SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965

Damien Marc Fenton

Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW@ADFA

2006

Certificate of Originality

I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial portions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged.

Mr. Damien Marc Fenton

Abstract

Despite the role played by the South East Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the defence of Western interests in that region during the Cold War, there has to date been no scholarly attempt to examine the development and performance of the organisation as a military alliance. This thesis is thus the first attempt to do so and as such seeks to take advantage of the recent release of much SEATO-related official material into the public domain by Western governments. This material throws new light upon SEATO’s aims and achievements, particularly in regard to the first ten years of its existence. Because SEATO was eventually rendered irrelevant by the events of the Second Indochina War (1965-1975) a popular perception has arisen that it was always a “Paper Tiger” lacking in substance, and thus easily dismissed. This thesis challenges this assumption by examining SEATO’s development in the decade before that conflict. The thesis analyses SEATO’s place in the wider Cold War and finds that it was part of a rational and consistent response within the broader Western strategy of containment to deter, and if need be, defeat, the threat of communist aggression. That threat was a very real one for Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the First Indochina War and one that was initially perceived in terms of the conventional military balance of power. This focus dominated SEATO’s strategic concepts and early contingency planning and rightly so, as an examination of the strength and development of the PLA and PAVN during this period demonstrates. SEATO developed a dedicated military apparatus, principally the Military Planning Office (MPO), that proved itself to be perfectly capable of providing the level of co-ordination and planning needed to produce a credible SEATO deterrent in this regard. SEATO enjoyed less success with its attempts to respond to the emergence of a significant communist insurgent threat, first in Laos then in South Vietnam, but the alliance did nonetheless recognise this threat and the failure of SEATO in this regard was one of political will rather than military doctrine. Indeed this thesis confirms that it was the increasingly disparate political agendas of a number of SEATO’s members that ultimately paralysed its ability to act and thus ensured its failure to meet its aims, at least insofar as the so- called “Protocol States” were concerned. But this failure should not be allowed to completely overshadow SEATO’s earlier achievements in providing a modicum of Western-backed stability and security to the region from 1955-1965.

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements - - - - - Page ii

List of Abbreviations - - - - - Page iv

Maps ------Page viii

Introduction ------Page 1

Chapter 1: SEATO’s Place in the Cold War - - Page 7

Chapter 2: The Conventional Military Threat - - Page 32

Chapter 3: SEATO’s Military Organisation 1955-1965 - Page 70

Chapter 4: SEATO’s Strategic Concepts - - - Page 105

Chapter 5: Planning for Limited War - - - Page 142

Chapter 6: Plan 5: The First Foray into Counter-insurgency Page 179 Planning

Chapter 7: Counter-insurgency Planning for South - Page 207 Vietnam and Thailand

Chapter 8: The Beginning of the End 1964-1965 - - Page 237

Conclusion ------Page 267

Appendix I ------Page 273

Appendix II ------Page 279

Appendix III ------Page 288

Bibliography ------Page 291

Acknowledgements

In keeping with tradition I would firstly like to thank my supervisors, Professor Jeffrey Grey and Professor Peter Dennis, for their support and guidance over the last six years. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have numbered amongst the ranks of their PhD students and a post-graduate with a passion for military history would be hard-pressed to find two better exponents of the field. Their professionalism, knowledge and generosity were invaluable – Jeff’s spirited efforts to make sure I got to carry out research in the US and the UK and Peter’s offers to house-sit for him (and thus escape my non-air-conditioned apartment) are but two examples that spring to mind. I should also mention that while I undoubtedly tested the forbearance of both men towards the end of this undertaking, they were never anything but encouraging in their insistence that I could finish it. I would also like to thank my other friends and colleagues from the School of History, now part of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, at UNSW@ADFA for their encouragement and support over the years. In particular Professor Robin Prior and Dr Albert Palazzo, who both offered gainful employment to a struggling student; the School Secretary, Bernadette McDermott, without whose Delphic powers I would never have managed to navigate the labyrinth of university regulations, entitlements and requirements; and my fellow frontschwein, Darren Clifford, John Connor and Luke Auton. As with any serious researcher I owe a great deal of gratitude to the many archivists and librarians who have helped me, although special mention must go to the staffs of the National Office of the National Archives of Australia and the Australian War Memorial Research Centre. Both institutions bore the brunt of my research effort – one that seemed to invoke the laborious process of obtaining access clearance for nearly every SEATO-related document I wished to see. My old friend and present-day Wellingtonian, Peter Connor, provided valuable assistance in preparing the way for a successful summer raid on Archives New Zealand. In a similar vein I am deeply indebted to another Mt. Maunganui old boy, Peter Butler, and his wife Suk, for their gracious offer of a spare room for the duration of my month-long stay in London. That research trip, which also included a month in Washington DC, would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Australian Army

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History Research Grants Scheme. I spent most of this thesis as a full-time student in part-time employment but end it as a part-time student in full-time employment with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. To that end I should like to thank my Director, Deborah Rollings, and her predecessor, Nik White, for their sympathetic support and understanding of my extra-curricular activities over the last two years – I know both of them gave me more leeway in this regard than I could rightfully expect from any employer. Thanks is also owed to my friends and colleagues in the Military History Section and Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial: firstly for the employment opportunities that helped me to keep body and soul together for some two and a half years, and secondly for the camaraderie and collegial encouragement offered by the likes of Dr Steve Bullard, Dr Chris Clark, Ian Hodges, Dr Peter Londey, Brad Manera, Dr Robert Nichols, Dr Peter Stanley, and Dr Keiko Tamura. The Canberra experience has not always been an easy one for an ex-pat New Zealander and with that in mind I would like to express my gratitude to Matthew Keene, Dr John Moremon and Tamara Johnston not only for the help and support they have offered me during the course of this thesis, but also for their friendship: my time in Australia would have been immeasurably poorer for their absence. Finally, I would like to thank my family, particularly my parents, Justine and Sel, for their unwavering belief in my ability to do this.

Abbreviations

1ATF 1st Australian Task Force

AA Anti-Aircraft

AATTV Australian Army Training Team Vietnam

AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines

AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle

AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement

ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malaya (agreement or area)

ANZUK Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom (division or smaller force)

ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States (treaty)

APC Armoured Personnel Carrier

ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam

ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare

BAOR British Army of the Rhine

BCFESR British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve

BCT Battalion Combat Team

BDCC-FE British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East

CCP Chinese Communist Party

CDNI Committee for the Defence of the National Interests

CEFEO Corps Expéditionnaire Française d’Extrême Orient

CENTO Central Treaty Organisation

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (US joint theatre command)

CINCUSARPAC Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific

CMPO Chief, Military Planning Office

CPI Communist Party of India

CPP Communist Party of Pakistan

CPT Communist Party of Thailand

CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers

CSE Committee of Security Experts

CTZ Corps Tactical Zone

DCMPO Deputy Chief, Military Planning Office

DRVN Democratic Republic of Vietnam

FAC Fast Attack Craft

FLN Front de la Libération Nationale

FMS Foreign Military Sales

FPDA Five Power Defence Arrangement

HMG Heavy Machine Gun

ICBM Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

IAC Intelligence Assessment Committee

JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff

JSPC Joint Strategic Plans Committee

KMT Kuomintang

LMG Light Machine Gun

MAAG Military Assistance Advisory Group

MACV Military Assistance Command, Vietnam

MAG Military Adviser’s Group

MAP Military Assistance Program

MAR Military Adviser’s Representative

MATC Military Air Transport Command

MDAP Mutual Defence Assistance Program

MPO Military Planning Office

NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NKPA North Korean People’s Army

OAS Organisation of American States

PAF Pakistan Air Force

PAVN People’s Army of Vietnam

PAVNAF People’s Army of Vietnam Air Force

PEO Program Evaluations Office

PLA People’s Liberation Army

PLAAF People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLANNAF People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force

PN Pakistan Navy

PRC People’s Republic of China

RAAF Royal Australian Air Force

RAF Royal Air Force

RCT Regimental Combat Team

RLA Royal Laotian Army

RLAF Royal Laotian Air Force

RNZAF Royal New Zealand Air Force

RPG Rocket Propelled Grenade

RTAF Royal Thai Air Force

RTN Royal Thai Navy

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RVNAF Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces

SAC Strategic Air Command

SAS Special Air Service

SEASTAG SEATO Standardisation Agreement

SEATO South East Asia Treaty Organisation

SMG Sub-Machine Gun

SPG Self Propelled Gun

UN United Nations

USARPAC US Army, Pacific

WEU Western European Union

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Map 1: Southeast Asia 1955-1965

Map 2: Laos (Provinces and Principal Towns/Cities) 1955-1975

Map 3: Laos: After Implementation of Geneva Accords 1954-1955

Introduction

It is now nearly 15 years since the Cold War effectively ended with the dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union and its client states in Eastern and Central Europe, and just over three decades since the final bloody climax of the Vietnam War played itself out on the streets of Saigon, Phnom Penh and Vientiane. The historiography of the wider Cold War has burgeoned accordingly, greatly assisted by increasing access to all manner of archival material belonging to former foes on both sides of what was once the Iron Curtain. That of the Vietnam War, at least insofar as the West is concerned, had already established itself as a field of significant depth and breadth by the end of the 1980s. However, it too has benefited from, and continued to grow, in the wake of the large-scale release by many Western governments of their remaining official material from that era into the public domain. But having taken over from the political scientists and other contemporary analysts (whither now the “Sovietologist”?) the job of placing already well- documented historical episodes (such as the Vietnam War) into the Cold War’s wider context, a number of “blind spots” in the attendant historiography have revealed themselves amidst the otherwise impressive development of the field to date. The role and relative importance of the South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in regard to Western defence and strategic planning during the Cold War is one such blind spot. (SEATO’s sister organisation, CENTO, can lay claim to a similar neglect.) In the last thirty years only two works focussed on SEATO, both academic monographs, have been published in the English-speaking world, and only one of those – Leszek Buszynki‘s SEATO: Failure of an Alliance Strategy – looked at the organisation as a whole. Compared with the multitude of volumes dedicated to the study (both historical and contemporary) of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) published during this same period one could be forgiven for thinking that SEATO had never existed. Yet SEATO - like NATO (and CENTO) a Western military alliance designed to deter and/or defeat Communist aggression, albeit in Southeast Asia as opposed to Europe (or the Middle East) - existed for 23 years and for at least half of that period was the pre-eminent forum for the co-ordination of Western defence and strategic planning for the region. This thesis seeks to explore that period - the first ten years of

SEATO’s existence - and determine the nature of the communist threat to Southeast Asia and exactly how SEATO, as a military alliance, set out to achieve its aims of both deterring and, if need be, defeating that threat. There is no denying that in the latter half of its existence SEATO was overshadowed, and indeed ultimately overwhelmed, by the Vietnam War and the eventual failure of the United States and its allies to prevent the conquest of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia by communist forces. The inescapable taint of failure attached to SEATO as a result of these events certainly explains the willingness of the organisation’s members to disband it in 1977, the disparagement it provoked among Western geo-political and defence observer’s in the final years leading up to its demise, and its total disappearance from their debates subsequent to that disbandment. What it does not explain is its neglect to date by Cold War historians as a subject worthy of their attention. Failures, particularly those contributing to military defeats, usually prove highly attractive to historians of any given period. One only has to look at the substantial body of literature dedicated to Twentieth Century strategic failures such as the Schlieffen Plan, the Maginot Line, and the fall of Singapore for proof of this attraction. It is true that SEATO was never officially involved in any actual military operation undertaken by Western forces in Southeast Asia. The closest SEATO came to such action was during the Laotian crisis of 1961-62, but on that occasion it was not ultimately called upon to act. However it should never be forgotten that the purpose of Western defence alliances during the Cold War were always twofold (i.e. to deter and, if need be, defeat communist aggression), of which deterrence was arguably the primary function. Thus the fact that NATO did not undertake its first military operation until the 1999 intervention in Kosovo does not diminish its importance as a military alliance during the previous four decades of the Cold War. Published in 1983, Buszynski’s work echoed and reinforced the views of earlier critics that SEATO had failed on both counts: “If deterrence was its primary function ultimately it did not deter, if defence was its function it was never given an opportunity to defend.”1 This thesis argues that this now orthodox view of SEATO is an overly simplistic one that, to begin with, does not reflect the actual importance of the organisation to Western defence strategy in Southeast Asia during the first ten

1 Leszek Buszynski, SEATO: Failure of an Alliance Strategy (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983), p. xi.

3 years of its existence. Furthermore, while agreeing with the second point of Buszynski’s critique that SEATO was never given an opportunity to defend against communist aggression, the issue of deterrence is more complicated. What was the exact nature of the threat that SEATO was established to deter? Did this threat change over time and if so, how did SEATO respond to such change? After all, if SEATO was the abject failure it is usually made out to be is it not worth noting that its three regional members, with particular regard to Thailand, were never subjected to serious communist aggression during this period? Could it be that while ultimately failing to deter covert communist aggression in Laos, Vietnam, and Cambodia, SEATO nonetheless succeeded in deterring overt aggression by conventional communist military forces in the region against both those countries and SEATO members such as Thailand? The place of SEATO in the context of the wider Cold War is examined in Chapter One. The establishment of the People’s Republic of China and the success of the communist dominated Viet Minh against the French in the First Indo-China War saw Southeast Asia rapidly assume its place alongside Europe, the Middle East and North Asia as a frontline region of the Cold War. Although the First Indo-China War was brought to end via a negotiated settlement between Western and communist powers in the form of the 1954 Geneva Accords, the United States remained deeply sceptical that such a settlement could be relied upon to deliver long-term geo-political stability to Southeast Asia. Instead the United States championed the establishment of a western-backed regional defence framework - SEATO - not to replace, but to work in parallel to, the Geneva Accords in shoring up the “Fourth Front” of the Cold War. The willingness of the new regional communist powers to use conventional military force to achieve their aims - witness the People’s Republic of China’s intervention in the Korean War and the Viet Minh‘s invasion of northern Laos in 1953 - led to an understandable emphasis by the United States and its allies on the conventional military threat during SEATO’s formative years. Chapter Two demonstrates why this emphasis was not misplaced by examining the conventional capabilities of both the People’s Liberation army (PLA) and the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) during the 1950s and 1960s. The extent of these capabilities, particularly those of the PLA, dwarfed those of their non-communist neighbours in Southeast Asia, and coupled with a proven propensity to use military force by both

Beijing and Hanoi, did indeed pose a significant and powerful threat that could not have been responsibly ignored by SEATO and its members. SEATO’s primary function as a military alliance was to co-ordinate and prepare a credible collective military response among its member states to act as a deterrent, and if necessary, actually defeat communist aggression in the region. Chapter Three traces the development of SEATO as an organisation capable of fulfilling this function from its inception in 1955 to 1965. In doing so the Chapter clearly establishes SEATO’s limitations - unlike NATO it never featured a standing command structure for example - but it also demonstrates that within those (largely self-imposed) limitations SEATO had, by the early 1960s, nonetheless evolved into an organisation capable of developing and co-ordinating strategic and operational military contingency planning for the defence of the region. This provided SEATO members, particularly the regional and other smaller members, with a sound basis on which to focus their peacetime military doctrinal, training and procurement priorities. At the heart of this work in SEATO lay the Military Planning Office (MPO), which from the moment of its creation in 1957 quickly became the core of SEATO’s standing military apparatus. With this in mind the Chapter pays particularly close attention to the development of the MPO and the impact its growth in size and status had on the organisation’s credibility as a military alliance. Having examined both the threat faced by SEATO and the military planning apparatus it developed in response to that threat the thesis moves on to examine the strategic and operational planning undertaken by the organisation between 1955 and 1965. Chapter Four begins this process by focussing on the development of an agreed set of strategic principles thrashed out by SEATO’s members over an 18-month period between 1955 and 1956. Given the disparate agendas of the individual member states the agreement achieved at the Third SEATO Planners Meeting at Hawaii in 1956 was no mean feat. It established a core group of principles including, for example, a refusal by SEATO members to rule out the use of nuclear weapons, that would guide the subsequent work of the MPO over the next nine years. This work was devoted to the development and ongoing refinement of a total of eight operational-level contingency plans to counter various scenarios involving different types and scales of communist aggression between 1957 and 1965. Chapter Five looks at the development of five of them - Plans 1, 2, 3, 4 and 6 - all of which were intended to deal with limited war scenarios involving overt communist military

5 aggression. Plan 4 was the most ambitious of this group and was adopted as SEATO’s response to a region-wide invasion by conventional PLA and PAVN forces. This provoked a serious debate about the role of nuclear weapons in SEATO planning as the detailed work on Plan 4 revealed tensions over how and when authorisation for their use would be given. Chapter Six examines the development of SEATO’s awareness of and response to the possibility of covert communist aggression in the region, including the organisation’s first foray into counter-insurgency planning, Plan 5. This Plan emerged in response to concerns as early as 1959 over the insurgent threat faced by the supposedly neutral government in Laos. The resumption of guerrilla war by the Pathet Lao that year and a subsequent series of coups and counter-coups by various neutral and rightist factions in Vientiene saw Plan 5 elevated to being the top priority for the MPO and it was presented as ready for implementation by the end of 1960. As the situation in Laos deteriorated even further in late 1961 a number of SEATO members called for SEATO intervention via the implementation of Plan 5. However it proved impossible for SEATO members to arrive at a consensus over the necessity for, and timing of, such action and Plan 5 was never implemented. The chapter concludes by examining the ramifications for the organisation of this oft-cited failure to intervene. Counter-insurgency contingency planning by SEATO did not end with Laos, its “failure” notwithstanding, and indeed within 12 months of the Laotian crisis the organisation was directed by its members to undertake such planning in regard to South Vietnam - Plan 7. Chapter Seven explores the development of Plan 7 and notes the lessons from Plan 5 incorporated into it by the MPO planners in Bangkok. The final such plan developed by SEATO - Plan 8, a counter-insurgency plan for Thailand - is also outlined. Finally Chapter Eight documents the beginning of the end of SEATO’s role as the pre-eminent forum for Western defence planning in Southeast Asia when it suffered a series of ultimately fatal blows to its credibility and relevance between 1964 and 1965. The chapter outlines the actions and motives of first France, and then Pakistan, in unilaterally adopting a position of selective participation in the organisation. With all hope of securing collective agreement to act crippled by these actions the United States, convinced of the need for large-scale military intervention in South Vietnam, abandoned any prospect of seeing Plan 7 implemented and instead opted for unilateral intervention in a war that would dominate Washington‘s attention

6 for the next decade. Having thus lost the interest of its most important member SEATO found itself relegated to the margins of Western strategy in Southeast Asia, a process hastened by the announcement in 1967 that the United Kingdom intended to withdraw all of its military forces east of Suez.

Chapter 1 SEATO’s Place in The Cold War

The South East Asia Treaty Organisation (SEATO) was created as a direct result of the First Indochina War, but as such it was only one element of the wider Cold War. This conflict, born amidst the dying embers of the Second World War, and, by some measures, not yet entirely consigned to history, enveloped most of the entire planet for some forty years as the Western democracies and their allies found themselves in direct confrontation with the Communist Bloc.1 The Cold War was a unique episode in the history of great power conflicts in that the two main protagonists, the United States and the Soviet Union, fought it without recourse to open war between each other - hence the name “Cold War”. This is not to suggest that such a cataclysm was easily avoided - the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 was only one such instance where the prospect of a Third World War became, momentarily, all too real. But if the spectre of nuclear annihilation ultimately stayed the hands of Moscow and Washington in relation to each other it did not prevent them from engaging in a vigorous series of wars by proxy. Beginning with the resumption of the Greek Civil War in 1946 through to the conflicts that engulfed Afghanistan, Cambodia and Nicaragua as late as 1989, the two superpowers supported local allied forces or, on occasion, sent their own troops into battle in a struggle of, quite literally, global proportions. Thus, while it was (and still

1 At the time of writing the People’s Democratic Republic of Korea, arguably the last unreconstructed Stalinist state, continued to pose a significant threat to the security of its neighbours in North Asia. Indeed, the North Korean’s development of both a ballistic missile capability and, by their own admission, a nuclear weapons program, has created an international crisis that has engaged the attention of the wider Asia-Pacific region for the better part of a decade and as yet remains unresolved. Nonetheless, while the dramatic collapse of communism in Europe in 1989-1991 was not immediately repeated in Asia, its effects were such that by the mid-1990s the communist regimes in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos had all abandoned socialism in favour of Western economic, if not political, models to one degree or another. While the sudden evaporation of Soviet military and economic aid helped to prompt this course of action, it was obviously also inspired by the economic success of the People’s Republic of China, which had embarked upon similar selective reforms under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping a decade earlier. This process has gradually transformed all four nominally communist states into more traditional nationalist/authoritarian ones whose leaders are more concerned with perpetuating their hold on power at home than promoting the universalist Marxist revolutionary aims of old. Whether or not the economic progress achieved in these states will be enough to stave off domestic demand for substantial political reform over the long term, particularly with regard to China, remains an open question. Cuba, a more avowedly faithful communist relic of the Cold War, possesses neither the geo-political importance of China nor the military capabilities of North Korea and, as such,

8 is) not readily apparent to the majority of people in what used to be described as the First and Second Worlds, the actual casualties of the Cold War number in their millions; spread out over four decades as opposed to four or six years, and heavily skewed towards what used to be described as the Third (now the Developing) World, but in their millions nonetheless. There is much to be learnt from treating the Cold War as a comprehensive period of military history as opposed to a series of “small wars” treated in isolation. SEATO and the other two Western military alliances, NATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) lend themselves to such comprehensive treatment, and provide a strategic and doctrinal link between many of those “small wars” and the determination on the part of the Western powers to avoid the escalation of such conflicts into something much more destructive. In fact the first point to make about all three military alliances is that they were intended to deter, as much as actually defeat, communist aggression. The importance attached to their role as tools of deterrence, and indeed the underlying reason for their creation, is the critical role of deterrence in the strategy of containment adopted by the United States (and shortly thereafter its allies) at the beginning of the Cold War.

The Strategy of Containment

Stalin’s ruthless and blatant installation of pro-Soviet communist regimes throughout Eastern Europe between 1945-1948 ended any hope that, with the end of the Second World War, the wartime alliance of the Western democracies and the Soviet Union would result in a seamless transition to friendly relations in peacetime. Truman, who had assumed the presidency after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s death in April 1945, had initially tried to work with Stalin to maintain a co-operative relationship with the Soviet Union but soon became disillusioned by the events unfolding in Eastern Europe and the Iranian crisis of early 1946. The latter saw the Soviets, in a crude attempt to wring oil concessions out of Tehran, threaten to renege on a wartime agreement between the Allies that the Red Army, which had occupied the northern half of Iran in 1941, would be withdrawn from the country within six months of the end of the war.2 The United States brought the matter to the United Nations (UN)

today poses little threat to anyone other than its own people. 2 R. Craig Nation, Black Earth, Red Star: A History of Soviet Security Policy, 1917-1991 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1992), pp. 165-6.

Security Council for debate, a measure that had no effect, other than to demonstrate how impotent the new world body would be in the superpower conflict ahead, when the Soviet ambassador to the UN simply refused to participate.3 Subsequent unilateral pressure by the US led to an eventual Soviet back-down in this instance, but it confirmed in the minds of many in Washington that Moscow’s willingness to confront the West extended to issues far wider than the short-term consolidation of the Red Army’s wartime conquests in Europe. The Soviet actions were simply bewildering for many in the West, particularly given the prominence with which Western wartime propaganda had featured images of “Uncle Joe” Stalin and the heroic sacrifices of the Red Army. But Soviet foreign policy was nothing if not consistent, in that it was derived from a blend of traditional balance of power principles and ideological conviction. Traditional Russian nationalist pretensions to leadership of Slavic nations and paranoia over the measures necessary to insure the territorial security of the Russian state were clearly identifiable features in Stalin’s foreign policy and that of most of his successors in the Kremlin.4 The realpolitik surrounding these aims was generally recognised and understood by the United States, the United Kingdom and other Western governments of the day. While the exercise of Soviet power in pursuit of these aims could lead to clashes of interest, and even outright confrontation on occasion, they represented a behaviour that could be negotiated or otherwise dealt with on an issue by issue basis. However there was a general unwillingness within Western governments to face up to the other driving force in Soviet foreign policy - the communist ideology that ultimately legitimised the Soviet regime and as a consequence underpinned all of its actions. At its heart Marxist/Leninist doctrine proclaimed that capitalist states such as those of the Western democracies were the logical enemies of communism.5 Therefore there could be no prospect of long-term harmony between the two political systems. Having also proclaimed to have uncovered the principles of history as a science there was no room for doubt as to the inevitable triumph of the communist

3 On 25 April 1945 the San Francisco Conference was convened to negotiate the establishment of the United Nations, culminating in the official foundation of the international institution, with the signing of the UN Charter by 50 countries, on 26 June 1945. Nation, p. 166. 4 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), pp. 33-4. 5 See Karl Marx & Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, Penguin Classics, reprint, trans. Samuel Moore, preface by A. J. P. Taylor (London: Penguin Books, 1985 [1888]).

10 movement over its enemies.6 Therefore from the doctrinaire Soviet point of view the wartime alliance was one of expedience, not an opportunity for East-West relations to start afresh. It was these factors that underlined Stalin’s view of the post-war world and explained his otherwise seemingly unprovoked hostility towards his former allies.7 No amount of concessions by the United States on any given day-to-day issue, be it territorial or otherwise, would assuage the Soviet Union’s assumption of the historical inevitability of a major conflict between the two superpowers and the ideologies they championed.

The friction between the Soviet Union and USA was therefore not the product of some misunderstanding or faulty communications between Washington and Moscow, but inherent in the Soviet Union’s perception of the outside world.8

That the Truman administration was initially reluctant to recognise these facts was understandable: to do so meant acknowledging that the normal tools of diplomacy and statesmanship would never produce a lasting resolution to their differences. In February 1946, George Kennan, a young State Department official working in the US Embassy in Moscow, sent his now famous “Long Telegram” that made this very point and went on to argue that the United States would need to prepare itself for a long struggle against the Soviet Union. Kennan’s assessment was a timely one as it struck a chord with senior officials in Washington, who, however reluctantly, were also reaching similar conclusions.9 The new appreciation of the Soviet, and by extension communist threat, emerging in the West was exemplified by Winston Churchill in the speech he delivered in Fulton, Missouri, on 5 March that year in which he famously described the Soviet Union’s consolidation of power in

6 Ibid. 7 Gaddis, p. 34. 8 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 448. 9 Nation, p. 165. This dispatch brought Kennan to the attention of James Forrestal, Secretary of the Navy, who ensured that Kennan’s views received wide circulation. Forrestal subsequently arranged for Kennan to return to Washington DC and take up a position at the National War College, where he was later selected by Secretary of State George C. Marshall to head the latter’s newly-established Policy Planning Staff. Thus Kennan became one of the foremost Soviet experts in the Truman administration between 1947-1949. For more on the extent of Kennan’s role in the development of the strategy of containment and his influence on the Truman administration’s policies towards the Soviet Union see Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy.

Eastern Europe as an “Iron Curtain” descending across the continent.10 By the end of 1946 the Americans were no longer prepared to allow this expansion of communist influence to continue unchecked. The first test of this newfound resolve came early in the new year. Since the beginning of 1946 civil war had raged in Greece between communist partisans and the monarchist government. The monarchists received British military aid while the communists were supplied from Yugoslavia, Albania and Bulgaria.11 In February 1947 the United Kingdom informed the United States that it was no longer capable of assisting the Greek government. This prompted Truman to appear before Congress on 12 March to ask for US$300 million in aid to Greece and US$100 million in aid to Turkey, both countries being seen as vital bulwarks against the penetration of the Mediterranean by communist and, ergo, pro-Soviet forces.12 In doing so Truman declared:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures. I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own ways.13

The Greek-Turkish Aid Act was passed, with bi-partisan support, by both Houses of Congress and thus the first decisive American step of the Cold War was taken. The significance of this Act lay not so much in what was actually offered or its intended beneficiaries, but rather in the precedent it had set. The policy outlined in Truman’s speech to the House in support of the bill - the Truman Doctrine - could be applied to any friendly state or “free people” threatened with, or subject to, communist aggression. Nonetheless the Truman Doctrine did not constitute a coherent strategy for dealing with the Soviet threat over the long term. Rhetoric to one side, it offered at best, a reactive case by case approach to communist expansion. It was George Kennan who, two months later, provided the West with a clear long- term strategy for dealing with the communist threat. In July 1947 Kennan produced the most influential work of his career with the

10 Nation, p. 165. 11 Ronald E. Powaski, The Cold War: The United States and the Soviet Union 1917-1991 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 72. 12 Ibid. 13 Deborah Welch Larson, Origins of Containment: A Psychological Explanation (Princeton, NJ:

12 publication of the article “Sources of Soviet Conduct” in Foreign Affairs under the anonymous moniker “X” in which he argued that “the main element of any United States policy toward the Soviet Union must be that of a long-term, patient but firm and vigilant containment of Russian expansive tendencies”.14 This would require, at least in part, the willingness and capability “to confront the Russians with unalterable counter-force at every point where they show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world”.15 In so far as determining what, or where, those interests were, Kennan was careful to stress “the necessity, imposed by limited means, of establishing hierarchies of interests, of differentiating between the vital and the peripheral”.16 He acknowledged that, contrary to the promise held out by the Truman Doctrine, the United States would never possess the strength and resources to aid victims of aggression everywhere at once. For Kennan the vital areas to be kept out of communist hands were those containing significant centres of military-industrial power such as Western Europe and Japan.17 Denied such expansion, Kennan felt that the Soviet Union would, over time, struggle to maintain the economic sacrifices and harsh social controls imposed upon its citizens: at that point the authoritarian Soviet system would be ripe for internal collapse - a process he estimated might take 15 years to come to fruition.18 In the interim Kennan expressly eschewed any notions of unilateral offensive action against the Soviet Union and its new satellites. Military power had an important role to play in this strategy but, to Kennan’s mind, this would be a conflict where economic might and Western political and social ideals would ultimately prove to be the decisive factors.

NSC-68

The Truman administration was quick to adopt the strategy of containment but gave its military aspect more emphasis than Kennan had argued for. Given the international crises that occurred during Truman’s second term in office this was an understandable development. The Berlin Blockade, the triumph of the communists

Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 311-12. 14 “X” (George F. Kennan), “Sources of Soviet Conduct”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, July 1947, p. 575. 15 Gaddis, p. 58. 16 Ibid., p. 56. 17 Ibid., p. 41. 18 Kennan, p. 576.

13 under Mao Zedong in China’s Civil War and the successful testing of an atomic bomb by the Soviets, put enormous domestic and international pressure on the Truman administration to take a harder line against a communist threat that appeared to be gaining strength at an alarmingly fast pace. The result, in early 1950, was the completion of NSC-68, a policy document that outlined the administration’s version of containment; a version that differed from Kennan’s by taking a far broader view as to what constituted a vital interest and calling for a more robust response to protect them. NSC-68 recognised that psychological factors were also critically important to the success or failure of a long-term strategy such as containment. Impressions of an irresistible communist juggernaut, no matter how lacking in actual substance, could lead to a self-fulfilling mood of defeatism on the part of those “free peoples” whose countries appeared to be directly in its path (Western Europe for example):

World order, and with it American security, had come to depend as much on perceptions of the balance of power as on what that balance actually was. And the perceptions involved were not just those of statesman customarily charged with making policy, they reflected as well mass opinion, foreign as well as domestic, informed as well as uninformed, rational as well as irrational. Before such an audience even the appearance of a shift in power relationships could have unnerving consequences of image, prestige, and credibility.19

Thus while Kennan’s call for the protection of military-industrial centres of power such as Japan and Western Europe was never questioned, the architects of NSC-68 made it clear that those countries and regions devoid of such attributes could not be universally abandoned to their fates simply because they lacked them.20 The role of such nations and the impact of their loss needed to be considered in light of a bigger, more intangible picture. On a practical note there was also the need to consider the potential of said nations to one day become military-industrial centres of power. Truman had already learnt a bitter lesson on both counts in the aftermath of the communist victory in the Chinese Civil War. Although no one in his

19 Gaddis, p. 92. 20 Ibid., p. 94; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia and the Cold War 1945-1980, 4th edition (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1980), p. 97.

14 administration doubted the sound reasoning behind Truman’s decision to avoid direct US involvement in that conflict, the subsequent defeat of the Kuomintang (KMT) resulted in his being castigated for “losing China” by an alarmed American public and Congress.21 It was notable that Truman’s opponents in the latter couched their attacks on his China policy in emotive terms of human tragedy and idealistic hypocrisy, rather than debate it on the grounds of a rational, if somewhat cold, cost-benefit analysis of where China sat in the pecking order of American vital interests. In the words of Republican Senator William F. Knowland (California): “it did not make sense to try to keep 240,000,000 Europeans from being taken behind the Iron Curtain, while we are complacent and unconcerned about 450,000,000 Chinese going the same way”.22 To add insult to injury it was increasingly apparent that the Chinese communists were consolidating their rule over the country with a dynamism and efficiency not seen in that part of the world for centuries, none of which boded well for the future of Western security interests in Asia (see chapter two). Needless to say it was an experience the Truman administration had no wish to repeat. Thus by the beginning of 1950 containment, as defined by NSC-68, was firmly entrenched as the overall framework for future US-Soviet relations and it would remain the cornerstone of Western strategy for the duration of the Cold War. Successive American administrations did differ, sometimes markedly, on how best to implement and maintain it - the “New Look” defence policy under Eisenhower, “Flexible Response” under Kennedy, “Vietnamization” under Nixon to name but a few - but they all adhered to the basic principles outlined by Kennan and codified by NSC-68. They also all accepted the implications of containment for the United States: namely that there could be no return to the isolationism of the pre-war years; that the US would have to fulfil the role of leadership of the Western democracies; that it would have to build up and maintain its military capability to a degree unprecedented in peacetime US history and that it would have to uphold these commitments for a potentially open-ended amount of time (Kennan’s 15 years notwithstanding). These commitments would, over the period of the Cold War, lead the United States to undertake many courses of action that were at odds with the traditions and shibboleths established over the first 150-odd years of the history of the republic, none more so perhaps than its apparent new-found enthusiasm for military

21 Ibid., p. 88. 22 Cited in Powaski, p. 82.

15 alliances.

The Formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)

Even before the final draft of NSC-68 was accepted its main conclusions had already been put into practice by an American government anxious to demonstrate its resolve to confront the communist threat to both the American people and the wider world. The rehabilitation of war-ravaged Western Europe had been a long-standing policy goal of the Truman administration and one that had seen a huge investment of American resources through the Marshall Plan. This massive program of economic aid, named after the Secretary of State, George C. Marshall, was designed to promote the economic recovery of Europe as quickly as possible and thereby help ensure political stability across the region, which in turn would, it was hoped, help to render Western Europe less susceptible to communist pressure, both domestically and externally. Overall the Marshall Plan, which saw the US inject US$12 billion into Europe between 1948 and 1952, largely succeeded in its first two objectives but achieved only qualified success in the third.23 While economic growth might dampen the attractiveness of local communist parties to their fellow countrymen and women, it did little to remove the ever-present spectre of the Red Army and the Soviet conventional military might it embodied. Attempts by the Western Europeans to counter this threat through the formation of military alliances, first through the Treaty of Dunkirk (between the United Kingdom and France) in 1947 and then through the 1948 Brussels Treaty (resulting in the “Western European Union” [WEU] an alliance comprised of the United Kingdom, France, and the Benelux countries), remained unconvincing.24 Western Europe‘s conventional military strength, even with the inclusion of the United Kingdom and France (albeit an inclusion at least partially offset by the complete absence of a German military contribution), clearly could not match that of the Soviet Union. No one was more aware of this than the Western Europeans themselves and, led by the United Kingdom and France, they undertook a combined diplomatic initiative to convince the United States to join the countries of the WEU and other European nations in committing itself to the defence of Western

23 Powaski, p. 73. 24 André Beaufre, NATO and Europe, trans. Joseph Green & R. H. Barry (London: Faber & Faber, 1967), pp. 22-3, 26-32.

Europe from Soviet aggression.25 For the United States such a move represented a dramatic break with its past: since the termination of the Treaty of Alliance with France in 1800 the US had studiously avoided “entangling” itself in a formal military alliance with another power.26 Even the American participation in the First and Second World Wars was conducted without recourse to such a measure.27 Isolationism had long been a powerful force in American politics and the avoidance of military alliances was a key feature of its philosophy. The failure of President Wilson’s attempt to re-model the international world order in the aftermath of the First World War was a classic testament to the traditional strength of isolationism in American politics. But the political mood in the US had undergone a dramatic change in the wake of the Second World War and the rise of communism. European entreaties for an American commitment to their defence, which would have been dismissed out of hand a decade earlier, found a surprisingly receptive ear both within the Truman administration and in Congress. But then, having already accepted the logic of both the Truman Doctrine and the wider strategy of containment, it was not such a great mental leap for the administration and its supporters in Congress to seriously contemplate such a step. A clear indication of this new mood came on 11 June 1948 when the Vandenberg Resolution - to begin negotiations with the WEU members for a new military alliance involving the US - passed in the US Senate by a margin of 64 to 4 in favour.28 After three months of negotiations, which now included Denmark, Canada, Iceland, Italy, Norway and Portugal in addition to the original WEU countries, a draft “North Atlantic Treaty” was agreed to and later officially signed in Washington DC on 4 April 1949.29 The Treaty was subsequently ratified by the US Senate 82 to 13 and the “North Atlantic Treaty Organisation” (NATO), the first military alliance to involve

25 Gaddis, p. 72. 26 Lawrence S. Kaplan, “The United States and NATO: The Relevance of History” in S. Victor Papacosma, Sean Kay, Mark R. Rubin, eds., NATO After Fifty Years (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2001), p. 243. On February 6, 1778, the United States and France signed a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, in which France recognized the United States and offered trade concessions. They also signed a Treaty of Alliance, which stipulated that if France entered the war, neither country would lay down its arms until the US won its independence, that neither would conclude peace with Britain without the consent of the other, and that each guaranteed the other's possessions in America. Jeremy Black, War For America: The Fight For Independence 1775-1783 (Burton-On-Trent, Staffordshire: Wrens Park Publishing, 1998), p. 146. 27 Kaplan, ibid. 28 Named after its sponsor Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg. Ibid., p. 244. 29 Nation, p. 182.

17 the US in 150 years, was born.30 The ease with which the North Atlantic Treaty was passed by the American legislature was at least in part due to the dramatic Soviet attempt to blockade West Berlin and the equally dramatic response of the Western powers to hold fast to the city via an unprecedented airlift operation. The crisis had its origins in the collapse of negotiations regarding the future of Germany within the Four Power Allied Control Commission in 1946.31 By the end of the following year, and with little prospect of ever reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union over the issue, the US, the United Kingdom and France, agreed amongst themselves to downgrade their role as occupying powers and restore self-government to that part of Germany under their control. Stalin now faced the prospect of an independent West German state and his response, on 24 June 1948, was to impose a total blockade on all traffic into and out of West Berlin with the intention of forcing the French, British and Americans to withdraw their garrisons and effectively abandon the beleaguered city.32 If the Soviets could not prevent the creation of a West German state they were determined nonetheless not to have to suffer the existence of a West German outpost some 200 kilometres deep in their midst. The three Western powers responded by imposing a counter-blockade of the Soviet zone of occupation in Germany and launching the largest airlift in recorded history, an operation that at its height was flying in 13,000 tons of supplies a day.33 Having demonstrated the determination of the Western powers not to abandon Berlin, Truman also ordered the deployment of 60 B-29 strategic bombers to the United Kingdom in an equally clear demonstration of the price any further escalation of the crisis on Moscow’s part would exact.34 After a tense stand-off that lasted ten months the Soviets, in a concession to the effectiveness of the Western airlift and a realisation that the episode had become an epic cause celebre for communist opponents throughout the US and Europe, if not the world over, finally backed down and lifted the blockade in May 1949.35 As a back-drop to the American ratification of the North Atlantic Treaty the Soviet actions over Berlin gave the Treaty’s supporters all the evidence of Soviet aggression they needed to ensure its passage through the US

30 LaFeber, p. 85. 31 Nation, p. 180. 32 Powaski, p. 75. 33 LaFeber, p. 78. 34 Powaski, ibid.

Congress. Yet despite this episode and the dispatch of the B-29s during it, nowhere in the provisions of the North Atlantic Treaty was there to be found a specific commitment of American forces to Western Europe’s aid, much less any suggestion of the need for the creation of a standing NATO force. Under Article V all parties agreed “that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all” however any implication of an automatic commitment was immediately qualified by the following clause: “if such an attack occurs, each of them … will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith … such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force”.36 Compare this to the unequivocal wording of the Treaty of Brussels where, in the face of armed attack, the signatories pledged to give each other “aid and assistance by all means in their power, military and other”37. The qualification contained in Article V was put there at the behest of the Americans and was drawn up to ensure that the US ultimately retained freedom of action as to how, when and where it would respond to Soviet aggression against Western Europe. Indeed, the wording of the Manila Treaty (see Appendix I) closely resembles that found in the North Atlantic Treaty, with a similar qualification preserving American freedom of action (located in Article IV rather than V). Thus while the American membership of NATO did represent a significant break with the past, the traditional American desire to avoid “entanglements” with foreign powers - even newfound military allies - needed little encouragement to manifest itself in a less obvious guise. Although disappointed with the legalistic caution of the American approach to the Treaty as embodied in Article V, France, the United Kingdom and the other European NATO members were not disheartened by it. Instead, they set about doing everything they could to ensure that the Americans were integrated so tightly into the military organisation of NATO that for all practical purposes their commitment would be an automatic one, regardless of the principle of freedom of action proclaimed by Article V. Thus the bulk of the command and staff posts in NATO’s fledgling military structure, concentrated in the “Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe” (SHAPE) located at Rocquencourt, near Paris, were given to the Americans, including

35 Ibid., p. 79. 36 Beaufre, p. 23. 37 Ibid., p. 22.

19 the appointment of General Dwight D. Eisenhower to the top military post, as the first “Supreme Allied Commander, Europe” (SACEUR).38 The Europeans were also greatly aided in this endeavour by the inclusion of North America and the North Atlantic in the military territorial command structure via the “Canada-United States Regional Planning Group” and the “Supreme Allied Command Atlantic” (SACLANT) respectively.39 But the most important factor for the West Europeans in their effort to bind the US to their fate as tightly as possible, was the existing presence of American occupation forces in Germany and the relative ease with which these troops were re-designated as an American contribution to NATO. In 1949 this amounted to two American divisions which, when compared with the dozen divisions France had nominally allocated NATO that same year, gives an indication of the real concessions made by the Europeans in the allocation of command appointments within NATO at that time.40 Nonetheless the total number of European divisions available to NATO, which now had responsibility for a land frontier that extended from Norway to Italy, amounted to 22, many of which were under strength and poorly equipped.41 This force was plainly inadequate when compared to the 30+ Soviet divisions then stationed in Eastern Europe, especially when the respective mobilisation of reserves was factored in to the equation.42 The Truman administration sought to remedy this situation by, in the first instance, encouraging its NATO partners in Europe to rearm and expand their armed forces (with or without the help of American military assistance and advisory programs);43 secondly, the US began to push for a swift resolution of outstanding issues surrounding the restoration of full sovereignty to West Germany, paving the way for West German rearmament and integration into the defence of Western Europe as quickly as possible,44 and; lastly, as an interim measure, in December 1950 Truman called for another four US divisions to be sent overseas and stationed in West

38 In the wake of France’s 1966 withdrawal from NATO’s military structure SHAPE was forced to shut down its facilities at Rocquencourt and moved to new premises located at near Mons, Belgium, in March 1967. LaFeber, p. 256. 39 Beaufre, p. 22. 40 Kaplan, p. 247. 41 David Miller, The Cold War: A Military History (London: John Murray, 1998), p. 22. 42 Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, p. 72; Beaufre, p. 29. 43 In July 1949 Truman signed off on a one-year Mutual Defense Assistance Bill authorising the expenditure of US$1.5 billion on military aid for NATO allies in Europe. It was to be the first of many. LaFaber, p. 85. 44 For more on the issues surrounding the establishment and rearmament of West Germany see David C. Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill, NC:

Germany.45 This last measure was the most controversial insofar as domestic American political opinion was concerned and initially Truman encountered substantial resistance to the proposal in the US Congress. As such it was a vivid illustration of the tension inherent in the broad acceptance of the strategy of containment on the one hand and, on the other, the great reluctance, reinforced by tradition, to see American forces tied down in any particular region and the corresponding curb on the United State’s freedom of action to respond to a crisis that accompanied such a commitment. By then US forces were embroiled in the Korean War and it was this realisation of actual communist aggression, coupled with a fear that it was a portent of a wider conflict to come, that helped Truman to finally gain Congressional approval, after a protracted debate in the House, in April 1951 for the deployment (personnel testimony to Congress on the need for the divisions by General Eisenhower, SACEUR, also greatly aided Truman’s cause).46 The most interesting point to make is that neither Truman nor Eisenhower portrayed this deployment as anything other than an interim measure to deter any would-be Soviet attempt to take advantage of the weak state of NATO’s European ground forces. In 1963 Eisenhower stated that he “had always believed Americans would be replaced by Europeans as soon as the Continent’s economies had fully recovered”.47 For Eisenhower once that recovery had occurred the physical commitment of US ground troops to NATO became an issue of symbolism as opposed to necessity: “One American Division in Europe can show the flag as definitely as several”.48 But as has already been established in the discussion surrounding NSC-68 symbolism, like credibility, prestige and image, is a concept at the mercy of perception. By the time Eisenhower became president the Marshall Plan had succeeded in restoring Western Europe’s economies to the point where most participating nations had actually surpassed their pre-war levels of economic performance, and by the beginning of his second term in office West German rearmament was a reality and NATO’s order of battle could anticipate the imminent addition of 12 West German divisions. Yet Eisenhower did not reduce, let alone

University of North Carolina Press, 1996). 45 Powaski, p. 77. 46 Kaplan, p. 246. 47 Kaplan, p. 254. 48 Ibid.

21 remove, US ground forces from Western Europe during his presidency despite apparently having all the grounds he required for doing so, particularly in light of his “New Look Defence Policy” and its emphasis on nuclear, as opposed to conventional, deterrence (see chapter four). An attempt to reduce US forces in Europe in his first term failed in the face of unified and determined European opposition to the proposal. Western European leaders, led by West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, were adamant that such a move would fatally undermine the West European public’s confidence in the United State’s commitment to NATO.49 A similar predicament in regard to South Korea and Japan had left the US Eighth Army in place guarding the 38th parallel, even though the Korean War had effectively ended with the signing of the Armistice in July 1953. The experience was a salutary one for Eisenhower and his Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles - under the conditions of the Cold War once significant US forces, particularly ground forces, were committed in support of allies overseas it was almost impossible to end that commitment regardless of changes to the nature of the threat being faced and/or doctrine. It is in this context that the creation of SEATO and the reconstitution of the Baghdad Pact into CENTO (both taking place under the auspices of the Eisenhower administration) need to be considered. The NATO of today, or even the 1960s, was not born into existence at the stroke of a pen in April 1949. The development of NATO, particularly its military structure, was a haphazard process that owed as much to the political exigencies unique to Western Europe in the 1950s as it did to purely military considerations. The Americans had not joined NATO with the intention of stationing permanent forces in Western Europe under its imprimatur. Far from being the benchmark for the additional multilateral military alliances entered into by the United States in the 1950s (ANZUS, SEATO and CENTO) NATO was more of an abject lesson in what to avoid, at least from Washington’s (or perhaps more accurately Eisenhower’s) point of view. Given this SEATO (and CENTO) are actually better represented as attempts by the Eisenhower administration to improve upon the NATO template rather than failed efforts to imitate it.

