WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT
Ideas, Beliefs, and Nuclear Policies: The Cases of South Africa and Ukraine
WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT
Dr. William J. Long is Professor and Director of Graduate Programs at the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs at the Georgia Institute of Technology. He also serves as Co-Director of the European Union Center of the University System of Georgia and Research Director for Georgia Tech’s Center for International Business Education and Research. He is the author of US Export Control Policy (Columbia University Press, 1989) and Economic Incentives and Bilateral Cooperation (University of Michigan Press, 1996). Dr. Suzette R. Grillot is Assistant Professor in Political Science and International Academic Programs at the University of Oklahoma. She is co- editor of Arms on the Market: Reducing the Risk of Proliferation in the Former Soviet Union (Routledge, 1998) and Arms and the Environment: Preventing the Perils of Disarmament (forthcoming).
focus on international anarchy and technology DeKlerk instructed the relevant agencies to terminate diffusion led many scholars of international re- the program, and by July 1991, South Africa had be- lations to initially predict the emergence of 25 come the first nation in history to “roll back” its posses- A 1 to 30 nuclear weapon states by the 1990s. When that sion of nuclear weapons. situation did not materialize, some analysts temporized, In December 1991, Ukraine gained its independence arguing that the unique constraints imposed by the from the Soviet Union and immediately inherited a sub- superpowers during the Cold War era had slowed pro- stantial share of the Soviet nuclear arsenal. Specifically, liferation, and they forecasted rapid nuclear prolifera- 15 percent of the former Soviet nuclear stockpile re- 2 tion in the post-Cold War era. Early evidence confounds mained inside the territory of Ukraine—approximately this prediction, offering instead some important anoma- 2,500 tactical and 1,500 strategic nuclear weapons. De- lies: since the demise of the Soviet Union, several coun- spite such an inheritance, Ukraine declared non-nuclear tries have dismantled their nuclear arsenals or renounced weapon status, became a party to the NPT, and began 3 their nuclear programs. the process of denuclearization—becoming, along with South Africa and Ukraine present particularly dramatic South Africa, one of four states to relinquish nuclear cases of denuclearization. On March 24, 1993, Presi- weapons capability. dent F.W. DeKlerk acknowledged that South Africa had The neorealist approach to state behavior expects that built six nuclear weapons and was working on a seventh in the post-Cold War era, states such as Ukraine and before it acceded to the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty South Africa would seek to acquire and maintain a (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state in 1991. In 1989, nuclear deterrent, and therefore, we argue, does little to
24 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT help us understand and explain their decisions to denucle- accumulating military force they can use singly or in arize. Accordingly, there is a need to consider alterna- combination with other states.... [A] state with access to tive models. This article presents a careful examination greater amounts of force has more control over its secu- of the South African and Ukrainian nuclear cases to il- rity than a state with access to lesser amounts of force.”6 lustrate the value of a model incorporating ideas and Nuclear weapons contribute to national power, or per- beliefs into explanations of political outcomes. It dem- ceptions of power, in at least two ways: the obvious, onstrates that an understanding of these countries’ military dimension and psychologically as prestige and nuclear decisions (first to build the bombs, then dismantle evidence of national technological achievement.7 them in the case of South Africa; and to relinquish an Nuclear weapons also reinforce states’ preference for inherited nuclear arsenal in the case of Ukraine) requires balancing through acquiring internal capabilities: “While a model of policymaking that appreciates the role of ideas allies were crucial in the pre-nuclear era to resist for- and beliefs both in the formulation of state preferences eign aggression, the advent of nuclear force has made and in the selection of state strategies. internal balancing both more feasible and more urgent.”8 Explaining policy change by reference to beliefs, how- As noted, despite the popularity of structural realism, ever, requires a rebuttal of neorealist claims that deeper nuclear proliferation predictions drawn from it have objective conditions force states in a given direction or twice proven themselves inadequate: first, during the that any limitation in this approach can be rectified by Cold War and second in its immediate aftermath.9 Para- incorporating domestic politics into the equation. Be- doxically, we have seen the unprecedented phenomena fore presenting a model incorporating beliefs and ideas of several states choosing to denuclearize at the end of and considering their relevance to the cases, therefore, the Cold War despite systemic factors that allegedly this article discusses two alternative approaches to ex- encourage all states to retain their nuclear weapons or plaining nuclear policy: (1) structural-realism or pursue new weapons capabilities. neorealism; and (2) domestic-level theories of foreign policy. Following a presentation of our model incorpo- AN ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATION: THE rating ideas, the South African and Ukrainian cases of ROLE OF DOMESTIC POLITICS nuclear decisionmaking are presented. The article con- cludes with a discussion of the findings and their impli- A Domestic Political Economy Explanation cations for understanding the role of ideas in nuclear As an alternative to an explanation that holds that the policy choice. It suggests that there may be opportuni- international distribution of power is the most impor- ties to promote nonproliferation by appealing to states’ tant variable shaping foreign policy, some scholars point senses of their identity and seeking to reassure them, to the primacy of domestic politics in determining for- not just on their physical security, but on the security of eign policy outcomes.10 This “domestic-dominant” per- their identity as well. spective argues that different state strategies result from different national political environments and different THE LIMITATIONS OF THE NEOREALIST national preferences.11 EXPLANATION Two variations on the domestic-dominant approach Neorealism maintains that states pursue power capa- could account for the nuclear policies of South Africa bilities in an anarchic international system as a means to and Ukraine: (1) the domestic political economy; or (2) their survival and security.4 The anarchic structure of democratic institutions and norms. The first explanation, the international system compels states to create a bal- offered by Etel Solingen, focuses on societal economic ance of power against potentially hostile actors. States coalitions and nuclear policy choice. She argues that balance internally by relying on their own capabilities states’ nuclear postures are the result of a struggle be- or externally by relying on allies’ capabilities.5 States tween two domestic coalitions: one advocating economic generally prefer internal balancing for reasons of au- liberalization, the other opposing it. Each coalition de- tonomy and self-sufficiency. velops contrasting perspectives on the domestic and in- The acquisition of military capability is central to ternational consequences of nuclear weapons states’ power pursuits. “States secure their survival by acquisition.12 The first group, a “liberalizing coalition,”
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 25 WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT she hypothesizes, is internationalist in its outlook. The tance of democracies to resort to military measures. A key supporters of liberalization are liquid asset holders second strand of domestic peace theory argues that the and export-oriented firms. She maintains that economic adoption of democratic norms14 of peaceful resolution interests and opportunities open to such a liberalizing of disputes could affect a state’s decisionmaking calcu- coalition make it “more likely to be receptive to com- lus and restrain states from resorting to force.15 promise nuclear postures that do not endanger their in- Extrapolating from questions of war or peace to the terests,” including interest in debt relief, export markets, issue of denuclearization, one could hypothesize that technology transfer, and investments available from pow- nascent democratic institutions reduced enthusiasm for erful international actors and institutions. Domestic con- sustaining the means to engage in large-scale violence siderations reinforce the liberalizing coalition’s and reduced the likelihood that weapons intended for opposition to large-scale, state-supported nuclear pro- such an end would be retained.16 Alternatively, decisions grams that are often inefficient, inflationary, unproduc- to denuclearize could be the result of internal democratic tive, and involve an expansion of state power. norms affecting external behavior. The internalization17 Opposition to the liberalizing coalition comes from of democratic norms could constrain a state’s nuclear an, “inward-looking” coalition generally composed of ambition, or cause a state to relinquish a nuclear arsenal unskilled blue-collar workers, state employees, small it already possesses, because democratic norms make it businesses, import-competing firms or those tied to the unacceptable for democracies to deter other states with state or local markets, under-employed intelligentsia, and one of the most dangerous and violent forms of weap- politicians that fear an erosion of the local bases of their ons.18 support. The military establishment adversely affected Applying the democratic peace theory to these cases by liberalization is also likely to oppose denucleariza- requires two assumptions—one empirical, and the other 13 tion, as are extremist