Previously, a Palestinian's visa status was based on country of emigration.

Source: "Facts and Figures about Palestinians," Informational Paper 1 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Policy Analysis on Palestine, 1992) : 5.

Abu-Lughod's analytical framework is solid and

comprehensive. The data, however, are problematic because

of unaccounted sociological permutations of the exile

experience. More concretely, there are particular parts of

119

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Palestinian population that could escape being counted.

For instance, Christians, by the end of 1946, comprised

about 10 percent of the total 1.4 million Palestinians

(n=145,063).20 The historical record shows that they were

absorbed more frequently than the Sunni Muslim majority (65

percent) into the British Mandate administrative apparatus.

Christians also had significant presence in the slim

professional class (around 8 percent), mainly concentrated

in urban areas, embedded in a predominately agrarian-

peasant class structure. According to the Cambridge

Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa, an exodus

in 1947 of "middle-class urban Palestinians anxious to

avoid the sporadic fighting," pre-dated the 1948 an-nakba

(the catastrophe) that made nearly one million Palestinians

refugees.21 In Abu-Lughod's study, Christians are located

in each category she examined. Yet, this particular group

of Palestinians, who could be considered early exiles (pre-

1948 Palestinians with no option of return), is excluded

from her target population.

20Figure is based on British Mandate census projection. McCarthy, The Population of Palestine, 65.

21Trevor Mostyn and Albert Hourani, ed., The Cambridge Encyclopedia of the Middle East and North Africa (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 468.

120

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. A second group that could get lost in the count is

assimilated Palestinians in the Diaspora. This is

particularly characteristic of those who immigrated abroad,

to Europe or the U.S. where the pressure to assimilate, to

minimize being Palestinian is high.2"1 This can be said with

some certainty because Arabs, but particularly Palestinian-

Arabs (and after the 1991 Gulf war, Iraqi-Arabs could also

be added), are feared and misrepresented by Western people,

governments and media.23 Often immigrants respond to open

hostility by retreating into ethnic enclaves where their

identity is preserved and affirmed by the group. These

individuals can be accessed through family networks,

mosques, churches, political and social organizations or

residential areas. An alternative strategy is to try to

22For an interesting conceptualization of the assimilation process for Arabs in the United States see Nabeel Abraham, "Arab-American Marginality: Mythos and Praxis," Arab Studies Quarterly 11 (Spring 1989). I tested Abraham's conceptual framework in my undergraduate senior honor's thesis. The findings of my study confirmed his categorization of Arab American identities. Christina Zacharia, "My Extended Family and the World Around Us: Toward an Understanding of Palestinian-American Political Identities," unpublished manuscript (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1991).

23See Edward W. Said and Christopher Hitchens, eds., Blaming the Victims: Spurious Scholarship and the Palestinian Question (New York: Verso, 1988); and Norman G. Finkelstein, Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (New York: Verso, 1995).

121

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. assimilate into the dominant culture and deny or hide their

Palestinian identity. These individuals may not be as

easily accessed.

Enumerating assimilated Palestinians has been

attempted in the U.S., where the largest group resides

outside of the Middle East. The crude method employed in

this task is to estimate the actual number of Palestinian

immigrants (at least 150,000), subtract the number of

individuals who are identified by organizational

affiliations and obtain a remaining sum. With such method,

the working estimate for the number of assimilated

Palestinians living in the U.S. is 30,000-50,000.24 Such a

wide estimate cannot be attributed to the earnest work of

the researcher. Rather, internal and external factors

pressing against Palestinians to assimilate or hide their

presence by registration as a foreign national--not as

Palestinians but by country of emigration (e.g., Jordan,

Israel, Libya)--render these figures unreliable.

Even the results from the 1990 U.S. census have not

resolved the question of how many Palestinians reside in

the country. The Zogby Group, headed by the well-respected

24Elisa H. Tuma, "Palestinians in America, " The Link 14 (July-August 1981): 27.

122

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pollster John Zogby, has compiled estimates of the Arab

American community based on 1990 census results,

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) data and from

on-the-ground observations, interviews of community leaders

in over 100 locations in the U.S.25 In its extensive study,

the Group estimates the Arab American population to be

three times larger than reported in the 1990 census. The

discrepancy between community estimates and census results

can be explained, says the Zogby Group, by the interviewing

techniques used in the census, a reluctance to state their

ethnicity to census takers or language barriers.

A third group of Palestinians, dispersed throughout

the world, is underground political and militant activists.

It is virtually impossible to fully quantify the

demographic characteristics of this group. A main part of

their survival strategy is to remain unknown, hidden,

mobile, elusive. Getting counted would mean getting caught

and suffering severe consequences as "terrorists."

Although their actual number is minuscule, in certain

political discourses they have come to (mis)represent

nearly all Palestinians.

25Arab American Institute, About Arab Americans (no date) report on-line; available from http://www.aaiusa.org

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Making Palestinians, Palestinian

This section tackles the problem of whose interest

does it serves to make and keep Palestinians a politically

defined population. The powerlessness experienced by

Palestinians throughout modern history is real, but does

not have to be reified into a permanent state of existence,

an inevitable, fixed feature of being Palestinian. The

problem is socially constructed and comprehensible through

sociological lenses. Underlying the problem is that their

powerless position acts back on itself, reinforces itself,

making it seem insurmountable. The absence of a state--

with definite borders, rule of law, political direction and

developed institutions--continues to leave the definition

of Palestinians open to political interpretation, one-sided

negotiations and even blatant manipulation. The absence of

a state also closes out possibilities to Palestinians to

counter assertions without interjecting further

politicalization of their national and personal

identification with Palestine.

To avoid the trap of a tautological argument, the

question of how have Palestinians been defined in the

absence of a state is perhaps best framed within specified

/arabamericans/census/census_indexhtm; Internet; accessed

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and dynamic political-economic interests of major actors in

the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. In describing these

relationships this section argues that Palestinians remain

weak because their fragmentation allows for undercounting

or inflating the numerical, economic and political weight

of any particular Palestinian group in exile. This study

also examines the extent to which the problem of mis

representation varies according to temporary or more stable

political-economic conditions of a given country in which

they are located.

To ground this theoretical position, it is necessary

to examine the historical context in which mis

representation of Palestinians is embedded. For example, a

study conducted by Beshara B. Doumani into mid-1800s'

Ottoman population registration records, reveals a gross

undercount of the actual population of Nablus, a major

economic center in northern interior Palestine.26 Doumani

probes into the frequently cited figure of 8,000-9,000

people of Nablus and finds that the population has to be no

less than 20,000 persons (in 1849). The explanation he

on 10 August 2 001.

26Doumani, "The Political Economy of Population Counts in Palestine."

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. offers for this glaring discrepancy between the estimates

is that local authorities at the time had vested political

and economic interests to undercount productive males and

completely exclude women, children and the elderly from the

annual survey. In his words,

The very act of counting constituted an infringement on the notables' control over the local population: it reaffirmed Ottoman authority during an aggressive period of centralization, and provided the government with valuable knowledge that could be used to manipulate the local population directly.2'

The significance of his finding is twofold. One, it calls

into question the validity of these and other Ottoman data

and the policies and theoretical propositions derived from

them. Further, it raises the issue of the social

construction of knowledge. That is, the importance of

defining the historical, social, political and economic

context in which knowledge--even that which is assumed to

be as objective as a statistic--is created and

disseminated. Moreover, Doumani carefully ties this piece

of evidence to current demographic studies on Palestinians,

pointing out that they, too, are "politically sensitive."28

Over the course of over fifty years in exile and

2'Ibid. , 5 .

28Ibid. , 3.

126

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. statelessness, Palestinians have accumulated many personal2

and collective experiences of being manipulated by state

policies and practices, far too many to recount here. In

Arab countries, there is a wide division between the

political discourse that supports the principles of

Palestinian rights and the actual treatment of them within

these states' borders. This is the case in Jordan, to

where nearly 30 percent of all Palestinians fled after 1948

and 1967. It is estimated that Palestinians comprise about

50 percent of Jordan's total population. (The Jordanian

government claims only 3 5 percent while Palestinians put

the estimate to be as high as 60-70 percent.) Such

ambiguity is actually unnecessary and could be resolved by

the findings of the first census conducted in Jordan in

1995. To date, however, the data have not been made

available to the public.

Laurie A. Brand argues that in Jordan this

"demographic problem" is tied to the larger process of

nation-state building and constructing a hybrid-Jordanian

national identity that encompasses Jordanians and

290ne source to find personal accounts of the Palestinian experience in exile is in Salma Khadra Jayyusi, ed., Anthology of Modern Palestinian Literature (New York: University of Columbia Press, 1992).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians. She identifies four main features of this

hybrid nationality: (1) loyalty to the monarchy, (2)

commitment to Arabism, (3) combined with commitment to

Palestine, and finally, (4) unity of the two people.30 So

far, however, such a complex identity remains largely

rhetorical and symbolic, often invoked in the service of

unpopular political and economic policies. It has been

fully embraced by neither Palestinians nor Jordanians,

leading to persistent communal tensions and occasionally

outright conflict.

Brand further states that this vision of unity

(which implies lack of discrimination and equality) has

been only partly institutionalized in the state

administrative apparatus. According to Brand, it is the

case that:

Bureaucratic procedures like obtaining a passport, a driver's license, a university fellowship, or registration a new business required Palestinian interaction with an increasingly Transjordanian bureaucracy. Leading to Palestinian complaints of powerlessness in a system in which tribal ties enable Transjordanians to cut red tape.31

The attempt to integrate Palestinians and Transjordanians,

30Laurie A. Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians: A Crisis of Identity," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 4 (Summer 1995): 46-61.

31Ibid., 50-51.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. is being tested as Jordan enters into a period of political

and economic liberalization, coupled with a shifting

regional order ushered in by the 1991 Gulf war and the Oslo

agreements. As Brand points out, all in Jordan now and in

the future have to "rethink who they are and who they will

be in relation to each other."32 Instead of confronting

this identity crisis with open and informed debate,

however, the regime attempted to suppress opposing voices

in the national political arena and media.33 Reliable

public opinion surveys are rare and virtually impossible to

generalize (with much confidence) in the absence of census

frames. This leaves most people in Jordan--but especially

the relatively disadvantaged Palestinians--without formal

channels to effect constructive change or express their

interests, which in turn weakens the entire effort to

j2Brand, "Palestinians and Jordanians," 53.

3jIn May 1997 the government of Jordan introduced amendments to the liberal 1993 Press & Publications law. The amendments--which were ruled technically unconstitutional by a high court decision--suspended the publication of nearly all weekly newspapers and raised the fines for journalists if they criticize the government on a wide range of topics. Although weekly newspapers resumed publication in January 1998, the confrontation between the press and the government has left the media in Jordan in professional disarray. Many speculate that these moves by the late King Hussein's Royal Court were taken to stunt debate and criticism especially in regard to Jordan's negotiations with Israel.

129

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. create a viable Jordanian, Palestinian or hybrid national

identity.

In Palestine, Studies

Even in scholarship that understands the complexity of

the Palestinian case, institutional and political factors

inhibit and promote certain types of research. Salim

Tamari focuses on the West Bank and Gaza Strip where weak

professional associations, an inability to attend or

convene regular conferences, burdens of heavy teaching

loads and frequent closures of schools create an

environment that is inconducive to long-term studies or

cross-fertilization of ideas.34 He argues that the

isolation of local academics promotes a tendency to treat

the Palestinian case as unique. Consequently, "Palestinian

exceptionalism" draws the field of study into unwarranted

specificity and ungeneralizability of its scholarship.

Once enclosed, intellectually and logistically, social

scientists must rely on data generated locally. This is a

serious problem because Israeli military law restricted

access to official records and archives, including raw data

34Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine." Tessler, et a l ., in Survey Research in the Arab World, point out that these constraints are present to various degrees in all Arab countries, thereby limiting the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. compiled since 1968 by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics

(ICBS). These restrictions, according to Tamari, "make it

almost impossible to find population frames for the

purposes of sampling and stratification using conventional

methods . " j5

The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS),

created under the Palestinian Authority, tried to compile

an accurate demographic profile of "resident" Palestinians

in the West Bank and Gaza Strip using some available data

from the Israel Central Bureau of Census (ICBS) before

attempting its own survey in 1997.j6 The PCBS underscored

the point that ICBS data include only Palestinians who are

physically present in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The

ICBC had excluded an estimated 250,000 who live abroad but

have legal rights to return to the occupied territories.

The PBS's preliminary report notes that the ICBS's

estimates may undercount the target population by as much

ability to conduct and publish meaningful survey research.

j5Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine," 75.

36Palestine Central Bureau of Statistics, Demography of the Palestinian Population in the West Bank and Gaza Strip: Current Status Report Series no. 1 (Ramallah: December 1994) .

131

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. as 6-10 percent, for two main reasons.37 One, the 1967

census, upon which projections are based, was conducted

using poor area maps and under severe duress (i.e., the

first month of occupation and under military curfew). Two,

data on birth rates are probably incomplete, which calls

the entire baseline for projections into question because

error accumulates over time.38

In fact, the first census conducted by the PBS

reveals a gross discrepancy between their findings and

Israeli population projections. In that gap there is a

minimum difference of almost a half-million Palestinians,

or nearly 21 percent more than the Israeli counts. Table 4

summarizes the findings, which includes crude figures and

post-census correction of 2.4 percent.

Obstacles to conducting surveys in Palestine go

beyond the lack of reliable sampling frames and area maps.

Reluctant respondents who tend to be suspicious about

openly divulging information or expressing opinions

compound them.

37Ibid. , 24.

38Ibid. , 39.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 4

Comparison of the 1997 Palestinian Bureau of Statistics (PBS) Census Data and Israeli Estimates

1997 PBS Census Data Undercount crude Adjusted Israeli estimates figures figures percent figure West Bank 1,596,442 1,634,757 1,242,400 -28 . 5 -354,042 E. Jerusalem 210,209 210,209 187,600 -12 . 1 -22,609 Gaza Strip 1,000,175 1,024,179 892,500 -12 .1 -107,675 Total 2,306,826 2,869,145 2,322,500 -20 . 9 -484,326

Source: Youssef Courbage, "Reshuffling the Demographic Cards in Israel/Palestine, " Journal of Palestine Studies XXVIII, no. 4 (Summer 1999) : 23.

Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer note these difficulties

for their 1986 survey of West Bank and Gaza Strip

Palestinians under Israeli occupation.

The occupation authorities essentially ban field research and surveys on political topics [as well as most others, according to Tamari]. If we had applied for and received a permit--a slim possibility at best- -we would have been suspected by the local population of collaboration, and the refusal rate would have been much higher [than the eventual 15 percent]. We decided not to request a permit, and thus our field staff was subject to imprisonment and the materials were subject to confiscation.39

The relative success of their research endeavor was rare.

(In fact, after the findings were published in a local

newspaper, Shadid was taken for questioning by the military

39Mohammed Shadid and Rick Seltzer, "Political Attitudes of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip," The Middle East Journal 42, no. 1 (Winter 1988) : 16-32.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. three times, his work permit was revoked and he was

prohibited from teaching at an-Najah National University in

Nablus.) To circumvent such problems, Tamari suggests that

an appropriate research design combines "a few selected

cases using intensive interviews, systematic observation

and critical use of existing secondary aggregate data."40

Valuable and insightful research, in other words, is built

upon familiarity with and acceptance by the people who are

being studied.

Concern for methodology within the practice of

social scientific research in Palestine is relatively new

and has been very limited. Only recently have scholarly

projects devoted much attention to the process behind their

conclusions. One of the three main reasons for this is

because relatively few studies of Palestinians have been

based on extensive primary research. Most used secondary

sources culled from the larger literature on Palestinians

and news articles. Original research relied on primarily

on documents, covering the legal, political, social,

economic and cultural aspects of Palestinian life. The

40Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine," 78. For a researcher who uses these techniques with success to study Palestinians in refugee camps in Lebanon see Rosemary Sayigh, Palestinians: From Peasants to Revolutionaries (London: Zed, 197 9); and Too Many Enemies:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. methods employed in these studies basically consisted of

citing proper sources and building an original argument

base on a collection of already created observations.

The second reason for the lack of concern for

methodology in Palestine Studies is the problem of access

to the population. As previously discussed, the absence of

sampling frames obtained by census data greatly hindered

the ability of researchers to generalize beyond their

sample. It would have been too costly and even illegal

under occupation to undertake a study on a sample large

enough to overcome these problems.

Third, the concern for methodology in Palestine

Studies has been subsumed by critiques of studies outside

of its own inter-disciplinary field. Although not the

first to open the subject,41 Edward W. Said's powerful book,

Orientalism,42 which appeared in late 1978, set in motion a

new direction for Arab and Palestine Studies. This

discursive shift occurred on two fronts. The first was

The Palestinian Experience in Lebanon (London: Zed, 1994) .

41Bryan S. Turner, Marxism and the End of Orientalism (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1978) actually put forth many of the same arguments before Said's book, but did not receive the same attention or notoriety.

42Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978) .

135

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ontological, based on a critique of the ways in which Arabs

have been (mis)represented by Europeans as part of the

larger system of colonialism and imperialism. He used

European texts as a representation of the colonialism

project,43 and found that Arabs have been understood by the

West through a narrow and tautological set of assumptions.

Namely, that it is possible to distill Arab culture into

stagnant categories because it is essentially uniform and

unchanging. Based on this assumption, Europeans could

ideologically justify dominating the colonial relationship

politically and economically. Orientalist scholars, who

were thought to be experts in the field because they

usually could speak some Arabic or might have traveled to

the region, provided the "scientific" evidence that Arabs

could never move outside their own constraints, to progress

or to represent themselves with clarity and credibility.

Once Said exposed such politically motivated

assumptions in classical texts, a whole group of

intellectuals emerged to establish a new tradition in the

field of Arab Studies. These scholars intellectually

430ne of the few hard-hitting, yet respectful, critical examinations of Said's own assumptions is from Aijaz Ahmad, In Theory: Classes, Nations, Literature (New York: Verso, 1992) .

136

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. ransacked, not only past literary and cultural

representations of Arabs but also prevailing theories that

form the basis of international relations in the era of

post-colonialism, with the U.S. as the world hegemone.44

Deconstuctionism, the eclectic procedure used by

Said to critique Orientalist discourse, was adopted by

these new scholars.45 In the post-modern movement, methods

became another way of saying 'the process that gives

legitimacy/authority to power. 146 After all, Said laid out

the methodological foundations of his critique as an

"analysis of the Orientalist text...[that] places emphasis

44A few examples are Timothy Mitchell, Colonising Egypt (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988); Talal Asad, ed . , The Colonial Encounter (London: Ithica Press, 1973); Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993); and Yahya Sadowski, "The New Orientalism and the Democracy Debate," Middle East Report 23, no. 4 (July-August 1993) : 14-21.

45For an informative article focusing on the changes in Arab Studies, as an area study connected to U.S. foreign policy concerns, see Lisa Hajjar and Steve Niva, "(Re)Made in the USA: Middle East Studies in the Global Era," Middle East Report 27, no. 4 (October-December 1997) : 2-9. Another study that offers different perspectives on changes in Arab studies is from Mark Tessler, ed., Area Studies and Social Sciences: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999).

46This position is explored by Steven Seidman in "The End of Sociological Theory: The Postmodern Hope," which was the lead article presenting various aspects of postmodern

137

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. on the evidence, which is by no means invisible."47 In

other words, it really did not matter how old assumptions

were shattered or how new representation were created;

methodology became secondary to ontology in the larger

effort to discredit false images of Arabs.

Said, and especially Turner, also made a radical

departure from the Marxist tradition of political-economy,

which developed the method of historical materialism to

uncover contradictions in the capitalist mode of

production. Used by both activists and scholars to present

and explain the question of Palestine, the long-standing

tradition of the left came under attack in post-modern

critiques of Orientalist discourse.48 Marxist thought did,

however, continue to inform political opposition in

Palestine. There, as in scholarly works, the interest was

in the mobilization of groups (i.e., classes) in relation

to the land (and other essential resources such as water

thought in the American Sociological Association Journal, Sociological Thought 9, no. 2 (Fall 1991) : 131-144.

47Said, Orientalism, 12.

48Ahmad says, "Said's break with political tradition was sweeping indeed. Marx himself was dismissed in the book [Orientalism] as yet another Orientalist, Marxism was swept aside as an unsavory child of 1historicism, '" in In Theory, 178 .

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and oil), labor and capital--particularly in regard to

unions, women's organizations and political parties.49

Largely absent from both the post-modern and Marxist

analyses of the question of Palestine were the thoughts and

opinions of Palestinians. Once again the problem of access

to the many populations of Palestinians scattered in exile

and under Israeli occupation did play an important role in

why more voices were not included in Palestine Studies.

Yet, their absence was rarely confronted or even mentioned,

even in the few studies that do use interviews or

participant-observation to understand Palestinians. What

emerges as the dominant trend in Palestine Studies is an

abstract view of the people, with a heavy emphasis in

recording the movement of the powerful (Europeans,

Americans, Israelis and Arab leaders) and the reactions of

masses trying to mobilize against total domination.

Palestine Studies After Oslo

The signing of the Oslo agreement in 1993 and the

creation and arrival of the PA has radically redefined the

priorities and concerns on the ground in Palestine and by

4SMany sources are referenced in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, which can be characterized as a political- economy of the Palestinians under occupation.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. extension Palestine Studies. Palestinian, as well as

other, intellectuals and scholars split into two camps.

The opponents, led by Said, blasted the accord, describing

it as "a betrayal of our history and our people."50 Critics

consequently directed their energies and research toward

exposing its shortcomings and dangers. The few supporters

within Palestine Studies were led by Ahmad Khalidi, who

defended the agreement by saying "Oslo's importance lies

less in the details of the agreement and the pace of its

implementation than in the fact that it happened at all."51

The political debate continues to this day and is unlikely

to end any time soon, especially since the eruption of Al

Aqsa Intifada in September 2000 has underlined the

fundamental flaws of the agreements reached.

In the shadow of the political debate lurks another,

but no less important, one. It centers, albeit indirectly,

on the changing nature of Palestine Studies in the post-

Oslo era. To date there has been no independent study, to

this researcher's knowledge, whose specific aim is to

50Edward W. Said, The Politics of Dispossession: The Struggle for Palestinian Self-Determination, 1969-1994 (New York: Pantheon, 1994), xxxii.

51Ahmad S. Khalidi, "The Palestinians: Current Dilemmas, Future Challenges," Journal of Palestine Studies XXIV, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 6.

140

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. pinpoint or identify this change, much less develop a

framework in which to assess or measure its impact.

It can be argued, though, that Palestine Studies has

moved into essentially two new directions.

One can be found in the sphere of collaborative

projects initiated recently among Palestinian and Israeli

scholars and institutions. Paul Scham, an Israeli scholar,

cites 195 Palestinian- and Arab-Israeli research projects

undertaken since 1993 . Scham contends that these

collaborations are the "lesser known chapter" in Arab-

Israeli relations, but "can be considered proof of the

[Oslo] peace process' success."52 For Israeli scholars, he

says, the endeavor has been viewed as a chance to further

leftist political beliefs, while Arabs, on the other hand,

are more interested in the instrumental benefits (i.e.,

exposure to new methodologies and use/transfer of

technology) of cooperation. Scham estimates that between

$15-30 million dollars per year have been distributed to

several research areas, with about 25 percent going to the

social science field, 18 percent to medicine, 18 percent to

52Paul Scham, "Arab-Israeli Research Cooperation, 1995- 1999," Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal 4, no. 3 (September 2000) journal on-line; available from http://www.biu.acit/SOC/besa/meria/j ournal/20 00/issue3/jv4n 3al.html; Internet; accessed 9 August 2001.

141

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. agriculture, 15 percent to water, 7 percent to education

and around 3 percent to other areas such as physics and

technology. Project funders, Scham1s survey found, have

been mainly European, with some projects funded by the U.S.

and Canada, Israel and international organizations. The

Palestinian side had been largely mute over this new sphere

of cooperation.53

Regional collaboration on projects has been

conducted along lines drawn by the multilateral track of

the 1991 Madrid peace conference. That conference called

for cooperation among Arab and Israeli parties on such

issues as refugees, water, environment and arms control.

Of particular interest in this area is Jordanian-

Palestinian studies aimed at defining future relations

between them. Ever since the Reagan Plan was announced in

1982, there have been attempts to draw a framework for the

relationship, one that would fall short of establishing an

53Barbara Demick examines the rise of "Israeli Arabists," who work "closely with their government and expected that the Oslo accords would open the doors to studying the Arab world, but have now had to shelve their research projects since the Al-Asqa intifada put a freeze on Palestinian- Israeli relationships. Even Tel Aviv University plans to launch an applied program in Middle East studies have been postponed. "Open Minds Study Closed Arab World: For forbidden Israeli scholars, their neighbors are an inviting subject," The Philadelphia Inquirer (Tuesday, July 17, 2001): Al.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. independent Palestinian state to satisfy Israeli conditions

for achieving a peaceful settlement. Soon after and as a

result of the Reagan proposal, which called for a

Jordanian-Palestinian federation, Jordanian and Palestinian

officials initiated and discussed work on future ties, but

serious academic studies on the issue surfaced only after

the Oslo accords. The Center for Palestine Research and

Studies (CPRS) collaborated with the University of Jordan's

Center for Strategic Studies to examine the Jordanian-

Palestinian relationship.54 The study was followed by

public opinion polls, conducted jointly by the two centers,

which tackled the same issues. Adnan Abu-Odeh, a former

senior Jordanian official of Palestinian origin, also

studied the relationship and wrote a book that was

published by the U.S. Institute for Peace.55

The other new direction Palestine Studies moved in is

the core subject of this dissertation: adding public

54Mustafa Hamarneh, Rosemary Hollis and Khalil Shikaki, Jordanian-Palestinian Relations: Where To? Four Scenarios for the Future (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, in association with the Center for Strategic Studies, Amman, and the Center for Palestine Research and Studies, Nablus, 1997).

55Adnan Obu-Odeh, Jordanians, Palestinians and the Hashemite Kingdom in the Middle East Peace Process (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace, 1999).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. opinion polling as an instrument of building knowledge

about the Palestinians people.

The conditions that gave rise to this new mode of

inquiry, the methodology used in conducting three surveys

by the CPRS in 1997 and their findings are analyzed in an

attempt to reach conclusions over its validity and

usefulness. At stake here is not only finding an answer to

whether and what Palestine Studies stands to gain or lose

from the new addition but also answering the question of

whether and how Palestinian society stands to benefit or

otherwise suffer from it. In order to draw conclusions

regarding these issues (which are presented in Chapter 6)

based on a comprehensive study of the methodology currently

used in conducting Palestinian polls (Chapter 4) , it is

only appropriate to outline here the debate over the role

of NGOs carrying out research work in Palestine.

Understanding the main components of this debate, at

the center of which lies the issue of foreign funding, is

crucial to the effort of defining the evolving nature of

Palestine Studies and consequently strengthening social and

scientific research about Palestinians.

To begin with, there is a body of opinion shared by

a group of Palestinians who view with deep suspicion

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. projects aimed at monitoring the Palestinians' reactions

and assessing their priorities in the wake of Oslo. Such

intellectuals and activists justify their suspicions by the

fact that these projects are funded mainly by American and

European organizations whose agendas are defined by the

need to recognize and normalize relations with Israel and

by their attempts to remodel other countries' systems of

government around theirs.

Some call the adoption by Palestinians of U.S.-

inspired models of development (which try to foster 'good

governance' and demand short-term planning, measurable

outcomes, and activities centered on training and

research), especially by former Palestinian leftists, a

"discourse of defeat." As Rema Hammami says,

While mobilisation was formerly the keyword, in the new discourses it was displaced by the more amorphous notion of empowerment. Moreover, empowerment was generally linked to bringing about social change through development --as opposed to political transformation through mass resistance.56

In other words, critics contend that accepting such

conditions as those advanced by the U.S. have made the once

56Rema Hammami, "NGOs: the professionalization of politics," Race & Class 37 (1995): 57. Her analysis of Palestinian NGOs has been applied and used in an article co-authored with Salim Tamari, "The Second Uprising: End or New Beginning," Journal of Palestine Studies XXX, no. 2 (Winter 2001) : 5-25.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. vital grassroots organizations shift their concerns from

radical change through mass-mobilization to the more

vaguely defined goal of "empowerment through democracy."57

Hammami also points out that the introduction of

this agenda has dramatically changed the relationship

between former leftist leaders and the wider community.

Constituencies became defined as 'target groups' while grassroots leaders became specialists armed with new forms of knowledge and techniques.... Changing methods came in line with changing goals and a narrowed focus.... What this means is that, little by little, NGOs became distanced from the wider community of which they were once an organic part.58

For Hammami, Palestinian NGOs are in a precarious position

since Oslo. Their alignment with donor agencies, foreign

governments and even Israeli groups have alienated them

from the people, who harbor deep suspicions toward this

form of outside influence in their society. So instead of

popularizing NGO programs to gain greater acceptance, they

have become narrower in scope and purpose, further

alienating the wider population.

Reaching similar conclusions, Adam Hanieh notes that

there has been a "definitive transformation of NGOs from

57Ibid 52.

S8Ibid, 57.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. mobilizers to service providers."55 He links this change to

attempts by Western governments to strengthen "'peace and

coexistence 1--i.e ., normalizing relations between Israel

and the Arab states,"60 thus forcing the once widespread and

highly effective NGO-system in Palestine to wither away

after Oslo. Hanieh argues,

The contradiction has sharpened in recent years as some smaller NGOs that have attempted to retain a grassroots and activist approach, struggle to survive, while a few favoured NGOs receive huge amounts of funding.61

He finds evidence for this position in the fact that

although foreign funding of NGOs in the region is not new,

since 1993 the amount of assistance has increased

dramatically, but sustaining fewer organizations. The ones

that flourished, he adds, have taken the NGO-movement in a

new direction, where "Palestinians are treated as passive

'constituencies 1 rather than active participants in the

struggle."02 He traces this change back to its source by

55Adam Hanieh, "Palestine and Israel after the Election," Links, no. 13 (September-December 1999) journal on-line; available from http://wwxv.dsp.org.au/links/back/issuel3/ 13hanieh.htm; Internet; accessed 9 August 2001.

60Ibid.

61Ibid.

62Ibid.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. following the money trail of millions of dollars given by

mainly U.S. and European funders to the Palestinian NGOs,

which are "clearly not going to be given [money] for

projects that are considered anti-Oslo."63

As both Hammami1s and Hanieh's arguments

demonstrate, the political-economy of NGOs in Palestine and

throughout the Arab World has been the subject of intense

debate that has centered largely on the issue of foreign

funding. Critics cannot be characterized as belonging to a

single political bloc. Rather, attacks come from the

right, left and center of the political spectrum. They do,

however, share the concern that organizations and the

individuals involved in them who seek and accept foreign

funding for projects have compromised their integrity and

ability to act in the best interests of their people.

(Some go as far as calling them sharmuta, which means

whores, one of the worst insults in Arabic or their

organizations dakakiin, which translates in this context to

mean 'shops,' where ideas and intellectuals are for sale.)64

Governments use the negative sentiments to enact laws

against NGOs accepting foreign funding (in spite of the

63Ibid.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fact that most Arab governments receive huge amounts money

in the form of donor assistance and loans), and then use

the law to target vocal organizations or intellectuals.

The debate over foreign funding is captured in a

study by Julia Pitner. In Palestine, she says, "the amount

of money available to NGOs from foreign funding sources has

increased exponentially since Oslo," but "the requirements

of receiving grants have also increased, since most funding

now comes with specific policy conditions attached."65

These conditions present more than just an administrative

problem for individual NGOs, they are altering the basic

function and structure of the whole NGO system. According

to Pitner, the old NGO network is being transformed or

replaced by a new set of organizations, which are largely

shaped in relation to priorities set forth by foreign

funding sources: "established NGOs that have refused to

alter their mandate or program methodology suffer from

diminished funding while new NGOs continue to mushroom."°6

64For a further critical examination of this trend see Salim Tamari, "Tourists with Agendas," Middle East Report 25, no. 5 (September/October 1995).

65Julia Pitner, "NGOs1 Dilemmas," Middle East Report 30, no. 214 (Spring 2 0 00): 36.

66Ibid. , 36.

14 9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Contrary to Hanieh and Pitner, Denis Sullivan argues

that there has actually been a decrease in funding to NGOs

in Palestine after Oslo. He attributes the decrease to two

reasons. One, is that after the 1991 Gulf war, traditional

supporters of Palestinian NGOs, the biggest being Saudi

Arabia, substantially reduced funding to not only NGOs in

Palestine, but also the PLO for their pro-Iraq stance.

Two, funding to NGOs took a further decline in 1994, as

international donors redirected funds to support the newly

created Palestinian Authority. Sullivan summarizes the

financial situation that NGOs face:

Since the signing of the Oslo Agreement in September 1993, assistance to NGOs has fallen from $170-240 million at it peak in the early 1990s to barely $100- 120 million since the peace agreement. The overwhelming majority of this is international assistance.6'

Hammami cites similar figures, but she reaches different

conclusions about the impact of the decline.68 What

67Denis J. Sullivan, "NGOs in Palestine: Agents of Development and Foundation of Civil Society," Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Spring 1996): 96.

68Interestingly, exact figures on the amount of foreign funding that Palestinian NGOs have received and for what projects since 1993 are not known. Khalil Shikaki estimates that to produce a single opinion poll cost the CPRS about $20,000 U.S. dollars. Jamil Rabah concurs with this figure (personal e-mail correspondences facilitated by Daoud Kuttab).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. concerns Sullivan most is not that foreign funding of

Palestinian NGOs is changing the basic character of these

organizations and their relationship to the wider

population. He is mostly interested in the issue of donor

money creating tension between the well-established NGO

network and the newly established PA that is seeking to

assert its control over the nation and state in Palestine.

Sullivan seems to side with the PA in the battle

over funding priorities. But he also believes that the

NGOs are essential to the whole state-building effort,

especially in the short term because the PA "remains unable

(in the short term) to replace them. 1,65 Furthermore, he

argues that "NGOs will continue to uphold a majority of

relief and developmental work for the foreseeable future

and thus are in need of donors' support."70 Sullivan,

therefore, can be characterized as a proponent in the

debate over foreign funding of NGOs in Palestine, so long

as that the money is properly.

Of the most powerful arguments made in defense of

the Palestinian NGOs comes from the organizations' leaders.

Miftah, a Jerusalem-based NGO headed by long-time political

69Sullivan, "NGOs in Palestine," 96 70Ibid. , 96.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. figure Hanan Asharwi,'1 takes the position that the debate

over foreign funding in Palestine is actually part of a

larger power struggle for control and authority of people

and resources after Oslo. Importantly, Miftah argues

further that the battle over foreign funding detracts from

more fundamental issues that Palestinians face.