49 Large, pp. 257-61.

The Expansion of the Cold War Beyond Europe

The fact that under Eisenhower the United States continued to persist with multilateral military alliances as a tool of containment in spite of the experience with NATO suggests that this was indeed the case. As long as Washington could do a better job of preserving American freedom of action, and managing the expectations of its allies accordingly, then such alliances still offered a powerful mechanism through which to deter communist aggression in a given region and stiffen the resolve of local forces to resist it. Certainly insofar as the Eisenhower era was concerned the need for such mechanisms appeared more necessary than ever in the face of a decade where communist achievements across a range of industrial and scientific fields - epitomised by the launch of the world’s first satellite, “Sputnik”, into orbit in 1957 - convinced many Western observers, let alone their counterparts in the developing world, that the socialist system was indeed fated to triumph over its capitalist counterparts in the West. Even allowing for the selective exaggerations of communist propaganda, the progress in these spheres was substantial and was matched (and more often than not fuelled) by a steadily increasing military capability (not least the Soviet development of ICBMs) and the emergence of significant communist activity - overt or otherwise - in regions hitherto largely free of such encroachment. It was no coincidence that the rise in this activity occurred as the first wave of post Second World War de-colonisation reached its climax in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. With the establishment of West Germany (followed shortly thereafter by the creation of its opposite in the East - the Democratic Republic of Germany), NATO and the Warsaw Pact, the dividing line between communist and non- communist Europe was stabilised. Such stability was welcomed by proponents of containment for with clear territorial and political boundaries came clear behavioural boundaries, as both sides found it easier to judge what the other would or would not tolerate. Time was also an important ingredient for the ongoing refinement of such judgement but without a stable “frontline” there was little hope of improving the latter. Geo-strategic stability then, was a highly sought after commodity as far as the United States and its allies were concerned - as was illustrated in the most tragic manner by the 1956 Hungarian Uprising.50

50 Eisenhower had won the presidency on an election platform that ostensibly rejected “containment” and promised to take a more aggressive approach to the Communist Bloc, promising to not only halt

Unfortunately the process of de-colonisation hardly lent itself to the fostering of stability - even in those instances where a colonial power had chosen to go gracefully the legacy of institutions and infrastructure they left behind was a fragile one at best. Where the colonial power did not go gracefully the US was often placed in the impossible position of trying to maintain good relations with that power - invariably a NATO ally in Europe - whilst doing all that it could to distance itself from the actions of that ally in the developing world, so as not to prejudice future relations with what the Americans saw as the inevitable (and indeed desirable) emergence of a host of newly independent states. The vulnerability of these new states, or perhaps more pointedly the groups that helped or sought to create them, to communist influence or intimidation further complicated the issue. The Americans often criticised what they saw as stubborn European intransigence for provoking the “radicalisation” of independence movements, while the Europeans complained of American naiveté in failing to recognise that the continuation of colonial rule, or at least influence, was sometimes the only thing preventing the emergence of states hostile to Western interests. It was against this background tension that the Americans attempted to implement the strategy of containment and its associated quest for stability during the 1950s: first in Europe, then North Asia, Southeast Asia and finally the Middle East. By the beginning of Eisenhower’s presidency Europe, the “First Front”, was already a well-defined strategic entity. North Asia, the “Second Front”, had also been stabilised albeit at the cost of a hard-fought three year war on the Korean peninsula. Since the end of the Second World War the British, as the principal colonial power in the region, had resumed the strategic responsibility for securing the Middle East and its precious oil reserves.51 Despite the United Kingdom’s unilateral abandonment of its mandate in Palestine and the subsequent emergence of an independent Israeli state, its relationships with the client kingdoms it had fostered throughout the region were generally sound and as such the US was content to play a secondary role there. To that extent while the US supported the formation of a regional military alliance in

further communist expansion, but also “roll it back” wherever the opportunity to do so presented itself. The policy of “rollback” was thoroughly discredited as a hollow sham when the administration, in an embarrassing turn-around, refused to offer any practical support for the Hungarian Uprising for fear of provoking a clash with the Soviets who had made clear their determination to crush it. The Eisenhower administration subsequently became a proponent of the strategy of containment in name as well as in practice. LaFeber, pp. 190-92. 51 See David R. Devereaux, The Formulation of British Defence Policy Towards the Middle East,

1955 - the Baghdad Pact - it did not join it. Unfortunately for the West the underlying stability of a number of those Arab kingdoms was doubtful and the rise of pan-Arab nationalism, beginning with the successful military coup against Egypt’s King Farouk in 1952 and the rise of Gamal Abdel Nasser to power in that country, posed a direct challenge to British (and French) influence in the region.52 The decline of Anglo- French prestige - hastened by the Suez crisis of 1956 - coupled with increasing Soviet support for the pan-Arab movement eventually caused the Americans to play a more dominant strategic role in this, the “Third Front”, beginning with the reorganisation of the Baghdad Pact as CENTO under American leadership in 1959.53 In Southeast Asia this transferral of strategic responsibility for the region from the former colonial powers to the United States occurred for much the same reason as in the Middle East - the need to prevent a power vacuum forming in a strategically vulnerable and important region - but in a much shorter time-frame. Initially the Americans, other than attending to their own post-colonial relationship with the Philippines, had avoided any serious involvement in the region, content, as in the Middle East, to let the local European colonial powers - in this case the British, French and Dutch - respond to the challenges of de-colonisation in a manner and timing of their choosing. This did not mean that the US necessarily approved of those responses and, indeed, where the Europeans opted to try and cling on to their old imperial privileges without any concession to post-war realities - most notably in the doomed efforts of the Dutch to prevent Indonesian independence - the Americans had no reservations in privately and publicly condemning the actions of their erstwhile allies. But beyond recourse to the normal array of diplomatic mechanisms at its disposal Washington saw no pressing reason to intercede in a more forceful and authoritative manner.

The First Indochina War

This changed in 1949 when the communist victory in China shattered American complacency in regard to the progress of de-colonisation in Southeast Asia. There was now a direct physical link between much of Southeast Asia and a major

1948-56, Studies in Military and Strategic History, Michael Dockrill, ed. (London: Macmillan, 1990). 52 LaFeber, p. 158. 53 Nation, pp. 226-7.

25 communist power, whose capacity to galvanise communist elements across the region, never mind its conventional military might, had the potential to subvert the process of de-colonisation and reduce it to an instrument of communist expansion. It was in light of this development that the US looked anew at the French war in Indochina, a conflict hitherto largely dismissed in Washington as a localised one of no immediate concern to anyone outside of Indochina other than France. The battle between French forces and their Viet Minh opponents now assumed an international dimension, due both to the border the nominally French territories shared with the newly-established People’s Republic of China, and the domination of the Viet Minh by Vietnamese communists. Fears of direct Chinese support for the Viet Minh were soon realised when the French reported not only an influx of Chinese-supplied ordnance, but also the presence of Chinese military advisers, amongst Viet Minh units.54 Although the Truman administration had little sympathy for France’s aim of maintaining its empire in the orient, the Americans had no wish to see another communist victory on the Asian mainland and thus a decision was made to offer the French substantial financial and military aid towards their war effort in Indochina.55 This offer was made with the hope that, if accepted, the French might also be persuaded to counter the Viet Minh’s manipulation of nationalist sentiment by giving up their imperial pretensions and agreeing to some form of independence for their Indochinese territories. In this the Americans were to be disappointed as the French initially dismissed such suggestions as undermining their raison d’être for fighting in the first place, and then, as the tide of the conflict turned against them, instigated moves towards local autonomy that were largely cosmetic in nature, and even then only grudgingly conceded. By 1953 the French government, worn down by seven years of conflict and with no end in sight, signalled its willingness to negotiate a settlement of the conflict which, after preliminary talks between the French, British , US and Soviet foreign ministers in Berlin in early 1954, led to the inclusion of the Indochina conflict in a planned peace conference that also aimed to produce a treaty formally ending the Korean War, scheduled for Geneva in April that year.56 In the interim the French tried to improve their military position in Indochina and thereby, in

54 Ang Cheng Guan, Vietnamese Communists’ Relations with China and the Second Indochina Conflict, 1956-1962 (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Co, 1997), p. 13. 55 LaFeber, p. 110. 56 Modelski, “SEATO: Its Function and Organization” in George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Melbourne: Cheshire, 1962), p. 58.

26 turn, their negotiating position at Geneva. General Henri-Eugène Navarre, in command of the Corps Expéditionnaire Française d’Extrême Orient (CEFEO) since May 1953, was the architect of a new strategy designed to restore mobility, and with it the initiative, to French operations, which in turn, were aimed at provoking the Viet Minh into a battle of annihilation where the (assumed) French superiority in conventional warfare could assert itself and inflict a decisive defeat upon them.57 This strategy led to the disastrous battle of Dien Bien Phu where Navarre’s hoped for battle of annihilation ended with a decisive defeat for the French, not the Viet Minh. In late November 1953 the French had occupied Dien Bien Phu to threaten the Viet Minh line of communications into northern Laos and after three months of careful and methodical preparations the Viet Minh finally attacked the French base, committing nearly all of their regular forces in the process.58 As the situation at Dien Bien Phu deteriorated the French, who, ever since the first receipt of American aid, had been very careful to guard their exclusive control and direction of the war, resorted to a direct appeal for American military intervention to save the garrison. Despite support by Admiral Arthur Radford, Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, for an airstrike on Viet Minh positions by B-29s, the Eisenhower administration was more cautious in its assessment of the situation, noting that once the decision to intervene was made it was highly unlikely that such action could be neatly restricted to a single series of airstrikes, particularly if they failed to break the Viet Minh hold around Dien Bien Phu.59 Eisenhower was also aware that, coming a mere eight months after the armistice in Korea, congressional support for unilateral US intervention in this instance, especially if US ground forces were required, was weak. Instead, on 4 April, he proposed that US intervention would occur only if three conditions were met: first, that Washington would do so only as part of a coalition of other “free nations” of Southeast Asia including the United Kingdom; second, that France accelerated the granting of independence to its Indochinese territories to remove any charge that the US was intervening in support of French colonialism, and; thirdly, that the French agreed not to withdraw any of their forces in the wake of such intervention.60 The Americans immediately began a round of intense discussions with the

57 Bernard P. Fall, “Indochina: The Last Year of the War” Military Review, December 1956, pp. 48-56. 58 Ibid. 59 LaFeber, p. 162.

French and the British over Eisenhower’s proposals during which it quickly became apparent that the first condition was unlikely to be met. Even at this late hour the French were reluctant to concede command and control of the conflict to anyone else and they rejected the idea of a coalition with anyone other than themselves at the head of it - American B-29s were welcome but American commanders were not.61 The British, while interested in exploring a regional security arrangement that took in their concerns over British Malaya and Borneo, were nonetheless extremely reluctant to countenance military intervention in a conflict whose ending was due to be negotiated at an international peace conference less than a month away. On 13 April at the end of three days of talks between Dulles and the British Foreign Minister, Anthony Eden, the British declared that while they would participate in any future discussions regarding the future formation of a collective defence alliance in Southeast Asia, they would do nothing in the interim to prejudice the outcome of the Geneva Conference.62 Despite a last minute decision by the French to drop their objections and accept Washington’s conditions the British refused to budge and the pressure for intervention passed with the fall of Dien Bien Phu on 7 May. The very next day the negotiations on Indochina began at Geneva.63

The 1954 Geneva Accords

The deliberations at the Geneva Conference were finally concluded on 21 July and the resulting settlement - the 1954 Geneva Accords - succeeded in bringing the First Indochina War to an end but the price for doing so included an acceptance by the Western powers of the partition of Vietnam at the 17th parallel and the establishment of a communist regime - the “Democratic Republic of Vietnam” (DRVN) - in the northern half of the country. While some parties to the Accords, such as the British, optimistically viewed them as a basis for introducing stability into the region, the US - which refused to officially endorse them - saw nothing in them to inspire such confidence.64 Indeed, as far as Eisenhower and Dulles were concerned, the Accords simply consolidated a communist foothold in Southeast Asia from which attempts to

60 Buszynski, p. 5. 61 Ibid., p. 8. 62 Ibid., p. 9. 63 Ibid., p. 5. 64 LaFeber, pp. 164-5.

28 make further inroads into the region could be expected. The newly independent states of South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia were extremely vulnerable to communist aggression and despite a continued French military presence allowed for by the Accords in those countries the US doubted its effectiveness in deterring or resisting any such aggression for long. Dulles was convinced that further territorial losses to communist expansion in Southeast Asia were inevitable unless a regional defence alliance under US leadership could be established.

The Manila Treaty and the Creation of SEATO

With Eisenhower’s backing Dulles moved quickly to build upon the momentum that had accrued in favour of such an organisation prior to the Geneva Conference. Negotiations were expanded beyond the United Kingdom and France to include Australia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines and, while they may not have all shared the same level of concern regarding the immediate communist threat to Southeast Asia as the US, none of them wanted to be left out of an American led security framework for the region (see chapter four). Thus within a mere six weeks of the signing of the Geneva Accords the aforementioned states, together with the US, signed the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (SEACDT) at the end of a three day conference convened for that purpose in Manila.65 Under Article V of SEACDT, also known as the Manila Treaty, the signatories agreed to form a council to “provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require”.66 It was by way of the establishment of this council that SEATO came into being. At the heart of the Treaty was the first clause of Article IV which stated that:

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with

65 Ibid., pp. 37-41. 66 See Appendix I.

its constitutional processes.67

Here, in a statement reminiscent of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, the Eisenhower’ administration’s determination to preserve American freedom of action is plainly apparent. While often cited by SEATO’s critics as the prime exhibit in any condemnation of the alliance as a “paper tiger” it is worth reiterating once again that this passage is not that dissimilar to its NATO counterpart. Its inclusion - in either case - was not some cynical ploy to allow the US to escape ever having to meet its commitments to its allies, but simply a reflection of American policy on how best to meet those commitments in the context of the long-term demands of a global strategy of containment. To suggest otherwise implies that the other signatories were duped into putting their names to a worthless piece of paper - which was clearly not the case. Membership of a military alliance with the US was a much sought after commodity amongst Western nations throughout the 1950s - the United Kingdom for example not only joined NATO, but SEATO and CENTO - and for good reason. American commitment to those alliances was never in question, only the means by which the US sought to meet those commitments and, as had been demonstrated in NATO, it was not impossible for allies of the US to persuade it in practice, if not in principle, to change them. Indeed, SEATO had already witnessed one such change at its very inception: the Eisenhower administration had originally wanted to invite South Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos to join SEATO but, in deference to British and French sensibilities regarding the status of the Geneva Accords (under which such an approach was forbidden), the US agreed not to do so.68 However in return for this concession the US did win agreement for the inclusion of a protocol to the Manila Treaty that made it clear that SEATO reserved the right to treat any threat to the stability and security of the three newly independent Indochinese states as a threat to the alliance itself (see Appendix I). This effectively put the “Protocol States” under SEATO protection which, while apparently satisfying the American aim of shoring up the boundary of the Cold War frontline in Southeast Asia, would nonetheless prove far more difficult in its execution than its proclamation. To begin with there was the fact that two of those Protocol States - Laos and

67 Ibid. 68 Buszynski, p. 19.

South Vietnam - shared a border with China and North Vietnam. Both Laos and South Vietnam were vulnerable to covert communist aggression supported by their communist neighbours and, indeed, Laos already harboured a significant force of communist guerrillas on its soil in the shape of the Pathet Lao. The continued presence of the latter had been agreed to under the Geneva Accords on the basis that they would eventually be integrated into the mainstream Laotian political process, but for the moment they remained armed and in outright control of two provinces (see chapter six). The potential threat of communist insurgency to the region was one factor which did differentiate SEATO from NATO. Under clause two of Article IV of the Manila Treaty this threat was acknowledged thus:

If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.69

The need to reach agreement, firstly, that the territorial integrity or sovereignty of a state was threatened by something other than external aggression and, secondly, what measures should be taken against that threat, was a difficult proposition for any multilateral military alliance to consider, the more so in SEATO’s case given that such a proposition was to extended to the Protocol States, i.e. non-signatories. But the full ramifications of this clause were not immediately apparent as the potential for communist insurgency was as nothing (or so it seemed at the time) compared with the potential conventional military threat posed by the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Army of Vietnam, not only to the Protocol states but the entire region. It was this threat, particularly from the PLA, that consumed the attention of SEATO in its early years and would continue to be treated as a serious

69 Ibid.

31 contingency up until the very end of the alliance. There has been a tendency amongst critics of SEATO, such as Buszynski, to dismiss this threat as one without any real basis in fact, as if it represented nothing so much as a failure of imagination and foresight on the part of SEATO planners to recognise that they were not faced with a mirror-image of the strategic situation in Europe. While the operational conditions were dramatically different to those in Europe the conventional military threat, certainly that posed by the PLA, was a significant one. The next chapter will explore this threat in detail and in so doing illustrate why SEATO was correct in treating it so seriously.

Chapter 2 The Conventional Military Threat

By late 1954 the potential threat to South East Asia posed by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and to a lesser extent, the People’s Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN), was one that could not be ignored by the United States and its allies. The Korean War had demonstrated the PRC’s readiness and ability to intervene and fight beyond its borders on mainland Asia. The defeat of the French by the Viet Minh had created a power vacuum in Indo-China as well as establishing a communist state, North Vietnam, intent on filling it. Communism was now a powerful geo-political force in South East Asia, the PRC and DRVN were its principal protagonists and both were capable of mounting conventional military operations to further its expansion. For the next decade these perceptions would dominate the thinking and planning of SEATO and its members. This chapter seeks to examine whether these perceptions were warranted.

The Origins of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 1927-1949

In 1954 the overall strength of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stood at approximately three million personnel distributed across China and North Korea.1 It had come a long way since its humble beginnings in 1927 when the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began organising its own military units.2 After a disastrous series of failed uprisings and attempts to seize cities, surviving communist forces had regrouped in the safehaven of Chingkanshan, Kiangsi Province, towards the end of the 1920s.3 There, under the leadership of Mao Zedong and Chu The, the “Red Army of Workers and Peasants” became a force to be reckoned with for the first time. This invariably attracted the attention of Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang

1 John Gittings, The Role of the Chinese Army (London: Oxford, 1967), p. 305, 308; Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War, 1950-1953, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), p. 270. 2 Edward L. Dreyer, China at War 1901-1949 (New York: Longman, 1995), p. 5; William W. Whitson, The Chinese High Command (London: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 26-7. 3 Whitson, pp. 29-57.

(KMT) forces: five separate KMT campaigns were launched against Chingkanshan between 1930 and 1934.4 The first four were defeated but the fifth and last campaign nearly destroyed the Red Army, and would have done so had the CCP not decided to abandon its bases and breakout of the trap that the encircling KMT armies had set for it.5 Thus began the legendary year-long ordeal of the “Long March” in which the Red Army sought to escape its pursuers and retreat to the safety of Yenan in the remote province of Shensi in northern China. After these formative events there followed a period of rebuilding and consolidation of the Red Army. The Party leadership’s efforts to husband their precious military capability during the latter half of the 1930s saw them take advantage of the Second Sino-Japanese War by convincing the KMT to accept the CCP in a second “United Front” against the Japanese.6 This temporary marriage of convenience allowed the CCP to strengthen its grip on north-western China.7 However the bulk of the Japanese territorial conquests came at the expense of the KMT and by 1941 the resentment this caused on the part of the latter had led to the end of any meaningful co-operation between the CCP and the KMT.8 From that point onward the United Front deteriorated into little more than an armed truce (and a fragile one at that) between the two movements.9 After the outbreak of hostilities between Japan and the United States both the KMT and the CCP sought to conserve their strength and the few major subsequent conventional actions mounted by either group against the Japanese were conducted completely independently of each other.10 Nonetheless the CCP did implement a strategy of intensive guerrilla operations against the Japanese and in so doing greatly expanded their territorial influence, particularly in rural areas, as well as winning the respect of many of their fellow Chinese.11 The success of this strategy meant that by the end of the Second World War the CCP controlled substantial swathes of territory in ten provinces and the Red Army had risen to an approximate strength of one million men.12

4 Dreyer, 159-69, 185-94; Whitson, pp. 130-7, 268-80. 5 Dreyer, pp. 185-94. 6 Samuel B. Griffith, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1968), p. 60. 7 Ibid., pp. 67-8; Dreyer, pp. 249-53. 8 Dreyer, pp. 234-5, 254-6; Bruce A. Elleman, Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989, Warfare and History, ed. Jeremy Black (London: Routledge, 2001), p. 206, 208, 220-1. 9 Dreyer, p. 256. 10 Ibid. p. 266. 11 Ibid., pp. 234-5, 250-1; Griffiths, pp. 72-4, 76-7. 12 Paul H. B. Godwin, The Chinese Communist Armed Forces (Washington: Air University Press,

With Japan’s defeat the resumption of full-scale civil war between the KMT and the CCP was not long in coming. At first the United States tried to mediate a negotiated settlement between the two factions but both sides merely used the resulting interlude to jockey for position and ready their forces for the struggle ahead.13 In June 1946 the KMT signalled the end of this ‘phoney war’ period by launching a major offensive aimed at clearing the communists from the main cities of central and northern China.14 This played into the hands of the newly re-named People’s Liberation Army which had decided on a strategy of defensive attrition as the best way to nullify the KMT’s initial superiority in men and equipment. Consequently throughout 1946 and into 1947 the PLA avoided large battles where these advantages could prove decisive and readily abandoned cities to order to do so.15 Before long much of the KMT’s strength had been soaked up by the need to garrison its newly occupied cities and maintain the vulnerable lines of communication between them, while communist control of adjoining rural areas was never seriously challenged.16 Tactically the PLA never lost the initiative and when Chiang Kai-shek’s 1947 drive into Yenan lost its momentum the strategic initiative as well finally passed over to the communists.17 As Chiang’s best troops were worn down in Yenan whilst being denied the decisive battle they sought there, the PLA counter-attacked in central China and succeeded in cutting the KMT supply lines to its garrisons in Manchuria.18

1988), p. 7. Estimates of Red Army strength in late 1945 vary. To begin with the number presented here includes ‘regular’ Red Army troops only and excludes the substantial number of Communist militia and guerrilla personnel that existed alongside the conventional forces. Even then, there are discrepancies: Godwin gives us a regular strength of 900, 000 in April 1945 growing to 1,300,000 in December 1945; Bruce Elleman gives a figure of 900,000 for ‘early’ 1945; Gittings gives a figure of 880, 000 in August 1945 rising to 1,300, 000 by the ‘end’ of 1945; Griffith gives a figure of 910,000 in April 1945 although this includes the guerrilla units in south China; Dreyer speaks of 475,000 regulars in ‘mid-1945’ rising to 1,278,000 in ‘mid-1946’; Peter W. Kozumplik claims that the PLA had 860,000 “regulars under arms” in 1945: see Elleman, p. 214; Gittings, p. 2, p. 59; Godwin, p. 7; Griffith, p. 74; Peter W. Kozumplik, “The Chinese Civil War” in The Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War, and The Korean War, The West Point Military History Series, Thomas E. Griess, ed. (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1987), p.53; Some of these discrepancies (particularly Dreyer’s) may be explained by noting that large numbers of Communist guerrilla units were being rapidly absorbed into the expanding regular army during this period. This transition appears to have been almost seamless as the distinction between guerrilla and regular status amongst Communist forces at that stage depended more on local operational requirements rather than fixed differences in operational capability. See Gittings pp. 59-61; Godwin, p. 7; Griffiths, p. 72. 13 Dreyer, pp. 315-20; Elleman, pp. 224-7. 14 Dreyer, pp. 324-6; Kozumplik, pp. 56-7. 15 Kozumplik, p. 57. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid. 18 Ibid., pp. 57-8; Whitson, p. 88.

From this point on the PLA engaged in open conventional warfare, and as it began to capture large quantities of artillery and tanks from the KMT these also began to feature in PLA operations.19 By the middle of 1948 the PLA had increased its strength to approximately three million men and proceeded to destroy all KMT forces north of the Yangtze River in four separate campaigns “that were conducted almost simultaneously and on a geographic scale surpassing any military action in European history”.20 The KMT is estimated to have lost 1,400,000 men in these battles (many of who were taken prisoner) and with these communist victories the demoralisation of Chiang Kai-shek’s remaining forces in southern China was complete.21 By early 1949 the war quickly degenerated into a series of mopping up operations for the PLA as the KMT regime collapsed and mass defections or surrenders of KMT troops became commonplace.22 On 1 October Mao Zedong was able to formally proclaim the establishment of the People’s Republic of China from Beijing and in December of that year the last mainland province to hold out against communist rule, Szechwan, finally succumbed to the PLA.23 Thus the PLA emerged victorious from 22 years of continuous conflict. The senior military leadership of the 1950s and 60s would be drawn from the men who had proven themselves as able and steadfast commanders in the darkest days of the Long March through to the triumphs of 1948-49.24 The communist soldier, fortified by the Party’s thorough system of political indoctrination, was demonstrably superior to his KMT counterpart, and at the very least a match for the Japanese, in terms of discipline and fighting spirit. Yet at the close of the Civil War question marks remained over the PLA’s real worth as a modern military force. Critics could point to the undoubted weaknesses of the KMT armies it had fought and the complicated conditions of the Second Sino-Japanese War as unique factors contributing to the PLA’s success that were unlikely to occur again. Furthermore,

19 Dreyer, pp. 329, 338; Elleman, p. 230; Whitson, pp. 461-3; According to a 1950 CCP publication by the end of the 1946-49 Civil War the PLA tank fleet consisted of 622 tanks nearly all of Japanese or American origin. Furthermore a total of 54,430 “artillery” pieces are claimed by the same publication to have been captured during this period, although it should be noted that this figure would appear to have been inflated by the inclusion of mortars, anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns in addition to field guns and howitzers. Cited in Lt. Col. Robert B. Rigg, Red China’s Fighting Hordes revised ed. (Harrisburg, PA: Military Service Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 100, 255. 20 Kozumplik, p. 58. 21 Ibid., p. 59. 22 Dreyer, pp. 345-8. 23 Kozumplik, p. 59. 24 According to Whitson no less than 95 per cent of the PLA high command in 1967 still consisted of

36 the PLA had fought as an unsophisticated infantry army throughout its short history and was woefully inexperienced in the management of substantial artillery, armour and other specialist support services (let alone the logistic networks needed to maintain them). As for air and naval power the PLA had quite simply never been in a position to acquire either until its victory in 1949. Many contemporary observers openly doubted the PLA’s ability to hold its own against a modern Western military force.25 In that sense the PRC’s decision to intervene in the Korean War can be seen as the PLA’s true coming of age.

The Korean War

The PRC was as surprised as the United States by the outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950 - neither the Soviet Union nor their North Korean clients had seen fit to give their Chinese counterparts any prior warning of the North Korean attack.26 At first it seemed that the North Korean People’s Army (NKPA) would succeed in overrunning South Korea before Western forces, under the banner of the United Nations (UN) and led by the United States, could intervene in strength. However, the NKPA’s invasion ground to a halt as it struggled to crack the last-ditch UN defence of Pusan and then collapsed in the face of the UN counter-offensive that followed.27 The PRC leadership became increasingly concerned as the UN forces, under the command of General Douglas MacArthur, crossed the 38th parallel and gave every indication that they would not stop until they reached the Chinese border. The re-unified and pro-western Korea that was bound to follow in the wake of these UN troops was seen as a direct threat to the security of the fledgling PRC by its leadership.28 From their perspective Korea, like Taiwan and Japan, would become another link in the United States’ hostile “strategic encirclement” of China.29 Determined to prevent this from happening the PRC committed itself to direct men who had joined the Red Army before July 1937 three decades earlier. Whitson, p. xix. 25 Stanley Sandler, The Korean War: No Victors, No Vanquished, Warfare and History, ed. Jeremy Black (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), pp. 127, 147. 26 Kim, Jin Kyung, “The Evolution of the Korean War and the Dynamics of Chinese Entry” PhD thesis, University of Hawaii, 1996, pp. 221-7. 27 The History of the United Nations Forces in the Korean War, Vol. I (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, 1972), pp. 81-116. 28 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation, The U.S. and Pacific Asia: Studies in Social, Historical, and Political Interaction (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 127-30, 158-60. 29 Shu, p. 81.

37 intervention in the conflict.30 Units of the PLA, designated ‘Chinese People’s Volunteers’ (CPV) for the duration of their operations in Korea, were first ordered across the Yalu River on 19 October 1950.31 Commanded by one of the PLA’s most senior leaders, P’eng Te- huai, the CPV was initially organised into four infantry armies, three artillery divisions and one anti-aircraft regiment with an overall strength of some 260,000 personnel.32 This intervention changed the course of the conflict and indeed, in the words of MacArthur himself, marked the beginning of “an entirely new war”.33 Between October 1950 and May 1951 the CPV launched five major offensives in an effort to gain all-out victory and re-unify Korea under communist rule.34 In the first three of these operations the CPV, aided by a reconstituted NKPA, inflicted serious defeats upon UN forces, advanced south of the 38th Parallel and recaptured Seoul.35 By the end of January 1951 however, the United Nations Command had regrouped and begun to launch counter-attacks of its own.36 Two further offensives by the CPV in April and May failed to break through the UN lines, and indeed the so-called ‘fifth offensive’ was so comprehensively defeated that for the first and only time during the Korean War, the CPV armies verged on the brink of collapse.37 Thereafter, Mao abandoned any lingering hopes of outright victory and the CPV spent the following two years embroiled in the tedious, but no less deadly, strategic stalemate that both sides were content to maintain while the search for a negotiated settlement of the conflict began in earnest. The impact of the Korean War on the PLA was enormous. In public the PRC leadership proclaimed it to be a great victory and a vindication of Mao’s military thought: the will of the masses, mobilised and fortified by the Party, had proven to be more important than the material and technological advantages of “the greatest

30 Chen, pp. 161-4, 171-89; Marshal Nie Ronngzhen, ‘Beijing’s Decision to Intervene’, in ed. Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millet & Bin Yu, Mao’s Generals Remember Korea, Modern War Studies (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), pp. 38-44; Shu, pp. 77-8. 31 Shu, pp. 82, 94. 32 Ibid. 33 Roy K. Flint, “The Korean War”, in The Arab-Israeli Wars, The Chinese Civil War and the Korean War, West Point Military History Series, ed. Thomas E. Griess (Wayne, NJ: Avery Publishing Group, 1987), p. 100. 34 Ibid., pp. 99-101, 103-6, 109-11; Sandler, pp. 129-47. 35 Flint, pp. 99-101; Shu, pp. 101-32. 36 Shu, pp. 134-6. 37 Flint, pp. 110-11; Shu, pp. 144-52; Griffith, p. 165.

38 industrial power of the capitalist world”.38 The reality was somewhat different. For the men who had served in the CPV, not least their commander Peng Te-huai, Maoist military doctrine had failed to prepare them for prolonged battle with a modern Western military force.39 Brutal lessons in the effectiveness of modern firepower and the need for efficient logistical support were acquired the hard way. That they were taken to heart, the rhetoric from Beijing notwithstanding, was amply demonstrated by the intense reform and re-equipment of CPV units that followed the failure of the fifth offensive through to the end of the war.40 Standardised scales of Soviet weapons and equipment replaced the unwieldy collection of ex-KMT or Japanese war booty with which the CPV had entered the conflict.41 Support arms and services, particularly the artillery, were either created from scratch or increased in proportion to the infantry.42 An air defence network was built up complete with radar-guided fire control and early warning systems, approximately 800 heavy AA guns and an interceptor force of hundreds of MiG-15 jet fighters.43 Soviet military aid was crucial to this process. Everything from small arms to tanks to aircraft was supplied in quantity. Soviet advisers accompanied this largesse and often took part in some of the more demanding technical roles, most notably as pilots.44 In other words the CPV, and by extension the rest of the PLA, underwent a crash course in professionalism and modernisation.45 The result was a

38 P’eng Te-huai cited in Shu, p. 248. 39 Soloman M. Karmel, China and the People’s Liberation Army: Great Power or Struggling Developing State? (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), p. 30; Whitson, pp. 97-9. 40 Xiaobing Li, Allan R. Millett, Bin Yu, p. 24. 41 Griffith, p. 178; Godwin, p. 81; The first wave of CPV formations deployed to Korea are reported to have resorted to swapping weapons between units to try and ease the logistical burden caused by the employment of so many different weapons. Xiabing Li, Allan R. Millett and Bin Yu cite the example of the 40th and 38th armies who were both originally equipped with a mix of ex-KMT Japanese and American rifles. Prior to deployment to Korea these two formations traded with each other to allow the 38th to become uniformly equipped with Japanese rifles and the 40th to become uniformly equipped with American rifles. Xiabing Li, Allan R. Millett, Bin Yu, p. 13. For a detailed survey of the multitude of different small arms fielded by the KMT prior to their defeat in 1949 see Paul Cornish, “Small Arms of Nationalist China 1937-1945”, Imperial War Museum Review No. 5, 1990, pp. 69-78. 42 Griffith, p. 178; Xiabing Li, Allan R. Millett, Bin Yu, p. 24. 43 Griffith, pp. 177-8; Gittings, pp. 137-8. 44 Griffith, pp. 166-7, 178; Gittings, p. 137; The participation of Soviet pilots in aerial combat over Korea was publicly denied by both the Soviet Union and the United States up until the end of the Cold War when it was finally confirmed that the Soviet 64th Fighter Aviation Corps had indeed taken part. Flying MiG-15s the 64th had deployed to airbases in Manchuria following China’s intervention and began operations in early November 1950. Over the course of the war approximately 72,000 Soviet air force personnel rotated through the 64th on tours of duty lasting between eight and fourteen months long. Sandler, pp. 184-6; David C. Isby, Fighter Combat in the Jet Age (London: HarperCollins, 1997), p. 28. 45 As the fighting settled down into a protracted stalemate the PLA appears to have begun to deliberately rotate divisions, armies and army groups through the CPV command in an effort to give as

PLA that emerged from the conflict a far more recognisably conventional or “Sovietised” force than the one that had entered it.46 Furthermore, having held its own in combat against the US Eighth Army for over two and a half years, the PLA had earned the wary respect of its Western opponents both for its actual prowess and its future potential.47

Red versus Expert: the development of the PLA 1954-1965

P’eng Te-huai and other senior PLA leaders were determined to achieve that potential by building upon the lessons of Korea and maintaining the impetus for modernisation and embedding the ethos of professionalism begun there. Upon his return from Korea P’eng was treated as a national hero and made Minister of Defence in September 1954 and his presence was soon felt.48 One of his first measures was the highly symbolic introduction of ranks into the PLA for the first time, complete with a hierarchical pay structure and visible insignia, in February 1955.49 A national system of conscription was also introduced in 1955 and, together with the post-Korean war reductions from three million to 2.5 million personnel, allowed the PLA to achieve stable and sustainable strength levels.50 At the same time the number of specialist military training facilities rose dramatically as every effort was made to increase the professionalism and technical proficiency of the PLA in the shortest time possible.51 In conjunction with these reforms and P’eng’s tenure as the Minister for National Defence a “golden era of Sino-Soviet military cooperation”52 ensued. A

much of the PLA as possible the experience of modern battle-conditions. Whitson, pp. 97-8. 46 Ibid., p. 97. 47 General Matthew B. Ridgeway wrote: “Considering the conditions under which it operated in Korea during the period described, the PLA must be rated highly. With good leadership, time for training, and first-class equipment, Chinese ground forces, with their huge reservoir of manpower, must be reckoned a formidable foe.” Cited in Griffith, p. 171. 48 Ibid., p. 172; Whitson, p. 98. 49 Joffe, pp. 30, 34-6. Fourteen separate officer grades were established ranging from supreme marshal down to second lieutenant and in September of that year ten senior PLA leaders were given the rank of marshal including P’eng. Ibid. 50 Ibid., pp. 38-9. Prior to this the PLA was, at least officially, recruited on a ‘voluntary’ basis. In practice, while genuine volunteers were easily raised amongst some segments of the population (students being one such example), recruits were often obtained from a number of other quarters including direct drafts taken from the ‘people’s militia’, and quotas that local party cadres met by fair means or foul. Gittings, pp. 74-98. 51 For example by 1962 an estimated 77 military academies had been established to serve the needs of the PLA officer corps. Joffe, pp. 21-2. 52 Whitson, p. 98.

40 series of Sino-Soviet agreements were signed throughout the decade involving technology transfers and licensed production of Soviet weapons systems and other military equipment. By 1965 the Chinese defence industry had become self- sufficient in the production of contemporary Soviet small-arms, infantry support weapons and light to medium field, anti-aircraft and anti-tank artillery pieces.53 Other achievements included the manufacture of MiG-17 jet fighters in 1956, the series production of the Soviet T-54 medium tank in 1959 and the construction of Soviet Whiskey-class attack submarines. Soviet military advisers were welcomed and PLA officers were sent to the USSR for advanced training. P’eng himself made little attempt to disguise his admiration for the Soviet conventional military model and his wish to recreate the PLA in its image.54 However P’eng’s reforms and his disdain for the Maoist model provoked a powerful backlash from the senior Party leadership. While the latter did not oppose modernisation per se they were suspicious of P’eng’s efforts to professionalise the PLA at the expense of the traditional pre-eminent role held by the CCP since the formation of the Red Army. The Party’s position within the PLA had certainly suffered during P’eng’s tenure as Minister of National Defence: “By mid-1960, it was discovered that 7,000 companies of the PLA lacked Party branches, most platoons lacked Party cells, and most squads had no Party members”.55 Amidst a growing atmosphere of disenchantment with their Soviet allies P’eng’s alienation of the CCP proved fatal. In September 1959 P’eng was summarily dismissed from his ministerial post and replaced by Marshal Lin Piao. The day of the “expert” was over. Lin Piao’s appointment was not a total triumph for the Maoist purists and in many ways he appears to have been a compromise candidate. Piao had a similar background to P’eng and was considered to be a professional soldier by the Party.56 However Lin favoured a less dogmatic and confrontational approach to the so-called “red versus expert” debate than his colleague.57 Under his direction the role of the Party in the PLA was rejuvenated and strengthened. The political commissars had

53 Samuel B. Griffith, “The Military Potential of China”, in Alastair Buchan, ed., Studies in International Security no. 9, China and the Peace of Asia (London: Institute for Strategic Studies, 1965), p. 73. 54 Whitson, p. 99. 55 Ibid., p. 99. 56 Griffith, pp. 309-10. 57 Whitson, p. 99-100.

41 their powers restored in full, Party membership within the PLA was increased and more time was spent on political education at the expense of military training.58 Yet Lin continued the PLA modernisation program as best he could in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal of aid in 1960 and even the system of ranks remained in place until May 1965.59 Lin dutifully restored the doctrine of People’s War to a dominant position in official PLA strategic thought but he also tried to temper its practical application, at least at the operational level, by making at least some allowances for the impact of modern technology on the battlefield60. Nevertheless the dismissal of P’eng in 1959 and the withdrawal of Soviet aid the following year were crucial turning points in the development of the PLA. At the very least the modernisation of the PLA was stalled for four years while the “Soviet model” of a professional military was completely abandoned by 1965. This resulted in a stagnation in conventional capability that would prevail until the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War jolted the Party establishment into re-examining its faith in Maoist military doctrine and embarking upon the sort of reforms that P’eng had championed two decades earlier. Yet despite his eventual disgrace P’eng did succeed in drastically improving the PLA’s conventional capability to the point where by 1959 it appeared to be well on the road to catching up with its Soviet mentor if not its Western adversaries. In time this legacy was eroded away but the PLA of the 1950s and early 1960s possessed more than enough conventional strength to dominate its smaller neighbours and challenge those who might come to their aid.

Organisation of the PLA 1954-65: Command and Control

The year 1954 marked the formal end of the PRC’s, and by extension the PLA’s, transition from a civil war footing to one more appropriate to a unified Chinese state. For the country as a whole this was marked by the ratification of a new constitution by the First National People’s Congress in September of that year.61 Among its many articles the 1954 Constitution included a number that formally enshrined the role of the PLA and outlined its relation to both the state and the

58 Ibid; Gittings, pp. 242-62. 59 Gittings, p. 251. 60 Ibid., pp. 242-3.

CCP.62 These acts were the last in a series of structural reforms of the PLA dating back to 1949 and the following organisation was to endure, largely untouched, throughout the period of this thesis.63 In theory the ultimate command of the PLA lay with the Chairman of the National People’s Congress who, via the latter body (or its Standing Committee when it was not in session - which was most of the time), had the power to declare war, impose martial law and order military mobilisation.64 The Chairman also oversaw an advisory body to the State Council known as the National Defence Council but this organisation had a symbolic role only and appears to have done little more other than to “provide prestige and official perquisites to senior military officers and Party hierarchs”65. However the real executive power in regard to all questions of defence and strategic direction lay behind this formal facade and resided exclusively with the Politburo of the CCP and this was managed through a ‘Military Affairs Committee’ (MAC) drawn from its ranks. The Ministry of National Defence carried out the day-to-day administration and implementation of policy. Officially the Ministry answered directly to the State Council but in reality it took its orders from the MAC. Incorporated into the Ministry were three ‘general staff’ departments and a dozen or so branch and service headquarters. The PLA did not have a general staff in the western sense and instead divided the functions one would expect to find in the latter amongst the three departments. The ‘General Rear Services Department’ was in charge of logistical planning, equipment acquisitions and development, financial, medical, supply, transportation and recreational services. The ‘General Political Department’ was responsible for maintaining the CCP’s political control of the armed forces and as such was directly overseen by the MAC. Part of the Political Department’s job involved running education and cultural programs, military law enforcement, creating propaganda, and fostering a highly motivated and ideologically correct

61 Griffith, p. 214. 62 Ibid. pp. 214-15. 63 Ibid. p. 215; Srikanth Kondapalli, China’s Military: The PLA in Transition (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 1999), Appendix A. The onset of the Cultural Revolution in 1966 threw much of the formal military infrastructure, and the civilian authority over it, into chaos, but officially the relationships outlined by the 1954 Constitution remained in effect until their replacement by the 1975 Constitution. See Harvey W. Nelson, The Chinese Military System: An Organizational Study of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1977), pp. 5-13, 24-43. 64 Griffiths, p. 214; AWM 122, 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, p. 1-1. 65 Griffiths, p. 215.

43 esprit de corps through the attachment of Party cadres at all levels of the PLA. Finally the ‘General Staff Department’ was left with the responsibility for actual military operations, military intelligence, communications and mobilisation. Military training was a joint responsibility shared by both the General Rear Services and Staff departments. Subordinate to the three departments were the various branch and service headquarters. These included the headquarters of the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) and the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN). From Beijing this heavily centralised organisation exercised its authority across the country through 13 military regions established in June 1954.66 Ten of these military regions corresponded to one or more civilian provincial boundaries while the remaining three covered the autonomous regions of Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia and Tibet respectively.67 These regions were then further subdivided into at least 23 military districts and a varying number of sub-districts.68 While these military regions were the principle conduit for the administration of the PLA in peace, the PLAAF and the PLAN were given separate territorial command organisations (see below).

The PLA (Ground Forces) 1954-1965

From the end of the Korean War to 1957 the ground forces of the PLA were reduced from three million to 2.5 million personnel and thereafter maintained a standing strength of approximately 2,300,000 personnel. According to contemporary American estimates, upon mobilisation this strength had the potential for expansion to 3,200,000 within six months and a formidable six million within two years.69 The PLA ground forces remained a predominantly infantry based force with some 120 infantry divisions accounting for the bulk of the PLA personnel. Most of these were organised into 34 armies with each army made up of at least two (and more often three) infantry divisions. A further 11-14 combat divisions (five armoured, three airborne, three to six cavalry) were built up along side 23 combat support divisions (fourteen field artillery, three anti-tank and six anti-aircraft).

66 Gittings, p. 272. 67 Ibid. p. 308; Griffith, Appendix B. 68 Ibid; Joffe, pp. 28-9; Elleman, p. 257; SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5. 69 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965,

Together with more than one hundred independent combat and combat support regiments, these divisions represented the effective ‘field force’ of the PLA. In peacetime these independent units and the 34 infantry armies were assigned to the 13 military regions and came under the command of their respective regional headquarters for administrative purposes.70 Upon the outbreak of conflict however the field force units would, depending on the scale of that conflict, be grouped into, or made available to, field armies and army groups formed specifically for the purpose of operational command.71 An army group could control the operations of between two to six armies and their supporting units while the field army, the highest operational field command in the PLA, could control any number of army groups and was reserved for the control of strategic, large-scale operations.72 The Korean War provides us with examples of both: The CPV command was a field army in all but name, entering that conflict with a single subordinate army group, the 13th, and ending it in control of four (the 3rd, 9th, 19th and 20th army groups).73 In turn, the 9th Army Group deployed with three armies under its control in November 1950, a figure that rose to five in late 1952 before dropping down to two by the time of the armistice.74

The PLA Infantry Division

The standard PLA infantry division contained 1,736 officers and 12,270 men based around three infantry regiments.75 Each regiment possessed three 674-strong infantry battalions consisting of three to four rifle companies equipped with 7.62- mm rifles, 7.62-mm SMGs, and 7.62-mm LMGs.76 Each infantry battalion also included a mortar company of nine 82-mm mortars and a HMG company of ten or so 7.62-mm HMGs.77 In addition the regiment had its own heavy weapons battalion

Annex 1, p. 1. 70 Gittings, p. 308; Griffith, Appendix B; SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, p. 2-2. 71 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, p. 2-2. 72 Ibid. 73 Zhang, pp. 263, 269. 74 Ibid., pp. 264, 268-9. 75 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 2, p. 4, plate 3, plate 7. 76 Ibid., part 2, p. 4, plate 4, plate 7. 77 Ibid.

45 with 12 120-mm heavy mortars, nine 57-mm or 76-mm AT guns, and nine 75-mm, 85-mm or 107-mm recoilless rifles.78 Additional support units (such as an engineer company, reconnaissance platoon, chemical warfare platoon, and so on) along with headquarters personnel brought the overall strength of the infantry regiment to just over 3,000 officers and men.79 Divisional fire support came in the shape of an artillery regiment equipped with 12 160-mm heavy mortars, 18 76-mm or 85-mm field guns and 12 122-mm howitzers and an armoured regiment comprised of one tank battalion and one (self propelled gun) SPG battalion.80 The former had a strength of 32 T-34/85 medium tanks and the latter one of 12 SPGs (either SU-76s or SU-100s).81 Additional support was provided by an AA battalion with 18 37-mm towed AA guns and 12 AA heavy machine guns (either 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm), an engineer battalion, a signals battalion and various other headquarter units.82 While vehicles were available for the support elements within the division the infantry themselves usually lacked any organic transport of their own and there appears to have been no attempt to form permanent motorised infantry divisions.83 In so far as the SEATO Treaty area was concerned the remote and rugged terrain that characterised much of the local geography meant that this lack of motorised mobility amongst the PLA infantry was not quite the tactical handicap it may have been elsewhere. Indeed if the recent experiences of the French Army in Vietnam were anything to go on, motorised troops were at a positive disadvantage in such terrain, tied as they were by their vehicles to the few rudimentary and vulnerable road networks that existed.84 Chinese troops had a reputation, dating back to the Second World War and confirmed by their performance in the Korean War, for being able to march further and faster than their Western counterparts.85 To

78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., part 2, p. 4, plate 7. 80 Ibid., part 2, pp. 4-5, plate 3, plate 4, plate 12. 81 Ibid., plate 4, plate 12. 82 Ibid., plate 3, plate 4. 83 According to Angus Fraser the PRC’s total national truck fleet “grew from an estimated fifty thousand in 1952 to five hundred thousand in 1971.” Given this small base and the need to meet the demands of the expanding civilian industrial sector during this period the decision not to attempt to motorise the PLA infantry is more readily understandable. Fraser, p. 6. 84 Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China 1945-54, trans. Josephine Bacon (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1990), p. 105. 85 Roe, pp. 431-2; Lynn Montross, Maj. Bubard D. Kuokka, USMC, and Maj. Norman W. Hicks, USMC, US Marine Operations in Korea 1950-1953, Vol. IV, The East-Central Front (Washington, DC; Historical Branch, G-3 Headquarters, US Marine Corps, 1962), p. 35.