religious groups. Hence, there theoretical. Empirically, it assumes that the South Afri- are both material and ideological bases for this inward- can and Ukrainian regimes were democratic or becom- looking coalition. ing democratic, institutionally or normatively, during the Notably, Solingen’s analysis offers a domestic-level, decisionmaking process that led to non-nuclear status. coalition-based explanation for a state’s nuclear weap- Even if South Africa and Ukraine were or were becom- ons decision. Phrased as a hypothesis for this study, her ing democratic during the time of their denucleariza- approach would assert that South African and Ukrainian tion, this explanation remains problematic because there decisions to denuclearize were the result of domestic are numerous non-democracies that are and remain non- coalition politics in which an economic liberalizing nuclear weapon states; and today most nuclear powers coalition’s support for denuclearization triumphed over are democracies. Theoretically, this approach assumes nationalistic, inward-looking groups that favored the re- that the alleged monadic effect of democracy,19 i.e., de- tention of nuclear weapons. As discussed below, how- mocracies are more peaceful in their relations with all ever, this approach has very little relevance to the South countries (itself controversial), can be extrapolated from African and Ukrainian cases. the question of war or peace to the issue of nuclear policy.20 This is particularly problematic in explaining The Role of Democratic Institutions and Norms the nuclear relations between two democracies in South Asia—Pakistan and India—at least prior to the 1999 A second domestic-dominant approach merits con- military coup in Pakistan. sideration. Perhaps the most popular variant of the no- tion that certain kinds of domestic political systems predispose countries toward particular policy preferences AN ALTERNATIVE MODEL: is the so-called “democratic peace” argument. Demo- THE ROLE OF CAUSAL BELIEFS cratic peace theorists offer two causal scenarios. One This article offers an alternative explanation for South strain of thinking focuses on democracies’ institutional African and Ukrainian nuclear policies. It accepts the structures and dynamics—checks and balances, division dominant assumption that states act rationally, i.e., they of political power, the need for public debate to enlist choose strategies to maximize their utility subject to widespread support for policies—to explain the reluc- environmental constraints.21 Further it accepts the propo-
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sition that to understand political outcomes, such as a Thus the decisionmaking chain begins with an actor’s state’s decision to build, dismantle, or relinquish nuclear basic interests. In pursuit of these interests, the actor weapons, we need knowledge of both actor preferences forms preferences. Given these preferences, the actor and the strategic environment in which it operates. Un- searches for the best available strategies to achieve like the approaches discussed above, however, this study them.26 We argue that strategy selection—like prefer- does not derive preferences solely from structure (inter- ence formation—includes an ideational component. state competition) or from domestic politics. Instead, it Actors choose strategies based on beliefs about expected demonstrates how causal beliefs shape policy outcomes returns under environmental constraints. As the envi- through their impact on both state preference formation ronment changes, it may induce a change in beliefs about and state selection of strategy in a changing environ- the efficacy of a strategy in achieving long-standing pref- ment. erences. A change in beliefs can thus lead to a change in Before applying this approach to South Africa and state/actor strategy. A visual model of the policy pro- Ukraine, a general exposition of the model and a defini- cess is represented in Figure 1. tion of terms are required. As used here, preferences are predilections for particular policy outcomes. They are a Ideational Model Applied: South Africa product of both basic interests and causal beliefs. Basic As applied to South Africa’s nuclear policy, we main- interests are antecedents to preference formation. We tain that South Africa’s basic interest, its desire for its maintain they are what Jeffrey Frieden calls “tastes,” physical security in a decentralized international system, basic desires that motivate behavior in a wide variety of was mediated by its belief about itself as a Western na- situations.22 Causal beliefs are “beliefs about the cause- tion—what some would call its identity.27 Together, effect relationships which derive authority from the structure and belief created South Africa’s preference shared consensus of recognized elites.”23 In short, pref- for pursuing its security through attempted affiliation erences combine basic interests and ideas or beliefs.24 with the West. This preference, solidly in place by the Following preference formation, states (or individu- late 1940s, led South Africa to pursue two distinctive als or groups within states) pursue strategies—instru- strategies in response to its changing beliefs about its ments used to get as close as possible to achieving one’s environment. First, during the Cold War era, South preferences.25 Strategies differ from preferences in that Africa’s increasing international isolation and insecu- the relevant actor has no independent predilection for rity led it to build nuclear bombs as part of its strategy to one set of strategies or another; the actor’s inclination is “blackmail” the West (especially the United States) into based on the best anticipated means to achieve the un- tacitly supporting its security, or at least not abandoning 28 derlying goal or preference. it wholly to its fate. South African elites believed the
Figure 1: Ideas and Outcomes
Causal beliefs Causal beliefs Basic re payoffs Preferences interests
Strategy
Environment
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West was less likely to abandon it if it possessed a cred- opposition to the regime in southern Africa and the ible nuclear weapons potential. During this period, weap- West—precisely the outcome South Africa hoped to ons possession became part of South Africa’s strategy. avoid. Moreover, development of an overt nuclear threat How then to account for South Africa’s decision to would have invited greater Soviet involvement in the dismantle its weapons? We argue that South Africa’s region through offers of treaties of friendship and closer preference (a prior melding of interest and beliefs)—to ties with South Africa’s neighbors, including protection 31 pursue its security as a part of the Western system of under its nuclear umbrella. The use of nuclear weap- states—did not change. What changed was its environ- ons against Soviet forces would have provoked over- mental setting and its belief about the anticipated whelming and devastating retaliation. Former Foreign response of the West to its possession of nuclear weap- Minister Pik Botha recently acknowledged that South ons in the new, emerging post-Cold War world. South Africa’s leaders knew nuclear weapons could not be used Africa came to believe that to remain part of the West, it as a local deterrent for fear of repercussions from the must change its strategy by ending apartheid policies international community, particularly the United 32 and dismantling its nuclear arsenal. States. Third, South Africa faced no nuclear threat and any Ideational Model Applied: Ukraine conventional threat could be handled by its superior con- ventional capabilities. No African state could success- Similar to South Africa’s position after the Cold War, fully project forces against South Africa in a way that Ukraine’s desire for physical security in an uncertain could not be met with a conventional response; South environment was mediated by its belief about its place Africa’s capabilities far exceeded that of her neighbors. in the Western community of liberal, democratic states. South Africa had responded to the partial Western arms Ukraine believed that being a part of the Western com- embargo by developing substantial indigenous conven- munity would guarantee its survival. Because the West tional weapons capabilities and securing new, nontradi- would be more likely to include Ukraine as a peer if it tional sources of supply. Moreover, black African relinquished its inherited nuclear arsenal, Ukraine even- countries never seriously threatened South Africa with tually chose to denuclearize and accepted non-nuclear military attack.33 weapon status. Finally, the real threat to the Republic came not from THE LIMITS OF A STRUCTURAL an antagonistic superpower or another African state but EXPLANATION FOR SOUTH AFRICA’S from within its borders in the form of revolt in the black DECISION TO ACQUIRE NUCLEAR WEAPONS community aided by sabotage conducted by guerrilla fighters harbored in neighboring states. In J.D.L. Moore’s There are several problems with relying exclusively words, “the only realistic threat to the South African re- on a structurally derived, security interest-based expla- gime, and one far more difficult to meet, comes from nation for South Africa’s decision to build nuclear weap- the people of South Africa themselves.”34 Whatever do- ons. First, South Africa had few, if any, targets for nuclear mestic political advantage the white regime gained from weapons. The only conceivable targets for a South Afri- describing the threat to the Republic as an external con- can bomb would have been hostage cities or staging ar- spiracy, the regime was not blind to its true antagonist— eas in neighboring states, embattled areas within South the majority of its population it had disenfranchised. Africa, or possible Soviet naval forces.29 Long distances and lack of suitable delivery systems precluded use out- After a detailed account of the history of the South side the region.30 African bomb that focused on the country’s structural security situation, Mitchell Reiss concludes “that nuclear Second, actual use of nuclear weapons against such bombs were developed without a strategic rationale.”35 targets carried more disadvantages than advantages. Others reach the same conclusion: a structure-based ex- Threatened use of nuclear weapons against a regional planation alone does not lead to an adequate explana- adversary would have precipitated South Africa’s total tion for South Africa’s nuclear weapons. As Moore isolation from international contacts and, thus, devas- observed in the 1980s, “it is difficult to see any need for tated the regime’s economic and technological well-be- their development.”36 ing. An overt nuclear policy would have crystallized