From questioning their loyalty as recipients of foreign funding, to selectivity and bias in reporting to suit their 'patrons,' to inflated salaries, to lack of accountability and corruption, to undue 'interference' in politics—the 'accusations' are endless.... The NGO's and political factions have responded, also publicly, demanding proof and rejecting these charges as being unfounded and politically motivated.... Whatever the reasons, it is clear that such a domestic "battle" is in not in the national interest, and can only serve to widen the rift between the PNA and civil society or even the public at large.... In its inability to meet external challenges and problems, the PNA is turning inwards and conducting a campaign with self-destructive consequences.72

Regarding the debate over foreign funding, Miftah tries to

assuage the fears and counter the accusations of PA

officials that it is the Palestinian NGOs that have

71The list members of Miftah's board of trustees reads like a who's who of Palestine Studies, and includes Khalil Shikaki and Ghassan Khatib, director of the Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre (JMCC). The organization's work can be viewed http://www.miftah.org. 72Miftah, "The Self-defeating Battle: Civil Society and the Palestinian Authority" (June 21, 1999) paper on-line; available from http://www.miftah.org/keylssues/english/ Jun27.html; Internet; accessed 9 August 2 0 01.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. weakened the national cause by pulling resources and funds

from the newly created government.

No one has accused the PNA of being foreign agents for receiving foreign funding, and the NGO's have actually succeeded in attracting increased and more diverse funding from, additional sources. They are not "taking away" funding slated for the Authority.73

These claims regarding how much money is going to where in

Palestine are difficult to substantiate, as no one seems to

know exactly the sizes, the sources or the expenditures of

the budgets of either the PA or NGOs. The leaders of

Miftah do, however, call for greater accountability of

funds in both private and public sectors and for regular

accounting standards to be applied without discrimination.

By trying to move the debate away from the hot issue

of foreign funding, Miftah hopes to spotlight a greater

concern to NGOs. Miftah argues against the blanket

condemnation of all NGOs, for whatever reason, as being

politically motivated.

The NGO's have repeatedly invited the Minister of Justice to present his case in specific terms and not to resort to generalizations and across-the-board unsubstantiated accusations. If these attacks actually prove to be in response to the NGO's reports on mismanagement and lack of accountability in the PNA or of persistent human rights violations, then the

73 Ibid.

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Especially divisive, Miftah points out, is when the rule of

law is used to target particular individuals and

organizations in order to intimidate and quiet voice of

criticism, opposition and dissent to the PA's presence,

policies or negotiations with Israel.

Laws and Regulations: Restricted Freedom

Upon the establishment of the PA, Palestinian NGOs

wasted no time in trying to carve an independent space in

public life. These efforts were in large part spearheaded

by an umbrella group, the PNGO (Palestine NGO Network)

composed of over sixty organizations. For its part, at

least initially, the PA had little interest in NGO

activity, assuming that its leaders would be PLO loyalists

or that PA institutions could simply replace the well-

established grassroots organizations in Palestine.

By August 1994, however, the Ministry of Justice

issued a statement that all NGOs should register with the

PA and staff members provide personal information about

themselves to intelligence agents. This move ignited

public debate and a general boycott of the registration,

74Ibid.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. led by the PNGO, in the absence of a legal framework. NGO

leaders and the PNGO lobbied the Palestinian Legislative

Council (PLC, elected in 1995) to write a law governing

NGOs that would favor organizations, giving them autonomy

and protection from the PA.

The PLC drafted a favorable NGO law and submitted to

the executive in 1998 for ratification. In an attempt to

target human rights organizations, which began to turn

their watchful eyes on the PA for its practices, Arafat

refused to sign the NGO draft law proposed by the PLC. The

PA bypassed the legislative process and engineered its own

vote on August 12, 1988. The Law of Charitable

Associations and Community Organizations (NGO law) that was

finally passed requires all non-profit, charitable and non

governmental organizations to register with the ministry of

Justice, submit annual financial and narrative reports to

the government and provide the ministry with a detailed

description of their members and activities. Furthermore,

the law specifies how, where and for what purpose funds can

be raised. Chapter 7, Article 33 states:

Associations or Organizations may collect contributions from the public or by organizing parties, charity bazaars and sports competitions, or other means or collecting funds for the social

155

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. purposed for which it was established, and to inform the competent Ministry. '5

Rather than securing autonomy and protection from the PA,

the current NGO law gives the government the ability to

oversee and control NGO activity.

The PA fortified the restrictive NGO law with the

1995 Press & Publication law, which absolutely limits the

ability of organizations to publicize their work. Subject

to the law are individuals (journalists, editors and

sellers of information) and organizations that produce and

disseminate information of any kind, including press

offices, news agencies, printing houses, libraries,

publishing houses, distribution houses, advertisement

agencies, study and research houses, public opinion and

research houses and translation houses. Each of these

operations must obtain license from the PA (as defined in

Article 18) and register capital (no less than 25,000

Jordanian dinars, or about US$42,500 for a daily newspaper,

as stipulated in Article 21). Responsible officers are

required to submit certain professional credentials and be

of Palestinian origin (Articles 11, 13, 14 and 16). (Non-

75Unless otherwise noted, all references to the "NGO law" and the 1995 Press and Publication law come from translations provided by Law Society, an Palestine-based NGO; available on-line from http://www.lawsociety.org/

156

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians have to seek special permission and have

worked with the PLO.)

On the face of it, the 1995 Press & Publication Law

promises to uphold the freedom of expression in all forms,

as set forth in Article 2, which states:

Press and Printing are free. Furthermore, the freedom of opinion should be entitled every Palestinian individual who attains the absolute right to express his opinion in a free manner either verbally, in writing, photography or drawing as different means of expression and information.76

Yet, the following articles amend the basic premise of

freedom of expression by making illegal a set of broad and

vague topics to enter into public discourse. Article 37

lays out the following eight topics that are "strictly

prohibited" to be printed, published or distributed:

1. Any secret information about police and security forces, its armament or locations or movements or military drills.

2. Articles and materials harmful to religious and doctrines guaranteed by law.

3. Articles which may cause harm to national unity or incite for committing crimes or planting seeds of hatred, dissension, and disunity, or instigate hostilities and sectarianism among the members of society.

LawsT/Index.html; Internet; accessed 9 August 2 001.

76Ibid.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. 4. The Minutes of secret sessions of the Palestinian National Council and the Council of Ministers of Palestinian National Authority (PNA).

5. The articles and the news which aim at shaking belief in the national currency.

6. Articles and news which may infringe on the individual 1s dignity or personal convictions and liberties and harmful to personal reputation.

7. News, reports, letters, editorials, and pictures inconsistent with morals.

8. Drugs or medical products or cigarette advertisements and the otherlinks [sic] unless advertisement has been permitted in advance by the Ministry of Health.'7

Acting through the Ministry of Information, the PA uses

these restrictive provisions within what is supposed to be

a liberal law to stifle public opposition to the PA,

negotiations with Israel and Arafat.

Human and press rights groups, local and

international, have monitored attacks on the freedom of

express since the creation of the PA. The 1999 World Press

Freedom Review gives an overview of the situation, one that

has been confirmed by many other reputable sources.

The Palestinian Authority frequently curtails freedom of the press although they profess to tolerate varying political views and criticism. Press freedom in the PA-controlled areas is subject to a restrictive 1995 press law. Moreover, the security services clampdown on the press by shutting down media outlets, banning

7' Ibid.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. publication or broadcast of material, and periodically- harassing or detaining media members.78

The extent of the problem cannot be measured only in terms

of number of arrests of journalists, editors and human

rights activists, closures of newspapers and television

stations or bans on books. '9 The threat of punishment for

publicizing information or opinions that could be

considered offensive creates an environment where "self

censorship is widely practiced. 1,80

Survey Research: Practitioners' Views

Practitioners of opinion polling in Palestine who

work in research centers are subject to both the 1995 Press

Sc Publications law and that governing NGOs. Yet, Jamil

78The 1999 World Press Freedom Review, "Palestinian Authority," report on-line; available from http://www.free media.at/wpfr/palestin.htm#1999WorldPressFreedcmReview; Internet; accessed 9 August 2001.

79 Indeed, Amnesty International reports that "More than 350 people were arrested during 1999 for political reasons [by the PA]. At least 90 were prisoners of conscience, including critics of the Palestinian leadership, journalists and members of a legal opposition Islamist party." Amnesty International, Annual Report 2000, "Palestinian Authority," report on-line; available http://www.web.amnesty.org/web/ar2 OOOweb.nef/countriesl7dae 741e569ofed5802568f20 0552 959?OpenDocument; accessed on 10 August 2001.

80The 1999 World Press Freedom Review, "Palestinian Authority."

159

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Rabah, former head of the polling unit at the JMCC, claims

that in his experience with opinion polling there have been

no legislative restrictions or interference in his work.81

Rather, he characterizes it in positive term, "a healthy

practice vital to democracy and nation-building"02 because

it strengthens the organizing mechanisms and relationship

between state institutions, governing bodies and the public

they are supposed to serve and represent. He also believes

that survey research is part of a grassroots movement, led

by Palestinian NGOs, "as a way to enhance political

participation and civil society, and a means to assist

policy makers to use scientific data as the base for

planning. " 33

Ghassan Khatib, director of JMCC, describes opinion

polls and the analytical studies that follow from them as

"a worthy contribution in empowering the trust of the

people in themselves [sic] as well as reinforcing

accountability within the discourse of democratization of

81Statement from Rabah was obtained through personal e-mail correspondences facilitated by Daoud Kuttab.

82Jamil Rahab, "Polling Empowers People," The Jemstone Network Newsletter (1996/1997): 15.

83Ibid. , 14.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Palestinian society."84 He does, however, enter one

important caveat (albeit indirectly) in the way polls

should be used to understand Palestinians in the West Bank

and Gaza Strip. He states that polling data are useful,

"particularly when these polls were consolidated and

analyzed in a historical context taking into consideration

the time period since the start of the political process

and the following four years."85

Khalil Shikaki86 is as confident as Rabah in the

potential political implications and the methods of survey

research in Palestine. A prolific writer, he has, in many

articles, expressed a more critical view of the post-Oslo

period, especially in regard to anti-democratic practices

of the PA.

Shikaki examines the post-Oslo period by identifying

three central and interconnected issues facing

84Ghassan Khatib, "Introduction," in Gil Friedman, Analysis of Palestinian Public Opinion on Politics: Popular Trust In Palestinian Islamist Factions (Jerusalem: Jerusalem Media and Communications Centre, September 2 0 00) : 1.

85Ibid.

86Shikaki was director the Survey Research Unit of the CPRS and a key figure at the Center generally at the time of the field research for this study, has since left the CPRS to start another research-oriented NGO in Ramallah, dedicated to polling and survey research, called Palestinian Centre for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Palestinians: One, continuing negotiations with Israel;

two, state-building efforts within the framework of the

negotiations, which he realizes that Palestinians are at a

great disadvantage relative to Israelis, but nevertheless

stands in support of the process; and three, the

possibility of a transition to democratic rule in Palestine

after twenty-seven years under occupation and within the

structural constraints imposed by the negotiations.

Shikaki further argues that of the three processes

currently underway in Palestine, "the peace process has

been most effective."8' As evidence for this observation he

cites the findings of the CPRS1s opinion polls, which

showed a steady increase in support for it coupled with a

decline in support for armed attacks against Israeli

targets. Also according to the polling data, public

attitudes toward the transition to democratic rule have

been supportive but, put against other outstanding issues

87Khalil Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," Journal of Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Winter 1996) : 5. See also his "Countdown to Confrontation, " The Jerusalem Report (April 16, 1998): 56, for a critical assessment of Palestinian negotiations with Israel.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. related to the national reconstruction efforts in Palestine

such as the economy, are not as important to Palestinians.88

Shikaki supplements his thesis with a strong

critique of the PA for conducting its administration

undemocratically in regard to the press, NGOs and the rule

of law especially as it is practiced in PA military courts

against opponents of the negotiations with Israel or

Arafat's regime. In his words, "the PA adopted

undemocratic policies aimed at 'protecting' the peace

process and the process of national reconstruction."89

Although Shikaki is critical of the PA, his analysis

does not extend to the possible methodological problems in

collecting reliable survey data, particularly data on

political attitudes, under these political circumstances.

Without such a concern, he leaves open a major

contradiction in his framework for analyzing Palestinian

opinions toward negotiations with Israel using primarily

survey data. On the one hand he cites CPRS findings that

"show consistent support for the ongoing Palestinian

negotiations" as evidence for their popularity, which

varies to some degree by education level and support for

88Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," 14.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. specific agreements.90 On the other hand, he recognizes

that on the ground and in the media Palestinians have real

reasons to fear openly stating opposition to the process,

to the PA and to Arafat.

In his published analysis, Shikaki fails to make the

connection between the potential intersection between

politics and methods. In other words, the question of

whether the findings of high support of the peace process

could be related to the possibility that Palestinians

surveyed could be afraid of openly stating opposition or

that their support is genuine has been left unresolved.

This outstanding problem weakens not just his thesis about

high support for the peace process, but perhaps also the

problem of fear and self-censorship prevalent throughout

the media and Palestinian society tainted the survey data

set.

89Ibid., 10.

90Ibid., 6.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 4

SURVEY RESULTS AND THE PROCESS BEHIND THEM

Entering the Field

The first exposure I had to survey research in

Palestine was in 1994, when I came across the results of

one of the first public opinion polls conducted by the

Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS). The poll

had been distributed by a long-established and highly

reputable Washington D.C. think tank, The Center for Policy

Analysis on Palestine (CPAP). At the time, I happened to

be taking an upper-division graduate methods course, with

an emphasis on quantitative research, which required a

major term paper. I thought the CPRS survey data could

easily become the subject of this paper.

As I began to prepare the data for analysis,

however, I encountered many problems in the statistics

circulated in the U.S. Among them, the CPRS did not report

the sample size, clearly state the methodology, mention the

margin of error for the entire survey (let alone individual

questions) or provide the demographic breakdown of the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. respondents. After fruitless attempts to tease-out these

important numbers from the survey itself, I had to turn to

their source. I made many attempts to obtain a copy of the

original survey or the raw data by contacting the CPRS by

phone, fax and mail. But got no response. It took over a

month, but I finally received a copy of the data set stored

on a computer disk through the Center for Policy Analysis

on Palestine.

During the process of trying to obtain the data, I

wondered why a research organization that is evidently

attempting to build its credibility in its scholarly

community would distribute its work in such an unscholarly

manner. Reporting sample size and demographic distribution

along with the results of a survey is a standard practice

required in the social sciences. (It is even common to see

these numbers and a statement of methodology of surveys

published in newspapers for non-academics.) What was even

more remarkable to me at the time was that this survey had

passed through the hands of many prominent intellectuals

without concern, discussion or controversy. My research

problem, henceforth, had expanded beyond an analysis of the

data or the results of the survey to the process behind

their creation and dissemination.

166

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. I pursued this interest by contacting another

Washington, D.C.-based organization that commissioned the

polls conducted by the CPRS, the International Republican

Institute (IRI), which in turn is funded by the U.S.

Congress and overseen by a board composed of Republican

party members. Its mission is to promote democracy

throughout the world by supporting (both financially and

technically) non-governmental organizations. While he was

in Washington, D.C., giving a talk at the IRI, I was able

to briefly meet Dr. Khalil Shikaki, then director of the

polling unit at the CPRS. I expressed my interest in his

work and briefly discussed the possibility of being based

at the CPRS while I conduct research in Palestine for this

dissertation. He agreed to my proposal on the condition

that I provide my own source of funding, although he did

generously offer housing provided by the CPRS in Nablus.

Within less than one year I received a dissertation

fellowship from American University of Washington, D.C.

Quickly I began to correspond with Dr. Shikaki over the

logistics and mission of my stay at the CPRS a few months

later. I arrived in Palestine in May 1996. Having

traveled extensively throughout Palestine in 1986, lived

Ramallah for nearly one year in 1991, and focused my

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. graduate studies in the period between, I thought that I

would be well prepared to begin work on a fairly ambitious,

post-modernist thesis proposed as "representations of

Palestinians." However hard I tried to stay focused on the

subject of how Palestinians represent themselves and how

they are represented on local, regional and international

levels, I became more directly involved in the Center's

activities, especially in the creation and dissemination of

the public opinion polls.

I found that studying the polls, both their results

and process behind them, illuminated important changes

underway in Palestine. One important change I noticed

immediately was the professionalization of political

activism, as discussed by Rema Hammami.1 In informal

interviews, the staff at the CPRS seemed to be well aware

of the retreat into academic, policy-oriented research as

being far removed from the mass-based mobilization efforts

that had been prevalent in Palestine during the 1987

intifada and before. Although several staff members raised

these concerns, they also believed that since the Oslo

accords were announced and signed, and after the arrival of

‘Rema Hammami, "NGOs: the professionalization of politics," Race Sc Class 37 (1995): 52-63.

168

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the Palestinian Authority (PA), the role of grassroots

organizations has diminished in relation to the large

administration of the Authority. These observations both

confirmed and challenged my understanding of the importance

of grassroots organization in Palestine during the Israeli

occupation because they acted as a counter-weight to

Israel's illegitimate and destructive rule.

The recognition of the changing role of Palestinian

organizations and their relationship with the people and

the new government also pointed to the need to reassess the

current situation on the ground, from its own terms. The

CPRS was one of the largest and most prolific organizations

in Palestine, leading the way in a discourse and

methodology new to Palestine Studies and Palestinian

politics.2 For these reasons, the CPRS and its surveys

offered an interesting point of perspective to critically

examine the political, economic, social and historical

currents at work, after Oslo and the creation of the

Palestinian Authority.

2In 1999 there was major breakdown of the CPRS, especially in the area of opinion polling. The details I have been able to get about the reasons behind Shikaki and many others leaving the CPRS have been cloudy, but all seem to point to internal disagreements about finances. Shikaki started a new research-oriented NGO in Ramallah called the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR).

169

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Problems with Using and Understanding Survey Data

The recent adoption of survey research in Palestine

Studies has introduced a new way of knowing Palestinians

living on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The application of

this methodology, however, brings forth the old problem of

generalizability of the findings beyond the sample to the

target population, which usually originates in the survey

research process itself. As students of social science

research are instructed

The issue of generalizability pertains not just to units of analysis but to all features of research, including the time of the study, the research setting and the operational definitions.... This is particularly true of survey studies, in which sampling of units is such an integral part of the research design.3

In other words, the ability to generalize the sample

depends upon who is asked, what is asked, and how it is

asked, as well as when it is asked. These crucial

questions are all related, not only the accuracy

(reliability) but also the meaningfulness (reliability plus

validity) of the results of a survey on any topic or

population.

As had been discussed in the previous chapter,

3Royce Singleton, Jr., Bruce C. Straits, Margaret M. Straits and Ronald J. McAllister, Approaches to Social Research (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 162.

170

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. critics of survey research in Palestine, such as Salim

Tamari, believe that the most appropriate methodology for

understanding particular populations such as Palestinians

should be based on in-depth knowledge of and familiarity

with the people. It is only after and in the process of

gaining trust and insight into the concerns of the people,

Tamari suggests, that statistical studies can begin to

describe, explain and even predict attitudes and opinions

of the population.

Through the participant-observer approach, this

study attempted to gain the kind of familiarity and insight

into the population surveyed by the CPRS. Although the

field experience was limited,4 it began to open a window

4I believe that my observations of the administration of the CPRS surveys were invaluable to understanding the larger problems facing Palestinians for this study. The field experience, however, was limited to just one survey cycle, which lasted three consecutive days, providing 50 observations of interviews. I had intended to participate in a total of three survey cycles, but fieldworkers thought that my presence would pose a dangerous threat to the study, to them and to me during the September 1996 clashes in which a survey was conducted. Again, in December 1996, I was persuaded not to go in the field in the aftermath of the clashes. These observations are also limited by fact that I accompanied only two teams of fieldworkers, which could mean that my observations were skewed for lack of comparisons. Although the findings were highly consistent, for these reasons I do not believe that I can generalize the results beyond an exploratory level of analysis. Stemming from the limitations inherent in the exploratory method,

171

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. onto possible shortcomings of the data that has not been

discussed in any other study of the survey research process

in Palestine. These problems, I argue, weaken the

reliability and validity of the results and ultimately the

ability to generalize the data beyond the sample to the

population. The origin of these problems are inherent in

both the technical application of the necessary sampling

procedures in the absence of census parameters and in wider

cultural, political and social problems that manifest in

the administration of the surveys. In both cases, this

study uses the experience of collecting data from the

field, to offer insight into the presence, extent and

perhaps effect of the technical and cultural barriers to

beginning to understand Palestinians of the West Bank and

Gaza Strip based on survey research methods and results.

The Way We Word

The structure of CPRS surveys fits into the top-down

approach toward political activity ushered in by the Oslo

accord and the establishment of the PA. Like the Oslo

accords and the Declaration of Principles that followed

(DoP), which were entered into without public debate or

this study does not present a quantitative analysis of the observations in relation to the results of the surveys.

172

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. scrutiny, so too surveys are constructed with pre-

established categories that limit the opportunity for

opposition and narrow the range of opinions expressed. In

this post-Oslo period, as reflected in survey designs,

Palestinian politics become divided into two: those that

support the agreements and continued negotiations with

Israel and those who oppose them. In both instances,

Palestinians are ordered into over simplistic categories,

segmented and disembodied--the supporters from their past

and the opponents from their future. Such a divide has

stifled and frozen possible dialogue. The lines have been

drawn, and the discourse has been predefined. Attempts to

cross the lines, to point out the fallacies and

contradictions in this superficial dichotomy, fall to the

side because the dominant model cannot contain such

opposition. Alternative perspectives are placed into

perhaps a third category--the Other, the Aberrant or the

Radical--which is swiftly discounted in rational

calculation by the power players, given the game as it is

designed. There are no rewards or punishments for these

voices; instead they are silenced, neglected and

marginali zed.5

5Noam Chomsky makes a similar obsenrntion:

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The growing societal problem of polemical politics,

as reflected in CPRS polls, became apparent as I

accompanied CPRS field workers when they administered

surveys in Palestinian cities, towns, villages and refugee

camps. In my experience, in no less than seven out of ten

instances (especially in the case of women) the

fieldworkers interrupted a respondent in order to cut-short

a lengthy response and interpret an answer to fit into the

few response categories presented in the questionnaire.

Ambiguous answers to survey questions commonly repeated by

respondents, such as 'in-sha-allah', which roughly

translates to mean 'God willing,1 or 'hopefully,' were

invariably recorded as a 1 Yes, 1 even though they could be

also understood as 'Don’t Know' or 'Not Sure.'

As an observer of the survey process in the field I

was struck by the constant prodding of responses for two

reasons. First, because one of the few controls in the

administration of a survey of a structured questionnaire is

The projected arrangements represent 'the triumph of realism over fanaticism and political courage over political cowardice. 'Realists' understand that in this world, you follow U.S. orders. Those who are not convinced of the justice of traditional U.S.-Israeli rejectionism are not only wrong, but are 'fanatics and 'cowards,' thus excluded from respectable society.

174

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. consistency, or "standardized [interviews] for all

respondents," so that the findings can be assumed to be

reliable.5 The second reason is because the CPRS claims

that it "does not adopt political positions and does not

tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached" in

its polls. Moreover, the CPRS explicitly undertakes

polling research in order to "give members of the community

an opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to

influence decision-makers on issues of concern to them."7 I

found, however, that the integrity of these goals had been

compromised by the both the survey design and the interview

process, creating biases in the results that cannot be

detected in the analysis of the aggregate data.

In "The Israel-Arafat Agreement: A just and lasting peace, or rejectionism," Z Magazine (October 1993) : 23.

5Royce Singleton, Jr., et al., Approaches to Social Research, 235. According to them, prodding the respondent and the like during the administration of a survey would be appropriate in a partially structured interview setting. Unlike a highly structured interview format, a partially structured one "would have specific objectives, but the interviewer would be permitted some freedom in meeting them" (236). This approach is useful in exploratory studies, as it "assists the researcher in formulating or refining hypotheses, clarifying objectives and specifying subtopics for subsequent partially structured interviews" (236) .

7These statements are made by the CPRS in each of the published results of their opinion polls.

175

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. These errors are not only readily undetectable, but

they also create a systemic bias that does not cancel out.

Moreover, the errors compound and cannot be controlled

statistically. In the analysis of the polls, I tried to

re-capture the hidden views in the responses by testing

relationships between attitudinal variables to try to find

consistency and inconsistency in viewpoints. Importantly,

I tried to explain away the high level of response for

support for the peace process by asking the data 'under

what conditions does a respondent support or oppose the

peace process with Israel?1 What I found is that the level

of expressed support for the peace process diminishes as

responses are examined against concrete issues surrounding

the peace process such as the status of Jerusalem,

amendment of the National Charter and Israeli settlements.

Surveys conducted by the CPRS in the past lend

further evidence to the finding that Palestinian support

for continuing negotiations with Israel is conditional on

an array of political factors. Leila Dabdoub analyzed some

of the earliest surveys conducted by the CPRS and reached

similar conclusions. The difference between her study and

this one is that she worked with surveys based on

questionnaires that attached conditions onto the question

176

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. about continuing negotiations. With the results from that

survey design available, Dabdoub was able to report that

In the poll conducted in December 1994, 38.7% of respondents expressed their support for continuing negotiations with Israel, compared with 31.5% who advocated suspending the negotiation until Israel complies with the terms of the agreements signed with the Palestinians. A further 20.6% supported halting the negotiations permanently.8

By tying attitudes toward continuing negotiations to other

outstanding points of the negotiation process, expectations

for the outcome of the process to be favorable to

Palestinians and demographic variables, I found in the

analyses of three polls (see Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and

Appendix 3 for reproductions of the original published

survey results and analyses), yields a clearer

understanding of Palestinian opinions than examining each

variable separately.

Truth or Dare

Political affiliation, a key variable in the

analyses of the findings, may appear to be consistent in

the results of the surveys through time. But there were

many instances in the field when respondents' stated

political affiliation contradicted their answers to other

questions and even their own physical surroundings.

8Leila Dabdoub, "Palestinian Public Opinion Polls on the Peace Process," Palestine-Israel Journal II, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 61 emphasis added.

177

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For example, the fieldworkers and I (invariably

introduced as an * aj nabeyeh,' which means foreign woman)

entered a household displaying many signs of opposition. A

large red banner, in Arabic, used by the PLFP and a picture

of George Habash, its leader, adorned the living room

walls, along side a photo of Sadam Hussein, leader of Iraq.

I also noticed a wooden plaque of all of Palestine in this

collection. The male fieldworker asked the woman

respondent what is her political affiliation, she paused

and answered, 'fatah.' We all smiled at this apparent

contradiction, but she insisted that 'Arafat is president.'

Fatah was recorded and the interview proceeded with many

interjections of 'in-sha-allah' and explanations.

An obvious interpretation of this encounter is that

the respondent feared expressing her opinions and instead

offered the safest answers to what she probably viewed as

challenging, even dangerous, questions. The effect of the

fear to state opinions on the results of the survey,

especially if this problem is widespread, is equally as

obvious. These non-sampling errors pose a major problem in

the data set because the error is not easily detected in a

statistical analysis.

Well aware of the possible effects of the 1 fear

factor’ on the survey results, the CPRS included a set of

two questions in its June 28-30, 1996 poll (#23) that was

intended to measure the extent of the problem:

178

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Question 18. Regarding the answers to the questions of this poll, I believe that

a. Most people are afraid to give truthful answers b. Some people are afraid to give truthful ansv/ers 44 . 5 c. Most people give truthful answers 26 . 5 d. No opinion 7 . 8

Question 19. As far as I am concerned, I gave truthful answers to

a. All of the questions 81.3% b. Most of the questions 12.7 c. Some of the questions 4.7 d. None of the questions 0.2 e. No opinion 1.1

Although the number of response categories between the

questions are incongruous (i.e., Question 18 asked about

most, some and most people whereas Question 19 asked about

all, most, some and none of the questions), making coding

and analysis uneasy, the results point to problems in the

reliability of the survey. Assuming that respondents are

truthful on these questions, then 81.3 percent of the data

could be considered as a genuine reflection of people' s

opinions on the questions that were asked. On the other

hand, only 21.2 percent of the people surveyed believed

that fellow respondents would give truthful answers on all

of the questions, suggesting underlying cynicism toward

both the survey process and the results. In a way, this

set of questions only raises more questions about how to

179

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. gauge and test respondents' honesty on surveys.9

Also in Poll #23 the questionnaire design could have

raised the importance of the fear factor in several key

attitudinal variables (see Appendix 1). Question 8 asked

respondents to evaluate "the treatment of citizens by the

Palestinian police and security services." A majority of

the respondents (81.1 percent) said it was good (44.3

percent) and fair (36.8 percent). Only 14.4 percent

believed it was bad and 4.5 percent had no opinion. The

next question asked respondents to classify themselves in

"the camp of the supporters of the peace process," or "the

camp of the opposition to the peace process," or a neutral

"I do not support or oppose the peace process." Once again

the majority (69.9 percent) said they were in the "peace

camp."

After two fairly benign questions, the survey asks

(question 12) turns to another sensitive issue by asking

respondents "In your opinion, can people criticize the

Palestinian Authority without fear." The response were

almost evenly divided, 43.9 percent said 'yes' and 49.1

percent answered 'no'. The following question again ties

9In private conversation, one senior researcher at the CPRS, who helped develop the questionnaires, described these particular questions as "silly" because their internal logic negates itself. That is, it cannot be assumed that a dishonest respondent would answer truthfully about being truthful.

180

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. the idea of fear to the peace process, by asking "Regarding

the current peace process between the Palestinian and

Israeli sides, I...." In that poll 81.1 percent of the

respondents said that they "support its continuation" and

12.5 percent said that they "support ending it." Question

14 proceeded to ask "which of the following political

trends do you support" and a list of political parties and

factions, with the option of none of the above and other,

provided for the respondent to chose. The questionnaire

design is different, and arguably better, for Poll #24 and

Poll #25 because it did not couple politically sensitive or

possibly threatening questions. (See Appendix 2 and

Appendix 3.)

I argue that the problem with the survey design

generally is that Palestinians living on the West Bank and

Gaza Strip, in the long and menacing shadow of Israeli

domination and under direct control of the repressive

Palestinian Authority, have real reason to fear reprisal

for expressing criticism and opposition openly. Even in

studies conducted under far less threatening or normal

circumstances "it has been shown that people are less

willing to admit holding undesirable positions and

attitudes when they are aware of being tested."10 After

all, subjects participating in a scientific study are also

10Royce Singleton, Jr., et al., Approaches to Social Research, 112.

181

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. importantly participating in a social occasion, and "other

stimuli related to the social aspects of the occasion may

have unintended effects, which account for subjects'

responses as much or more than the intended experimental

manipulation. 1111 Respondents are known to practice "self

censorship" and modify their behaviors in order to "help"

or even "sabotage" the research.12

People's sensitivity to the process of observation

is termed 'reactive measurement effect,' and introduces

'systematic measurement error' into the results. Such

errors produce biased results, which "because of their

constancy do not adversely affect reliability," but rather

the validity of the measurements.13 It is possible to test

and improve the reliability of survey data by checking for

consistency between variables within the same or other

surveys. It is also possible to indirectly assess the

validity of results by evaluating the operational concepts

behind the measurements. Although neither type of

assessment is totally precise, they are essential steps in

the survey research process.14

13-Ibid. , 185-186 .

12For a thorough discussion of this aspect of social scientific research see ibid., 185-190.

13Ibid. , 113 .

“ Various tests for reliability and validity of data are presented in ibid., 144-121.

182

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Women: Seen, Not Heard

The fieldworkers' treatment of women respondents

created another major bias originating in the polling

process. Fieldworkers, generally impatient with lengthy

and ambiguous responses from men, usually tried to coax a

structured answer; women's responses were handled very

differently.

The CPRS sends fieldworkers into areas in male and

female teams: "More than fifty percent of our fieldworkers

are female, so as to ensure the representation of women in

the sample."15 Even though the CPRS attempted to formally

control the potential bias by making men numerically equal

to women, in my observations, it is the male fieldworker

who dominates the interview process. A page from my field

notebook provides an example.

West Bank Village near Nablus Enter a house under construction Woman respondent/woman interviewer

Interviewer reads questions too fast; needs explanations and interpretation, not just by interviewers but also by some family members. Respondent is constantly saying 'ma-barafish' (I don't know). Direct intervention—the male fieldworker takes over the interview. Now we hear 'in-sha-allah' about final status issues.

15Again, this statement and technique is used in all CPRS surveys.

183

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Political affiliation—she insists that she does not know; with more pressing she says 'halas fatah' (Finish, Fatah). Again pressing for responses on television viewing, she insists 'no' and 'none.' Again she is pressed until she says 'halas Amman.'

After interview, respondent rises to make and bring coffee.

The scene was very common. (In only one instances out of

fifty, did the male fieldworker ask the female fieldworker

to conduct the survey for him.) To distill the observation

to its basic components, when a woman respondent does not

answer within the structured interview format, the male

fieldworker intervenes quickly, often supplying an answer

for her. In the case where the woman fieldworker is

interviewing, and the respondent, male or female but more

often a woman, and does not answer according to cue, the

male fieldworker takes over the interview process entirely.

These acts are not symbolic. Rather, they become an

integral part of the whole survey process and reflect the

rooted cultural beliefs about men in relation to women in

Palestinian culture. One woman's comments show how these

beliefs translate into an attitude far deeper than

attitudinal variables measured in the survey. After being

asked to participate, she stated "Why? I am a woman with

children." In another instance, the young son of a female

184

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. respondent asked the male fieldworker, "Why ask this stupid

woman? Why not ask a man?" I observed a few interviews

where a woman's responses were given and accepted without

problem by the fieldworkers and family members, but much

more often they were not.

The gender bias in the survey process that I

witnessed probably manifests itself in the results and

created a kind of error that cannot be fully detected or

controlled in a statistical analysis of the data. Assuming

that the way women respondents were treated during the

interview process was not limited to my field experience,

then it can be said that women as a demographic variable in

the survey results does not yield valid results. In other

words, even though the consistency of the results (i.e.,

women tended to be less critical and more optimistic than

men on most of the issues) suggest the data are reliable,

they may not have reflected the true opinions and attitudes

of the sampled population.

Sample Selection

Another problem within the survey process is that

the CPRS could obtain only very poor area maps in order to

select household units and then persons of the population

into the sample. To circumvent this problem, the CPRS used

185

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. a multistage cluster sampling technique, which involves the

random selection of clusters of the population (e.g.,

towns, villages, camps or residential areas), then further

selection of units within the clusters and so on.

The benefit of cluster sampling is that it reduces

the cost of data collection compared to the more precise

stratified or simple random sample techniques for two

reasons. One, it cuts down on travel to isolated and

dispersed localities since interviews are concentrated in

smaller geographical areas. And, two, there is only a need

to obtain lists of all the units in the clusters randomly

selected to be sampled.

The following statement describes the four-staged

sampling procedure used by the CPRS. It is from the

published "Results of Public Opinion Poll #24, September

26-October 17, 1996," with seme specifics, but is used as a

template in each of the three full analyses (see Appendixes

1, 2 and 3):

Sample Selection The sample in this poll was obtained using a multi-stage sampling technique. There are four stages in the process of randomly selecting units of the population into the sample.

1) selecting population locations with probabilities proportional to size of sample (PPS); 2) selecting one or two random blocs from each

186

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. location; 3) selecting a household using systematic random s amp1ing; and 4) selecting a person 18-years or older from the household.

We used 120 population locations in this poll, from which 1,23 3 respondents were selected into the sample. At the first stage of sampling, CPRS fieldworkers and researchers create maps of the localities for the population centers randomly selected into the sample. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas. They are further divided into a number of sampling units (blocs), with each bloc comprising an average of 100 housing units. Households are selected based on a systematic sampling procedure. For example, if the fieldworkers estimate the number of houses in the sampling unit to be 100 and were assigned 10 interviews, the fieldworkers divide 100 by 10, obtaining 10. The fieldworkers then conduct the first interview in the 10th household, the second in the 20th and so forth. Fieldworkers start their sample selection of households from a well-recognized landmark such as a post office, mosque or business. They are instructed to report the direction of their sampling routes, and play an active role in drawing maps of each locality as well as estimating the number of housing units in each blo c .