46 that end the PLA promised to be as capable and as determined as the Imperial Japanese Army had been a decade or so earlier in traversing the swamps, jungles and mountains of Southeast Asia. Given this the tanks and other heavy vehicles found in the standard PLA infantry division would be of little use in such terrain. Accordingly Western planners assumed that the PLA would instead employ a “light” infantry division in such conditions. Strictly speaking no such organisation existed on the PLA order of battle and all infantry divisions officially complied with the standard organisation given above. However it was a reasonable assumption to make and therefore a “standard” organisation for the hypothetical light infantry division was agreed upon for SEATO planning purposes. The biggest difference between the two infantry divisions was the removal of the armoured regiment from the organisation of the light division.86 The artillery regiment was retained but was equipped with 24 76-mm mountain guns instead of the normal complement of field guns and howitzers while the 160-mm heavy mortars were “replaced” with 12 107-mm or 120-mm heavy mortars.87 The anti-aircraft battalion lost its 37-mm towed AA guns but doubled its strength in 12.7- mm/14.5-mm AA heavy machine guns from 12 to 24 in compensation.88 The number of trucks, including specialist vehicles like prime movers, was reduced from a total of 529 to a mere 120 vehicles while the number of horses increased and mules were introduced as well.89 The infantry regiments themselves were left untouched and remained at “full” strength.90 The effect on the total strength of the division was to reduce it by approximately 1,000 personnel to 13,000.91

Other Field Force Combat Arms

While any military action by the PLA in the Treaty area could be guaranteed to involve infantry units (by virtue of their overwhelming dominance of the PLA force structure if nothing else) the presence of other combat arms would depend on the scale of the action, the nature of the terrain and to a lesser degree the capabilities

86 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 2, p. 2-7, plates 5-6. 87 Ibid., plate 6. 88 Ibid. 89 Ibid., plates, 4, 6. 90 Ibid., plates 5- 6. 91 Ibid., plate 5.

47 of their opponents. The PLA’s independent cavalry regiments and divisions were not much use in the jungles and cities of Indo-china but they could be of use to operations in the more open, albeit desolate, terrain of the Tibetan plateau and the borders of West Pakistan. In fact both the Tibet and Sinkiang military regions included cavalry amongst the field forces stationed in their areas.92 Armed with little more than small arms (including sabres) and light support weapons the 5,500-strong cavalry division, or 1,500-strong cavalry regiment, could nevertheless conceivably carry out reconnaissance missions, anti-partisan/commando sweeps, and guard lines of communication effectively in a Central Asian environment.93 PLA armoured divisions and independent armoured regiments were capable of operating in a far greater portion of the SEATO Treaty area than the cavalry, but given their small numbers and intended role they were only likely to be encountered in the course of a large-scale PLA conventional offensive. Although the PLA had formed and sent two armoured divisions to Korea by the end of 1952 this rapid growth was not matched in the years that followed the end of that conflict.94 By 1965 only three additional armoured divisions and a small number of independent armoured regiments were reported to been created. This appears to have been due primarily to the limited availability of trained personnel and modern Soviet AFVs rather than to any deliberate doctrinal stance.95 Both the 8,000-strong armoured division and the 1,450-strong armoured regiment required a far higher proportion of technically skilled personnel than did the infantry and of course such people were in equally high demand elsewhere. The goal of furnishing each infantry division with its own organic armoured regiment must also have consumed a large amount of the armoured branch’s limited manpower resources. This consumption was deemed necessary, however, as the PLA armoured division was intended to “spearhead breakthroughs aimed at objectives deep behind enemy lines”. It was not to squander its strength supporting the infantry, hence the

92 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, p. 2-7, plate 21. 93 Ibid., table 1, p. 5. 94 Whitson, p. 97. 95 While the Soviets supplied hundreds, if not thousands, of Second World War era T-34/85s to the PLA during the Korean War there was little point in the Chinese attempting to manufacture it when its successor, the T-54, was already in series production for the Soviet Army. Instead the PRC sought, and obtained, the right to licence-produce its own T-54s but production of the Chinese version, the Type 59, did not begin until September 1959. In the interim Soviet T-54s were apparently purchased but in small numbers only. David C. Isby, Weapons and Tactics of the Soviet Army, 2nd edition (London: Jane’s, 1988), p. 126; Kondapalli, Appendix A; Rigg, p. 323.

48 need for the latter to have their own organic armour. As a purely offensive formation it bore a close resemblance to its Soviet counterpart. At its core were two armoured regiments each with 94 T-34/85 or T-54 medium tanks, five JS-1 or JS-2 heavy tanks and 12 JSU-122 or JSU-152 assault guns. A motorised infantry regiment was also provided with a strength of two battalions equipped with BTR- 152 wheeled APCs.96 Fire support came in the shape of an artillery regiment with a total of 12 76-mm field guns and 12 122-mm howitzers and this formation too was fully motorised. Other organic support units included an anti-aircraft artillery battalion with 12 57-mm AA guns and 12 12.7-mm or 14.5-mm AA HMGs, a reconnaissance company with 12 armoured cars and various other administrative and maintenance units. The PLA also possessed three airborne divisions each with an estimated strength of 10,000 personnel.97 The division was divided into three airborne regiments, a heavy weapons battalion and a dozen or so smaller support and headquarters units.98 The airborne regiment had a strength of just under 3,000 troops which put it on a par with its infantry counterpart in numbers if not firepower, as the former did not include the heavy weapons battalion found in the latter.99 While the exact composition of the airborne division’s heavy weapons battalion is unclear it is hard to imagine it being much more powerful than that of the infantry regiments, especially given constraints in PLAAF airlift capabilities (see below). Thus, in keeping with conventional airborne doctrine the PLA airborne division was equipped as a light division to seize and hold objectives in anticipation of quick relief by advancing PLA ground forces.100 Therefore, like the armoured divisions, the use of PLA airborne troops outside of major offensive operations was highly unlikely. Their use was also constrained by the airlift capabilities of the PLAAF’s Military Air Transportation Corps (MATC) which was responsible for transporting

96 Ibid; Griffith, p. 221; Godwin, pp. 82-3. 97 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 2, p. 2-7; NIE 13-54, “Communist China’s Power Potential Through 1957”, CIA, 3 June 1954, p. 6; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 5, p. 1. 98 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 2, p. 2-7, plate 22. 99 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 2, plate 22. 100 Ibid. p. 2-7.

49 them to their objectives.101 While building up a strong fleet of light transports the MATC held only a small number of medium transports and lacked any heavy transports.102 While this force was considered capable of meeting the PLA’s peacetime logistical needs the requirements of a major airborne operation was another matter.103 Using all its assets it was estimated that by 1965 the MATC could airlift a total of 4,000 troops, or airdrop 2,500 troops, in a single instance.104 If the transport aircraft of the PLANAF and the civilian airline were factored in this number would rise to a maximum airlift capacity of 6,600 or a maximum airdrop capacity of 4,130.105 In other words an all out effort would allow the PLA to paradrop six airborne infantry battalions or land just over two airborne infantry regiments at most. This effort also assumes a high rate of aircraft serviceability that was unlikely to be kept up during sustained operations such as that required to supply regimental or divisional airborne forces by air for a prolonged period.106 Therefore if PLA airborne deployments bigger than battalion-sized groups did occur they were likely to be staggered and could only be made in close conjunction with ground forces where the prospect of linking up with the latter was imminent.

Field Force Combat Support Divisions

The PLA adopted the Soviet model of separate “combat support” divisions with great enthusiasm and, according to one CIA estimate, had amassed 19 artillery divisions as early as 1954.107 By 1965 this figure had expanded to a total of 23 artillery divisions but this included an unknown number of anti-tank as well as anti- aircraft divisions.108 A more specific 1969 SEATO breakdown identified three anti- tank, six anti-aircraft and 15 field artillery divisions and it seems prudent to assume that similar or greater ratios of field artillery occurred in the earlier figures.109 The

101 Ibid; Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 5, p. 1. 102 Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 5, p. 1. 103 Ibid. 104 Ibid. 105 Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 NIE 13-54, “Communist China’s Power Potential Through 1957”, CIA, 3 June 1954, p. 6. 108 Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1, p. 1. 109 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011, part 2,

50 artillery division had a strength of 5-6,000 personnel and included three artillery regiments each equipped with either 24 122-mm and 12 152-mm guns or 24 122- mm and 12 152-mm howitzers and an AA battalion with 57-mm AA guns.110 Some artillery divisions also included a rocket launcher regiment equipped with 24 132- mm or 140-mm rocket launchers.111 In line with Soviet practice these divisions were designed to overwhelm enemy attackers and defenders alike through the use of massed-fire tactics and as such could be used to achieve initial breakthroughs or bolster key defensive positions.112 Outside of major offensive or defensive operations the field artillery divisions, or elements of them, could be employed on counter-battery missions, the reduction of bypassed enemy strong-points or harassing fire directed at enemy lines of communication.113 The organisation of the PLA anti-aircraft artillery division appears to have consisted of either three or five regiments. Regardless of this total each division maintained a mix of medium regiments (equipped with 16 85-mm AA guns) and light regiments (equipped with 20 37-mm or 57-mm AA guns), albeit usually in favour of the former. Ordinarily the anti-aircraft divisions were assigned to the defence of airfields and strategic industrial and population centres within China. Nevertheless in the event of a major PLA offensive the anti-aircraft artillery divisions could be deployed to provide the field forces with air defence in their rear areas and lines of communication if needed. An unknown number of independent medium anti-aircraft regiments also existed with a similar “dual” role as their divisional counterparts. Anti-tank artillery divisions comprised four regiments equipped with a mix of 57-mm, 76-mm, 85-mm and 100-mm anti-tank guns. As with the field and anti-aircraft artillery they could be deployed as complete divisions or as separate regiments, battalions and so on depending on the operational requirements of the situation. With the exception of Pakistan the regional armed forces of the SEATO Treaty area possessed few AFVs and this fact, combined with the difficulties of the terrain, meant there was no real role for anti-tank divisions, or elements thereof, in PLA operations there.

p. 1. 110 Ibid., pp. 5-6, plates 13-15. 111 Ibid. 112 Harold J. Gordon, “Artillery”, in The Soviet Army, ed. B. H. Liddell Hart (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1956), pp. 344-64; Isby, pp. 223-4; SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 2, pp. 5-6. 113 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 2,

Regional Force Units

In addition to the field force the PLA possessed large ‘regional forces’ with a wide range of responsibilities ranging from administrative functions through to air defence. By far the largest single component in terms of personnel were the Border Defence/Military Internal Security (BD/MIS) divisions. At least 20 of these divisions and a number of independent BD/MIS regiments existed between 1954 and 1965. The BD/MIS division was a light infantry formation with a strength of approximately 8,000 men comprised of three BD/MIS infantry regiments, an artillery battalion and a basic complement of divisional support and administrative units. Both types of units came under the command of their local military region or district headquarters and the real difference between the two types lay in their respective roles rather than their organisation or equipment. MIS units were routinely stationed in regions experiencing serious internal dissent and their job was to hunt down and eliminate those groups responsible. BD units on the other hand were tasked with guarding China’s border in times of peace and providing an initial defensive screen in the face of a hostile invasion. However, given the local frontier knowledge built up by individual BD units their use in limited operations, or even the initial stages of a major offensive, beyond China’s borders could not be dismissed. Mention must also be made of the Railway Corps and the Construction Corps. Both of these corps had a vital role to play in the creation and maintenance of the transport networks necessary for the supply of PLA field force units in time of war. The 10,000 strong railway divisions concentrated exclusively on rail while the construction divisions were tasked with the building and maintenance of both roads and airfields. In peacetime these two engineering branches were able to hone their skills on the construction of strategically important projects within China. The antecedents of these units had already proven their worth during the Korean War where despite an intensive and prolonged air interdiction campaign by UN forces communist supply lines remained intact, if seriously impeded, throughout the war.114

p. 6. 114 This is not to suggest that CPV supply lines were impervious to UN air attack. On the contrary CPV frontline units suffered shortages and much hardship as a result of UN interdiction campaigns, however the point is that despite this pressure, and with great sacrifice, CPV logistical lines were never allowed to deteriorate to the point where the efficiency of combat units was decisively undermined. See Walter

North Korean and Chinese road and rail-gangs displayed a ferocious and ingenious capacity for repairing damage virtually within hours of it being inflicted, much to the frustration of UN aircrew who found themselves returning to the same targets again and again.115 Of course the total strength of the PLA was not going to be deployed against the SEATO area. For a start the CPV commitment to North Korea lasted until 1958 and the continuing US presence in South Korea and Japan insured that the borders of Manchuria were heavily guarded at all times.116 Taiwan too was an ongoing source of tension and the PLA maintained strong forces along the coast to both deter Western amphibious action and facilitate their own against the renegade province should the opportunity arise. With this in mind only five PLA military regions and the forces under their control were deemed relevant in terms of assessing the short to medium term PLA threat to the Treaty area: the Canton, Kunming, Chengtu, Tibet and Sinkiang military regions.

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)

The PLAAF was officially formed in November 1949 around a small collection of ex-KMT aircraft and a number of ex-Japanese planes handed over by the Soviets in Manchuria.117 Modest numbers of prop-driven La-7/La-9 fighters and Tu-2 light bombers were acquired from the USSR prior to China’s intervention in the Korean War, but from that point on the PLAAF underwent one of the most dramatic expansions in both size and capability of any air force in history.118 With the effective annihilation of the North Korean People’s Air Force the Soviets readily agreed upon an accelerated program to turn the PLAAF into a force to be reckoned with.119 By the end of 1951 the PLAAF could boast a total air strength of 1,500

G. Hermes, United States Army in the Korean War, Vol II, Truce Tent and Fighting Front (Washington, DC: United States Army, 1966), pp. 192-6; Richard P. Hallion, The Naval Air War in Korea (Baltimore, MD: Nautical & Aviation, 1986), pp. 207-8; Wayne Thompson, “The Air War Over Korea”, in Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: A History of the United States Air Force, Volume II 1950-1997 (Washington DC: United States Air Force, 1997), pp. 40-3; Sandler, pp. 179-80; Xiabing Li, Allan R. Millett, Bin Yu, pp. 23-4. 115 Griffith, p. 223. 116 Zhang, p. 270. 117 Kondapalli, Appendix A; Gittings, p. 136. 118 By the end of 1950 the PLAAF had a total strength of 500 aircraft of all types. Godwin, p. 95; Gittings, p. 137; 119 Sandler, p. 178; Godwin, p. 95.

53 aircraft of which at least half were MiG-15 jet fighters.120 At the time of the Armistice in July 1953 this figure had increased to 2,000 aircraft and included approximately 900 MiG-15s and 100 Il-28 jet bombers.121 In the words of General Hoyt S. Vandenburg, US Air Force Chief of Staff (from 1948-1953), the PLAAF had “blossomed overnight into one of the most powerful air forces in the world”.122 The PLAAF headquarters was located in Beijing and was headed by a Commander who was responsible to the General Staff and the Ministry of National Defence. The headquarters staff included five deputy commanders whose respective responsibilities were political affairs, rear services, combat training, aviation engineering services and a chief of staff. The latter was responsible for operational planning, intelligence, meteorology and air defence as well as the literal function of deputy commander in the absence of the PLAAF commander. The country was divided into ten air defence districts which bore only the vaguest relation to the military regions they overlapped (see map 2.2). Operational control was exercised from Beijing through the headquarters of these districts. The largest operational unit was the air division, which in theory consisted of three air regiments, although many PLAAF divisions operated with two regiments only. Air divisions could be organised as “pure” fighter and bomber formations or as composite divisions with a combination of fighter and bomber regiments. A PLAAF fighter regiment contained 24-30 aircraft while a bomber regiment comprised up to 25 aircraft. At the end of the Korean War the first priority for the PLAAF was to reduce its reliance on the Soviets for the supply and maintenance of its newly created jet fleet. In this regard the PLAAF was an early beneficiary of the Soviet technology transfers that occurred under P’eng’s direction. Licensed production of the MiG-17 jet fighter began in Soviet-built production plants in Shenyang in 1956.123 Similar agreements were signed in 1958 regarding the supersonic MiG-19 fighter but production had barely begun before the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960 brought the program to a halt. The PLAAF as a whole suffered greatly as a result of this breakdown in Sino-Soviet relations as, despite the progress of its aircraft industry, it

120 Godwin, ibid. 121 Ibid; Gittings, pp. 137-8. 122 Cited in Asher Lee, “The Air Allies of the USSR”, in Asher Lee, ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1959), p. 271. 123 Godwin, p. 95; Gittings, p. 140; Elleman, p. 257.

54 still depended almost entirely upon Soviet logistical support to sustain it.124 For four years almost all aircraft production was halted as the need to become self-sufficient in everything from jet engine design to aviation fuel production was slowly addressed.125 Production of the MiG-19 resumed in 1964 and by 1965 at least two fighter regiments were equipped with them.126 In the interim the Soviet Union had, somewhat surprisingly, supplied the Chinese with 30-35 MiG-21 fighters and a project to reverse engineer these aircraft was begun.127 The effect of these upheavals on the total air strength of the PLAAF was to see it come full circle to a figure not much larger than it had been at the end of the Korean War, around 2,500.128 As the MiG-17s rolled off the production lines in the latter half of the 1950s they had initially been absorbed by the need to replace prop- driven fighters. By the time this was accomplished only a marginal increase in overall fighter strength could have been achieved before production was interrupted in 1960, and this would then have faced attrition during the four-year production hiatus thanks to a lack of replacement aircraft and spare parts.129 Thus in 1958 the PLAAF was estimated to have 1,785 jet fighters and 275 piston fighters at its disposal, while by 1965 it possessed an estimated 1,831 jet fighters (of which the majority were MiG-17s) and no piston fighters.130 Similarly the fleet of Il-28 jet bombers is reported to have risen to a total of 450 by 1958, a figure that had shrunk to 290 by 1965.131 The higher attrition rate amongst the Il-28s may be explained by the fact that they were all purchased from the Soviet Union and no attempt to manufacture them locally appears to have been made until after 1964.132 A dwindling number of Tu-2 light bombers lingered on

124 Griffith, p. 225; Gittings, pp. 140-1; Godwin, pp. 96-7; Elleman, p. 258. 125 The sudden break with the Soviet Union led Mao and the Politburo to give increased priority to the PRC’s nuclear weapons program at the expense of other high technology military projects, which added to the delay in aircraft production. Godwin, pp. 97-8, 128. 126 Ibid., p. 97; Gittings, p. 141; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Volume I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C. 127 Godwin, pp. 97, 99; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C. 128 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C. 129 According to Gittings an estimated 500 planes “were grounded or dismantled” between 1960 and 1964. Gittings, p. 141. 130 M. H. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History”, Memorandum RM- 4900-ISA, DOD, December 1966, p. 5; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C. 131 Ibid. 132 It seems that the Il-28 was reverse engineered sometime between 1964 and 1965 with the first locally built version (designated the H-5 by the PLA) appearing in 1966 and remaining in production

55 into 1965 as did 20 obsolete Tu-4 heavy bombers originally supplied by the Soviets in 1955.133 Two jet-propelled Tu-16 strategic bombers were received from the Soviets sometime between 1958 and 1960 in anticipation of a licence-production agreement.134 This process was obviously disrupted in 1960 and a project to reverse engineer the Tu-16 was initiated in 1964.135 The MATC was made up mostly of An- 2 light transports (the only aircraft whose production apparently continued through 1960-1964), a small number of Il-14 medium transports and an equally modest but growing fleet of Mi-4 helicopters.136 The primary role of the PLAAF between 1954 and 1965 was that of air defence, a fact reflected in the high proportion of fighter aircraft in relation to other types cited above. Nevertheless the PLAAF did maintain a solid capacity for tactical air support operations through its fleet of IL-28s, and its piston-driven Tu-2s could still be considered effective under certain conditions.137 Its fighter fleet of MiGs could also be utilised for tactical support missions and it seems that some training in this role, particularly in fighter units equipped with the older MiG-15s, was carried out.138 A limited strategic bombing capability within the Treaty area was also provided by the Il-28s and to a lesser extent the Tu-4s. The PLAAF clearly had ambitions to acquire a substantial strategic bombing capability during this period and would have done so had its plans to license-produce the Tu-16 not been thwarted by the events of 1960. Nonetheless, the reality on the ground between 1954 and 1965 was a PLAAF whose offensive capability was largely restricted to

until 1982. Godwin, p. 100. 133 Asher Lee gives a figure of 30 to 40 Tu-4s as having been delivered in 1955. If this figure is correct they must have suffered a high attrition rate as a 1958 CIA estimate of PLAAF air strength only identifies 20 “piston medium bombers” a figure repeated in a 1965 US estimate. Taken together though these figures appear far more credible than the unsupported figure of 400 Tu-4s given by Godwin. Asher Lee, “The Air Allies of the USSR”, in Lee, ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces p. 272-3. M. H. Halperin, “The 1958 Taiwan Straits Crisis: A Documented History”, Memorandum RM-4900-ISA, DOD, December 1966, p. 5; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C; Godwin, p. 100. 134 Godwin, p. 100. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., p. 99; Asher Lee, “The Air Allies of the USSR”, in Lee, ed., The Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, p. 274; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1C. 137 Assuming the PLAAF could achieve local air superiority there is no reason why the Tu-2 could not have been used to similar effect as the prop-driven tactical bombers (such as the Second World War A- 26) employed by the US in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Wayne Thompson, “The Air War Over Korea”, in Bernard C. Nalty, ed., Winged Shield, Winged Sword: Volume II 1950-1997, pp. 40, 43-4; John Schlight, “The War in Southeast Asia, 1961-1968”, in Nalty, Ibid., pp. 245, 253, 289, 292-3. 138 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 part 3, p. 9.

56 tactical operations against China’s immediate neighbours on the Eurasian continent. Even this capability was a qualified one. PLAAF pilot training was of a low standard compared with Western air forces and this was exacerbated in the wake of the withdrawal of Soviet aid in 1960.139 Shortages of adequately trained ground crew were also frequent and the logistical network needed to sustain the PLAAF at an operational tempo had to be created from scratch once the Soviets left.140 Finally the absence of a significant all-weather fighter capability weakened the scope and intensity of any potential PLAAF operation.141 Yet the PLAAF was not without at least one advantage – its size. The PLAAF’s huge MiG fighter fleet could be guaranteed to quickly overwhelm the comparatively tiny regional air forces in the SEATO Treaty area and thus create the conditions where even venerable aircraft like the Tu-2 and the Tu-4 could be brought into action. The PLAAF also possessed a good and steadily improving network of airfields and by 1965 ninety-three airfields out of a total of 272 were capable of supporting light jet bombers and fighters.142 Of these 11 airfields were located in the South and South West air defence districts and would allow the deployment of up to 540 MiG fighters and 120 Il-28s in the immediate vicinity of the Treaty area.143 Therefore, while the PLAAF was certainly flawed by Western standards, these weaknesses could only be exploited by Western airpower: in its absence the PLAAF could be assured of dominating the skies of the Treaty area.

139 For example, according to Gittings the average monthly flying time available to PLAAF pilots was reported to have dropped to ten hours a month over the 1963-1965 period. This amounted to “one half the time considered minimum in the US, Japanese and Nationalist air forces to maintain all-weather pilot proficiency”. Gittings, p. 225; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Chapter 2, p. 13; SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 3, p. 10. 140 Ibid. 141 By 1965 only 10% of the PLAAF fighter fleet were considered to be all-weather capable. DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1, p. 6; SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011 Part 3, p. 10. 142 Two of these were also capable of supporting strategic jet bombers. DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Chapter 2, p. 13. 143 Ibid., pp. 13-14.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN)

The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) was officially formed as a service branch of the PLA in 1950.144 Devoid of a naval tradition the PRC limited its maritime ambitions to the creation of a “brown water” navy with coastal defence as its primary role.145 This meant that the development of the PLAN came a very distant third behind the air force and army through out the first two decades of its existence. However, within these constraints substantial progress was made and by the early 1960s the PLAN was in a position to guarantee the security of Chinese coastal waters against anything short of a major incursion by Western naval forces.146 Furthermore, the PLAN’s acquisition of a significant number of long- range submarines gave it a potential for offensive operations beyond its territorial waters that could not be discounted by SEATO planners. The PLAN was the last of the three service branches to feel the effects of the 1954 reorganisation of the PLA and the centralisation of military authority in Beijing. The PLAN Headquarters was located there as part of the Ministry of National Defence and the PLAN Commander-in-Chief doubled as a Vice-Minister, a move apparently designed to give him equal status with the overall commander of PLA ground forces (to whom he was otherwise technically subordinate). Assisting the Commander-in-Chief PLAN were five deputy commanders including a Deputy Commander for Naval Air (see PLANNAF below) and a Deputy Commander for Political Affairs. The latter, unlike the other four deputy commanders, was not strictly subordinate to the Commander-in-Chief and effectively worked with him rather than for him.

144 Godwin, p. 115; Kondapali, Appendix A. 145 Note this observation refers specifically to the communist regime that took power in 1949. Historically the coastal provinces of China have sustained a robust ocean-going tradition dating back to the early years of the Han Dynasty (206BC-AD220). This tradition reached its zenith during the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries with the great exploratory expeditions of Admiral Zheng He to Southeast Asia, India, Africa and the Middle East. The full potential of these ground-breaking journeys across the world’s largest oceans was never realised due to the short-sighted political decisions of the later Ming emperors to wind back, and eventually ban, such ventures. Nevertheless a Chinese naval presence was maintained in the East and South China seas through to the fall of the Imperial court in 1911 and the Republican successor states that followed. See Bernard D. Cole, The Great Wall at Sea: China’s Navy Enters the Twenty-First Century (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001), pp. 1-11; Louise Levathes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne 1405-1433 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994); Richard N. J. Wright, The Chinese Steam Navy, 1862-1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2001). 146 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1, p. 3; Cole, p. 22.

A planned three fleet system was only partially implemented in 1955 with the creation of the South Sea Fleet with its headquarters in Canton and the East Sea Fleet with its headquarters in Shanghai.147 For reasons unknown the North Sea Fleet was not officially established until 1960.148 The commander of each fleet was directly responsible to the Commander-in-Chief PLAN in Beijing for all operational matters concerning their respective commands. Each fleet commander was in turn assisted by deputies for political affairs, naval aviation and training. Within the fleet actual operational elements were organised into the following ‘type’ commands: Main Surface Force; Submarine Force; Motor Torpedo Boat Force; Minesweeping Force; Amphibious Force and Naval Coastal Defence Force. The strength and make up of these forces was largely the result of two factors, both beyond the immediate control of the PLAN. The first was the fait accompli that was the large assortment of vessels that fell into the lap of the PLA when the KMT regime fell, and the second was the level of Soviet technical assistance and aid, and the pace with which Chinese shipyards were modernised and expanded as a result. The bulk of the PLAN’s surface fleet was made up of a motley collection of Second World War American, British, Canadian, Australian and Japanese vessels inherited from the KMT in 1949.149 This windfall initially included some 15 destroyers and frigates although age, disrepair and a lack of spare parts combined to insure that their inclusion in the PLAN order of battle served symbolic needs more effectively than it did operational ones.150 Nonetheless large numbers of ex-KMT patrol boats, mine warfare vessels and landing craft were maintained at varying levels of seaworthiness throughout the period.151 Many of these were refurbished with Soviet assistance under a 1952 Sino-Soviet agreement aimed at modernising Chinese shipyards and increasing their capacity for the construction and maintenance of modern warships.152

147 John R. O’Donnell, LCDR, USN, “An Analysis of Major Developmental Influences on the People’s Liberation Army-Navy and Their Implications for the Future” MA thesis, Fort Leavenworth, KS, US Army Command and General Staff College, 1995, p. 31. 148 Kondapali, Appendix A.. 149 Godwin, p. 115.. 150 Ibid. 151 Ibid; DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Volume I, Chicom Military Forces, Annex 1A, June 1965. 152 Godwin, p. 115; Kondapali, Appendix A.

This program of technical aid culminated in the production of four domestic- built Chengdu-class (Soviet Riga-class) frigates between 1955 and 1956.153 In the interim four Soviet Second World War era Gordy-class destroyers (renamed Anshan-class by the PLAN) were transferred to the PLAN during 1954 and 1955.154 These eight ships constituted the principal surface combatants of the PLAN until 1966.155 In that year the lead ship in the Jiagnan-class frigate project, the first major surface combatant to be designed and built in the PRC, was commissioned three years after the project’s inception in 1963.156 However, while this modest warship program laid the foundations for the long-term expansion of the PLAN’s surface capabilities, there was no disguising the fact that in the short-term it represented little more than a token threat to SEATO given the formidable anti-shipping capabilities at the latter’s disposal. Of more immediate benefit to the PLAN was the transfer of Soviet submarine technology. Between 1954 and 1964 approximately 21 long-range Whiskey-class diesel submarines were assembled in the PRC from Soviet components.157 Building on the local expertise gained from this program the Chinese began production of the more modern Soviet Romeo-class submarine in 1960.158 Both of these submarine designs had an operational range of 4,800 nautical miles and were thus quite capable of threatening the sea-lanes of the SEATO Treaty area from their homeports.159 A program to build Soviet Golf-class diesel-powered ballistic missile submarines in China was also initiated in 1959 but the withdrawal of Soviet aid in the following year dealt an apparently fatal blow to this effort (ballistic missiles for example, were never supplied).160 Only a single vessel of this class was completed, after much delay, in 1964.161

153 Godwin, ibid. 154 Ibid. 155 Angus M. Fraser, The People’s Liberation Army: Communist China’s Armed Forces (New York: Crane, Russak & Company, 1973), p. 9. 156 O’Donnell, p. 40. 157 Ibid., p. 7; Godwin, p.115; AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, p. 4-4. 158 Godwin, p. 115. 159 AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, Table 8, p. 2. 160 Kondapali, Appendix A. 161 Godwin, p. 115.

Another significant factor was the rapid growth of the PLAN’s fast attack craft (FAC) fleet and the swiftness with which Chinese industry became self-reliant in the design and production of such vessels.162 Again Soviet aid provided the initial impetus with the transferral of “P4” and “P6” class torpedo FACs to the PLAN in the early 1950s.163 Local versions of these FACs were quickly put into production and then followed up with the indigenous designed Shanghai-class gun FAC and the all-metal Huchwan-class hydrofoil torpedo FAC in the latter half of the decade.164 A further two designs, the Hainan and Haikou-class gun FACs, entered series production in 1963 and 1964. By the end of 1965 the PLAN possessed more than 200 FACs of all types.165 These craft formed the backbone of the PLAN’s coastal defence capability and they would have been all the more effective had the Soviet transfer of surface-to-surface anti-ship missile technology not been interrupted in 1960. As it was the Chinese successfully manufactured copies of the Soviet Osa and Komar-class missile FACs, and the SS-N-2 “Styx” anti-ship missile they carried, from the mid-sixties onwards.166 Indeed, the “Styx” missile was delivered to the Chinese by the Soviets as early as 1959, the same year as the PLANs first shore-to- ship coastal missile unit was reported to have been formed.167 The third, and perhaps the most serious, threat that SEATO planners had to take into consideration was the PLAN’s mine warfare capabilities. The PLAN inventory included Chinese versions of the Soviet M-08, M-26, MKB and MYaM moored contact mines and the MKD ground mine with a magnetic induction firing mechanism.168 At the core of the PLAN’s Minesweeping Force was the Soviet “T- 43”-class fleet minesweeper, a post-war design with a range of 3,000 nautical miles (at 10 knots). The Soviets transferred two of these ships to the PLAN in 1954-55 and Chinese production of the class began in 1956 and continued at the rate of about two a year until 1966. Five American and four Japanese Second World War era coastal minesweepers captured from the KMT were also maintained and a force of

162 Ibid. 163 Christopher Chant, Small Craft Navies (London: Arms & Armour, 1992), pp. 56, 123-5. 164 Ibid., p. 56. 165 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, Annex 1A, June 1965. 166 Ibid., p. 56-7. 167 Huang, p. 460. 168 AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, Table 11, p. 1

61 some 20 auxiliary coastal minesweepers built up.169 In addition to these dedicated mine warfare vessels the Whiskey-class attack submarines were also capable of laying mines, as were the PLANAF’s Il-28 light bombers.170

The People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF)

In 1952 a naval aiviation arm, the somewhat cumbersomely named People’s Liberation Army-Navy Air Force (PLANAF), was formed.171 Subordinate to the Commander of the PLAN, the PLANAF’s Commander held one of the five deputy commander positions at PLAN Headquarters in Beijing.172 Below him a PLANAF Deputy Commander was in turn assigned to each of the three Fleet headquarters and answered to their superior in Beijing on all matters bar those concerning actual fleet operations.173 A completely shore-based force, the PLANAF did not receive its first jet aircraft until 1955 and it experienced a comparatively modest expansion in size and capability over the ensuing decade.174 By 1965 it had grown to a strength of 14,500 personnel and approximately 445 aircraft.175 The latter total included 110 Il- 28 light bombers, 130 MiG-15, 55 MiG-17 and 25 MiG-17D fighters, with transports and obsolete piston-driven types making up the remainder.176 These were organised into air regiments of 24 to 30 planes depending on the aircraft type and two or three such regiments made up a division, which, like its PLAAF counterpart, was the largest tactical unit in the PLANAF.177 Compared to contemporary Western naval air forces the PLANAF’s effectiveness was severely limited. Its capacity for night and all-weather operations was virtually non-existent thanks to a conservative flight training program that

169 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1A; Jane’s Fighting Ships 1960-61 (London: Jane’s, 1960), p. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1966-67 (London: Jane’s, 1966), p. 56; A single ex-Royal Australian Navy Bathurst-class fleet minesweeper (ex-HMAS Bendigo) was also inherited from the KMT but it appears the latter had reconfigured it for use as a patrol boat and the PLAN made no attempt to restore it to its original role. Ibid. 170 SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, AWM 122 68/2011, Table 8, p. 2. 171 O’Donnell, p. 25; Kondapali, Annex A. 172 AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, p. 5-1. 173 Ibid. 174 O’Donnell, ibid. 175 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1, p. 4-5. 176 Ibid., p. 4, Annex 1C. 177 AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”,

62 provided no regular instruction or practice in either technique, although it should be noted that the PLANAF lacked an all-weather fighter in any event. As a shore-based air force the PLANAF faced obvious restrictions in its ability to project force beyond its borders and into its surrounding seas, a restriction compounded by the PLA’s lack of air-to-air refuelling capability. In addition to this the PLANAF did not possess a long-range maritime patrol aircraft and was thus unable to carry out any systematic offshore reconnaissance. Finally, the PLANAF, like its parent service and the PLAAF, suffered from a shortage of technically trained recruits and its reliance on Soviet aid and instruction to make up the shortfall left it horribly exposed when that assistance was cut off in 1960. Nonetheless, while all of this is true it needs to be remembered that the PLANAF’s primary role at the time was to support the PLAN surface fleet in coastal defence operations. Within this parameter American intelligence described the PLANAF as being “adequate” to the relatively simple task assigned to it. Under the guidance of its land-based radar defence system and in conjunction with PLAN close-in surface forces, the PLANAF could realistically add the bombs and torpedoes of its Il-28s and the defensive screen of its MiG fighters to the obstacles a major seaborne attack against the Chinese coast could expect to face. But beyond Chinese territorial waters however, the PLANAF’s ability to threaten or act against hostile shipping was negligible.

PLAN Marine Corps

The PLAN first formed its own Marine Corps in the early 1950s but this initial attempt never amounted to much.178 A number of modern studies suggest that the Marine Corps was abolished in 1957, a fact apparently confirmed by the lack of references to it in Western intelligence reports in the ensuing decade.179 Exactly when the force was reconstituted is not clear although six hundred PLAN “marines” reputedly took part in the operation to seize the Paracel (Xisha in Cantonese) Islands from South Vietnam in January 1974.180 Certainly that operation and the increasing PRC interest in upholding its territorial claims in the South China Sea led to a

p. 5-1. 178 Alexander Chieh-Ch Huang, “Chinese Maritime Modernization and its Security Implications: The Deng Xiaoping Era and Beyond”, PhD Thesis, The George Washington University, 1994, pp. 245-6. 179 Ibid; Cole, p. 25. 180 Cole, p. 140.

63 reversal of the Marine Corp’s fortunes. By the end of 1979 a complete marine brigade was established on Hainan Island and the Corps continued to expand throughout the 1980s and 90s.181 During the early 1950s however the PLAN Marine Corps was a short-lived and insignificant force, whose very existence between 1957 and the 1970s remains open to question.

The South Sea Fleet

The South Sea Fleet was undoubtedly the weakest of the three fleets throughout the 1950s and 1960s. Contemporary SEATO and American intelligence breakdowns of the PLAN peacetime order of battle indicate that no principal surface combatants or attack submarines were permanently assigned to the South Sea Fleet. These were divided between the other two fleets with most going to the North Sea Fleet while the East Sea Fleet, due to its responsibility for the Taiwan Straits, held the majority of the PLANs amphibious assets.182 However by 1965 at least 65 FACs (mostly torpedo types), four “T-43”-class fleet minesweepers and four coastal minesweepers were permanently stationed with the South Sea Fleet along with 70 other patrol craft and assorted vessels.183 These were distributed between the Fleet Headquarters at Canton and five other bases including two on Hainan Island, Zhinglan in the north and Yulin in the south.184 Together with a third base located on the coast of Kwangtung Province, Chan-Chiang (Zhanjiang), they formed an arc bordering the strategically important Gulf of Tonkin. This importance was reflected in the fact that Yulin was the second largest PLAN base in the South Sea Fleet area - only Canton itself was bigger.185 For the duration of the 1950s and 60s the South Seas Fleet remained a “brown water” force of very limited means, especially when compared to the sort of naval power SEATO could call upon. Nevertheless, if left unchallenged by SEATO the South Sea Fleet, in conjunction with local PLANAF squadrons, was quite capable of carrying out significant coastal operations in the Gulf of Tonkin. Even in the event of SEATO intervention, the possibility that

181 Ibid., pp. 25, 114-15: Huang, p. 246. 182 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965, Annex 1, p. 4. 183 Ibid., Annex 1A. 184 Ibid., Annex 2; AWM 122 68/2011 Part 5, SEAP 7 draft, “Handbook on the Communist Chinese Military Forces”, Table 9, p. 1 185 DOD, Military Assistance Reappraisal FY1967-1971, Vol. I, Chicom Military Forces, June 1965,

64 submarines and other vessels might be transferred to it from the other PLAN fleets meant that the South Sea Fleet could still pose a threat, even if only initially and of a minor order, to SEATO forces to the extent that SEATO planners would need to take precautionary measures (such as including ASW frigates in any SEATO naval force).

People’s Army of Vietnam (PAVN)

The armed forces of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRVN) could trace their immediate origins to the formation of the “League for the Independence of Viet Nam” (Viet-Nam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi) in 1941.186 Organised by the then Indo- Chinese Communist Party under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh, the League was a classic example of the broad-based “united front” strategy pursued by communist parties the world over.187 As part of its operations a small military wing was established and it was this force, the Peoples Army of Vietnam (PAVN) more popularly known as the “Viet Minh” (derived from the League’s full name), that fought the French in the First Indochina War.188 During the course of that conflict (1945-1954) the PAVN developed into an organisation that encompassed large and sophisticated guerrilla forces as well as an elite core of regular units. The formation of the latter began in 1949 after General Vo Nguyen Giap, commander of the PAVN, decided that the time had come to begin the transition from guerrilla warfare to more conventional or “mobile” warfare.189 By March 1951 five regular infantry divisions had been formed along with a number of independent regiments and battalions.190 These regular units operated almost exclusively in the rugged highlands of northern Tonkin and north-eastern Laos where they were able to gain experience through a series of steadily escalating actions

Annex 2. 186 Carlyle A. Thayer, War by other means: National Liberation and Revolution in Vietnam 1954-60 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), p. xxi. 187 Ibid; Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China 1945-54, trans. Josephine Bacon (Savage, MD: Barnes & Noble, 1990), p. 46. 188 The League was actually renamed the “League for the National Union of Viet-Nam” (Hoi Lien Hiep Quoc Dan Viet Nam) during a reorganisation of independence forces in early 1951, but by then the term ‘Viet Minh’ had become too entrenched in the vocabulary of both sides for this to affect its use. Thayer, pp. xxviii-xxix. 189 Dalloz, p. 99; Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War, People’s Army (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 106-10. 190 James W. McCoy, Secrets of the Viet Cong (New York: Hippocrene Books, 1992), p. 30.

65 against French outposts and garrisons. That this growth in Viet Minh capability mirrored the communist victory in China was no coincidence. As pointed out by no lesser a figure than Giap himself the collapse of the KMT regime meant that “Vietnam was no longer in the grip of enemy encirclement, and was henceforth geographically linked to the socialist bloc”.191 Northern Tongkin bordered the Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Kwangsi and these territories quickly became the major source of supply for Giap’s forces.192 Much of the equipment supplied by the PLA was made up of Japanese and ex-KMT American stock as well as American weapons captured in Korea.193 In addition to weapons and ammunition the PLA also provided training to selected PAVN cadres and at least one source cites the presence of no less than 400 PLA instructors in Tonkin itself during the early 1950s.194 By 1953 the PAVN could field six infantry divisions (304th, 308th, 312th, 316th, 320th, 325th divisions), one ‘heavy’ division (351st) and another fifteen independent regiments of varying strengths. The average strength of the infantry divisions was around 10,000 men and these were organised into three regiments and an artillery battalion. Each regiment was in turn organised into four 800-strong infantry battalions and a small support company equipped with 120mm mortars and 75mm guns. The 351st Heavy Division included an engineer regiment; two artillery regiments (one equipped with American 105mm howitzers and the other with a mix of 120mm mortars and American 75mm pack howitzers); a heavy weapons regiment

191 Michael Gerard Grow, “The French Defeat at Dien Bien Phu” MA thesis, California State University, 1997, p. 23. 192 The PRC officially recognised the Democratic Republic of Vietnam on 16 January 1950 and the Viet Minh were subsequently allowed to set up training and supply bases in the cities of Nanning, Kwangsi Province, and Kunming, Yunnan Province, respectively. Truck convoys from these cities brought supplies to the border where they were turned over to porters and the construction of an all- weather gravel surfaced road from the rail terminus at Kokiu, Yunnan to Lai Chau in Tonkin, Vietnam, was begun. This military road was completed by PLA construction troops in late 1953. Dalloz, p. 129; Philip McDonnell, “Roads to the Rice Bowl”, in Military Review, Vol. XLIII, No. 4, April 1963, pp. 8-9. 193 Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, Inside the VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam’s Armed Forces (New York: Ballantine, 1992), p. 119; Dalloz, p. 145. The quantity and quality of the American arms supplied by the PLA, in particular the large number of 75mm recoiless rifles, led the French to complain that the Viet Minh received more modern US equipment than their own forces did from the United States itself. George C. Herring, “Franco-American Conflict in Indochina, 1950-1954”, in Lawrence S. Kaplan, Denise Artaud & Mark R. Rubin, eds., Dien Bien Phu and the Crisis of Franco-American Relations 1954-55, America in the Modern World Studies in International History series (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 1990), p. 31. 194 Martin Windrow, The French Indochina War 1946-1954, Osprey Military Men-at-Arms No. 322 (Oxford: Osprey, 1998), p. 22. The PLA first sent a military mission to Tonkin to assist the Viet Minh as early as December 1949. McDonnell, p. 8.

(with 82mm mortars) and an anti-aircraft regiment equipped with Soviet-built 37mm AA guns and heavy machine guns. Four of these infantry divisions (304th, 308th, 312th, 316th divisions), along with the 351st Heavy Division, took part in the epic battle of Dien Bien Phu (13 March – 7 May 1954).195 Despite incurring horrendous losses the PAVN succeeded in forcing the surrender of the French garrison after a three-month siege.196 Approximately 8,000 troops of the CEFEO were taken prisoner and at least 2,000 killed in a defeat that signalled the end of the First Indo-China War.197 The garrison had included the best troops available to the French in Indo-china, and their destruction had shattered any remaining will on the part of France to continue the eight-year conflict.198 At Dien Bien Phu the dedication and bravery of the PAVN rank and file was second to none as had been demonstrated many times before during the conflict. Equally the determination and ruthlessness with which the PAVN commanders from Giap down had pressed their attacks and pursued their objectives had long been a hallmark of Viet Minh operations. The real surprise to the French planners in Hanoi was the deployment of the complete 351st Heavy Division and the effectiveness of its fire support, be it delivering accurate and concentrated artillery fire or establishing a tactical air defence network.199 With the end of the First Indochina War the PAVN was able to expand and enhance these conventional capabilities. The first task was to regroup approximately 90,000 PAVN guerrillas from South Vietnam to the North.200 Most of these men were

195 Jules Roy, The Battle of Dien Bien Phu, trans. Robert Baldick (London: Faber & Faber, 1965), pp. 81-2. 196 The sources vary: Simpson estimates Viet Minh casualties at Dien Bien Phu of 8,000 dead and 15,000 wounded but qualifies these figures by noting that these do not take into account the casualties caused by French air attacks on the Viet Minh supply lines and attacks by loyalist Thai tribesmen on Viet Minh patrols and outposts in the surrounding area. Simpson, p. 169. Windrow estimates “probable” figures of 8,000 dead and 12,000 wounded. Windrow, p. 10. 197 Dalloz gives the French garrison’s casualties as being 3,000 killed and 10,000 taken prisoner of whom “[h]alf the prisoners were wounded”. Dalloz p. 173. According to Simpson French casualties amounted to 2,000 killed and 11,000 taken prisoner of whom 1,500 were wounded while another 5,000 wounded had been evacuated before the garrison’s sole airstrip became unusable. Simpson, pp. 169, 176. 198 The garrison included all-volunteer units such as the French Foreign Legion’s elite 1er Bataillon Étranger de Parachutistes, the Algerian recruited 2e Bataillon de Marche/1er Régiment de Tirailleurs Algériens and the locally recruited 6e Bataillon de Parachutistes Coloniaux. The high proportion of paratroopers, Foreign Legionnaires and North Africans represented the toughest and most aggressive units available to the entire French Army let alone the French Far East Expeditionary Force. Windrow, pp. 39-40. 199 Roy, pp. 124-5. 200 Thayer, p. 18.