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SOUTH AFRICA’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND South Africa’s Atomic Energy Corporation (AEC) re- THE LIMITS OF A DOMESTIC-DOMINANT ported to Prime Minister John Vorster that it could build EXPLANATION a nuclear explosive device.42 Vorster then authorized the Although South Africa’s sense of threat and its isola- development of a nuclear explosive capability and ap- tion were directly linked to its domestic racial policies, proved funding for the testing site. Waldo Stumpf, head shifting domestic economic coalitions or increasing of South Africa’s AEC, identifies 1977 as the point when democratic institutions or norms played virtually no di- South Africa’s strategy shifted from a predominantly rect role in nuclear weapons policy. During South “peaceful” nuclear explosive program, i.e., one devoted Africa’s nuclear age, all elements of white society shared to explosives used for mining or construction, to a pro- a general consensus over foreign and defense policy. In- gram based primarily on the manufacture of weapons 43 deed, there was little discussion of foreign affairs in gen- for military purposes, i.e., war-fighting or deterrence. eral, and nuclear weapons proliferation in particular, by The AEC and the Armaments Corporation (ARMSCOR), white South Africans. The remarkable feature in South the state-owned arms manufacturer, compiled the first Africa’s domestic coalitions, institutions, and norms was bomb in 1979, and over the next decade five more weap- continuity, not change. Throughout South Africa’s ons were added to the stockpile. nuclear period, the South African public regarded nuclear These developments in nuclear technology and strat- matters as state secrets to be left to the government.37 egy occurred within an environment of growing internal Opposition parties did not challenge the ruling Nation- and external threats. The ultimate source of South alists on nuclear policy.38 Press comments were mini- Africa’s insecurity and international estrangement was mal, and only a handful of South African academics its racial policies. South Africa was one of the few coun- wrote on the subject of nuclear weapons.39 The business tries in the world where a racial minority controlled the community was absent on the nuclear question,40 and government, which sought to preserve the privileged academic and public interest groups were largely silent position of whites with a policy of apartheid (“separate- on nuclear matters.41 Moreover, there is little evidence ness”). When the Nationalist Party came to power after that South Africa’s domestic institutions or norms the 1948 elections, it passed laws that segregated the changed to become more democratic and influential racial groups and gave the government extensive police during this time period (as opposed to the later transi- powers. tion to majority rule). Although largely unchallenged in the 1950s, a num- ber of events in the 1960s threatened the Nationalist re- THE ROLE OF BELIEFS IN SHAPING STATE gime. In particular, the March 21, 1960, Sharpeville PREFERENCES: SOUTH AFRICA’S WESTERN massacre of 69 unarmed protesters strengthened inter- IDENTITY AND ITS BLACKMAIL STRATEGY nal resistance. It led the Pan African Congress (PAC) South Africa’s nuclear aspirations originated from its and the African National Congress (ANC) to adopt sabo- abundant uranium reserves, which led it to establish an tage as an explicit strategy to further the aim of over- indigenous civilian nuclear research and development throwing apartheid. External opposition to apartheid program by the late 1950s. In the 1960s and 1970s, South from many countries grew following Sharpeville. In the Africa was the world’s third largest producer of uranium 1970s, the end of Portuguese rule and the installment of and a partner with the United States and Britain on many national left-leaning governments in Mozambique and nuclear energy matters. In 1969, South Africa demon- Angola brought insecurity closer to South Africa’s bor- strated its independent nuclear expertise with the con- ders. Internally, threats also were on the rise, culminat- struction of a pilot uranium enrichment plant, the Y Plant, ing in the 1976 Soweto riots and another round of at Valindaba near Pretoria. The Y Plant made possible international condemnation and ostracism. the manufacture of weapons-grade uranium outside in- Although the chronology of South Africa’s nuclear ternational inspection and control. weapons development and the domestic and international In 1971, South Africa embarked on research for sources of South Africa’s insecurity are reasonably clear, “peaceful nuclear explosives.” By 1974, its program had the explanation for its acquisition, and later its destruc- begun to acquire greater military potential. That year, tion, of nuclear weapons, is more opaque. The goal of
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the next section is to illustrate how South Africa’s inse- courted security ties with the West. During the 1950s curities and beliefs shaped South Africa’s preference to and 1960s, Pretoria remained determined to enter into a be part of the West, and how that preference led to two defense alliance and to draw the Western powers into a distinct nuclear strategies under different environmen- commitment to ensure South Africa’s security.47 South tal constraints. Africa’s initial efforts to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were rejected, however, and, al- South Africa’s Beliefs and Its Policy Preference though Pretoria was invited by Britain to join the Middle East Defense Organization, it failed to become actively It is within the context of South Africa’s search for a involved because of opposition from developing nations. Western guarantee of its security that the acquisition and After strenuous efforts, South Africa’s courtship of Great dismantlement of nuclear weapons can be best explained. Britain was rewarded in the 1955 Simonstown Agree- Why did South Africa seek, or expect, a Western guar- ment. While not an alliance or a promise of protection antee of its security? of any sort, under the terms of the agreement, a base To answer that question, one must appreciate that fun- near Cape Town would be used by the British Royal damental to South Africa’s preference formation was Navy in exchange for the sale of arms and munitions to its belief that it was part of the West. White South South Africa. In signing the agreement, South Africa Africa’s Western orientation is the unshakable core of emphasized that it confirmed the strategic importance its worldview.44 The consequence of this belief for South of the country to the West and conferred “legitimacy on Africa’s international alignments and foreign policy has its aspirations to enjoy the benefits of association with been an enduring invitation to Western nations to in- the Western alliance system.”48 clude South Africa in their collective security arrange- Events in the early 1960s weakened South Africa’s ments and to accept it as an ideological, security, and faith in its role as a secure and protected member of the economic partner. Over time, South Africa pursued ever West and prompted the Republic to modernize and ex- more desperate efforts to link itself to the West as West- pand its defense forces to better attend to its own secu- ern antipathy toward the regime increased. Nuclear weap- rity. Withdrawal from the Commonwealth and UN ons acquisition became part of a long-term strategy to sanctions convinced South Africa of the need for greater attain its policy preference of security through Western self-reliance. South Africa did not give up on its efforts alignment. This preference was derived in substantial to be invited to join a Western security alliance, how- part not only from the structural environment—the Cold ever. During the defense build-up of the early 1960s, War and regional/domestic insecurity—but from South Defense Minister Fouché explained that the moderniza- Africa’s beliefs about itself. tion program was designed to make South Africa a more The origins of South Africa’s beliefs stemmed in part attractive alliance partner. Even if the West failed to from an earlier period, 1919 to 1945, when it was a re- come to South Africa’s aid, South Africa would remain spected member of the predominantly white international steadfast in its loyalty to the West. Prime Minister system—what one author calls the “golden age” high- Vorster declared that the Republic would defend the free lighted by Jan Smuts’ contribution to the genesis of the world even if the West refused to provide the arms nec- League of Nations.45 Prime Minister Smuts firmly be- essary for it to do so.49 lieved that Great Britain and the other Commonwealth Nonetheless, South Africa was progressively cut off nations would stand by South Africa and provide exter- from nuclear cooperation and conventional arms. Great nal support in the event of regional conflict. In 1947, Britain terminated the Simonstown agreement in 1975, Smuts proclaimed, “We have friends, and if it comes to and the United Nations and United States imposed a stra- the worst, we shall find that we are not standing alone.”46 tegic and munitions embargo against the Republic by Smuts’ opinion was undoubtedly based on the fact that the late 1970s. However, the United States continued to South Africa had provided substantial support to the al- share some intelligence with South Africa, and the United lies during World War II, and a quid pro quo could be States, Great Britain, and France blocked the 1974 move expected. to oust South Africa from the United Nations. Further- After World War II, South Africa’s elites repeatedly more, some Western arms continued to find indirect stressed their role as a Western nation and assiduously routes to South Africa.