Although the CPRS states in the methodology section of its

published results that the first stage of the selection

process is creating maps of the localities randomly

selected into the sample, in my experience in the field, no

maps were available to or created by the fieldworkers.

Tfye actual process entailed asking the taxi or bus

driver who took us into the area where he thinks the center

of the town or village is located. Once at that 'center,'

187

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. different ways were used to select the blocs in which to

survey. Basically, within less than a few minutes the

fieldworkers decided on a direction to start the sampling

walk by a flip of a coin or a whim. (In one instance I was

asked to point the directions.) In my experience, no maps

were drawn of the locations or routes that we sampled. I

asked the fieldworkers as we entered one village 'Do you

know the village's size or total population?' The reply

was 'I don't know. We will ask.' I questioned further,

'Who will you ask, an official?' Again, the reply signaled

a lack of concern and even preparation in this stage of the

survey process, 'anybody,' he said. (After this

discussion, the male fieldworker asked the first respondent

at the end of the interview how many people lived in his

village. The matter was pursued no further.)

These potential errors, compounded and integrated

throughout the results, raise important questions about the

validity and reliability of the surveys. The survey design

and wording, fear to state an opposing political

affiliation, the treatment of women and poor mapping limit

the ability of researchers to generalize the data beyond

each sample surveyed. Although the CPRS presents the

process and outcome of its survey research as

188

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. "scientifically" as possible, I found the experience to be

much like making sausage: it is a messy process, but the

results appear clean and ready for consumption.

In the Appendixes of this dissertation are analyses

of these polling data, written while I was a paid research

fellow at the CPRS. (Since I left the CPRS in February

1997, the Center stopped producing full analyses of the

data and instead distributes descriptive and much less

detailed press releases with very little discussion of

relationships between attitudinal variables.) In the work

that I produced for the CPRS, these methodological issues

are not discussed. Rather, the data were presented as if

measurable error could be determined, which allows for

discussion of significance of differences within and

between variables.

In the full analyses, however, I did try to use the

experience of collecting the data from the field to examine

the problems of reliability and validity of the survey

results by pointing out relationships that could go

unnoticed in descriptive summaries of the results alone.

Importantly, I tried to show that the high level of support

for the peace process, as found in previous polls and taken

for granted as a statistical fact, could be partly

189

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. explained away by examining this attitude in relation to

other salient variables, such as satisfaction with the

Palestinian government and its institutions, expectations

surrounding progress in the negotiation and demographic

characteristics of the population surveyed.

After recognizing some of the methodological

problems in CPRS polls, the results are still interesting

and helpful in understanding the opinions of Palestinians

as they into a major and dramatic phase of their historical

development. Perhaps with better sampling frames obtained

through census parameters and detailed maps as well as a

greater sensitivity to cultural and political influence

within the interview, the process of survey research in

Palestine will gain higher levels of validity and

reliability. The following chapter further examines some

of the statistical relationships found in the surveys, as

well as reflects further on the reports' problems as they

were published and distributed by the CPRS.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. CHAPTER 5

REPORTING THE SURVEY RESULTS

This chapter presents a statistical analysis of the

relationships between a key attitudinal variable and three

demographic variables from three surveys conducted by the

Center for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS).

Specifically, it discusses the outcome of tests for

significance (chi-square with Pvalue < 0.05) for the

relationships between Palestinian support or opposition fo

the peace process with Israel (the dependent variable) and

the independent variables of Region (West Bank or Gaza

Strip), Gender (Male or Female) and Education level (0-6

years, primary; 7-12 years, secondary; more than 12 years,

tertiary).

Although the CPRS asked many questions in each of

its surveys to measure opinions toward the negotiations

with Israel, domestic and regional concerns as well as

policy related issues, the question which most directly

asks respondents to state their opinion toward the "peace

process" with Israel, in three consecutive opinion

191

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. polls, is used in this analysis for two reasons. One, as

discussed previously, the findings for this single question

had been a main interest, the headline, of entire opinion

polls in the regional and international media, as well as

the academic publications such as those produced by Khalil

Shikaki. Two, this question, which is supposed to measure

attitudes toward the "peace process," has yielded

consistently high levels of support, despite the political

conditions surrounding the surveys. As discussed earlier,

it is a surprising finding that it warrants further

investigation.

Testing the significance of the relationship between

support or opposition toward the "peace process" and three

demographic variables selected from an array of variables,

allows for a statistical exploration of the observations

made in the field. Finding significant differences between

males and females, West Bankers and Gazans, as well as

education levels in regard to support or opposition to

continuing negotiations would encourage further

investigation into the non-sampling errors that were

observed in the field. In other words, assuming that the

non-sampling errors and sampling errors discussed in the

previous chapter--i.e ., questionnaire design and question

192

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. wording, fear factor, treatment of women respondents and

poor sampling techniques used to select individuals into

the sample--have not totally corrupted the data set, it is

arguably worth the effort to see if these problems might

have manifested in the statistics produced by the survey.

The full reports on the data (Poll #23 [June 28-30,

1996], Appendix 2: Poll #24 [September 26-October 17, 1996]

and Appendix 3: Poll #25 [December 26-28, 1996] ) , which I

wrote while employed as a research fellow at the CPRS, are

placed in the appendices 1, 2 and 3 of this dissertation.

The results of the tests of significance contradict one of

the statements made in the original reports I wrote, which

had been published by the CPRS under the organization's

name. Following the presentation of the significance test

results, the chapter notes additional corrections to errors

and explanations to gaps found in the original reports.

The final section of this chapter offers a critical

reflection of the assumptions underlying the written

reports.

Tests of Significance

A question intended to measure, track and record

Palestinian attitudes toward negotiations with Israel had

been asked consistently by the CPRS in three consecutive

193

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. surveys analyzed for this dissertation. Although the

placement in each survey was different, as discussed in

Chapter 4, the wording was fairly similar, allowing for

analysis of this attitudinal variable over a nine-month

period. Question 13 in Poll #23 asked respondents:

Regarding the current peace process between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, I Support it continuation Support ending it No opinion

Question 3 in Poll #24 and Question 21 in Poll #25 asked

exactly the same question:

Do you support or oppose the peace process between Palestinians and Israeli? Support Oppose No opinion

As discussed further below, tests of significance for the

results presented in contingency tables were not part of

the CPRS1s standard procedures in the analyses of the

results of their polls. Further investigation conducted

for this dissertation shows that indeed most of the

relationships between the findings on support or opposition

to the peace process by key demographic variables were

significant when they were stated as such in the reports.

There is, however, at least one relationship that proved to

be not significant when it was claimed that it was.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Table 5 shows that the difference between

Palestinians respondents living on the West Bank and Gaza

Strip is statistically significant in Poll #23.

Table 6 shows that there are no significant

differences between attitudes toward continuing the peace

process and gender of respondent. (In the original report,

Poll #23, no significant relationship was claimed.)

Table 5

Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Region (Poll #23)

Region N Support (%) Oppose (%) West Bank 570 77 . 8 16. 8 Gaza Strip 342 86 . 3 5 . 6 Total 912 81. 1 12 . 5 Pvalue < 0.001 < 0.05

Note: To be consistent with the published reports, for all tables in this chapter, the 'no opinion1 or 'don't know' category for each question has been removed before conducting the chi-square test of significance. This means that the number sample size is reduced by 4-6 percent, thereby reducing the baseline (N) upon which percentages in the contingency tables are derived.

Table 6

Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Gender (Poll #23)

Gender N Support (%) Oppose (%) Male 450 80.4 13 . 6 Female 459 81.7 11. 6 Total 909 81. 1 12 . 6 Pvalue > 0.370 > 0.05

195

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. The relationship between attitudes toward dependent

variable and educational level of respondent is also

significant (see Table 7).

Table 7

Attitudes toward Continuing the Peace Process, by Education (Poll #23)

Education N Support (%) Oppose (%) 0-6 years 237 84 . 6 8 . 1 7-12 years 567 81. 9 13 . 3 More than 12 years 103 69 . 6 17 . 9 Total 907 78 . 7 13 . 1 Pvalue < 0.013 < 0.05

Unlike in the previous survey (Poll #23), in Poll

#24 there is no significant difference between the

dependent variable and region of respondent (see Table 8).

The published results, however, claimed that the

relationship was significant (see Appendix 2).

Table 8

Attitudes toward the Peace Process, by Region (Poll #24)

Region N Support (%) Oppose (%) West Bank 728 67 . 8 26 . 4 Gaza Strip 432 73 . 3 22 . 1 Total 1160 70.5 24 . 3 Pvalue > 0.068 > 0.05

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. In Poll #24 there is a significant difference between men

and women. That is, more men were opposed to continuing

the peace process than women (see Table 9).

Table 9

Attitudes toward the Peace Process, by Gender (Poll #24)

Gender N Support (%) Oppose (%) Men 528 67 . 1 27.7 Women 578 72 . 5 21. 9 Total 1160 69 . 8 24 . 8 P value < 0.02 < 0.05

In Poll #24 there is also a significant relationship

between education and attitude toward the peace process:

the more education a respondent has achieved, the more

likely s/he is to oppose the peace process (see Table 10).

Table 10

Attitudes toward the Peace Process, by Education (Poll #24)

Education N Support (%) Oppose (%) 0-6 years 299 80 . 3 15 . 0 7-12 years 628 68 . 8 26 . 4 More than 12 years 233 61 . 2 30.1 Total 1160 70 . 1 23 . 8 Pvalue < 0.001 < 0.05

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. For Poll #25 the analysis that I wrote for the CPRS

did not contain a separate discussion of the dependent

variable under current investigation. Nor did it present a

demographic breakdown of the respondents' opinion to the

question of support or opposition to the peace process.

(This is discussed further below.) There is necessary

information in the published report to test for the

significance in the relationship between the dependent

variable and region of respondents. Table 11 shows that

this relationship is significant.

Table 11

Attitudes toward the Peace Process, by Region (Poll #25)

Region N Support (%) Oppose (%) West Bank 856 74 . 2 86 . 3 Gaza Strip 181 86 . 3 8 . 2 Total 1037 80 . 3 14 . 9 Pvalue > .001 > 0.05

To summarize: five of the seven relationships proved

to be statistically significant in three opinion polls,

suggesting that the differences between region, gender and

education were not due to chance and should be examined

more closely. The two relationships (Region in Poll #23

and Gender in Poll #24) that showed no significant

1S8

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. differences between West Bankers and Gazans as well as

between men and women, may also indicate a trend that

should be followed up with further investigation.

Corrections

The reports, written and published soon after each

poll was conducted, were supposed to analyze not just the

results to the individual questions but also examine

relationship between attitudinal variables. There are,

however, statements that need to be corrected and gaps in

the presentation that should be filled in order to gain a

genuine understanding of the results. Ideally, there

should be no need for this kind of explanation. The

published presentation of the data should have been free

from errors and have provided necessary information about

the data set. This dissertation can be viewed as an effort

to address these outstanding issues, as well as an attempt

to shed light on the larger problems of survey research in

Palestine in order to correct not just the polls but the

entire process.

In 1996 I wrote three reports for three surveys

conducted by the CPRS, and take full responsibility for the

errors. Yet, the reports that I wrote in English were

supposed to have been checked by several senior staff

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. members at the CPRS involved in conducting the polls,

before they were translated into Arabic and published in

both languages. Moreover, most of the main findings had

been pointed out in a CPRS Survey Research Unit (SRU)

meeting before the task of developing and writing the

reports was given to me. As a newcomer in the

organization, with my own research concerns it was a bit

difficult to challenge the CPRS1s approach to survey

research. I had intended to observe the CPRS at work more

than participate in it.

For instance, after beginning analysis of the first

survey results (Poll #23), I suggested that tests of

significance be conducted on all the relationships

presented in the written reports. I was told that it is

not necessary--the large sample size of the survey meant

that the margin of error was a sufficient measure of

significant differences within each table. Although I knew

better, I did not interfere in what seemed to be standard

procedure at the CPRS. (In fact, I cannot recall

encountering one published report on the findings of a

survey from any Palestinian organization that tests for

significance differences between the examined variables.)

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Another gap in the presentation of the survey

results is that in Poll #23 and Poll #25 the sample sizes

had to be weighted in order to obtain unbiased estimates of

the population. In fact, it was I who alerted both the

person who processed the data and Dr. Shikaki about the low

number of women respondents in Poll #23. There was

supposed to be a roughly equal number of men and women

included in the sample because field workers were

instructed to alternately interview a respondent from each

sex. This problem was remedied quickly by weighting the

data to get an equal number of male and female respondents

in the sample and by raising the margin of error of the

survey from its usual +3 to +5 percent. As far as I know,

there was no further investigation into the origin of the

problem.

Another related matter, found in each of the

published results in the sub-section called "Data

Analysis," is a statement that reads: "The data were

processed through SPSS, a computer program that is able to

detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies." With

this said, the CPRS does not elaborate on the results of

this step of the data analysis. Moreover, the ability of

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. SPSS to do such a task is very limited. The program can

detect coding errors, not illogical answers.

There is a mistake I made in the written report for

Poll #24, Chart 4, "Performance of the President and the

Palestinian Legislative Council by Political Affiliation,

mean scores." In the discussion explaining the chart, I

stated that "the greatest difference between evaluations of

the President and the Council is within Fateh, followed by

Islamic Jihad." Actually, the chart showed that

Independent Islamistists followed Fateh not Islamic Jihad.

After the reports were published I noticed several

typographical errors in each of the analysis as well as

several poorly constructed sentences. Because the analyses

have been appended in the dissertation as they were

published, for reasons elaborated in the following section

of this chapter, a reader should be aware of the presence

of mistakes in the text of the reports.

Further Reflection

What I found in the results of the polls, as I tried

to show in the discussion on the process of gathering them,

are real differences between not only the way people

express themselves during a survey interview and the way

their answers were recorded, but also between the results

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and the time, place and people they were supposed to

represent.

Ideally, it should be possible to take these surveys

as genuine snapshots of the public's attitudes toward

political, economic and social conditions in Palestine.

Similar polls, administered over time, go beyond being

static moments in time to become a moving picture of

attitudes, demographic characteristics and the relationship

between them. Yet, it would difficult to tell that in the

three-month period before the first survey (Poll #23)

tension between Palestinians and Israelis had been rising

over such important issues as Jerusalem and settlements or

that highly visible human right abuses had been committed

by the PA's police and security forces. More importantly,

the results of this poll do not indicate or even hint at a

possible explosion throughout Palestine that occurred just

three months later. The second survey (Poll #24), which

had been administered in September 1996, during intense and

violent clashes between the Israeli military and

Palestinians, focuses on the usual issues. Moreover, the

next survey after that (Poll #2 5) does not ask one question

about the clashes, in which over 7 0 Palestinians and 16

Israeli soldiers died, Israeli tanks and armed helicopters

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. imposed total restriction of movement between Palestinian

cities and the talks between the leaders broke down

completely--cutting off people from jobs, education and

each other.

It was a survey process taken by surprise. But what

is even more surprising, to me as an observer and

participant, was how normally the survey process continued.

The CPRS maintained its concern with such issues as

'Evaluation of Performance of the Government1 and its

relationship to attitudes toward continuing the 'peace

process with Israel.1 So far removed from the events of

the day, these concerns do not even begin to reflect the

context in which the surveys were conducted and designed to

statistically describe.

As the paid author of the full analyses of the

results, I tried to uncover relationships between the

variables that would help explain the results in terms of

the life they are supposed to represent. Without questions

directly relating to everyday life in Palestine, before,

during and after the violence, I probably did not and could

not succeed in that endeavor.

The analyses have been appended in this work as they

were published by the CPRS mainly in order to illustrate

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. one large point. The surveys conducted by the CPRS

definitely had a bias toward promoting (at least) the

concept of 'democracy,1 even if they contradicted or did

not make much sense to the people they polled.

I tried to show this bias in the written analyses,

to emphasize the 'democratic transition theory' language

used by both Shikaki1 and in the questionnaire design and

wording order to make clear to any reader that the data may

be useful in some ways, but are certainly not neutral.

Moreover, the analyses point out major contradictions, gaps

and inconsistencies in the findings, within and between

each survey, which beg further research--survey or

otherwise. By doing this I had hoped to raise the

discourse and even critique of survey research around

theoretical, methodological and even ideological concerns.

As for the problems in the administration of the

surveys that I observed in the field--the fear factor,

treatment of women and sampling procedures, all detailed in

Chapter 4--these are not discussed in the analyses

published by the CPRS. After all, my experience had been

1Khalil Shikaki has developed a thesis of transition to democracy in Palestine in many articles. Among many, see his "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction, and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," Journal of Palestine

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. unexpectedly limited to only one survey cycle and two teams

of fieldworkers because of the violence and struggle that I

knew was part of Palestinians' life. Nevertheless, the

experience informed the analyses of the surveys and also

hopefully laid the basis of for further research. Concrete

ways to improve the whole process of survey research in

Palestine will be discussed in the following conclusion to

this dissertation.

Studies 25 (Winter 1996); and "Countdown to Confrontation," The Jerusalem Report (April 16, 1998).

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CONCLUDING THOUGHTS AND ANALYSES

Since the Oslo accord was signed in 1993, Palestine

has been undergoing the most radical re-structuring in its

modern history. Even 1948 cannot compare in the sense that

Palestinian leaders have formally accepted not only

Israel's existence, but, as it turns out, also dominance

and brutality. More than half of all Palestinians live

outside of what remains of Palestine, and their right to

return is being negotiated away in return for the rest of

the Palestinians to live enclosed in underdeveloped, small

and disconnected pieces of land. The Israeli military and

a 30,000-strong Palestinian police force have been expected

to enforce the deal. It is the kind of settlement that

Palestinians have rejected and resisted for over fifty

years because it goes against their basic right of self-

determination codified in international law.

Palestinians have been able to resist such an unfair

settlement and keep their cause at the forefront of

international politics, not only because theirs is just,

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. but also because they have fought for it. The fight has

taken many forms: military, political, economic, cultural

and social. Scholars, intellectuals and activists have

played an important role in the fight by keeping a record

of the Palestinian struggle and presenting it to the world.

In this way, Palestine Studies has been a sustained attempt

to take a proactive stance against constantly being the

weaker party in the conflict.

It is against such a backdrop that this dissertation

set out to examine and analyze the introduction of public

opinion polls on the West Bank and Gaza Strip as an

emerging source of knowledge about the Palestinian people.

The question of whether or not to conduct public opinion

polls in a developed society, living in peace in a stable

part of the world would be moot. In the case of Palestine,

however, it is at best politically controversial and

academically loaded. At this critical juncture of

Palestinian national history, the development and use of

polls to record and portray public opinion has to be viewed

as a double-edged sword.

On the one hand, the Oslo accord and subsequent

agreements brought about major changes in the political

structure of Palestine, which have not yet taken a definite

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. form or direction. In Palestine, from the start of the

occupation in 1967 until 1993, the political agenda had

been clear: defend Palestinian people, land, labor and

resources from further Israeli incursion and domination.

Palestinians organized into grassroots, radical and

progressive non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in order

to provide the people with necessary social and economic

services and, importantly, political direction. Since

1993, however, this deeply entrenched system of social,

political and economic organizations is being displaced by

a different breed of NGOs. These NGOs have introduced into

Palestine a narrow concern for such issues as good

governance, transparent institutions and 'fair and free'

elections. In stark contrast to the political work done

before 1993, activists spend a great amount of resources

competing among each other for foreign funding, writing

financial and narrative reports and holding workshops that

are very limited in scope instead of mobilizing and

servicing the masses.

On the other hand, these new NGOs are also bringing

into Palestine new methods for understanding people. As

this dissertation has outlined, survey research in

Palestine is a budding field that carries with it the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. promise to gain greater and new insights into a people who

never before had the opportunity to voice their opinions

and thoughts directly, regularly and systematically. Part

of the promise of survey data is that they could be used to

correct gross misrepresentation of Palestinians as

fanatics, terrorists and backward people. Further, the

data obtained through a sound research process provide a

rational basis upon which their leaders, policy makers and

others can build and develop social institutions that serve

the real needs of the people. There is the promise that

survey data and the organizations that produce them could

function as a feedback system between the people and their

government. In the process, an array of public

institutions is strengthened, bringing with it political

stability and even economic prosperity.

Some Palestinian intellectuals, who are mostly

leftist but also Islamic, see the establishment of such a

model for societal development as a necessary step toward

democratizing their society. Although it is recognized

that these political concepts are largely the product of

western thought and experience, they believe that with

enough time democracy, liberalization and internationalism

can best serve the cause of the Arab masses. In the short

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. term, intellectuals such as those involved in the Center

for Palestine Research and Studies (CPRS), Jerusalem Media

and Communications Centre (JMCC) and elsewhere in Palestine

that try to propagate liberalism, believe that their

organizations is vital to Palestinians because they form

both a political support and counterweight to the PA in the

post-Oslo era.

Many attempts have been made to tackle the issue of

the NGOs' role in developing, modernizing or transforming

the cultural and political landscape in Arab societies,

certainly in Palestine but also in other "democratizing"

Arab countries. The PA created a government ministry to

regulate and deal with the work of Palestinian NGOs.

Jordan and Egypt, for their part, devised special sets of

draconian legislation to control the development of their

NGOs. But the issue has not been settled for various

reasons. Not the least among them are that Arab societies

themselves and Western donor organizations and governments

now have a shared interest in the outcome of the debate.

But while the tug of war is unlikely to end any time

soon, one conclusion is inevitable regarding the issue of

conducting public opinion polls in the West Bank and Gaza

Strip. Doubts and suspicions will always surround their

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. legitimacy as long as they continue to be funded by

organizations and governments whose agendas are considered

to be inimical to Arab interests as perceived by certain

Arab groups, governments, and certainly the masses.

What is to be done? In particular, how should

intellectuals and academics view the emergence, in terms of

timing and political purpose, of the polls in the aftermath

of the Oslo accords and their sustainability through

foreign funding? And, importantly, how they should deal

with them--lock, stock and barrel--in light of their

history, methodology and actual usefulness in developing

society and serving national interests?

These are mutually reinforcing, rather than mutually

exclusive, questions. Answering them is what this

dissertation has attempted to do. In Chapter 3, the debate

over NGOs was outlined with this purpose in mind. One

important conclusion that can be reached from a study of

that debate is that, while there seems to be no real

alternative to foreign funding and the West (especially the

U.S.) won't change its policies in the region, a number of

steps can be taken to strengthen the credibility of

Palestinian NGOs as a whole. One practical suggestion is

that donor organizations should work with NGOs as partners

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. in designing programs that are relevant to their

communities. Julia Pitner imagines that this partnership

would have a tremendously positive impact on social and

political realities throughout the region.

By encouraging cooperation and communication between funders and NGOs, both would have a better understanding of the problems, limitations, needs and opportunities before them. This would help combat some NGOs1 perceptions that foreign funders and I [nternational]NGOs have 'hidden' agendas, and would thus enhance local NGOs' confidence in the building of true partnerships.1

Specific to the debate surrounding the role of NGOs

carrying out survey research in Palestine, the argument can

be extended to explore the "credibility-over-legitimacy"

factor and its potential in raising the quality of

scientific research without compromising national

interests. In other words, while the question over

legitimacy of public opinion polls will not disappear any

time soon, the credibility of the work and the

practitioners themselves will ultimately determine their

viability and usefulness.

NGOs conducting opinion polls can increase this

credibility-over-legitimacy factor should they be able to:

1) define for themselves a new role in the changing field

1Julia Pitner, "NGOs1 Dilemmas," Middle East Report 30, no. 214 (Spring 2000): 37.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. of Palestine Studies; 2) recognize and tackle the

shortcomings of their work, especially methodological; 3)

promote informed use of survey research; and 4) raise the

professional standards of their organizations. This

concluding chapter to this dissertation elaborates these

four points and then discusses the political significance

of survey research in Palestine more fully.

Re-defining Palestine Studies

In Chapter 3 of this dissertation, I tried to make

the point that since Edward Said's book Orientalism2 in 1978

there has been an anti-methods tendency within Palestine

and Arab Studies. Riding the wave of post-modernism, a

prominent group of intellectuals on the question of

Palestine moved the discipline into a new kind of literary

style, with an emphasis placed on the "text" that is read

to reveal and combat negative assumptions about

Palestinians. This way of knowing has raised several

important ideas that cannot be ignored in trying to

understand Palestinians and Arabs both politically and

culturally, especially on the international stage.

Explicitly, however, the post-modern movement does not

2Edward W. Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Books, 1978) .

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study to be tested, generalized or theorized beyond the

particular subject. This stance within post-modernism is

inherent because systematic methods would collide against

one of its few theoretical propositions, namely that

modernization is a process of fragmentation. Post

modernists study the fragments. They do so, subsequently,

in a fragmented fashion.

There is also another kind of fragmentation within

Palestine Studies. Salim Tamari pointed out that Palestine

Studies suffers from "Palestinian Exceptionalism," which

has enclosed the discipline within a small circle of

scholars who generally accept each other's work without

much critique. They cite each other as references, rely

mainly on secondary sources and do little comparative or

theoretical work.3 Also Tamari is suggesting that there is

not much concern for methods in Palestine Studies. There

is much more general interest in the outcome of a research

project than the process behind it.

By way of a solution to these problems within

Palestine Studies, Tamari and even Said do insist that

3Salim Tamari, "Problems of Social Science Research in Palestine: An Overview," Current Sociology 94 (Summer 1994): 67-86.

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wherever they are presently located. For Said, this is a

political statement.4 For Tamari, this is more of an

academic necessity. Both believe that a census would help

clarify the definition of the Palestinians, creating the

basis to make informed statements, comparisons and

policies. Implied in this position is a real critique of

conducting opinion polls on only parts of the Palestinian

nation. One that this dissertation took seriously because

calls for a census underlined the need to include the

Palestinian people as a whole in the current discourse on

Palestine.

Organizations conducting survey research in

Palestine should be the first to confront the anti-methods

tendency in Palestine and Arab Studies. By spearheading or

joining a campaign to heighten interest in using primary

data in academic studies of any kind, these organizations

4While initiating a post-modern, deconstructionist approach in Palestine and Arab Studies, Edward Said was also possibly one of the first to point out the need for an international Palestinian census. How he reconciles these opposing theoretical and methodological positions to make an argument for a census is unclear in his own writings. But, perhaps, the question can be resolved by considering the whole body of his work as an attempt to first expose misrepresentations and secondly to present an accurate portrayal of Palestinians. A census would be part of that correction.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. would be able not only to justify their purpose (since

their strategy is largely based on survey research methods

and data), but also become better positioned to play a

leading role in the political struggle for national

liberation.

Conducting an international census would have

important political ramifications as well. Enumerating the

Palestinians scattered throughout the world would

contribute toward organizing this fragmented people in

exile--under the Palestinian Authority (but also still

under Israeli control) in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in

Israel, Arab countries and further abroad.

The process of conducting an international census

would begin with an explicit recognition that despite their

physical fragmentation there is something real that unites

Palestinians wherever they are presently located. Unlike

most nations, however, it is not a geographically bounded

entity with other defining features of a modern state.

Rather, the bond lies in the idea of Palestine--Palestine

is a state of mind. Ironically, the absence of a state

forms a Palestinian national identity.

Exile, the experience of being removed from one's

own native place, either physically or quasi-legally, is

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bonds the Palestinians. Thus, until there is a state of

Palestine, with an inclusive law of return, I would argue

that any person descended from pre-1948 Palestine would

have to be considered a Palestinian.5 It is true such a

bond, however real and fundamental, does not automatically

secure national unity or personal identification with being

Palestinian. But to begin to fully access the multiple

sociological permutations of a Palestinian national

identity, a census, which gives numerical and substantive

definition to an entire population, needs to be conducted.

As Edward Said recognizes, at this present juncture, a

census would serve as a powerful reminder of the

Palestinians in the Diaspora, compressed into a faceless

mass of refugees or wrongly projected as a masked gang of

terrorists. In his words, an international census of the

Palestinian people

would comprise an act of historical and political self-realization outside the limitations imposed on them by the absence of democratic participation, now ostensibly curtailed by Israel and the PLO in a

5This definition of the Palestinian people is similar to the PLO's except that it includes children born to Palestinian mothers and all those after no matter how diluted the blood-line becomes. The PLO recognizes anyone born or living in Palestine under the British Mandate before 1948 or descended from the paternal line of a Palestinian with those characteristics.

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A census of Palestinians opens the possibility of building

international institutions in which to coordinate efforts

between and among them, wherever they happen to be

presently located. It could become one of the basic steps

toward realizing a Palestinian state and government that is

for and all of its people.

Another way research organizations could better

contribute to Palestine Studies is by devoting themselves

to analyzing new trends in the discipline. This study

identified at least four emerging areas in Palestine

Studies: one, joint studies with Israeli scholars; two,

joint studies with Arab countries, particularly Jordanian-

Palestinian cooperation; three, use of the Internet to

circumvent mainstream media's bias against Palestinians and

distribute information to a large audience inexpensively;

and, four, sustained efforts to conduct survey research.

Each of these new areas began to develop as a

consequence (not the Internet, of course) of the changed

relationship between Israel and Palestine since 1993.

Research organizations in Palestine played a critical role

sEdward W. Said, Peace and Its Discontents: Essays on Palestine in the Middle East (New York: Vintage Books, 1995), 18.

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also be the first to point out the need to monitor and

analyze their progression, effectiveness and deficiencies

within the larger problem of state-building in Palestine.

Tackling Methodological Problems

Although critical of the PA for censorship,

corruption and human rights abuses, Khalil Shikaki, who was

director of projects at the CPRS when the field research

for this study was conducted, but now heads a new policy

and survey research-oriented organization, does not extend

his critique to the possible methodological problems in

collecting survey data under these political circumstances.

Without such a concern, he leaves unresolved a major

contradiction in his framework for analyzing Palestinian

opinions toward these same issues and negotiations with

Israel using primarily survey data. On the one hand, he

cites CPRS findings that "show consistent support for the

ongoing Palestinian-Israeli negotiations," which varies by

educational level and support for specific agreements.7 On

the other hand, he recognizes that on the ground

Palestinians have real reason to fear openly opposing the

7Khalil Shikaki, "The Peace Process, National Reconstruction and the Transition to Democracy in Palestine," Journal of

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intersection of politics and methods in the survey results

and address the question of whether the findings such as

high support of the process could be related to the fact

that Palestinians could be hesitant of openly stating

opposition or some other underlying attitude not directly

captured by the survey instrument.

In the context of continued Israeli domination, fear

of the PA and general suspicion of survey fieldworkers,

respondents will probably be on guard. Respondents might

be afraid to criticize Arafat, and by extension the

negotiations and the government he heads. I found strong

evidence for that observation when I accompanied two teams

of fieldworkers as they administered Poll #23 over a three-

day period. I also found that internally the CPRS did

recognize this "fear factor" as a problem in the research

process but accounts for it as respondents "reluctant to

state their views out of fear or disinterest in the present

political circumstances" in the non-response rate of about

3 percent. In other words, the CPRS assumed that

respondents who were afraid to share their views with

Palestine Studies XXV, no. 3 (Winter 1996): 6.

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altogether.

From the experience in both participating in the

survey cycles at the CPRS, I found that this 'fear factor'

to be one of several major non-sampling errors in survey

research in Palestine. Another major problem is the

sampling procedure used by the CPRS, which introduced the

element of unknown bias at the level of selecting

individuals into the sample. This problem is mainly due to

the fact that the Palestinians lacked census parameters,

reliable maps or lists of the entire target population on

the West Bank and Gaza Strip from which to randomly select

individuals (the unit of analysis) into the sample.

Non-sampling errors, which are no less important

than sampling errors, were found at nearly each stage of

the survey process--from the content and design of the

questionnaires, to the actual administration of the survey

in the field. Each of these problems, in its own way,

reduces the reliability, validity and importantly the

ability to generalize the survey data.

A problem in the methodology used in the polls that

might have biased the results, is the design of the survey

instrument. The CPRS claims to be politically neutral,

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. objective and scientific in conducting its opinion polls

and presenting its findings. Yet, most of the questions in

its polls are framed directly in relation to issues of

democratization, civil society and political affiliation in

regard to all other outstanding issues, such as the

economy, settlements, education. For example, the CPRS

does not ask rather straightforward questions as, 'How

strongly do you believe that Jerusalem is the capital of

Palestine?1 Rather, in its attempt to link outstanding

issues to its larger concern for tracking the progress of

democratization of Palestine, the Center takes a

politically loaded approach to the question, as in, "How do

you evaluate the President's performance in the

negotiations on the issue of Jerusalem?"

Once again, by entangling the subject of Jerusalem

with the President's performance, for example, there is the

possibility that respondents will answer positively because

they fear criticizing Arafat on any issue. In other words,

by linking the two variables in a single question, in this

case Jerusalem and the President, a clear analysis of

either attitude becomes difficult.

The problems created by the over-lapping variables

in the questions were also apparent in the field, as the

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. fieldworkers used the questionnaire to interview

respondents. As discussed in Chapter 4, respondents often

gave lengthy answers to each question, which were not

captured in the response categories. This 'spill over1

effect, as I call it, suggested that there were other

important factors shaping the opinions of Palestinians who

were polled than had been tested in the surveys.

From first-hand experience in the field, it was

possible to recognize the problems of the fear factor,

survey design and spill over effect in the final results.

To begin to address these problems in the full analyses of

the polls that I wrote for the CPRS, I departed from what

the CPRS had done previously, reporting the results for

each question independently and without much further

examination. Rather I looked at relationships between

variables, not just relying on the findings for each

question, in order to understand better respondents 1

opinions on important issues.

A new finding emerged from this approach to the data

set. One that challenged a central and consistent result

put forth by the CPRS about how the 70-80 percent support

for the negotiations should be analyzed and interpreted.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. Statistical analysis on the data shows (Analysis of

the Results for Poll #23, Poll #24 and Poll #25, which can

be found in Appendix 1, Appendix 2 and Appendix 3,

respectively) that understanding the findings of high

support, but with conditions, makes better sense than

taking the finding at face value. Attaching conditions to

the negotiations even makes political sense--peace is

supported in principle, but peace at any price is

unacceptable.

The most useful demographic variable that reduced

support for the agreements and their implementation is

education level of the respondents. In each of the three

surveys I analyzed for this study and confirmed by tests of

significance (PVaiue < 0.05), I found that the higher the

level of education, the more critical the person. I think

this means two things. One, the education levels of the

West Bank and Gaza Strip are structured much like a

pyramid, with most people occupying the bottom and fewer

people on the top. The survey captures this: some

respondents have a high school diploma most have less

education, the rest have between some college up to a post

graduate degree. The surveys also show that higher

educated respondents follow the news on the negotiations

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. more regularly than lower educated respondents and are more

concerned about such things as democracy and human rights--

the kind of issues that the surveys focus on and test.

To extend this observation, perhaps into the realm

of speculation, the CPRS surveys' true target population is

higher educated Palestinians not the population as a whole.

Looking at the results of the surveys from that point of

view, there is very little unconditional support for the

agreements and their implementation. As for the bulk of

the population, support for the agreements seems to be

closely tied to loyalty to or even perhaps fear of Arafat.