67 integrated into the regular PAVN army being formed in the north, which by the end of 1955 had reached a strength of 210,000 personnel.201 At this time the PAVN underwent its own brief version of the “red versus expert” debate. General Giap led the pro-Soviet “expert” faction and had little trouble in overcoming the pro-Chinese “red” faction.202 Unlike his PLA counterpart P’eng te-Huai, Giap’s triumph in this matter put the issue to rest once and for all. While guerrilla warfare would play a major, if not the dominant, role in the Second Indochina War, the interests and security of the DRVN would nevertheless be guaranteed primarily by regular PAVN units. The PAVN’s responsibility for the conventional defence of the DRV was officially sanctioned by the 12th Plenum of the Vietnamese Workers Party in early 1957 and universal conscription was introduced later that year at the 7th Session of the DRVNs National Assembly.203 Formal military ranks and insignia were also introduced and a system of infantry, artillery and other specialist training facilities was established.204 Particular attention was paid to the improvement of both the quality and quantity of the PAVN officer corps which grew from 20,000 in 1955 to 50,000 by 1965.205 The overall strength of the PAVN increased slowly at first reaching an estimated 275,000 personnel by late 1961 before an accelerated expansion program took it to approximately 400,000 by 1965.206 This pattern reflects the initial aim of Giap to consolidate and improve the quality of the regular army in the aftermath of the Geneva Accords. Given the almost overwhelming demand on the fledgling state’s resources in nearly every area of governance Giap in fact had little choice but to follow this policy. Only when the renewed guerrilla war in the South achieved the conditions for a transition to mobile warfare would the DRVN leadership feel justified in authorising a rapid expansion in PAVN strength. Building on the seven veteran ‘Viet Minh’ divisions it possessed in 1955 the PAVN increased its strength to include a total of 13 infantry divisions a

201 Peter G. Tsouras, Changing Orders: The Evolution of the World’s Armies, 1945 to the Present (New York: Facts On file, 1994), p. 133. 202 Giap, p. xxxix. 203 Thayer, pp. 158-9, 167. 204 Tsouras, p.132-3; Daniel F. O’ Brian, “Vietnam”, in Richard A. Gabriel, ed., Fighting Armies: Nonaligned, Third World and other Ground Armies A Combat Assessment (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983), p. 56. 205 Tsouras, p. 133. 206 Ibid; Chiefs of Staff Committee agendum No. 10/1962, “Use of Tanks in South East Asia”, 26 February 1962, AWM 122, 3/5 SEATO Part 15.

68 decade later.207 The basic infantry division organisation outlined above remained in place augmented by an increase in specialist personnel, the standardisation of equipment and training and an upgrade in the scale and type of field artillery provided. Thus the overall strength of the PAVN grew at a deliberately measured pace over the period 1955-1965, with the emphasis on quality as opposed to quantity. By the same token only the most rudimentary foundations were laid in this period for both the North Vietnamese navy and air force. The former was built around a small force of Soviet and Chinese-supplied FACs designed to ensure that, at the very least, any incursion by hostile naval forces into North Vietnamese coastal waters did not go completely uncontested.208 The first units of the PAVNAF (People’s Army of Vietnam Air Force) - a training regiment and a light transport regiment organised on the Soviet model - were not established until mid-1959.209 Again, as with the PAVN, the emphasis was on carefully staged development and the North Vietnamese were not interested in acquiring large numbers of aircraft until they had built up the cadres of ground technicians, as well as the aircrew, that they would need to maintain, as well as fly, a modern air force. Thus the PAVNAF only took possession of its first jet aircraft - the MiG-17 - in February 1964 and it was not until August that year that its first fighter regiment became operational. It was only after the American bombing campaign against the North began in early 1965 that a substantial expansion in both the size and capability of the PAVNAF was initiated, again with Soviet assistance.210

Conclusion

The conventional military threat posed by the PLA and PAVN was no figment of imagination. Compared to their regional neighbours both China and Vietnam possessed an overwhelming superiority in both the number and the quality of the forces at their disposal. Throughout the 1950s both countries implemented a policy to modernise and professionalise their armed forces along conventional Soviet lines.

207 The 351st Heavy Division appears to have been broken up during this period but the six infantry divisions remained on the order of battle through the Second Indochina War. For example in 1975 the final battle for Saigon was fought by the PAVN 2nd Corps consisting of the 304th, 324th and 325th divisions. Douglas Pike, PAVN: People’s Army of Vietnam (Novato, CA: Presidio, 1986), p. 102. 208 Ibid., pp. 110-12. 209 Ibid., p. 119. 210 Ibid., p. 115.

While, thanks to the Sino-Soviet split, the pace of this reform suffered a setback in China it was only in late 1965, as the Cultural Revolution began to gain impetus, that it was officially abandoned in favour of a return to the doctrines of People’s War favoured by Mao. Thus for the first decade of SEATO’s existence the conventional military capability of both communist states increased with each passing year. Coupled with the considerable combat experience – and success – gained by the PLA and the PAVN against Western forces at the beginning of the 1950s, the threat posed to the security of Southeast Asia was a formidable one. The intentions of Beijing and Hanoi with regard to the use of military force to further their aims in the region remained a difficult task for SEATO planners to fathom but again, the Korean and First Indochina wars both suggested that the resort to such means was far from out of the question. At the very least the regional power vacuum created by the Geneva Accords constituted a tempting target for the exercise of such force and one that, without the presence of SEATO, might have proven irresistible to the communist powers in Hanoi if not Beijing. The next chapter examines the development of SEATO’s military organisation into a body capable of planning for and deterring such contingencies.

Chapter 3 SEATO’s Military Organisation 1955-1965

Having established that the PRC, and to a lesser extent the DRVN, presented a credible threat to the security of South East Asia we must now turn to SEATO’s response. By itself the Manila Treaty and the statements of intent contained within its articles would not be enough to deter communist aggression. If those statements were to have any sway in either Beijing or Hanoi then SEATO would need to demonstrate that the organisation was a real military alliance involving real military cooperation among its member states. This chapter examines the growth and extent of that cooperation between 1955 and 1965. The first part of the chapter charts the development of SEATO’s military structure from its humble beginnings in February 1955 to the creation of the Military Planning Office (MPO) in March 1957 to the latter’s emergence as a mature organisation after being reformed in August 1960. This is followed by a closer look at the more important aspects of the organisation including its core functions and its relationships with other Western military alliances.

Early Days: The Military Advisers’ Group

The kernel of SEATO’s military organisation, the Military Advisers’ Group (MAG), was established during the first SEATO Council of Ministers meeting held in Bangkok from 23-25 February 1955 and would remain the most senior military body within the Organisation’s institutional machinery until the official suspension of SEATO military planning in 1973.1 The MAG consisted of one “Military Adviser”, always a senior military officer, drawn from each member state.2 Throughout the period 1955-65 the Hawaii-based Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), fulfilled the role of the US Military Adviser, while the Singapore-based Commander-in-Chief, Far East Command, acted as the British Military Adviser.3 The other military

1 SEATO Record: 1954-1977 (Bangkok: SEATO Secretariat, 1977), pp. 24, 30: Monro MacCloskey, Pacts for Peace: UN, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and OAS, The Military Research Series, revised edition (New York: Richards Rosen Press, 1967), p. 100. 2 Ibid. 3 Modelski, p. 24.

71 advisers were usually service chiefs in the armed forces of their respective countries.4 At its first conference (24-25 February 1955) the MAG agreed to meet on a bi-annual basis, with one conference scheduled to be held in a member state’s capital just prior to the annual SEATO Council meeting (usually held in March or April), and the second to be held in Bangkok in the latter half of the year (usually in September or October).5 As directed by the SEATO Council the MAG was to evaluate military issues affecting SEATO and the Treaty area and then give its recommendations in regard to those issues to the Council.6 Each military adviser was expected to present the views of his own nation’s high command (i.e. chiefs of staff or its equivalent) and the conference agenda was circulated months in advance so as to allow for the preparation of national positions on all aspects of it.7 Indeed, the agenda was circulated so as to allow the drafting of the official SEATO conference report prior to the actual conference taking place. In this regard difficult or irreconcilable issues were rarely allowed to remain on the conference agenda. Where collective agreement on issues could not be established the matter was normally referred back to either the appropriate sub-committee, or national high command, for further consideration.8 Political questions arising from the work of the MAG were forwarded on to the SEATO Council for guidance.9 Thus the bulk of a typical conference agenda involved the examination of reports tabled from various sub-committees (intelligence, planning, etc) and the allotment of current and future work to those sub-committees.10 Much of this sub-

4 Ibid. 5 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, p. 30. 6 Ibid., pp. 24, 30; MacCloskey, p. 100. 7 For example, see the following: “8th SEATO Military Advisers Meeting - Relief of the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office, The Security Co-ordinator and the Military assistant to the public Relations Officer”, Australian Defence Committee minute, 20 February 1958, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384; “SEATO: Theatre estimate and MPO Plan 4/61 for the defence of South-east Asia against Chinese Communist and DRV forces, Brief for Australian Military adviser at MA14C”, annex to Defence Committee minute, 16 February 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/315 Part 1; “Agenda Item D - Future work for the Military Planning Office, Brief for New Zealand Military Adviser”, annex to New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee minute, COS(61)58, 14 September 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/5/10 Part 1; “SEATO Military Advisers Sixteenth Conference, Brief for Agenda Item B (Plan 7)”, UK Chiefs of Staff Committee, Joint Planning Staff report, JP(62) 49 (final), 11 April 1962, PRO: DEFE 6/79. 8 See Australian military adviser’s reports on the following MA conferences: the 15th MA Conference, 3-6 October 1961, NA: A1209/134, 61/1239; the 16th MA Conference, 2-4 May 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 11; the 18th MA Conference, 2-4 April 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 14; the 22nd MA Conference, 29-30 April 1965, NAA: A1838/346, 688/10/16 Part 2; the 25th MA Conference, 7-8 December 1966, NAA: A1209/80, 67/7018. 9 Ibid. 10 “Agenda, Military Advisers’ Sixteenth Conference (MA16C)”, report, Australian Military Adviser,

72 committee activity, with the exception of intelligence, would later fall under the control of the Military Planning Office (MPO) when it was formed in 1957 (see below). The conferences concluded with an agreement on the chairmanship, date and location of the next conference, and the approval of an official press release.11 Upon returning to their respective countries and/or commands, it was common practice for each military adviser to compile his own conference report for his government.12 These usually contained a more frank assessment of the state of the alliance and trends and problems in its future direction than was possible in the consensus-driven official SEATO conference reports. The latter were produced by the Military Liaison Group to begin with and became the responsibility of the MPO from 1957 onwards.13 These reports were submitted to the SEATO Council of Ministers in addition to the respective high commands and other appropriate government agencies of member states.14

Military Liaison Group and Staff Planners

With the formation of the MAG the Council of Ministers left it up to the military advisers to establish the details of any additional supporting infrastructure they felt was necessary. In turn, it was decided by the MAG at the February 1955 Bangkok meeting to refer such issues to a SEATO Military Staff Planner’s conference they agreed would be held later that year in Baguio, the Philippines.15 Over a period of ten days (25 April-5 May 1955) the staff planners concluded this, their inaugural conference, with the recommendation that a “Military Liaison Group” be formed to provide “a point of contact between the Military Advisers and the Council”.16 This was accepted by the MAG, as was the staff planners’ proposal that a small Permanent Military Secretariat be attached to the Military Liaison Group.17 The Group itself, to be based permanently in Bangkok, consisted of a staff officer from each member state

16 May 1962, AWM 122, 3/5 Part 2. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid; “Report of the Military Advisers’ Twenty-Fifth Conference”, Bangkok, December 1966, NAA: A1209/80, 67/7018. 15 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, p. 30; Buszynski, p. 68. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid; “Australian Views on Proposed SEATO Permanent Military Planning Staff”, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 26 April 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776.

73 however, for the first year of the Liaison Group’s existence New Zealand opted to have itself represented by the United Kingdom instead.18 This was due to the fact that New Zealand at that stage had no embassy in Bangkok and the New Zealand government felt it was therefore uneconomical to post a single unsupported officer to Thailand on a permanent basis.19 Nevertheless in a reflection of the increasing importance of SEATO’s military activity the New Zealand government eventually rectified the situation with the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel H. A. Purcell as the New Zealand Military Liaison Officer in March 1956.20 The military liaison officers’ first duty was to represent the views of their respective military advisers at all meetings of the Liaison Group and to keep the advisers regularly informed of the Group’s work.21 If a military adviser wanted to raise an issue with his counterparts out-of-session he could do so by having his liaison officer initiate the discussion through the Liaison Group in Bangkok.22 A member state’s liaison officer was also responsible for providing relevant military advice to his civilian counterpart, the SEATO Council Representative, when needed.23

Security Coordinator and Deputy Public Relations Officer (Military)

In January 1956 two more positions were formally added to the fledgling organisation at the Second Military Adviser’s Conference in Melbourne.24 A Security Coordinator with the rank of lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent was appointed to deal with security issues arising out of the formation of the Military Liaison Group and the Permanent Secretariat while a Deputy Public Relations Officer (Military) was appointed to take over military publicity from the SEATO Council’s Public Relations

18 Ibid. 19 Mark Pearson, Paper Tiger: New Zealand’s Part in SEATO 1954-1977 (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1989), p. 40. 20 Although it should be noted that this was a dual appointment - Purcell was also appointed the New Zealand Military Liaison Officer in South East Asia, on the staff of the New Zealand Commissioner for South East Asia, Singapore. As such he was based in Singapore rather than Bangkok and during the inevitable absences from SEATO Headquarters that followed this arrangement the British military liaison officer was responsible for acting on New Zealand’s behalf. “Directive for the Military Liaison Officer in Singapore”, Chiefs of Staff Committee memorandum JPC(56) 8, 7 March 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/1 Part 2. 21 “Directive for the New Zealand Member of the SEATO Military Liaison Group”, Appendix A, Chiefs of Staff Committee memorandum JPC(56) 8, 7 March 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/1 Part 2. 22 Ibid. 23 Ibid. 24 Appendix F, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 16 February 1956, NAA: A2031/8, 42/1956.

Officer.25 The Security Coordinator’s primary role was to identify potential military security problems, recommend solutions to them and, upon his advice being endorsed by the MAG, ensure that the resulting security policies and procedures were implemented.26 He was also authorised to consult with individual member states to ensure that national security arrangements for the protection of SEATO “secret” and “top secret” classified military documents were of an adequate, if not uniform, standard.27 With this rudimentary structure in place the MAG set about establishing an agreed set of strategic concepts for SEATO. To this end another SEATO military staff planners conference was held in 1955 and was in turn supplemented by a number of ad hoc sub-committee meetings.28 The resulting strategic concepts were completed at the Third SEATO Military Staff Planners Conference in Singapore, June 1956, and confirmed by the Military Advisers at their third conference (Baguio, September 1956) later that year. Underpinning the work of the staff planners during this period were a series of ad hoc committees sanctioned by the Military Advisers to deal with more specialised issues such as communications, threat evaluation, intelligence, meteorology and so on.29

Creation of the Military Planning Office (MPO)

As the initial work on strategic concepts for SEATO drew to a close it became increasingly clear that the system of ad hoc committees and Military Staff Planners meetings was ill-suited to the task of taking those concepts to the next level. To attempt to produce detailed operational and logistical planning using a system where months could elapse before the parties involved met again was a recipe for a painfully drawn out, expensive and inefficient process.30 The most obvious solution was to create a permanent planning staff for SEATO.

25 Ibid. 26 Annexure 1, ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 “Proposal to establish a SEATO Permanent Military Planning Staff”, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 26 April 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776. 29 “SEATO Military Planning Staff, Bangkok - directive for the Australian representative on the Chief planners Committee”, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 6 December 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776. 30 “SEATO Military Staff Organization”, COS(56)5, minute, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, 14 February 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/1 Part 2.

In fact the formation of such a body had been anticipated by the SEATO Military Staff Planners at their first meeting in Baguio. While recommending the immediate establishment of the Military Liaison Group and the Permanent Secretariat the staff planners were careful to qualify these recommendations with the following conclusion:

The establishment of such an ad hoc arrangement should not prejudice the eventual creation of a standing group, or certain sections of a standing nature to augment the ad hoc system, should the need become necessary because of inadequacies revealed by experience.31

That need was now apparent and at an extraordinary conference held at Karachi in March 1956 the military advisers appointed a sub-committee of staff planners to study the necessity, size and function of a SEATO permanent planning staff.32 The resulting sub-committee report was circulated amongst the military advisers and, while they endorsed the broad direction of the report, they referred the matter to the Third Military Staff Planner’s Conference for further refinement.33 That conference, held in June, produced a formal proposal that, after minor amendments, was agreed to by the military advisers at their third conference in September.34 The military advisers then took this proposal back to their respective governments with a view to completing an out-of-session ratification process by 1 November 1956 and establishing the newly- named “Military Planning Office” two months later on 1 January 1957.35

MPO Headquarters, Bangkok

In the lead up to the Third Military Adviser’s Conference at Baguio in September 1956 there had been some debate as to where the MPO would be located.

31 Conclusion IIc of Item H, Baguio Staff Planners Report, cited in “SEATO Military Staff Organization”, ibid. 32 “Proposal to establish a SEATO Permanent Military Planning Staff”, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 26 April 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776; T. L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of Defence, memorandum to Cabinet, (?) December 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3 Part 1. 33 Ibid. 34 Ibid. 35 Sir Philip A. McBride, Australian Minister for Defence, to ministers for the Army, Navy and Air, 25 October 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776.

While there was no question of it being located in any of the Western member states outside the Treaty area, the choice of Bangkok (where both the Military Liaison Group and the Secretariat-General were already established) was not an automatic one. Based on the sub-committee report undertaken at the extraordinary Military Adviser’s conference held earlier that year in Karachi, the Filipino cities of Baguio and Manila were selected alongside Bangkok for consideration as suitable sites.36 The arguments in favour of the Filipino sites were based solely on practical grounds: the required level of security and communications arrangements were not readily available in Bangkok and nor could they be provided without considerable expense. The elaborate and longstanding US military base facilities in the Philippines could easily provide these measures with a minimum of effort. The cost-conscious Australian Defence Committee even noted that as the Philippines could provide English-speaking personnel “more readily than Thailand” the contribution of nationals by the other member states to the Military Secretariat could be reduced.37 In contrast, the Australian Department of External Affairs favoured the concentration of all SEATO facilities in Bangkok.38 In doing so they represented the majority view amongst the member states that locating the MPO in Thailand, in the heart of the Treaty area, sent a strong message to the region, if not the wider world, that SEATO was serious about defending Southeast Asia from communist aggression. The symbolism was too powerful to ignore, and having the military and civilian branches of SEATO situated literally next door to each other was not without practical advantages of its own. By the time of the September conference the choice of Bangkok as the location was all but assured and was duly confirmed by the military advisers during the course of their deliberations. Accordingly, after a two month delay caused by the out-of-session ratification process, the MPO was officially established at SEATO Headquarters, Rajdamneon Avenue, Bangkok, on 1 March 1957.39

The MPO 1957-1960

The organization that they had agreed upon (see Chart 3.1), while modest in

36 Australian Defence Committee, minute, 26 April 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

77 size, nonetheless marked a turning point in the existence of SEATO. For the first time in its short history SEATO possessed a permanent military body dedicated to giving substance to its professed aim of defending the region from armed aggression. It was no longer quite so easy for critics to dismiss it as a “paper tiger”.

CHART 3.1 MPO ORGANISATION 1957-1960

Chief Military Planning Office

Security Senior Administrative Coordinator Planners Section Committee Military Military Assistant to PRO Secretariat

Planning Teams

Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO)

The head of the new organisation was given the title “Chief, Military Planning Office (CMPO)”. This post was to be filled by a senior staff officer with the rank of brigadier or its equivalent. The CMPO was responsible for all aspects of the work carried out by the MPO and as such answered directly to the MAG.40 As well as drafting the agenda for MAG conferences (subject to the latter’s out-of-session approval of course) the CMPO was ultimately responsible for ensuring that all reports and documents (ranging from planning studies to training schedules to budget estimates) relevant to that agenda were prepared in time.41 As befitted his status the CMPO was required to attend those conferences where he would table a report of the

39 CMPO report to MAG, 23 April 1957, ANZ: EA 120/5/3, Part 1. 40 “Directive to the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 27 August 1959, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384 41 Ibid.

78 activities of the MPO since the last MAG conference (i.e. six months or so).42 In addition to this formal report the CMPO was also expected to keep the military advisers up to date with the MPO’s work throughout the year as well as liaising with the SEATO Secretary-General and SEATO Council representatives.43

Senior Planners’ Committee

At the heart of the structure of the newly created MPO (see chart 2.1 above) was the “Senior Planners Committee”. Each member state was to appoint one senior planner of colonel rank or its equivalent to this body where they would hold both collective and national responsibilities.44 The former required them as a committee to advise on the composition of planning teams (see below), determine the scope and nature of the projects assigned to those planning teams, and monitor the work of the planning teams.45 The Senior Planners Committee was also responsible for preparing final drafts of the resulting plans or studies for consideration by the MAG.46 Additional responsibilities included drawing up the annual schedule of training exercises and assessing the need for, and function of, any suggested specialist ad hoc committees.47 Each senior planner was expected to represent the national view of his country in the Senior Planners Committee’s deliberations and provide guidance in this regard to his national subordinates on the planning teams.48 He was also to assume the old military liaison officer’s duties and maintain a close relationship with his nation’s military adviser and embassy.49 Finally the senior planner could also be called upon to carry out staff work for his military adviser prior to a MAG conference, and indeed,

42 For example see “Progress report to Military Advisers from the Chief Military Planning Office - 15 August 1959”, Brigadier L. W. Thornton, CMPO, Bangkok, 17 August 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1; “Directive to the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 27 August 1959, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384. 43 “Directive to the Chief, SEATO Military Planning Office”, ibid. 44 “Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation: New Zealand Contribution to a Permanent Body of Military Staff Planners”, T. L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of Defence, memorandum to Cabinet, (?) December 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3 Part 1; “SEATO Military Planning Staff, Bangkok - Directive for the Australian representative on the Chief Planners Committee ”, Annex A, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 6 December 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776 45 “SEATO Military Planning Staff, Bangkok - directive for the Australian representative on the Chief planners Committee”, ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid.

79 would be required to act as his military adviser’s staff officer during the conference itself.50

Planning Teams

Aside from the senior planner each member state was invited to appoint up to three permanent planners with the rank of lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent to the MPO.51 These officers would provide the pool from which the chief planners would draw their planning teams, although there was provision for additional staff officers to be assigned from national sources on a project-specific basis if necessary.52 The exact national and inter-service composition of the teams was determined by the CMPO on the advice of the Senior Planner’s Committee.53 Once assembled into specific teams the planners were responsible for the drafting of plans and studies as well as carrying out any related reconnaissance or other “fieldwork” approved by the senior planners.54

Military Secretariat

The Military Secretariat was primarily responsible for the provision of secretarial (i.e. typing, stenographic and reproduction) services for the MPO.55 Other duties included coordinating postal and local courier services, providing appropriate support to conferences and meetings staged by the MPO as well as control of all classified publications and material produced by the MPO or received from other sources.56 In relation to this last duty the Secretariat was also charged with the setting up and administration of an MPO library and archive.57 The staff consisted of a “Head of the Military Secretariat” (of colonel rank or its equivalent), two “Assistant Heads of the Military Secretariat” (not to hold a rank higher than lieutenant-colonel or

50 Ibid. 51 “Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation: New Zealand Contribution to a Permanent Body of Military Staff Planners”, T. L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of Defence, memorandum to Cabinet, (?) December 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3 Part 1. 52 “SEATO Military Planning Staff, Bangkok - Directive for the Australian representative on the Chief Planners Committee ”, Annex A, Australian Defence Committee, minute, 6 December 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 “Reorganization of the Military Planning Office”, Appendix D3, memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 17 November 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 56 Ibid.

80 its equivalent) and a dozen or so clerical staff drawn from both enlisted and civilian personnel.58 Administrative Staff

The Administrative Staff was responsible for a wide range of functions, and indeed, as its name would suggest, acted as something of a catch-all for those tasks that fell outside the gambit of the other sections within the MPO. Nevertheless its core function was the control of all day-to-day MPO financial matters. This included administering the MPOs accounts, consolidating the annual MPO budget estimates and liaising with the Secretariat-General on financial concerns.59 In keeping with its finance role the Administrative Staff was also in charge of the procurement and maintenance of all MPO equipment, vehicles, chattels, and stationary.60 Other duties included running the MPO motor pool, arranging receptions for official visitors and organising travel arrangements for MPO staff.61 Overseeing all of this was the “Administrative Officer” (of major rank or its equivalent) supported by an “Assistant Administrative Officer” (of warrant officer rank or its equivalent), a “General Duty Section” of one or two enlisted personnel and a “Transport Section” of 15 enlisted men.62 In a pragmatic decision taken prior to the MPO’s creation Thailand, as the host country, agreed to provide all of the Administrative Staff’s personnel, including its officers.63

Staffing

The staffing requirements of the MPO were driven by three factors: duration of postings, national representation and financial concerns. The structure of the Senior Planners Committee (see above) and its pivotal role in the MPO meant that the only aspect of its staffing open to debate was the length of the appointments to it. Based on prior experience of “tropical” postings the non-Asian members preferred the adoption of a two-year appointment to the position and this was readily agreed to by

57 Ibid. 58 Ibid; Australian Defence Committee, minute, 20 September 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776. 59 “Reorganization of the Military Planning Office”, Appendix D3, memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 17 November 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 26 June 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1.

81 the others.64 Indeed, this set the benchmark for all other military and civilian positions within the MPO - two years became the standard duration of any given appointment.65 The problem of national representation was a little more difficult to accommodate when faced with the need to fill those senior “international” MPO positions outside the Senior Planner’s Committee. The obvious answer was to adopt a system of rotation, with each member taking turns to appoint officers to the posts in question. Thus, one of the first tasks to be completed by the MPO in early 1957 was the creation of a roster for future reliefs of the three Military Secretariat officers.66 This was formally endorsed by the MAG at the Seventh Military Adviser’s Conference in Bangkok that September.67 Rosters for the positions of Security Coordinator and Deputy Public Relations Officer (Military) were drawn up by the MPO later that year and placed on the agenda for the Eighth Military Adviser’s Conference in Manila (March 1958) where they too were approved.68 In all three cases the roster was based on a 16-year cycle thus allowing each SEATO member one term in each position.69 The rosters were also arranged so that no member would fill more than two of these posts concurrently.70 Rotation was rejected, however, as an option in the appointment of the CMPO. Of all the international MPO positions to fill, the most important was that of the CMPO. Over the course of the Military Advisor and Staff Planner conferences in 1956 it had been accepted that the first CMPO would be drawn from the Philippines for political and symbolic reasons associated with having an Asian member filling the position.71 Thailand excluded itself from consideration for the CMPO post because of its push to have Pote Sarasin made the first SEATO Secretary-General (no member could expect to hold both the top civilian and military positions in SEATO at the same time) and Pakistan did not put a candidate forward. Accordingly Brigadier- General Alfredo M. Santos, AFP, was appointed the first CMPO unopposed.72

63 Australian Defence Committee, minute, 20 September 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776. 64 T. L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of Defence, memorandum to Cabinet, (?) December 1956, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3 Part 1. 65 Memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 8 January 1958, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384. 66 CMPO report to MAG, 23 April 1957, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 67 Australian Defence Committee, minute, 20 February 1958, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384. 68 Memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 8 January 1958, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Australian Defence Committee, annex to minute, 27 August 1959, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384. 72 Ibid.

Having considered the option of replacing this ad hoc approach with a roster system the MPO recommended against it and this was accepted by the MAG at the Eighth MA Conference.73 All members agreed that the MPO should be headed by the best available officer and that this was most likely to occur through a competitive appointment process rather than a rostered one. The MAG confirmed that the CMPO would normally be appointed for two years and that those nations wishing to put forward candidates to succeed to the position could do so after one year of the current CMPO’s term had been completed.74 In practice this system was a long way from being a meritocratic free for all. A certain amount of self-regulation occurred; for example the country of the incumbent CMPO always refrained from entering another one of their nationals to succeed him. Political considerations inevitably played some part in the 12 month period of ‘horse-trading’ that took place before the final selection of a successor was made – Pakistan’s failure to get their 1958 candidate appointed, and the other members’ awareness of Pakistani frustration over the alliance’s treatment of its concerns regarding Afghanistan and India, undoubtedly helped to cement their candidate, Rear-Admiral Syed M. Ashan, as the favourite to replace the third CMPO, Australia’s Major-General John G. Wilton in July 1962 (although the latter’s personnel recommendation did not go unnoticed either). But such informal considerations had their limits. For example New Zealand’s Brigadier Leonard W. Thornton was replaced in July 1960 by Wilton without anyone insisting that it was an Asian member’s “turn”. To the degree that a SEATO member was prepared to field a candidate their bid would be taken seriously, a fact borne out by the quality of those officers who were selected (see Appendix 2). Finally, the often considerable differences in financial resources available to the respective defence establishments of each SEATO member played a (largely negative) part in determining the contribution of staff by some members. While SEATO was responsible for paying transport costs to and from Bangkok in all other respects the pay and conditions for individuals (and their families) assigned to the MPO remained the responsibility of their respective governments.75 This was a prime factor in explaining why most members, particularly the New Zealanders and the Filipinos, rarely utilised all three spots available to them on the planning teams

73 Ibid. 74 Ibid. 75 T. L. MacDonald, New Zealand Minister of Defence, memorandum to Cabinet, (?) December 1956,

83 whereas the Americans always maintained a full-strength presence. Such constraints also influenced responses to SEATO requests for additional personnel above the normal MPO establishment for special projects or studies. MPO Reorganisation 1960

As with all bureaucratic entities the MPO took on a life of its own and the experience of those working in it invariably revealed a number of inefficiencies inherent to the structure of the organisation established in 1957. The CMPO found that the Administration Officer did not possess enough authority in his present rank and as a consequence had to delegate a number of otherwise mundane functions to the CMPO. This also led to the Head of the Military Secretariat having to assume financial responsibilities that strictly speaking were beyond his terms of reference and obviously impinged on his stated duties. The development of plans and studies had also quickly reached a stage where permanent specialists (for example in communications and logistics), as opposed to general planning teams, were required as the reliance on ad hoc committees for such detailed work was becoming too cumbersome and slow. Furthermore, the Security Coordinator’s position had proven somewhat redundant given that the Coordinator had to rely upon the Administration Staff or the Military Secretariat to implement most of his policy. Finally, and not surprisingly, the very existence of the MPO had encouraged the MAG to make use of it and the resulting workload was soon in excess of the core planning function originally intended. Indeed, tying in with the MPO’s discovery of these shortcomings was the development of the debate regarding SEATO command structures within the MAG. Pakistan had been the earliest and most enthusiastic proponent of the need for concrete action on this issue but had found little support amongst the other members until the Tenth Military Advisers Conference (Wellington, New Zealand, March 1959). At that meeting the US Military Adviser, Admiral Stump, tabled a position paper outlining a largely cautious approach that revolved around the need for the MPO to include recommendations for a command organisation for each separate plan (see next chapter).76 Nevertheless the US paper also agreed in principle with the idea

ANZ: EA1 120/5/3 Part 1. 76 Memorandum, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee to New Zealand Military Adviser, 3 August 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1.

84 that any such command organisation could be supplemented with MPO personnel.77 The Pakistanis seized upon the apparent window of opportunity this presented and quickly followed up that conference with an out-of-session position paper of their own calling for a review of the MPO organisation “in order to bring it more in line with a SEATO Headquarters”.78 This was circulated amongst the military advisers in late June and placed on the agenda of the forthcoming Eleventh Military Adviser’s Conference without being processed by the MPO.79 While the extent of Pakistani ambitions in regard to a SEATO Headquarters were still regarded somewhat suspiciously by most of the other military advisers, in many respects the Pakistani paper dovetailed nicely with the CMPO’s reports on the shortcomings of the MPO’s organisation. Accordingly the MAG ended the Eleventh Conference having agreed upon the need to reorganise the MPO along functional lines and directed the MPO to come up with detailed proposals for such a reorganisation. They also agreed that the post of CMPO should be upgraded to the rank of Major- General (or its equivalent) and that the post of “Deputy CMPO” (DCMPO) should be created and filled by a Brigadier (or an equivalent rank).80 The Senior Planner’s Committee struggled for consensus over the draft MPO proposal as the call for reform saw senior planners torn between the need to achieve the most operationally efficient organisation whilst still protecting their role as national representatives. Although they finally hammered out a draft for inclusion on the agenda of the forthcoming Military Adviser’s conference its out-of-session circulation amongst the military advisers sparked a vigorous debate on these lines. In an effort to break the deadlock the CMPO, Brigadier Thornton, took the unusual step of preparing a brief outlining his own views on the subject for inclusion on the agenda of the Twelfth Military Adviser’s Conference. Thornton felt that the command structure of the MPO needed to be clarified with a view to a moderate strengthening of his own authority in relation to the Senior Planner’s Committee. While stressing that this concern did not reflect his actual experience with the senior planners (indeed he described his working relationship with them as “excellent”), Thornton felt the potential for a future clash between the

77 Ibid. 78 Position paper, Pakistani Military Adviser to rest of MAG, 16 June 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 79 Memorandum from CMPO to all military advisers, 8 January 1958, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 80 Report, Joint Planning Committee to Australian Defence Committee, 18 November 1959, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1384.

85 two parties over their respective areas of authority was highly likely if those areas were not better defined.81 He felt this was best served by dividing the planning teams into a “General” division and a “Specialist” division with the CMPO in direct command of the former while the Senior Planners retained control of the latter.82 The CMPO would have full authority over the planning teams when it came to administration and procedural matters, but the composition and direction of those teams would remain with the Senior Planner’s Committee.83 However the CMPO would gain some formal input into those deliberations with the inclusion of the DCMPO on the Committee.84 Thornton’s proposals were tabled at the Twelfth Military Adviser’s Conference where in the end the military advisers decided to take them one step further. The new MPO organisation they agreed upon saw the roles of national representation and planning separated completely (see Chart 3.2). CHART 3.2 MPO ORGANISATION 1960-1965

MPO Organisation August 1960

Chief MPO

Deputy Chief MPO

Military Specialist Advisers Committees Representatives Committee

Military Head Head Deputy Public Secretariat of Administration Information Planning Officer (Military)

Plans Logistics Intelligence Communications- Organisation, Division Division Division Electronics Training & Division Standardisation Division

A “Military Adviser’s Representatives Committee” which, as the name suggests, was a body solely concerned with national representation, replaced the Senior Planners Committee. It was made up of one Military Adviser’s Representative (MAR) from each member state and these officers (of colonel rank or its equivalent) were responsible for expressing national views “on all matters affecting

81 Memorandum from CMPO to MAG, 26 June 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid.

86 the functioning and work of the Military Planning Office” and were to attend all MAG conferences as part of their national delegations.85 As such they were answerable only to the MAG and the CMPO had no authority over them.86 By the same token however they were completely removed from the administration of the planning process. The MAR Committee was a consultative body and while they were charged with reviewing all plans, studies and other materials destined for the MAG they had no official input into the actual processes that produced them – that was to be the preserve of the CMPO.87 Ultimately their advice was intended to influence the decisions of both the CMPO and the MAG (and of course the MAG could always direct the CMPO to follow a recommendation from the MARs) but the day-to-day running of the MPO finally had a clear chain of command.

The intention to re-structure the planning teams on functional lines was carried out. Five planning divisions were formed consisting of Plans; Logistics; Intelligence; Communications-Electronics and Organisation, Training & Standardisation.88 These divisions were staffed by officers of lieutenant-colonel rank or its equivalent drawn from all of the SEATO members.89 The Plans Division was the largest with a total of eight officers, one from each member state, while the other divisions varied in size with seven officers assigned to Logistics, three to both Intelligence and Communications-Electronics and a total of two assigned to Organisation, Training & Standardisation.90 It was envisaged that the Plans Division would operate as a “generalist” body dealing with all plans and studies assigned to the planning staff and would draw upon the expertise of the other divisions wherever appropriate.91 The officers assigned to the Plans Division were also regarded as the senior planner in relation to their fellow nationals assigned to the other divisions. With the abolition of the Senior Planners Committee it was decided that a “Head of Planning” with the rank of colonel or its equivalent would be appointed to command and co-ordinate the new

84 Ibid. 85 Directive to Australian Military Adviser’s Representative, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 28 August 1962, NAA: A1838/346, 688/11, Part 3. 86 Ibid. 87 Appendix A, ibid. 88 Memorandum, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 13 September 1961, NAA: A1838/346, 688/111, Part 3. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Appendix D2, MPO Reorganization Study, MPO, 17 November 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1.

87 planning staff organisation.92 The introduction of dedicated specialists into the MPO did not mean the end of the ad hoc committees however. Separate committees dealing with intelligence, communications and other areas such as meteorological and medical issues would be continued. Their role was to continue to examine the broader picture while the specialists of the planning staff were charged with dealing with questions related to specific MPO projects and carrying out “follow-up action” arising from the ad hoc committees work.93 Beyond the formation of the MAR Committee and the reorganisation of the planning staff other, albeit less dramatic changes also took place. In line with Thornton’s recommendations the post of Head of Administration was upgraded to lieutenant-colonel or its equivalent and was also reclassified as an “international” position and thus became open to the other SEATO members.94 Supporting Administration staff continued to be drawn exclusively from the Thai military with two assistant officers, in the ranks of major and lieutenant-equivalents present instead of the single junior officer assigned previously.95 Finally, the post of security- coordinator was abolished and his duties divided between the Military Secretariat, the Administrative Staff and the Intelligence Division of the Planning Staff. In the aftermath of the Twelfth Military Adviser’s Conference this reorganisation of the MPO was initiated at the beginning of August 1960 under the stewardship of Thornton’s successor, Major-General Wilton.96 While it was still a far cry from the scale and scope of the NATO the MPO was certainly on a par with the development of military institutions in the Baghdad Pact, an organisation that, like SEATO, had only been formed in 1955. Furthermore the MPO was now ready to seriously increase the tempo and quality of its work. The focus of the MPOs efforts were quickly moving away from strategic and broad operational concepts to the more delicate specifics of movement tables, logistic requirements and force contributions.

92 Ibid. 93 Ibid. 94 Memorandum, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 13 September 1961, NAA: A1838/346, 688/111, Part 3. 95 Ibid. 96 Memorandum, SEATO Military Secretariat to Budget Sub-Committee, 19 January 1961, NAA: A1945/28, 249/10/17.

Role of the MPO

The MPO had four long-term roles to fulfil: These were the development of operational plans; the gathering and maintenance of general knowledge of the Treaty area; the development of a standardisation program amongst SEATO members; and the planning of SEATO military exercises. The first of these roles will be dealt with in greater detail over the next two chapters but it should be noted that the MPO was called upon to create eight separate operational plans over the period 1956-1965. These could be broadly divided into two categories: those dealing with conventional military aggression and those dealing with insurgencies. Within these basic parameters the plans are listed below in Table 3.1.

TABLE 3.1 SEATO OPERATIONAL PLANS 1956-1965

PLANS: AREA INVOLVED: CONFLICT AGGRESSOR TYPE: Plan 1 Protocol States & Thailand Conventional DRV Plan 2 Protocol States & Thailand Conventional DRV & PRC Plan 3 South Vietnam Conventional DRV, PRC (covert) Plan 4 Entire Treaty area Conventional PRC & DRV Plan 5 Laos Counter-insurgency Pathet Lao, DRV (covert) Plan 6 Protocol States Conventional DRV Plan 7 South Vietnam Counter-insurgency DRV Plan 8 Thailand Counter-insurgency DRV

The extent to which each plan was developed varied, with some being carried no further than the conceptual stage while others were developed to the point where individual SEATO force commanders were nominated in readiness for a plan’s implementation. Similarly the plans were not all in development at once with some being discarded and new ones devised as the early concentration on conventional threats gave way to a growing emphasis on the threat of insurgency. Concomitant with the development of specific operational plans was the need for SEATO to build up a comprehensive knowledge of the Treaty area generally.

Accurate data on the communications, logistics and transport networks of the entire Treaty area was vital if the MPO was to make realistic estimates of communist force projection capabilities, SEATO force projection capabilities and the work required to improve the latter. A standing knowledge of the political, ethnic and even religious climate within the nations of the Treaty area was also important if one was to assess where local sympathies would lie in the event of conflict. Similarly the industrial and agricultural strengths and weaknesses of the various developing nations in the area needed to be gauged to determine what could be supplied locally. Medical data, such as the difference between tropical diseases likely to be encountered in the northern highlands of Thailand as opposed to those found in the Mekong delta, were equally vital. A number of approaches were taken by SEATO in response to the need to answer such questions. Mandatory area familiarisation tours of Thailand by MPO planners were instituted, while more discrete forays were carried out in the surrounding protocol states with the quiet cooperation of non-member states South Vietnam and Laos (where the US MAAGs provided convenient cover).97 But this was largely overshadowed by the production of comprehensive “country studies” dealing with all states inside the Treaty area as well as special studies on Sinkiang, southern China (specifically Yunnan, Kwangsi and Kwantung provinces) and Tibet (see Table 3.2).98 The country studies began life as annexes to the threat estimate prepared annually at SEATO Intelligence Meetings.99 It was then decided that they should be published separately and each member nation (with the exception of New Zealand which felt it had neither the intelligence resources nor the regional knowledge to attempt such a project) was allocated the responsibility for producing at least one study.100 This led to mixed results, largely as a result of having left the format of the studies up to each individual member, and at the Seventh Intelligence Meeting (Bangkok, November 1961) it was decided that the MPO should draw up a uniform country study format.101 This was implemented in early 1962 with completed studies being revised to comply with the new format. The drafts of the country studies were distributed to all members for comment and endorsement and this led to some lengthy

97 Progress Report, CMPO to MAG, 17 August 1959, ANZ: EA1 120/5/3, Part 1. 98 Memorandum, New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee, 16 September 1966, ANZ: EA1 120/16/1, Part 1. 99 Memorandum, New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee, 1 May 1962, ANZ: EA1 120/16/1, Part 1. 100 Ibid.

90 delays in their completion due to disputes over accuracy – Pakistan, for example, was suspected of exaggerating numerous aspects of its study of Afghanistan to emphasise the threat it felt from that quarter. Nevertheless once completed these works were unmatched in their detail and provided an invaluable resource for future planning. The study on Laos, for example, ran to 41 pages and included topics running from the seasonal variations in cloud cover to the geographic distribution of clonorchiasis (Chinese liver fluke disease).102 Provision was made for the incorporation of minor amendments but major changes (usually political) in the country concerned would usually lead to the production of a revised edition. These studies were in turn complimented by the work of the specialist committees such as the Meteorological Committee, Mapping Committee and the Medical Committee.103

TABLE 3.2 SEATO COUNTRY STUDIES 1961-1966

TITLE COMPLETED TITLE COMPLETED Tibet 1961 Sinkiang 1966 (China Vol II) (China Vol I) Cambodia 1961 Yunnan, Kwangsi, 1966 Kwantung (China Vol III) Pakistan 1961 North Vietnam 1966 Thailand 1964 South Vietnam 1966 Philippines 1964 Laos 1966 Afghanistan 1964 Burma 1966

SEATO Military Exercises

The MPO was also responsible for the scheduling of SEATO military exercises. The first SEATO exercise, code-named “Firmlink”, was held in Thailand over the first two weeks of February 1956.104 An air/ground exercise it involved American, Thai and Filipino forces.105 From that point through to the end of 1965 a

101 Ibid. 102 Country Study - Laos, 5th edition, (Bangkok: MPO, 1968), NAA: A1838/346, 688/18/5/3, Part 2. 103 Memorandum, New Zealand Joint Intelligence Committee, 1 May 1962, ANZ: EA1 120/16/1, Part 1. 104 Annex J, SEATO Record: 1954-1977, loc. cit. 105 Ibid.

91 total of 30 SEATO military exercises took place and, with the exception of the first four, these were coordinated by the MPO.106 While at least two exercises were held annually, no fewer than five exercises were carried out in the years 1957 and 1959 alone and four in 1962.107 Most of these exercises were governed by regulations set out in SEATO Military Publication No 4 (SEAP4), Principles and Procedures for Staging SEATO Military Exercises.108 This work was one of the first to be produced by the MPO and over the lifetime of the alliance underwent at least two complete revisions and numerous amendments. France and Pakistan voiced some initial concerns over the application of the SEATO label to exercises that did not include the participation of all member states, but the logistic and financial considerations associated with coordinating the force availability of eight nations (three of whom lay outside the immediate region) saw this dissent quickly disappear.109 Instead it was decided that as long as all members had been invited to participate in a given exercise then the SEATO label could be bestowed upon it.110 Where SEATO members were unable to participate in an exercise they usually endeavoured to send observers. In fact there were only two exercises held between 1956 and 1965 where all eight SEATO members participated and one of those, “Dhanarajata” (1-20 June 1963), was a command post exercise involving headquarters units only. The other exercise, code named “Sea Lion” (28 April-16 May 1960), was a maritime operation. A more persistent problem was how to handle the sensitivities of those states within the region who were not part of SEATO. Territorial issues arose with Indonesia in regard to SEATO maritime and combined air/sea exercises such as “Albatross” (26 September-22 October 1956), “Oceanlink” (1-14 May 1958) and “Sea Demon” (10-29 April 1959) that required a sizable flotilla of Australian and New Zealand (and sometimes British) warships to pass through the Sunda and Gaspar straits on their way to the exercise area in the South China Sea.111 These events were

106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 SEAP4B, Principles and Procedures for Staging SEATO Military Exercises, December 1964, NAA: A1838/388, 688/24/5, Part 1. 109 Briefing, New Zealand Department of External Affairs to Prime Minister’s Office, 1 March 1957, ANZ: EA1 120/5/1, Part 2. 110 SEAP4B, loc. cit, p. 2. 111 Memorandum, Australian Embassy, Washington, to Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 28 September 1956, NAA: A1838/2, 563/10/9; Memorandum, Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra, to Australian Embassy, Jakarta, 15 May 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/25/10.

92 usually seized upon by the more excitable elements of the Indonesian media and parliament as evidence of western aggression and intimidation.112 Matters were made more complicated however when in 1958 Indonesia unilaterally proclaimed a 12-mile maritime territorial limit.113 In response to this claim the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand not only ignored it (recognising the traditional 3-mile limit instead) but also abandoned the practice of giving the Indonesian Government prior notification of such passages.114 Prior notification was soon revived however after the “Sea Demon” flotilla (comprising 16 naval vessels including two aircraft carriers, HMS Albion and HMAS Melbourne) inadvertently violated the three-mile limit provoking not only the usual uproar amongst the Indonesian press and parliament, but also an incident involving the “buzzing” of the Commonwealth ships by two Indonesian MiG-17s.115 Another sensitive topic was the presence of non-member military observers at SEATO exercises. At various times between 1956 and 1965 small numbers of officers from South Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, Burma, Indonesia, South Korea and Taiwan attended SEATO exercises as observers.116 On the one hand such a presence offered SEATO a golden opportunity to demonstrate its effectiveness to middle and high-ranking officers from around the region. On the other the potential publicity to be gained from their presence was as much negative as it was positive. States whose presence SEATO would have liked to have given a high profile, such as Burma, insisted on keeping it quiet while states that were unconcerned about publicity, such as South Korea and Taiwan, had little to offer in terms of improving the alliance’s regional credibility. The dispatch of observers from the Protocol States presented a particularly delicate public relations problem. Even had the Protocol States wished to advertise their involvement (and for most of this period, with the exception of South Vietnam on occasion, they did not) SEATO itself was divided between those, such as the US, who felt such publicity would enhance the alliance’s credibility and those,

112 Ibid. 113 Memorandum, Defence Liaison Branch, Australian Department of External Affairs, to the Minister, 14 April 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/25/10. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. This issue was not exclusively related to SEATO but also reflected broader tensions between the British Commonwealth and Indonesia over issues such as the emergence of an independent Malaysia. See Jeffrey Grey, Up Top: the Royal Australian Navy and Southeast Asian Conflicts 1955- 1972, Vol. VII, Official History of Australia’s Involvement in Southeastern Conflicts 1948-1975 (Sydney: Australian War Memorial & Allen & Unwin, 1998), pp. 51-2. 116 Australian Senior Planner, MPO, Bangkok, to Australian Military Adviser, 13 March 1959, NAA: A1838/269, 688/25/14.