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South Africa’s partial international isolation and deployed militarily or integrated into the country’s mili- worsening internal and external security during the tary doctrine. 1970s coupled with its abiding belief about itself as part Although South Africa had few, if any, military uses of the West best explain its decision to move ahead with for nuclear weapons, its likely possession of nuclear its nuclear weapons program as part of a blackmail strat- weapons was a useful political device to extract security egy to prevent Western abandonment. concessions from, and to maintain the country’s tenu- ous links with, the West. The specter of nuclear weap- The Three-Part “Blackmail” Strategy for the Bomb ons and the possibility of revealing their actual presence In April 1978, Prime Minister Vorster approved a were designed to avoid military or economic abandon- three-phase deterrent strategy for the use of nuclear weap- ment by the West. The pursuit of nuclear weapons only ons. Director of the program, Waldo Stumpf, explained makes sense if one understands it as a strategy meant to the plan: best serve South Africa’s preference of remaining part Phase 1: Strategic uncertainty in which the of the West to ensure its survival. nuclear deterrent capability will not be ac- knowledged or denied. Why Dismantle the Bomb? Phase 2: Should South African territory be How best to explain South Africa’s decision to dis- threatened, for example, by the Warsaw Pact mantle its weapons? Most approaches emphasize South countries through the surrogate Cuban forces Africa’s improving external security situation by the mid- [then] in Angola, covert acknowledgment to to late 1980s as the most important reason. This inter- certain international powers, e.g., the USA, pretation is consistent with a structural explanation for would be contemplated. South Africa’s acquisition of the bomb in the first place. Phase 3: Should this potential disclosure of Analyses by Reiss, Albright, Stumpf, and others Africa’s capability not bring about interna- chronicle the changing circumstances in southern Af- tional intervention to remove the threat, pub- rica and internationally: lic acknowledgment or demonstration by an • in August 1988, a cease fire was negotiated for the underground test of South Africa’s capability, northern border of Namibia; 50 would be considered. • in December of that year, South Africa, Angola, and In short, South Africa’s “bombs in the basement” strat- Cuba agreed on the phased withdrawal of Cuban troops egy was primarily for political use. Nuclear weapons from the region consistent with Soviet leader Mikhail would be used in case of emergency to extract military, Gorbachev’s call for a “political settlement” and an strategic, or economic concessions from the West. David end to the conflict;54 Fischer explains South Africa’s strategy: “The card it • on April 1, 1989, Namibia was granted independence; keeps in play is political, not military. A country be- and lieved to be able to make nuclear weapons is treated with • by year-end 1989, the Berlin wall had fallen and greater circumspection. South Africa is courted by the many recognized the Cold War as over.55 51 West, especially the U.S....” David Albright similarly Several authors conclude that the end of the Cold War concludes, “In essence the weapons were the last card in and greater regional stability made possession of nuclear a political bluff intended to blackmail the United States weapons “superfluous” as a defense against a “total on- or other Western powers. Whether it would have worked slaught.” is impossible to determine.”52 True, but as discussed, nuclear weapons were of mar- South Africa’s political strategy for the bomb remains ginal value or counterproductive in meeting a conven- the most plausible explanation. All those associated with tional or Soviet nuclear threat in the first place. Moreover, the program claimed that no offensive use of a nuclear South Africa’s relative security from these threats was explosive was ever foreseen or intended because it was established by the mid-1980s. Meanwhile, the broader recognized that such use would not serve South Africa’s strategic environment was changing in other important interests and could bring about massive counter-retalia- ways. Pretoria’s economic and political isolation was tion. In practice, Stumpf claims, “the strategy never ad- worsening. Between 1985 and 1988, over 100 compa- vanced beyond Phase 1.”53 The weapons were never
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nies pulled out of South Africa and all Organization for reforms, including ending apartheid, dismantling the Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) coun- country’s nuclear weapons program, and signing the tries imposed sanctions against the regime.56 The regime NPT. This regime change was a critical factor leading also felt the costs of apartheid in the form of an over- to a fundamental shift in South African nuclear strat- sized bureaucracy and military to maintain the system egy. On February 2, 1990, President DeKlerk delivered and the rigidities and distortions it created in the economy a speech in which he announced the unbanning of the and society. Apartheid was becoming increasingly dif- ANC, PAC, and other dissident groups and the release ficult to reconcile with the needs of a modern economy.57 from prison of ANC leader Nelson Mandela. He justi- Further, the end of the Cold War and all credible fied his actions with the end of the Cold War and the claims of a Soviet threat in southern Africa removed desire to eliminate South Africa’s international isola- any leverage South Africa’s blackmail strategy might tion and economic estrangement. have held over the West. South Africa could no longer The same month, DeKlerk terminated the nuclear make a meaningful claim of its strategic importance to weapons program. South Africa’s nuclear policy would the West because of its mineral supplies, Cape route, or become part of this strategy to normalize its relations anti-Communist ideology. Growing economic problems, with the West. Removal of its nuclear weapons and ac- continuing domestic unrest, and continuing international cession to the NPT assumed some distinct advantages ostracism meant white South Africa faced a stark choice for South Africa both in the West and in the region.62 if it were to achieve its preference of security through In sum, the dismantlement decision, like the decision Western affiliation: remove the barrier between itself to acquire and maintain an implicit nuclear threat, was and the West by directly addressing apartheid and other motivated by South Africa’s beliefs about the likely barriers like nuclear weapons possession, or forego its Western response to its nuclear strategy. As its strategic Western ties. Nuclear weapons had become a burden to environment changed, its beliefs and, eventually, its strat- South Africa rather than a benefit in the political/eco- egy changed as well. Its interest and preference remained nomic sense; nuclear weapons never had any direct mili- constant, however. The end of a Communist insurgency tary purpose. in the region eliminated South Africa’s belief that it was Unable to blackmail the West but wishing to remain a able to coerce the West through the threatened posses- part of it, a change in strategy was imperative. The only sion or use of nuclear weapons, rendering them super- remaining question for South Africa was when and how fluous in a strategic sense and a barrier to its reaching its to cash in its nuclear bargaining chip for whatever ad- preference of remaining linked to the West. The regime’s vantage it might bring.58 Pretoria looked to alleviate is apartheid policy remained the unavoidable source of international isolation by signing the NPT and using the South Africa’s isolation, and with the end of the Cold concession for maximum advantage with the West and War, there was no longer a countervailing geostrategic to counter conservative Afrikaner opposition to such a motive for the West to tolerate South Africa’s domestic move. The government also wanted to provide the Na- policies. South African elites believed that to maintain tional Party with distinction for the dismantlement deci- its Western ties, South Africa must sooner or later dis- sion and thus prevent any future government from taking mantle apartheid and rid itself of nuclear weapons for the credit.59 Foregoing its nuclear weapons and joining whatever political or commercial benefits that action the NPT was a way “to reenter the international com- could bring. The changed security picture in the region munity in compliance with international norms.”60 But, and internationally also reduced South Africa’s near-term these actions alone would not be sufficient to earn the threat and helped to create an opportunity for a new strat- West’s support.61 The basis for Pretoria’s isolation was egy. Structural conditions remain important, but must its apartheid policy, not its nuclear policy. Internal re- be understood in conjunction with state preferences and form in dismantling apartheid and denuclearization causal beliefs to understand policy outcomes. would have to be addressed together. 63 The change in South Africa’s strategy was precipi- UKRAINE AND ITS NUCLEAR DECISION tated by the election of F.W. DeKlerk in September 1989. Even before its independence, Ukraine declared its He assumed office ready to make fundamental political intention to become “a permanently neutral