In other words, most respondents' attitudes toward Arafat

could be a key intervening variable in explaining the

general high support for the negotiations with Israel.

Another lesson that can be learned here is that CPRS

data, especially reported descriptively, need to be treated

with caution. Shortcomings in the data are many, leading

to serious questions regarding the reliability and the

validity of the results. As discussed in Chapter 5, there

were several errors in the three published analyses of

survey results that I wrote for the CPRS, which were

supposed to have been thoroughly checked by senior

researchers at the CPRS before they translated into Arabic

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. and published in both languages. One of the most serious

errors was a statement claiming that the difference between

West Bankers and Gazans was significant regarding

respondents' positions toward continuing negotiations with

Israel in Poll #24. A chi-square test of significance

(Pvaiue > 0.068 > 0.05) showed that the difference between

the two nominal levels of the variable (Region) may not be

due to chance.

With further investigation of these methodological

problems, they could probably be corrected in future

surveys. From this initial study the investigation could

proceed into three areas of concern. One, reducing the

fear factor among participants or at least devise a way to

better account for it in the non-response rate. Two,

designing the surveys to better reflect the concerns of the

population. And, three, re-examining past surveys with

attention to potential biases and errors in the data set

and published reports. What could be done immediately in

order to advance the methodology used in the surveys might

entail conducting focus groups to test survey design and

questions and better train the fieldworkers.

Organizations in Palestine that conduct survey

research could benefit from these methodological insights

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. raised in this study in several concrete ways. For one,

organizations could conduct fewer but more detailed surveys

on particular issues based on a partially structured

interview technique, which would capture, and allow

participants to express, fuller opinions on significant

questions. Second, recalibrate the research design from a

trend study (based on different samples selected for each

survey) to a panel study, which would permit the study of

individuals as well as the group and the changes in both

the group and the individual. Although it might be

difficult to find a representative sample to follow in a

trend study because individuals might fear that they could

be more easily identified, the larger aim should be to

produce survey research in Palestine that truly reflects

the opinions and concerns of Palestinians. For that to be

accomplished, this study found, culturally sensitive and

appropriated methods need to be used and developed. For

that to happen, though, thorough and extensive studies into

sampling procedure, questionnaire design and content and

interviewing technique need to be conducted on a regular

basis.8

8Mark A. Tessler, Monte Palmer, Tawfic E. Farah and Barbara Lethem Ibrahim studied survey research efforts in various Arab countries into the late-1980s, before Palestinians

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The Survey Research Unit at the CPRS was only one

part of the organization as a whole. The data from the

surveys could have augmented other departments' studies at

the Center, which ranged from parliamentary research to an

Israeli studies center. From my experience, however, the

data were hardly used unless directed or commissioned to be

used in a specific study. In other words, no department

within the organization besides the survey research unit

devoted resources or attention to understanding and using

the data on a regular and sustained basis. It was on an ad

hoc, rather than systematic, basis that departments used

the data. For example, while I was at the CPRS I was asked

to write a chapter for a book on the January 1996

Palestinian elections using data from an exit poll over one

year later.9 Beside the press release, it was the first

time the data was studied and published.

began to conduct their own surveys on a regular basis, and reached many of these same recommendations to improve both the process and results of opinion polls. The Evaluation and Application of Survey Research in the Arab World (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987).

9Khalil Shikaki, ed., Palestinian Elections: Political Environment, Electoral Behavior, Results (Palestine: Center for Palestine Research and Studies, 1997) in Arabic.

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the question that if the data had been underutilized by the

CPRS itself, how should it be expected that other sectors

of society and the government would themselves take the

initiative to use the data and in a proper fashion?

As for their dissemination, the data are mainly used

and published by the media, almost verbatim from press

releases issued by the CPRS. I found very few articles in

scholarly journals that examined or used the data. This,

combined with the fact that policy-makers and leaders

hardly use the data in making key decisions,10 could

indicate that the process of conducting survey research was

an end in itself rather than a means to an end. But the

issue is not as simple as this. In this context,

Palestinians are still subjected to political forces beyond

their control and not in their favor, and that serious

questions have been raised regarding the identity and

10The Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS) issued a statement on its website concerning the under-utilization and misuse of statistics throughout relevant sectors of Palestinian society, including government officials and ministries, policy-oriented NGOs and the media. Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, "Background and Justifications," Dissemination, Analysis and Training for Effective Utilization of Census Findings: Population, Housing and Establishment Census, 1997; report on-line; available from http://www.pcbs.org/inside/f_pophos.htm; Internet; accessed on 10 August 2001.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. intention of the end user of the polls results. Is it the

foreign funders who want questionnaires to focus more on

democracy and good governance in the autonomous areas at

the expense of raising more important questions concerning

national liberation? Or is it the Israelis who might want

to manipulate such findings as Palestinians still support

"terrorist" attacks against settlers and their military?

These issues and questions put the onus on

Palestinians not only to ensure that the polls do

accurately reflect the thinking of the Palestinians but

also to promote the informed use of results of these polls.

It is incumbent upon them to prove that the process of

survey research and the use of its results are where the

intersection between politics and academia begins, rather

than where it ends.

Of course the organizations and practitioners

directly involved in the field of survey research would

know best how to improve the data source and its

utilization.11 But from observations at a distance, there

are four steps that need to be taken to raise the practical

u Once again, Tessler et al., make similar recommendations based on the experiences of practitioners who attended a six-day conference to discuss a wide array of issues pertaining to survey research, in Survey Research in the Arab World.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. importance of the effort to provide the public with a clear

echo of its voices. One suggestion for these organizations

is to make a more concerted effort to popularize the polls,

by widening and/or narrowing the scope of the issues

contained in them. This might mean, again, conducting

fewer polls per year in order to identify important issues

and refine the process behind the ones that are done. A

second suggestion is to establish systematic mechanisms to

obtain feedback from policy-makers and the public at large

on the value of the information provided by the polls. A

third is to encourage secondary independent studies of the

findings and the methods used in the survey process.- by

individuals and by institutions. A fourth suggestion is to

make the poll results more accessible to the public and

interested parties, for example by using the Internet and

multiple houses to store the database (e.g., libraries,

universities, NGOs).

Raising Professional Standards

Public opinion polling, even in advanced democracies

like the U.S., is still described as a budding field.12 In

the recognition that it is even more so in Palestine, it

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. would only be prudent for its practitioners to proceed with

their work with caution and care. The goal should be not

only to assert their credibility based on improving methods

and promoting informed use of surveys' findings, but also

to do so within an institutionalized framework. To this

end, the Palestinians have to draw for themselves and

follow professional standards and ethics that would advance

both theory and methodology.

Building on the experience of others, but drawing

heavily on their own society's unique history, structure

and goals, Palestinian practitioners can come up with a

code of conduct which they themselves and anybody who is

joining the field have to observe meticulously.

Independence from government, pressure groups and

organizations funding the research, foreign or otherwise,

is crucial for success. Opinion polls can become an

important resource for detecting and discerning trends in

Palestinian society, but only if those who are conducting

them support and cement the structure, culture and

professional norms of the research community and understand

12Norman M. Bradburn, "Questionnaire Design: From Art to Science," Paper delivered at the Fifth International Conference of Social Science Methodology (Germany: 2 0 00).

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. their role and influence in government and shaping public

policy.

In Palestine there had been two major organizations,

the JMCC and CPRS, that regularly conducted survey

research, but other organizations are beginning to enter

the field. The CPRS became one the biggest non

governmental organizations in the West Bank and Gaza Strip,

with an annual budget of probably close to two million

dollars a year.13 Very few other organizations compared to

its size or importance; the rest barely fell in its shadow.

Once again, the CPRS1s political agenda has been explicitly

pro-democracy--a model in liberalization theory's ideal of

'civil society.' (Internally, however, the organization is

run by a few and worked by many. Probably not unlike a

Washington, D.C., think-tank.)

In accordance to their size, these organizations

arguably have the greatest responsibility in guiding the

professional development of survey research. They could be

the first to point out the need for the creation of

13A s discussed in Chapter 4, the CPRS underwent a major organizational breakdown about two years ago. Dr. Shikaki left the Center and started his own NGO, which focuses on survey research. Staff and researchers from the CPRS joined him; while others from the CPRS started another polling organization based at Beir Zeit University. As far as I know, the CPRS still exists, but in name only.

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database it has collected as well as independent training

centers for fieldworkers and statisticians now and for the

next generation.

The Baby and the Bath Water

Although the recommendations discussed in this

chapter are largely prescriptive and entail further studies

and much work to begin to implement them, they should not

be ignored or brushed aside until a later time. Put

bluntly, without developing an institutional framework for

survey research to develop within, there is a certain

danger that the whole endeavor undertaken since 1993 could

disintegrate into individual enterprises and gain little

credibility or legitimacy in Palestine. Failing to fulfill

the larger promise and potential of survey research in

Palestine, particularly opinion polling, I believe, would

be an unfortunate outcome to the introduction of this

method in Palestine studies and politics.

It is arguable that the development of opinion

polling serves no real practical purpose within Palestine

Studies and to Palestinian people, except to create a

statistical record of positions that are obvious or well

known from a Palestinian point of view. In other words,

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the question of Palestine. There are so many issues

surrounding opinion polls that need to be addressed--

methodological, technical, financial and political--it

might be seen as a waste of time, resources and effort to

invest in their institutional development, especially since

there are many larger and more immediate problems facing

Palestinians.

It might be a luxury now for Palestinians to discuss

such issues as sampling and non-sampling errors versus

surviving bombs and bullets or having food and water. But,

from my understanding of Palestinian history, there are

many struggles and battles that need to be fought within

the larger conflict that are as essential to survival in

Palestine. These battles all revolve around basic human

rights--for every man, woman and child--that were totally

disrespected during Israeli occupation and only given lip

service by the PA. These basic rights are not symbols of a

state, like a postage stamp or national airport, they are

the substance of a nation: they can make battles worth

fighting and life worth living. As this dissertation has

argued, opinion polls can give people a voice in their

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. lives and are one of the ways Palestinians can invest in

their future toward creating a viable state of Palestine.

The most important question that I believe needs to

be addressed before investing in development of survey

research in Palestine is whether or not the practice of

opinion polling can eventual begin to have weight in

Palestinian politics. This is especially true as

Palestinians stay locked in a violent, unbalanced and

chaotic relationship with Israelis.

It is highly unlikely that the findings of opinion

polling can become independent of Palestinian politics when

war, violence and basic survival occupy the daily life in

Palestine. Without ignoring this point or pretending that

change can happen with a stroke of a pen, public opinion

polling does attempt to present a different way of

assessing Palestinian problems and a new approach for

resolving them. That approach rests on the belief that

people are important. Palestinian views--whether well

formulated and directed or spontaneous and reactive--play a

major role in defining the conflict. The promise of public

opinion polls lies in the potential to begin to include

Palestinian voices in the conflict's resolution, to define

its parameters and requirements for a durable and just

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. solution to replace the violence, uncertainty and indignity

of Palestinian history, present and foreseeable future.

It is ironic that Palestinian people, whose conflict

with Israel has been a determining factor in shaping

history and development of the Middle East, have had few

formal and recognized channels to collectively express

their voice as major events have unfolded over the past

several decades. Once again, even the Oslo accords--hailed

to be the most important breakthrough in the Palestinian-

Israeli conflict--were brokered secretly and signed without

public debate. This study hoped to make the case that

surveys and a census, which capture the voices of

Palestinians, at any stage of their national development

but especially at this point, are a small but necessary

step toward better representation of Palestinian.

Carefully executed opinion polls could enable people to

express who they are, and, no less importantly, how they

wish to determine their future.

There are no guarantees that even the most accurate

and meaningful surveys will be elevated to become a

powerful voice of the people within Palestinian politics.

Public opinion polls, in themselves, cannot do this without

an array of institutional supports and interested

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. advocates. They are basically instruments developed by

people to describe and record demographic characteristics

and attitudes of a population. Surveys, by definition,

cannot explain how they will be interpreted or used once

the data are collected. They can, however, provide

valuable insights and information to the public and

decision-makers about the concerns of the population on

certain subjects at a particular point in time. They can,

in other words, provide an anchor and legitimacy to public

policy and larger debates about the national agenda.

In my assessment, so far the introduction of public

opinion polling in Palestine has been able to barely

fulfill its promise and potential. Much more work needs to

be done in order to develop opinion polls and the polling

process to not only accurately reflect peoples lives but

begin to contribute to shaping them. But with cautious

optimism and sustained effort, survey research in Palestine

would be a worthwhile effort.

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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission. APPENDIX 1

RESULTS OF CPRS PUBLIC OPINION POLL #23

JUNE 28-30, 1996

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P o ll # 2 3 28-30 June 1996

♦ The Peace Process After Netanyahu’s Election ♦ Freedom of Expression ♦ Democratization under the PNA ♦ The Recent Arab Summit ♦ The Performance of the Legislative Council

Prepared by: Survey Research Unit

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS) Nablus-Palestine, P.O.Box 132, Tel. (09) 380383 Telefax, (09) 380384

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Introduction This is the Survey Research Unit’s (SRU) twenty-third public opinion poll. It covers the topics of the peace process after Netanyahu’s election as Israel’s Prime Minister, the final status negotiations, freedom of expression and democratization under the Palestinian National Authority, the recent Arab Summit and the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council.

The S R U has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history of the Palestinian people and to record the reaction of Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to current events. CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions reached. CPRS is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to the study of Palestinian politics and publishing the results of all its studies. Poll results provide a vital resource for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls also give members of the community an opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision-makers on issues of concern to them.

The following is an analysis of the results obtained in the twenty-third opinion poll conducted by the SRU. For further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at Tel: (09) 380 383 or Tel/Fax: (09) 380 384.

General Background Among the more important events in the two-month period preceding this poll, the Palestinian National Council (PNC) held its twenty-first session in Gaza on 4 April 1996. This session took place after the Israeli authorities allowed a select group of Palestinian leaders from outside the occupied territories to attend the meeting. Top of the agenda was the discussion and vote on the amendment of the Palestinian National Charter which contradicts the PLO’s commitments in the Oslo agreements with Israel. The majority agreed that the Charter should be amended, with 504 in favor, 54 opposed and 14 abstained. Also, by the end of the session, a new executive committee of the PLO was elected.

A new Palestinian Government was formed by the Executive office. It was presented to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) for a vote of confidence and to discuss its guideline. The new government received the vote of confidence from the PLC, after debate and criticism from the members.

Within this period, Likud party leader, Binyamin Netenyahu. was elected as Israel’s Prime Minister, while the centrist, right-wing and religious parties maintained a majority of seats in the Knesset. The Israeli elections were accompanied by a continued closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel and Jerusalem. The closure aggravated the already poor economic

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conditions for Palestinians. An Arab Summit was held in Cairo to discuss the outcome of the Israeli elections and confirm Arab countries' support of Palestinians as they enter the final status negotiations with Israel.

Palestinian police raided Al-Najah National University in Nablus, on 30 March, arresting students who were believed to belong to opposition groups. The PLC condemned the crackdown on educational institutions and called for upholding the freedom of expression on campuses and throughout Palestinian society.

Israel continued to maintain strict security measures throughout the occupied territories not under Palestinian Authority. Also, in violation of the Oslo agreements, Israel confiscated more Palestinian land to build by-pass roads and expand existing settlements. This resulted in confrontations between Palestinians and Israeli settlers in the areas of Qalqilia, Samon’ and villages nearby Ramallah. Israel also imposed harsher restrictions on Palestinians in Jerusalem, including areas of political activity, building permits and residency status. Leading advocates of Palestinian rights maintain that these policies are intended to prejudice the negotiations on final status of Jerusalem.

Methodology The questionnaire used in this poll was designed by through consultation with CPRS researchers. Prior to the polling dates, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 50 respondents in the Nablus area. As in all of our polls, it includes a large number of demographic and attitudinal variables (see Table 1 for the demographic distribution of the sample). Interviews were conducted between 28-30 March 1996 (Thursday, Friday and Saturday). The total sample is 1,382 persons, with 865 from the West Bank and 518 from the Gaza Strip.

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T a b le 1 Demographic Distribution & Characteristics of Sample, weighted percentages and counts ______Characteristic °/o of Total Count Characteristic % o f T o ta l C o u n t Region Education West Bank 62.0 6 0 7 Up to 9 years 47.2 45 8 Gaza Strip 38 0 373 10-12 years 3 1.2 303 Total* 100.0 9 8 0 2 years College 9 4 9 1 University** 12.3 120 Place of Residence Marital Status City' 42.3 4 1 4 Single 25.2 245 T o w n 4.3 43 M arrie d 69.3 67 4 V illa g e 35.1 344 Divorced or 5.5 54 Refugee Camp 18.2 179 Windowed A g e O c c u p a tio n 18-22 19.8 192 Laborer 9.8 94 2 3 -2 7 16.6 161 Craftsman 8.3 SO 2 8 -3 2 14.0 136 Housewife 42.2 405 3 3 -3 7 12.2 1 18 Specialist*** 0.4 4 3 8 -4 2 9.2 90 Employee**** 13.9 133 4 3 -4 7 8.2 79 M erch an t 4.8 46 4 8 -5 2 5.5 53 Student 8.0 77 5 0 + 14.6 142 Farm er 2.4 23 Retired 1.2 12 Refugee Status None 9.0 86 R efugee 41 .2 4 0 0 Non-Refugee 58.8 5 7 2 G e n d e r R e lig io n M a le 49 .4 481 M oslem 94.9 924 Fem ale 50.6 493 Christian 5.1 49 •Note, as discussed more fully below, the sample size (counts and percentages) have been weighted in order to obtain unbiased estimates. '•Includes all post-secondary degrees. •••Specialists are defined as Professors/University Instructors, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers, Pharmacists or Executives. ••••Em ployees are defined as School Teachers, Government Employees, Nurses, Lower-level Company Employees.

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1) selecting population locations with probabilities proportional to size of the sample (PPS); 2) selecting one or two random blocks from each location; 3) selecting a house using systematic random sampling; and 4) selecting a person 18-years or older from the household.

W e used 75 population locations in this poll, from which 1,382 households were selected into the sample. In this poll, the gender distribution does not reflect expected population parameters and therefore had to be weighted to obtain unbiased estimates of the actual population. Specifically, we obtained an unequal distribution of men and women in the sample f/.e., 40% men and 60% women), which was corrected by reducing the base of the sample size to n=980.

At the first stage of the sampling procedure, CPRS fieldworkers and researchers create maps of the localities of population centers randomly selected into the' sample. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets and clusters of residential neighborhoods in these areas. They are further divided into a number of sampling units (blocks), with each unit comprising an average of 100 housing units.

Households are selected based on a systematic sampling procedure. For example, if the fieldworkers estimate the number of houses in the sampling unit to be 100 and were assigned 10 interviews, the fieldworkers divide 100 by 10, obtaining 10. Then the fieldworkers conduct the first interview in the 10th household, and the second in the 20th and so forth. Fieldworkers start their sample selection of housing units from a well defined point in the area such as a post office, mosque or business. They are instructed to report on the direction of their sampling walks, and play an active role in drawing maps of each locality as well as estimating the number of houses in each block.

Data Collection Our fieldworkers participated in a number of workshops and training sessions where we discuss the aims and methods of the poll. The topics we covered are household interviewing techniques, confidence building, mapping and sampling' procedures. Four special training seminars were held prior to the poll which were attended by a total of 75 fieldworkers.

Fieldworkers are grouped into teams of two who are supervised by senior CPRS researchers. Senior researchers make random visits to interview

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locations to discuss the research process with the teams. More than fifty percent of our fieldworkers are female, so as to ensure the representation of women in the sample. Fieldworkers are assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 17 per team) to allow for careful interviewing. The non-response rate for this sample is around 3%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their views out of fear or disinterest in the present political circumstances.

Data Analysis In previous polls, we estimated the margin of error to be approximately ±3%. For this poll, however, we estimate the margin of error to be +5%.

The data were processed through SPSS, a computer program that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies.

Summary of Results Unemployment The results of this poll show that the total unemployment rate in the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 37%, a 12-point decrease since March 1996 (Poll #22). As consistently found in previous polls, unemployment in the Gaza Strip (47%) is higher than in the West Bank (30%). The high rates can be mainly attributed to the continued closure of the West Bank and Gaza Strip from Israel since the February and March bombings. Note, these figures were collected within a three-day period (28-30 June 1996), from respondents 18-years or older, and based on a definition of unemployment used by the International Labour Organization (ILO).

Overview Attitudes toward the future of the peace process, measured by several questions, mostly indicate a general high level of support for its continuation. This support is tempered by reservations particularly when it comes to the belief that the final status negotiations will result in an acceptable solution to both the Israelis and Palestinians. These findings, examined together, can be partly explained by the sense of improvement or disappointment in the national reconstruction and transition to democracy efforts on the domestic level. For supporters of the peace process, the majority tends to have trust in the new Palestinian government, the perception that freedom of expression is better under the Palestinian National Authority (PNA) and that the election of Netanyahu as Israel’s new Prime Minister left no impact on the future of the peace process. As for the opposition, those who do not support the continuation of the peace process or identify with the “peace camp”, their views tend to be pessimistic on both regional and domestic issues.

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Future of the Peace Process West Bank and Gaza Strip Palestinians are almost evenly divided regarding the future of the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis, after the Israeli elections and the formation of the new Likud-led government. 34.4% say that they are optimistic, 27.6% pessimistic while 33 .3% think that the elections will not affect the peace process. Optimism is higher in the Gaza Strip (42.2%) than in the West Bank, where 29.6% expressed optimism and 31.4% pessimism. As for those who think that the elections will not change the peace process there is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. On this issue, and on several others, men tend to be more pessimistic than women (31.0% and 24.2%, respectively); the more educated tend to have more pessimistic attitudes than the less educated (see Table 2); and the younger members of the sample are more likely to believe that there is no change, but are more optimistic than older people. This is a change in attitude, however, from March 1996 (Poll #22), when 40% thought that an Israeli government led by the Labor Party would be better in regard to Palestinian goals. Only 4.9% thought that the Likud Party would be better and 43% expressed that there is no difference, between the two Israeli parties.

On the final status negotiations, which will be greatly affected by the Israeli election results, a similar pattern emerges. Overall, public opinion is almost divided on the question of whether or not it is possible to reach an acceptable solution in the course of negotiations over Jerusalem, Refugees, Borders and Israeli Settlements. 44.3% think it is possible to reach a solution acceptable to both parties, but 47.5% do not. In the Gaza Strip, belief in a positive outcome (51.6%) is higher than in the West Bank (39.8%). Once again, men are more pessimistic than women on this question (52.0% and 43.6%, respectively); and those with higher education levels are more likely to think that the final status negotiations will not lead to an acceptable solution than less educated respondents in our sample (see Table 2).

A majority of the Palestinians polled (50.5%) believes that Palestinians cannot rely on Arab countries to support them in obtaining their rights, as discussed in the recent Arab Summit. 43.1% think that Arab countries will support Palestinian rights and only 6.4% had no opinion on the matter. As with the attitudes on the Israeli elections and the outcome of the final status negotiations, there are differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, men and women and the more and less educated (see Table 2). In all cases, the former tends to be more pessimistic than the latter.

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T a b le 2 Attitudes on Israeli Elections, Final Status Negotiations and Arab Sum m it by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts (n) ______Israeli Elections Final Status Arab Summit optimistic pessimistic acceptable unacceptable can relv cannot rely T o ta l 54.4 (3 3 6 } 2 7 .6 (2 7 0 ) 44.3 (432) 47. S (464) 4 3 .1 (4 1 9 ) 5 0 .5 (4 9 1 ) Region West Bank 2 9 .6 (1 7 9 ) 31.4 (190) 39.8 (240) 53.2 (3 2 1 ) 40.1 (2 4 2 ) 54.5 (3 2 9 ) Gaza S trip 42.2 (1571 21.4 (80) 51.6 (192) 38.2 (1 4 2 ) 4 8 .0 (1 7 7 ) 4 4.0 (1 6 2 ) G e n d e r M ale 35.3 (160) 31.0 (149) 42.6 (204) 52.0 (2 4 9 ) 3 6.3 (1 7 3 ) 60.0 (2 8 6 ) Fem ale 29.3 (174) 24.2 (119) 45.6 (224) 43 6 (2 1 5 ) 4 9 .7 (2 4 3 ) 41.7 (2 0 4 ) E d ucation Illiterate-Elementary 38.5 (98 ) 27.9 (71) 5(1.9 (130) 35.3 (9 0 ) 55.2 (1 4 0 ) 34 2 (8 7 ) Seeondarv-HS Diploma 35 3 (2101 27.4 (163) 43.9 (261) 49.3 (2 9 4 ) 4 1 7 (2 4 7 ) 53.5 (3 1 6 ) Colleae-Posl Graduate 20.9 (25) 28.7 (34 ) 31.1 (37) 64.9 (7 7 ) 2 4 .7 (2 9 ) 72.1 (8 5 ) Age 18-27 33.7 (I 19) 27.0 (95) 43.6 (154) 49.1 (1 7 4 ) 4 2 .8 (1 5 0 ) 50.3 (1 7 7 ) 28-37 38.fi (98) 23.2 (59) 45 7 (116) 48.6 (1 2 3 ) 41 0 (10 3 ) 56.2 (1 4 1 ) 38-47 33 9 (57) 25.6 (43) 45.7 (77) 4 6.0 (7 8 ) 4 2 .4 (7 1 ) 51.2 (8 6 ) 48- vears old 31 4 (61) 36 I (7 0 ) 42.5 (83) 43.9 (8 5 ) 4 8 .2 (9 3 ) 42.6 (821

As suggested by the findings displayed in Table 2, Palestinians’ future outlook can be described as a cautious blend of optimism and pessimism. These attitudes are inconsistent with support for the continuation o f the peace process which is at its highest, with 81.1% supporting and 13% opposing. (In the March #23 Poll, CPRS found that 78% supported its continuation and 16% stopping it.) But again, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (86.3% ) are more likely than those in the West Bank (77.8%) to support the continuation o f the peace' process; and West Bankers are nearly three times (16.8%) more likely to advocate stopping the process than Gazans (5.6%). On this question, there is no significant difference between the attitudes of men and women, but the difference between education and age levels is pronounced (see Table 3).

Such high support for the continuation of the peace process is reflected in the high percentage of total respondents (69%) who identify themselves with a party or faction that supports the peace process. 66.9% o f Palestinians in the West Bank and 72.5% in the Gaza Strip classify themselves within the “peace camp” (see Table 3 and further discussion based on Tables 11 & 12 below). On the recent decision by the Palestinian National Council to amend the National Charter, a condition by Israel to continue the peace process, a little less than the plurality (47.6% ) was in favor and a sizable percentage (3 1.1%) was opposed (see Table 3). Note again the relationships between age and education levels: the older and the less educated the respondent the more likely s/he is to be in support of continuation of the peace process, identify with the “pro-peace camp” and favor the amendment of the Palestinian National Charter. In a

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similar question asked in Poll #20 (13-1 5 October 1995), pending the decision to amend the Charter, 50% supported and 39% opposed it.

T a b le 3 A ttitude on Continuation of the Peace Process, Identification with Support/Oppose Camp, Amendment of National Charter by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts (n) ______Continuation Camp Amend Charter support oppose peace opposition support oppose Total 8 1.1 (7 9 0 ) 12.5 (1 2 2 ) 69.0(673);; 11.6(113) 47.6 (464): 3 1 .9 ( 3 1 1 ) R egio n W est B a n k 77.8 (469 ) 16.8 (1 0 1 ) 66.9 (4 0 3 ) 13.9 (8 4 ) 4 4 .7 (2 7 0 ) 37.2 (2 2 5 ) G aza S trip 8 6.3 (32 1) 5.6 (2 1 ) 72.5 (2 7 0 ) 7 .8 (2 9 ) 5 2 .2 (1 9 4 ) 2 3.2 (8 6 ) G e n d e r M a le 80.4 (38 5 ) 13.6 (6 5 ) 6 9 .7 (3 3 3 ) 13.8 (6 6 ) 4 8 .0 (2 3 0 ) 39.2 (1 8 8 ) F em ale 8 1 .7 (40 2) 11.6 (5 7 ) 6 8 .7 (3 3 8 ) 9.3 (4 6 ) 4 6 .9 (2 3 0 ) 25.1 (1 2 3 ) E d u c a tio n Illiterate-Elementary 8 4.6 (21 6) 8.1 (2 1 ) 75.7 (1 9 3 ) 5.1 (1 3 ) 52.1 (1 3 3 ) 18.4 (4 7 ) Secondary-H.S. Diploma 8 1.9 (48 8) 13.3 (7 9 ) 68.6 (4 0 8 ) 12.6 (7 5 ) 4 7 .6 (2 8 3 ) 33.6 (2 0 0 ) Colleee-Post Graduate 6 9 .6 (82 ) 17.9 (2 1 ) 5 7.6 (6 8 ) 19.9 (2 4 ) 3 6.4 (4 3 ) 53.5 (6 3 ) Age 18-27 7 7.2 (27 3 ) 14.4 (5 1 ) 6 2 .6 (2 2 1 ) 14.5 (5 1 ) 4 5 .7 (1 6 1 ) 34.4 (1 2 1 ) 2 8 -3 7 7 9 .7 (20 2) 14.5 (3 7 ) 6 9 .7 (1 7 7 ) 12.7 (32 ) 4 6 .2 (1 1 7 ) 36.1 (9 1 ) 38-4 7 8 2.5 (13 9) 11.8 (2 0 ) 7 3 .7 (1 2 3 ) 8.8 (15 ) 52.8 (8 9 ) 29.4 (4 9 ) 4 8 + years old 89.1 (172 ) 7.1 (1 4 ) 75.9 (1 4 8 ) 6.9 (1 3 ) 4 8 .2 (9 4 ) 23.8 (4 6 )

Domestic Politics Such high support for the continuation o f the peace process, but divided views on its outcome based on regional factors and future outlook, is partly explained by the perception of improvement and trust (or lack of it) in the new Palestinian government and institutions. These findings suggest that there is a strong relationship between a positive or negative assessment o f the domestic national reconstruction and transition to democracy efforts and support or opposition to the peace process. This observation can be measured in several attitudinal variables and tested by the strength of the relationship between these variahles.

I) Governance Most Palestinians we polled (56%) trust the ability of the newly formed- Palestinian government to improve the general Palestinian performance, 21.1% eave a negative response and 22.8% are not sure at this time. Trust varies by region: Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are more likely to trust the government (60.7%) than in the West Bank (53.2%), but there is no regional difference between those who are not sure. Women also expressed a higher level pf trust than men, who, in turn, are more likely to not to trust the new government (see Table 4). There is a strong negative relationship between trust and education level: the higher the education level the lower the level of trust in the government's ability to improve the Palestinian performance (see Table 4). Age of the respondent has no discernible affect on this attitude.

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W hen asked to assess the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), 36.9% rated it as “Fair”, 28.7% as “Good” and lastly 14.8% as “Bad”. Similar to the trust in the new government, a similar percentage (20.2% ) are not' sure about the performance of the newly elected PLC. As with most variables already discussed, we find a similar pattern in terms o f region, gender, education and age of respondent (please refer to Table 4). In the Election Day Survey (20 January 1996), respondents expressed a higher level of optimism toward candidates they elected. 43% expected that the candidate they voted for will fulfill their election campaign promises; 47% thought that they will to some extent; while only 10% said that the candidates will not. Despite the low rating of the performance of PLC, relative to respondents’ expectations, a great majority (78.4%) of all Palestinians polled intends to participate in the up coming elections for local councils in their area. This finding is higher than the 71% who said that they will participate in the general elections for the PLC, obtained in Poll #20 (13-15 October 1995). As with the General Elections, SRU plans to track participation in local elections over time in future polls.

T a b le 4 Trust in New Government and Performance of Palestinian Legislative Council by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts (n) ______New Government Performance of PLC Trust Not Trust Good Fair B ad N o t Sure T o ta l 5 6 .0 (5 4 6 ) 2:1.1 (206) 28.0 (272) 36:9(3591 14.8(144) 20:2.(196) Region West Bank 53.2 (3 2 1 ) 24.0 (145) 2 8 .7 (1 7 3 ) 37.7 (227) 16.8 (101) 16.8 (10 1 ) Gaza Strip 60 .7 (2261 16.4 (61 ) 26.9 (99 ) 3 5 .7 (1 3 2 ) 1 i .6 (43) 25.8 (95) G e n d e r M ale 52.6 (2 5 2 ) 25.9 (124) 24.9 (119) 38.7 (185) 18.2 (87 ) 18.2 (8 7 ) Female 59.3 (2 9 0 ) 16.7 (82 ) 31.2 (152) 3 5 .0 (1 7 1 ) 11.5 (56) 22.4 (109 ) Education Illiterate-Elementary 64.5 (1 6 3 ) 13.4 (34 ) 38.4 (98 ) 27.4 (70) 10.9 (28 ) 23.3 (59 ) Secondarv-H.S. Diploma 55.0 (3 2 8 ) 2 2.0 (1 3 1 ) 25.9 (153) 3 9 .7 (2 5 3 ) 15.3 (90) 19.1 (1 13) Collepe-Post Graduate 4 2 .6 (50 )' 33.7 (40 ) 17.2 (21) 41.3 (49) 21.9 (2 6 ) 19.5 (23) Age 18-27 54.0 (1 9 1 ) 22.3 (79 ) 24.7 (87 ) 43.1 (151) 13.2 (46 ) 19.0 (67 ) 28-37 55.7 (1 4 1 ) 23.4 (59 ) 28.6 (72 ) 35.0 (88) 17.2 (44 ) 19.2 (48) 38-47 59.9 (1 0 0 ) 19.2 (3 2 ) 31.7 (53 ) 35.7 (60 ) 15.4 (26 ) 17 1 (29 ) 48+ vears old 58.0 (1 1 2 ) 17.6 (34 ) 31.0 (60 ) 28.8 (56) 14.0 (27) 26.2 (51)

2) Transition to Democracy Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip are divided on the status of freedom o f expression, an important indicator in the transition to democracy, under the Palestinian National Authority. About 48% of the respondents believe that freedom of expression has become better since the arrival of the. PNA; while another 48% think it has become worse or did not change. Palestinians in the Gaza Strip (52.1%) are more likely than in the West Bank

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(44.8% ) to think that the freedom of expression has improved; with no regional difference for those who think it has become worse; but more West Bankers (20.6% ) than Gazans (12.4%), however, say that it has not changed since the arrival of the PNA. Similarly, 49% feel that people today cannot criticize the PNA without fear, and only 42% feel that they can. There is no significant difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip. For both of these variables, men are more likely than women to think the freedom o f expression has become worse or has not changed under the PNA and are more fearful to criticize the PNA. There are also strong negative relationships between freedom of expression and criticism with age and education o f the respondent: the older and less educated a respondent, the more likely s/he thinks that freedom of expression has improved and can criticize the P N A without fear (see Table 5).