93 such as Britain, who felt it would have the opposite effect by undermining the spirit, if not the substance, of the 1954 Geneva Agreement.117 Nonetheless, the overall record of SEATO exercises was a highly profitable and successful one. On a political level SEATO exercises provided a valuable and media-friendly measure of substance. The practical benefits included the development of cooperation and understanding between the member’s military forces and invaluable insights into the logistic and operational problems imposed by the regional conditions. These experiences were used to inform and, when necessary, change the planning focus of the MPO through a continuous loop of exercise scenarios based on MPO operational plans and comprehensive post-exercise reports.118 Along with intelligence updates the feedback from SEATO exercises played a significant role in the almost annual refinement and revision of Plans 4, 5, and 6.

SEATO Standardisation

The question of standardisation amongst SEATO members was initially raised at the First Staff Planner’s Conference held in Baguio, the Philippines (25 April-5 May 1955), with the conference report calling for the “standardization of techniques and equipment as necessary and practicable” and the convening of a specialist ad hoc committee to examine the issue more closely.119 Accordingly the “ad hoc Committee on Standardisation of Techniques” met in October of that year in Bangkok.120 The committee recommended that detailed studies be carried out by technical experts:

with a view to assessing interchangeability of, and devising common nomenclature and designation for, the following: Ammunition; POL; tyres; common spare parts for automotive equipment; common spare parts for electronic equipment.121

117 Memorandum, Australian High Commission, Ottawa, to Australian Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 4 June 1957, NAA: A1838/385, 688/25/1. 118 SEAP4B, loc. cit. 119 Enclosure 9F, Report of First Staff Planner’s Conference, 5 May 1955, p. 10, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5850. 120 Report, Joint Administrative Planning Committee, to New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, 26 July 1956, ANZ: EA 1 120/5/1, Part 2.

The SEATO Third Staff Planner’s Meeting examined this proposal and concluded that given the predominance of British and American equipment used by SEATO members there was, in general, no immediate need for such studies.122 The one exception however was in the field of communications equipment where it was felt that the level of interdependence between equipment and technique was so high that commonality in the one could not be achieved without commonality in the other.123 From that point on SEATO standardisation efforts would remain focussed on nomenclature and technique rather than material equipment where a de facto standardisation was already occurring courtesy of American military aid programs (see below). From 1957 onwards the MPO assumed responsibility for these efforts and in consultation with the MAG drew up the SEATO Standardisation Agreement (SEASTAG) which established a template for the initiation, drafting and ratification of standardisation agreements in specific areas.124 Under the auspices of this agreement the MPO immediately set about producing the booklet SEAP-2 Glossary of Military Terms and Definitions and other publications soon followed.125 Most of this work was devoted to devising a common procedural framework and resulted in documents such as SEASTAG No. 2041 “Operational Road Movement Orders, Tables and Graphs” for the use of all units assigned to SEATO field forces and issued in November 1962.126 In an attempt to speed up this process relevant NATO standardisation agreements were provided by the US and the United Kingdom as the basis for SEASTAGs where possible.127

Military Aid

Closely tied to the question of standardization was that of military aid. The need to improve SEATO’s ability to defend the Treaty area had been recognised right from the start. At the First Staff Planner’s Conference the following observation was made:

121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, loc. cit. 125 Ibid; Progress Report, CMPO to MAG, 15 August 1959, ANZ: EA 1 120/5/3, Part 1. 126 SEASTAG No. 2041 “Operational Road Movement Orders, Tables and Graphs”, CMPO to MAG, 29 November 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 12.

In spite of every effort being made by nations individually to improve their defensive effectiveness by self-help, it is clear that there must also be mutual aid in order that the Treaty may become an effective means of countering Communist expansion.128

The United States, Britain and France had little need of any such aid, of course, and the Antipodean members, Australia and New Zealand, were considered to be on a professional par with their western brethren. Deficiencies in the size and equipment of Australian and New Zealand forces did remain a problem throughout the period but this was felt to be due to a lack of political will rather than resources or ability.129 More fundamental issues than mere parsimony in regard to defence expenditure were required to confer eligibility for military aid. These were to be found in ample evidence amongst the armed forces of the three Asian members, however, a factor the significance of which was greatly exacerbated by the “frontline” geographical status of Pakistan and Thailand. The militaries of Thailand, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan, all suffered from poor training, antiquated equipment and doctrine, and inadequate underlying infrastructure. The effort to improve SEATO’s military capability was fundamentally an effort to modernise the armed forces of these three states. However this requirement had already been largely addressed through bilateral military aid agreements inaugurated by the United States with all three countries prior to the signing of the Manila Treaty. A US Mutual Defence Assistance Program (MDAP) had been in place with the Philippines since 1946, Thailand since October 1950 and Pakistan since February 1954.130 The Philippines benefited to the tune of US$351 million in military aid between 1946 and 1965.131 Support for Thailand was more generous with a total of approximately US$686 million worth of American military

127 Progress Report, CMPO to MAG, 15 August 1959, ANZ: EA 1 120/5/3, Part 1. 128 Enclosure 9F, Report of First Staff Planner’s Conference, 5 May 1955, p. 10, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5850. 129 For example in regard to the Australian Army see J. C. Blaxland, Organising an Army: The Australian Experience 1957-1965, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 50 (Canberra: Australian National University, 1989); in regard to the New Zealand Army see Damien Fenton, A False Sense of Security: The Force Structure of the New Zealand Army 1946-1978 (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1998). 130 Harold A. Hovey, United States Military Assistance: A Study of Policies and Practices (New York: Praeger, 1965), pp. 7, 34; memorandum, New Zealand Embassy, Washington DC, New Zealand Department of External Affairs, 30 December 1955, ANZ: EA1 120/5/1 Part 2. 131 William H. Mott, United States Military Assistance: An Empirical Perspective, Contributions in

96 aid being supplied between 1950 and 1965.132 Meanwhile Pakistan received the comparatively impressive total of US$729 million in just over a decade from 1954 to 1965.133 In all three cases the majority of this aid came in the form of outright Military Assistance Program (MAP) grants of equipment, training and the construction of facilities. Only towards the mid-sixties was a small proportion of this money used to subsidise the purchase of American equipment through the US Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program.134 The tangible results of this support quickly made themselves apparent as is illustrated by the example of Thailand. By 1960 the Royal Thai Air Force (RTAF) had received a total of 368 aircraft from the United States, including 31 F-84G jet fighter-bombers and 40 F-86F Sabre jet fighters, and approximately 600 RTAF officers and airmen had undergone training in the United States.135 Three Royal Thai Army infantry divisions had been raised and completely kitted out with American equipment while the rest of the Army’s units were estimated to be 75% so equipped.136 Even the small Royal Thai Navy (RTN) had received 37 naval vessels, including one destroyer and seven ex-US Coastguard cutters, and seen 740 of its personnel pass through training programs in the United States.137 In addition to all of this a Military Assistance Advisory Group (MAAG) consisting of 255 American military personnel and three civilians was operating inside Thailand itself.138 None of the other developed member states of SEATO could come close to matching this scale of effort. The United Kingdom did sell US$162 million worth of military equipment to Pakistan between 1954 and 1965 and maintained training links but even here there was little doubt of the pre-eminence that the US military relationship had acquired in the former British colony.139 The Pakistani Air Force (PAF) was almost entirely refurbished with American built aircraft with 130 F-86F Sabre jet fighters, 24 Martin B-57 jet bombers, 14 Cessna T-37 jet trainers and 22

Military Studies No. 218 (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 2002), pp. 223-4. 132 Ibid., pp. 236-7. 133 The South Asian Military Handbook (Washington DC: CIA/DIA/Department of State, 1973), p. V- 12. 134 Ibid; Mott, pp. 223-4, 236-7. 135 Monty D. Coffin & Ronald D. Merrell, The Royal Thai Air Force, Project CHECO Report (Honolulu: Directorate of Operations Analysis, HQ PACAF, 1971), p. 26; Library of Congress, United States (hereafter referred to as LC): The Declassified Documents Reference System (hereafter referred to as DDRS) microfiche (79) 448-D, State Department. 136 LC: DDRS microfiche (79) 448-D, State Department. 137 Ibid. 138 Ibid.

Lockheed T-33 advanced jet trainers being delivered between 1954 and 1961.140 This enabled the PAF to field eight operational jet fighter/bomber squadrons and one light jet bomber squadron by 1960.141 Pakistan also became the first country outside of NATO to receive the Lockheed F-104A Starfighter.142 Ten of these Mach-2 capable high altitude interceptors and two F-104B training versions were delivered in 1961/62 and replaced the piston-driven Hawker Furies of No. 9 Squadron PAF, thus eliminating the last British combat aircraft operated by the Pakistanis.143 The Pakistani Army did continue to draw most of its small arms from the United Kingdom but apart from artillery (where the venerable 25-pdr and 5.5-inch medium gun continued to give good service) British arms suppliers were rapidly supplanted by American ones in regard to ‘big-ticket’ items. By 1960 four of Pakistan’s six infantry divisions had been upgraded through MAP assistance from a “loose collection of battalion-sized combat units” to formations “organized, disposed and equipped to deal with the external threat”.144 Included in this assistance were 10,536 vehicles, 5,601 of which were 2.5- ton trucks, along with 90mm and 106mm recoilless rifles and man-portable 3.5-inch anti-tank rocket launchers.145 In addition to this 230 M47 Patton medium tanks, 200 M4A3E8 Shermans, 282 M24 Chaffee light tanks, along with large numbers of M36B2 Jackson tank destroyers and M3 half- tracks, had also been supplied allowing the formation of an armoured division and a number of independent armoured cavalry regiments.146 Pakistani armoured units were further reinforced with the delivery of 202 of the more modern M48 Pattons between 1961 and 1963 through yet another MAP funded contract.147 Even the Pakistan Navy (PN), which maintained the closest links of all three services with its British counterpart during this period, was not immune. While the United Kingdom continued to supply the PN with its principal surface combatants during the 1950s most of the ships acquired by the PN were paid for with MAP funds.

139 The South Asian Military Handbook, loc. cit. 140 LC: DDRS microfiche (79) 109-A, Agency for International Development. 141 Ibid. 142 John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965 (London: Ian Allen, 1979), p. 33. 143 Ibid; LC: DDRS microfiche (79) 109-A, loc. cit. 144 Ibid. 145 Ibid. 146 Ibid; Steven Zaloga, The M47 and M48 Patton Tanks, Osprey New Vanguard Series No. 31 (Oxford: Osprey, 1999), p. 22; Steven Zaloga, M3 Infantry Half-Track 1940-73, Osprey New Vanguard series No. 11 (Oxford: Osprey, 1994), p. 22; Steven Zaloga, M10 and M36 Tank Destroyers 1942-53, Osprey New Vanguard Series No. 57 (Oxford: Osprey, 2002), p. 42; Steven Zaloga, US Light Tanks 1944-84, Osprey Vanguard Series No. 40 (Oxford: Osprey, 1984), p. 25.

Four British destroyers, including two modern “Battle” class ships, were bought in this manner in 1955, while three Second World War era “O” class destroyers (originally transferred from the Royal Navy between 1948 and 1951) were returned to British shipyards for conversion into ASW frigates in 1957 courtesy of American MAP grants.148 In other words the question of military aid was already being more than adequately answered by the United States and its bilateral agreements with Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. Thus there was never any need for SEATO to institute a formal military aid program in its own right. Australia and New Zealand did implement limited military aid programs under the SEATO banner but again it was distributed on a bilateral basis. The Australian government set aside a specific SEATO allocation when drawing up its annual national aid budget and then divided this total between Pakistan, Thailand, the Philippines, and, from 1962 onwards, South Vietnam.149 The amount of aid provided paled into insignificance when compared to the American MAP – Australia spent a total of approximately 2.5 million Australian pounds on SEATO aid between 1956 and 1962.150 This is made even more apparent when one considers that Australian SEATO aid also covered SEATO civilian projects such as the SEATO Cholera Research Laboratory (established in Dacca in 1960), in addition to military assistance such as the training of a small number of Pakistani, Thai and Filipino officers and NCOs in Australian military institutions.151 New Zealand confined itself to ad hoc measures such as the establishment of a “SEATO Technical Training Fund” in 1959 to provide 25 places for Thai, Pakistani and Filipino NCOs to undergo technical training in New Zealand (in the event only the Thais took up the offer).152 In both cases the governments of Australia and New Zealand preferred to focus their aid activities on civilian and economic projects where, through the auspices of the Colombo Plan for example, they would get more diplomatic “bang for their buck”.153

147 LC: DDRS microfiche (79) 109-A, Agency for International Development. 148 James Goldrick, No Easy Answers: The Development of the Navies of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka 1945-1996, Papers in Australian Maritime Affairs No. 2 (New Delhi: Lancer, 1997), pp. 54-5. 149 Memorandum, Australian Department of External Affairs, [?] October 1964, NAA: A1838/1, 189/10/15 Part 1. 150 Ibid. 151 Memorandum, Australian Department of External Affairs, 3 August 1965, NAA: A1838/1, 189/10/15 Part 1. 152 Memorandum, New Zealand Department of External Affairs, 1 June 1960, ANZ: EA 1 120/17/2. 153 See Daniel Oakman, “The Seed of Freedom - Regional Security and the Colombo Plan”, Australian

The only occasion when something approximating a SEATO coordinated military aid program occurred happened as a result of an October 1962 decision to improve the Thai Provincial, Marine and Border Patrol Police’s counter-insurgency capabilities. This led to an agreement on the part of Australia, New Zealand, France, the United Kingdom and the United States to cooperate in the re-equipping of the Thai police forces in March 1963. The bulk of the equipment was supplied by the United States (communications gear, helicopters, etc) closely followed by Australia (70 jeeps), with France, New Zealand and the United Kingdom offering blankets, tents and other basic goods. As the United States had been solely responsible for aiding the Thai police forces up to that point, and given the rather token contributions made by the others, one is forced to speculate that this episode arose merely as a response to Thai concerns in the aftermath of the Laotian crisis (see chapter 7) by demonstrating the commitment of the non-regional members to SEATO and not from any real necessity.

Intelligence

The gathering and analysis of intelligence was one of the more important aspects of SEATO. An intelligence sub-committee was formed in 1955 and after its second meeting in July 1956 became a permanent fixture in the organisation, meeting on an annual basis thereafter.154 The SEATO Intelligence Committee (as it was referred to from 1959 onwards) was dedicated to the analysis of conventional military intelligence and its primary function was to produce an estimate of the communist military threat to the Treaty area for the MAG and MPO. As such it concerned itself with producing and updating the orders of battle of Treaty area states and the PRC, tracking developments in regional logistical networks and military infrastructure (such as new jet-capable airfields for example) and providing specialist studies on subjects ranging from potential communist invasion routes to targeting lists for SEATO air strikes.155 Broader intelligence, including all communist “subversive” activity, was

Journal of Politics and History, Vol. 46, No. 1, 2000, pp. 67-85; Oakman, “Politics of Foreign Aid: Counter Subversion and the Colombo Plan”, Pacifica Review, Security and Global Change, Vol. 13, No. 3, October 2001; Pearson, pp. 54-60. 154 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, loc. cit. 155 For example see the agendas for the Third and Seventh Intelligence Committee Meetings; minute, Australian Defence Committee, 21 February 1958, NAA: A1209, 1957/5961; minute, Australian Defence Committee, 8 September 1961, NAA: A1209, 1961/1032.

100 the proviso of the Committee of Security Experts (CSE), a separate body that answered directly to the SEATO Council Representatives.156 The CSE met twice a year and its work ranged from monitoring the growth of legitimate communist parties to estimating the scale and nature of communist guerrilla activity throughout the region.157 The latter was obviously of great interest to the military planners and the CSE “insurgency” assessments were incorporated into the work of the Intelligence Committee.158 In 1963 the CSE was replaced by the SEATO Intelligence Assessment Committee (IAC) during a reorganisation of the “civilian” side of SEATO.159 The IAC’s brief was essentially the same as its predecessor and the Intelligence Committee continued to rely upon it for information regarding the regional communist insurgent effort.160

Relations with the Baghdad Pact (CENTO) and NATO

The prospect of formal linkages between SEATO, the Baghdad Pact (later known as CENTO), and NATO grew out of talks held between the British Prime Minister and President Eisenhower during the former’s October 1957 visit to Washington.161 Both leaders had agreed that such linkages would be useful in strengthening the West’s overall position in regard to the Communist Bloc as well as invigorating the regional alliances outside of NATO – this included the Organisation of American States (OAS).162 That December the NATO Council gave life to these discussions by directing the NATO Secretary-General to write to his counterparts in OAS, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact to propose that they explore the possibility of low-level information exchanges.163 While little came of this approach as far as the OAS was concerned, both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact responded favourably.164 The SEATO Council of Ministers approved the NATO suggestion in principle and gave Secretary-General Pote Sarasin authority to begin negotiating the details of

156 George Modelski, “SEATO: Its Function and Membership”, in George Modelski, ed., SEATO: Six Studies (Sydney: F. W. Cheshire, 1962), pp. 23, 32-3. 157 Ibid. 158 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, loc. cit. 159 Memorandum, US State Department, 6 August 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 3296; Cable, US Embassy, Bangkok, to US Embassy, London, 1 May 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 1578, 59/250/6/22/2. 160 SEATO Record: 1954-1977, loc. cit. 161 Memorandum, Australian Department of External Affairs, [1958?], NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 162 Ibid. 163 Ibid. 164 Ibid.

101 such an exchange with the NATO Secretary General in March 1958.165 These negotiations resulted in a formal agreement between both parties in August 1959.166 The agreement provided for the exchange of information classified no higher than “confidential” (one level above the lowest SEATO security classification of “restricted”) and limited to that produced by the Secretariat-General – the agreement did not involve the MPO.167 In practice this amounted to the automatic distribution of the “Trends and Highlights” and “Background Briefs” periodicals produced by the Secretariat-General’s Research Services Office and the distribution of other documents on a case-by-case basis.168 The latter included economic papers, SEATO cultural activities and papers produced by the Committee of Security Experts.169 In return the Secretariat-General received similar material from NATO such as the weekly bulletin “Trends in Communist Propaganda”.170 At the same time as the NATO-SEATO “civilian” link was being established an approach was received from the Baghdad Pact expressing an interest in establishing a specifically military linkage with SEATO. The Permanent Secretariat of the Baghdad Pact sought to use those Baghdad Pact members (and the United States) who were also members of SEATO as a ready made “liaison group” to initiate discussions on a military linkage with SEATO. Thus the SEATO senior planners of the United Kingdom, United States and Pakistan were instructed by their respective governments in June 1958 to form a “Baghdad Pact Liaison Group” under the chairmanship of Pakistan.171 After some delay caused by the July 1958 revolution in Iraq and its subsequent formal withdrawal from the Baghdad Pact (24 March 1959), the SEATO Council Representatives approved the opening of informal discussions with this group in February 1959.172 These exchanges led to the submission of formal proposals by CENTO in

165 Agendum, Australian Defence Committee, 13 October 1958, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 166 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General Pote Sarasin to SEATO Council of Ministers Representatives, 21 August 1959, NAA: A9947/1, SCR/59/D-172. 167 Ibid. 168 Memorandum, Manila Treaty Branch, Australian Department of External Affairs, 12 January 1961, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 169 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General’s Office, 10 January 1961, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 170 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General’s Office, 3 July 1961, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 171 Note, Defence Liaison Branch, Australian Department of External Affairs, 20 November 1958, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 172 Letter, CMPO to MAG, 7 April 1960, NAA: A1209/100, 1960/511; Monro Mac Closkey, Pacts for Peace: UN, NATO, SEATO, CENTO, and OAS (New York: Richard Rosen, 1967), p. 116.

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October that year.173 After some amendments both the Council Representatives and the Military Advisers endorsed the proposals at their respective meetings in March and May 1960.174 The resulting agreement allowed for the exchange of documents classified no higher than “Confidential” and only where the information contained was deemed to be relevant to the receiver.175 This agreement produced little more than the exchange of documents similar to those that took place under the “civilian” agreement with NATO. Pakistan in particular was frustrated by this and the issue was revisited at the Seventeenth Military Adviser’s Conference (Bangkok, 16-17 October 1962).176 There it was agreed to recommend that the classification of documents to be exchanged be upgraded to include those classified “Secret” and “Top Secret”.177 This recommendation came with the qualification that such information be confined to specific points rather than complete plans or reports and that all “Secret” and “Top Secret” exchanges be individually approved by the Military advisers.178 These recommendations were formally approved by the Council Representatives in March 1963.179 Minor amendments would be made over the following years but this agreement would remain the basis for SEATO-CENTO relations from that point on. Despite these efforts, however, the actual flow of information was never significant and remained largely low-key. A request was received in November 1962 from the CENTO Combined Military Planning Staff for information regarding the PLA threat to East Pakistan from Tibet, via Sikkim and Bhutan, and China, via Burma.180 After much deliberation by the MAG a study of the problem based on verbatim extracts from a report tabled at the Eighth Intelligence Meeting was supplied in May 1963.181 This was the first occasion an exchange of information between SEATO and CENTO above “confidential” took place although the use of the word “exchange” should be tempered by the knowledge that SEATO never received (or for

173 Letter, CMPO to MAG, 7 April 1960, NAA: A1209/100, 1960/511. 174 Ibid; Memorandum, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 19 September 1962, NAA: A1838/346, TS682/5 Part 2. 175 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General’s Office, 19 October 1961, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 176 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General’s Office, 30 November 1962, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 177 Ibid. 178 Memorandum, SEATO Secretary-General, 26 December 1963, NAA: A1838/269, TS2493/4. 179 Ibid. 180 Chief of Staff, CENTO Combined Military Planning Staff, to CMPO, [?] November 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 14. 181 Memorandum, CMPO to MAG, 24 May 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 15.

103 that matter requested) similar material from CENTO during this period. In keeping with this trend exchanges of personnel were also strictly limited and amounted to no more than the occasional “courtesy call“. Plans for an official visit by the CMPO to CENTO headquarters in Ankara had been raised as early as 1959 but were never realised – scheduled visits by both Thornton and Wilton were invariably postponed and eventually cancelled. However the Chief of Staff, Combined Military Planning Staff, CENTO, Major-General S. E. Gee, US Army, and his Deputy (Administration), Brigadier Mahmud Jan, Pakistani Army, did manage a five-day visit to SEATO Headquarters in August 1964.182 Discussions with the then newly-appointed British CMPO, Major-General Hugh Anthony Prince, centred around the exchange of information regarding the Chinese communist threat to East Pakistan.183 There was also some discussion of the possibility of setting up a combined working party to look at ways the two organisations could coordinate air and naval defence of the SEATO western region but little appears to have come of this.184 The fact was that there was really very little in terms of relevant specific military information or practices that either organisation could offer the other. CENTO’s military planning was geared towards a full-scale conventional war with the Soviet Union in the context of a wider world war involving NATO. While the scenario of a full-scale invasion of South East Asia by the PRC and the DRV in the context of a Third World War was considered by SEATO, neither of the Western alliances would be capable of doing more than defending their own regions in the event of such a conflict. Conversely the whole raison d’être of SEATO, if not CENTO, was to prepare for and deal with the “lesser” regional conflict scenarios within its Treaty area on its own. There was nothing to be gained by sharing details of SEATO’s contingency plans for a North Vietnamese invasion of Laos with the Iranian and Turkish military nor could the latter benefit by sharing their plans for defending the Caucasus with Australia and the Philippines. Those nations that would need to prioritise their commitments in respect of both organisations such as Pakistan, the United Kingdom and the United States, were already perfectly positioned to do so by way of their dual membership of SEATO and CENTO.

182 Report, CMPO to MAG, 24 August 1964, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 16. 183 Ibid. 184 Ibid.

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Conclusion

In a little under a decade the military organisation of SEATO developed into a robust and substantial body capable of planning a credible defence of South East Asia and fostering the requisite level of cooperation needed between its members to put those plans into effect. This development was marked by a progression from a small and loose network of ad hoc committees set in motion by the MAG in February 1955 to a formal dedicated military infrastructure in the shape of the MPO in 1957 and the refinement of that structure over the following three years as experience revealed its strengths and weaknesses. The resulting re-organisation of the MPO in 1960 created a highly efficient and productive military organisation capable of fulfilling all of the tasks assigned to it by the MAG. These tasks included the drafting of operational plans for the defence of South East Asia, the scheduling and coordination of SEATO military exercises, the development of a standardisation program designed to insure a common framework of nomenclature and procedural techniques existed and the creation and maintenance of institutional knowledge about all aspects of the Treaty area. The work of the SEATO Intelligence Committee and the IAC complimented that of the MPO and informed and enhanced all aspects of the latter’s activities. The establishment of formal relationships with both CENTO and NATO, while an apparently obvious step at first glance, produced only limited benefits for all concerned in practice. That these three regionally focussed alliances should have little to talk about when it came to their core military function, namely the preparation of specific plans for the defence and defeat of communist aggression in their respective parts of the world, seems less surprising with hindsight. This will become readily apparent over the next two chapters where the plans that were at the heart of SEATO’s military preparations will be examined in detail.

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Chapter 4

SEATO’s Strategic Concepts

The Military Advisers agreed that before any substantial planning could take place the alliance members needed to agree upon a set of strategic concepts. Throughout 1955 and 1956 a series of Staff Planners' Meetings were held to produce this framework. These took place against the backdrop of a range of different strategic priorities brought to the meetings by each SEATO member. Some of these were complementary to each other while others were less readily reconciled. Invariably the initial positions of some SEATO states had to be modified to accommodate the wider concerns of the alliance as a whole. This chapter begins with a brief survey of the individual strategic concerns of the eight SEATO states before going on to examine the SEATO strategic concepts that arose from the Staff Planners' Meetings, and the degree to which these satisfied those individual concerns.

ANZAM and the defence of British Malaya

Even before the Second World War was over the United Kingdom had begun to give serious thought as to what sort of defence strategy would be required for the post-war era. Acknowledging the cost of two world wars to its economic and military might the British eventually sought to compensate for this in two ways: first, by doing everything they possibly could to retain and strengthen their wartime alliance with the United States, particularly in regard to the defence of Western Europe; second, by convincing the so-called “Old Dominions” to play a bigger role in the implementation, if not the formulation, of policies for the defence of the wider British Empire.1 This latter process was formally launched at the Commonwealth Prime

1 Within the context of the British Empire the term “Dominion” signified “a self-governing territory, formerly with colonial status, and enjoying free association with the United Kingdom”. It was first applied to Canada with the passing of the British North America Act in 1867 and later expanded at the 1907 Colonial Conference to include Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Rhodesia and Newfoundland (until the latter’s parliament was suspended by the UK in 1934). The common thread connecting these territories was that they had all been subject to significant European settlement. With the end of the Second World War and the impending independence of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka the term “Old Dominions” came into play as a means of differentiating between the established European core of the Empire and these newly independent states. At the same time the term “British

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Ministers' Conference in London in 1946 and was taken up with varying degrees of enthusiasm by the governments of Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand.2 By early 1949 the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand had agreed that Australia should take strategic responsibility for the defence of a region incorporating both Dominions and British Malaya (which included Singapore and Borneo) – the ‘ANZAM’ region - but little in the way of joint planning had taken place. At that stage British priorities placed South East Asia a very distant third behind the defence of the oil-rich Middle East and the United Kingdom itself in the event of a global war with the Soviet Union.3 Indeed both Australia and New Zealand had committed themselves to providing forces for deployment to the Middle East in the event of such a war, although the Australians avoided making specific force nominations.4 This rather sanguine approach towards South East Asia was gradually replaced by a sense of greater urgency in the aftermath of the communist victory in China and the outbreak of the Korean War. The communist insurgency that had plagued Malaya since 1948 suddenly seemed more ominous despite its failure to gain significant support outside of the ethnic Chinese population. Much to the United Kingdom’s chagrin, however, the Australian and New Zealand governments responded by concentrating on securing the ANZUS Treaty with the United States which they achieved in April 1952.5 Initial hopes on the part of the British that ANZAM

Commonwealth” slowly began to replace the term “British Empire” as more of the African and Southeast Asian colonies followed the Indian subcontinent into negotiated independence. See Alan Palmer, Dictionary of the British Empire and Commonwealth (London: John Murray, 1996), pp. 87-94, 109. 2 Devereaux, pp. 75-77. 3 For a comprehensive account of the immediate post-war British strategy in the Middle East see Michael J. Cohen, Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945- 1954 (London: Frank Cass, 1997). 4 New Zealand deployed No. 14 (Fighter) Squadron RNZAF to Cyprus from October 1952 to April 1955 and formally committed themselves to sending an augmented infantry division, ten RNZAF squadrons and whatever naval ships could be spared from the Pacific to the Middle East in the event of global war. Ian McGibbon, ed., Oxford Companion to New Zealand Military History (Auckland: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 318; In similar fashion Australia deployed No. 78 Wing RAAF to Malta from July 1952 to December 1954. No. 78 Wing comprised two fighter squadrons, a base squadron and a maintenance squadron. Alan Stephens, The Royal Australian Air Force, Australian Centenary History of Defence, Vol. II (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 222-3. 5 This chagrin stemmed from a complex mix of strategic self-interest and cultural sentiment. Evidence of the latter is best exemplified in Alan Burnett’s observation that “the ANZUS Treaty was negotiated at a time when some members of the [British] House of Commons found it difficult to concede that Australia and New Zealand had a right to enter into a defence treaty with a foreign power”. Alan Burnett, The A-NZ-US Triangle (Canberra: Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, 1988), p. 9; For comparative national accounts of the formation of ANZUS see M. A. McKinnon, "From ANZUS to SEATO" in New Zealand in World Affairs, Volume 1 (Wellington: New

107 planning could be merged within ANZUS through the inclusion of the United Kingdom in the pact were soon dashed by the Americans.6 By 1953 it was clear that ANZAM planning would have to be developed independently of the Americans and that, beyond the maritime boundaries established by the Radford-Collins Agreement, very little could be assumed about US involvement in the region.7 With the dust having finally settled around the ANZUS Treaty and the cessation of hostilities in Korea ANZAM planning began in earnest. The three governments agreed upon their shared responsibilities and objectives for the ANZAM Region at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference in June 1953 and the military implications of those decisions were thrashed out at a Commonwealth Defence Conference held in Melbourne that October.8 An ANZAM Defence Committee was formed with the existing Australian Defence Committee at its core and augmented by the presence of the Heads of the British and New Zealand Joint Service Liaison Staffs in Australia.9 Subordinate ANZAM intelligence and planning committees were also established on a similar basis with a strong weighting in favour of Australian personnel.10 Three separate geographical commands were set up: the Australian Maritime Area; the New Zealand Maritime Area; and the Malayan Area.11 Strategic responsibilities for the first two were fairly straightforward and largely left to the respective governments in both areas. The Malayan Area Command was complicated

Zealand Institute of International Affairs, 1977), pp. 117-42; Robert O’Neill, Australia in the Korean War, Volume I: Strategy and Diplomacy (Canberra: Australian War Memorial and Australian Government Publishing Service, 1981), pp. 185-200. 6 Although it should be noted that both Australia and New Zealand made it clear to the UK that given a choice between securing a defence treaty with the US that excluded the UK and not having a treaty at all they were happy to settle for the former. See McKinnon, pp. 121-7; O’Neill, pp. 192-3. 7 The Radford-Collins Agreement, named after Admiral Arthur Radford USN, CINCPAC, and Vice- Admiral John Collins, Australian Chief of Naval Staff, was a service level agreement signed in September 1951 by Radford, Collins (representing the British C-in-C Far East as well as Australia) and Commodore Frank Balance RN, New Zealand Chief of Naval Staff. The agreement was the culmination of months of discussions between Radford and Collins on the need to coordinate the respective American and ANZAM plans to protect sea communications in the Western Pacific. Accordingly the agreement concentrated on establishing joint protocols for the naval control of shipping in the event of regional or global conflict. These protocols included the acceptance of a maritime boundary between the ANZAM region and CINCPAC’s area of command. Collin’s role as chief negotiator was in keeping with Australia’s lead role in the ANZAM arrangement. Tom Frame, Pacific Partners: A History of Australian-American Naval Relations (Sydney: Hodder & Stoughton, 1992), pp. 85-7; David Stevens, ed., The Royal Australian Navy, The Australian Centenary History of Defence, Volume III (Melbourne: Oxford University, 2001), pp. 163-64. 8 L. MacLean, ANZIM to ANZUK; An Historical Outline of ANZAM (Canberra: Dept. of Defence, 1992), pp. 7-8. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid.

108 by its colonial status and the ongoing communist insurgency there. In the immediate post-war era the defence and security of Malaya and the surrounding colonial territories was the province of the British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East (BDCC-FE).12 Based in Singapore the BDCC-FE comprised the senior civilian colonial administrators and the Service Commanders-in-Chief and was responsible for both the internal and external security of those territories.13 ANZAM had been conceived as a mechanism to coordinate and prepare for external aggression only, and as such the counter-insurgency effort in Malaya was left under the control of the BDCC-FE although the latter body was now made subordinate to the ANZAM Defence Committee insofar as external security was concerned. This separation of responsibilities was soon put to the test by one of the first concrete outcomes of ANZAM planning, the formation of the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (BCFESR). First mooted at the 1953 Defence Minister’s Conference in Melbourne the creation of the Strategic Reserve was confirmed by the prime ministers of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom at a meeting in London in February 1955.14 It was to consist of an infantry brigade group (designated the 28th Commonwealth Brigade), naval forces up to carrier group strength and several fighter, bomber and transport squadrons.15 Most of the British contribution was assigned from forces already stationed in Malaya but for the Australians and New Zealanders it represented a significant, and potentially open-ended, peacetime forward deployment of a kind relatively unknown to both countries in their short histories.16

11 Ibid., p. 8. 12 Raffi Gregorian, The British Army, the Ghurkas and Cold War Strategy in the Far East, 1947-1954, Studies in Military and Strategic History, Michael Dockrill, ed. (New York: Palgrave, 2002), pp. 7-8, 26. 13 Ibid. 14 MacLean, p. 16. 15 Annex No. 1, Operation “Hermes” – Outline Plan, ANZAM Defence Committee Agendum No. 21/1956, 16 August 1956, NAA: A5954, 1460/3. 16 The contributions were as follows: Britain initially provided the 28th Commonwealth Brigade with its headquarters, two infantry battalions, a field artillery regiment and a field engineer squadron while Australia supplied an infantry battalion. New Zealand’s commitment was initially restricted to an SAS squadron until August 1957 when it finally agreed to raise an infantry battalion thus allowing the British to remove one of their battalions from the order of battle. With regard to the Strategic Reserve air component the Royal Air Force supplied two fighter-bomber squadrons, two medium transport squadrons, a photo reconnaissance squadron and a maritime reconnaissance squadron; the Royal Australian Air Force provided two fighter squadrons, one bomber squadron and an airfield construction squadron; and the Royal New Zealand Air Force sent one fighter-bomber squadron and a medium transport flight. Meanwhile all Royal Navy ships assigned to the Far East Station and based at Singapore were considered to be assigned to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve as well. Australia and New Zealand’s naval contribution consisted of two destroyers or frigates and two frigates respectively. Australia also agreed to send its sole aircraft carrier, HMAS Melbourne, on annual visits

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The primary role of the Strategic Reserve was to act as a deterrent against any external aggression against the Malayan Area but as a secondary role it was also tasked with assisting the counter-insurgency campaign against the Malayan communists as long as such assistance did not “prejudice” its primary role.17 This rather vague directive meant that in practice, particularly for the infantry of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, units assigned to the Strategic Reserve played a substantial role in the latter part of the Malayan Emergency.18 While the formation of the Strategic Reserve was being considered, the ANZAM plan for the defence of Malaya that it would underpin was progressing much faster. Based on the experience of the Second World War, the ANZAM planners quickly settled on the Kra Isthmus as the key to any successful defence of Malaya. The planners envisaged a line running from the port of Songkhla in the east to the town of Satun on the west coast, incorporating the communications and transport hubs of Hat Yai and Rattaphum, as being the optimum defensive position for Commonwealth forces on the Isthmus.19 The problem was of course that the Kra Isthmus belonged to Thailand, not Malaya, and if this line was to become a reality then Commonwealth forces would have to occupy a substantial swathe of Thai territory. This led to the development of two operational scenarios, one dealing with the defence of Malaya against overt aggression and the other with the defence of Malaya “short of” overt aggression. This latter scenario tackled the difficult proposition of what to do in the event that indigenous communist forces took control of Thailand without any significant help from the PRC or DRVN. The planners concluded that the threat posed by a communist Thailand to Malaya’s continued security was too great to ignore and that a pre-emptive strike aimed at securing the Kra defence line before communist control could be consolidated would be required. The result was Plan “Hermes” which called for two infantry divisions supported by 248 aircraft and 65 naval vessels to swiftly occupy the Songkhla line and defend it without further

to Singapore. In the event of actual hostilities both nations proposed to assign additional ships to the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. Ibid. 17 MacLean, p. 17. 18 For Australia’s military role in the Emergency see Peter Dennis, “The Malayan Emergency”, in Dennis and Grey, Emergency and Confrontation, pp. 74-6, 90-163; For New Zealand’s see Christopher Pugsley, From Emergency to Confrontation: The New Zealand Armed Forces in Malaya and Borneo 1949-66, (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2003). 19 Ibid.

110 assistance for at least a month.20 In the worst case scenario it was envisaged that Bangkok could deploy and sustain no more than 25,000 regular troops and 5,000 paramilitary police against Commonwealth forces in that time.21 Thai air and naval assets, whose US-backed modernization was in its infancy at that stage, were considered incapable of offering little more than token resistance. If for wider geo- political reasons the DRVN and PRC chose not to intervene directly it was felt that a newly installed Thai Communist government would be incapable of sustaining open warfare for long and that it would be forced to negotiate a ceasefire that left the new de facto border intact if not internationally recognized.22 If this did not occur and North Vietnamese and Chinese forces intervened “Hermes” would be expanded into Plan “Warrior” which called for a further four divisions plus corps and army troops to reinforce Malaya Command within six months.23 Furthermore the numbers of aircraft and naval vessels required increased to 681 and 222 respectively.24 In the case of an outright communist invasion of Thailand “Hermes” would be activated as the preliminary phase to “Warrior”. No attempt was to be made to assist the resistance effort of Royal Thai forces north of the Kra Isthmus since this might detract from or delay the implementation of these plans. In both instances the estimates of Commonwealth forces required rested on the assumption that while the US government would support the Commonwealth action it would not intervene directly.25 The planners also noted that the 20+ British battalions already engaged on counter-insurgency operations inside Malaya could not be spared for either “Hermes” or “Warrior” without risking a serious deterioration in the internal security situation there. While the lack of a firm indication of US intentions in such circumstances did lend a certain air of unreality to the work of ANZAM, it has to be remembered that little more than a decade had passed since the British Commonwealth had organized and fought a dozen campaigns from Libya to Madagascar without direct American involvement. As a principle its absence, while undesirable, was not necessarily fatal.

20 Operation “Hermes” – Outline Plan, ANZAM Defence Committee Agendum No. 21/1956, 16 August 1956, NAA: A5954, 1460/3. 21 Appendix ‘B’, ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Annex No. 3, “Memorandum on ANZAM planning for the defence of Malaya and South East Asia”, March 1955, NAA: A5954, 1460/3. 24 Ibid. 25 Operation “Hermes” – Outline Plan, ANZAM Defence Committee Agendum No. 21/1956, 16 August 1956, NAA: A5954, 1460/3.

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What really rendered the whole exercise academic were the very real discrepancies between the forces required and those actually made available by the ANZAM countries. While one of the two divisions needed for “Hermes”, the 17th Ghurkha Infantry Division, was formed from British and Ghurkha troops already in Malaya the other was supposed to be drawn from British home forces (i.e. the United Kingdom itself) which due to NATO commitments invariably restricted the forces available to those of the British Territorial Army.26 The mobilisation and dispatch of a Territorial infantry division to Malaya was estimated to take a minimum of at least six months, yet under the likely circumstances in which “Hermes” would be executed time was of the essence.27 Furthermore, given the strains already placed on the British Army by its commitments to NATO and the Middle East it was difficult to see how it could actually furnish, never mind deploy in time, this additional force requirement if global war really did break out.28 Similarly, the New Zealand Army’s top priority in the event of war supposedly remained the mobilisation and dispatch of an infantry division to the Middle East (and would remain so, at least in theory, until the Prime Ministers' Conference in February 1955 ).29 While Australia had always been more circumspect in its force commitment to the Middle East, it had nevertheless organised its post war Army on the basis of raising up to three divisions for overseas service if required.30 However it was expected to take six months to mobilise the first of these divisions for deployment and nine months to mobilise the other two.31 The New Zealand Division would also require six months to mobilise and deploy regardless of its destination.32 The reason for these lengthy mobilisation timeframes lay in the fact that neither the Australian nor the New Zealand Army possessed large regular units; both relied upon universal military service schemes to produce a semi-trained pool of reserves to flesh out what were otherwise paper formations in time of war - and even then, in Australia‘s case, those conscripted could only be compelled to serve inside

26 Gregorian, p. 173. 27 Ibid., p. 94. 28 Cable, Australian High Commission, London, to Department of External Affairs, Canberra, 8 June 1955, NAA: 1838/269, TS687/1 Pt. 4B. 29 Damien Fenton, A False Sense of Security: The Force Structure of the New Zealand Army 1946-1978 (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1998), pp. 38-40. 30 Albert Palazzo, The Australian Army: A History of its Organisation 1901-2001 (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 206-7; Gregorian, p. 199. 31 Annex No. 3, “Memorandum on ANZAM planning for the defence of Malaya and South East Asia”, March 1955, NAA: A5954, 1460/3. 32 Fenton, p. 40.

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Australian territory.33 Similar models had been the hallmark of Australian and New Zealand defence policies for the previous fifty years and had, Australia’s reservation regarding overseas service notwithstanding, proved effective enough in providing the basis for expeditionary forces for overseas service in both world wars.34 Yet unlike those conflicts the Australian and New Zealand roles would be crucial, as opposed to supplemental, to the British military effort if “Hermes” was to be successfully carried over into “Warrior”. Given the Australian and New Zealand mobilisation estimates, “Warrior” simply was not credible. Even “Hermes” looked doubtful with its reliance upon the prompt dispatch of an undesignated infantry division from the British home forces. At the very least “Hermes” and “Warrior” gave the ANZAM Defence Committee a realistic appreciation of the problems they faced in attempting to defend Malaya by themselves. When presented with these realities their respective governments did have the choice of opting to eliminate the credibility gap between their current force capabilities and those required by the two plans. In this regard some effort was made, at least insofar as “Hermes” was concerned. “Warrior” posed a more insurmountable problem, and even if the deployment of ground forces in the numbers and timeframe needed could have been realised the huge number of additional aircraft and naval ships required was clearly beyond the means of Australia and New Zealand and could only be supplied by the United Kingdom at the expense of its NATO commitments. There was only one other Western power in the Asia- pacific capable of dealing with threat scenarios on that scale – the United States. At

33 For further detail on Australia’s national service system see Palazzo, pp. 217-21, 237-45. For further detail on New Zealand’s Compulsory Military Training (CMT) scheme see Fenton, pp. 8-11, 40-7, 67- 9. 34 The Australian expeditionary forces sent overseas in the First and Second World Wars - the 1st and 2nd AIF (Australian Imperial Force) respectively - were drawn from volunteers only, although many of those volunteers had served, or were serving, in the Citizen Military Force (CMF), otherwise known simply as the Militia, in which men could be compelled to serve inside Australian territory. This distinction did become somewhat blurred with the Japanese entry in to the Second World War in December 1941. The definition of Australian territory at the time included that of Papua and the League of Nations Mandate of New Guinea (i.e. the former German colony - not to be confused with the adjacent Dutch New Guinea) and thus CMF units could be, and were, stationed there. These CMF units became caught up in the fighting as the Japanese thrust into the South West Pacific reached its crescendo in mid-1942, engulfing Australian New Guinea and Papua. Then in February 1943 the government of Prime Minister John Curtin extended the territorial obligation of the CMF to most of the South West Pacific Area. In addition to these events the Australian government also sanctioned a scheme whereby if 65 percent or more of the soldiers of a CMF unit voted to join the 2nd AIF then that unit was transferred to the AIF, and thus became liable for overseas service. In total approximately 206,000 CMF personnel volunteered to transfer into the 2nd AIF during the Second World War. Palazzo, pp. 140-153.

113 the Prime Ministers' Conference in London in late 1954 it was decided that the coordination of ANZAM and US planning for the region was essential to the future of ANZAM planning. To this end the Australian government broached the subject with the US in early 1955 and to their relief found the Eisenhower administration receptive to the idea. This led to the examination of ANZAM plans by the Chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Arthur Radford, and while the Americans did not reciprocate with their own plans Radford’s criticisms gave strong hints of American intentions towards Southeast Asia. As a consequence all three ANZAM countries placed SEATO at the forefront of their contingency planning for “Warrior”-scale conflict in the region. We turn now to the developments in US defence policy with regard to Southeast Asia that shaped the US approach towards the formation of an agreed set of SEATO strategic principles.