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state…holding to three non-nuclear principles: not to UKRAINE AND THE LIMITS OF A accept, produce or acquire nuclear weapons.”64 In fact, NEOREALIST EXPLANATION two months before Ukraine became an independent Shortly after its independence, Ukrainian leaders be- country, its Parliament (Rada) adopted the statement “On gan to express concern regarding Russia’s apparent un- the Non-Nuclear Status of Ukraine.” On December 21, willingness to respect Ukrainian independence or its 1991, members of the Commonwealth of Independent present borders.67 Russian officials reportedly described States (CIS) signed the “Agreement on Joint Measures Ukraine’s independence as “transitional” and went so on Nuclear Arms,” which provided for the removal of far as to warn European governments not to open em- tactical weapons from Ukraine by July 1, 1992, and stra- bassies in Kiev.68 Moreover, Ukrainian leaders com- tegic weapons by the end of 1994. All tactical nuclear plained that the Russians were attempting to reassert weapons were removed from the country ahead of sched- authority in the former Soviet region through their ma- ule, by May 1992, despite Ukrainian fears that the Rus- nipulation of the CIS agreements.69 sians would not destroy the weapons and concerns that Ukrainians were being denied their share of disarma- Problems also arose between Russia and Ukraine over ment assistance. the ownership of the Black Sea Fleet. Disagreement over the fleet began when the CIS agreed on January 16, 1992, Nonetheless, Ukraine proceeded down the path of that troops in the strategic forces would swear allegiance denuclearization. Its leaders signed the Lisbon Protocol to the CIS. There was no agreement, however, on which in May 1992, which required Ukraine to return its stra- forces were “strategic.” The battle over the fleet height- tegic weapons to Russia and join the NPT “in the short- ened when Russian leaders declared Sevastopol a “Rus- est time possible.” Obstacles emerged, however, as the sian city.”70 Rada began to emphasize conditions for START I and NPT ratification. In September 1993, the Russians and Other territorial disputes with Russia and Romania Ukrainians met at Massandra to work through some of increased Ukraine’s security concerns as well. The Rus- the issues that stood in the way of Ukrainian non-nuclear sian dispute, however, was more threatening because of status. The agreement reached at this meeting, however, the 11 million Russians living in Ukraine. Russia and was quickly thrown aside as both the Russians and the Ukraine have also debated the ownership of territory in Ukrainians argued that neither side intended to keep its eastern Ukraine (Donbas), southern Ukraine (so-called bargain.65 Novorossiya), and the Crimea.71 On November 18, 1993, the Ukrainian Rada ratified Tension between Ukraine and Russia also increased START I, but attached 13 conditions before it would be concerning the considerable debt owed to Russia for fuel, implemented. This led to a trilateral meeting in Wash- oil, and gas shipped to Ukraine.72 By late 1994, Ukraine ington, DC in January 1994 where Russia, Ukraine, and owed Russia $4.2 billion for imports of oil and natural the United States agreed on appropriate Ukrainian com- gas; an amount that increased $100 million every three pensation for fissile materials, dismantlement assistance, months.73 Because of Ukraine’s inability to pay for such and security assurances. One month later the Rada re- services, and because Ukrainian exports to Russia col- moved the conditions it had attached to START, but lapsed, Russia threatened to halt the much needed en- again delayed its consideration of the NPT. In the sum- ergy supply. mer of 1994, Ukraine’s President Leonid Kravchuk was Given Ukraine’s security concerns, the neorealist ap- defeated in elections by Leonid Kuchma, who ran on a proach would expect that it would seek to balance against platform of market-based economic reform and closer the power of Russia either by developing and maintain- relations with Moscow. Kuchma also supported, as had ing a credible military capability or by allying with oth- Kravchuk, NPT membership. In November 1994, after ers who share its concerns about Russia. To balance Kuchma’s speech to the Rada appealing for NPT ratifi- internally, Ukraine could rely on its conventional mili- cation, it voted to join the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon tary capability. It is widely accepted, however, that state. On December 5, 1994, Ukraine submitted its NPT Ukraine could not defend itself if it were to enter a con- ratification to the Conference on Security and Coopera- ventional war with Russia. Russia outpaces Ukraine tion in Europe (CSCE), and START then entered into three-to-one in population, gross domestic product, and force.66 military capability. Moreover, Ukraine cannot make its
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defenses viable geographically. It has long, open bor- UKRAINE’S DOMESTIC POLITICS AND THE ders (a 1,600-kilometer border with Russia and a 900- LIMITS OF DOMESTIC-LEVEL APPROACHES kilometer border with Belarus) that lack natural Like the South African case, domestic political pres- boundaries. In fact, some analysts have suggested that, sures and democratic institutional or normative factors at best, Ukraine’s 20 armored divisions could defend played virtually no role in Ukraine’s nuclear 74 approximately 600 kilometers of its border. decisionmaking. Domestic coalitions, either “inward Regarding external balancing, neorealists would ex- looking” or “liberalizing,” that pressured the government pect Ukraine to ally with other powers to counter Rus- to select a particular nuclear path were largely non-exis- sian power capability. Of course, an alliance with the tent. Although public opinion polls on the nuclear issue CIS would not have been feasible given Russia’s promi- were conducted, such opinions were rarely if ever con- nent role in this loose organization of former Soviet sidered during the decisionmaking process in Ukraine. states. Allying with other powers (joining NATO for Other forces, such as the media and independent re- example) would be provocative to Russia, possibly plac- searchers or groups, were of little significance as well. ing Ukraine in a less secure situation between Russia During the early years of Ukraine’s independence, at and the Western alliance. Nonetheless, Ukraine has which time the nuclear question was being considered, sought closer military ties with Western powers.75 The coalitions, groups, and public opinion remained outside West, however, demonstrated relatively little interest in the relevant decisionmaking circles.79 Moreover, Ukrai- Ukraine, instead focusing its foreign policy almost ex- nian domestic institutions and norms were hardly demo- clusively on Russia.76 cratic during this period. Although Ukraine was In addition, neorealists suggest that states are over- attempting to make strides in that direction, it was hav- 80 whelmingly concerned with relative gains. Because the ing difficulty adjusting to the pains of democratization. international system is anarchic in nature, states are in- Ultimately, the domestic upheavals with which the herently fearful and distrustful of other states. In an en- Ukrainian population had to deal during the nuclear de- vironment where states seek to survive and maintain cision process meant that there was little to no involve- 81 sovereignty, they can never be sure of another state’s ment by the Ukrainian citizenry in the nuclear issue. intentions. They must be suspicious of other states’ ac- Ukraine’s ideas about democracy were, however, of tions and must always anticipate danger.77 States are, considerable significance regarding the country’s deci- therefore, very sensitive to the capabilities of others. sion to denuclearize.