T a b le 5 Freedom of Expression and Ability to Criticize the PNA by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts ______Freedom of Expression C ritic is m o f P N A better no change worse without fear with fear Total 47.6 (4653 . 17.5(171) 30.5 (298) 43.9 C429) 49.1 (479) Region West B ank 44.8 (27 1) 20.6 (1 2 5 ) 30.3 (1 8 3 ) 44 .3 (2 6 8 ) 48.3 (2 9 2 ) Gaza Strip 52.1 (19 4) 12.4 (4 6 ) 30.9 (1 1 5 ) 4 3 .3 (16 1 ) 50.3 (1 8 7 ) G e n d e r M en 41.0 (19 7) 15.8 (7 6 ) 39.4 (1 8 9 ) 39.C. (187) 55.3 (2 6 5 ) W om en 53.5 (26 3) 19.1 (9 4 ) 2 2 .2 (1 0 9 ) 4 8 .9 (24 1 ) 42.7 (2 1 0 ) E d u c a tio n Illiterate-Preparatory 56.5 (14 4) 16.6 (4 3 ) 2 2.4 (5 7 ) 52.0 (1 3 3 ) 38.5 (9 8 ) Secondary-H.S. Diploma 47.6 (28 4 ) 18.0 (1 0 7 ) 30.4 (1 8 1 ) 4 3 .6 (2 6 0 ) 50.6 (3 0 2 ) College-Post Graduate 27.8 (33 ) 16.1 (1 9 ) 49 6 (5 9 ) 29 3 (3 5 ) 63 8 676) Age 18-27 42.3 (15 0) 18.6 (6 6 ) 34.5 (1 2 2 ) 39.4 (1 3 9 ) 55.2 (1 9 5 ) 28-37 46.4 (118 ) 17.6 (4 5 ) 32.5 (8 3 ) 4 4 .7 (1 1 4 ) 49.7 (12 6 ) 38-47 50.7 (8 6 ) 1 8 6 (3 1 ) 2 5 .7 (4 3 ) 4 6.0 (7 7 ) 44.3 (74) 48— vears old 55.9 (109 ) 14.5 (2 8 ) 24 6 (4 8 ) 4 9 .5 (9 7 ) 40 4 (79)

On a question related to the issues of freedom of expression and the ability to criticize the Palestinian National Authority without fear, CPRS asked respondents to rate the treatment of Palestinian citizens by the police and security services. 44.3% of the respondents feel that the treatment is “Good”, 36.8% “Fair” and 14.4% “Bad”. Although Palestinians on the West Bank tend to be more critical o f the PNA and its institutions overall, 46.7% rate the police and security services as “Good”, compared to 45.5% in the Gaza Strip, who, in turn, mostly (42%) assessed the treatment of citizens as “Fair”. Men have a more critical attitude toward the police and security services than women. There is also a strong negative relationship between education level and assessment of treatment: the more educated the more likely to rate it as “Bad”. Older respondents tend to think that the treatment is “Good”, but the bulk of

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the younger respondents think it is “Fair”. Refugees also gave a more favorabie- assessment than non-refugees (see Table 6).

In a telling answer question about the truthfulness of responses to this poll, which is also intended to measure people’s perceptions freedom o f expression under the Palestinian Authority, 21% said that most people are afraid to give truthful answers and 45% said some people are afraid to give truthful answers to the questions. On the other hand, less than one percent of the respondents admitted that they themselves ' have not give truthful answers to a ll o f the questions; and only 5% said they have give truthful answers to some o f the questions; 81 % claimed they have given truthful answers to a ll o f the questions and 13% to most o f the questions.

As for the Palestinian media in the process of democratization, more respondents (41% ) think that the Palestinian media under the PN A have shown a commitment to the freedom of expression and democracy; compared to 33% who think they have failed to uphold such values. Again, regional differences are significant; as 37.6% of Palestinians in the West Bank and 46.8% in the Gaza Strip believe that the Palestinian media uphold the freedom o f expression and democracy. Conversely, 40.1% in the West Bank and 31.2% in the Gaza. Strip think, that the Palestinian media have failed. There is no regional difference among people who have no opinion on this matter. More women (42.5% ) than men (39.2%), in our sample, think that the Palestinian media uphold democratic values, as do the less educated (see Table 6). Also, there is a difference between refugees and non-refugees: 38.9% of refugees compared to 42.5% of non-refugees think that the Palestinian media are democratic (please refer to Table 6).

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T a b le 6 Palestinian Police & Security and the M edia Under the Palestinian Authority by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts ______Palestinian Police & Security M e d ia good fair bad dem ocratic undemocratic T o ta l 44.3 <433) 3 6.8 (3 5 9 ) 14.4(1-40) 41.1 (402) . 36.7(359) Region W est Bank 46.7 (28 2 ) 33.6 (203 ) 14.0 (85 ) 37.6 (2 2 8 ) 40.1 (2 4 3 ) Gaza S trip 40.5 (1 5 1 ) 42.0 (15 6) 15.0 (56) 4 6 .8 (1 7 4 ) 3 1 .2 (1 1 6 ) G e n d e r M en 38.4 (184 ) 40.3 (193) 18.2 (87 ) 39.2 (1 8 8 ) 44.8 (2 1 5 ) W om en 49.9 (2 4 6 ) 33.4 (164) 10.8 (53 ) 42.5 (2 0 9 ) 2 9.3 (14 4 ) E d u catio n Illiterate-Preparatory 57.5 (14 7 ) 28.8 (73) 9.3 (24 ) 42.3 (1 0 8 ) 27 1 (69 ) Secondary-H.S. Diploma 41.0 (2 4 4 ) 40.1 (239 ) 15.1 (90 ) 4 2.9 (2 5 5 ) 36.9 (2 2 0 ) Colleee-Post Graduate 30.8 (37 ) 38.3 (4 6 ) 22.7 (27) 29.3 (35 ) 57.7 (6 9 ) Age 18-27 39.7 (14 0 ) 41.0 (14 5) 15.2 (54 ) 45.4 (1 6 1 ) 37.2 (131 ) 28-37 43.0 (10 9) 34.4 (8 7 ) 17.9 (46) 39.2 (9 9 ) 39.5 (10 0 ) 38-17 48.2 (8 1 ) 38.8 (6 5 ) 10 ] (17 ) 34.7 (59 ) 38.5 (65) 48-*- vears old 51.8 (101 ) 29.6 (581 12.3 (24 ) 4 0.9 (80) 30.7 (60) Refugee Status Refugee 40.3 (16 1 ) 39.6 (1 5 8 ) 16.8 (6 7 ) 38.9 (1 5 6 ) 39.8 (2 1 5 ) Non-Refugee 47.0 (2 6 8 ) 34.9 (20 0) 12.8 (73 ) 42.5 (24 3) 3 4.7 (1 4 4 )

Some 51% of the respondents are able to watch the Palestinian T V station in their area: in the Gaza Strip it is 84% while in the West Bank it is only 30%. The most popular TV station among Palestinians in the West Bank is the Jordanian station (watched by more than 54% of the respondents), followed by local stations in the different cities o f the West Bank (13% ) and the Palestinian and Israeli stations (each watched by about 9%). In the Gaza Strip, where the signal of the Palestinian TV station is easily received by 84.2% of the respondents, 56.6% watch this more than any other; while only 6% watch the Jordanian T V station (whose signal is not clearly received). The Egyptian T V station is the second most popular station in the Gaza Strip (16%); and the Israeli is the third, with 12% watching (see Table 7). No local TV stations are available in the Gaza Strip.

T a b le 7 Ability to W atch Palestinian TV station, T V Station Most Watched by Palestinians and Most Trusted News Bulletins (Palestinian, Jordanian and Israeli) by Region, weighted

Most Watched T V Most Trusted News Bulletin Palestinian Jordanian Israeli Palestinian Jordanian Israeli T o ta l ; 26.7 (356) 36.1 (345) -10.3 (9 8 ) 2 1 :0 (2 0 0 ) . 18.4 (174) 32-3 (306) - Region West Bank 8.5 (83) 54.2 (5 3 1 ) 9.4 (92) 10.1 (99) 23.5 (230) 33.5 (328) ; Gaza Strip 56.6 (5 5 5 ) 6.4 (63 ) 1 1 .7 (1 1 5 ) 39.1 (383) 10.0 (98) 30.3 (297)

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As shown in Table 7, when it comes to trusting the news bulletins o f different T V stations, the picture is different. The most trusted news bulletin in the Gaza Strip is the Palestinian TV station (39.1%), followed by Israeli (30.3% ) and lastly Jordanian T V (10%). In the West Bank 34% trust Israeli new bulletins, 24% Jordanian, 11% foreign stations and 10% Palestinian. Among those who actually receive the Palestinian T V signal in the West Bank, only 21% say they trust the new bulletins the most.

3) Political Affiliation CPRS has tracked political affiliation over time in two ways. First, by asking respondents directly to state their political affiliation (i.e., party or faction). In’ this poll, we adopted a second approach of asking respondents to identify themselves with a party or faction that supports or opposes the peace process which we intend to track over time (see Table 3 for total figures and breakdown by demographic distribution). As for political affiliation, directly stated by the respondent, there is an overall stability in the distribution of responses since December 1994, with a few notable exceptions. One, affiliation with Hamas has declined since December from nearly 17% to 7.8%, averaging 10-points; as has Fateh, the largest political party among Palestinians. Affiliation with Fetah reached a high o f 55.3% in December 1995, but in this poll, affiliation has fallen a full 12-points below its high and 4-points below its average (47.3% ) since December 1995. Accompanying declines in Fateh and Hamas, there has been a notable steady increase in respondents with “None of the Above” political affiliation. With an average of 19.7%, this group has grown from a low of 11.7% in December 1995 to its highest point (28.1%) in this June poll (see Table 8).

T a b le 8 Political Affiliation, weighted percentages and counts (n) December 1994 December 1995 March 1996 Jane 1996 A verag e (°/o) Hamas 16.6(177) 9.7 (110) 5.8 (7 3 ) 7 8 (7 6 ) 10.0 A l-S h a ’b 0.8 (9 ) 1.8 (2 1 ) 1.7 (2 2 ) 2 .4 a s ) 1.7 00 rri /—s rr PFLP 6.7 (7 2 ) 2.1 (2 6 ) 4 0 (39) 4.2 Fateh 43.1 (4 6 0 ) 55.3 (6 2 8 ) 47.5 (5 9 7 ) 4 3 ,3 (4 2 4 ) 47.3 Feda 0.8 (9 ) 0.4 (5 ) 0.2 (2 ) 0 7 (7 ) 0.6 Islamic Jihad 2.6 (28) 2.0 (23) 1.0 (13) 19 (1 0 ) 1.9 DFLP 1.4 (1 5 ) 1.5 (1 7 ) 1.1 (14)1 0 8 (7 ) 1.2 Islamic Independent 3.7 (39) 3.6 (41) 4.4 (5 5 ) 3 7 (36) 3.9 National Independent 4.9 (52) 3.2 (3 6 ) 6.0 (7 5 ) 4.5 (4 4 ) 4.7 None of the Above 1 1 .7 (1 2 5 ) 13.8 (1 5 7 ) 25.0 (3 1 4 ) 28.1 (2 7 5 ) 19.7 Others 7.7 (82) 4.8 (55) 5.3 (6 7 ) 2 0 (2 8 ) . 5.2 T o ta l 100.0(1068) 100.0(1136) 100.0 (1258) 100.0 (980) —

For the three largest political groups in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (Fateh, Hamas and None of the Above), there are some notable demographic variations.

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Within Hamas and the None of the Above categories, there is no regional differences, but more women than men identify their political affiliation with both groups. Palestinians in the West Bank (49.7%) are more likely than Gazans (39.3%) to support Fateh, as are men, the less educated and younger respondents in our sample (see Table 9).

T a b le 9 Political Affiliation (Hamas. Fateh and None of the Above) by Selected Variables, weighted percentages and counts ______H am as Fateh N o ne o f the A bove TotaJ 7.8 (76 > : 43.3 (422) 28.1 (2 7 4 ) R egion W est Bank 8.8 (53', 39.3 (237) 29 4 (1 7 7 ) G aza Strip 6.2 (23) 49.7 (185) 26.0 (97 ) G e n d e r M a le 5 8 (2 8 ) 46.8 (224) 22.8 (1 0 9 ) Fem ale 4 7 (4X) 40.2 (197) 33.1 (16 3 ) E d u catio n 11 literale-Preparalory X.3 (2 1 ) 42.9 (1 10) 29.1 (74 ) Secondary-H.S Diploma 7.3 (43 ) 45.4 (270) 28.3 (1 6 9 ) College-Post. Graduate 10.0 (12) 34.6 (41) 25.1 (30 ) Age 18-27 8.4 (30 ) 44.7 (158) 26.7 (94) ZX-37 8.8 (22) 45.3 (115) 26.7 (68) 3X-47 X.2 (14 ) 42.6 (72) 2 7 .7 (4 7 ) 48+ vears old 5.0 ( 10) 40.2 (78) 33.1 (64 )

There is also a significant relationship between gender, political affiliation and. attitudes toward the national reconstruction effort. With Hamas, Fateh and the None o f the Above categories women tend think that the freedom o f expression is better under the Palestinian National Authority, the Palestinian media uphold the values of freedom of expression and democracy and can criticize the PNA without fear (compare statistics across Table 10).

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T a b le 10 Political Affiliation of Men and Women by Attitudes toward Freedom of Expression, the Palestinian M edia and Ability to Criticize the PNA, weighted percentages and counts Political Affiliation Hamas Fateh None of the Above ' men " women men women m en wom en Freedom of Expression B e tte r 32.1 (9 ) 37.9 (18 ) 5 4 .9 (1 2 3 ) 67.1 (13 3 ) 28.4 (31 ) 44.4 (7 2 ) N o Change 7-1 (2) 18.4 (9) 17.4 (3 9 ) 16.7 (33 ) 15.6 (17 ) 21.0 (3 4 ) W o rse 57.1 (161 4 1.4 (20 ) 24.6 (5 5 ) 13.6 (27) 45.9 (54) 26.8 (4 3 ) Palestinian Media D em o cratic 42.9 (12 ) 39.1 (19 ) 5 1 .8 (1 1 6 ) 52.2 (103) 24.8 (27) 32.8 (5 3 ) Undemocratic 42.9 (12 ) 39.1 (19 ) 34.4 (7 7 ) 22.9 (45 ) 53.2 (58 ) 30.7 (5 0 ) Criticism of PNA W ith Fear 46.4 (13 ) 47.1 (23) 4 7 .3 (1 0 6 ) 58.8 (116) 26.9 (29 ) 40.3 (6 5 ) Without Fear 53.6 (14) 49.4 (2 4 ) 4 6 .0 (1 0 3 ) 37.0 (73 ) 66.7 (72 ) 4 5.4 (7 4 )

Attitudes toward the future of the peace process, as measured by several variables, are strongly associated with identification with the “peace” or “oppose” camps, in some surprising and expected ways. Unsurprisingly, people with the “peace camp” overwhelmingly support the continuation of the peace process (91.6%); but are more hesitant about the amendment of the National Charter (57.5% ), as stipulated by agreements with Israel. Moreover, those who are within the “peace camp” tend to be optimistic about the Israeli elections or think they won’t change the future of the peace process (40.2% and 29.3%, respectively). Yet, they also think that the final status negotiations will lead to an acceptable solution (52%) and Arab countries are committed to uphold Palestinian rights (50%).

On the other hand, those respondents who identify with the “oppose camp” can be characterized as pessimistic on all these issues; importantly, and surprisingly, 39 .5% support the continuation o f the peace process, despite their identification with the “oppose camp:, compared to 47.7% who oppose the continuation of the peace process. The “ swing camp” , as on domestic issues, are mainly pessimistic, with one exception; the bulk (44.7% ) of swing respondents think the outcome of the recent Israeli elections will not change the future of the peace process (see Table 11).

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T a b le 11 Support/Oppose Peace (Process) Camps by Attitudes toward the Future of the Peace Process, weighted percentages and counts ______Support/Oppose Peace (Process) Camps Support Camp Swing Oppose Camp Israeli Elections O p tim istic 40.2 (270) 25.2 (48) 15.9(18) N o Change 29.3 (201 ) 44.7 (8 5 ) 34.5 (39 ) Pessimistic 2 5 .7 (1 7 3 ) 23.7 (4 5 ) 46.0 (52 ) Final Status Negotiations Acceptable 52.0 (35 0) 32.8 (62) 17.4 (19) Unacceptable 39.8 (28 6) 22.9 (1 0 6 ) 79.7 (89 ) Arab Summit Can R elv 50.0 (33 4) 33.8 (63) 19.0 (21) Cannot Relv 43.9 (29 3 ) 56.8(106) 79.0 (89) Continuation of Peace Process Support 91.6 (61 5 ) 68.0 (1 2 9 ) 39.3 (45 ) Oppose 5.6 (40 ) 15.1 (2 9 ) 47.7 (54) Amendment of National Charter Support 57.5 (38 7) 33.7 (6 3 ) 11.8 (13) Oppose 2 3 .7 (1 5 9 ) 33.0 (6 2 ) 79.1 (89)

Identification with either the “peace camp” or “opposition camp”, as indicated by our findings, is strongly associated with positive or negative attitudes toward domestic political issues than with regional factors and future outlook. As shown in Table 12, the bulk of the respondents both support the “peace camp” and believe that Palestinians can trust their government (66.1% ) and its elected' representatives (84.4% think the performance of the PLC is “Good”), exercise the freedom of expression (57.1%), criticize the PNA (50.4%) and that the treatment o f Palestinian police and security is “Good” (84.4% ).

Note, however, that the strength of the statistical (not numerical) relationships moves in the opposite direction with identification of the “swing” and “oppose” camps. In other words, respondents who identify with the “swing” or “oppose” camps are much more likely to be critical of the government and its institutions. For example, 50.9% of those in the “oppose camp” believe that they cannot trust the government; only 25.7% feel that they are able to criticize the PNA without fear; moreover, 36.1% assess the treatment of Palestinian citizens by their police and security as “Bad” compared to only 19.1% who believe it is “Good”. As can be expected, there is less variation between negative and positive attitudes among those respondents who identify with the “swing” camp, but, nevertheless, they are overall more negative in their assessments than the “peace camp” (see Table 12).

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T a b le 12 Support/Oppose Peace (Process) Camps by Attitudes toward Domestic Politics, weighted percentages and c o u n t s ______Support/Oppose Peace (Process' Cam ps Support Camp Swing Oppose Camp Abilitv to Criticize PNA A ble 50.4 (3 3 9 ) 32.1 (61) 25.7 (29) Not A b le 42.8 (2 8 8 ) 57.3 (1 0 8 ) 72.4 (821 Freedom of Expression Better 57.1 (3 8 4 ) 32.8 (62) 15.9 (18) No Chanee 15.6 (1 0 5 ) 25.5 (4 8 ) 67.5 (7 6 ) W orse 22.8 (1 5 3 ) 36.0 (68 ) 14.8 (1 7 ) Performance of PLC Good 84.4 (2 2 9 ) 11.8 (32) ■ 3.9 (11) Fair 68.8 (2 4 7 ) 19.4 (70 ) I 1.7 (42 ) Bud 44.7 (6 4 ) 29.4 (4 2 ) 25.9 (3 7 ) Not Sure 66 7 (1 3 1 ) 22.7 (4 4 ) 10.7 (2 1 ) Treatment bv Police & S ecu ritv Crood 52.0 (3 5 0 ) 32 4 (61 ) 19 1 (22 ) Fair 33.1 (2 2 3 ) 49.3 (93 ) 37.6 (4 2 ) Bad 11.7 (7 8 ) 11.2 (13) 36.1 (41) Trust in Government Trust 66.1 (4 4 4 ) 41.5 (78) 21.3 (24) Not Sure 20.2 (1 3 6 ) 29.0 (55) 27.8 (31) Not Trust 13.7 (9 2 ) 29.4 (55) 50.9 (57)

To summarize, there is a strong relationship between satisfaction or disillusionment with the national reconstruction process and identification with the support and opposition camps of the peace process. In other words, opponents of the peace process are largely critical of domestic issues and pessimistic about its future. Although some supporters o f the peace process are also critical o f the new Palestinian government and its institutions as well as the final status negotiations Israel, on the whole, they fully endorse the continuation of the peace process and are largely satisfied with the national reconstruction effort on the domestic level. As for the swing camp, who comprise a sizable. minority of the population, their support for the continuation of the peace process appears to be mainly associated with a combination of present trust in the government and an optimism toward finding an acceptable solution in the final status negotiations with Israel.

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Results of Public Opinion Poll #23 The Peace Process, Freedom o f Expression, Arab Summit, and the Performance o f the Palestinian Legislative Council 28-30 June 1996

W.Bank & Gaza W.Bank G aza 'Unemployment 37% 3 0 % 4 7 %

1. Regarding the future of the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis in the aftermath of the success of the L.ikud party and its leader, Netanyahu, in the Israeli elections, and after the form ation of a

W.Bank W.Bank Gaza & Gaza 1) optimistic 3 4 .4 % 29.6% 4 2 .2 % 2) pessimistic 2 7 .6 % 3 1.4% 2 1 .4 % 3) no change has taken place in 3 3 .3 % 34.8% 3 1.0% the peace process 4) no opinion 4 .7% 4 .3 % 5 .3 %

2. Regarding the freedom of expression since the arrival of the Palestinian Authority, I feel: 1) It has become better than before its arrival 47.6% 44.8% 52.1% 2) It has become worse than before its arrival 30.5% 30.3% 30.9% 3) It did not change 17.5% 20.6% 12.4% 4) No opinion 4.4% 4.4% 4.5%

3. Regarding the recent decision by the Palestine National Council to amend the Palestinian National Charter, I: 1) Support the decision 47.6% 44.7% 52.2% 2) Oppose the decision 31.9% 37.2% 23.2% 3) No opinion 20.5% 18.0% 24.6%

4. Regarding the Palestinian media under the Palestinian Authority, I see it 1) Upholds freedom of 41.1% 37.6% 46.8% expression and democracy 2) Shows failure to uphold freedom of 36.7% 40.1% 31.2% expression and democracy 3) No opinion 22.2% 22.3% 22.0%

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5. A fter the convening of the recent Arab Summit Conferences, do you feel that the Palestinians can rely on the Arab countries to support them in obtaining their rights?

1) Yes 43.1% 40.1% 48.0% 2) No 50.5% 54.5% 44.0% 3 ) N o opinion 6.4% 5.3% 8.0%

6. The formation of the new Palestinian government has recently been announced. Do you have trust it the ability of this government to improve the general Palestinian performance?

1) Yes 56.0% 53.2% 60.7% 2) No 21.1% 24.0% 16.4% 3) N ot sure 22.8% 22.8% 22.9%

7. Regarding the permanent status negotiations over Jerusalem, Refugees, Borders, and Settlements, between the Palestinian and Israeli sides, I believe:

1) There is a possibility to reach a solution 44.3% 39.8% 5 1.6% acceptable to the two parties 2) There is no possibility to reach a solution 47.5% 53.2% 38.2% acceptable to the two sides 3) No opinion 8.2% 7.-0% 10.2%

8. Regarding the treatment of citizens by the Palestinian police and security services, I feel it is

1) Good 44.3% 46.7% 40.5% 2) Fair 36.8% 33.6% 42.0% 3) Bad 14.4% 14.0% 15.0% 4) No opinion 4 .5% 5.7% 2.5%

9. In which camp do you classify yourself?

1) The camp o f the supporters of the 69.0% 66.9% 72.5% peace process 2) The camp of the opposition to the 11.6% 13.9% 7.8% peace process 3) I do not support or oppose the 19.4% 19.2% 19.8% peace process

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10. I believe the performance of the Palestinian Legislative Council so far has b e e n : 1) Good 28.0% 28.7% 26.9% 2) Fair 36.9% 37.7% 35.7% 3) Bad 14.8% 16.8% 11.6% 4) No opinion 20.2% 16.8% 25.8%

11. Do you intend to participate in the upcoming elections to the local council in y o u r area? 1) Yes 78.4% 78.6% 77.9%, 2) No 16.3% 16.8%, 15.4% 3) Not Sure 5.3% 4.5% 6.6%

12. In your opinion, can people today criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear? 1) Yes 43.9%, 44.3%, 43.3%, 2) No 49.1% 48.3% 50.3% 3) No opinion 7.0% 7.4% 6.3%

13. Regarding the current peace process between the Palestinian and Israel sides, I 1) Support its continuation 81.1% 77.8% 86.3% 2) Support ending it 12.5% 16.8% 5.6% 3) No opinion 6.4% 5.4% 8.0%

14. W hich of the following political trends do you support? 1) ppp 2.4% 2.6% 2.1% 2) PFLP 4.0% 3.5%, 4.9% 3) Fateh 43.3% 39.3%, 49.7%, 4) Hamas 7.8% 8.8%, 6.2% 5) D FLP 0.8% 0.5%, 1.2% 6) Islamic Jihad 1.9% 1.6% 2.4%, 7) Fida 0.7% 0.8% 0.6%, 8) Independent Islamists 3.7% 4.6%, 2.2% 9) Independent Nationalists 4.5% 5.5%, 2.8% 10) None of the above 28.1% 29.4%, 26.0%, 11) Others 2.9% 3.5% 1.9%

15. Are you able to watch the Palestinian T V station in your area? 1) Yes 50.7% 30.0% 84.2% 2) No 36.9% 53.8% 9.5% 3)Sometimes 12.5% 16.2%, 6.3%

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16. The T V station which I watch more than the others is (select one station o n ly ):

1) The Israeli Television 10.3% 9.4% 11.7% 2) The Jordanian Television 36.1% 54.2% 6.4% 3) The Palestinian Television 26.7% 8.5% 56.6% 4) The Egyptian Television 9.0% 4.6% 16.3% 5 ) Local T V stations 8.2% 13.3% — 6 ) Foreign stations 2.4% 3.1% 1.3% 7) Others 7.2% 6.9% 7.6%

. The T V station whose news bulletins I trust more than the others is 1) The Israeli Television 32.3% 33.5% 30.3% 2) The Jordanian Television 18.4% 23.5% 10.0% 3) The Palestinian Television 21.0% 10.1% 39.1% 4) The Egyptian Television 3.1% 2.1% 4.9% 5) Local T V stations 1.4% 2.1% 0.3% 6) Foreign stations 8.1% 10.9% 3.6% 7) Others 15.7% 18.0% 11.8%

Regarding the answers to the questions of this poll, I believe that: 1) Most people are afraid to give truthful 21.2% 20.6% 22.2% answers reflecting their attitudes 2) Some people are afraid to give 44.5% 46.4% 41.3% truthful answers reflecting their attitudes. 3) Most people give truthful answers 26.5% 25.5% 28.2% reflecting their attitudes. 4) No opinion 7.8% 7.4% 8.3%

As far as I am concerned, I 1) Have given truthful answers to 81.3% 82.1% 80.1% all the questions 2) Have given truthful answers to most 12.7% 12.5% 13.0% o f the questions 3) Have given truthful answers to some 4.7% 4.3% 5.4% of the questions 4) Have not given any truthful answers 0.2% 0.3% 0.1% 5) No opinion 1.1% 0.9 % 1.4%

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RESULTS OF CPRS PUBLIC OPINION POLL #24

SEPTEMBER 26-OCTOBER 17, 1996

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Poll # 24 26 September - 17 October 1996

♦ The Peace Process ♦ Performance O f the Palestinian Authority ♦ Performance of The Legislative Council

Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS) Nahlus-Palestine.P .O .B ox 132. Tel. (09) 3X03X3 Teli'ax. (09) 380384

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Introduction This is the twenty-fourth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research Unit (SRU), now part of the newly established Parliamentary Research Unit (PRU), at the Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS). It covers the topics o f the peace process, during and after the violent confrontations between Palestinians and Israelis, evaluation o f the three branches o f the Palestinian government and the police and security services, corruption in PA institutions and the economy.

The SRU has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an important phase in the history' o f the Palestinian people and to record the reactions o f Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to current events. The CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions it reaches. It is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to the study o f Palestinian politics. Toward this end, poll results provide a vital resource for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls also give members of the Palestinian community an opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision-makers on issues o f concern to them.

The following is an analysis of the results obtained in the twenty-fourth opinion poll conducted by the SRU. For further information, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki, at Tel: (09) 380-383 or Tel/Fax: (09) 380-384.

General Background This poll was preceded by major political events. Moreover, it was conducted during and in the aftermath o f the violent clashes between Palestinian demonstrators and police forces on one hand and Israeli soldiers on the other. In 27, August, 1996 Israeli authorities ordered the demolition o f“al-Laqlaq tower” building inside Jerusalem's old city. This decision led to several nonviolent confrontations in the city between Palestinian demonstrators and Israeli police. The Israeli government continued its policy o f confiscating the Jerusalem ED’s from the city’s Arab residents. Ramallah was closed by the Israeli army for several days after Palestinian security personnel detained a Palestinian Jerusalemite for questioning. A general strike was declared to protest the continued Israeli settlement policy and land confiscation.

Inside the Palestinian areas, several incidents took place highlighting the continued deterioration in human rights conditions. Several confrontations between demonstrators and Palestinian police took place in Nablus and Tulkarem in which one Palestinian was killed by the police. The chief justice o f the supreme court in the West Bank -was forced into retirement after he issued an order demanding the

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release o f Bir Zeit university students detained for several months without charges being made against them. Earlier, Dr. Iyad al-Sarraj, head o f the Independent Palestinian Citizen Right Commission, was arrested after making severe criticism against the PNA. In Nablus, a prisoner, Mohammed al-Jumail, died under torture in a Palestinian jail. A book by Edward Sa’id was temporarily banned in some Palestinian cities. The relationship between the executive and legislative branches o f government was showing signs o f strain after the president’s refusal to respond to the legislative council demand for signing the basic law which had passed the first reading in the council.

Meanwhile, Mr. Arafat met during this period with the Israeli prime minister, but the meeting failed to produce tangible results. The peace process was stalled as the new Israeli government demanded to re-negotiate some aspects of the Palestinian Israeli agreement on the Hebron Re-deployment.

On 25, September, 1996, the Israeli government ordered the opening of a tunnel beneath the walls of al-Aqsa mosque. The wailing wall tunnel was perceived by Palestinians as a step toward the Judization o f the city and as a threat to al-Aqsa mosque. This Israeli action led to the irruption o f major violent confrontation between Israelis and Palestinians throughout the West Bank and Gaza cities leading to death o f over 70 Palestinians. Sixteen Israeli soldiers also died in the clashes. Israeli forces imposed extreme restrictions on the movement of Palestinians in the West Bank. Tanks were deployed at the outskirts o f major Palestinian cities.

Methodology The questionnaire used in this poll was designed by CPRS researchers. Prior to the polling dates, the questionnaire was pre-tested on 50 respondents in the Nablus area. As in all o f our polls, it includes a large number o f demographic and attitudinal variables. (See Table 1 for the demographic distribution of the sample and the attached list of questions.) Usually, interviews are conducted within a three-day period (Thursday, Friday and Saturday).- For this poll, however, the survey was administered over a twenty-one day period, 26 September-17 October 1996, because clashes and closures prohibited fieldwork. SRU was able to conduct its fieldwork in the Gaza Strip within the scheduled three-day period (26- 28 September); for the West Bank, however, the period was extended from 26 September-17 October. The total sample is 1,233 persons, with 777 from the West Bank and 465 from the Gaza Strip.

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T a b le 1 Demographic Distribution & Characteristics of Sample, percentages & c o u n ts Characteristic % of Total Count Characteristic % of Total C o u n t R e g io n E d u ca tio n West Bank 63.0 777 Up to 9 y ears 25.6 316 G a z a S trip 37.0 456 10-12 years 53.9 664 T o ta l 100.0 1,233 2 years C ollege 7.6 94 University* 12.9 159 Area of Residence Marital Status City' 30.7 373 Single 21.5 264 Town/Village 50.8 618 Married 75.9 933 Refugee Camp 18.5 225 Divorced or 2.7 33 W idow ed A g e O c c u p a tio n 18-22 17.2 210 L abourer 9.1 111 23-2 7 19.3 236 C raftsm an 10.7 131 28 -3 2 14.6 178 H ousew ife 41.2 502 33-37 13.6 166 Specialist** 1.9 23 38-42 10.6 129 Employee*** 12.1 147 43 -4 7 5.8 71 M erchant 5.7 69 48 -5 2 5.1 62 Student 5.8 71 53 + 13.9 170 F arm er 2.5 30 Refugee Status R etired 1.6 19 R efugee 36.5 448 N one 9.5 116 Non-Refugee 63.5 779 G e n d e r R eligion M ale 50.0 617 M oslem 96.4 1187 F em ale 50.0 616 C h ristian 3.6 44 * Includes all post-secondary degree holders. ** Specialists are defined as Professors/University Instructors, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers, Pharmacists or Executives. * * * Employees Eire defmed as School Teachers, Government Employees, Nurses, Lower-Level Company Employees.

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1) selecting population locations with probabilities proportional to size o f sample (PPS); 2) selecting one or two random blocs from each location; 3) selecting a household using systematic random sampling; and 4) selecting a person 18-years or older from the household.

Households are selected based on a systematic sampling procedure. For example, if the fieldworkers estimate the number of houses in the sampling unit to be 100 and were assigned 10 interviews, the fieldworkers divide 100 by 10, obtaining 10. The fieldworkers then conduct the first interview in the 10th household, the second in the 20th and so forth. Fieldworkers start their sample selection o f households from a well recognized landmark such as a post office, mosque or business. They are instructed to report the direction o f their sampling routes, and play an active role in drawing maps o f each locality as well as estimating the number of housing units in each bloc.

Data Collection Prior to the survey, our fieldworkers participate in a number of workshops and training sessions where we discuss the aims and methods o f the poll. The topics we cover are household interviewing techniques, confidence building, mapping and sampling procedures. Four special training seminars were held prior to the poll which were attended by a total o f 75 fieldworkers.

Fieldworkers are grouped into teams o f two who are supervised by senior CPRS researchers. Senior researchers make random visits to interview locations to discuss the research process with the teams. M ore than fifty percent o f our fieldworkers are female, so as to ensure the representation o f women in the sample. To allow for careful interviewing, fieldworkers are assigned a limited number of interviews (an average of 17 per team).

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The non-response rate for this sample in approximately 8%. This is higher than the 3% usually obtained in past surveys. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their views out o f fear or disinterest in the present political circumstances.

Data Analysis The data were processed through SPSS, a computer program that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies.

For this poll, we estimate the margin of error to be ± 3 % .

Summary of Results Unemployment The results of this poll show that the total unemployment rate for the West Bank and Gaza Strip is 38%, which indicates no change since June 1996 (Poll #23), but an 1 1-point decrease since March 1996 (Poll #22). As consistently found in previous polls, unemployment in the Gaza Strip (45%) is higher than in the West Bank (34%). The high rates can be mainly attributed to the continued closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since the February and March 1996 bombings. Note, these figures are based on respondents 18-years or older and on a definition o f unemployment used by the International Labour Organization (ILO ).

O v e rv ie w Attitudes toward the peace process, generally indicate a high level o f support for its continuation. This finding is surprising given that this attitude was measured during and after a period o f intense violent clashes between Palestinian civilians and security forces and Israeli military forces and settlers. Moreover, the poll also found that most Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip think that the peace process has negatively affected the economy; and barely a majority think that it will lead to a state in the near future.

These poll results, point to a possible explanation for this contradiction: Support for the continuation o f the peace process with Israel remains high because support for a political leadership which in turn supports the process is high. In other words, positive evaluation for the Palestinian leadership, particularly for the Executive branch, is one o f the most highly explanatory intervening variables in the relationship between people’s perception o f the economy and their expectations for the future and support or opposition for the peace process.