The USA

American strategy for the defence of Southeast Asia was shaped by the Eisenhower administration’s “New Look” defence policy. Concerned with preserving the United States’ economic strength in what was envisaged as being a decades-long struggle with the Soviet Union Eisenhower and his Secretary of Defense, John Foster Dulles, sought to expand the US nuclear deterrent while reducing the size of America’s conventional armed forces, particularly the Army. Massive retaliation became the mainstay of the US strategic posture. In an attempt to deflect criticism that this deterrent lacked credibility in preventing a limited war like Korea, the Eisenhower Administration sought to encourage and aid its allies to build up their own conventional forces and thus relieve the US of the responsibility for expensive and inflexible “garrison” deployments within their regions. As Eisenhower himself put it in the first volume of his presidential memoirs, published in 1963:

The logical role of our allies … would be to provide (with our help) for their own local security, especially ground forces, while the United States, centrally located and strong in productive power, provided mobile reserve forces of all arms, with emphasis on sea

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and air contingents.35

It was in this context that the Eisenhower government’s support for the creation of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact must be seen. Both alliances were viewed as useful mechanisms by which the build up of pro-Western regional conventional forces could be encouraged and given direction. With these regional forces in place American forces would be free to respond as and when circumstances required. However, the threat of massive retaliation remained the cornerstone of US defence policy. Dulles made this very clear:

Local defense will always be important. But there is no local defense which alone will contain the mighty land power of the Communist world. Local defenses must be reinforced by the further deterrent of massive retaliatory power.36

Thus the “New Look” defence policy, while acknowledging the need for a local, conventional, pro-western force deterrent against opportunistic aggression by local communist forces, effectively relegated those pro-western forces to act as little more than regional tripwires for an American nuclear response if faced with substantial Soviet or Chinese aggression. While there was a certain brutal logic to this from the American point of view, it was cold comfort to those US allies who were being asked to fulfil the tripwire role. Nagging doubts persisted among many of those allied governments over the continued credibility of the US policy of massive retaliation given the ongoing development and expansion of Soviet strategic nuclear forces. As the Soviets improved their capability to strike the continental United States, it became harder to believe that the US would risk such a strike by unleashing its own nuclear arsenal in response to conventional communist aggression short of global war. Indeed, many senior figures within the US, most notably the Army Chief of Staff, General Matthew Ridgeway, and his successor, General Maxwell Taylor, shared these doubts.37

35 Cited in Douglas Kinnard, President Eisenhower and Strategy Management: A Study in Defense Politics (Lexington, Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 1977), p. 10. 36 John Foster Dulles, “Massive Retaliation”, in Schuyler Foerster and Edward N. Wright, editors, American Defense Policy, 6th edition (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press), 1990, p. 294. 37 As the US Army was the service most likely to suffer cuts as a result of the New Look policy,

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These fears together with the realities of the geo-political situation inherited by Eisenhower combined to ensure that the New Look policy was never as rigid and all- encompassing in its execution as it was on paper. To begin with, Eisenhower and Dulles had to contend with already existing NATO commitments and the ongoing war in Korea. Tentative plans to scale back US ground forces in Western Europe had to be abandoned early in the administration’s first term in the face of vigorous opposition from Western European leaders, particularly West Germany’s chancellor, Konrad Adenauer.38 Eisenhower did succeed in keeping his election promise to end the war in Korea, but to the administration’s frustration the July 1953 ceasefire did little to reduce tensions in the area and the security of South Korea and Japan could only be guaranteed by the continued presence of the US Eighth Army. Nonetheless despite these concessions Dulles was determined to avoid any further erosion of the New Look policy. Insofar as Southeast Asia was concerned the American Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) wholeheartedly supported him. The JCS displayed no enthusiasm for any action that could lead to specific US force commitments to the region thereby reducing the US strategic reserve and restricting US strategic options. Indeed, the JCS did not undertake serious contingency planning for Southeast Asia in relation to SEATO until Dulles requested it in December 1954.39 The JCS then directed its Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) to prepare a study setting out what was required to effectively deter overt Chinese or North Vietnamese aggression in the area and what would be required to defeat such aggression if deterrence failed.40 In the case of the latter the JSPC was also told to provide for two options, one involving the use of nuclear weapons and the other involving

Ridgeway’s and Taylor’s concerns were initially dismissed as partisanship; as the decade wore on the senior leadership of the US Navy and Marines also became increasingly disenchanted with the policy’s ramifications. For more detail on the tensions and debate within the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Administration over the New Look policy see Maxwell D. Taylor, The Uncertain Trumpet (New York, Harper & Brothers, 1960). Outside of government the New Look policy provoked a great deal of scrutiny and criticism from American scholars and journalists including the likes of Henry Kissinger, William Kaufmann and Bernard Brodie, all of whom argued in favour of variations on the theme of flexible response, i.e., the ability to defeat or contain limited wars without resort to mutual nuclear annihilation. See Kinnard, pp. 45-7. 38 See David C. Large, Germans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 257-61. 39 Kenneth W. Condit, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Volume VI, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy 1955-56 (Washington DC: Historical Office Joint Staff, 1992), p. 222. 40 Ibid.

116 conventional forces only.41 The JSPC presented its report to the JCS on 25 January 1955, with its Army member dissenting from the majority view agreed upon by his Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps colleagues. That majority view held that:

The deterrent effect would derive from: the acquisition of bases in the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya through which US and allied forces would be rotated for training and familiarization; the holding of combined air and naval maneuvers in the Southeast Asia area; and public announcements stressing the determination of the United States and its SEATO allies to resist aggression.42

If this failed a communist invasion of the region could be stopped by immediate countermeasures against the aggressor’s own territory using US air and naval forces only. For instance, overt aggression by the PRC would be met with US air strikes against pertinent targets in mainland China and a blockade of its ports by the US Navy.43 This somewhat optimistic assurance was tempered by the qualification that it was predicated upon the use of nuclear weapons against those targets. If US forces were denied the use of nuclear weapons then, in a terse statement that all but conceded the impossibility of achieving victory without them, the JSPC majority simply noted that “the time to defeat the aggressor would be indefinitely extended.”44 By contrast, the Army member insisted that a balanced force of US air, naval and ground units was required to defeat either overt communist aggression or the “Viet Minh style” guerrilla operations used against the French in Indo-China. In the face of the former he estimated that the equivalent of 20 US divisions would be needed to overcome an invasion of Southeast Asia by the PLA.45 While assuming that the other SEATO members, particularly the regional ones, could build up and provide the bulk of this ground force, at the bare minimum the US would have to commit at least three American divisions to the fighting.46 The Army member felt that this estimate remained valid regardless of whether or not nuclear weapons were used. No

41 Ibid. 42 Ibid., p. 224. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid.

117 matter how effective the destruction of communist sources of supply in the short to medium-term the reality of the communist field armies would have to be confronted in the short-term. These armies could not be stopped, or at least delayed, by anything other than a credible SEATO ground force. With this end in mind the Army member advocated the stationing of no less than two US divisions in the Philippines as a deterrent to any such communist “adventurism”.47 Before this split report was received the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Lemuel C. Shepherd, further muddied the waters by declaring he could not concur with either view. While reluctant to see any of his elite amphibious divisions locked into the roles of conventional infantry and “squandered” in the defensive phase of any SEATO operation, General Shepherd nevertheless felt that the Air Force and Navy should not rule out intervention on the ground altogether.48 The potential for amphibious offensive operations by his Marines in the later stages of such a conflict needed to be explored first. One cannot help but suspect that Shepherd, as with any effective peacetime service chief, had spotted an opportunity to advance the interests of his own Corps and that this played some part in his objections. The Korean War had led to a dramatic expansion of the United States Marine Corps to a strength of three divisions and three air wings.49 Two of those divisions were stationed in the Pacific, with the 3rd Marine Division divided between bases in Okinawa and Hawaii while the 1st Marine Division, withdrawn from Korea in 1954, had relocated to Camp Pendleton in California.50 Although this expansion had been written into law with the passing of the Douglas-Mansfield Act in June 1952, and retained the support of a sympathetic Congress, the Eisenhower administration had made it clear to Shepherd that he could expect a call for large reductions in manpower before the President’s first term was over.51 Any additional role dependent upon the unique amphibious capabilities of his Marines would make Shepherd’s attempts to resist those cuts all the more compelling. Questions of motive aside, Shepherd’s argument did provide the basis for an

46 Ibid. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 Alan R. Millett, Semper Fidelis: The History of the United States Marine Corps, revised edition (New York: Macmillan, 1991), pp. 506-8. 50 The 2nd Marine Division was based at Camp Lejeune, North Carolina, and was responsible for providing the 2nd and 6th US fleets with amphibious forces for operations in the Atlantic and Mediterranean theatres. Ibid., p. 520. 51 Ibid., pp. 507, 518-28.

118 alternative solution to the impasse dividing the JSPC. The JSPC submitted its split report to the JCS on 25 January. The JCS (which included Shepherd when dealing with matters pertaining to the USMC), responded by directing the JSPC to revisit the issues and produce a new report that resolved them.52 While the JSPC did not quite manage to do this a compromise of sorts was reached, with the army still insisting upon the necessity of deploying US ground forces but conceding that they should be used in a manner “appropriate to the superior strategic and tactical mobility of US formations”.53 For their part the other JSPC members agreed to a role for US ground forces with the proviso that they not be employed in the initial defensive phase of the conflict.54 The JCS decided that they could live with the remaining ambiguity surrounding the JSPC’s position, and indeed went on to make a virtue out of it by using it as the basis for their memorandum to Dulles on the matter. That document, sent to Dulles on 11 February, summed up the US strategy towards the defence of Southeast Asia as one where aggression would be deterred or countered by “being prepared to retaliate promptly with attacks by the most effective combination of US armed forces against the military power of the aggressor”55. This sweeping statement was clarified in a briefing delivered by Admiral Radford to Dulles four days later. Radford made it clear that at a bare minimum retaliation meant hitting military targets inside those countries supporting or carrying out the aggression, and that such strikes would invariably require the use of nuclear weapons to be effective.56 A naval blockade of aggressor-controlled ports would also be implemented.57 Other possible actions included supporting a Chinese Nationalist invasion of mainland China from Taiwan or even opening a “second front” in Korea to divert men and material away from PLA forces invading Southeast Asia.58 Dulles, while noting the political difficulties surrounding the use of nuclear weapons in the region, nevertheless accepted Radford’s presentation.59 The United States would encourage and aid the build up of local SEATO armed forces while studiously avoiding any specific peacetime commitment of US forces to the region. In the event of large-scale communist aggression the primary American response would be to

52 Condit, pp. 223-4. 53 Ibid., p. 224. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid., p. 225. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

119 retaliate with air and sea launched strikes against military targets inside the aggressor countries, preferably using nuclear weapons. Any deployment of American ground forces would only occur in the context of decisive offensive operations in the latter stages of the conflict and then only if required (i.e. if the air strikes and naval blockade failed to force a communist withdrawal).

The JCS Review of ANZAM Planning

It was shortly after deciding upon this strategy the Americans received the request from Australia for the JCS to review ANZAM planning. This was agreed to and on 31 March a memorandum to that effect was received by the JCS.60 In outlining their plans the ANZAM members hoped to elicit a firm indication of their intentions from the US and thus lay the foundation for closer co-ordination between the four countries. Indeed the Australians, backed by the UK and New Zealand, had raised the possibility of establishing regular “four power consultations” to ensure that co-ordination. The response from Admiral Radford on behalf of the JCS failed to satisfy the recipients on either count. With the formation of SEATO, Radford insisted that regional planning could only be legitimately discussed within that forum and that the proposed four power consultations would be seen as nothing more than a “white man’s club” designed to exclude the Asian members of the alliance.61 As for American intentions, Radford’s reply contained little more than brief allusions to the need to defend Thailand and the Protocol states and the probability that nuclear weapons would have to be used if that defence was to succeed.62 Furthermore the JCS dismissed the ANZAM plans for the defence of Malaya, particularly “Warrior”, as fanciful, concluding that the ANZAM forces would be incapable of mounting a sustained and indefinite defence of Malaya should communist forces gain control of the rest of Southeast Asia.63 While acknowledging that the Kra Isthmus had a role as a defensive line of last resort, Radford emphasised that the best way to defend Malaya from external communist aggression was to ensure that it was stopped before it ever

59 Ibid. 60 “Review of ANZAM Planning by United States Joint Chiefs of Staff”, Australian Defence Committee Report, 30 August 1955, NAA: A1838/269, TS687/1 Part 4B. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

120 got that far.64 To that end he effectively admonished the ANZAM members to direct their energies towards the defence of the wider SEATO region.65 This blunt American response provoked initial disappointment and even outrage on the part of the Australian, New Zealand and British governments.66 They were understandably put out by the apparent reluctance of the Americans to share their plans for Southeast Asia’s defence, but the reality was that US contingency planning had not progressed to the detail provided for in “Hermes” or “Warrior” while the Eisenhower administration would not have wanted to share it in any case, even with allies as close as the ANZAM countries, for fear that revealing such plans would lead to calls for cast iron force commitments to the region. The ANZAM partners took the hint: SEATO was now the pre-eminent mechanism for coordinating the defence of Southeast Asia against communist aggression and the narrow fixation with Malaya would have to end. ANZAM would continue, but its role was now to guarantee the protection of Malaya while supporting wider regional SEATO goals. To that end “Warrior” was quietly abandoned and the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve was placed at SEATO’s disposal. Plan “Hermes” lingered on, an unspoken insurance against Thai instability until it too was cancelled in 1958 when developments in SEATO planning and the upsurge of American aid to Thailand made the likelihood of an internal communist coup too remote to be taken seriously.67 Thus by the time of the first SEATO Staff Planners' Meeting in May 1955 the United States and the ANZAM powers were moving towards a common approach to the defence of the SEATO Treaty area. The US was determined to implement the ‘New Look’ defence policy in the region. This meant building up the military capabilities of the frontline Asian member states - Thailand, Pakistan and to a lesser extent the Philippines - while at the same time resisting any calls for the prior commitment of US forces to the region, particularly ground forces. The US had no interest in contributing to the defence of British Malaya in isolation from its

64 Ibid. 65 Ibid. 66 Letter, Australian Minister of External Affairs to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 10 August 1955, NAA: A1838/269, TS687/1 Part 4B. 67 In early 1957 the British Chiefs of Staff in consultation with the BDCC(FE) recommended that “Hermes” be suspended and this was upgraded to outright cancellation after agreement by the UK, Australian and New Zealand governments the following year. Rear-Admiral R. S. Wellby, Head, UK Service Liaison Staff, to Secretary, ANZAM Defence Committee, Melbourne, 24 September 1957, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5982; Secretary, ANZAM Defence Committee, Melbourne, to Prime Minister’s Department, Canberra, 10 June 1958, NAA: 1209/23, 5982.

121 neighbours. This fact proved harder for the United Kingdom to accept than for its ANZAM partners, whose policies of forward defence were as readily served by Thailand as they were by Malaya. Nevertheless the United Kingdom did accept it and while it remained sensitive to proposals that threatened to interfere with its counter- insurgency campaign in Malaya its agreement to make the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve available for SEATO operations gave substance to its newfound interest in defending the Treaty area as a whole.

France

While the other non-Asian members of SEATO had been drawing up contingency plans for the defence of their regional interests in Southeast Asia, France had spent eight years waging a real war in pursuit of the same. At the height of the First Indo-China War the Corps Expéditionnaire Française d’Extrême Orient (CEFEO) reached a strength of approximately 245,000 personnel before the disastrous defeat at Dien Bien Phu destroyed the French government’s will to continue the fight.68 The French public had never shown any great enthusiasm for “La Sale Guerre” but they had tolerated it so long as the government refrained from sending conscripts to the CEFEO.69 This policy had meant that the war had been fought by French regulars, Foreign Legionnaires, North African and West African colonial troops and, of course, large numbers of locally-recruited Indo-Chinese auxiliaries.70 Nevertheless the strain imposed by the war on the French armed forces, particularly the Army, was considerable. Despite the use of proxy forces like the Legion 20,000 Frenchmen were killed during the conflict - a figure that included 1,900 officers.71 These losses were incurred trying to maintain the integrity of the French Empire, and while that aim had been severely damaged by events in 1954, the blow appeared to be far from being a fatal one at the time .72 While the Geneva Agreements had established a Viet Minh regime in North Vietnam that was uniformly hostile to France, those same agreements had codified France’s right to maintain the CEFEO

68 Martin Windrow, The French Indochina War 1946-1954 (Oxford: Osprey, 1998), p. 11. 69 George A. Kelly, Lost Soldiers: The French Army and Empire in Crisis 1947-1962 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1965), pp. 32-3. 70 Ibid; Windrow, pp. 13-20. 71 Jacques Dalloz, The War in Indo-China 1945-1954, trans. Josephine Bacon (Dublin: Gill & MacMillan, 1990), p. 185. 72 Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy

122 and station elements of it in the newly independent states of Laos and South Vietnam. Furthermore under Article 8 of the Geneva agreements France was also allowed to provide training missions to assist the development of the South Vietnamese, Cambodian and Laotian armed forces.73 France might have lost its imperial prerogatives in Indo-China, but there still appeared a very real chance of retaining significant political, as well as cultural, influence in those three fledgling states. The French premier, Pierre Mendès-France, signalled his government’s intentions in a statement issued during the Geneva Negotiations: “We shall stay in the Far East; let our allies and our opponents make no mistake about it.”74 These sentiments were quickly put to the test by three separate developments. The first was the unwelcome realization that the United States had no intention of continuing the levels of financial support that it had provided to the CEFEO during the latter stages of the First Indo-China War. That conflict, American aid not withstanding, had cost France almost eight billion dollars – nearly twice the amount received by France under the Marshall Plan.75 As Mendès-France’s government saw it the continued provision of a large French military force in Southeast Asia was not just furthering the interests of France but that of the entire West by deterring North Vietnamese or Chinese aggression against the three Protocol states. They felt it was unfair to ask France to bear the financial burden of this task alone. The United States had some sympathy for the French position and offered to support the CEFEO to the tune of $100 million in 1955, but this fell far short of French expectations.76 France was unwilling to make up the shortfall and instead opted to reduce the size of the CEFEO to a strength of 40,000.77 The training missions, which were separate, were unaffected by these cuts. At the same time France’s relations with the South Vietnamese government of Ngo Dinh Diem broke down as a result of Diem’s decision in early 1955 to crush the private armies belonging to the Cao Dai, Hoa Hao and Binh Xuyen sects. The sects

(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), p. 28; Kelly, pp. 61-4. 73 Cable, Australian Department of External Affairs, Washington to Canberra, 10 January 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS422/4/3/1; Canadian Delegation, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 March 1956, NAA: 1838/269, TS422/4/3/1. 74 Kelly, p. 53. 75 Gordon, p. 26. 76 Ronald H. Spector, Advice and Support: The Early Years 1941-1960, Official History of the United States Army in Vietnam, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, US Army, 1983), p. 238. 77 Ibid.

123 had supported the French against the Viet Minh and French disquiet at the manner and timing of their suppression was interpreted by Diem (with some justification) as an active attempt on the part of France to undermine his government.78 Diem responded by withdrawing South Vietnam from the French Union and insisting that the CEFEO leave his country.79 American attempts to convince Diem to reconsider his position failed. Dulles and the JCS had both initially feared that a French withdrawal would expose a weak and vulnerable South Vietnam to North Vietnamese aggression, but these fears were eased somewhat by the surprising efficiency and vigour displayed by Diem’s newly formed Vietnamese National Army in the operations against the sects.80 In any event Diem would not be budged and France, faced with a clear demand to leave, had little choice in the end but to go. The withdrawal of the CEFEO began in early February 1956 and was completed on 26 April when the Headquarters of the CEFEO in Saigon was formally disbanded and at Diem’s request the United States took over the training missions.81 The acrimony that surrounded France’s departure may be judged by the unseemly and ungrateful haste (in French eyes) with which the South Vietnamese military discarded French uniforms and martial traditions for American ones.82 The expulsion of the CEFEO from South Vietnam effectively left it with nowhere to go. The logistics infrastructure of the CEFEO had been based firmly in South Vietnam, as had most of its units. A land-locked Laos was too isolated and undeveloped to sustain any sizeable French force without a huge investment in its infrastructure, and by early 1956 France did not have the resources, even if it could have mustered the will, for such a project. By then, French attention was firmly focussed on a guerrilla war in Algeria that threatened to eclipse the scale of the First Indo-China War. The impact of the Algerian War on French defence and foreign policy during the latter half of the 1950s and early 1960s was all encompassing. Beginning in November 1954 when the Algerian nationalist group, the Front de la Libération Nationale (FLN), called for a general insurrection against the French authorities, the war in Algeria dragged on for more than eight years.83 By the time de Gaulle brought it to an end the conflict had cost more than 240,000 lives, including 25,000 French

78 Ibid., pp. 243-54. 79 Ibid., p. 253. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid., p. 254. 82 Ibid., p. 255.

124 soldiers, destroyed the Fourth Republic and bitterly divided the French public and military for a generation.84 Insofar as the French presence in Southeast Asia was concerned, the CEFEO quickly came under pressure to provide urgently needed reinforcements for North Africa. At the time of the FLN’s call to arms there were 60,000 French troops in Algeria – a figure that doubled to 120,000 nine months later.85 By 1959 this number had blown out to 418,000 and exceeded 500,000 the following year.86 Thus by 1960 more than half of the entire French Army was engaged in operations against the FLN.87 The implications of this were enormous. In sustaining this effort France all but abandoned its commitments to NATO. Having promised to contribute 20 divisions in 1952 the reality was that no more than two French divisions were available for NATO operations in 1959.88 Three mechanized infantry divisions (among the most modern French combat formations in the French Army at that time), originally earmarked for NATO’s central front, were instead dispatched to Algeria between 1956 and 1959.89 If this made a mockery of France’s NATO commitment it also sounded the death knell for any major military commitment to Southeast Asia. It is possible that with enough determination France could have overcome the financial rectitude of its American ally and the loss of its bases in South Vietnam and still retained a sizeable military presence in Southeast Asia, but the Algerian War rendered what would have been a difficult task an impossible one. France simply did not have the military capability to maintain a robust CEFEO in South Vietnam, meet its NATO commitments and fight a war in Algeria. Furthermore Southeast Asia came a very distant third behind Western Europe and Algeria in terms of practical defence priorities for the French. Thus by the end of April 1956 France’s military presence in the region was reduced to a single military airbase at Seno in Laos, two training missions attached to the Cambodian and Laotian armed forces, and a small transit

83 Ibid. 84 Windrow, p. 3; For detailed accounts of the Algerian War (in English), see Martin Thomas, The French North African Crisis: Colonial Breakdown and Anglo-French Relations, 1945-1962 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) and; Martin Alexander & John Keiger, eds., France and the Algerian War, 1954-62. Strategy, Operations and Diplomacy (London: Frank Cass, 2002); while Alistair Horne‘s work, A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962 (New York: Viking Press, 1978), still provides a solid introduction to the conflict. 85 Windrow, p. 8; Kelly, p. 151. 86 Gordon, p. 27. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid., p. 26. 89 Ibid., pp. 26-7.

125 facility in Saigon to support the three detachments.90 Although entitled to maintain a force of up to 3,500 personnel at Seno the garrison had dwindled to a total of 1,100 men by February 1957.91 This consisted of a single Senegalese infantry battalion and a pool of Armée de l’Air ground crew whose job was to provide technical support to the tiny Royal Laotian Air Force (RLAF).92 The training missions had a theoretical ceiling of 1,500 personnel each, but again this figure was never reached and appears to have hovered between 700-900 personnel in each case.93 France could offer little more than token military assistance to its former Indo- Chinese colonies after 1955, but this did not mean that the French government had abandoned its ambitions to remain a force in the region. For the remaining life of the Fourth Republic France refused to accept that the circumstances preventing it from playing the regional role to which it aspired were anything but temporary.94 France’s continued participation in SEATO was predicated on this assumption. Once the war in Algeria was won substantial French forces would again be available for possible deployment to the Far East, and until that day arrived France needed to prevent itself being locked out of the region’s emerging defence framework.95 Membership of SEATO guaranteed that the door would be kept open for France’s return as a regional power in Southeast Asia.

Thailand

Thailand’s post-war strategy was little different to its predecessors in that it focused primarily upon the preservation of Thailand’s territorial integrity and independence. Traditionally this had been achieved by the ruthless application of realpolitik in its dealings with both its regional neighbours and with the succession of great powers that had sought to dominate Southeast Asia at various times over the

90 Cable, Australian Department of External Affairs, Washington, to Canberra, 10 January 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS422/4/3/1; Cable, Australian Department of External Affairs, Saigon, to Canberra, 2 May 1956, NAA: A816/56, 7/361/67. 91 Memo, Australian Department of External Affairs, 17 April 1957, NAA: 1838/269, TS422/4/3/1. 92 Ibid. 93 Cable, Australian Department of External Affairs, Washington, to Canberra, 10 January 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS422/4/3/1; Canadian Delegation, International Commission for Supervision and Control in Laos, Vientiane, to Canadian Undersecretary of State for External Affairs, Ottawa, 26 March 1956, NAA: 1838/269, TS422/4/3/1. 94 Guy de Carmoy, The Foreign Policies of France 1944-1968, trans. Elaine Halperin (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 168-89. 95 Daniel Fineman, A Special Relationship: The United States and Military Government in Thailand,

126 previous three centuries.96 Certainly insofar as the modern era was concerned it was Thai political skill rather than martial prowess that had seen it escape the grasp of European imperialism. Even the Empire of Japan, a demanding and brutal master if ever there was one, failed to extract more than token participation from its Thai ally during the Second World War.97 The Cold War forced Thailand to rethink its reliance upon traditional machiavellian diplomacy to safeguard its security. Since 1932 the Thai military had dominated the nation’s politics and had fostered a keen sense of Thai nationalism through a number of devices such as the introduction of a national anthem, the discouragement of local dialects and foreign languages and the persecution of the local Chinese community.98 A brief period of civilian rule in the immediate post-war period was brought to an end in November 1947 by a military coup that restored the rehabilitated wartime leader, Field Marshal Plaek Phibunsongkhram (Phibun) to power.99 Phibun, a conservative Thai nationalist, recognised that communism posed a direct and un-negotiable threat to much of the Thai identity and culture he and his followers had ostensibly dedicated their careers to promoting (not to mention the continued survival of his military dictatorship).100 The growth in support for Mao Zedong and the CCP amongst the Thai Chinese community during this period helped to vindicate his regime’s stance in this regard.101 Earlier attempts by his civilian predecessors to reach an accommodation with communist movements in the region

1947-1958 (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), p. 195. 96 See David K. Wyatt, Thailand: A Short History (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1984). 97 See E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand and Japan’s Southern Advance 1940-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1994). 98 The Thai military’s anti-Chinese policy was based upon existing prejudices in Thai society. Traditionally the Chinese had played a part in Thailand’s mercantile life out of all proportion to their numbers and their success had provoked an equally historical anti-Chinese sentiment amongst the wider Thai population. Wyatt, pp. 217-19, 242-56. 99 Although the coup, led by the Royal Thai Army, took place in November 1947 Phibun did not assume the Prime Ministership until April the following year. This hesitation was due to lingering doubts on the part of Phibun and his supporters as to how the US and UK governments would respond to his return to power. Donald E. Nuechterlein, Thailand and the Struggle for Southeast Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 94-96. 100 Ibid., pp. 102-5; Wyatt, p 272. It should be noted that a recent revisionist work by Daniel Fineman questions the sincerity of Phibun’s anti-communist motives. Rejecting what he calls the conventional “Cold War thesis” put forward by Nuechterlein and others Fineman argues that Phibun’s actions remain within the traditional paradigm of Thai foreign policy and that they were motivated simply by the desire for military aid – from any quarter - to strengthen his regime. Fineman, pp. 3-6. 101 It should be noted that upon his return to power Phibun cracked down on any overt displays of Chinese identity be they Communist or Kuomintang inspired. However the success of the former in the Chinese Civil War saw Thai-Chinese support for Mao’s forces increase dramatically especially amongst the young and thus anti-communism became almost inextricably associated with older anti- Chinese prejudice by default. Nuechterlein, pp. 101-2; Wyatt, p. 267.

127 were abandoned, and in 1950 Phibun made two crucial decisions that effectively cemented Thailand’s alignment with Western interests in the region. In February of that year Thailand became the first Asian country to formally recognise the Bao Dai government of Indo-China, a government universally condemned by the rest of Asia as a French puppet regime.102 Five months later Thailand seized upon the outbreak of the Korean War to demonstrate its pro-western credentials by sending an infantry battalion, and later an air transport detachment and a small naval flotilla, to serve with United Nations forces.103 The price of this alignment was a reduction in Thailand’s diplomatic room for manoeuvre and an increase in reliance upon, and the importance of, military force. Thailand’s post-war armed forces were small, poorly trained and poorly equipped and one of the prime objectives of the Phibun regime’s pro-Western policy was to secure Western help in modernising its military. While the Korean expeditionary force was a resounding success from the diplomatic standpoint, it was also useful in developing a small group of officers with operational experience of both modern warfare and working alongside western allies such as the United States.104 Nonetheless this cadre could not mask, nor could it make up for, the widespread deficiencies of the Royal Thai armed forces as a whole.105

102 Thailand granted formal recognition of the French-controlled Bao Dai Vietnamese government on 28 February 1950. South Korea was the only other Asian state to ever recognise the Bao Dai regime. Fineman, pp. 102-13; Neuchterlein, pp. 106-7. 103 The Thai government was quick to respond to the UN Secretary-General’s call for assistance and on 20 July 1950 made the decision to send an infantry battalion. The Thai battalion arrived at Pusan on 7 November and went in to combat some three weeks later. Apart from a short period with the 29th Commonwealth Brigade the Thai Battalion was normally attached to American formations and approximately 4,000 Thai soldiers were rotated through its ranks before hostilities ceased with the signing of the Armistice in 1953. This initial commitment was soon expanded to include contributions from the other two services and the “Royal Thai Expeditionary Force to Korea” (RTEFK) eventually fielded the infantry battalion, an RTAF transport detachment (three C-47 Dakotas and an air medical team) and an RTN corvette unit (two frigates and a transport). In all the RTEFK suffered 236 battle casualties with the Army bearing most of them. However Thailand’s commitment to South Korea did not finish there and indeed remained a going concern long after the fighting had ended. Post-armistice the Thais kept their battalion in South Korea for a further three years before reducing it to a company- sized unit in July 1956. The corvette unit stayed in Korean waters until January 1955 and the RTAF transport detachment continued its duties with the UN Command for a further 23 years. The History of the United Nations Forces in Korea War, Volume VI (Seoul: Ministry of National Defense, ROK, 1977), pp. 349-78. 104 Fineman, pp. 117-8; Cable, Australian Embassy, Washington DC, to Canberra, 11 May 1953, NAA: A1838, 3010/12 Part 1. 105 As late as August 1954 an Australian Military Intelligence report on the Royal Thai Army noted that while the American instructors had made progress at platoon and company level the combat effectiveness of Thai formations above battalion level remained essentially non-existent. The report also observed that, with the exception of the infantry, the American re-equipment program had proceeded very slowly and most branches were still reliant upon obsolete Second World War-era Japanese equipment. For example the Royal Thai Army’s two armoured regiments operated a mix of

128

The danger posed by these continuing deficiencies was highlighted when the Viet Minh launched their first invasion of Laos in April 1953. This offensive had caught the CEFEO by surprise and for a few anxious weeks it appeared that the Viet Minh would reach the Thai border.106 In the event the French succeeded in halting the Viet Minh but the episode was a stark reminder to the Thai leadership of just how vulnerable Thailand remained when thrown back on its own resources. It also highlighted the strategic importance of Laos as a buffer state between Thailand and the newly emergent (China) and emerging (North Vietnam) communist powers to its north. Coupled with France’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu four months later this salutary experience saw Thailand redouble its efforts to speed up the flow and quantity of American military aid - joining SEATO certainly enhanced Thailand’s prospects in this regard. The next strategic goal for Thailand was to insure that its SEATO allies committed themselves to defending the Protocol states, particularly Laos, and, failing that, as much, if not all, of Thailand’s territory as possible

Pakistan

The biggest threat faced by Pakistan in 1954 was from India – at least insofar as the Pakistanis were concerned. The conflict between India and Pakistan arose from the bloody process of partition that accompanied their transition to independence in1947, particularly their inability to successfully resolve their competing claims of sovereignty over the State of Jammu and Kashmir (hereafter simply referred to as Kashmir). A UN-brokered ceasefire had been agreed to in January 1949 that left the bulk of the territory under Indian control.107 The ceasefire was supposed to be the preliminary step to a local plebiscite where the Kashmiris would finally get to decide the future of their state.108 The Pakistani government was confident that the Muslim- majority population of Kashmir would vote to join Pakistan.109 That this confidence

40 Japanese Type 95 HA-GO and 46 American M24 Chaffee light tanks while the artillery held 150 Japanese Type 38 75mm field guns as opposed to 68 American M2A1 105mm guns. Report, “The Thai Army”, Australian Army Headquarters, Melbourne, 25 August 1954, NAA: A1838, 3010/12 Part 1. 106 The Daily Telegraph, Sydney, 4 May 1953; Cable, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 5 May 1953; The Herald, Melbourne, 6 May 1953, NAA: A1838, 3010/12 Part 1. 107 S. M. Burke, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 33. 108 Ibid., p. 34. 109 Ibid.

129 was not misplaced is borne out by the fact that India subsequently refused to allow the plebiscite to go ahead.110 Further appeals to the UN Security Council and General Assembly were successfully thwarted or simply ignored by India.111 Similar efforts by Pakistan to raise the issue within the framework of the British Commonwealth also ended in diplomatic failure.112 In the face of such diplomatic isolation Pakistan was understandably worried by the military threat posed by India. There is no denying the fact that need to modernise and expand its armed forces vis-à-vis India played a large part in the decision by Pakistan to join both SEATO and the Baghdad Pact. However the problem of Kashmir and the threat of renewed conflict with India was not Pakistan’s only strategic concern. Pakistan’s relationship with its northern neighbour, Afghanistan, was also plagued with mistrust and suspicion. Pakistan’s border with Afghanistan was based on the colonial era “Durand line” established under the British Raj.113 This line split the traditional lands of the Pushtun (also sometimes referred to as Pathan or Pakhtun) mountain tribes in two, leaving a substantial minority under nominal British and later Pakistani control.114 In the lead up to Pakistan’s independence in 1947 the Pushtun-dominated Kingdom of Afghanistan had championed a proposal to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the Pushtuns living in what the Afghans somewhat provocatively termed “Pushtunistan” wanted independence or inclusion in either Pakistan or India.115 Despite the similarities with its own stance over Kashmir, the Pakistani government rejected these proposals on the basis that the North West Frontier Province (an artificial administrative entity created by the British that included the Pushtun tribal areas) had voted as a whole to join Pakistan – even though this vote had been boycotted by Pushtun separatist parties.116 From that point on the issue continued to poison Afghani-Pakistan relations. Afghanistan refused to accept Pakistan’s unilateral absorption of the Pushtun tribal areas and encouraged the growth of a separatist Pushtunistan movement.117 Ironically

110 Ibid. 111 Ibid. 112 Ibid., pp. 112-5. 113 Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London: Pall Mall, 1968), p. 141. The British Raj, incorporating the Hindi word for sovereignty, is often used to refer to the period of British colonial rule in India. Palmer, p. 288. 114 Ibid. 115 Richard S. Newell, The Politics of Afghanistan (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972), p. 67. 116 Brines, p. 141. 117 Ibid.

130 the fierce tribalism that was a hallmark of Pushtun culture prevented this movement from developing into a truly serious threat although there were sporadic outbursts of separatist violence and unrest against Pakistani authority in the tribal areas throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.118 More important than the comparative failure of the separatist movement itself, however, was the Pakistani suspicion that Afghanistan’s ongoing support for Pushtunistan arose out of an irredentist agenda.119 Thus it was with some alarm that Pakistan viewed the improving relationship between the Soviet Union and Afghanistan. Beginning in 1950, Soviet aid had steadily increased with each passing year culminating in a US$100 million loan in 1955.120 More ominously from the Pakistani point of view was the fact that part of the Soviet aid program was devoted to the modernization of the Royal Afghan Army and Air Force.121 Furthermore, the announcement of projects to construct all-weather road links between the Communist superpower and Afghanistan suggested a revival in Moscow’s ambitions towards the subcontinent not seen since Tsarist times.122 The Soviet threat was made even more plausible by Moscow’s undisguised courtship of India in preference to Pakistan.123 In this context the People’s Republic of China fell far behind India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union in terms of Pakistan’s strategic priorities. Nonetheless China’s invasion and occupation of Tibet in 1950, and the enthusiasm with which Beijing condemned its existing border with most of the subcontinent as being the result of “unfair treaties”, suggested that Communist China was every bit as expansionist as the Soviet Union.124 The Chinese proceeded to make claims on Nepal, Bhutan and parts of Assam that, if realized, could enable the PLA to directly threaten East Pakistan.125 Furthermore the Chinese did not recognise their 300-mile long border with Pakistani-controlled Kashmir and indeed on some occasions laid claim to all of Kashmir.126 While it is true that taken in their entirety the Chinese territorial claims caused more discomfort to India than Pakistan (much to the latter’s delight), the Pakistan

118 Ibid. 119 Burke, pp. 87-8. 120 Newell, p. 128; Brines, p. 141. 121 Brines, ibid. 122 Newell, pp. 128, 131-2. 123 Burke, pp. 98-101. 124 Ibid., pp. 105-6. 125 Ibid., p. 105. 126 Ibid., p. 107.

131 government in the early 1950s was nevertheless wary of the long-term ambitions of the PRC in the region. In addition to this, until the Sino-Soviet split became a reality Pakistan felt it could not ignore the possibility of the Chinese and Soviets supporting each other’s expansionist aims up to and including global war.127 Pakistan’s immediate strategic goal then was a fairly simple one – to build up the Pakistani armed forces to insure the territorial integrity of Pakistan against all-comers. Membership of SEATO and the Baghdad Pact was crucial in this regard, but these also gave Pakistan an equally vital deterrent and an array of powerful allies against communist, although not Indian, aggression.

The Philippines

The Philippine’s main security concern in the years leading up to its joining SEATO was to defeat its own communist insurgency, the so-called Huk Rebellion. The “Hukbo ng Bayan laban sa Hapon” (Anti-Japanese People’s Army), or “Huk” for short, had been formed by Filipino communists in 1942 and had waged a successful guerrilla war against the Japanese.128 Relations between the Huks and the newly independent post-war Filipino government deteriorated rapidly and in 1947 the communist led movement renamed itself the “Hukbo ng Magapayang Bayan” (People’s Liberation Army) and began a new guerrilla war against the authorities in Manila.129 The Huk threat had peaked in 1950 when the strength of the organization reached some 12,800 fighters, but thereafter the Filipino government’s counter- insurgency effort steadily reduced Huk effectiveness through a combination of military and civil action.130 The capture of the Huk’s leader, Luis Taruc, in 1954 signalled the end of serious Huk activity and although the communist movement did not disappear altogether Manila was confident that it now had the situation under control.131 The effect on the Philippines strategic focus was twofold. On the one hand

127 Ibid., pp. 91-5. 128 See Benedict J. Kerkvliet, The Huk Rebellion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), pp. 67, 93-5. Kerkvliet notes that claims made by the Huk leadership that they had killed 20,000 Japanese soldiers and Filipino collaborators during the war are given credence by contemporary reports from the US Sixth Army during its 1945 campaign on Luzon, which state that the Huks were the most effective resistance organisation on the island. 129 Ceferina Gay Hess, “The SEATO Alliance and Philippine-American National Security Policy (1954-1974)”, PhD thesis, Southern Illinois University, 1974, p. 216. 130 Ibid, p. 218; Kerkvliet, pp. 210, 236-7. 131 Kerkvliet, p. 234; Hess, p. 218.

132 it confirmed the staunch anti-communist outlook of the Filipino government and its genuine commitment to halt communist expansion in the region.132 On the other hand the internal security situation meant that the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) was geared towards counter-insurgency operations rather than conventional warfare. Given that the situation was still fragile, a wholesale reorientation of the AFP’s force structure towards large-scale conventional warfare did not seem advisable.133 In this regard the Philippines had the support of the United States, which was quite content for Manila to concentrate on ensuring the internal security of the country. From the American point of view the Philippines government was already making a valuable contribution to the defence of the wider region through its support for the continued presence of US bases in the country. These bases included Clark Air Force Base, Subic Bay Naval Base, and the San Miguel Naval Communication Station which were all located on the central island of Luzon.134 Clark Air Force Base was the home of the Thirteenth Air Force and Subic Bay was home to at least a third of the US Seventh Fleet at any one time.135 Between them these two bases provided the basis for any sustained American force projection into Southeast Asia. In short, they were crucial to the credibility of the United States’ avowed commitment to SEATO. The future of these bases had been initially secured by an agreement signed by the US and Filipino governments in March 1947 that, among other things, gave the Americans a 99-year lease for all their bases on Filipino territory.136 However this agreement was subject to Filipino domestic criticism almost from the moment it was signed. It served as a rallying cry for various opposition groups ranging from leftist Huks to right-wing nationalists.137 Given the sensitivities surrounding the issue it is not surprising that the Filipino government did not feel inclined to look too far beyond its own borders in terms of its strategic planning – nor was it asked to do so. That said the Philippines, like Thailand, had sent an infantry battalion to serve in the Korean War and it seemed reasonable to expect a similar gesture in the event of potential SEATO operations.138

132 Hess, pp. 131-33. 133 Ibid., pp. 233 134 Ibid, pp. 139-40. 135 Ibid. 136 Ibid., p. 137. 137 Ibid., pp. 143-5. 138 The History of the United Nations Forces in Korea War, Volume VI, pp. 309-28. The Philippines sent a 1,300-strong unit, the 10th Battalion Combat Team (BCT) to Korea on 19 September 1950. The battalion was attached to the 25th US Infantry Division and was in action by October. After a 12-

133

Creation of SEATO’s Strategic Concepts

While united in their general commitment to deter communist aggression in Southeast Asia the eight SEATO members entered the alliance with different security priorities. The United Kingdom was initially pre-occupied with the defence of Malaya as were Australia and New Zealand whose policies of forward defence were advanced by their association with ANZAM. The US was concerned with the entire region, albeit with particular emphasis on the Protocol states and Thailand, but was also determined to uphold the tenets of its ‘New Look’ defence policy in formulating its response to those concerns. France’s immediate strategic priority was simply to retain whatever influence it had left in the region. Pakistan sought to modernise and expand its armed forces in the face of perceived threats from India and Afghanistan as well as the Soviet Union and China. Thailand was also concerned with modernising its military forces and viewed the fate of the Protocol states as being irrevocably tied to its own. The Philippines was a little more sanguine, given the protection afforded by the oceans that surrounded it and the presence of the US Seventh Fleet, although its experience of the Huk insurgency made it wary of further communist advances in the region. Nonetheless, all parties realised that the first task in military planning facing SEATO was to replace these differences with a common strategic approach towards the defence of the region. This was an essential first step in establishing the military credibility of the alliance, and occupied SEATO’s planning efforts throughout 1955 and 1956 as the relevant issues were thrashed out over the course of three SEATO Staff Planners' Meetings before their final recommendations were accepted by the MAG at the Third Military Advisers' Conference (Baguio, September 1956).139 The first of those meetings was held at Bangkok between 25 April – 5 May 1955 under the chairmanship of the senior Filipino delegate, Brigadier-General P. A. Cruz.140 The focus was primarily upon the overt, as opposed to covert, communist military threat to the region. A paper summarising the AFP’s experience in dealing

month tour the 10th BCT was replaced by the 20th BCT in September 1951. In all a total of five BCTs were rotated through Korea before the last one, the 2nd BCT, returned home in May 1955. During that time a total of 7,420 Filipino soldiers saw service in Korea. Battle casualties amounted to a total of 468 including 112 killed in action. 139 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, 6 December 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776.

134 with the Huk insurgency was tabled but the planners were content to defer further discussion on the subject pending the conclusion of an ad hoc anti-subversion sub- committee that had been scheduled to begin two days before the Staff Planners meeting ended.141 This lack of urgency reflected the perception among most, if not all of, the SEATO members that the overt communist threat posed the greater and more immediate danger of the two. The apparent success enjoyed by the two SEATO members, the United Kingdom and the Philippines, in their counter-insurgency efforts against communist guerrillas within the region suggested that the situation was under control and could be explored at some leisure. Indeed the unilateral nature of the British and Filipino experiences suggested to some that beyond building up a common pool of counter-insurgency techniques and knowledge there was little required in the way of joint SEATO military planning on the subject. Thus attention quickly turned to establishing some basic parameters for future contingency planning against the overt communist military threat. A list establishing the order of priority for SEATO contingency planning was drawn up (see Table 4.1), with the defence of Thailand and the Protocol States at the top.142 This ranking was based upon the force projection capabilities of the PRC, DRVN and Soviet Union (which, with the possible exception of the latter, were largely confined to ground forces), and the invasion routes available to them.143 Burma presented an obvious problem in this regard, since it provided potential invasion routes into north-western Thailand and East Pakistan, and the suggestion was made that this, coupled with the fact that Burma was not protected by SEATO (and thus omitted from the list), could encourage communist aggression against it.144 West Pakistan faced a possible Chinese attack through Sinkiang and the Pakistani fear of a Soviet invasion via Afghanistan was also acknowledged.145 Malaya and the Philippines were placed at the bottom of the pile due to their geographical good fortune, with Thailand in the first instance and the South China Sea in the second providing comfortable buffers between themselves and the PRC and DRVN.

140 First SEATO Military Staff Planners' Meeting Report, 5 May 1955, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5850. 141 Enclosure 3, “Military Participating in Combating Communist Subversion”, ibid. 142 Item ‘D’, Ibid., pp. 4-5. 143 Ibid., p. 3. 144 Ibid., p. 2. 145 Ibid.

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Table 4.1: Priority Listing of Contingency planning for Defence of Treaty Area FIRST PRIORITY SECOND PRIORITY THIRD PRIORITY South Vietnam Pakistan Philippines

Laos Malaya Cambodia Thailand

In addition to the immediate territorial defence of the countries named in the list the planners also agreed upon a set of “Supporting Actions” to be implemented in the event of attack. These too were prioritised in order of importance. The first priority concerned the wider roles of SEATO air and naval power in the event of conflict. Both services were tasked with securing the air and sea lines of communication in the Treaty area while the naval forces were also charged with blockading the communist coasts and the air forces were to attack selected targets on the Chinese mainland.146 The second priority involved the coordination of psychological and unconventional warfare with the latter category defined as including guerrilla warfare, resistance movements and escape and evasion operations.147 The planners also set out some basic planning assumptions to guide future work. The first of these was that conditions short of global war would exist and that, with the exception of West Pakistan, the USSR would not overtly intervene although it would provide military material and advice to the PRC and DRVN.148 Furthermore attempts by the Chinese to cloak their aggression through the use of devices such as the re-labelling of PLA troops as “Chinese People’s Volunteers”, as in Korea, would not be allowed to succeed in shielding China from the full consequences of its actions.149 The aerial interdiction program against the Chinese mainland and the naval blockade of the communist coasts would be triggered by the intervention of any Chinese communist forces regardless of the status conferred upon them by Beijing. Finally the planners agreed that SEATO forces would employ nuclear weapons, but

146 Ibid., pp. 6-7. 147 Ibid. 148 Ibid., p. 7. 149 Ibid.

136 only if it was politically acceptable as well as military necessary. To this end they recommended that both nuclear and non-nuclear contingencies be prepared.150 Insofar as the communist forces were concerned the SEATO planners assumed that if the former possessed nuclear weapons then they would use them, although the Chinese and North Vietnamese were thought to be highly unlikely to either develop such a capability, or be supplied with it by the Soviets, for the foreseeable future.151 This first meeting laid the foundations of SEATO’s strategic concepts, and while it was refined over the next 12 months it remained in essence the blueprint for all that followed. On the basis of the priorities established at Bangkok the Second Staff Planners' Meeting (Pearl Harbor, November 1955) concentrated on developing a more detailed understanding of the military response required to defend South Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand and Pakistan (both the Philippines and Malaya were officially off the agenda by this stage). One of the main outcomes from this process was the recommendation that the defence of Thailand be studied in conjunction with the defence of the three Protocol states. The planners estimated that, if looked at in isolation, the defence of Thailand using conventional weapons only would require the deployment of 10 SEATO divisions, 668 aircraft, a carrier group and additional patrol, escort and mine warfare forces.152 Even then large areas of Thai territory would have to be abandoned with the SEATO force envisaged capable of merely consolidating a defensive line incorporating Bangkok and as much of central Thailand as possible.153 Further forces would be required before SEATO could launch a counter-offensive.154 This was clearly an unappetising prospect for the Thais, but it was also equally unappealing to the US and other SEATO members. For one, it assumed the complete and unopposed loss of at least Laos and South Vietnam to communist forces. Furthermore if supporting actions such as a naval blockade and air interdiction campaign against targets in the DRVN or PRC were to be effective, it was bizarre to suggest that they should not be implemented during an earlier phase of overt aggression against the Protocol states. Clearly the defence of Thailand was best

150 Ibid. 151 Ibid. 152 Of these forces Thailand could supply the equivalent of four infantry divisions, five fighter-bomber and one transport squadron, nine corvettes and an assortment of smaller vessels. The balance needed to be supplied by other SEATO states within 30-60 days after communist forces crossed the Thai border. Agenda Item “E”, 2nd SEATO Military Staff Planners Meeting Report, Pearl Harbor, November 1955, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5853, pp. 6-8. 153 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 154 Ibid., p. 7.