Because Ukraine regularly expressed concerns about UKRAINE’S WESTERN IDENTITY AND the relative position and capability of Russia, neorealists ITS DECISION TO DENUCLEARIZE would expect that Ukraine would find it rather difficult to give up its nuclear weapons—especially to a state it When Ukraine achieved its independence in Decem- did not trust. The neorealist approach, in other words, ber 1991, the new country began a difficult political, would not expect Ukraine to relinquish the arsenal that economic, and social transition. The Ukrainian people would “level the playing field” and reduce the gap in had to decide what kind of government they would cre- relative capabilities between Russia and Ukraine. More- ate and maintain, as well as who were their friends and over, Ukraine’s position in the international system as a foes. The Ukrainian state, in other words, had to estab- 82 middle-range power should have made its leaders even lish its new identity as a new independent country. more sensitive to any possible change in relative power. Very soon after Ukraine became an independent coun- Indeed, some Ukrainian leaders expressed concern that try, its leaders began asserting its status as a European it was their nuclear inheritance that created such interest state. Moreover, Ukraine’s conception of its position in in Ukraine, and that renunciation of their nuclear arse- Europe provided the country’s leaders with a guide for nal would only lead the other powers of the world to action. President Kravchuk stated in February 1992 that turn a blind eye to Ukraine.78 “Ukraine, as a European state, has an intention to par- ticipate in all European structures.”83 President Kravchuk also stated Ukraine’s intention of fully integrating into the European community.84 In July 1992, Ukraine ap-
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plied to become a member of the Council of Europe, that this community of nations was created by those who and by July 1993 was regularly attending Council of “share common principles” for the purpose of “working Europe meetings. together.”96 Ukraine and the United States signed a These activities are the result of Ukraine’s concep- “friendship” agreement in May 1992 in which both par- tion of itself as a “100% European state.”85 Foreign ties promised to “strive to protect and promote the val- Minister Zlenko reiterated this conception when he said, ues that bind us together in the democratic community 97 “Ukraine is in Europe. Furthermore, the geographical of nations.” Ukrainians often asserted their “mutual center of Europe is situated on Ukrainian territory.”86 understanding” of Western ideals, and their commitment Ukrainian decisionmakers consistently referred to to become a “full-fledged member” of the Western com- 98 Ukraine’s Western orientation and its “place” in the com- munity. Most importantly, however, Ukrainian lead- munity of West European states.87 Ukraine, they be- ers linked their Western orientation and membership in lieved, would serve as “a stabilizing force in Europe” a Western community with their nuclear decision. Presi- and intended to develop itself according to a “Western dent Kravchuk, for example, suggested that “Ukraine’s model.”88 President Kravchuk asserted that Ukraine international standing and membership in the commu- “would like as soon as possible to endow [itself]...with nity of European nations depends on its denucleariza- 99 components that proceed from tried-and-tested European tion and abiding by its commitments.” experiences.”89 Ukraine, therefore, believed that it was part of the On July 5, 1993, the Ukrainian Rada endorsed Western community it so admired. To be accepted as a Ukraine’s Western orientation when it adopted the “Ba- part of that community, Ukraine necessarily had to re- sic Principles of Ukraine’s Foreign Policy.” This docu- nounce its nuclear inheritance and accede to the NPT as ment highlighted the importance of the West in Ukraine’s a non-nuclear weapon state. In other words, the country’s foreign policy, and urged Ukrainian participation in belief in the importance of the West and its role in the Western organizations such as the European Union (EU), European region was inconsistent with nuclear weap- 100 West European Union (WEU), NATO, and North At- ons status. lantic Cooperation Council (NACC).90 Ukraine’s For- In addition to Ukraine’s belief that it belongs to a eign Minister Anatoly Zlenko discussed the country’s Western community of nations, Ukraine’s ideas concern- foreign policy priorities stating that “Ukraine should be ing democracy and the peaceful resolution of conflict directly and fully involved in the creation of an all-Eu- greatly influenced the country’s decision to denuclear- ropean system on the basis of NATO, the CSCE, and ize. Ukrainians often linked liberal democracy and the other international structures.”91 Moreover, Ukraine’s notion of peaceful change. In an agreement with the military doctrine, adopted in 1993, further asserted United States, for example, Ukraine agreed “to promote Ukraine’s self-conception as a Western, European state. democratic peace across Europe.”101 Moreover, Ukraine The document, for example, stated that “Ukraine can agreed that “security must be based on a multilateral and must become an influential state, capable of play- commitment to uphold shared principles, especially de- ing a significant role in ensuring political, economic, mocracy and the peaceful resolution of disputes.”102 In and military stability in Europe.”92 By 1994, Foreign 1993, President Kravchuk stated that “democracy is the Minister Hennadiy Udovenko boasted of Ukraine’s ultimate protector,” and that “democratic transformations strong and active “economic, political and psychologi- in the countries of the [former Soviet] region are neces- cal ties with the Western world.”93 sary for the peaceful settlement of conflict.”103 In addition to asserting its own position as a Euro- Ukraine’s notion of democracy and peace was par- pean state, Ukraine fully recognized the existence and ticularly focused on Russia’s domestic political situa- importance of the “community” of Western states. This tion. Ukrainian leaders often spoke of the necessity of a community is the result of “intensive integration” on the democratic Russia for there to be peace and stability in part of many Western nations.94 The Ukrainians ac- the region. President Kravchuk, for example, stated that: knowledged, for example, that the “political marks and stabilization and peace in Russia are an im- geographical affiliation of countries [are] disappear[ing] portant factor of stabilization and peace in step-by-step.”95 Moreover, Ukrainian leaders understood Ukraine respectively. This is why we should
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in every way possible support democratic pro- policy and policy change solely by reference to power, cesses in Russia, democratic as to their essence, insecurity, or, for that matter, domestic political machi- as to their nature, and abstain from the moves nations. Deriving South African or Ukrainian strategies which would stand in the way of Russia’s from their security environment or domestic politics progress along the road of democracy because alone inadequately explains why these countries made this is an important factor of our security and the nuclear decisions they did. In the case of South Af- our possibilities exactly on way toward demo- rica, the beliefs and ideas of the country’s leaders re- cratic market transformations.104 garding the West’s potential abandonment of it clearly Kravchuk further suggested that “Russian democracy affected their decisions first to develop a nuclear weap- and reform” would mean “calm, peace and harmony.”105 ons capability and then to dismantle it. Similarly, Ukrainian parliamentarians also linked Ukrainian demo- Ukraine’s belief in the Western, democratic community, cratic development with that of Russia’s, stating that the and understanding that its inclusion in that community two were “dependent” on each other.106 More impor- required non-nuclear status, greatly affected its decision tantly, a democratic Russia appears to have been a sig- to denuclearize. nificant factor for Ukraine in its decision to relinquish Beyond simply supporting the proposition that “ideas its inherited nuclear arsenal. “Democracy in Russia,” matter,” this study sheds some light on how beliefs and according to Kravchuk, “is important to Ukraine’s ideas matter to nuclear policy outcomes, exposes the nuclear position.”107 limitations of both strict rationalist and strict reflectivist In sum, Ukraine’s decision to relinquish its inherited positions on beliefs and ideas, and suggests how both nuclear arsenal was largely motivated by its beliefs and approaches might find common ground in ideas about itself as a member of the Western, liberal operationalizing ideational variables. The South Afri- community of states and about democracy and the peace- can and Ukrainian cases show that causal beliefs play a ful resolution of conflict. Ukrainian leaders consistently