Future o f the Peace Process Although this poll was conducted during violent clashes in the West Bank and Gaza Strip at the end o f September, 70% o f all respondents support the continuation of the peace process with Israel. This support has decreased 11-

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percentage points, however, from its highest level (81% ) in June 1996 (see Poll #23). Opposition to the continuation of the peace process rose from 12% to its highest level o f 24.8%, during this same period. Also, despite such high support, general optimism does not exceed 53%; while 41.6% of all respondents are pessimistic about the future. Barely a majority (50.9% ) of the respondents believe that the peace process will lead to the establishment o f a Palestinian State in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the near future, and 33.5% do not expect such an outcome. Table 2 summarizes the demographic distribution of responses toward o f continuation o f the peace process, expectations of a State and outlook for the future.

T a b le 2 Support for the Continuation of the Peace Process, Expectation for State and Future Outlook by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & counts* Continuation Expect a State Future S u p p o n O ppose Y es No O ptim istic Pessimistic T o ta l 69.8 (856) 24:8 (304} :. : 5G.9 (624) 33 5 £410) 53.0 (652} 4 i .6 (512} R e g io n W est B ank 67.8 (524) 26.4 (204) 49.4 (382) 37.0 (286) 51.4 (399) 44.1 (342) G aza S trip 73.3 (332) 22.1 (100) 53.5 (242) 27.4 (124) 55.7 (253) 37.4 (170) G e n d e r M ale 67.1 (412) 27.7(170) 48.4 (296) 38.6 (236) 51.9 (319) 44.4 (273) F em ale 72.5 (444) 21.9 (134) 53.4 (328) 28.3 (174) 54.1 (333) 38.9 (239) E d u c a tio n Illiterate-Elementary 80.3 (252) 15.0 (47) 61.3 (193) 20.6 (65) 52.5 (166) 39.2 (124) Preparatory- 68.8 (454) 26.4 (174) 52.1 (343) 33.6 (221) 55.1 (365) 39.9 (264) 67.7 (63) 21.5 (20) 41.9 (39) 46.2 (43) 46.8 (44) 48.9 (46) S econdary 54.7 (87) 39.6 (63) 30 8 (49) 50.9 (81) 48.7 (77) 49.4 (78) 2 Years College B.A.-Post Graduate T h e Don’t Know category is excluded from Table 2, but percentages are based on the total nu m ber o f responses.

The results presented in Table 2 indicate that although general support for the continuation o f the peace process is high, there are significant differences between Pa'estinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip, men and women and finally educational levels. As with many attitudinal variables, a consistent pattern of responses can be detected. That is, West Bankers, men and higher educated Palestinians tend to be more critical and pessimistic than their counterparts.

For example, educational level o f the respondents is strongly correlated with support or opposition to the peace process, expectations for a State in the near future and general optimism or pessimism. In nearly inverse proportion, respondents with less education have more positive views on these key issues than respondents with higher education levels. There is also a significant difference between men and women, but these differences disappear when educational level is

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controlled. In other words, women and men with similar educational levels, with a few exceptions, tend to also share similar attitudes toward most issues.

Interestingly, for this poll which was conducted during a time of intense clashes in the Gaza Strip and in the aftermath of closures throughout Palestine, Gazans are more likely than West Bankers to support continuing the peace process, have more optimism and expect the current negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians to lead to a State. This finding is surprising but not unusual. As in past polls, Gazans are usually more supportive and optimistic. Yet, unemployment rates in the Gaza Strip are consistently much higher than in the West Bank. Moreover, as displayed in Table 3, this poll finds that Gazans assess their economic conditions since the peace process as more negative than West Bankers. T a b le 3 Economic Conditions by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & c o u n ts * ______Effect of Peace Process on Palestinian Economv Verv Positive Positive B etw een Negative Verv Negative T o ta l 2 . 9 ( 2 9 ) 8 .7 ( 1 0 7 ) 1 9 .4 ( 2 3 9 ) 38 9 (479) 27.5 (338) R eg io n W est B ank 1.7 (1 3 ) 8.3 (6 4 ) 17.8 (1 3 8 ) 4 0 .9 (3 1 7 ) 2 8 .1 (2 1 8 ) G az a Strip 3.5 (1 6 ) 9.5 (4 3 ) 2 2 .2 (1 0 1 ) 3 5 .6 (1 6 2 ) 2 6 .4 (1 2 0 ) G e n d e r M en 2.3 (1 4 ) 8 .9 (5 5 ) 15.8 (9 7 ) 3 9 .5 (2 4 3 ) 3 1 .9 (1 9 6 ) W om en 2 .4 (1 5 ) 8.5 (5 2 ) 23.1 (1 4 2 ) 3 8 .4 (2 3 6 ) 2 3 .1 (1 4 2 ) E d u c a tio n Illiterate-Elementary 2 .5 (8 ) 9.5 (3 0 ) 1 8.4 (5 8 ) 3 8 .0 (1 2 0 ) 2 7 .5 (8 7 ) Preparatory-Secondary 2.4 (1 6 ) 8.5 (5 6 ) 2 0 .6 (1 3 6 ) 3 8 .3 (2 5 3 ) 2 7 .4 (1 8 1 ) 2 Years College 3 .2 (3 ) 10.6 (1 0 ) 2 4 !5 (2 3 ) 3 3 .0 (3 1 ) 2 5 .5 (2 4 ) B.A.-Posl Graduate 1.3 (2 ) 6 .9 (1 1 ) 1 3.8 (2 2 ) 4 7 .2 ( 7 5 ) 2 8 .9 (4 6 ) *The Don't Know' category is excluded from Table 3. but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Overall, the plurality of respondents (66.4% ) think that the peace process has had a ‘negative’ or ‘very negative’ affect on the Palestinian economy. When these categories are combined, the difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is substantial, as 69% of West Bankers and 62% of Gazans assess their economic conditions as negative or very negative. Men (32% ) are also more likely than women (23% ) to think that the economy has been ‘very negatively’ affected. Educational levels o f the respondents, which are usually highly correlated with income levels, seem to have no discernible affect on their assessment o f the economy. This could indicate that the problems of the economy (both in perceived and actual terms) are widespread, affecting all groups relatively similarly, rather than any group in particular.

These findings contradict conventional wisdom and one of the main premises o f the peace process. That is, simply put, economic development will increase support

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for the peace process. W hat partly explains this contradiction, as indicated by the results o f this and previous opinion polls, is that respondents’ attitudes toward continuing the peace process are related to their assessment of the performance o f their leadership and governmental institutions. It is the case that Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be broken (analytically) into roughly two groups: those that support the continuation o f the peace process and favor their government and those who are critical of both.

Performance of the Government and Its Institutions Generally, most respondents assessed the performances o f the Legislative Council, Judicial, the Executive (including the President and his Cabinet) branches o f the Palestinian Authority between a range of good and fair. The most positive overall evaluation was for the performance o f the President, with 72% o f all respondents considering his performance to be ‘good’ (42.8% ) or ‘very good’ (29.2% ). The second highest evaluation o f was given to the Executive Cabinet, which is closely affiliated with the Presidency, with 48.9% rating it as ‘good’ and 20.2% as ‘fair’. Respondents evaluated the performance o f the Palestinian Legislative Council mainly as ‘good’ (37.9%) but a quarter consider it ‘fair’ (25%). The PLC also was the least likely to receive the highest evaluation and the most likely to receive the lowest evaluation of all the branches (see Table 4). The Judicial branch of PA obtained the lowest overall evaluation, with 38.6% of all respondents considering its performance as ‘good’ and 18.5% as ‘fair’(see Table 4).

T a b le 4 Evaluation of Performance of the Four Branches of Government, percentages & c o u n t s ______Evaluation of Performance V .' Good . F a ir B a d V B a d N o O p in io n P resident 29.2 (358) 42.8 (525) 12.1 (149) 6.5 (80) 3.2 (39) 6.2 (76) C abinet 13.7 (168) 48.9 (597) 20.2 (247) 7.2 (88) 2.5 (31) 7.4 (91) Legislative 9.6 (118) 37.9 (467) 25.0 (308) 8.7 (107) 4.6 (57) 14.3 (176) Judicial 11.1 (136) 38.6 (474) 18.5 (227) 8.6 (106) 3.8 (47) 19.4 (239)

Please note, there is also a pronounced tendency for respondents to have 'no opinion’ on the performance of a particular branch of government and their evaluation o f its overall performance. In other words, the branches that are ranked the highest to lowest also correspond to an increasing level o f respondents with no opinion. For example, the percentage of people with ‘no opinion’ on the President’s performance is nearly three times lower than that for the Judicial branch.

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There are some notable demographic differences between respondents in their evaluations of the performance of their government; in many ways similar to the ‘no opinion’ response pattern. It is the case, as discussed above, that Gazans, wom en and lower educated Palestinians give higher evaluations o f each o f the branches than West Bankers, men and higher educated Palestinians. (Please see the appended list o f questions and distribution of responses for the West Bank and Gaza Strip, as the following discussion is not summarized in a separate table in the text.) It is also the case, moreover, that among these groups, theie is greater polarization between responses as positive assessments o f performance increase. For example, there are no significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, except in one notable category. Palestinians from the Gaza Strip are more likely to assess the performance of each branch as government as ‘very good’ than respondents from the West Bank (see Table 5).

T a b le 5 Very Good Evaluation of Performance by Region, percentages, counts & differences* ______Verv Good Performance President Cabinet Judicial Legislative W e s t B ank 24 .2 (1 8 7 ) 10.5 (8 1 ) 9.4 (7 3 ) 8 .2 (6 4 ) Gaza Strip_ ___ 3 7 .6 (1 7 1 ) 19.3 (8 7 ) 13.8 (6 3 ) _____ 1 1 .8 (5 4 ) Difference 13.4 Ky;;v:V ♦The Don’t Know category is excluded from Table 5, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

As shown in Table 5, West Bankers are more critical in their assessment o f the branches o f government than Gazans. Also note, the difference between the Gaza Strip and West Bank tends to decrease in relation to the overall assessment. For example, the difference between the West Bank and Gaza Strip is the greatest for the President (13.4 percentage-point difference) but steadily declines to its lowest level for the Legislative Council (3.6 percentage-point difference).

A similar trend can be detected for Palestinians with different educational levels. Table 6 shows the assessment o f the government by education level, with the categories o f evaluation collapsed into three, very good/good, fair and bad/very bad. For a basis o f comparison, also included in Table 6 is the percentage point difference between the highest (B.A.-Post Graduate) and lowest (Illiterate- Elementary) educational levels.

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T a b le 6 Evaluation of Performance of Government by Education Level, percentages, counts & differences* ______Vers- Good/Good F a ir Batl/Verv Bad P re s id e n t 111 i icralc-EIcm cniarv 78. 9 (247) 9.9 (31) 5 1 (21) Preparatory-Secondary 73.9 (590) 11.3 (75) 9.4 (62) 2-Ycar College (>4.9 ((>1) 11.7 (11) 14.9 (14) B.A.-Post Graduate 54.1 (85) 20.4 (32) 13.4 (18) D ifference 24.8 10.S - ; 8.3 C a b in e t tllilcratc-Elcnicntarv 65 1 (205) 17 8 (56) 6.3 (20) Preparatory-Secondary' (>5.4 (429) 19.8 (130) 8.2 (54) 2-Ycar College (>2.8 (59) 18.1 (17) 13.8 (13) B.A.-Post Graduate 46.9 (72) 27.0 (44) 1 1 9 .0 (3 2 ) D ifference 18.2 9.2 12.7 Legislative Illiterate-Elementary 50.6 (160) 19.6 (62) 9.2 (29) Prcpa ra torv-Scco nda ry 51.1 (349) 25.6 (170) 1 1.9 (79) 2-Ycar College 34.1 (71) 35 1 (33) 18.1 (17) B.A.-Post Graduate 33 9 (54) 27.0 (43) ______24.5 (39) D ifference .. 16.7 ; 7.2 ■ 15.3 J u d ic ia l Illilcralc-Elcmcniarv 51.8 (163) 16.9 (51) 7.9 (25) Preparatory-Secondary 50.7 (336) 17.8 (1 18) 12.8 (85) 2-Ycar College 48.9 (46) 22.3 (21) 14.9 (14) B.A.-Post Graduate 35.1 (65) 23.6 (37) 25.7 (29) D ifference 16.7 6 .7 17.8 *Tltc Don't Know category is excluded from Table 6. but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

For each branch o f government there is a strong negative relationship between educational levels of the respondents and their overall assessment o f performance. In each case, lower educated respondents are more likely to give positive evaluations than higher educated respondents, who in turn are more likely to give negative evaluations. This trend is particularly pronounced for the President, for example, as there is a nearly 25-percentage point difference between the highest and lowest educational categories for positive performance evaluation. Also note that only 5 .1% of the respondents who obtained a B.A. or higher level of education, but 13.4% o f the lowest educated, similarly assessed the President’s performance as 'very good'. The gap between educational levels narrows, however, from its highest level for the President, and continues to descend for the Cabinet, to the Council to its lowest point for the Judiciary.

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The Executive Branch: The Presidency and the Cabinet Positive overall assessment o f the Executive branch, including the President and the Cabinet, is also reflected in the evaluations for particular areas o f government. ‘Very good’ and ‘good’ evaluations were especially high for the fields of education (78.4% ), followed by health (66.5% ) and safeguarding the security o f citizens (65.4% ). The percentage of respondents who give positive evaluations decline, however, in the areas of promoting democracy and protecting human rights (41.4% ) and improving the economy (20.8% ). See Chart 1 below for a graphic depiction o f the evaluation of the government.

Chart 1 Evaluation of Areas O f Government, percentages

□ Very Good/Good S F a ir □ Bad/Verv Bad

Education Health Security Democracy Economy

As with performance evaluations o f the separate branches of government, discussed above, there are significant differences between the West Bank and Gaza Strip for particular areas of government, especially in the highest evaluation category (Very Good). It is the case that Gazans are nearly twice as likely than West Bankers to give the highest level of evaluation in the areas o f education (43.2% and 28.8%, respectively), security (30.5% and 16.1%, respectively) and health (31.1% and 15.4% respectively). For promoting democracy and human rights as well as the economy, however, there are no significant regional differences. There are also no significant differences in the evaluations o f higher and lower educated respondents, except in one area. Lower educated respondents are much more likely than higher educated respondents to give positive evaluations to their government in the area o f democracy and human rights (see Table7).

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T a b le 7 Evaluation of Government’s Performance in the Area of Democracy & Hum an Rights by Educational Level, percentages & counts ______Promoting Democracy & Protecting Human Rights V . Good Good Fair | B ad V, Bad No Opinion Illiterate-Elementary 6.1 (19) 39.3 (1 2 3 ) 15.0 (47) I 16.3 (51) 8.0 (25) 15.3 (4 8 ) Preparatorv-Secondarv 7.6 (50) 35.9 (237) 2 2 .2 (1 4 7 ) 18.6 (1 2 3 ) 9.7 (6 4 ) 6.1 (4 0 ) 2-Years College 8.5 (8) 26.6 (25) 25.5 (24) [ 21.3 (20) 16.0 (15) 2.1 (2 ) B .A. -Post-Graduate 1.9 (3) 27.2 (4 3 ) 21.5 (34) | 29.7 (47) 15.2 (24) 4.4 (7)

The difference between educational levels and the assessment o f the government in terms of human rights and democracy, is also reflected generally in the expectations for the direction o f government. As a little as one-third o f all respondents believe that the Palestinian government is moving toward a democratic system with respect for human rights, whereas 38% believe that it is moving toward a combination of a dictatorship and democracy. On the positive side, only 17% believe that it is moving toward a dictatorship. Once again, there is a strong relationship between educational level and attitudes toward the direction o f the governm ent, as indicated in Table 8.

T a b le 8 Direction of Palestinian Government by Educational Level, percentages & counts ______Direction of Government Democracy ComirinatidM Dictatorship No Opinion 11 literale-Elementary 36.2 (113) 32.4 (101) 11.5 (36) 19.9 (62) Preparatory-Secondary 34.1 (226) 38.5 (255) 16.9 (112) 10.6 (70) 2-Years College 26.6 (25) 37.2 (35) 26.6 (25) 9.6 (9) B.A.-Post Graduate 17.7 (28) 50.0 (79) 25.3 (40) 7.0 (11)

Although most respondents agree that the government is not heading toward a democracy, 62% of those who have had direct experiences with the police and security services think that its performance is ‘good’ or ‘very good’, 13.4% ‘fair’ and 23.5% ‘bad’ or ‘very bad’. (Note, these percentages are derived from only 19.6% of total respondents who said that they have had direct experience with the Palestinian police and security services.) Gazans, who have had direct experiences with the police and security services, are more likely than West Bankers to give positive evaluations (66.7% and 58.8% , respectively); while Palestinians in the West Bank are more likely to give negative evaluations (27.2% and 18.6%, respectively). Women also tend to be far less critical than men; and once again there is a negative correlation between education level and attitudes toward the police and security services.

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The results o f this poll show that there is a widespread belief among Palestinians that corruption exists in their government. Nearly a majority (49.3% ) of all respondents believe there is corruption in the institutions and agencies o f the Palestinian Authority; while only 27.1% think that there is no corruption. Moreover, o f the respondents who think that there is corruption, 40.1% think it w ill increase, 10% think it will remain the same in the future, while 40.5% believe it w ill decrease. Unlike other salient issues, there is no difference in opinions between the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see attached questions), except that Gazans (42.4% ) are more likely than West Bankers (37.1%) to think that corruption will decrease. Men tend to be more critical of the government on this issue than women. Respondents with higher levels of education tend to be the most critical o f all, as 70.7% of respondents with a B.A. or higher degree of education think that corruption exists in the PA. There is no significant relationship, however, between educational level and expectation for corruption to increase, remain the same or decrease (see Table 9).

T a b le 9 Corruption in the PA by Educational Level , percentages & c o u n ts Corruption in PA Institutions& A gencies Y es N o W ill Increase/Remain W ill Decrease Illiterate-Elementary 34.1 (1 0 7 ) 3 6 .6 (1 1 5 ) 46.5 (65) 32.1 (4 5 ) Preparatory-Secondary 4 9 .4 (3 2 7 ) 2 8 .9 (1 9 1 ) 4 4 .6 (139) 4 0 .2 (1 5 8 ) 2-Years College 6 4 .1 (5 9 ) 16.3 (1 5 ) 4 7 .8 (32) 43.3 (2 9 ) B.A.-Post Graduate 7 0 .7 (1 1 1 ) 7 .0 (1 1 ) 4 8 .0 (60) 40 .0 (5 0 ) ♦The Don’t Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 9. but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Despite a low evaluation o f the government in the areas of democracy, the economy and the perception that there is corruption in PA institutions, most people in the West Bank (50.5% ) and Gaza Strip (55.5% ) agree that the President’s popularity has increased since election day. On the other hand, a sizable percentage o f the total population believes that his popularity has remained the same (20.4% ) or decreased (21.3% ).

Perceptions on the President’s popularity are strongly related to people’s attitudes toward continuing the peace process with Israel, expectations that the negotiations will lead to a State in the near future and general optimism or pessimism (see Table 10).

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T a b le 10 President’s Popularity and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & c o u n ts * ______President’s Popularity Since his Election Increased No Change Decreased Continue Peace Process S upport 7 8 .6 (5 0 2 ) 73.1 (1 8 2 ) 4 8 .3 (1 2 5 ) O ppose 17.2 (1 1 0 ) 2 0 .9 (5 2 ) 4 6 .7 (1 2 1 ) Expect Palestinian State Y e s 6 3 .2 (4 0 2 ) 4 9 .4 (1 2 3 ) 2 5 .8 (6 7 ) N o 23 .4 (1 4 9 ) 32.1 (8 0 ) 6 0 .8 (1 5 8 ) General Outlook O p tim is tic 62 .5 (4 0 0 ) 4 8 .2 (1 2 0 ) 34.1 (8 9 ) Pessimistic 3 3 .6 (2 1 5 ) 4 4 .6 (1 1 1 ) 6 1 .3 (1 6 0 ) ♦The Don’t Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 10. but percentages are based on the total number o f responses.

As indicated in Table 10, respondents who think that the popularity o f the President has increased since his election are also more likely to support the continuation o f the peace process, expect a State and have optimism toward the future. The relationship is inverted for those who think his popularity has decreased. They are, overall, more critical and pessimistic. Interestingly, however, support or opposition toward the peace process is not related to the perception that the President’s popularity has decreased since the elections, as nearly the same percentage of supporters (48.3% ) and opponents (46.7% ) think his popularity has declined. The respondents who think that the President’s popularity has not changed tend to be slightly more optimistic, have higher expectations that the negotiations will result in a State, and by a wide majority, support continuing negotiations with Israel.

There are even stronger and clearer linear relationships between attitudes toward these same issues and the evaluation of the Presidency, as a branch o f government. This could indicate that respondents’ personal feelings toward President Arafat, as a leader, are less critical than their attitudes toward the Presidency as an institution. In other words, the division between supporter and opponents o f continuing negotiations with Israel becomes clearer when respondents are asked to evaluate the Presidency as an institution o f the Palestinian Authority (see Table 11).

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T a b le 11 Evaluation of the Presidency and Attitudes toward the Peace Process, Statehood and General Outlook, percentages & counts* ______Evaluation of Presidency Verv Good/Good F air Bad/Verv Bad Continue Peace Process S u p p o rt 8 0 .7 (7 0 9 ) 52.7 (78) 27.1 (32) O p p o s e 15.1 (1 3 3 ) 40.5 (60) 66.9 (79) Expect Palestinian State Y e s 6 0 .5 (5 3 1 ) 50 .0 (7 4 ) 17 .8 (21) N o 24.3 (2 1 3 ) 20.3 (3 0 ) 7 0 .3 (83) General Outlook O p tim is tic 59.1 (5 2 1 ) 42.3 (63) 29.4 (35) Pessimistic 36.3 (3 2 0 ) 53.0 (79) 66.4 (79) "The D on’t Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 11. but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

N oting the strength of the statistical and numerical relationships presented in Table 11, it is clear that Palestinians who support the continuation of the peace process, expect a State in the near future and are optimistic evaluate the President’s performance positively. Conversely, those who assess the performance of the President negatively, are more likely to oppose continuing negotiations with Israel, not expect a State and be pessimistic. In other words, and to summarize, the President’s popularity, as well as the assessment of the Executive branch of government, is strongly related to Palestinians’ position on the peace process. The more a person favors the President, both as a national personality and as the representative of government, the more likely s/he is to be in support of continuing negotiations.

The Palestinian Legislative Council As discussed above, the overall evaluation of the Legislative branch of government is low, compared to the Executive branch. Moreover, the public’s relatively negative evaluation of the Council’s performance is reflected in the evaluation of the performance of district representatives. Specifically, positive evaluations did not exceed 46% . By district, Jericho came first in first in terms of positive assessments, followed by Ramallah, Bethlehem, Central and South Gaza. Third came Nablus, Hebron, Jerusalem and North Gaza, while Tulkarem and Jenin are ranked fourth with the lowest positive evaluations. An examination of the evaluations given to the Council, may point out its areas o f weakness and strengths in reaching out to the public, both nationally and at the district level.

It is the case that the Council does receive very high evaluations on particular issues, mostly pertaining to current events, such as defending Jerusalem and land asainst settlements as well as its relationship with the Executive. The Council obtained lower positive evaluations and greater negative evaluations on issues that

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may not have receive media attention during the time when the poll was conducted, such as enacting democratic laws, the Council’s role in negotiations with Israel and resolving citizens’ problems. (Chart 2 presents a summary of evaluations.)

C h a r t 2 Perform ance of the Legislative Council by Issues, percentages

□ Vcry Good/Good □ F air O B a d /V e ry B a d 59 9

518 51 S 50 9

27.6

Jerusalem Settlements Executive Human Prisoners Democracy Negotiations Citizens Rights

Chart 2 suggests that the Palestinian public approves o f the Council, especially in regard to issues on which it is informed about the Council’s activities. It also suggests, furthermore, that the media are key in communicating the activities o f the Council. On this point, 54.8% of all respondents (51.7% in the West Bank and 60.1% in the Gaza Strip) say they are interested in following the activities o f the Council, 24.2% say they are sometimes, while only 18.2% expressed no interest. As more than a plurality are interested in the Council’s activities, 41.8% think that the press coverage of the PLC is very good (9% ) or good (32.8% ); 24.2% say it is fair; and 17.7% believe it is bad (13.6%) or very bad (4.1% ). Moreover, there is a strong relationship between evaluations o f the Council, and media coverage on the Council (see Table 12).

T a b le 12 Evaluation of M edia Coverage of the Council by Overall Evaluation of the Council’s Perform ance, percentages & counts* ______Evaluation of Media Coverage on Council Very Good Good F a ir B a d V e rv Bad Verv Good/Good 79.2 (88) 63.6 (257) 39.3 (107) 26.8 (45) 15.7 (S) Bad/Verv Bad 3.6 ( 2) 6.2 (25) 10.7 (3 2 ) 36.3 (61) 51.0 (26) *The Don't Know. No Opinion and 'Fair' evaluation categories are excluded from Table 12, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

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As displayed in Table 12, there is a strong linear relationship between evaluation o f press coverage on the Council and overall assessment o f its performance. For example, 79.2% of all respondents who think the coverage is very good also positively assess the Council’s performance. On the other hand, 51% who think that the coverage is very bad also think that the performance is very bad. Although the findings are not presented in a table, evaluation o f the media coverage o f the Council is also strongly and similarly related to evaluations of the Council’s activities discussed above, such as defending Jerusalem, responding to citizens’ problems and so forth.

To lend more evidence to the observation that Palestinian citizens who are informed o f the Council’s activities tend to give more favorable evaluations, Chart 3 shows that even the frequency o f following the news bolsters the Council’s ratings.

C h a r t 3 Perform ance of the President and Palestinian Legislative Council by Frequency of Following the n e w s ■ President E3 Council

Aivvtiys

Som etim es

0 10 20 30 40 SO 60 70 80

Presented in Chart 3 are the mean scores of the evaluations for the Presidency and the Council. (Note, scores are based on the weighted average o f the performance ratings.) For the President, the frequency o f following the news has no affect on its overall performance score. In other words, citizens give the President a relatively high evaluation regardless o f how frequently they follow the news. For the Council, however, there is a significant positive relationship between the frequency o f respondents following o f the news and their evaluation of the Council. Respondents who sometimes follow the news give the lowest performance score of 57. Scores increase as frequency of following the news increase from to 60 for respondents who follow the news often, to 62 for those who always follow the news.

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Although the public tends to favor the Presidency more than the Council, there is wide support (60% ) for the view that the Executive branch o f the Palestinian Authority should implement all decisions taken by the Legislative Council. This is particularly the case for the Gaza Strip (66% ). It is noteworthy that most supporters o f this view are not affiliated with the opposition; where support amounts to 68% within Fetah, only 51% within Hamas and 56% within the PFLP. As for the draft law for the anticipated municipal elections, presently under discussion in the Council, the vast majority of Palestinians (85% ) support the proposal that inhabitants o f refugee camps should participate in these elections. The level of support for the participation o f camp residents rises to 87% and 89% among refugees and camp residents, respectively.

Political attitudes are also strongly related to Palestinian citizens’ evaluation o f the Council and its activities. As with the evaluation o f the President’s performance, Palestinians who are supportive, expect a State and optimistic are more likely to give positive evaluations to the Council. Conversely, those who are critical on all these issues tend to assess the performance of the Council negatively. (Please see T a b le 13.)

T a b le 1 3 Evaluation of the Council by Position on the Peace Process, Expectations for a State and General Outlook, percentages & counts* ______Evaluation of the Legislative Council Verv Good/Good F a ir Bad/Verv Bad Continue Peace Process S upport 8 2 .6 (4 8 1 ) 6 7 .0 (2 0 5 ) 4 1 .4 (6 7 ) O ppose 1 3 .4 (7 8 ) 28.1 (8 6 ) 5 4 .3 (8 8 ) Expect Palestinian State Y e s 6 3 .3 (3 6 8 ) 4 5 .2 (1 3 8 ) 2 5 .2 (4 1 ) N o 2 3 .2 ( 1 3 5 ) 37 .0 (1 1 3 ) 6 3 .2 (1 0 3 ) General Outlook O p tim is tic 6 4 .2 (3 7 5 ) 4 7 .7 (1 4 6 ) 3 1 .7 (5 2 ) Pessimistic 3 1 .2 (1 8 2 ) 4 7 .7 (1 4 6 ) 6 5 .9 (1 0 8 ) ♦The Don’t Know and No Opinion categories are excluded from Table 13, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Although the strength o f the relationships are not as great as for the President, Table 13 indicates that position on the peace process, expectations for a State to result from the negotiations and general outlook affect the Council’s performance evaluation. In other words, a person who opposes the process is much more likely than a supporter to give a positive evaluation to the Council.

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Political Affiliation SR U has tracked political affiliation over time by a s k in g respondents to directly state their affiliation (i.e ., party or faction). For this poll, there are no notable difference between the distribution of response since June 1996 (See Poll #23). Moreover, there is an overall stability in the structure o f political affiliation since December 1994, with three notable exceptions. One, affiliation with Hamas has declined from 16.6% in December 1994 to 8.1% in this poll, averaging 9.5- percentage points. Two, affiliation with Fateh, the largest political party among Palestinian, has also declined from a high o f 55.3% in December 1995, down 12- percentage points, to 43.6% in this poll. Three, there h a s been a steady increase in respondents with ‘None o f the Above’ political affiliation. This group has grown from a low o f 11.7% (in December 1995) to its highest point o f 28.1 % in June 1996, but has decreased slightly to 25.9% in this poll. Once again, the distribution o f responses o f all other parties are stable (see Table 14).

Table 14 Political Affiliation, percentages & counts December December March June October Averag 1994 1995 1996 1996 1996 e (%)

H a m a s 16.6 (177) 9.7 (110) 5.8 (73) 7.8 (76) ' 8 . 1 ( 1 0 0 ) 9.6 PPP 0.8 (9) 1.8 (21) 1.7 (22) 2.4 (23) 1 *7 ( 2 1 ) 1.7 PFLP 6.7 (72) 3.8 (43) 2.1 (26) 4.0 (39) 4 -0 (4 9 > 4.1 F a te h 43.1 (460) 55.3 (628) 47.5 (597) 43.3 (424) 4 3 .6 (5 3 5 ) 46.6 F id a 0.8 (9) 0.4 (5) 0.2 (2) 0.7 (7) 0 . 4 ( 5 ) 0.5 Islamic Jihad 2.6 (28) 2.0 (23) 1.0 (13) 1.9 (19) 2 . 4 ( 2 9 ) 2.0 DFLP 1.4 (15) 1.5 (17) 1.1 (14) 0.8 (7) 0 . 8 ( 1 0 ) 1.1 Independent Islamist 3.7 (39) 3.6 (41) 4.4 (55) 3.7 (36) 4 . 6 ( 5 6 ) 4.0 Independent Nationalist 4.9 (52) 3.2 (36) 6.0 (75) 4.5 (44) 5 .5 ( 6 8 ) 4.8 N o n e o f th e A b o v e 11.7 (125) 13.8 (157) 25.0 (314) 28.1 (275) 2 5 .9 ( 3 1 8 ) 20.9 O th e rs 7.7 (82) 4.8 (55) 5.3 (67) 2.9 (28) 3 . 0 J 3 7 ) 4.7 Total 100(10681 100(11361 100(12581 100 (9801 too (12281 —

In this poll, there are some notable demographic differences between the three largest political groups (Fateh, Hamas and None o f the Above) among Palestinians. For example, Palestinians in the West Bank (60.4% ) are more likely than Gazans (39.6% ) to support Fateh, as are male and the less educated respondents in the sample. Also, more women (68.0% ) than men (32.0% ) identify their political affiliation with Hamas. Respondents with None o f the Above affiliation seem to be comprised from a cross-section o f Palestinian o f the W est Bank and Gaza Strip. In other words, no particular demographic characteristics describe this group. (See T a b le 15 .)

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Table IS Political Affiliation with Fateh, Hamas and None of the Above by Selected Demographic Variables, percentages & counts Fateh Hamas None of the Above 43.6 (531) 8.1 (100} 25 9 (3 1 8 ) R e g io n W est B a n k 60.4 (232) 64.0 (64) 60 .1 (1 9 1 ) G a za S trio 39.6 (212) 36.0 (36) 3 9 .9 (1 2 7 ) G e n d e r Male 53.5 (286) 3 2 .0 (3 2 ) 4 7 .5 (1 5 1 ) Female 46.5 (249) 68.0 (68) 5 2 .5 (1 6 7 ) E d u c a tio n Illiterate-Elementary 27.9 (148) 26.5 (26) 2 7 .4 (8 7 ) Preparatory-Secondary 56 .3 (2 9 9 ) 58.2 (57) 51.4 (163) 2-Year College 14.7 (78) 14.3 (1 4 ) 2 0 .2 (6 4 ) B.A.-Post Graduate 1.1 (6 ) 1-0 (1 ) 0 .9 (3 )

As discussed above, most respondents assess the performance o f the Legislative Council, Judicial and the Executive (including the President and his Cabinet) branches o f the Palestinian Authority between a range o f good to fair. It is the case that these evaluations are strongly related to political affiliation. That is, political groups and parties associated w ith the opposition to continuing the peace process with Israel, tend to give lower evaluations to the government and its institutions. Conversely, those who support the government tend also to support the peace process.

As can be expected, respondents affiliated w ith Fateh give the highest overall evaluations for each branch of the government. Moreover, they give the highest evaluation to their President (83 mean score), then to his Cabinet (75 mean score), dropping ten-points for the Council (65 mean score). Hamas affiliates, on the other hand, express their evaluations on the lower end o f the scale: President (65 mean score), the Cabinet (62 mean score) and finally the Legislative Council (53 mean score). Respondent with None o f the Above political affiliation straddle Fateh and Hamas in terms of their evaluation scores. (See Chart 4 for a graphic comparison o f evaluations for the President and Legislative Council by political affiliation o f respondents).

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C h a r t 4 Perform ance of the President and the Palestinian Legislative Council by Political A ffiliation, mean scores

urn

PFLP DFLP PPP FIDA Fateh Hamas Islamic Ind. Ind. Other No One Jihad Islamistist National

As shown in Chart 4, the President tops the evaluation scores, receiving higher scores, even from the opposition, than the Palestinian Legislative Council. The greatest difference between evaluations o f the President and the Council is within Fateh, followed by Islamic Jihad. It should be pointed out, however, that respondents affiliated with Islamic Jihad are the most critical o f both the President and the Council than any other political group or party, where as supporters o f Fateh give the highest approval ratings. Political parties and groups, considered left o f center in Palestinian politics, tend to give high evaluation scores for both the President and the Council. Those parties and groups to the right o f center, on the other hand, tend to evaluate all branches o f the government lower than the average but also give the highest scores to the President and lower scores for the Council’s performance.

T o summarize, the results o f this poll show a strong relationship -between approval o f the Palestinian Authority, its branches of government and institutions, and support or opposition to the peace process w ith Israel. The relationship is evident in several attitudinal variables, regarding expectations toward a State, outlook toward-the future and on specific issues such as defense o f Jerusalem and land against confiscation. That is, those who support the continuation o f the peace process tend to also be less critical toward domestic issues than those who oppose it. Moreover, although a sizable percentage o f the population opposes the continuation o f the peace process and is critical o f the PA, on the whole most respondents endorse the continuation o f the peace process and are mainly satisfied with their government, especially the President and his Executive Cabinet.