137 integrated into the defence of the Protocol States. The defence of Pakistan also posed problems, but these proved to be far more controversial than those concerning Thailand. The assumptions and threat estimates contained in the Pakistani planners report on the subject, while accepted at the Pearl Harbour meeting, subsequently caused some alarm amongst the other members of the MAG. The Pakistani report had concluded that in the early stages of global war West Pakistan faced an invasion by eight Soviet and four Afghan divisions through Afghanistan and eastern Iran, while a secondary attack by two PLA divisions would be launched through the mountain passes of Sinkiang.155 In addition to this the Pakistanis estimated that the Soviets had up to 1,400 aircraft available for operations against West Pakistan from bases in the Soviet Central Asian republics, of which 90 percent were said to be tactical fighters or bombers.156 While pointing out that “Pakistan has an abundance of man power, which includes some of the finest fighting material in the world”,157 the report went on to outline the minimum additional military support the Pakistani armed forces would require to meet this threat (see table 4.2). Equally telling was the inclusion of a short section entitled “Aspects of Pakistan’s economy”, which concluded by noting that it was “only too obvious that Pakistan’s economy would NOT permit [an] additional burden on its exchequer for defence purposes”158. The clear inference was that Pakistan could supply the manpower needed to meet these requirements – indeed at one point the paper specifically talks of “creating” the additional land forces – if others could supply the equipment or means to acquire it.

155 Agenda Item “F”, ibid., pp. 9, 16. 156 Ibid., p. 6. 157 Ibid., p. 8.

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Table 4.2 Estimated Additional Force Requirements for the Defence of West Pakistan

LAND FORCES AIR FORCES NAVAL FORCES 1 x Armoured Division 9 x Jet Fighter Squadrons 1 x Aircraft Carrier

1 X Armoured Recon Regiment 15 x Jet Bomber Squadrons 1 x Cruiser

5 x Infantry Divisions 8 x Light Jet Bomber Squadrons 4 x Destroyers

1 x Airborne Brigade 1 x Photo Recon (Jet) Squadron 12 x AA/ASW Frigates

1 x Long-range Transport Squadron 6 x Submarines

1 x Maritime Recon Squadron 3 x Ocean Minesweepers

12 x Coastal Minesweepers

12 x Inshore Minesweepers

12 x Motor Torpedo Boats

1 x Tanker

In light of this apparent shopping list Pakistan’s appreciation of the Soviet and Afghan threat it would face in the event of global war was met with much scepticism, particularly by the British. The British Chiefs of Staff were adamant that a Soviet invasion of the Middle East would concentrate upon seizing the oilfields there and this meant that West Pakistan was at best a secondary theatre for Soviet planners.159 Furthermore the fact that Afghanistan was receiving Soviet aid did not in itself automatically consign it to the Eastern Bloc. The US also had an aid program in place with Afghanistan and while this did not include military assistance the Americans had gone some way to balancing the Soviet influence in the Kingdom.160 The Afghan government itself had shown no marked desire to break with a policy of studied neutrality in favour of one superpower or the other. Finally the references to eastern Iran (accompanied by an assessment of Iranian defensive capabilities in that part of the country) were clearly out of place in a SEATO document since these were matters

158 Ibid., p. 12. 159 Memo, UK Commonwealth Relations Office, 25 May 1956, NAA: A1838, TS688/18 Part 3. 160 Beginning in 1949 with the granting of loans to assist in the Helmand Valley Project (a multipurpose agricultural/hydropower development scheme), by 1956 American aid to Afghanistan had reached an annual rate of $15 million. Having assessed Afghanistan as being unable to realistically defend itself against overt Soviet aggression no matter how much military aid it received, the Americans decided against supplying any on the grounds that it would merely provoke a hostile Soviet response towards Kabul. Instead the Americans concentrated on infrastructure and education projects and dominated the development of civil aviation in the country (most notably through the acquisition by the US carrier, Pan Am, of a 49% stake in Afghanistan’s national airline, Ariana). Newell, pp. 121- 3, 129-32.

139 that belonged to the deliberations of the Baghdad Pact, not SEATO. It was this last point that allowed the other SEATO members to effectively disavow much of the Pakistani assessment and its implications without having to openly embarrass the Pakistanis with a formal rejection. At the Third Staff Planners Meeting held in Singapore in June 1956 the planners agreed that the scale of the overt Soviet threat to West Pakistan in global war could not be accurately assessed without a wider appreciation of Soviet Middle East strategy, and that this was beyond the scope of SEATO to determine.161 However they also agreed that “a serious communist inspired and communist aided threat from Afghanistan does exist and, as a result of this threat, there is a danger of tribal uprising in the frontier areas which may lead to the outbreak of a limited war between Afghanistan and Pakistan”162. The sincerity with which this view was really held by Pakistan’s fellow SEATO members may be determined by the fact that the Staff planners also agreed that the force requirements needed by Pakistan to deal with this threat amounted to little more than had already been scheduled under the US military aid program.163 Nevertheless they did concede that SEATO would keep a watching brief on developments in Afghanistan and that the threat from that quarter would be reviewed if the balance of forces altered significantly.164 Within this context it was felt that a unilateral attack by Chinese forces from Sinkiang could be defeated by available Pakistani forces given the difficult nature of the terrain and the severe limitations it would place upon the size and sustainability of any PLA offensive effort.165 Another issue raised by the Pakistani report was its assumption of global war, an assumption that was not made in the other SEATO threat scenarios. Although the idea of incorporating global war into SEATO’s planning had not been ruled out at that stage, there was a growing consensus that it was probably unnecessary. The scale of commitment suggested by the term “limited war” was indeed misleading in some ways. The planners had already assumed that the military commitment of the Protocol States, Thailand and certainly the DRV in a limited or regional war would be nothing short of total. While a global war would undoubtedly strain France and

161 Agenda item “E”, Report of the leader of the Australian delegation to the Third Staff Planners' Meeting, 5 July 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/4260. 162 Agenda item “L”, ibid. 163 Report on Agenda Item “L”, Australian Defence Committee, 9 August 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/4260. 164 Ibid. 165 Ibid.

140

Britain’s ability to contribute forces, the US Thirteenth Air Force and a sizable portion of the US Seventh Fleet were already dedicated to the region while Australia and New Zealand had previously indicated their preparedness to raise up to four divisions under such circumstances in the context of ANZAM planning. If anything the availability of PLA forces for offensive action in the region would be decreased by more pressing strategic imperatives in Northeast Asia. On balance there really seemed to be little to choose between the two scenarios in terms of practical consequences. Thus there was no mention of global war in the two principal strategic concepts agreed to at Singapore: the defence of Southeast Asia, including East Pakistan, against overt attack by PLA and PAVN forces; and the defence of Southeast Asia (specifically Thailand and the Protocol states) against overt attack by PAVN forces only. Both concepts were broken into four phases with the first consisting of deployment and reconnaissance operations by SEATO ground forces coupled with vigorous SEATO air and naval supporting actions designed to prevent the total defeat of indigenous forces and to slow the communist advance.166 This was to be followed up with a consolidation phase in which essential areas and lines of communication would be secured and the main thrusts of the communist advance contained while preparations were made to launch a counteroffensive.167 In the third phase the SEATO counteroffensive would begin with the aim of liberating occupied territories and defeating the communist forces found there.168 Maximum use was to be made of SEATO’s perceived superiority in airborne and amphibious capabilities.169 Finally the last phase involved the expansion of the offensive into communist territory with the aim of destroying the remaining communist field forces and reducing “all communist operations in Indochina to at least guerrilla status” – in other words to invade and occupy North Vietnam.170 In both cases SEATO’s air interdiction operations would involve the use of nuclear weapons against targets in North Vietnam and, in the case of overt aggression by PLA forces, in Southern China.171

166 Agenda Items “B”, “C” and “D”, 2nd SEATO Military Staff Planners' Meeting Report, Pearl Harbor, November 1955, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5853; Agenda items “C” and “D”, Report of the leader of the Australian delegation to the Third Staff Planners' Meeting, 5 July 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/4260 167 Ibid. 168 Ibid. 169 Ibid. 170 Ibid. 171 Ibid.

141

These strategic concepts were subsequently endorsed by the MAG at the Third Military Advisers' Conference in September and formed the basis for the MPO’s initial programme of work the following year.172 With the exception of Pakistan all of the SEATO states could be pleased with the outcome. For the British the external security of Malaya was effectively provided for in the top priority given by SEATO to defending Thailand and the Protocol states. The United States could feel satisfied at having weaned the British (and by extension the Australians and New Zealanders) away from their fixation with Malaya and could feel equally happy with its apparent success in safeguarding the principles of the “New Look” policy through the emphasis given to air and naval supporting action including the use of nuclear weapons. The Australian and New Zealand policies of forward defence could be just as easily be accommodated to Thailand and the Protocol states as they could to Malaya and both countries were pleased that their principal allies, the US and the United Kingdom, were now working in tandem in the region. Thailand was reassured by the priority given to it and the neighbouring Protocol states in the SEATO strategic concepts and was now receiving more American military aid as a consequence of that emphasis. While the Philippines was not receiving a similar scale of assistance it could hardly complain about the focus on mainland Southeast Asia given that this ultimately satisfied its long-term strategic goal of preventing further communist domination in Southeast Asia and signalled an equally long-term American regional commitment to that effect. France had every reason to be content with the fact that while it had soon become painfully obvious that it had little to offer in terms of substance, it was nonetheless treated as a valuable participant throughout the proceedings. However in many respects the formation of the SEATO strategic concepts represented the easiest phase of SEATO military planning. In essence it was simply a matter of agreeing on the nature of the communist threat faced by the member states, prioritising their response accordingly and agreeing in the broadest terms possible what that response would be. The next step, operational planning based on those strategic concepts, promised to be a much tougher proposition. References to “SEATO” divisions and the like would have to be replaced with specific force contributions from member states, operational command structures would have to be decided upon and a more detailed or realistic assessment of objectives agreed to.

172 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, 6 December 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 57/4776.

142

Chapter 5 Planning for Limited War

With the establishment of SEATO’s strategic concepts and the creation of the MPO the stage was set to begin turning those concepts into viable contingency plans dealing with specific scenarios. Planning at this level would involve the acquisition of highly detailed knowledge of the region in general, equally detailed knowledge of the PLA’s and PAVN’s capabilities and potential objectives, the creation of scenario- specific SEATO responses and finally a willingness on the part of SEATO members to contribute the forces needed to carry out those responses. It was this last point that would prove the most difficult for the Alliance to deal with. This had much to do with the fact that the disparities in capability between the SEATO allies were so vast. While geography all but guaranteed that the entire armed forces of Thailand and Pakistan could be factored in to any scenario directly affecting them this could not be said for the other SEATO members. Non-regional members could share the burden of external force requirements for lesser scenarios relatively equally but the reverse was true for the larger scenarios. Inevitably this meant that if the United States was unable or unwilling to contribute the bulk of external forces required for contingency plans dealing with full-scale limited war involving the North Vietnamese and/or the Chinese then those plans became an exercise in futility. Initially nuclear weapons held out some promise of bridging the gap in the conventional forces needed for such scenarios but their utility became increasingly questionable as SEATO entered the 1960s and the American New Look policy was rejected by the incoming Kennedy administration. The MPO began work on its first operational contingency plan within weeks of its formal establishment in March 1957. Based on the conclusions of the Staff Planners meetings and the first two Intelligence Committee meetings priority was given to dealing with the threat of an overt invasion of the Protocol States by the DRVN. This resulted in the creation of “Plan 1” (the rather bland designation setting the precedent for all future SEATO operational plans). Plan 1 envisaged an offensive by no fewer than 12 PAVN divisions along three lines of advance. The main PAVN effort would involve a direct attack by eight

143 divisions across the 17th parallel with the port city of Tourane (Da Nang) as the immediate objective.1 Meanwhile three PAVN divisions would launch an attack through the highland passes into central Laos, seizing Thakhek, Savannakhet and the Seno airbase before switching south to follow the east bank of the Mekong.2 Northern Laos would be subject to a swift assault by Pathet Lao forces in situ supported by a single PAVN division with the aim of overrunning Luang Prabang and the capital, Vientiane.3 Such air and naval assets as were possessed by the North Vietnamese were expected to be used to support the ground offensive although their impact was predicted to be minimal.4 The 25,000 strong Royal Laotian Army (RLA) was assessed by SEATO intelligence as being incapable of defending the country against such an attack and even the RLA’s ability to mount significant delaying actions was questioned. Little hope was offered in regard to preventing the loss of most of Laos to communist forces due to this perceived weakness on the part of the RLA and the lack of geographical depth in relation to the long border it shared with the DRVN. This last factor meant that even by foot most northern and central Laotian towns and cities were within ten to twelve days reach of PAVN and Pathet Lao units.5 Accordingly the SEATO planners opted to concentrate on establishing defensive enclaves around Vientiane and the provincial capitals of Savannakkhet and Pakse, all of which hugged the Mekong River (and in the cases of Vientiane and Savannakkhet the border with Thailand as well).6 Once these were established the SEATO and surviving RLA forces holding them would have to wait upon events elsewhere to take their course before any operations to liberate Laotian territory were contemplated. Estimates of capabilities of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF) were more upbeat however, particularly in regard to the South Vietnamese ground forces: it was thought that with timely SEATO air and naval intervention the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) could delay the North Vietnamese long enough to

1 Extracts from SEATO Plan 1 attached to memorandum, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, Melbourne, 23 October 1957, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Pt 5. 2 Ibid. 3 The Pathet Lao forces in the northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua were estimated to be capable of fielding a total of 11 infantry battalions (each of approximately 500 men) and one heavy weapons battalion. Ibid. 4 Ibid. 5 Extracts from SEATO Plan 1 attached to memorandum, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, Melbourne, 23 October 1957, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Pt 5. 6 Ibid.

144 allow the insertion of SEATO ground forces into Tourane.7 Failing that the establishment of a second defensive line across the Plateau du Kontum forward of the communication hubs of Plei Ku and Binh Dinh would be attempted.8 Should this too prove untenable then as a last resort the planners provided for the creation of a final defensive perimeter incorporating Saigon and the port of Vung Tau, an option remarkably reminiscent of the Pusan perimeter of Korean War fame.9 Indeed, it was intended to serve the same purpose, the ultimate aim of SEATO being to take advantage of its naval supremacy and counterattack into North Vietnam via amphibious operations once its defensive lines stabilised and its build-up of the requisite offensive forces was completed.10 While the overall soundness of the SEATO response laid out in Plan 1 was accepted by all members one of the underlying premises of the plan – unilateral overt aggression by the DRVN against the protocol states – was increasingly questioned. In November 1957 the Third SEATO Intelligence Committee Meeting re-examined this assumption and completely revised its previous assessment. In effect they downgraded their estimate of Vietnam’s capacity for independent action by now insisting that “any aggression in South East Asia would need the approval of Russia and China”.11 This reassessment was understandable given the dramatic improvements in Sino-Soviet relations facilitated by P’eng Te-huai’s ascendancy in Beijing during this period. Instead it was felt that initial aggression by PAVN forces would simply represent an attempt by Beijing and Moscow to “test” SEATO’s resolve.12 As such, once it became apparent that SEATO would intervene Chinese, if not Soviet, military involvement was now deemed “inevitable”.13 In light of this new intelligence estimate the MAG agreed (out of session) that the MPO should cease all work on Plan 1 and redirect their efforts towards the creation of Plan 2 - “A Concept of operations for Defence against Initial Vietminh Aggression and subsequent Chinese Communist Intervention”.14 Once again the

7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Australian Delegation Leader’s Report, “SEATO Intelligence Ad Hoc Committee Meeting [INT3M], Bangkok, November 1957”, 9 December 1957, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 5. 12 Ibid. 13 Ibid. 14 H. M. Loveday, Australian Department of Foreign Affairs, Canberra, to J. Plimsoll, Australian High Commission, Singapore, 27 February 1958, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/12, Part 7.

145

Protocol states were assumed to be the primary target of North Vietnamese aggression, however the prospect of Chinese intervention was taken to signal the beginning of a dramatic escalation and expansion of the conflict that presented a clear threat to Thailand as well. In this regard Plan 2 clearly envisaged that this intervention by the Chinese would take the form of overt military aggression on a large scale with up to seven PLA armies and 400-500 aircraft estimated as being available for combat operations in Southeast Asia.15 A draft concept of operations for Plan 2 was completed by the MPO in January 1958 and, after minor amendments, was approved by the MAG at the Eighth Military Advisers' Conference held in Manila two months later.16 The MPO then proceeded to prepare a logistics and movement study in time for the Ninth Military Advisers' Conference in September.17 While the study was deemed satisfactory for the purposes of further refining Plan 2 the MAG also decided to set up a dedicated logistics working party to review it.18 Meanwhile the MPO was directed to incorporate the study into its development of Plan 2 and present a new draft, Plan 2/59, to the MAG for consideration alongside the logistic working party’s findings at the Tenth Military Advisers' Conference in March 1959.19 The basic ingredients of Plan 2 reflected those found in Plan 1 albeit on a larger and more detailed scale. Again Laos was to be largely abandoned to its fate in favour of the defence of key cities and river crossings along the Mekong River/Thai border.20 While this line shielded Thailand SEATO would also make a stand at Pakse in southern Laos thereby blocking any further advance by communist forces down the Mekong Valley into Cambodia and beyond.21 Da Nang was again selected as the best position to block the communist advance down the Vietnamese coast.22 Similarly the

15 These estimates of PLA forces available for operations in Southeast Asia were confirmed by the Second SEATO Intelligence Committee Meeting in Singapore in December 1956 and represented a considerable increase on the previously accepted strength estimate of five PLA armies and 400 aircraft issued by the First Intelligence Committee Meeting in July 1955. Annexure “A”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 28 February 1957, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 5; Draft report, “The Overall Overt Communist Threat to the Treaty Area”, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 8 May 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 3. 16 Report on SEATO MPO Plan 2/59, Australian Defence Committee, 10 September 1959, NAA: A2031/8, 90/1959. 17 Minute, Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, 24 March 1959, NAA: A8447/6, 32/1959. 18 Report on SEATO MPO Plan 2/59, Australian Defence Committee, 10 September 1959, NAA: A2031/8, 90/1959. 19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

146 early intensive air and sea interdiction effort by SEATO forces called for in Plan 1 was also a prominent feature of Plan 2.23 Finally the inevitable SEATO counter- offensive would still climax in an amphibious invasion of North Vietnam.24 However beneath these broad strategic brushstrokes there were also some significant differences. The threat posed by the PLAAF saw air defence being elevated to rank alongside interdiction in terms of importance for SEATO air operations. To this end a minimum of 60 all-weather fighters was required to protect the key centres of Da Nang, Saigon and Bangkok.25 This was in addition to the 160 aircraft the planners estimated were needed to provide adequate tactical air support to SEATO ground forces.26 Carrier strike forces located in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea were to contribute to these tasks throughout the defensive phase of the conflict.27 In addition to this the SEATO interdiction operations were expanded and modified with enemy airfields being assigned the highest priority upon the outbreak of hostilities. This included, as soon as PLA intervention was established, 11 jet-capable airfields in southern China (mostly on the island of Hainan) that were within operational range of the expected combat zones.28 Furthermore ports, communications centres, and all lines of communication in southern China connected with PLA operations in Southeast Asia were to be targeted for strategic air attack.29 These attacks, at least initially, would be carried out by high altitude medium bombers which in the opinion of the SEATO planners “could operate effectively over enemy targets without significant interference from MiG-15 and MiG-17 fighters”30. Planning for SEATO naval operations also had to be revised in the face of the increased threat of enemy action presented by Chinese intervention. While the capabilities of the PLAN did not alter the balance of forces as dramatically as did

23 Ibid. 24 Ibid. 25 Appendix “D”, Ibid. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid. 28 Five jet-capable airfields in North Vietnam were also to be targeted from the outset. Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid. While the available SEATO planning documents fail to give a more detailed description of the type of aircraft to be assigned to these missions the most likely candidate was the American Boeing B- 47 Stratojet. The B-47 was the only medium jet bomber in American service during this period and by the time the five year delivery program (397 B-47Bs and 1,341 B-47Es) was completed in 1957 the B- 47 equipped 27 wings of the Strategic Air Command. Marcelle Size Knaack, Post-World War II Bombers 1945-1973, Volume II, Encyclopedia of US Air Force Aircraft and Missile Systems (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, United States Air Force, 1988), pp. 111-46.

147 those of the PLAAF they nonetheless posed a number of problems for SEATO planners. The primary missions of SEATO naval units remained that of keeping the approaches to SEATO ports open (principally Bangkok, Saigon and Da Nang), defending sea lines of communication and supporting SEATO ground and air operations.31 To this was now added the task of interdicting enemy shipping in the Gulf of Tonkin and off the coast of southern Canton.32 Furthermore the SEATO Fourth Intelligence Committee had estimated that the PLAN’s South Seas Fleet possessed the ability to transport up to 10,000 men in a single operation.33 While the sea-lift capability offered by the number of specialised landing craft and ships held by the South Seas Fleet was lower than this, the assessment assumed that the PLAN would requisition large numbers of traditional coastal junks to supplement the former. There was a risk that the PLAN would try to carry out localised night-time amphibious operations in support of the PAVN/PLA coastal thrust into South Vietnam and thus the need to intercept any such attempts also had to be anticipated by SEATO naval forces.34 The biggest threat posed by the PLAN lay in its mine-laying capability rather than any capacity for direct confrontation with SEATO naval task groups.35 That said, as a precautionary measure the planners agreed that it was desirable, if not essential, to eliminate the PLAN FAC bases adjacent to the Gulf of Tonkin before SEATO naval forces were committed to the amphibious operations against North Vietnam that were at the heart of SEATO’s counter-offensive plans.36 The planners also assumed that the Chinese would commit the bulk of their Whiskey class submarines to the conflict. While there was some optimism that SEATO naval forces could swiftly neutralise the small PLAN submarine fleet this optimism was tempered by the

31 Appendix “E”, Report on SEATO MPO Plan 2/59, Australian Defence Committee, 10 September 1959, NAA: A2031/8, 90/1959. 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid. 34 Auxiliary and dedicated amphibious vessels had been used in this manner by Imperial Japanese forces during their rapid advance through Southeast Asia in 1942. Even in the face of total Allied air and naval superiority in the later years of the war the Japanese used such craft under the cover of night to maintain, albeit somewhat tenuously, lines of communication amongst their otherwise isolated garrisons in the Southwest Pacific. See Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Volume VI, Breaking the Bismarcks Barrier, 22 July 1942 – 1 May 1944 (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1950), pp. 48-9, 208, 239-43, 426-7. 35 Indeed, the mine threat was described as “considerable” with Saigon and Bangkok appearing to be particularly vulnerable given that both were river ports - the former being 36 miles from the sea while the latter was 42 miles. Appendix “E”, Report on SEATO MPO Plan 2/59, Australian Defence Committee, 10 September 1959, NAA: A2031/8, 90/1959. 36 Ibid.

148 possibility that the Soviet Union would not only make good any Chinese losses but actually increase its supply of submarines to the PLAN.37 The possibility was also raised that the otherwise ineffectual maritime strike capabilities of the PLANAF might be bolstered by the provision of Soviet Tu-16 Badgers complete with “volunteer” crews.38 In other words SEATO could not afford to be complacent in regard to its naval superiority, at least insofar as initial operations were concerned. This was reflected in the accompanying force estimates for Plan 2, which included a requirement for the maintenance of three carrier groups on station for the duration of the conflict.39 The estimated minimum force needed to sustain such a commitment amounted to six aircraft carriers, three cruisers, 36 destroyers and frigates plus an undetermined number of support vessels.40 On top of this it was felt that at least initially two dedicated escort groups of six ASW frigates each was needed to protect military convoys entering the South China, Java and Andaman seas en route to ports in Thailand and South Vietnam.41 These escort groups would be necessary until the PLAN submarine fleet was either eliminated or forced to withdraw from the theatre of operations. To hasten this process, or in the eventuality that the Soviets endeavoured to make up any Chinese losses, it was suggested that an anti-submarine group of three hunter/killer (SSK) submarines might also be needed (with a minimum of eight SSKs required to maintain the group on permanent station).42

37 Ibid. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. The SSK concept of a submarine specifically designed to find, track and destroy enemy submarines had been adopted by both the US Navy and the Royal Navy in the late 1940s. The US Navy was the first to produce a purpose-built SSK, the Barracuda class, between 1951-52. Disappointed at the Barracuda’s performance the US Navy cancelled the program after commissioning only three of the class into service. The Americans then opted to convert a number of Second World War era Gato class submarines into SSKs. The initial Gato conversion (“SSK Type I”) took place in 1951 and, pleased with the result, the US Navy proceeded to convert six more Gatos to “SSK Type II” standard in 1953. Thereafter however the US Navy began to lose its enthusiasm for dedicated diesel- electric SSKs as the prospect of fast nuclear powered attack submarines became a reality towards the end of the decade. In 1959 the US Navy finally abandoned the dedicated SSK concept and instead directed that all of its submarine fleet should in future be capable of carrying out anti-submarine operations. In that same year the Barracudas were stood down and re-assigned as training vessels. The British however retained the SSK concept throughout the Cold War. The Royal Navy commissioned its first purpose-built diesel-electric SSK, HMS Porpoise, in April 1958 and received seven more of this class over the next two years. The Porpoise class (not to be confused with the US Navy’s Porpoise class submarines of the inter-war period) was swiftly followed into service by its successor, the Oberon class SSK, in late 1961 and a total of 12 of these submarines were commissioned into the Royal Navy between then and 1967. The Australians also developed an SSK capability - In January 1963 the Australian government announced that it had decided to acquire eight Oberon class SSKs and the first of these, HMAS Oxley, was commissioned into the Royal Australian Navy in April

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While Plan 2 was the main focus of SEATO planning efforts throughout 1958 some thought was given to the possibility that the DRVN would set itself the less ambitious task of invading South Vietnam only. This scenario certainly held advantages for the DRVN in that it could concentrate its forces against South Vietnam and attempt to portray its actions to the international community as a war of national re-unification. Nonetheless SEATO intelligence estimates suggested that again Hanoi would not launch an invasion without the backing of Moscow and Beijing and on that basis Chinese covert support for the PAVN was to be expected if an attack limited to South Vietnam was launched.43 Accordingly in March 1958 the MAG agreed at their Eighth Military Advisers' Conference that the MPO should prepare a concept of operations, “Plan 3”, based on this threat scenario.44 This work was completed in time for its consideration at the Ninth Military Advisers' Conference later that year. However while the MAG accepted the concept of operations they were not convinced of the need to proceed any further with Plan 3. Instead it was felt that the scope of Plan 2 was broad enough to deal with this “lesser scenario” and thus the MPO was simply directed to take Plan 3 into consideration as part of its ongoing development of Plan 2.45 Thus after two years of work only Plan 2 had progressed beyond an initial concept of operations. Obviously there was nothing unusual in shelving a plan in the face of a radical revision of the underlying strategic assumptions (as in the case of Plan 1), nor was it unreasonable to recommend incorporating a lesser threat scenario into the brief of a larger one (as in the case of Plan 3). However as the work on Plan 2 reached an advanced stage it became clear that the United States and the United Kingdom were fast losing their enthusiasm for further work as the planners began to approach the point of calling for specific force contributions. This was due at least in

1967. John D. Alden, The Fleet Submarine in the US Navy: A Design and Construction History (London: Arms & Armour Press, 1979), pp. 59, 181-2; Norman Polar, The American Submarine (Cambridge: Patrick Stephens Ltd, 1981), pp. 85-7; Jim Ring, We Come unseen: The Untold Story of Britain’s Cold War Submariners (London: John Murray, 2001), pp. 41, 45-6, 83; Michael W. D. White, Australian Submarines: A History (Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992), pp. 195-7. 43 Minute, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, Melbourne, 26 August 1958, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/27/5. 44 Report, “Concept of operations for the defence of South Vietnam against Viet Minh aggression with Chinese Communist covert support”, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 29 August 1958, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/27/5. 45 Report, “SEATO – Review of MPO Planning”, Australian Defence Committee, 29 April 1960,

150 part to the growing consensus on the part of the planners that the impact of PLA overt intervention would be far greater than first thought. In particular the PLA field formations were felt to be less susceptible to SEATO air strikes than originally envisaged. This led to the inescapable conclusion that not only would the numbers of SEATO aircraft needed in the crucial defensive phases of the conflict have to be increased but that so would the numbers of SEATO ground units. Indeed under Plan 2/59 the revised estimate of SEATO ground forces required for the defensive phases of the conflict had risen to 25 brigade groups.46 While no official approach had been made to any SEATO member in regard to force contributions the planners had been working on the assumption that the 11 Royal Thai Army brigades that had been modernised with American military aid would be available for service under SEATO command.47 Without official confirmation of this availability however the British Military Adviser’s Representative was most vocal in insisting that this assumption be treated with great caution if not scepticism. Even if the Thai government was forthcoming on this issue it was quite clear that with the exception of the United States and, to all appearances the United Kingdom, the other SEATO members were then largely incapable of deploying brigade-sized formations to Indo-China in the timeframe required (Under Plan 2/59 half of the 14 non-Thai brigades were needed in-theatre within 40 days of its implementation and the balance within 85 days).48 In fact the Government of British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan was already secretly contemplating reducing its military commitments east of Suez as part of a wide-ranging review of British defence policy conducted by a special inter- departmental working group raised specifically for that purpose.49 Until this review was concluded the British were understandably loathe to enter into any discussion of specific national force contributions above and beyond the troops already in place with the 28th Commonwealth Brigade in Singapore. Premature and speculative

NAA: A1209/64, 60/447. 46 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, Melbourne, 10 September 1959, NAA: A2031/8, 90/1959. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 The group was named the “Future Policy Committee” and involved representatives of the three service ministries, the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the Commonwealth Relations Office, the Treasury and the Board of Trade. Set up in 1958 the Committee was expected to report back to the incoming government after the 1959 general election but failed to meet this deadline and did not complete its final report until mid 1960. See Philip Darby, British Defence Policy East of Suez 1947- 1968 (London: Oxford University Press, 1973), pp. 143-5.

151 revelations of British intentions in this regard could only serve to embarrass the United Kingdom’s standing within SEATO and harm its intimate defence relationship with Australia and New Zealand. Nonetheless since succeeding Anthony Eden as Prime Minister in January 1957 Macmillan had made it quite clear that the United Kingdom’s conventional forces would bear the brunt of defence cuts deemed necessary in the face of serious domestic economic problems. Macmillan and his Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, both embraced the idea that the most cost-effective defence policy for the United Kingdom lay with an emphasis upon strategic nuclear deterrence rather than large-scale conventional military forces. On 4 April 1957 after barely three months into his appointment Sandys had overseen the production of a new Defence “White Paper” that sent shock-waves through much of the British defence establishment.50 Amongst its many reform measures was the announcement that the British would phase out their national service scheme by 1962, reduce the size of their conventional forces accordingly and concentrate on developing intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and thermonuclear weapons.51 This approach bore some similarities to Eisenhower’s and Dulles’ New Look defence policy and it also faced similar problems, in that the British inherited a number of overseas military commitments that could not just be shrugged off on a whim, nor resolved by the application of nuclear firepower alone. NATO loomed largest in these considerations but there was also a bewildering array of defence obligations and strategic necessities arising out of the United Kingdom’s immediate imperial past. Insofar as the Far East was concerned Macmillan’s government had actually signed a treaty, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA), stipulating an ongoing defence relationship with the Federation of Malaya shortly after the latter’s independence in August 1957.52 As the Malayan Emergency drew to a close

50 C. J. Bartlett, The Long Retreat: A Short History of British Defence Policy, 1945-70 (London: Macmillan, 1972), p. 129. 51 Ritchie Ovendale, British Defence Policy since 1945, Documents in Contemporary History (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), pp. 113-5. 52 The Federation of Malaya Agreement that ushered in Malayan independence came into effect on 31 August 1957. This was followed by a drawn out attempt over the ensuing eight years to cement a place for the colony of Singapore (which was granted domestic self-government in November 1958) in the fledgling Malayan state. The reluctance of Malay leaders for such a move (based largely upon racial and political tensions in regard to having to absorb the mostly Chinese-populated island city) was eventually assuaged by a British offer to give their territories in Borneo the opportunity to join the proposed expanded federation. This led to the creation of the Federation of Malaysia, incorporating the Malay Peninsula, Singapore and the former British Borneo territories of Sarawak and Sabah, on 16

152 this treaty was accompanied by the withdrawal of some British troops, but the headquarters of the 17th Ghurkha Division and its subordinate brigade headquarters remained in place as did some of its Ghurkha battalions. This was taken by most of the United Kingdom’s defence partners in the region (SEATO members or otherwise) as a solid indicator of what to expect from the British in the event of a limited war there. Macmillan was in no way anxious to dispel this impression amongst his allies until such time as a definite decision on the Division’s future had been made. In fairness to Macmillan and his ministers the British were only contemplating reductions at this stage – not an outright withdrawal from the region. Indeed Singapore’s strategic importance as a British military base had arguably been given a new lease of life through the United Kingdom’s membership of SEATO. By 1959 almost four decades of sustained expenditure by the British government on the development of the base in Singapore had resulted in the creation of extensive military facilities covering approximately ten per cent of the entire island.53 Foremost amongst these was the only dry-dock between Sydney and Japan capable of accommodating an aircraft carrier.54 While the Malaysian and Singaporean political leaders had rejected any formal association with SEATO on the part of their newly emerging states, their defence agreement with the United Kingdom (and by extension Australia and New Zealand) provided sufficient leeway to allow the staging of British and Commonwealth forces mobilised for SEATO operations through Singapore and other British bases located in Malaya.55 To that end the United Kingdom’s ability to

September 1963 – the British Protectorate of Brunei having opted against joining. Unfortunately, as well as provoking conflict with Indonesia (which harboured ambitions of its own in regard to British Borneo), the new Federation failed to take root and after two years Singapore left it to finally secure outright independence on 9 August 1965. Despite this backdrop of constitutional and political uncertainty AMDA remained in effect throughout this period. Under AMDA the United Kingdom promised to guarantee Malaya’s territorial integrity against external aggression and assist in the development of the Malay armed forces. In 1963 AMDA was amended to extend its provisions to Singapore, Sarawak and Sabah and underwent a minor name change to become the Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement. Despite Singapore’s separation from Malaysia in 1965 the treaty was deemed to still extend to the new city-state and together with Australia and New Zealand (who had entered into formal association with AMDA in 1959) it continued until its replacement by the Five Power Defence Arrangement in April 1971. See Yeo Kim Wah and Albert Lau, “From Colonialism to Independence, 1945-1965”, pp. 117-53, in Ernest C. T. Chew and Edwin Lee, eds., A History of Singapore (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991); N. J. Ryan, A History of Malaysia and Singapore (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1976), pp. 253-305. 53 Bartlett, p. 162; In fact expenditure on improvements and major additions to the base facilities continued well into the 1960s. In 1959 alone the Macmillan Government authorised the construction of a purpose-built cantonment for the 28th Commonwealth Brigade at an estimated cost of £8-9 million as well as a £2-3 million upgrade of the RAF base at Tengah. Darby, pp. 211-12. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid.

153 incorporate these formidable facilities into any assessment of its overall contribution to the SEATO alliance boosted its credibility as a regional force and thus added crucial substance to its voice amidst the deliberations of the SEATO Council and the MAG. The fact that the British possessed a base capable of sustaining thousands of troops and hundreds of ships and aircraft made for a powerful psychological statement of intent – and as long as the British could avoid having to actually confirm the extent to which any specific SEATO force contribution of theirs would utilise the potential of Singapore the ambiguity would continue to work in the United Kingdom’s favour. The United States reluctance to be drawn on the question of force contributions was more straightforward and simply reflected the prevailing “New Look” doctrine established four years earlier under Dulles and Eisenhower. During the first few years of SEATO the Eisenhower Administration had managed to avoid any NATO-type questions of specific commitments due to the broad nature and slow pace of the work undertaken by the alliance in that period. However, this pace quickened with the creation of the MPO, and “in one sense… the MPO’s planning activities were too successful”.56 The Eisenhower administration appears to have been taken by surprise and clearly had not anticipated that SEATO would reach the level of operational planning exemplified by Plan 2/59 in such a short time. However, at the same time that this Anglo-American reluctance over Plan 2/59 was coming to the fore pressure to re-focus planning efforts elsewhere had also begun to emerge from a number of other quarters. Notwithstanding the strategic concepts agreed to in 1956, both Pakistan and the Philippines were becoming increasingly restless over the fact that the MPO had not even begun to consider contingency plans dealing with scenarios beyond those strictly confined to the Protocol States and Thailand. The Pakistanis continued to emphasise their fear of the potential threat from Afghanistan and the threat to East Pakistan through Burma at every opportunity. Furthermore, and to the surprise of many, the Philippines had become increasingly concerned at developments in Indonesia to the point where the Filipinos began to argue that SEATO should recognise Indonesia as a potential threat to alliance interests and plan accordingly. Pakistan and the Philippines also felt that planning for a regional, if not global, war involving Chinese conventional aggression against their

56 Byron R. Fairchild and Walter S. Poole, History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Chiefs of Staff and National Policy, Volume VII 1957-1960 (Washington, DC: Office of Joint History, Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2000), p. 219.

154 respective nations was still necessary and long overdue.57 Meanwhile the SEATO Intelligence Committee was beginning to express serious doubts in relation to the likelihood of the Chinese initiating a conventional war of aggression as envisaged by Plan 2/59. While they would not rule out the possibility of such a conflict occurring this was now estimated as being highly unlikely. The feeling was that if it did occur it would most likely emerge through a Chinese miscalculation in support of overt North Vietnamese aggression or covert communist operations in the region. Indeed, by 1959 the latter type of conflict was receiving much more serious consideration by both the MPO and the MAG than the original strategic concepts had allowed. This was due largely to the apparently swift deterioration of the domestic situation in Laos in favour of the Pathet Lao. Such was the urgency with which SEATO viewed these events that before the year’s end the MAG had directed the MPO not only to draw up a specific contingency plan for intervention and counter-insurgency operations in Laos - Plan 5 – but to make that plan the MPO’s top priority (see next chapter). In view of all these factors support emerged for what amounted to a new catch-all contingency plan against communist conventional aggression in the SEATO region – Plan 4. This new plan would go a long way towards placating the Pakistanis and Filipinos while at the same time giving the Americans and the British valuable breathing space in regard to the question of specific force contributions while the MPO planners were forced to go back to the drawing board. Indeed, with the increased emphasis on counter-insurgency planning and a commensurate decrease in emphasis on the limited conventional war covered by Plan 2 the Americans and British could, with some confidence, expect to avoid the issue for at least another couple of years. That said, the creation of the proposed contingency plan should not be viewed as an entirely cynical enterprise. There were sound operational reasons for considering a broader conventional war than that found in Plan 2, not the least of which was the delicate question of Burma’s role in such a conflict. As early as 1956 SEATO planners had recognised that Burma was a potential gateway for a Chinese invasion of either East Pakistan and/or north western Thailand. If one assumed that

57 Preliminary report on SEATO Twelfth Military Advisers Conference by Vice-Admiral Roy Dowling, RAN, Australian Military Adviser, to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 2.

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China was prepared to go so far as to launch a conventional war against the Protocol States and Thailand, it seemed a little naive to imagine that Beijing would hold the sovereignty of Burma above the dramatic military advantage to be gained by opening up another front against Thailand. Furthermore, to gain this advantage China did not necessarily even have to formally violate Burma’s borders but merely gain legitimation for its actions from that impoverished and fragile country’s government. Indeed Beijing had a reasonable casus belli of the sort that may have proved persuasive to the wider international community if not Rangoon: The presence of Chinese Nationalist irregular forces in Burma’s Keng Tung state. Referred to somewhat optimistically as the “93rd Division” by their supporters in Taiwan in reality this force consisted of a few thousand men, including a number of local Burmese recruits.58 While they had carried out raids into Yunnan in the early 1950s this Nationalist “guerrilla” group had long since degenerated into general banditry and by 1960 showed far more enthusiasm for controlling the area’s opium trade than liberating mainland China from the communist yoke.59 A 1953 attempt to repatriate the Nationalists, brokered by the Americans, had only been partially successful and a stubborn, though dwindling, remnant had successfully resisted subsequent efforts by the Burmese military to eliminate them.60 Nevertheless this thorn in US, Burmese and Taiwanese relations had appeared to be fading of its own accord until Chiang Kai Chek sought to revive the group in the wake of Mao’s disastrous “Great Leap

58 Chinese Nationalist soldiers began crossing into Burma and French Indo-China from Yunnan Province in December 1949. While the French moved quickly to disarm and intern the Chinese troops entering their territory the Burmese government, already plagued by half a dozen separatist and communist insurgencies, proved incapable of carrying out similar action. The weak response from Rangoon gave the shattered Nationalist forces in Burma the opportunity to reorganise themselves and assert de facto control of a number of villages and areas on the border with China, Laos and Thailand. General Li Mi, former Nationalist commander of the 8th Army, assumed command of the remnants of that army along with survivors from the 26th Army and the original 93rd Division. By April 1951 this force, merged into a new 93rd Division, contained approximately 4,000 Chinese Nationalist soldiers in its ranks. See Victor S. Kaufman, “Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan, and the 93rd Nationalist Division”, The China Quarterly, No 166, June 2001, pp. 440-2. 59 Ibid., pp. 441-5, 448. 60 For a brief period between 1951-53 the 93rd Division was covertly supported by the CIA who had hoped it would act as a catalyst for anti-communist resistance in Yunnan and thus help undermine China’s war effort in Korea. Although raids were launched by the Nationalists all ended in complete failure and as the Korean War drew to a close the Americans, under whelmed by the Nationalist’s performance, began to view them as more of a liability in Washington’s relations with Burma than an asset in the effort to contain Communist China. All American aid ended in mid-1953 and Eisenhower began to press Chiang to agree to evacuate the troops to Taiwan. Only after Burma appealed to the United Nations, much to the United State’s embarrassment, did Chiang reluctantly agree to repatriation. This was carried out over eleven months beginning in September 1953. Although more than 5,700 Nationalist soldiers, including General Li, left Burma as a result more than 2,000 remained behind with some taking temporary refuge in Laos until it was safe to return. Ibid, pp. 446-51.

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Forward”.61 Two years of American diplomatic pressure to persuade Chiang to end his support for the Nationalists in Burma followed but to no avail.62 By October 1960 the Burmese government’s frustration at the lack of progress on the issue boiled over and in that month the Burmese Prime Minister, U Nu, signed an agreement with the PRC sanctioning joint-border operations against the Nationalists that would allow PLA forces to operate up to 12 miles inside Burmese territory.63 The agreement was exactly the sort of development SEATO planners had feared in relation to Burma. Beijing now had official sanction for its troops to operate inside Burmese territory and, with the door thus opened, what was to stop the Chinese from utilising this cover to their full advantage in the advent of a region-wide conflict? This action prompted an immediate response from the Americans and the incoming Kennedy administration took a far tougher line with Chiang over his support for the Nationalists in Burma than Eisenhower had. The palpable anger from Washington, which for the first time hinted that military aid to Taiwan was now in jeopardy, finally forced Chiang to change course and in February 1961 he agreed to end his support of the 93rd Division.64 With the swift cooperation of the Burmese and Thai governments approximately 4,400 Nationalist irregulars and their dependants were repatriated to Taiwan between March and April 1961.65 An estimated 1,000 refused to leave but as part of his agreement with the Americans Chiang severed all remaining ties with them.66 It was in the context of these events that the MPO had to develop SEATO’s strategy towards Burma under Plan 4 and the shock of Burma’s agreement with the PRC on joint-border operations reverberated through the work that followed. After receiving an out-of-session directive from the MAG the MPO rushed to prepare a position paper on the need and desirability for Plan 4 in time for the Tenth Military Advisers' Conference in Wellington in March 1959.67 In this task they were

61 Chiang saw the disastrous effects of Mao’s Great Leap Forward as an opportunity to exploit the social upheaval and return to liberate the mainland from communist rule. Accordingly he resumed sending supplies and personnel to the Nationalist irregulars in Burma in late 1958 and together with fresh waves of Chinese refugees fleeing the famine in Yunnan the 93rd’s numbers increased to an estimated 5-6,000 by 1960. Ibid., pp. 449-50. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid., pp. 450-1. 64 Ibid., pp.451-3. 65 Ibid., p.453. 66 Ibid. 67 Annex “D”, Report of Australian Military Adviser, MA12C, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 1.

157 only partially successful in that, while the paper was completed, it was felt the Military Advisers did not have enough time to study it properly before the conference began.68 Indeed, it was not until some six months later that the creation of Plan 4 was formally approved at the Eleventh Military Advisers' Conference in Bangkok.69 In part this delay was due to a dogged defence of Plan 2/59 on the part of Australia. The Australians argued vigorously throughout most of 1959 against the need for Plan 4, especially as it became clear from the SEATO deliberations before the Eleventh Military Advisers' Conference that the bulk of the MAG had begun to favour the outright replacement of Plan 2 with Plan 4. The Australians rejected the ‘miscalculation’ scenario, arguing that war on the massive scale envisaged by Plan 4 could only occur as a premeditated act on the part of the Chinese.70 As the SEATO Intelligence Committee’s latest assessment was that such a premeditated act of aggression was highly unlikely, the Australians felt that the potential threat did not warrant the effort SEATO now proposed to spend on it – especially when the alliance’s contingency planning for smaller but more likely conflict scenarios had not been completed.71 Certainly there was a recognition amongst the other SEATO members that Plan 4, as proposed, lacked the flexibility to deal with smaller scenarios. The issue of independent conventional aggression by the DRVN towards the Protocol States alone was revisited in this context and led to the suggestion that a new plan to deal with this scenario, Plan 6, be developed.72 By this stage the first indications that all was not well between the Soviet Union and the PRC had begun to filter through to Western intelligence agencies and this led SEATO to question the level of influence the latter had previously been thought to exercise over the DRVN. The outcome of the power struggle between the “red” and “expert” factions in Beijing in 1959 certainly gave pause for thought, given that it was a complete reversal of the triumph enjoyed by the pro-Soviet “expert” faction over the pro-Maoist “red” faction in Hanoi a few years earlier.

68 Ibid. 69 Preliminary report on SEATO Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference by Vice-Admiral Roy Dowling, RAN, Australian Military Adviser, to Prime Minister Robert Menzies, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 2. 70 Annex “D”, Report of Australian Military Adviser, MA12C, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 1. 71 Ibid. 72 Minute, “Review of MPO Planning”, Australian Defence Committee, 29 April 1960, NAA: A1209/64, 60/447.