significant role both in preference formation and strate- and often suggested that their country belonged with the gic choice regarding nuclear policymaking. This con- other democratic nations of Europe. Accordingly, they clusion challenges a strict rationalist perspective that understood that Ukraine’s acceptance by and participa- treats beliefs and ideas as either unimportant or as tion in the Western club required denuclearization. “hooks” used by elites to justify their pursuit of inter- ests.111 Further, this study encourages rational theorists to consider ideational variables in their analysis, first by CONCLUSION: IDEAS, BELIEFS, AND using adjustments in beliefs in explaining strategy, and NUCLEAR POLICIES second by deriving a contextual, ideationally based state In a recent work, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane preference as an earlier endogenous choice in the pur- offer a straightforward hypothesis asserting that ideas suit of a basic interest, rather than treating preference and beliefs are often important determinants of govern- formation as fully exogenous. ment policy. Ideas, they claim, provide road maps and The study also challenges a strict reflectivist position clarify goals or means-ends relationships.108 This asser- that asserts the indeterminate nature of ideas and their tion is not offered to the exclusion of the rational/ intersubjective, rhetorically determined qualities.112 Al- neorealist emphasis on the pursuit of interest as a guide though this position offers a useful epistemological in- to state action, but as a complement: “ideas as well as sight, this article demonstrates that some ideas and beliefs interests have causal weight in explanations of human may be sufficiently enduring as to make them opera- action.”109 An explanation based on the force of ideas, tional in policy analysis. Specifically, causal beliefs about however, must overcome the null hypothesis that the oneself—that is, beliefs related to one’s identity—are actions described can be understood on the basis of ego- enduring beliefs that help shape basic interests into pref- istic interests in the context of power realities.110 erences. Identity is designed to resist change and must This study lends support to the position that beliefs be subjected to large amounts of inconsistent informa- and ideas are critical to explaining foreign policy out- tion before it is replaced or altered.113 Because identity comes. It illustrates the limits of attempts to understand is a stable and openly expressed idea, it is possible to
36 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT operationalize beliefs about how to preserve or gain out- side acceptance of one’s identity as causal variables in the policymaking process. In sum, this study argues that causal beliefs were im- 1 See Herbert S. Parmet, Eisenhower and the American Crusades (New York: portant in two distinct phases of policymaking: in the Macmillian, 1972), pp. 450-51. formation of actor preferences and in the choice of strat- 2 See, for example, Benjamin Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation,” in Zachary S. Davis and egy. The cases support Goldstein and Keohane’s point Benjamin Frankel, eds., The Proliferation Puzzle (London: Frank Cass and that “causal ideas help determine which of many means Company, Ltd., 1993), pp. 42-3; and John J. Mearsheimer, “Instability in will be used to reach desired goals and therefore help to Europe After the Cold War,” International Security 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56. provide actors with strategies with which to further their 3 Specifically, four countries (out of a universe of 11 known nuclear states) objectives.”114 Further, it suggests that ideas matter with recently chose to dismantle their nuclear arsenals: South Africa, Ukraine, regard to political outcomes not only in the selection of Belarus, and Kazakhstan. See Leonard S. Spector and Mark G. McDonough with Evan S. Medeiros, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation (Washington, DC: strategies, but in the formation of state preferences as Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1995), p. 9. well. Certain causal beliefs become imbedded in long- 4 See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Company, 1979); Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and term calculations to such an extent that they are no longer its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). merely guides to strategies, but become part of the state’s 5 States also “bandwagon,” that is, accede to the directives of a clearly more goals or preferences themselves.115 powerful state. See Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 117-123; Stephen M. Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, From a practical policy perspective, the South Afri- 1987); Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of Power,” International Security 9 (Spring 1985), pp. 3-43. can and Ukrainian nuclear decisions caution against 6 Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear Weap- sweeping generalizations regarding inevitable pressures ons Proliferation,” pp. 42-43; Stephen M. Walt, “Testing Theories of Alli- for nuclear weapons proliferation or denuclearization in ance Formation: The Case of Southwest Asia,” International Organization 43 (Spring 1988), pp. 275-316; and Walt, “Alliance, Threats, and US Grand a post-Cold War world. State ideas and beliefs are likely Strategy: A Reply to Kaufman and Labs,” Security Studies 1 (Spring 1992), to mediate underlying interests in security when states pp. 448-82. are forming preferences and choosing nuclear weapons 7 Zachary S. Davis, “The Realist Nuclear Regime,” in The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 80. See also George Quester, “Conceptions of Nuclear Threshold strategies. The range of state choice, therefore, may be Status,” in Regina Cowen Karp, ed., Security With Nuclear Weapons (Ox- more varied than a narrow focus on structurally deter- ford: Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 217. 8 Peter R. Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” mined interest alone would allow. Likewise, the range in The Proliferation Puzzle, p. 196. of policy options available to address the problem of 9 See Frankel, “The Brooding Shadow: Systemic Incentives and Nuclear nuclear proliferation, and the underlying insecurity that Weapons Proliferation.” 10 See generally, Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and In- engenders it, may be broader than is generally recog- ternational Ambition (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991). nized. Confidence-building measures essential to coop- 11 Jeffrey Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” pa- eration can and should include those directed to a state’s per prepared for the IGCC project on Strategic Choice in International Rela- tions, Preliminary Draft, June 1996, p. 12. “ideational” security, as well as its physical and eco- 12 Etel Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” Interna- nomic security. Recognition of a state’s identity and tional Security 19 (Fall 1994), pp. 136-139 13 On the role of vested interest groups in nuclear weapons acquisition, see validation of the legitimacy of its beliefs (not the accu- Lavoy, “Nuclear Myths and the Causes of Nuclear Proliferation,” pp. 192- racy of them) could help facilitate cooperation even on 212. matters of nuclear weapons strategy. This point forces 14 On norms and political behavior see Friedrich Kratochwill, Rules, Norms and Decisions: On the Conditions of Practical and Legal Reasoning in In- us to question the wisdom of a nonproliferation policy ternational Relations and Domestic Affairs (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni- that begins by branding potential proliferants “rogue versity Press, 1989); Bruce Russet, Grasping the Democratic Peace: nations,” for example. We do not, however, want to over- Principles for a Post-Cold War World (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 31-32; and William Dixon, “Democracy and Peaceful Settlement state the general policy prescriptions that can be derived of International Conflict,” American Political Science Review 88 (March from two case studies. Rather, in concluding, we hope 1994), p.16. 15 Admittedly, the study of norms and their effect on behavior is not without only to suggest that policymakers, like theoreticians, methodological problems. Compare Henry S. Farber and Joanne Gowa, “Poli- have much to gain from incorporating ideational vari- ties and Peace,” International Security 20 (Fall 1995), pp. 123-146 with G. ables into their analyses. John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, “Socialization and Hegemonic Power,” International Organization 44 (Summer 1990), p. 294. 16 For a less benign view of the impact of democratization, see Edward S. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and War,” Foreign Affairs 74 (May/June 1995), pp. 79-97; “Democratization and the Danger of War,” International Security 20 (Summer 1995), pp. 5-38.