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Results of Public Opinion Poll #24 26 September-17 October 1996

T o t a l W en t Bank Gaza Strip Unemployment 38.0% 34.0% 45.0%

1. How often do you follow the news? Always 38.0 (467) 38.3 (297) 37.5 (170) Often 16.9(208) 17.4 (135) 16.1 (73) Sometimes 40.9(502) 40.6(315) 41.3 (187) Not Sure 4.2 (51) 3.6 (28) 5.1 (23)

2. Generally, are you optim istic or pessimistic about the future? Optimistic 53.0 (652) 51.4 (399) 55.7 (253) Pessimistic 41.6(512) 44.1 (342) 37.4(170) Not Sure 5.4 (66) 4.5 (35) 6.8 (31)

3. Do you support or oppose the peace process between Palestinians and Is ra e lis ? Support 69.8 (856) 67.8 (524) 73.3 (332) Oppose 24.8 (304) 26.4(204) 22.1 (100) Don’t Know 5.4 (66) 5.8 (45) 4.6 (21)

4. In your opinion, how has the peace process affected the Palestinian e c o n o m y ? More Positively 2.4 (29) 1.7 (13) 3.5 (16) Positively 8.7 (107) 8.3 (64) 9.5 (43) Between 19.4(239) 17.8 (138) 22.2(101) Negatively 38.9 (479) 40.9 (317) 35.6 (162) More Negatively 27.5 (338) 28.1 (218) 26.4(120) No Opinion/Don’t No 3.1 (38) 3.2 (25) 2.8 (13)

5. Do you expect that the peace process w ill lead to a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in the coming years? Yes 50.9(624) 49.4(382) 53.5 (242) No 33.5 (410) 37.0 (286) 27.4 (124) Not Sure 15.6 (191) 13.6 (105) 19.0 (86)

6. How do you evaluate the press coverage of the activities of the PL.C? V e ry G ood 9 .0 (1 1 1 ) 6.8 (5 3 ) 12 .7 (5 8 ) G ood 3 2 .8 (4 0 4 ) 3 1 .9 (2 4 8 ) 3 4 .2 (1 5 6 ) B etw een 2 4 .2 (2 9 8 ) * 23.6 (183) 2 5 .2 (1 1 5 ) Bad 1 3 .6 (1 6 8 ) 16.2 (1 2 6 ) 9 .2 (4 2 ) V e ry Bad 4 .1 (5 1 ) 4 .0 (3 1 ) 4 .4 (2 0 ) N o O pinion '16.3 (201) 17.5 (1 3 6 ) 14.3 (6 5 )

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T o ta l W e s t B a n k G a z a S tr io 7. A re you interested in the activities of the PLC? Y e s 54.8 (673) 51.7 (400) 60.1 (2 7 3 ) S o m e tim e s 24.2 (297) 23.1 (179) 2 6 .0 (1 1 8 ) N o 18.2 (2 2 4 ) 2 1 .7 (1 6 8 ) 12.3 (5 6 ) N o O p in io n 2.8 (34) 3.5 (27) 1.5 (7 ) 8. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of the PLC? V e r y G o o d 9 .6 (1 1 8 ) 8 .2 (6 4 ) 11.8 (5 4 ) G o o d 37.9 (467) 38.0 (295) 3 7 .7 (1 7 2 ) B e tw e e n 25.0 (308) 25.1 (195) 2 4 .8 (1 1 3 ) B a d 8.7 (107) 8.5 (66) 9 .0 (4 1 ) V e r y B a d 4.6 (57) 5.1 (40) 3 .7 (1 7 ) N o O p in io n 14.3 (176) 15.1 (117) 12.9 (5 9 ) 9. How do you evaluate the performance of the PLC in the following areas: a) Defending human rights V e r y G o o d 12.6 (155) 10.9 (85) 15.4 (70) G o o d 3 9 .2 (4 8 3 ) 3 9 .6 (3 0 8 ) 3 8 .4 (1 7 5 ) B e tw e e n 2 0 .9 (2 5 8 ) 19.9 (155) 22.6 (103) B a d 13.6 (1 6 8 ) 14.5 (113) 12.1 (55) V e r y B a d 4 .4 (5 4 ) 4 .8 (3 7 ) 3 .7 (1 7 ) N o O p in io n 9.3 (1 1 5 ) 10.2 (79) 7.9 (36) b) Defending land against settlements V e r y G o o d 2 1 .9 (2 7 0 ) 19.0 (1 4 7 ) 2 7 .0 (1 2 3 ) G o o d 3 8 .0 (4 6 8 ) 40.1 (311) 34.4 (157) B e tw e e n 12.9 (1 5 9 ) 12.3 (9 5 ) 14.0 (6 4 ) B a d 13.6 (1 6 7 ) 13.9 (1 0 8 ) 12.9 (5 9 ) V e r y B a d 7 .2 (8 9 ) 8.1 (63) 5.7 (26) N o O p in io n 6 .3 (7 8 ) 6.6 (51) 5.9 (27) c) Adopting laws that enhance democracy V e r y G o o d 7.1 (8 7 ) 4.7 (36) 11.2 (51) G o o d 35.3 (4 3 4 ) 35.5 (275) 35.0 (159) B e tw e e n 19.0 (2 3 3 ) 16.0 (124) 24.0 (109) B a d 16.1 (1 9 8 ) 18.0 (139) 13.0 (59) V e r y B a d 5 .4 (6 6 ) 5.7 (44) 4.8 (22) N o O p in io n 17.1 (2 1 0 ) 20.2 (156) 11.9 (54) d) Relationship with the Executive authority V e r y G o o d 11.7 (1 4 4 ) 8.3 (64) 17.6 (80) G o o d 4 0 .1 (4 9 2 ) 3 9 .8 (3 0 7 ) 4 0 .7 (1 8 5 ) B e tw e e n 12.7 (1 5 6 ) 12.6 (97) 13.0 (59) B a d 7.0 (86) 7.9 (ol) 5.5 (25) V e r y B a d 1.9 (2 3 ) 2.1 (1 6 ) 1.5 (7 ) N o O p in io n 26.5 (325) 29.4 (227) 21.6 (98)

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9. How do you evaluate the performance of the PLC in the following areas ( continued): e) Defending Jerusalem V e iy G o o d 38.3 (4 7 2 ) 32.0 (248) 49.1 (224) G o o d 3 2 .5 (4 0 0 ) 35.8 (278) 26.8 (122) B etw een 9 .7 (1 1 9 ) 9 .3 (7 2 ) 10.3 (4 7 ) B a d 8.1 (100) 9.4 (73) 5.9 (27) V e r y B ad 5.7 (7 0 ) 6.8 (53) 3.7 (70) N o O p in io n 5.8 (7 1 ) 6.7 (52) 4.2 (19)

f) Prisoners V e ry G o o d 19.6 (2 4 1 ) 15.9 (123) 25.9 (118) G o o d 31.3 (385) 32.3 (251) 2 9 .4 (1 3 4 ) Between 15.3 (189) 14.4 (112) 16.9 (7 7 ) Bad 16.0 (197) 16.9(131) 14.5 (6 6 ) Very Bad 11.6 (143) 13.9 (108) 7 .7 (3 5 ) No Opinion . 6.2 (76) 6 .4 (5 0 ) 5 .7 (2 6 )

g) Negotiations with Israel V e ry G o o d 12.3 (1 5 1 ) 10.3 (8 0 ) 15.6 (7 1 ) Good 29.6 (365) 3 1 .0 (2 4 1 ) 27.3 (1 2 4 ) B e tw e e n 2 0 .4 (2 5 1 ) 19.0(148) 22.6 (103) B a d 19.5 (2 4 0 ) 1 9 .2 (1 4 9 ) 2 0 .0 (9 1 ) Very Bad 7.6 (94) 7 .9 (6 1 ) 7.3 (3 3 ) No Opinion 10.6 (130) 12.5 (9 7 ) 7.3 (3 3 )

h) Resolving citizens’ problems Very Good 9.4 (115) 7 .4 (5 7 ) 12.7 (5 8 ) G o o d 32.1 (3 9 4 ) 3 2 .3 (2 4 9 ) 3 1 .9 (1 4 5 ) Between 19.2 (235) 18.3 (1 4 1 ) 2 0 .7 (9 4 ) Bad 20.1 (246) 20.6(159) 19.1 (8 7 ) V e ry B ad 10.1 (1 2 4 ) 10.4 (8 0 ) 9 .7 (4 4 ) N o O pinion 9.1 (1 1 2 ) 1 1.0 (8 5 ) 5 .9 (2 7 )

10. Generally, how do evaluate the perform ance of your district representative to the PLC? Very Good 12.5 (151) 10.5 (7 9 ) 15.9 (7 2 ) G o o d 3 3.5 (4 0 5 ) 35.1 (2 6 5 ) 3 0.8 (1 4 0 ) B e tw e e n 2 0 .4 (2 4 7 ) 18.3 (1 3 8 ) 2 4 .0 (1 0 9 ) B a d 11.9 (1*44) 12.5 (94) 11.0 (5 0 ) Very Bad 7.0 (85) 7 .8 (5 9 ) 5 .7 (2 6 ) N o O pinion 14.6 (1 7 7 ) 15.9 (120) 12.6 (5 7 )

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11. How do evaluate the perform ance o f the government in the following areas.' a) Education V e ry G o o d 34.1 (4 1 9 ) 2 8.8 (2 2 2 ) 4 3 .2 (1 9 7 ) G ood 4 4 .3 (5 4 3 ) 47.3 (3 6 5 ) 3 9 .0 (1 7 8 ) B etw een 10.4 (1 2 8 ) 11.0 (85) 9.4 (4 3 ) B ad 6.1 (7 5 ) 7.3 (56) 4.2 (1 9 ) V e ry B ad 1.5 (1 9 ) 1.3 (1 0 ) 2 .0 (9 ) N o O pinion 3.5 ( 4 3 ) . 4.3 (33) 2.2 (1 0 )

b ) H e a lt h Very Good 21.3 (261) 15.4 (119) 31.1 (142) G ood 4 5 .2 (5 5 4 ) 4 4 .7 (3 4 5 ) 4 5 .8 (2 0 9 ) B etw een 14.7 (1 8 0 ) 15.2 (1 1 7 ) 13.8 (6 3 ) B ad 10.4 (1 2 8 ) 13.5 (104) 5.3 (2 4 ) Very Bad 3.9 (48) 4 .7 (3 6 ) 2 .6 (1 2 ) N o O p in io n 4 .6 (5 6 ) 6.5 (50) 1.3 (6 )

c ) E c o n o m y V e ry G o o d 2 .5 (3 1 ) 2.1 (1 6 ) 3.3 (1 5 ) G ood 18.3 (2 2 5 ) 18.9 (146) 17.3 (7 9 ) B etw een 2 3 .6 (2 9 0 ) 21.8 (168) 26.8 (122) B ad 3 4 .9 (4 2 8 ) 35.7 (275) 33.6 (153) V e ry B ad 16.9 (2 0 7 ) 16.5 (1 2 7 ) 17" 5 (8 0 ) N o O p in io n 3 .7 (4 6 ) 5.1 (39) 1.5 (7 )

d) Democracy & Human Rights Very Good 6.5 (80) 5.2 (40) 8.8 (40) G ood 3 4 .9 (4 2 8 ) 3 3.9 (2 6 1 ) 3 6 .6 (1 6 7 ) B etw een 2 0 .6 (2 5 2 ) 2 0 .9 (1 6 1 ) 2 0 .0 (9 1 ) Bad 19.7 (241) 20.3 (156) 18.6 (85) V e ry B ad 10.4 (1 2 8 ) 9.7 (75) 11.6 (53) N o O p in io n 7 .9 (9 7 ) 10.0 (7 7 ) 4 .4 (2 0 )

e) Security of Citizens V e ry G o o d 2 1 .5 (2 6 3 ) 16.1 (124) 30.5 (139) G ood 4 3 .9 (5 3 8 ) 45.2 (348) 41.7 (190) B etw een 13.7 (1 6 8 ) 13.9 (107) 13.4 (61) Bad 12.3 (151) 14.0 (1 0 8 ) 9 .4 (4 3 ) Very Bad 5.3 (65) 6.4 (49) 3.5 (16) No Opinion 3.3 (41) 4.4 (34) 1.5 (7)

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12. Do you believe that the Executive authority should im plem ent all of the decisions made by the PLC? Yes 60.0 (734) 56.2 (433) 66.3 (301) N o 2 3 .6 (2 8 9 ) 25.8 (199) 19.8 (90) No Opinion 16.4 (201) 17.9 (138) 13.9 (63) 13. In your opinion, what direction is the government heading toward? Democracy 31.9 (392) 29.2 (226) 36.6 (166) Dictatorship 17.4 (2 1 3 ) 18.9 (146) 14.8 (67) Combination o f both 3 8 .3 (4 7 0 ) 39.1 (303) 36.9 (167) N o t Sure 1 2 .4 (1 5 2 ) 12.8 (99) 11.7 (53) 14. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of the judicial authority and c o u rts ? V e ry G o o d 11.1 (1 3 6 ) 9 .4 (7 3 ) 13.8 (6 3 ) Good 38.6 (474) 3 7 .6 (2 9 1 ) 40.1 (1 8 3 ) B etw een 18.5 (2 2 7 ) 18.4 (142) 18.6 (85) Bad 8.6 (106) 7.8 (60) 10.1 (46) Very Bad 3.8 (47) 3.5 (2 7 ) 4 .4 (2 0 ) No Opinion 19.4 (239) 23.3 (180) 12.9 (59) 15. Have you had any direct experience w ith the Palestinian police and security s e rv ic e s ? (if yes, go to # 2 6 ) Yes 19.6 (241) 17.9 (1 3 8 ) 2 2 .7 (1 0 3 ) N o 79.1 (971) 81.2 (628) 7 5 .6 (3 4 3 ) 16. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian police and security services? Very Good 25.2 (60) 25.7 (35) 24.5 (25) G ood 3 7 .0 (8 8 ) 33.1 (4 5 ) 4 2 .2 (4 3 ) B etw een 1 3 .4 (3 2 ) 13.2 (18) 13.7(14) Bad 13.4 (32) 16.9 (2 3 ) 8.8 (9 ) V e ry B ad 10.1 (2 4 ) 10.3 (14) 9.8 (10) No Opinion 0.8 (2) 0.7 (1) 1.0 (1) 17. Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions? (if yes, go to 18) Y es 4 9 .3 (6 0 4 ) 4 9 .7 (3 8 3 ) 4 8 .7 (2 2 1 ) N o 27.1 (3 3 2 ) 28.8 (2 2 2 ) 2 4 .2 (1 1 0 ) N o t Sure 2 3 .6 (2 8 9 ) 21.5 (1 6 6 ) 27.1 (1 2 3 ) 18. W ill this corruption in PA institutions increase or decrease in the future? Increase 40.1 (242) 39.5 (151) 4 1 .2 (9 1 ) R em ain as it is 10 .0 (6 0 ) 10.7 (4 1 ) 8 .6 (1 9 ) Decrease 40.5 (244) 4 2 .4 (1 6 2 ) 37.1 (8 2 ) No Opinion 9.5 (57) 7.3 (2 8 ) 13.1 (2 9 )

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19. C urrently, the PLC is discussing m unicipal election laws for villages and cities. It is suggested that refugees should participate in these elections. Do you Support 84.5 (1038) 82.7 (639) 87.7 (399) Oppose 9.4 (116) 10.7 (83) 7.3 (33) No Opinion 6.0 (74) 6.6 (51) 5.1 (23)

20. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance o f the Palestinian government (the Cabinet)? Very' G o o d 13.7 (1 6 8 ) 10.5 (81) 19.3 (87) G ood 4 8 .9 (5 9 7 ) 4 9 .4 (3 8 1 ) 4 7 .9 (2 1 6 ) B etw een 2 0 .2 (2 4 7 ) 20.6 (159) 19.5 (88) B ad 7 .2 (8 8 ) 8.2 (63) 5.5 (25) V e ry B ad 2.5 (3 1 ) 3.0 (23) 1.8 (8) N o O pinion 7.4 (9 1 ) 8.3 (64) 6.0 (27)

21. Generally, how do evaluate the performance of the institution of the Presidency? V e r y G o o d 2 9 .2 (3 5 8 ) 24.2 (187) 37.6 (171) G ood 4 2.8 (5 2 5 ) 4 3 .8 (3 3 8 ) 41.1 (1 8 7 ) B etw een 12.1 (1 4 9 ) 13.0 (1 0 0 ) 10.8 (49) B ad 6.5 (8 0 ) 8.3 (6 4 ) 3.5 (16) V e ry B ad 3.2 (3 9 ) 4.1 (32) 1.5 (7) N o O pinion 6.2 (7 6 ) 6 .6 (5 1 ) 5.5 (25)

!. In comparison to election day, do you believe that A rafat’s popularity has Increased 5 2.4 (6 4 1 ) 50.5 (389) 55.5 (252) N o Change 2 0 .4 (2 5 0 ) 17.8 (137) 24.9 (113) Decreased 21.3 (2 6 1 ) 25.5 (196) 14.3 (65) N o O pinion 5.9 (7 2 ) 6.2 (48) 5.3 (24)

3. W hich political party do you support? PPP 1.7 (2 1 ) 1.6 (1 2 ) 2 .0 (9 ) PFLP 4 .0 (4 9 ) 4.1 (32) 3.7 (17) Fateh 4 3 .6 (5 3 5 ) 4 1 .8 (3 2 3 ) 4 6 .6 (2 1 2 ) Ham as 8.1 (1 0 0 ) 8.3 (64) 7.9 (36) DFLP 0.8 (1 0 ) 0.9 (7 ) 0 .7 (3 ) Islamic Jihad 2 .4 (2 9 ) 2.5 (1 9 ) 2.2 (10) Fida 0 .4 (5 ) 0.5 (4) 0.2 (1) Independent Islamists 4 .6 (5 6 ) 5.6 (4 3 ) 2.9 (13) Independent Nationalists 5.5 (68) 6.2 (48) 4.4 (20) N o O ne 25.9 (318) 24.7 (191) 27.9 (127) O th er ( s p e c ify) 3.0 (37) 3.9 (30) 1-5 (?)

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RESULTS OF CPRS PUBLIC OPINION POLL #25

DECEMBER 26-28, 1996

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Poll # 25

26-28 December 1996

♦ Armed Attacks ♦ Performance of Palestinian Authority & the Legislative Council ♦ Democracy and Corruption

Center For Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS) Nablus - Palestine, P.O.Box 132, Tel. (09) 380383 Telfax (09) 380384

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Introduction This is the twenty-fifth public opinion poll conducted by the Survey Research U nit (S R U ), at the Center for Palestine Research & Studies (CPRS). It covers the topics o f the peace process, armed attacks against Israelis, evaluation o f the three branches o f the Palestinian government and the police and security services, corruption in PA institutions and the status o f democracy in Palestine and in other c o u n trie s .

The SR U has been conducting regular public opinion polls to document an im portant phase in the history o f the Palestinian people and to record the reactions o f Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip to current events. The CPRS does not adopt political positions and does not tolerate attempts to influence the conclusions it reaches. It is committed to providing a scholarly contribution to the study o f Palestinian politics. Toward this end, poll results provide a vital resource for researchers needing statistical information and analysis. The polls also give members o f the Palestinian community an opportunity to voice their opinions and to seek to influence decision-makers on issues o f concern to them.

T h e following is an analysis of the results obtained in the twenty-fifth public opinion poll conducted by the SR U in the period from 26-28,December,1996. For further information, explanations and results, please contact Dr. Khalil Shikaki at the Center for Palestine Research & Studies, Nablus: Tel: 09-380-383/1 or 381-619; Fax: 09-380-384

General Background The poll was preceded by continuous, but yet unsuccessful, efforts o f Palestinian and Israeli negotiators to finalize the Hebron agreement, There were reports o f continued Israeli efforts to build Jewish settlements in the Arab part o f Jerusalem. Sim ilarly, there were report o f Israeli settlement activities and land confiscation on other parts o f the W est Bank. Several demonstrations took place against Israeli settlement policy. Israeli soldiers opened fire on one o f these demonstration killing one and injuring 13 other Palestinians.

An armed attack carried out by PFLP members against Israeli settlers near Ramallah led to the death o f a mother and her son and the wounding o f five other members o f the family. Israel imposed a siege on Ramallah for two weeks, and the Palestinian police succeeded in arresting the attackers who received sentences ranging between life imprisonment and 15 years in jail. The period before the poll also witnessed an incident in which an Israeli settler beat to death a Palestinian boy Another Israeli shot to death a Palestinian w orker from the Gaza Strip.

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Elections at An-Najah university led to a victory for the Islamic bloc which received 39 seats compared to Fateh which received 36 only. There was talk o f internal Palestinian dialogue. The Palestinian legislative council completed its debate about the civil service law and passed the local election law. In early December, a Palestinian prisoner died while in custody in a jail in Jericho.

Methodology The questionnaire used in this poll was designed by CPRS researchers. P rior to the polling dates, the questionnaire was pre-tested on SO respondents in the Nablus area. As in all o f our polls, it includes numerous demographic and attitudinal variables. (See Table 1 for the demographic distribution o f the sample and the attached list o f questions.) Interviews were conducted between 26-28 December 1996 (Thursday, Friday and Saturday). The total sample is 1,307, with 804 from the West Bank and 503 from the Gaza Strip.

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Table 1 Demographic Distribution & Characteristics of Sample, weighted percentages & counts*______Characteristic % of Total Count Characteristic % of Total Count Region Education West Bank 63.0 689 Up to 9 years 24.9 268 Gaza Strip 37.0 404 10-12 years 54.7 587 Total 100.0 1093 2-years College 9.0 97 B.A.+** 11.4 122 Area of Residence Marital Status City 41.6 454 Single 22.4 243 Town/Village 41.7 456 Married 74.8 812 Refugee Camp 16.7 182 Divorced or Widowed 2.8 30 Age Occupation 18-22 20.7 226 Laborer 9.5 102 23-27 18.3 200 Craftsman 2.4 26 28-32 15.5 170 Housewife 42.3 454 33-37 13.0 142 Specialist*** 2.1 23 38-42 8.8 97 Employee**** 12.5 134 43-47 6.6 72 Merchant 5.6 60 48-52 5.2 57 Student 7.0 75 53+ 11.8 129 Farmer 2.4 26 Refugee Status Retired 0.7 7 Refugee 40.7 442 Non-Refugee 59.3 645 Gender Religion Male 49.6 542 Moslem 95.0 1030 Female 50.4 550 Christian 5.0 56 * Note, as discussed more fully below, the sample size (expressed in counts and percentages) has been weighted in order to obtain unbiased estimates. * * Includes a ll post-secondary degree holders. * * * Specialists are defined as Professors/University Instructors, Engineers, Doctors, Lawyers, Pharmacists or Executives. * * * * Employees are defined as School Teachers, Government Employees, Nurses or Lower-Level Company Employees.

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Sample Selection The sample in this poll was obtained using a multi-stage sampling technique. There are four stages in the process o f randomly selecting units o f the population into the sample. These are the following: 1) selecting population locations w ith probabilities proportional to size o f sample (PPS); 2) selecting one or tw o random blocs from each location; 3) selecting a household using systematic random sampling; and 4) selecting a person 18-years or older from the household.

W e used 120 population locations in this poll, from which 1,307 respondents were selected into the sample. In this poll, the gender distribution does not reflect expected population parameters and therefore had to be weighted to obtain unbiased estimates o f the actual population. Specifically, we obtained an unequal distribution o f men and women in the sample {i.e., 41.5% men and 58.5% women), which was corrected by reducing the base o f the sample size to n=l,092. This reduction does not affect the margin o f error, but does equalize the gender distribution o f the sample.

At the first stage o f sampling, CPRS fieldworkers and researchers map the population centers randomly selected into the sample. These maps indicate the boundaries, main streets and clusters o f residential neighborhoods in these areas. These areas are further divided into one or tw o sampling units (blocs), w ith each bloc comprising an average o f 100 housing units.

Households are selected based on a systematic sampling procedure. For example, if the fieldworkers estimate the number o f houses in the bloc to be 100 and were assigned 10 interviews, the fieldworkers divide 100 by 10, obtaining 10. The fieldworkers then conduct the first interview in the 10th household, the second in the 20th and so forth. Fieldworkers start their sample selection o f households from a recognized landmark such as a post office, mosque or business. They are instructed to report the direction o f their sampling routes and play an active role in drawing maps o f each locality as well as estimating the number o f housing units in each b lo c .

Data Collection Prior to the survey, our fieldworkers participate in a number o f workshops and training sessions where we discuss the aims and methods o f the poll. The topics we cover are household interviewing techniques, confidence building, mapping and sampling procedures. Four special training seminars were held prior to the poll which were attended by a total o f 75 fieldworkers.

Fieldworkers are grouped into teams o f two (male+female) who are supervised by senior CPRS researchers. Senior researchers visit the interview locations to discuss the survey process w ith the teams. M ore than fifty percent o f our

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fieldworkers are female, so as to facilitate work and to ensure the representation o f women in the sample. To allow for careful interviewing, fieldworkers are assigned a limited number o f interviews (an average o f 22 per team), 11 for each location.

The non-response rate for this sample is approximately 7%. Some respondents, we believe, were reluctant to state their views out o f fear or disinterest in the present political circumstances.

Data Analysis The data were processed through SPSS/DE, a computer program that is able to detect illogical answers and other inconsistencies. SPSS/PC was used for data an alysis

For this poll, we estimate the margin o f error to be ± 3 % .

Summary of Results Unemployment The results o f this poll show that the total unemployment rate for the W est Bank and Gaza Strip is 31%, which indicates 7-percentage point decline since September 1996 (Poll #24) and an 18-point decrease since March 1996 (Poll #22). As consistently found in previous polls, unemployment in the Gaza Strip (44% ) is higher than in the West Bank (25% ). The high rates can be mainly attributed to the continued closures o f the W est Bank and Gaza Strip since the February and March 1996 bombings. Note, these figures are based on respondents 18-years or older and on a definition o f unemployment used by the International Labor Organization (ILO).

O v e rv ie w Attitudes toward the continuation o f the peace process with Israel is rising at the same time that support for armed attacks against Israelis has increased. Such support for political strategies and positions that contradict the basis o f continuing peace process, is partly explained by a positive or negative evaluation o f the Palestinian government and its institutions. In other words, the findings o f this and previous polls suggest that there are strong relationships between assessment o f the domestic national reconstruction and transition to democracy efforts and support or opposition to the peace process. This observation can be measured in several attitudinal variables, tested by the strength o f the relationship between these variables as w ell as tracked over time.

The Peace Process & Ar m e d Attacks There has been a significant rise in support for the continuation o f the peace process, from 70% three months ago to 78.7% in this survey. This rise brings the level o f support to what it was six months ago, before its deterioration last

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September 1996, after the intense and violent confrontations between Palestinian police and citizens and Israeli m ilitary and settlers. (See the analysis o f Poll #24 for a fuller discussion o f Palestinian public opinion during this period.)

The afterm ath o f these confrontations may be reflected in a significant rise in support for armed attacks against Israeli targets, reaching 39% in this survey, interestingly, at the same tim e that there is a rise in support for the peace process. In M arch 1996, support for suicide attacks, which took place in February 1996, was only 21% , compaied to 33% in M arch 1995 (see Poll #22). This rise in support for armed attacks might be attributed to several factors: (1) the set-back in the peace process, most directly relating to delays in re-deployment o f the Israeli m ilitary in Hebron and other occupied territories; (2) the September confrontations which were viewed positively by Palestinians; and (3) the fact that this attitude was measured after a recent armed attack against settlers. (As found in September 1995, 19% supported armed attacks against Israeli civilians which is quite low relative to the 70% support for attacks against settlers and 69% for attacks against m ilitary ta rg e ts .)

It sbould be noted that there are significant differences among Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip in regard to support for armed attacks. These difference mainly relate to respondents’ positions toward continuing the peace process w ith Israel and their affiliation w ith a political party or faction (see T a b le 2 ).

Table 2 Continuation of the Peace Process by Attitude toward Armed Attacks, weighted percentages & counts I Position on Peace Process fl Support Oppose N o O pinion | Support Attacks 34.8 (298) 6 3 .7 (1 1 5 ) 2 3 .0 (1 2 ) | Oppose Attacks 5 4 .9 (4 6 9 ) 2 7 .5 (5 0 ) 2 2 .7 (1 2 ) 11 No Opinion 10.3 (88) 8.8 (1 6 ) 54.3 (2 8 )

As displayed in Table 2, there is a strong relationship between support or opposition for the peace process and attitudes toward armed attacks. It is the case that a m ajority (54.9% ) o f those who support the process also oppose attacks. On the other hand, 63.7% o f the respondents who oppose negotiations with Israel express support for armed attacks. Such an opinion is also reflected in a respondent’s stated political affiliation, as responses from opposition parties and groups are more supportive o f armed attacks than supporters o f the peace process: for example, Hamas (70.1% ), PFLP (64.0% ) and Islamic Jihad (59.3% ) compared to Fateh (32.1% ) and Independent Nationalists (29.4% ).

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Performance of the Palestinian Government Overall, most respondents assessed the performances o f the Legislative Council, Judicial and the Executive (including the President and his Cabinet) branches o f the Palestinian Authority between a range o f very good and good. The highest positive evaluation continues to be enjoyed by the Presidency, w ith 74.9% o f all respondents believing that its performance to be ‘very good’ (39.5% ) or ‘good’ (35.4% ). This is a slight overall increase since December 1996, when it reached 72% , but a significant rise in the highest level o f evaluation, very good, category (from 29.2% in Poll #24). The second highest evaluation was given to the Executive Cabinet, which is comprised o f Ministers o f the Palestinian Authority and closely affiliated w ith the President. 62% o f all respondents rated the Cabinet as ‘very good’ (18.3% ) or ‘good’ (43.7% ). Lastly, the performance o f the Palestinian Legislative Council received a positive evaluation o f 48.9% from all respondents (indicating no change since September 1996), with only 10.6% rating it as ‘very good’, 38.3% as ‘good’ and 25% as ‘fair’ (see Chart 1).

Chart 1 Positive, Fair and Negative Evaluations of the Presidency, Cabinet and Legislative Council

□ Ftositive

Presidency Cabinet Council

Straddling the Presidency and Cabinet, the Palestinian police and security services obtained a high positive evaluation, as 71.1% o f all respondents assessed its performance as ‘very good’ (28% ) or ‘good’ (43.1% ). As a basis o f comparison, albeit inexact, in September 1996, 62.2% o f the respondents who said that they have had direct experience w ith the police and security services evaluated their performance positively. This rise in support might reflect the public’s approval o f their performance in the September confrontations with the Israeli m ilitary.

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There are some notable demographic differences between respondents in their evaluation o f the performance o f their government and institutions. As w ith many attitudinal variables, and consistency found in previous surveys, W est Bank, men and higher educated Palestinians tend to be more critical than their counterparts. Table 3, Table 4 and Table 5 show the demographic breakdown by region, gender and level o f education for the evaluation o f the Presidency, Cabinet, Council and police and security services. (N ote, for each o f the tables, the categories o f evaluation are collapsed into three levels: positive=very good/good, fair and negative=bad/very bad.)

T a b l e 3 Evaluation of the Government by Retdon, weighted percentages & counts* Positive Fair Negative W est B ank Gaza Strip W. Bank Gaza Strip W. Bank Gaza Strip Presidency 72.6(501) 7 8 * (316) 9.9(68) 10.7 (43) 9 2 (63) 417 (19) Police & Security 6 8 .4 (4 7 1 ) 75.4 (301) 14.4 (99) 13 .4 (5 4 ) 11.5 (78) 8.1 (32) Cabinet : 5 9 2 (407): 66i6:(267) •v;l8:3:(125)«- J7A (70) 13.7 (94) 9.6(39) C o u ncil 50.3 (343) 46.5 (187) 2 2 .4 (1 5 2 ) 29.4 (118) 16.8 (114) 12.7 (5 1 ) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 3, but percentages are based on the total number of re sp o n se s.

Note, for nearly every category o f the variable, Palestinians from the W est Bank tend to be more critical o f their government than Gazans. This trend is particularly evident for positive evaluation o f the Presidency, police and security services and Cabinet. For the Council, however, there is a slight, but significant, regional difference between evaluations, as W est Bankers and Gazans are nearly equally as likely to assess its performance positively or negatively. M oreover, Gazans are more likely to assess the performance o f each branch o f government as ‘very good’ than W est Bankers. (For a regional breakdown, please see the attached list of questions and distribution o f responses.)

It is also the case that in their assessment o f the government and its institutions, men tend to be much more critical than women. Table 4 shows that there is around a 10-percentage point difference between men and women in their positive evaluations o f the Presidency, police & security services, Cabinet and PLC. M oreover, men are nearly tw ice as likely than women to give a negative evaluation to each o f these branches. In the middle-range, fair, category there are no significant gender differences.

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Table 4 ------Positive Fair Negative M e n W o m e n M e n W o m e n M e n W o m e n *. p ! V ig&sidcncv m m m s m m m m s m * 10.0 (54) 104(57) 10.9(59) 1 Police & Security 65.4 (352) 76.5 (420) 16.2 (87) 11.9 (66) 14.6 (79) 5.7(31) Cabinet w m m m m m m m m m 18.1 (98) 17.8(97) 17 6(95) (38) Council 43.4 (233) 54.5 (297) 26.2 (141) 23.8 (130) 22.7 (122) 7.9 (43) • The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 4, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Table 5 shows that there is a strong linear relationship between educational level and evaluation o f performances. For each branch o f government, respondents with higher educational levels tend to more critical in their evaluations than those w ith low er educational level?. Thic is evident in the positive evaluation category as well as in the negative category. For example, 86.8% o f the respondents with the lowest level o f education evaluated the Presidency as ‘very good’ or ‘good’, but 69.8% o f those w ith a B .A . degree or higher positively evaluated the Presidency’s performance. On the other hand, 3% o f the lowest educated gave a negative evaluation o f the Presidency’s performance. The percentage o f negative evaluation increases to its highest point (16.1% ) among the highest educated respondents.

Table 5 Evaluation of the Government by Educational Level, weighted percentages & c o u n t s * ______Positive Fair Neeative Presidency Illiterate-Elementary 86.8(211) 10.2 (25) 3.0 (7) Preparatory-Secondary 82.0 (454) 10.4 (58) 7.5 (42) 2-Year College 76.2 (67) 11.7 (10) 12.1 (11) B.A.+ 69.8 (76) 14.1 (15) 16.1(18) Police & Security Illiterate-Elementary 77.1 (192) 15.8 (39) 7.1 (18) Preparatory-Secondary 77.6 (439) 13.6 (77) 8.8 (50) 2-Year College 70.9 (65) 16.2 (15) 12.9 (12) B.A.+ 58.7 (65) 15.9 (18) 25.4 (28) Cabinet Illiterate-Elementary 74.3 (173) 17.6 (41) 8.1 (19) Preparatory-Secondary 69.1 (381) 19.4 (107) 11.5 (63) 2-Year College 64.5 (56) 17.3 (15) 18.1 (16) B.A.+ 51.1 (59) 23.3 (27) 25.6 (30) Council- Illiterate-Elementary 63.9 (139) 23.9 (52) 12.1 (26) Preparatory-Secondary 56.4 (303) 28.5 (153) 15.1 (81) 2-Year College 49.9 (43) 25.4 (22) 24.7 (21) B.A.+ 35.4 (39) 36.4 (40) 28.3 (31) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table S, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

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T h e Palestinian Legislative Council A fter one year since the Legislative Council elections, it seems that the Palestinian public is unsatisfied w ith the Council’s performance. As discussed above, the Council received the lowest overall evaluation o f all the branches o f government, in this and the previous poll. Moreover, the public is not making an effort to contact Council Members in order to convey their concerns, positions and request; 90.9% o f all respondents said that they did not try to communicate w ith any Members during this year. Yet, 42.7% think Council Members are ready to offer their help to those who ask for it, but 33.1% believe that they would not offer their help in solving a problem. It is also the case that barely a m ajority all respondents (51.7% ) believe that Council Members ‘know what ordinary people think’; while 29.7% say that Members ‘don’t know’ what they think.

Table 6 shows the relationship between the evaluation o f the Council’s performance in respect to contact w ith its Members and their ability to understand and solve problems o f ordinary people.

Table 6 Evaluation of the Performance of the Legislative Council by Contact with Its Members, helping if asked, and Knowledge of Ordinary People, weighted percentages & counts*______1 Evaluation of the Legislative Council’s Performance II Positive Fair Negative | Contact with Members | Yes 8.3 (44) 9.4 (25) 14.5 (24) 90.6 (244) 1 N o 91.7 (484) 85.5 (141) | W o u l d help if asked 1 Yes 56.7 (300) 32.5 (88) 22.5 (37) 42.7 (115) 8 N o 20.4 (108) 61.9 (101) H K n o w People’s Problems 8 Yes 59.1 (313) 46.5 (126) 46.9 (74) fl N o 24.1 (127) 36.2 (98) 43.8 (69) 9 The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 6, but percentages are based on the total number of re s p o n s e s .

Based on Table 6, it appears that although nearly all people have not contacted any Members during this year, a positive evaluation o f the Council’s performance is related to the perception that its Members are ready to help with problems and understand how ordinary people think. It is the case that respondents who do not think that Members would help and that they don’t know what ordinary people are tw ice and three times likely, respectively, to give a negative evaluation o f the Council’s performance. Conversely, those who believe that Council Members are easy to approach with their concerns, problems and requests give a positive assessment o f its performance.

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Corruption & Al-Wasta (Personal Connections and Nepotism) Palestinians o f the West Bank and Gaza Strip think that corruption constitutes one o f the most serious problems in the process o f state-building. The percentage o f those who believe that there is corruption in the PA has increased from 49% three months ago to 52.7% in this survey. Moreover, respondents who think that there is corruption are split as to whether corruption w ill increase and/or rem ain the same or decrease in the future. Table 7 shows the distribution o f responses on these issues by selected demographic variables.

Table 7 Corruption in the Palestinian Authority by Selected Demographic Variables, weighted percentages & counts* Corruption in PA Institutions and Aeencies Yes N o Will Increase/Remain Will Decrease Region West Bank 56.9 (391) 23.7(163) 41.2(179) 45.0 (195) Gaza Strip 45.5 (182) 25.1 (100) 45.0 (91) 38.4 (78) Gender M e n 63.8 (344) 19.5 (105) 42.0 (155) 44.7(165) W o m e n 41.7 (229) 28.9(158) 42.8 (114) 40.4 (108) Education Illiterate-Elementary 38.7(104) 32.0 (86) 32.6 (40) 47.0 (58) Preparatory-Secondary 53.3 (311) 27.2(159) 42.3 (145) 44.4 (152) 2-Years College 58.1 (56) 10.1 (10) 45.4 (28) 35.6 (22) 74.8 (91) 5.8 (7) B . A + 52.6 (50) 36.3 (35)

* The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 7, but percentages are based on the total num ber of re sp o n se s.

As shown in Table 7, Palestinians in the Gaza Strip are less likely than in the W est Bank to think that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority’s institutions and agencies. It is also the case that women are less critical o f the government than men. The most critical group is comprised o f respondents who have obtained a B. A. degree education or higher, as 74.8% think there is corruption in the PA. M oreover, the highest educated are also most likely to think that it w ill increase or remain at the same level in the future. The strength o f this opinion declines as education decreases, as only 32.6% o f the least educated, compared to 5 2 .6 % o f the highest educated think corruption w ill increase or remain the same. In terms o f outlook toward the future on this question, there are no significant gender differences. Gazans, once again, are more optimistic than W est Bankers, as 44.7% compared to 38.4% , respectively, expect that corruption w ill decrease in the fu tu re .

One form o f corruption, al-w asta, or the use o f personal connections and nepotism to gain employment and other advantages within institutions, is also considered a significant problem to the public. A full majority o f all respondents (56.6% )

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believe that al-wasta is alw ays used to get a job, 26.6% say it is often u sed , and only 7.7% think that it is never used. The opinion that al-wasta is widespread (always used), prevails to a great extent among refugee camp residents (63.8% ), B.A. degree holders (68.4% ), professionals (75.3% ), the unemployed (65.3% ) and opposition parties, such as Hamas (66.5% ), in comparison to Fateh supporters ( 5 2 .8 % ) .

Supporters and opponents o f continuing the negotiations w ith Israel also differ in their views toward corruption and al-wasta in Palestinian Authority institutions and agencies (see Table 8).

Table 8 Perception of Corruption and Al-Wasta by Attitude Toward the Peace Process, weighted percentages & counts* Corruption in the PA Necessity of al-Wasta to Obtain Employment Yes No Always Sometimes Never Peace Process Support 47.7 (408) 77.0 (139) 53.5 (457) 29.0 (248) 8.5 (72) Oppose 28.0 (239) 10.6 (19) 70.8 (128) 17.8 (32) 5.4 (10) * The N o Opinion category is excluded from Table 8, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Noting the strength o f the statistical (not numerical) relationship, respondents who think that there is no corruption in the PA are more likely to support the continuation o f the peace process with Israel. Also, 70.8% o f opponents o f the negotiations greatly believe that al-wasta is a widespread problem within the PA. Barely a m ajority o f supporters o f the negotiations share this concern.

Dealing with Palestinian Authority Institutions On the positive side, a m ajority o f Palestinians (55.9% ) say they feel comfortable (to a great or some extent) when dealing with official Palestinian institutions and agencies. Only 16.2% feel the opposite. This percentage increases slightly among Hamas supporters (20% ), PFLP (28.6% ) and declines to 11.1% among respondents affiliated w ith Fateh. It should also be pointed out that the majority o f all respondents (54.3% ) are confident that the Judicial branch o f government and the court system have the ability to rectify any injustice imposed by the Palestinian A u th o rity .

In a more general assessment o f leaders o f the Palestinian Authority, a m ajority o f respondents believe that they are descent and honest. Specifically, more than a m ajority (60.9% ) agree or strongly agree that Judges are honest, as are leaders o f the police and security services (58.9% ), Ministers (53.1% ) and lastly the Members o f the Palestinian Legislative Council (52.2% ). Table 9 shows that confidence rises among women, the less educated and Gazans.

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Table 9 Confidence In Ruling-Elite by Selected Demographic Variables, weighted percentages & counts Stroiiely Agree & Agree that Leaders are Honest Judges Security Forces Ministers P L C Members Region West Bank 57.4 (383) 54.3 (368) 49.2 (327) 48.8 (331) Gaza Strip 66.8 (267) 66.8 (268) 59.6 (239) 57.8 (230) Gender M e n 56.7 (299) 50.9 (273) 48.2 (255) 46.0 (247) W o m e n 65.1 (351) 77.1 (363) 57.9 (311) 58.3 (314) Education Illiterate-Elementary 66.7 (172) 69.4 (182) 63.3 (153) 59.7 (175) Preparatory-Secondary 62.9 (364) 62.5 (366) 56.0 (324) 54.6 (319) 2-Years College 53.9 (51) 45.8 (44) 45.2 (43) 42.8 (42) B.A.+ 45.9 (55) 31.0 (38) 24.3 (29) 31.9 (38) • The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 9, but percentages are based on the total number o f responses.

Interestingly, there is a strong relationship between respondents’ belief that there is corruption in the Palestinian Authority and confidence in the leaders o f the Judiciary, Legislative Council, police & security and Ministers. Unsurprisingly, respondents who think that there is corruption tend to also think that these leaders are not honest. Table 10 displays this relationship.

Table 10 Corruption in the Palestinian Authority by Confidence in Leaders, weighted percentages & counts* 1 Leaders Are Honest Strongly Agree Agree Agree/Disagree Disagree Strongly Disagree Judges Corruption 40.2 (58) 48.2 (244) 52.9 (135) 77.1 (88) 75.5 (33) N o Corruption 39.7 (57) 28.9 (146) 13.8 (35) 11.9 (14) 13.9 (6) PLC Corruption 40.7(41) 40.8 (188) 55.7 (175) 83.3 (126) 77.4 (37) N o Corruption 39.0 (39) 33.5 (154) 16.3 (51) 8.2 (12) 5.7 (3) Ministers Corruption 31.2 (27) 42.9 (206) 56.8 (166) 78.7 (120) 83.5 (45) N o Corruption 43.1 (37) 32.0 (153) 16.1 (47) 9.6 (15) 9.1 (5) Security Corruption 38.1 (51) 41.5 (208) 59.1 (140) 80.9 (119) 85.7 (49) I N o Corruption 37.8 (50) 33.4 (168) 13.3 (32) 7.1 (10) 3.5 (2) * The No Opinion category is excluded from iable 10, but percentages are based on the total number o f responses.

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Overall, there is a strong linear correlation between opinions on corruption and honesty o f the leaders. Specifically, respondents who believe that there is corruption in the PA do not think that their leadership is honest. Note, however, that respondents who seem to be most critical o f Ministers and leaders o f the Security Forces, as 83.5% and 85.7%, respectively, strongly disagree that they are honest and also hold the opinion that the P A is corrupt. Palestinians also appear to be not as critical o f Judges and PLC Members in this respect, as a relatively less percentage o f respondents believe there is corruption and strongly disagree that they are honest. W ith this said, it should also be mentioned that o f all these leaders, Judges receive the highest level o f public confidence in terms o f being the most honest regardless if they think that the PA is corrupt.

The Status of Democracy in Palestine Criticism o f the Palestinian Authority seems to be linked to larger critic o f the transition to democracy in Palestine. Although 42.9% o f all respondents assessed the status o f democracy in Palestine as positive (33.7% as fair and 22.8% negatively), this is low compared to their evaluations o f democracy in Israel, the U S A and France, but higher than for Jordan and Egypt (see Chart 2).

Chart 2 Status of Democracy in Palestine, Israel, USA, France, Jordan and Egypt, weighted percentages

Israel U.S.A. France Palestine Jordan Egypt

Criticism o f the status o f democracy in Palestine under the Palestinian Authority is stronger among certain demographic groups in this survey. Table 11 shows that men tend to be much more critical than women as are the less educated respondents.

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Table 11 Evaluation of the Status of Democracy in Palestine by Selected Demographic Variable, weighted percentages and counts* Status of Democracy jj Positive Fair Negative 8 Gender 1 M e n 35.0 (185) 37.2 (197) 27.4 (145) I W o m e n 50.7 (274) 30.3 (163) 18.2 (99) 1 Education I Illiterate-Elementary 45.6 (118) 35.3 (92) 18.6 (48) | Preparatory- Secondary 46.4 (268) 32.4 (187) 20.9 (121) 1 | 2-Years College 35.4 (34) 33.2 (31) 29.8 (28) | B .A .+ 29.2 (35) 34.2 (42) 35.1 (43) I Political Affiliation I Fetah 40.2 (246) 32.9(161) 16.0 (79) X Hamas 31.0 (32) 35.9 (37) 32.5 (34) 8 None 38.2 (104) 37.6 (103) 24.0 (66) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 11, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Dissatisfaction with the Palestinian Authority extends to other pertinent issues for the transition to democracy in Palestine. A sizable percentage (52.7% ) o f all respondents think that people, today, cannot criticize the Authority without fear. This opinion is also reflected in the low percentage (27.7% ) o f respondents who think that the press is free in Palestine. Moreover, only 35.3% expressed their belief that Palestine is heading toward democratic rule, while only 14.7% think the opposite (i.e ., their government is heading toward dictatorship). As with the evaluation o f the status o f democracy in Palestine, certain demographic groups are more critical of the PA: specifically, men, West Bankers, opposition parties and groups as well as more educated Palestinians.

Although only around 15% o f all respondents think that Palestine is heading toward a dictatorship, most respondents (38.7% ) believe that their government is developing with both democratic and dictatorial tendencies. This view is strongly related to opinions toward the status o f democracy in Palestine, including the freedom o f expression and the ability to criticize the PA without fear (see T a b le l2 ).

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Table 12 Rule Tendency by Opinions on the Status of Democracy in Palestine, Freedom of the Press in Palestine, weighted percentages & counts* Rule Tendency Democracy Combination Dictatorship Evaluation of Democracy Positive 63.7 (240) 36.5 (151) 16.6 (26) Fair 26.2 (99) 41.0 (170) 22.2 (35) Negative 10.1 (38) 22.5 (93) 61.3 (97) Freedom of the Press Yes 37.7 (145) 25.7 (108) 11.4 (18) Somewhat 31.9 (123) 38.0 (159) 24.6 (39) N o 27.3 (105) 34.7 (146) 62.5 (100) Criticism of PA Without Fear 51.9 (200) 30.6 (128) 24.2 (39) With Fear 38.2 (147) 59.7 (250) 71.6 (114) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 12, but percentages are based on the total number o f responses.

As can be expected there is a consistency o f responses in regard to opinions on the direction o f the Palestinian government. Respondents who believe that Palestine is becoming a democracy with respect for human rights are also more likely to believe that their freedom of expression is protected. On the other hand, those ho think that Palestine is heading toward dictatorial rule, strongly believe that they cannot criticize the PA without fear and that the press is not free. Palestinians who think that the government is developing with both tendencies, give a ‘fair’ evaluation o f the status o f democracy in Palestine, think that press is ‘somewhat’ free, but a solid majority believe that they cannot criticize their government without fear. The opinion that speech is restricted, however, hardly hinders the respondents from voicing their criticism o f the government for corruption in its institutions and the practice o f al-wasta. In other words, as shown in Table 13, people who believe that Palestine is becoming a dictatorship criticize their government for corruption.

Table 13 Rule Tendency by Opinion on Corruption in the PA and the Use of Al- Wasta, weighted percentages & counts* Rule Tendency I Democracy Combination Dictatorship Corruption in PA Yes 40.1 (155) 57.5 (24) 81.0 (129) N o 36.5 (141) 18.4 (77) 9.5 (15) Al-Wasta Always Used 44.3 (171) 65.0 (273) 72.6 (116) | Often Used 33.5 (130) 22.9 (96) 20.0 (32) 1 Never Used 11.5 (44) 5.9 (25) 2.6 (4) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 13, but percentages are based on the total number o f responses.

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Although a sizable percentage o f people think Palestine is becoming a democracy, they also believe that there is corruption in the government, generally and in the form o f al-wasta. These respondents differ, however, than those who think that Palestine is heading toward dictatorship by believing that corruption will decrease in the future. People who think that their government is becoming a dictatorship, are less optimistic about the future. They strongly believe that the level of corruption in the PA will increase or remain at the same level in the future (see Table 14).

Table 14 Rule Tendency by Attitude toward the Future of Corruption, weighted percentages & counts* Rule Tendency Democracy Combination Dictatorship Corruption in the Future Increase/Remain the Same 23.3 (42) 43.8 (117) 63.9 (88) Decrease 62.0(112) 43.2 (114) 21.0 (29) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 14, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

Attitudes toward the status o f democracy in Palestine— including the freedom of press and expression— are related to positions on peace process, but it is so with opinions on armed attacks. Table 15 shows that opponents o f continuing the negotiations w ith Israel as well as supporters o f Armed attacks against Israelis are dissatisfied with their government in terms of allowing freedom o f speech in the press, criticism o f the PA without fear and the overall status o f democracy in Palestine.

Table 15 Attitudes toward the Peace Process and Armed Attacks by Status of Democracy in Palestine, Criticism of the PA and Freedom of the Press, weighted percentages and counts* Peace Process 1 A r m e d Attacks Support Oppose H Support Oppose Evaluation of Democracy Positive 49.2 (412) 18.6 (33) 39.1 (162) 47.6 (248) Fair 34.3 (287) 29.3 (52) 30.3 (126) 34.2 (178) Negative 16.5 (138) 52.1 (92) 30.6 (127) 18.2 (95) Criticism of PA Without Fear 40.8 (348) 24.1 (44) 39.0 (165) 37.6 (199) With Fear 49.3 (412) 69.9 (126) 54.0 (229) 53.0 (280) Freedom of Press Yes 30.9 (264) 12.5 (23) 27.4 (117) 28.0 (148) Somewhat 34.2 (292) 26.2 (47) 29.8 (127) 34.5 (183) N o 31.8 (272) 60.3 (109) 40.7 (173) 34.5 (183) * The No Opinion category is excluded from Table 15, but percentages are based on the total number of responses.

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The finding o f the previous polls suggest that the position o f Palestinians from the W est Bank & Gaza Strip toward the continuation o f the peace process is strongly related to their attitudes toward domestic issues. In other words, supporter opponents on the peace process differ greatly in other areas o f concern. Namely, supporters o f the peace process are more likely than opponent, to be optimistic about their governments ability to reduce corruption in its institutional agencies. Supporters also give higher evaluations o f their govemment-officials & institutions, as are women, less educated & Gazan respondents. On the other hand, opponents o f the peace process with Israel tend to also criticize their government for issues pertaining to the transition to democratic rule in Palestine, especially for the ability to voice their opinions without fear.

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Results of Public Opinion Poll # 25 26-28 December 1996 Weighted Data Total West Bank Gaza Strip % Count % Count % Count 31.0 25.0 44.0

1. H o w often do you follow the news ? 1) A lw ays 3 4 .3 (3 7 5 ) 37.8 (260) 28.4 (114) 2 ) O ften 14.4 (1 5 7 ) 14.8 (1 0 2 ) 13.8 (5 5 ) 3) Sometimes 44.2 (482) 40.8 (2 8 1 ) 50.1 (2 0 1 ) 5) Don’t follow the news 7 .0 (7 7 ) 6.7 (4 6 ) 7.7 (3 1 )

2. Nearly a year has passed since the elections of the Legislative Council. During this year, have you made contact, other than a social visit, with your district representative? The contact could have been a face to face encounter, attending a group meeting, a telephone call or a letter through the mail? 1) Yes 9.1 (99) 10.2 (70) 7.1 (28) 2) No 90.9 (990) 89.8 (617) 92.9 (373)

3. If you have a problem which you think a PL C member can help resolve, do you think s/he would help if you asked? l)Y e s 42.7 (464) 45.0 (3 0 9 ) 38.8 (1 5 6 ) 2) No, s/he would not 33.1 (3 6 0 ) 31.3 (2 1 5 ) 36.1 (1 4 5 ) 3) Don’t Know 24.2 (264) 23.7 (1 6 2 ) 2 5 .2 (1 0 1 )

4. Some people say that many PL C members know very well how ordinary people like you and me think, but others say that PL C members do not know how ordinary people like you and me think. What do you say? Do they: 1) K n o w 51.7 (560) 50.1 (342) 54.3 (2 1 8 ) 2) Don’t Know 2 9 .7 (3 2 2 ) 32.4 (2 2 1 ) 25.3 (1 0 2 ) 3) Not Sure 18.6 (2 0 1 ) 17.5 (1 1 9 ) 20.5 (8 2 )

5. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the PLC? 1) Very Good 10.6 (1 1 5 ) 9.8 (6 7 ) 12.0 (4 8 ) 2 ) G ood 38.3 (4 1 5 ) 40.5 (276) 34.5 (139) 3 ) F air 2 5 .0 (2 7 1 ) 22.4 (1 5 2 ) 2 9 .4 (1 1 8 ) 4 ) B ad 9 .4 (1 0 2 ) 10.5 ( 7 1 ) 7.6 ( 3 1 ) 5 ) V e ry B ad 5.8 ( 6 3 ) 6.3 ( 4 3 ) 5.1 ( 2 0 ) 6) No Opinion 10.9 (118) 10.5 (72) 11.4 ( 4 6 )

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Total West Bank Gaza Strip % Count •/. Count °/o Count 6. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian government (the Executive Cabinet)? 1) Very Good 18.3 (199) 15.1 (104) 23.6 (95) 2) Good 43.7 (475) 44.1 (303) 43.0 (172) 3) Fair 17.9 (195) 18.3 (125) 17.4 (70) 4) Bad 7.9 (86) 9.3 (64) 5.4 (22) 5) Very Bad 4.3 (47) 4.4 (30) 4.2 ( 17) 6) No Opinion 7.9 (86) 8.7 (60) 6.4 (26)

7. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian security forces and police? 1) Very Good 28.0 (304) 25.5 (176) 32.1 (128) 2) Good 43.1 (468) 42.9 (295) 43.3 (173) 3) Fair 14.0 (153) 14.4 (99) 13.4 (54) 4) Bad 5.5 (59) 5.9 (40) 4.8 (19) 5) Very Bad 4.7 (51) 5.6 (38) 3.3 (13) 6) No Opinion 4.8 ( 52) 5.7 (39) 3.1 (12)

8. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the institution of the Presidency? 1) Very Good 39.5 (430) 34.2 (236) 48.5 (195) 2) Good 35.4 (386) 38.4 (265) 30.1 (121) 3) In between 10.2 (111) 9.9 (68) 10.7 (43) 4) Bad 4.1 ( 45) 5.1 (35) 2.4 ( 10) 5) Very Bad 3.4 ( 37) 4.1 (28) 2.3 ( 9) 6) No Opinion 7.5 (81) 8.3 (57) 5.9 (24)

9. Some people say that these days it is not possible to find a job without wasta (personal connections and nepotism). But others say that jobs are given based only on qualifications. Based on experience^) you personally knew about, you say: 1) Jobs are obtained by wasta to 56.6 (617) 51.6 (355) 65.3 (262) a large extent 2) Jobs are obtained by wasta 26.8 (292) 28.6 (197) 23.8 (95) sometimes 3) Jobs are not obtained by 7.7 (83) 10.0 (69) 3.6 ( 14) wasta - 4) I have no experience 8.8 (96) 9.7 (67) 7.3 (29)

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Total WestBahk GazaStrip % Count --^Cmmt..-- % Count 10. Some people say that they feel comfortable dealing with Palestinian officials in the authority, but others say they feel uncomfortable. Based on your own personal experience, you feel: 1) Very comfortable 2 7 .4 (2 8 7 ) 3 2 .0 (2 0 8 ) 19.8 (7 9 ) 2) Comfortable 28.5 (2 9 9 ) 2 7 .5 (1 7 9 ) 30.3 (1 2 1 ) 3) In between 27.8 (2 9 2 ) 2 3 .8 (1 5 5 ) 34.4 (1 3 7 ) 4) uncomfortable 10.9 (115) 11.0 (71) 10.9 (4 3 ) 5) Very uncomfortable 5.3 (5 6 ) 5.7 (3 7 ) 4.7 (1 9 )

11. If you have been unjustly treated by an official Palestinian authority, such as a ministry or a security service, do you feel that the judicial authority and the Palestinian courts are capable of removing that injustice? 1) Definitely, yes 2 5 .4 (2 7 2 ) 2 6 .0 (1 7 5 ) 24.3 (9 8 ) 2 ) Y es 2 8 .9 (310) 29.0 (195) 28.7 (115) 3 ) M a y b e 26.5 (284) 23.7 (159) 31.2 (1 2 5 ) 4 ) N o 12.0 (129) 14.0 (94) 8.8 ( 3 5 ) 5) Definitely no 7 .2 ( 7 7 ) 7.3 (49) 7.0 (28)

12. In your view, do we have a free press? 1) Y es 27.1 (295) 23.2 (160) 33.8 (135) 2) To some extent 3 2.8 (3 5 7 ) 3 3 .7 (2 3 2 ) 31.4 (1 2 6 ) 3 ) N o 37.1 (4 0 3 ) 3 9 .3 (2 7 1 ) 33.1 (1 3 2 ) 4) No opinion 3.1 ( 3 3 ) 3.8 ( 2 6 ) 1.8 ( 7)

13. In your opinion, can people in the West Bank and Gaza Strip criticize the Palestinian Authority without fear? 1) Yes 37.4 (406) 37.2 (255) 37.5 (150) 2) No 52.7 (572) 53.2 (365) 51.9 (208) 3) Do not know 10.0 (108) 9.6 ( 66) 10.6 ( 42)

14. If you want to evaluate the status of democracy and human rights under the Palestinian Authority, you would say it is: 1) Very Good 8.7 ( 9 3 ) 8 .4 ( 5 6 ) 9.3 ( 3 7 ) 2 ) G o o d 3 4 .2 (3 6 6 ) 3 3 .8 (2 2 8 ) 34.9 (1 3 8 ) 3 ) F a ir 3 3 .7 (3 6 0 ) 32.6 (219) 35.6 (1 4 1 ) 4 ) B ad 14.7 (1 5 7 ) 15.6 (105) 13.0 (5 2 ) - 5) Very Bad 8.1 ( 8 7 ) 8 .7 ( 5 9 ) 7.1 ( 2 8 ) 6) No Opinion 0 .6 ( 6 ) 0 .8 ( 6 ) 0.2 ( 1)

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Total WestBank Gaza Strip % Count % Count % Count 15. An d what about the status of democracy and human rights in other countries: 15-1 America 1) Very Good 44.5 (483) 44.0 (3 0 2 ) 4 5 .4 (1 8 2 ) 2 ) G ood 24.1 (261) 24.4 (1 6 7 ) 23.5 (9 4 ) 3 ) F air 6.7 (7 3 ) 6.1 (4 2 ) 7.7 (3 1 ) 4 ) Bad 4 .2 (4 6 ) 4 .6 (3 1 ) 3 .6 (1 4 ) 5) Very Bad 3.0 (3 3 ) 4.1 (2 8 ) 1.3 (5 ) 6) No Opinion 17.4 (189) 16.9 (1 1 6 ) 18.4 (7 4 ) 15-2 Israel 1) Very Good 53.1 (5 7 7 ) 50.6 (3 4 7 ) 57.4 (2 3 0 ) 2) Good 25.0 (2 7 2 ) 25.3 (174) 24.4 (9 8 ) 3) Fair 5.6(61) 5.0 (3 5 ) 6 .6 (2 6 ) 4 ) B ad 4.6 (5 0 ) 5.8 (4 0 ) 2 .7 (1 1 ) 5) Very Bad 2.3 (2 5 ) 2 .7 (1 9 ) 1.6 (6 ) 6) No Opinion 9.4 (102) 10.6 (73) 7 .4 (2 9 ) 15-3 Jordan 1) Very Good 7.8 (8 4 ) 5.5 (3 8 ) 11.6 (4 7 ) 2 ) G ood 24.6 (267) 20.7 (1 4 2 ) 31.1 (1 2 4 ) 3 ) Fair 2 4 .4 (2 6 5 ) 21.8 (1 5 0 ) 2 8 .9 (1 1 6 ) 4) Bad 17.5 (190) 21.3 (146) 10.9 (4 4 ) 5) Very Bad 14.5 (157) 19.7 (135) 5.6 (2 2 ) 6) No Opinion 11.3 (123) 11.0 (75) 11.9 (1 2 3 ) 15-4 Egypt 1) Very Good 8.4 (9 1 ) 5.8 (3 9 ) 12.9 (5 2 ) 2 ) G ood 2 4 .4 (2 6 5 ) 2 0 .7 (1 4 1 ) 30.8 (1 2 4 ) 3) Fair 20.4 (221) 16.8 (1 1 5 ) 26.5 (1 0 6 ) 4 ) B ad 17.3 (188) 18.5 (127) 15.3 (6 1 ) 5) Very Bad 14.3 (156) 18.7 (128) 6 .9 (2 7 ) 6 ) N o O pinion 15.1 (1 6 4 ) 19.5 (1 3 4 ) 7 .6 (3 1 ) 15-5 France 1) Very Good 36.3 (3 9 5 ) 34.8 (2 3 8 ) 3 8 .9 (1 5 6 ) 2 ) G ood 2 5 .4 (2 7 6 ) 24.5 (1 6 8 ) 2 6 .9 (1 0 8 ) 3 ) F air 4.5 (4 9 ) 4 .7 (3 2 ) 4 .2 (1 7 ) 4 ) B ad 2.1 (2 2 ) 2.5 (1 7 ) 1.2 (5 ) 5) Very Bad 1.2 (1 3 ) 1.7 (1 2 ) 0 .2 (1 ) 6) No Opinion 30.6 (3 3 3 ) 31.8 (2 1 8 ) 2 8 .7 (1 1 5 )

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Total jWestJlaiik ■■■■ ■ Gaza Strip */• Count % Comtt % Count Tell us what you think of the following statements: 16-1 PL C Members are honest 1) Definitely agree 9 .4 (1 0 1 ) . . 8.7 (59) 10.6 (42) 2 ) A gree 4 2 .8 (4 6 0 ) 40.1 (2 7 2 ) 4 7 .2 (1 8 8 ) 3) In between 29.3 (315) 28.4 (1 9 2 ) 3 0 .8 (1 2 3 ) 4) Do not agree 14.1 (151) 17.3 (117) 8.5 (34) S) Definitely do not agree 4 .5 (4 8 ) 5.4 (36) 2.9 (12) 16-2 Leaders of police and security services are honest 1) Definitely agree 12.4 (1 3 4 ) 9.8 (6 7 ) 16.8 (6 7 ) 2 ) Agree 4 6 .5 (5 0 2 ) 44.5 (3 0 1 ) 50 .0 (2 0 1 ) 3) Fair 22.0 (2 3 8 ) 23.6 (1 6 0 ) 19.4 (7 8 ) 4) Do not agree 13.7 (1 4 8 ) 16.2 (110) 9.4 (3 8 ) 5) Definitely do not agree 5.3 (5 7 ) 5.8 (3 9 ) 4 .4 (1 8 ) 16-3 Ministers in our country are honest 1) Definitely agree 8.1 (8 6 ) 6.8 (4 5 ) 10.2 (4 1 ) 2 ) A gree 4 5 .0 (4 8 0 ) 42 .4 (2 8 2 ) 4 9 .4 (1 9 8 ) 3) Fair 27.6 (295) 27.7 (1 8 5 ) 2 7 .5 (1 1 0 ) 4) Do not agree 14.3 (153) 17.1 (1 1 4 ) 9 .6 (3 9 ) S) Definitely do not agree 5 .0 (5 4 ) 6.1 (4 0 ) 3.3 (1 3 ) 16-4 Judges in our country are honest 1) Definitely agree 13.5 (1 4 4 ) 12.2 (8 2 ) 15.6 (6 2 ) 2 ) A gree 4 7 .4 (5 0 6 ) 45.2 (301) 51.2 (2 0 5 ) 3 ) Fair 2 4 .2 (2 5 8 ) 24.6 (1 6 4 ) 23.5 (9 4 ) 4) Do not agree 10.8 (1 1 5 ) 12.8 (85) 7.3 (2 9 ) 5) Definitely do not agree 4 .2 (4 4 ) 5 .2 (3 4 ) 2 .5 (1 0 )

In your opinion, what direction is the government heading toward? 1) Democracy 3 5 .5 (3 8 7 ) 35.5 (244) 35.5 (1 4 3 ) 2) Dictatorship 14.7 (160) 16.7 (1 1 5 ) 11.4 (4 6 ) 3) Combination o f both 3 8 .7 (421) 36.0 (247) 43.2 (1 7 3 ) 4) Not Sure 11.1 (1 2 0 ) 11.7 (8 1 ) 9 .9 (4 0 )

Do you think that there is corruption in PA institutions? (if yes, go to Q19) 1) Y es 5 2 .7 (5 7 3 ) 56.9 (391) 45.5 (1 8 2 ) 2 ) N o 2 4 .2 (2 6 3 ) 2 3 .7 (1 6 3 ) 25.1 (1 0 0 ) 3) N ot sure 23.1 (2 5 1 ) 19.4 (1 3 3 ) 2 9 .5 (1 1 8 )

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Total West Bank Gaza Strip °/o Count % Count % Count 19. Will this corruption in PA institutions increase, decrease or remain as it is in the future? 1) Increase 34.0 (2 1 6 ) 32.9 (143) 36.4 (7 4 ) 2 ) R em ain as it is 8.4 (53) 8.3 (36) 8.6 (1 7 ) 3) Decrease 4 2 .9 (2 7 3 ) 4 5 .0 (1 9 5 ) 3 8 .4 (7 8 ) 4) No opinion 14.7 (9 4 ) 13.8 (6 0 ) 16.6 (3 4 )

20. With regard to armed attacks against Israelitargets, I_ 1) Support 39.1 (2 7 1 ) 3 9 .4 (4 2 6 ) 3 8 .6 (1 5 5 ) 2 ) O ppose 4 8 .7 (5 3 1 ) 4 9 .2 (3 3 9 ) 4 8 .0 (1 9 2 ) 3) No opinion 12.2 (1 3 3 ) 11.5 (7 9 ) 13.4 (5 4 )

21. Do you support or oppose the peace process between Palestinians and Israelis? 1) Support 78.7 (8 5 7 ) 7 4 .2 (5 1 1 ) 86.3 (3 4 5 ) 2 ) O ppose 16.6 (181) 21.5 (148) 8.2 (3 3 ) 3) No opinion 4 .7 (5 1 ) 4 .3 (3 0 ) 5.4 (2 2 )

22. Generally, how do you evaluate the performance of the Palestinian opposition parties, movements and factions? 1) Very good 9.7 (106) 7.9 (5 4 ) 12.9 (5 2 ) 2 ) G o o d 29.5 (322) 29.9 (205) 2 9 .0 (1 1 6 ) 3 ) F a ir 25.9 (282) 23.7 (163) 2 9.6 (1 1 9 ) 4 ) B ad 17.1 (186) 19.7 (136) 12.5 (5 0 ) 5) Very bad 5.8 (63) 6.6 (45) 4 .4 (1 8 ) 5) No opinion 12.0 (130) 12.2 (84) 11.6 (4 6 )

23. Which political party do you support? 1 )P P P 1.3 (1 4 ) 1.4 (1 0 ) 1.2 (5 ) 2 ) P F L P 3.3 (36) 3.3 (22) 3.4 (1 4 ) 3 ) Fateh 4 5 .7 (4 9 8 ) 41.3 (284) 53.3 (2 1 4 ) 4 ) H am as 9.7 (1 0 6 ) 9 .6 (6 6 ) 9.9 (4 0 ) 5 ) D F L P 0 .9 (1 0 ) 1.3 (9 ) 0 .4 (1 ) 6) Islamic Jihad 2.0 (2 2 ) 1.9 (1 3 ) 2 .0 (8 ) 7 ) F id a 0.4 (4 ) 0 .4 (3 ) 0 .4 (2 ) 8) Independent Islamists 3.2 (35) 4.2 (29) 1.5 (6 ) 9) Independent Nationalists 3.7 (4 0 ) 4 .6 (3 2 ) 2.1 (8 ) 10) N o one 26.1 (2 8 4 ) 2 7 .8 (1 9 1 ) 23.1 (9 2 ) 11) O th er {S p e c ify )' 3.6 (3 9 ) 4 .2 (2 9 ) 2.5 (1 0 )

317

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