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17 On the process of internationalization, see John Finley Scott, The Inter- Studies, Brussels, February 1985, p. 18. nalization of Norms: A Sociological Theory of Moral Commitment 40 Interviews by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ; Prentice Hall, 1971); Herbert C. Kelman, “Compli- and Pretoria, South Africa, December 20, 1995. ance, Identification, and Internalization: Three Processes of Opinion 41 Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation, pp. 66-67. Change,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 2 (1958), p. 132. 42 Barrie, “South Africa,” p. 156. 18 See Solingen, “The Political Economy of Nuclear Restraint,” p. 132. 43 Waldo Stumpf, “Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons 19 The monadic effect is in contrast to the dyadic effect, which maintains Programme,” presentation given at the conference, “50 Year After more narrowly that democracies are not prone to conflict with other democ- Hiroshima,” organized by the USPID (Unione Scientiati per il Diarmo), racies, but are as prone to conflict with nondemocracies as nondemocracies Castiglioncello, Italy, September 28-October 2, 1995, pp. 7-8. are with one another. David L. Rousseau, inter alia, “Assessing the Nature 44 Fischer, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 16. of the Democratic Peace, 1918-88,” American Political Science Review 90 45 Bustin, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy Alternatives and Deterrence Needs,” (September 1996), pp. 512-533. pp. 217-218. 20 Michael Doyle, Joseph Nye, Jr., Bruce Russett, and others working on the 46 Garth Lawrence Shelton, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonprolif- democratic peace question recommend testing the thesis on a wider range of eration: The Case of South Africa,” Ph.D. diss., University of Witwatersrand, dependent variables than merely war or its absence. See, for example, Michael South Africa, 1992, p. 119. Doyle, “Correspondence: The Democratic Peace,” International Security 47 G. Cawthra, Brutal Force (London: International Defense Aid Fund for 19 (Spring 1995), pp. 181-183. Southern Africa, 1986) p. 11; Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Prolifera- 21 We employ the term “rationality,” just as most rational choice scholars tion, p. 63. do, to mean that a person acts on his or her preferences in ways that he or 48 Shelton, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonproliferation: The Case she expects to maximize his or her welfare, given those preferences. This is of South Africa,” p. 122. an instrumental definition of rationality. It asserts that people do what they 49 Gwendolen Carter and Patrick O’Meara, eds., Southern Africa in Crisis believe is in their best interests, however they may define them. See Bruce (Bloomington, IN: University of Indiana Press, 1977), chapter one. Bueno de Mesquita, Principles of International Politics (Washington, DC: 50 Stumpf, “Birth and Death of the South African Nuclear Weapons CQ Press, 2000), p. 242. Programme,” pp. 7-8. 22 Freiden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” p. 14. 51 Fischer, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” p. i. 23 Judith Goldstein and Robert O. Keohane, eds., Ideas and Foreign Policy 52 David Albright, “South Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” ISIS (Institute (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 10. for Science and International Security) Report, May 1994, pp. 8-9. 24 For more on how ideas affect political outcomes, see Jeffrey Checkel, 53 Ibid. Ideas and International Political Change: Soviet/Russian Behavior and the 54 Shelton, “Nuclear Weapons, Deterrence, and Nonproliferation: The Case End of the Cold War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997). of South Africa,” p. 213. 25 Frieden, “Actors and Preferences in International Relations,” p. 14. 55 See for example, Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 17; Stumpf, “Birth and Death 26 Ibid. of the South African Nuclear Weapons Programme,” p. 11; Albright, “South 27 We use the term “identity” to mean a very important and particular set of Africa’s Secret Nuclear Weapons,” p. 16; J.W. Villiers, Roger Jardine, and beliefs that provides a group with a sense of self and a means for under- Mitchell Reiss, “Why South Africa Gave Up the Bomb,” Foreign Affairs 72 standing its relationship to the external environment. Critical for one’s sur- (Nov/Dec 1993), pp. 98-109, p. 102. vival, these beliefs or identity are relatively long-standing and slow to change. 56 Michele A. Flournoy and Kurt M. Campbell, “South Africa’s Bomb: A See Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International Military Option?” Orbis (Summer 1988), p. 394. System,” American Political Science Review 88 (June 1994), p. 385; Will- 57 Fisher, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons,” p. 19. iam Bloom, Personal Identity, National Identity, and International Rela- 58 Former Foreign Minister Pik Botha, interview by author, Pretoria, South tions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 23; and Peter J. Africa, December 20, 1995. Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in 59 Ibid. World Politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). 60 Mr. Derek Keys, former Minister of Finance, interview by author, 28 On South Africa’s growing international ostracism, see Audie Klotz, Norms Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995. in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid (Ithaca: Cornell 61 For example, the European Community tied future nuclear cooperation University Press, 1995). with South Africa to changes in its social policies. Donnelly, “South Africa 29 Warren H. Donnelly, “South Africa and Nuclear Weapons,” CRS Issue and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 9. Brief, Congressional Research Service, the Library of Congress, June 27, 62 Mr. Harry Schwartz, former South African ambassador to the United States, 1991, p. 7. interview by author, Johannesburg, South Africa, December 14, 1995. 30 Ibid. See also Edouard Bustin, “South Africa’s Foreign Policy Alterna- 63 For a more full and complete analysis of Ukraine’s nuclear decisionmaking, tives and Deterrence Needs,” in Onkar Marwah and Ann Schultz, eds., see Suzette R. Grillot, “Explaining Ukrainian Denuclearization: Material Nuclear Proliferation and the Near-Nuclear Countries (Cambridge, MA: Interests or Liberal Identity?” International Politics (forthcoming, June Ballinger Publishing Company, 1975), p. 223. 2000). 31 Donnelly, “South Africa and Nuclear Weapons,” p. 7. 64 Quote from Annex 1 in Victor Batiouk, “Ukriane’s Non-Nuclear Option,” 32 Pik Botha, interview by author, Pretoria, South Africa, December 20, 1995. UNIDIR Research Paper 14 (1992), p. 17. 33 J.D.L. Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation (London: MacMillan 65 Reiss, Bridled Ambition, p. 109. Press, 1987), p. 126. 66 Ibid., p. 121; Dunbar Lockwood, “Ukraine Accedes (Finally) to NPT; 34 Ibid., p. 131. Opens Way to START Reductions,” Arms Control Today 24 (December 35 Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University 1994), p. 17; and Spurgeon M. Keeny, Jr., “Wisdom Prevails in Kiev: Glo- Press, 1995), p. 29. bal Security Wins,” Arms Control Today 24 (December 1994), p. 2. 36 Moore, South Africa and Nuclear Proliferation, p. 126. 67 “Kravchuk Interviewed on Russian, German Ties,” Der Spiegel, February 37 Renfrew Christie, “South Africa’s Nuclear History,” paper presented at 3, 1992, in FBIS-SOV-92-023 (February 4, 1992), p. 58; and “Kravchuk the Nuclear History Program Fourth International Conference, Sofia- Said to Call Russia ‘Main Enemy’,” Pravda, September 15, 1993, pp. 1-2, Antipolis, Nice, France, June 23-27, 1993, p. 12. in FBIS-SOV-93-178 (September 16, 1993), pp. 36-7. 38 George Barrie, “South Africa,” in Joseph Goldblat, ed., Nonproliferation: 68 See Chriystia Freeland, “Russia ‘Trying’ to Isolate Ukraine,” Financial The Why and the Wherefore (London: Taylor & Francis, 1985), p. 156. Times, March 17, 1993, p. 2. 39 David Fischer, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: Western Europe’s In- 69 Roman Solchanyk, “Russia, Ukraine, and the Imperial Legacy,” Post- fluence on South Africa,” Occasional Paper, Center for European Policy Soviet Affairs 9 (October-December 1993), pp. 337-374; “Russia’s Monroe
38 The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT
Doctrine,” Izvestia, August 7, 1992; and “Russia Wants Special Role in the Ukraine, October 21, 1993, from BBC, October 23, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis, Former Soviet Union,” Reuters, February 28, 1993, in Lexis-Nexis,
The Nonproliferation Review/Spring 2000 39 WILLIAM J. LONG & SUZETTE R. GRILLOT
111 Kenneth A. Shepsle, “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (1979), pp. 27-60. 112 Alexander Wendt, for example, argues that beliefs such as social identi- ties “are always in process during interaction.” Thus identities should “be treated as dependent variables endogenous to interaction. This would allow us to treat collective action…as a process of creating a new definition of self.” Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the Interna- tional System,” pp. 386-387. 113 Alexander Wendt states that identities are “relatively stable, role specific understanding and expectations about self.” Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Or- ganization 46 (Spring 1992), pp 397-398. 114 Goldstein and Keohane, Ideas and Foreign Policy, pp. 13-14. 115 For a similar approach, see Charles A. Kupchan, The Vulnerability of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994).
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