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Although not the official object of the exercise the creation of Plan 6 would supply a suitably intermediary contingency plan to bridge the gap between the low- level SEATO response activated by Plan 5 and the “all or nothing” response activated by Plan 4. Having accepted the rationale behind Plan 4 the logic behind Plan 6 was self-evident to most of the MAG and approval to develop the plan was granted at the Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference in Washington DC in May 1960.73 In light of this decision, the military advisers also agreed that while the MPO was to continue to give first priority to the development of Plan 5 the second priority would now go to Plan 6, leaving Plan 4 at the bottom of the list.74 An Australian suggestion that the Plan 6 scenario could be adequately covered by turning Plan 2/59 into a two phase plan (the first dealing with aggression by the DRVN only and the second dealing with any subsequent overt intervention by the PRC), failed to attract support and in the end the Australians reluctantly endorsed Plan 6.75 In doing so the fate of Plan 2, the second to last item on the conference agenda, was sealed and the MAG directed the MPO to cease all work on it.76 Thus by the middle of 1960 SEATO had settled upon three contingency plans of which one, Plan 5, dealt with counter-insurgency while the other two, Plans 4 and 6, remained focussed upon conventional conflict. Plan 5 had top priority, and as will be seen in the next chapter it underwent swift and substantial development from its beginnings in 1959. A significant factor in this development was the willingness of both the United Kingdom and the United States to nominate specific force contributions for Plan 5. This change of heart was partly borne out of the desire to avoid a repetition of the rather embarrassing filibustering tactics both nations had been reduced to in response to the looming call for contributions to Plan 2. The comparatively small size of the SEATO forces required by Plan 5 as opposed to Plan 2 also encouraged the Eisenhower and Macmillan governments to act positively in this regard. However, the potential SEATO force requirements of both Plans 4 and 6 remained a sensitive issue for both governments. The long-term confidence in the Alliance by the smaller members, particularly the frontline Asian states, was invariably tied to this question and endless delay on the part of the United States and

73 Appendix ‘B’, ibid. 74 Report, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 11 September 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1097. 75 C. T. Moodie, Assistant Secretary, to Secretary Heydon, Australian Department of External Affairs, 1 July 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 1. 76 Vice-Admiral Roy Dowling, RAN, Chairman, Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, to Prime

159 the United Kingdom was simply not an option. While it is possible that a new Republican administration under Richard Nixon would have changed its position on this matter (and Eisenhower’s newfound willingness to declare its contribution to Plan 5 suggests that the door, however grudgingly, would have henceforth been open in this regard), the American election victory of John F. Kennedy in November 1960 signalled a true sea change in the United States’ approach to SEATO as a military alliance. The rejection of the New Look policy by the Kennedy administration in favour of one of flexible response inevitably meant larger US conventional forces, and accordingly rejuvenated the American military’s approach towards limited war. The ripple effect of these changes was quickly felt in SEATO. While the priority given to Plan 5 was not initially affected, the development of Plans 4 and 6 was injected with a new sense of energy and purpose.

SEATO and Nuclear Weapons

At the Fourteenth Military Advisers' Conference (Bangkok, 22-25 March 1961) the MAG directed that the MPO should proceed with the development of Plan 4 to the stage where force contributions would be dealt with.77 The ensuing debate over this question quickly spilled over into what became the first serious reconsideration of the exact role that nuclear weapons should play in SEATO military planning. The idea that SEATO was prepared to use nuclear weapons against both the DRVN and PRC if required had been accepted in principle as far back as the Second SEATO Staff Planners' Meeting in 1956. This was certainly the assumption upon which the SEATO strategic air offensive component of plans 1 and 2 rested. During the development of those two plans the MPO and the SEATO Intelligence Committee did create a list of potential targets for air attack, but this was of a general nature and was never specifically integrated into either contingency plan. Nonetheless, a consensus on the type of targets to be selected for nuclear air strikes was established. Original estimates tabled by the Americans at the Second Staff Planners' Meeting in 1956 suggested there were approximately 50 targets in southern China and North Vietnam “suitable” for attack by nuclear weapons, with at least half of these

Minister Robert Menzies, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6 Part 2. 77 Report on MA14C, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 18 April 1961, NAA: 5799/17, 32/1961.

160 categorised as first priority targets.78 The latter included jet-capable airfields and other transport and communication hubs and their destruction was aimed at establishing SEATO air supremacy as swiftly as possible and destroying any capacity for strategic movement by large sized communist forces.79 Secondary targets for nuclear strike included major supply depots, storage facilities and troop staging areas not already targeted as a by-product of the first priority targets.80 The aim of the secondary targets was to seriously damage, if not destroy, the ability of the PLA to maintain those forces already in the field.81 The delicate question of how to reconcile this targeting policy with the fact that many of the targets were invariably to be found next to or inside large population centres was dealt with bluntly:

The SEATO problem is to select the proper munition to destroy or neutralize the selected targets. It is not so much a problem to decide whether or not to use a general purpose munition filled with TNT or one filled with fissionable material, as it is to decide the correct amount of destructive force required to destroy the target under consideration. It is not desirable to over-destroy or kill needlessly. Rather, it is the SEATO aim to attack only those targets, with the proper destructive munitions, the neutralisation or destruction of which will help attain the SEATO goal.82

To this end the Americans identified an additional 75 targets in southern China and North Vietnam suitable for strategic air attack that only required the use of conventional munitions.83 They were also at pains to point out that their atomic arsenal contained a range of weapons with varying degrees of destructive power. While this included thermo-nuclear weapons whose yields were measured in megatons – clearly capable of destroying a major city – it also included weapons of much lower yields including so-called ‘tactical’ bombs of ten to 20 kilotons.84 The

78 Item “G”, “Attack on selected targets of the Chinese Mainland in support of military operations in the Treaty area”, 2nd SEATO Staff Planners' Meeting, Pearl Harbour, 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/5853. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid. 84 By the mid-1950s the United States Air Force nuclear arsenal included a wide variety of fission

161 inference was that SEATO’s nuclear doctrine was a strictly utilitarian one and SEATO would not engage in so-called ‘counter-value’ targeting (i.e. the identification of large civilian population centres as legitimate targets in and of themselves). This distinction would probably have been lost upon those Chinese or North Vietnamese civilians unfortunate enough to live in cities possessing a major port or large railway marshalling yards. The case of Hanoi in particular demonstrates that the adoption of a utilitarian nuclear doctrine by SEATO still amounted to a virtual death sentence for hundreds of thousands, possibly millions, of civilians. Hanoi was recognised as being the crucial bottleneck for all main routes, including road and rail, connecting China with Vietnam and together with its airfields contained a number of first priority targets.85 Partly because of this transport nexus it also featured a large number of facilities that qualified as secondary priority targets.86 From a strictly utilitarian standpoint it made more sense to attack the city once with a high-yield fission or thermo-nuclear bomb, thereby eliminating all targets in a single blow, instead of conducting a series of attacks using low-yield and/or conventional bombs and thus heightening the attrition rate of scarce SEATO-tasked bombers. Such was the inescapable logic of SEATO’s nuclear doctrine. Conversely, insofar as dealing with the immediate threat posed by PLA and PAVN forces already in the field was concerned that same doctrine could only offer limited direct assistance to those SEATO and Protocol States forces engaged in the defensive phase of a major conflict. While not ruling out the possibility of directing tactical nuclear strikes against “targets of opportunity”, SEATO planners concluded that the likelihood of suitable targets appearing was small and that the effectiveness of low-yield nuclear weapons was seriously reduced in the dense rainforest jungles common to the region. Such jungles were thought to prevail in roughly half of the

bombs ranging from the 10-60 kiloton Mk-5 bomb to the 500 kiloton Mk-18 bomb. The first generation of fusion (thermo-nuclear) bombs had also been introduced and included the most powerful nuclear warhead ever built by the United States, the Mk-17/24 bomb, which had a yield of between 15 to 20 megatons. While the US Army had by this stage developed nuclear artillery shells, land mines and first generation nuclear-armed tactical surface-to-surface missiles such as the Honest John and Corporal systems there was never any suggestion that these would be made available for SEATO operations. See Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin and Milton M. Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume I, US Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge, MA: Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc, 1984), pp. 6-12; Chuck Hansen, US Nuclear Weapons: The Secret History (Arlington, TX: Aerofax, 1988), pp. 109-68, 171-6, 189-200. 85 Appendix “B”, “A study on the effects of nuclear air attacks upon selected logistic targets in south China and North Vietnam”, revised draft paper, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 9 February 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 1. 86 Ibid.

162 territory encompassed by the Protocol States and Burma and some 40% of Thailand.87 A 1956 SEATO study on the subject estimated that a 20 kiloton bomb detonated at ground level would create a zone of almost complete destruction and heavy contamination approximately 300 yards in diameter.88 However the ability of the thick vegetation to absorb both blast, heat flash and radioactive fall out was such that the study claimed there would be few immediate casualties beyond 500 yards from ground zero.89 Coupled with this discouraging information the SEATO planners also felt that the PLA would take as many precautions against nuclear attack as they could and that these would further diminish the impact of any tactical nuclear strikes against communist field formations. Foremost amongst these was the notion that the PLA would eliminate most of the heavy weapons and other motorised or mechanised support units from the order of battle of those divisions and armies selected to spearhead any invasion (PAVN divisions were already considered to be “light” formations by Western standards).90 This would reduce the logistical needs of those formations and allow them to avoid being “vehicle-bound” to main roads and highways.91 As seen in Chapter Two this led to the inclusion of a hypothetical PLA light infantry division table of organisation and equipment in all subsequent SEATO intelligence assessments of the PLA order of battle even though such a formation did not actually exist in the peacetime PLA. Another measure thought likely to be adopted by the PLA and PAVN was the clandestine pre-positioning of small supply dumps dispersed throughout North Vietnam, Laos and even parts of Cambodia.92 These would give the first wave of communist field forces at least some degree of self-sufficiency during the first days, possibly weeks, of an invasion. Therefore the targeting of tactical nuclear strikes against dispersed light formations independent of

87 Appendix “D”, “A study on the effects of nuclear air attacks upon selected logistic targets in south China and North Vietnam”, revised draft paper, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 9 February 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 1. 88 Ibid. 89 The study broke the terrain into three types of mature vegetation cover found in Southeast Asia: “Evergreen” rainforest; “mixed” forest; “open” forest. Both air burst and ground burst detonations were considered. Even at its most effective, in open forest (defined by the study to contain a tree density of 4200 per square kilometre with the average tree being 40-50 feet high and possessing a diameter of more than three feet), casualties were not expected beyond a 1200-1300 yard radius from ground zero. Ibid. 90 Memorandum, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 24 January 1956, A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 1. 91 Ibid. 92 Ibid.

163 centralised sources of supply and operating in jungle conditions would in all likelihood fail to surpass the damage and disruption caused by conventional SEATO air attacks against such targets. It was with this in mind that the MPO planners had called for large SEATO air and ground forces to be deployed in the defensive phase of Plan 2. The last facet of SEATO’s nuclear doctrine as adopted in 1956 was the notion that while communist forces would use nuclear weapons if they possessed them, short of global war – and thus direct Soviet involvement – there was little chance of this happening. While the PRC’s efforts to create its own nuclear weapons was noted it was felt that the successful conclusion to this program would not take place for many years to come. Furthermore there was a surprisingly resolute confidence that whatever other military aid might be supplied from the Soviet Union to the PRC the transfer of nuclear weapons and/or the means to produce them would not be forthcoming. Given that Sino-Soviet relations were, generally speaking, at their peak this seems at first glance to be a somewhat reckless assumption. However there was no doubt on the part of Western analysts that while Moscow was happy to support the build up of a competent and capable Chinese ally in Asia it had no wish to create a strategic rival for the leadership of the communist world. Even in the face of 50-odd nuclear strikes against southern China and North Vietnam it was thought that the Soviets would refrain from giving the PRC the means to retaliate in kind given its misgivings over Beijing’s ambitions and the risk that such action would escalate a limited conflict into a wider war. The conviction within the Alliance of the veracity of this assessment is best illustrated by the fact that the MPO made no allowance for retaliatory (or pre- emptive) nuclear strikes against SEATO forces in any of its contingency plans. This left a nuclear doctrine that espoused 50 or so nuclear strikes against strategic targets of military importance in southern China and North Vietnam. Meanwhile the possibility of carrying out tactical strikes against targets of opportunity in the field was kept open, but was not to be relied upon by SEATO forces engaged in the defensive phase of the conflict. Beyond these generalities, however, nothing further in the way of serious planning was carried out by SEATO itself. The main reason for the lack of more detailed SEATO planning in regard to matters nuclear during this period was the reality that, despite the long-term ambitions of the United Kingdom, France, and Australia, the only real nuclear power capable of

164 delivering a nuclear attack on the part of the alliance was the United States. The US had jealously guarded its monopoly of the Western nuclear deterrent since the beginning of the Cold War and saw no need to indulge its SEATO allies by making them privy to the finer details of its nuclear capabilities.93 In this case the familiar anxiety to avoid doing anything that would jeopardize US freedom of action combined with the desire to protect the most sensitive cornerstone of American national security policy from foreign scrutiny. Should nuclear weapons be introduced into the region by SEATO they could only be supplied, maintained and delivered by the American Strategic Air Command (SAC) and thus from Washington’s point of view there was nothing to be gained by involving their SEATO allies in planning for operations the latter would take no practical part in. Where strategic air attacks using nuclear weapons were envisaged in the concept of operations for Plans 1 and 2, the MPO had to simply assume that the United States would make its own preparations to ensure that they were carried out. For most of the other SEATO members this de facto arrangement was acceptable so long as the decision to use nuclear weapons was based upon political agreement amongst the alliance rather than purely military considerations. No formal SEATO process was established to facilitate this political agreement and one can speculate that in truth the leverage of a single Pakistani, French or New Zealand “no” against a US determination to go nuclear was more a case of wishful thinking than reality given the unilateral nuclear arsenal available to the Americans. Nonetheless this rather ambiguous formula saved everyone the

93 Nonetheless as part of its New Look doctrine the Eisenhower administration did make an effort to try and convince its allies to regard nuclear weapons as being a normal part of the landscape of modern conventional warfare. In SEATO’s case for instance the Americans issued an invitation at the end of the Third Staff Planners Meeting in 1956 for other members to send representatives to a week-long atomic warfare indoctrination course at Pearl Harbour in February the following year. Thirty two officers equivalent or higher in rank to lieutenant-colonel (including six from the United States) from all SEATO member states except France attended the course. Subjects covered ranged from basic nuclear physics to delivery systems to damage control. At one session, “Preventive and Countermeasures”, it was noted that “[n]uclear radiation, because it is new, because it can be neither seen nor felt and because its effects are delayed is viewed with something approaching horror”. To “assuage this fear” there followed a case study of the “experience of the natives who suffered from the Bikini [Atoll] fall out”. After documenting the islanders unpreparedness and the resulting level of contamination (51 hours receiving a dosage of 175 roentgens) it was stressed that while “some suffered loss of hair, some suffered lesions … [and] there was some discolouration of the skin… none died and in six months all were fully recovered”. Report, “Notes on Lectures on Atomic Weapons”, Department of the Navy, Navy Office, Melbourne, 16 April 1957, NAA: A816/43, 44/301/212; Brigadier John G. N. Wilton to Air Marshal Sir John McCauley, Australian Military Adviser, SEATO, Report of the Leader of the Australian Delegation to the Third Staff Planner’s Conference, 5 July 1956, NAA: A1209/23, 1957/4260.

165 embarrassment of having to confront such uncomfortable notions – and, to begin with, most of the Alliance members were content to accept this arrangement. The only member to actively seek to change this state of affairs from the start was the United Kingdom, and it did so by trying to establish itself as a genuine nuclear power in Southeast Asia and thus insure that its voice became an indispensable one insofar as the development and implementation of SEATO’s nuclear doctrine was concerned. This was a difficult and expensive strategy undertaken by the British and they received little encouragement, and virtually no practical assistance, from the Eisenhower administration in trying to achieve it – while the Americans had accepted a nuclear role for the United Kingdom in NATO, they remained sceptical of Britain’s ability to extend that role beyond Europe and were suspicious of London’s motivation in trying to do so.94 Nevertheless the British had already made substantial headway on their own in their drive to become a nuclear power and were not easily deterred. Much of their nuclear weapons research and testing had in fact taken place in Australia (with the support of that nation’s government) where the first successful British nuclear test – the detonation of a 25-kiloton bomb – had taken place on 3 October 1952.95 This achievement was quickly followed up with the introduction of the United Kingdom’s first production nuclear weapon, a 20-kiloton bomb named “Blue Danube”, into service with the Royal Air Force’s (RAF) Bomber Command in November 1953. The British had also embarked upon the development of a series of high altitude strategic jet bombers, the “V-Bombers”, to deliver Blue Danube and its successors to targets deep inside the Soviet Union.96

94 Indeed cooperation in relation to the development of nuclear technology and weapons had been one of the most acrimonious elements of the immediate post-war Anglo-American relationship and had been effectively curtailed when Congress passed the Atomic Energy Act (better known as the McMahon Act after the Senator who sponsored it), prohibiting the passing of information about the United States nuclear program to any foreign nationals in November 1946. Eisenhower was more sympathetic to his former wartime ally on this issue than the Truman administration and given the United Kingdom’s successful creation of its own bomb (not to mention the Soviet Union’s earlier elevation to nuclear power status) Eisenhower restored limited cooperation in 1954 by getting a new Atomic Energy Act through Congress. This was eventually followed up by the signing of a far more comprehensive agreement on nuclear collaboration, the Anglo-American Atomic Agreement, between the two countries in July 1958. For a thorough examination of this aspect of Anglo-American relations during this period see Ian Clark and Nicholas Wheeler, The British Origins of Nuclear Strategy 1945- 1955 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989); Ian Clark, Nuclear Diplomacy and the Special Relationship: Britain’s Deterrent and America 1957-1962 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). 95 Richard Moore, “Where Her Majesty’s Weapons Were”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, Vol. 57, No. 1, January/February 2001, p. 59. 96 Early British post-war missile experiments based on captured German technology and expertise had revealed that the technological hurdles that needed to be overcome if their potential as strategic weapons was ever going to be realised were far more complex and difficult than had been previously thought. Coupled with a frank assessment of Britain’s industrial capability (or more to the point its

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Although the United Kingdom’s nuclear deterrent had been developed primarily in the context of the Soviet threat to Western Europe, the British Chiefs of Staff had periodically canvassed the issues surrounding the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia since the outbreak of the Korean War.97 While much of this work was initially focused on second-guessing the capabilities and intentions of the Americans in the region, by the middle of the decade this focus had begun to shift in favour of quietly exploring the potential impact of the United Kingdom’s own nuclear forces in the context of the defence of Malaya.98 Yet despite noting the effectiveness of such weapons in offsetting the overwhelming numerical advantage enjoyed by the PLA, the British Chiefs of Staff were more often than not in agreement with their colleagues in the Foreign, Commonwealth and Colonial Offices that the reaction of other Asian countries to a unilateral British nuclear strike would be so negative as to outweigh any military gains thereby achieved.99 This attitude began to change with the formation of SEATO. The deliberations of the SEATO Staff Planners' Meetings in 1955 and 1956 established that not only did the United States consider the inclusion of nuclear retaliation as part of SEATO’s strategic concepts to be essential, but that this inclusion was acceptable to the Asian members of the Alliance. The implication was twofold: on the one hand the United States had all but guaranteed that SEATO was henceforth going to be confronted over Asian sensitivities in relation to the “bomb” and, thus, further British equivocation on the subject was simply redundant; on the other hand the apparent ease with which the concept of nuclear retaliation was accepted by the Asian members of SEATO would go some way to neutralizing the suspicions of racism underpinning such sensitivities. Therefore, from the British point of view, SEATO offered a

limitations) the British Government of the day decided that to try and develop a missile based nuclear delivery system was simply unjustifiable in terms of the research effort, resources and time required to carry out such a program. Instead the British felt that the strategic bomber would remain the most affordable and practical nuclear delivery system for the foreseeable future and in January 1947 the Air Ministry issued its first operational requirement for a long-range jet bomber. In the end three different designs were eventually accepted into RAF service beginning with the Vickers Valiant in January 1955, followed by the Avro Vulcan in May 1956 and finally the Handley Page Victor in November 1957. Collectively referred to as the “V-bombers” or “V-force” these aircraft in conjunction with the nuclear weapons they carried fulfilled the strategic nuclear deterrent role for the United Kingdom until that function was transferred to the Royal Navy and its newly acquired Polaris submarine force in 1969. See Andrew Brookes, V-Force: The History of Britain’s Airborne Deterrent (London: Jane’s, 1982), pp. 12-14, 159-60; Robert Jackson, V-Bombers (London: Ian Allan, 1981), pp. 19, 47, 79. 97 Matthew Jones, “Up the Garden Path? Britain’s Nuclear history in the Far East, 1954-1962”, The International History Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, June 2003, pp. 307-8. 98 Memorandum, British Chiefs of Staff Committee, COS (55) 31, 25 November 1955, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 1.

167 legitimate avenue through which the United Kingdom could use its fledgling nuclear forces to offset its dwindling conventional capabilities in the region and maintain its position as a Southeast Asian military power to be reckoned with.100 This idea was taken up with much enthusiasm by the British defence and diplomatic establishment, and helped to form the underlying rationale for the United Kingdom’s policy towards defence and strategic issues in Southeast Asia for the next decade.101 The other key consideration that drove the United Kingdom to contemplate deploying nuclear weapons to the region was the idea that, by doing so, the British would compel the Americans to reveal their own plans regarding nuclear warfare in Southeast Asia and include the British in any future plans.102 The latter goal was deemed to be particularly important since London saw itself acting as a moderating influence on an excessively aggressive approach to the PRC by the United States. The apparent ease with which prominent members of the Eisenhower administration discussed using nuclear weapons against China over issues such as Taiwan, and the avowed determination of senior US military leaders that there would be “no more Koreas”, alarmed the British governments of both Sir Anthony Eden and Harold Macmillan.103 The British were anxious lest a hasty resort to nuclear weapons by the Americans turned an otherwise “manageable” conflict in the SEATO area into something much, much worse. Even after Kennedy came to power and abandoned the New Look policy in favour of a strategy of flexible response, the British could never quite abandon the assumption that, when it came to China, their American allies were far more prone to impetuous action than themselves. Unfortunately for the British, the implementation of their nuclear strategy in Southeast Asia was characterised by a consistent underestimation of the problems and costs involved and of the level of substance that needed to be achieved before the Americans would accord them the influence they felt they deserved. The initial British plan, Operation Mastodon, called for the dispatch of 24 V-bombers from the United Kingdom to Singapore in the event of impending war in the SEATO region.104 Unfortunately, this required the upgrading not only of the runway and storage facilities (for the nuclear bombs) at RAF Tengah and Butterworth, but also the Indian

99 Jones, p. 312. 100 Ibid., p. 313. 101 Ibid., p. 315 102 Ibid; Moore, p. 60. 103 Ibid.

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Ocean stopover point of RAF Gan, an island in the Maldives.105 This work was horrendously expensive and drawn out, with that on Gan only completed in 1959, Butterworth in 1960 and Tengah in 1962.106 These delays aside, the fact that the United Kingdom never possessed more than 144 V-bombers in total raised doubts about the soundness of sending roughly one fifth of the nation’s strategic nuclear strike force to Southeast Asia in the face of an international crisis that could potentially engulf Europe as well.107 Partially in response to this, a decision was made in 1959 to convert one of the resident RAF Canberra light bomber squadrons in Singapore into a nuclear-capable unit.108 This conversion was delayed until August 1962, at least in part because of the ongoing lack of storage facilities and some delicate discussions with both the Malayan and Singaporean governments on the subject.109 While the Canberra lacked the range of the V-bombers, it could reach targets in North Vietnam by staging out of Bangkok.110 More importantly, in terms of gaining credibility with the Americans, it established a permanent in situ British nuclear strike force in Southeast Asia. This credibility was further enhanced by the deployment of the aircraft carrier HMS Victorious to the British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve in November 1960.111 Onboard were 2-4 nuclear bombs and a Fleet Air Arm squadron of nuclear-capable Scimitar F.1 jet fighter-bombers to deliver them (albeit, like the Canberra, with a short range).112 After this deployment the Royal Navy maintained a nuclear-armed aircraft carrier on station with the Commonwealth Far East Reserve for the rest of the decade.113 This permanent British

104 Jones, pp. 316, 320-1, 329. 105 Ibid, p. 316. 106 Ibid, pp. 316, 318, 321. 107 Ibid, p. 329. 108 Ibid. p. 323. 109 Ibid, pp. 324-5. 110 Ibid, p. 323. 111 Ibid, p. 325. 112 Ibid, p. 325; Robert S. Norris, Andrew S. Burrows, Richard W. Fieldhouse, Nuclear Weapons Databook, Volume V, British, French and Chinese Nuclear Weapons (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 135-6. The sub-sonic Supermarine Scimitar F.1 first entered operational service with the Fleet Air Arm in June 1958 and had a range of 1,422 miles. The Fleet Air Arm began to replace it’s Scimitars with new nuclear-capable supersonic Blackburn Buccaneer S.1 strike aircraft in July 1962 (a process completed in 1966) and the latter made its first appearance in Southeast Asia the following year. With an operational radius of 805-965 km the Buccaneer was an improvement on the Scimitar and, together with an increase in the number of bombs stored onboard British aircraft carriers in 1963, further enhanced British nuclear capabilities in the region. Owen Thetford, British Naval Aircraft since 1912, 6th revised edition (London: Putnam Aeronautical Books, 1991), pp. 64-5, 346-8; Ray Williams, Royal Navy Aircraft Since 1945 (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1989), pp. 107-8. 113 In addition to the Illustrious class fleet carrier HMS Victorious three other fleet carriers, HMS Ark

169 nuclear presence finally convinced the Americans to take their British counterparts seriously. In March 1962 Admiral Felt recommended to the Joint Chiefs in Washington that bilateral nuclear strike planning between the United States and the United Kingdom in support of Plan 4 should be undertaken.114 By the end of that year serious discussions on the subject had taken place and the British had reason to be pleased that they had apparently achieved their aims of becoming a nuclear power in Southeast Asia and gaining a unique position of influence in relation to American nuclear strategy in the region as a result.115 Unfortunately for the British, this moment of triumph occurred just as the rationale underlying SEATO’s nuclear strategy was being increasingly questioned by the other members, and indeed to some extent by the United States itself. A number of factors appear to have contributed to this. The rejection of the New Look doctrine by the Kennedy administration has already been touched on, and this new-found American scepticism towards the utility of nuclear weapons once a crisis had emerged (as opposed to deterring it in the first place), was reinforced by the experience of the Berlin crisis of 1961 and the Cuban missile crisis the following year. These potentially catastrophic confrontations with the Soviet Bloc had demonstrated to Washington’s allies just as clearly as it had to Kennedy the limitations of nuclear deterrence and the danger of over-reliance upon it. Within SEATO these events made for particularly sober contemplation since there was a growing awareness that the alliance would almost certainly face a nuclear armed PRC before the decade was out. At that point SEATO could find itself boxed into the same nightmarish dilemma of strategic nuclear stalemate in which Kennedy and his advisers had so recently found themselves.116 This provoked a careful re-examination of the concept of operations for Plan

Royal, HMS Hermes and HMS Eagle shared this duty throughout the rest of the 1960s. All four carriers were deployed with at least one Scimitar - or Buccaneer - equipped Fleet Air Arm squadron aboard. Ray Sturtivant and Theo Balance, The Squadrons of the Fleet Air Arm (Tonbridge, Kent: Air- Britain History, 1994), pp. 124-76, 393-402. 114 Jones, p. 326. 115 Ibid. 116 In fact the radical nature of Mao’s regime suggested a scenario far more unpredictable than that already presented by a nuclear-armed Soviet Union. A 1963 Australian military assessment on the use of nuclear weapons in Southeast Asia made the following observation: “If China develops a nuclear capability… she also has to develop an attitude of mind which believes that use of such weapons in a nuclear conflict will not be in her interests. It is, at least, questionable whether or not this attitude of mind will develop in China with her large manpower resources and her low regard for the sanctity of human life.” Air Commodore Hartnell RAAF, “Circumstances under which nuclear weapons might be used in pursuit of SEATO plans”, [?] July 1963, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/33.

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4. While noting that it contained the usual preamble that the decision to use nuclear weapons would be a political as opposed to a military one, it was quickly pointed out that the rest of the plan was based on the assumption that nuclear strikes against targets in southern China and North Vietnam would be launched within the first day or two of SEATO’s response to a communist invasion. There was simply no provision for the time needed to arrive at a political decision on the use of nuclear weapons from the seven member governments, nor any viable alternative course of action should that political decision decide against their use. The issue was not an easy one; the theatre estimate drawn up by the MPO in the wake of the call for force nominations for Plan 4 clarified the enormity of the task the alliance had set itself.117 Plan 4 built upon the concept of operations found in Plan 2, but extended them to include the Philippines, East Pakistan and Burma as combat theatres. The command structure of Plan 4 reflected this geographical breadth and consisted of three regional commands under an overall SEATO Force Commander based in Bangkok (see table 5.1).118

Table 5.1 SEATO Regional Commands Plan 4 SEATO Regional Commands: Area included: Eastern Region Field Force The Philippines Central Region Field Force The Protocol States, Thailand (Western boundary formed by Salween River, i.e. eastern Burma) Western Region Field Force West and East Pakistan, Burma (Eastern boundary formed by Salween River)

Given SEATO’s naval supremacy, the direct threat to the Philippines under a Plan 4 scenario was still miniscule and required no additional substantive force commitments for the archipelago itself, while the Pakistani military would assume sole responsibility for the defence of East Pakistan. Burma, however, represented a significant new burden for the MPO planners.

117 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, 14 September 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098. 118 Australian Military Adviser’s report, Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference, [?] October 1961,

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The vulnerability of Burma to Chinese intimidation or outright invasion had been implicitly acknowledged through the inclusion of Burma in the annual reports and threat assessments produced by the SEATO Intelligence Committee and the commissioning of a country study to be completed by Australia. However, by confining itself to the threat scenarios of plans 1, 2 and 3 SEATO had hitherto avoided dealing with the problem of how it would respond to a hostile, if not pro- Chinese, Burma. This particular dilemma mirrored that faced by the ANZAM planners in Plan “Hermes”, and the question of how to deal with a PLA thrust through Burma into north-western Thailand and/or East Pakistan was almost as contentious as the nuclear question. While the Alliance members agreed that a request from the Burmese government for SEATO to help it resist a Chinese invasion would be met in the affirmative, the problem was that everyone also agreed that such a request was unlikely to arrive in time, if it arrived at all.119 Burma’s readiness to cooperate with Beijing over the 93rd Division gave little ground for confidence on that score. SEATO Intelligence Committee estimates suggested that a Chinese attack through Burma could involve six PLA divisions in the first wave.120 Pre-emptive intervention was ruled out, but the prospect of unilateral intervention by SEATO forces once it was clear Chinese troops were advancing through the country was accepted by most of the MAG as an unavoidable necessity.121 The United Kingdom dragged its feet on the issue for fear of damaging its relationship with India as well as Burma in the event that SEATO’s intentions were made known to the two countries.122 After much deliberation on the problem between 1960-61, it was agreed that if Rangoon’s cooperation was not forthcoming SEATO ground forces would establish defensive lines on the Thai and Pakistani borders and that only SEATO air operations aimed at interdicting advancing Chinese forces would be permitted to take place inside Burma.123 Thailand, Pakistan and the United States insisted that SEATO reserve

NAA: A1209/134, 61/1239. 119 Cablegram, Australian Embassy, Bangkok to Canberra, 12 July 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/950. 120 “Outline Concept of Enemy Operations”, Section VII, Attachment 1, Annex “A”, Agenda “A”, Summary Report of the Intelligence Committee Sixth Meeting, Bangkok, [?] December 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 9. 121 Ibid; Cablegram, Australian Embassy, Bangkok to Canberra, 13 June 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/950. 122 Cablegram, Australian High Commission, London to Canberra, 23 June 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61950. 123 Cablegram, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 27 June 1961, NAA: 1209/134, 61/950; Cablegram, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 24 July 1961, NAA: 1209/134, 61/950.

172 the right to carry out localised cross-border ground operations to improve SEATO defensive positions. Whether the definition of localised as intended in this instance extended up to the Salween River is unclear, although its value as a defensive line is obvious and its selection as the boundary line between the Western and Central SEATO field forces was probably no coincidence.124 These restrictions would apply only during the defensive phase of Plan 4 – once SEATO was in a position to launch its own counter-offensives, the possibility of driving the PLA out of Burma by force (an action that would involve significant SEATO ground forces) was not ruled out.125 Even with this initial defensive stance over Burma the manpower demands of Plan 4 were daunting. The SEATO ground force requirements presented at the Fourteenth Military Advisers Conference included a total of 14 infantry divisions, two marine divisions (to be held in reserve), ten regimental combat teams/brigade groups and one armoured brigade.126 Of these troops three infantry divisions, the two marine divisions and five regimental combat teams/brigade groups would need to be provided by the non-regional members i.e. the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Australia and New Zealand.127 The most sobering aspect of this requirement was that it was based on the assumption that nuclear weapons would be used.128 Unease over the de facto automatic use of nuclear weapons in Plan 4 was such that in the build up to the Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference (Bangkok, 3-6 October 1961) the French Military Adviser, General Cheneliere, initiated an out-of- session discussion on the desirability of developing an additional theatre estimate for Plan 4 using conventional weapons only.129 At that conference the United States Military Adviser, Admiral Felt, made it clear that the American position was that Plan 4 objectives could not be achieved without resort to nuclear weapons.130 In deference to the rest of his colleagues in the MAG, all of whom had supported the French proposal, Felt did not object to the creation of an alternate “conventional weapons only” theatre estimate for Plan 4.131 But his concession on this issue no doubt

124 Cablegram, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 24 July 1961, NAA: 1209/134, 61/950. In today’s Myanmar (i.e. Burma) the Salween River is officially called the Thanwin Myit. 125 Ibid. 126 Minute, “SEATO Plan 4/1961”, Australian Defence Committee, 16 February 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/315 Part 1. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Report, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 12 July 1963, NAA: A5799/17, 39/1963. 130 Australian Military Advisers report, Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference, [?] October 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1239. 131 Ibid.

173 reflected his belief, and that of his government, that such an exercise would only reinforce their position that without nuclear weapons SEATO simply did not possess the military capability to withstand and defeat a communist attack on the scale envisaged by Plan 4. The MPO was thus directed to prepare a second theatre estimate for Plan 4, finished by the end of February 1962.132 Issued to the military advisers out-of-session, the new estimate appeared to go some way towards vindicating the American stance. It did not go far enough for Felt. Although it contained sizable increases in the air, ground and naval forces SEATO would require to implement Plan 4, Felt argued that the MPO had underestimated the level of air and ground forces needed, particularly the numbers of heavy and medium bombers.133 The Americans also questioned whether the MPO had allowed for the full logistical impact of such an increase in conventional forces and called for a more detailed and separate logistical estimate to complement the theatre estimate.134 The MAG agreed to direct the MPO to revise the theatre estimate and create a separate logistic estimate, but this work was not completed until July 1963.135 Any lingering doubt over the possibility of carrying out Plan 4 using conventional weapons only was in turn firmly removed by the new theatre estimate. There was only a small increase in the naval forces required, but the ground component now included 21 infantry divisions, eleven regimental combat teams/brigade groups, one airborne brigade, one armoured brigade, two armoured cavalry regiments and three marine battalions. This represented an increase of three divisions on the 1962 conventional theatre estimate, but the most glaring increase of all was to be found in the air force requirements. While there was no change in the other combat aircraft categories between the old and new estimates (see Table 5.2), the 1963 version called for no less than 685 heavy and medium bombers. The only SEATO member theoretically capable of supplying this number of bombers was the United States, and only by stripping SAC to the bone - a completely unrealistic proposition. The United Kingdom, the only other SEATO member to possess a strategic bomber force was, as we have seen, equally hard-pressed to send more than two dozen or so of its precious V-bombers to the region.

132 Report, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 12 July 1963, NAA: A5799/17, 39/1963. 133 Ibid. 134 Ibid.

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Table 5.2 SEATO Combat Aircraft Requirements for Plan 4 Type of Aircraft Using nuclear Using Using and conventional conventional conventional weapons weapons only weapons only (original MPO (revised MPO assessment) assessment) Heavy/medium 30 200 685 bombers Light bombers 40 60 60 Tactical fighters 125 190 190 All-weather 40 50 50 fighters Carrier based: Light bombers 50 50 50 Tactical fighters 60 150 150

In truth the United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand had begun to resign themselves to a “nuclear” Plan 4 after the provision of the first conventional theatre estimates. The degree to which Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines seriously entertained the possibility of a conventional option after the 1962 estimates were released is hard to quantify. The insistence of France, which, given its commitments to the war in Algeria, had never been expected to contribute more than token forces to Plan 4, on exploring the conventional option is also curious but is perhaps best understood through the prism of Gaullist politics and a genuine concern, shared with other members, over the automatic use of nuclear weapons implied by Plan 4. Despite the impossibility of a conventional Plan 4, this concern did not go away. Indeed during the entire period that the conventional estimates were being considered Australia, with the support of New Zealand, sought to try and establish a set of “guiding principles” to provide a standing framework through which SEATO member governments would consider the question of authorising the use of nuclear weapons.136 If achieved these principles would speed up the decision-making process in the event of a crisis while also clarifying to all what constituted an acceptable trigger for such action. Wary of causing a crisis in confidence in the alliance, the Australians opted for a discrete bilateral approach to the United States and United

135 Ibid. 136 Draft report, “SEATO Military Planning – Nuclear Weapons”, Australian Department of External

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Kingdom on the matter.137 Fears that both of the latter would interpret the suggestion as an attempt by the non-nuclear SEATO powers to impose a veto on their use of nuclear weapons in the region proved well-founded, however, since neither the United States nor the United Kingdom were prepared to entertain anything other than a case- by-case approach. Despite repeated attempts to raise the issue at the highest diplomatic level, the Australian initiative was politely sidelined by the Kennedy administration. In response to Australia’s concerns the Americans responded with vague assurances that while they understood them and would consider them (as they were already doing to some extent in NATO), the matter was a complicated one and, in any case, the United States, in the words of the Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, was “not straining at the leash to make an early use of nuclear weapons in Asia”.138 The British were less concerned about the situation than their ANZAM partners, and this was not solely due to their imminent arrival as a regional nuclear power in their own right because the British saw Plan 4 primarily as an exercise in deterrence rather than operational planning. As early as February 1961, before the first conventional theatre estimate had been completed, the British had told their Australian and New Zealand counterparts on the ANZAM Defence Committee that they thought Plan 4 was militarily impracticable in any context outside of global war.139 Although initially frustrated by this attitude, by the end of 1963 the Australians and New Zealanders had, however reluctantly, begun to adopt it. Doing so allowed them to treat the automatic nuclear trigger as not so much a rigid military necessity as a statement of intent that, reinforced by thorough preparation and planning, need never be put to the test. This breathed new life into the principle that the decision to use nuclear weapons really would be a political one involving all SEATO members. After the failure to come up with a feasible “conventional weapons only” version of Plan 4 or establish clearly defined political guidelines for the use of nuclear weapons by SEATO, the only other choices were to abandon Plan 4 altogether (which would have completely undermined any confidence in SEATO by its Asian members) or accept the automatic and immediate use of nuclear weapons (which even the US shied away from – the Kennedy administration insisting that the

Affairs, [?] October 1961, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/33. 137 Ibid; Draft letter, Sir Garfield Barwick, Australian Minister for External Affairs to Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, 18 April 1962, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/33. 138 Report, “Discussions with US Secretary of State (Mr Dean Rusk)”, Australian Department of External Affairs, 9 May 1962, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/33.

176 political decision-making process would not be a simple rubber stamp). To that end the Australians, New Zealanders, and to a lesser extent the British, continued to treat Plan 4 with the utmost seriousness long after 1963. All three countries joined the United States in nominating their force contributions to Plan 4 at the Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference in October 1961.140 The 28th Commonwealth Brigade formed the basis of these contributions insofar as ground forces were concerned, but both Australia and New Zealand declared their readiness to dispatch an additional battle group and a brigade group respectively. At first glance these nominations suggested the possibility of combining these brigade groups into a single unified division – a precedent for this had been established in the Korean War where units from all three nations, along with Canadian troops, had formed the Commonwealth Division. However, Australia’s adoption of the pentropic organisation in 1958 had made its new battle groups (each based around five battalions) difficult to integrate with the traditional triangular brigades maintained by the British and New Zealand armies.141 For a brief period in late 1962/early 1963 the Australians entertained ideas of eventually fielding a complete pentropic division to fight what was expected to be a protracted war in a Plan 4 situation.142 In terms of concrete policy this did result in an increase in the strength of their nominated ground forces from a single battle group of 4,300 men to two battle groups plus additional support units totalling 12,700 men.143 The second battle group in this figure was intended as a reserve to be available at 75 days notice.144 This additional commitment proved short-lived as the Australian Army’s abandonment of its pentropic organisation in December 1964 gave the idea of a unified division substantial impetus, and by the middle of 1965 the British, Australian and New Zealand governments had agreed to form a combined “ANZUK” (Australia-New Zealand-

139 Minute, ANZAM Defence Committee, 22 February 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/317. 140 Cable, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 8 October 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098. 141 This organisation had been adopted by the Australian Army in 1958 and was based on the US Army’s pentomic organisation. Despite the US Army’s abandonment of its pentomic organisation in 1961 in favour of returning to a triangular system the Australians persisted with their version until November 1964. For more on this issue see J. C. Blaxland, Canberra Papers on Strategy and Defence No. 50, Organising an Army: The Australian Experience 1957-1965 (Canberra: SDSC, Australian National University, 1989). 142 “SEATO Plan 4: Defence of South-East Asia against Chinese Communist and Viet Minh Aggression -Review of Australian Force Contributions”, Australian Defence Committee, 8 August 1963, NAA: 1209/134, 61/1098. 143 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, 20 August 1963, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098. 144 Memorandum, Australian Prime Minister’s Department, [?] August 1963, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098.

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United Kingdom) Division in the event of plans 4 or 6 being activated. For much of the rest of the decade ANZAM became the forum of choice through which Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom presented, compared and, where appropriate, coordinated the initial movement and ongoing logistical arrangements needed to dispatch and then sustain their respective national contingents, and the ANZUK Division as a whole, under plans 4 and 6.145 The Americans also continued to treat Plan 4 very seriously. Having dismissed the conventional version of Plan 4 the Kennedy administration went to some lengths to demonstrate its commitment to the original plan. At the Fourteenth Military Advisers' Conference the Americans nominated a force contribution of some four divisions (two infantry, one airborne and one Marine) along with significant elements of both the US Seventh Fleet and the Thirteenth Air Force.146 This did not include the heavy and medium bombers from SAC which were to remain under national, rather than SEATO, command. Additional American ground and air force contributions to Plan 4 were tabled by Admiral Felt the following year at the Seventeenth Military Advisers' Conference (Bangkok, 15-17 October 1962).147 These included two infantry divisions, one Marine division, one airborne battle group and one Marine air wing.148 The other SEATO members did not add to the original force nominations previously.149 As far as Thailand and Pakistan were concerned this amounted to their entire armed forces in any case (albeit with some portions retained under national as opposed to SEATO command). The Philippines was fully committed to looking after the Eastern Field Force Region (and indeed was to provide the Field Force commander for that region), but did nominate a token infantry battalion to serve in the Central Region Field Force. The smaller (and in the case of France, Pakistan and the Philippines non-existent) force demands of Plan 6 were easily accommodated under the umbrella of those already declared for Plan 4. Thus SEATO continued to refine its contingency plans against large-scale overt communist aggression through to 1965 and beyond. Plan 4’s value as the ultimate deterrent against such acts (at least insofar as SEATO was concerned),

145 See for example, “Order of Battle ANZUK Division in a SEATO Plan 4 Situation – Working Party Brief”, ANZAM Joint Planning Committee, 11 November 1965, NAA: A1945/37, 249/7/89. 146 Report, Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference, Australian Military Adviser, [?] October 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1239. 147 Minute, Australian Defence Committee, 20 August 1963, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098. 148 Ibid. 149 Cable, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, to Canberra, 8 October 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1098.

178 remained long after the attempts to incorporate a non-nuclear SEATO response into it had failed. Plan 6 was treated as seriously as Plan 4 ever was, and indeed had benefited from being in the shadow of Plan 4 when it came to receiving the force nominations it required. It was certainly true that by the early 1960s the focus of SEATO had begun to move irreversibly away from conventional, limited war to counter-insurgency scenarios. However, the fact that the MAG and the MPO were able to devote more and more of their attention to this problem was at least in part due to the fact that by 1963 the major arguments and issues surrounding the development of limited war contingency plans had been settled once and for all. The contentious problem of force contributions that had plagued SEATO from Plan 2 through to Plan 4 was finally out of the way, and the nuclear question had been answered once and for all (however unsatisfactorily for some Alliance members). At the same time the broad operational concepts first raised in Plan 1 in 1957 had been honed to a keen edge through innumerable logistical studies, intelligence studies, specialist studies (a study on the use of tanks in Southeast Asia carried out in 1960-61 was one such example) and general reviews over a six-year period. SEATO then, did not abandon its interest in overt limited war but rather freed up the resources to expand its understanding and capacity to deal with guerrilla war, which it did with great gusto after a somewhat hesitant start. Some of SEATO’s critics have claimed that this effort was too little too late but, as will be argued in the following chapter, this is the wrong lesson to take from SEATO’s ambitious but ultimately doomed attempt to formulate a robust response to the threat from communist guerrilla movements in Southeast Asia.

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Chapter 6 Plan 5: The first foray into Counter- insurgency planning

At the SEATO Staff Planners' Meetings of 1955-56 the alliance had designated planning for limited war contingencies as SEATO’s first priority. Counter-insurgency, while recognised as key element of the Communist threat to the region, was something to study, share intelligence on and monitor, but for political and operational reasons it was felt that insurgent threats facing member states were best handled by the affected state itself. At first, beyond the deliberations of the Intelligence Committee and a brief flicker of interest in the potential of Southeast Asia’s Chinese diaspora as fifth columnists the MAG kept its planning activities restricted to conventional scenarios only. However the Protocol States presented a clear problem in this regard as events in Laos confronted SEATO with the reality that the Royal Laotian Government was incapable of containing, let alone defeating, its domestic communist insurgency without Western covert or overt intervention of some sort. Whether a multilateral military alliance like SEATO was best placed to decide when and where such intervention was warranted, and then deliver it, was the crucial question to which the Laotian situation demanded an answer.

The “Overseas Chinese” Threat

A 1956 estimate put the number of Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia at just over ten million people (see Table 6.1). Nearly all of this population had originated from south-eastern China, particularly the coastal provinces of Kwantung, Fukien and Kwangsi.1 These provinces had exploited their links to the sea for centuries and had long since established a formidable tradition for entrepreneurship, albeit as fishermen, traders or, indeed, pirates. These origins helped explain the concentration of the Overseas Chinese population amongst the major ports and commercial centres of Southeast Asia. It also went some way to explaining their disproportionate presence and success amidst the commercial and industrial sectors of their adopted countries.

1 Appreciation No 20/1956, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, [?] April 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 2.

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Table 6.1: Estimated Ethnic Chinese Populations in Southeast Asia 19562

Countries/Territories Estimated Ethnic Chinese Population Vietnam (North & South) 1,000,000 Laos 10,000 Cambodia 300,000 Thailand 3,000,000 Burma 310,000 Malaya 2,160,000 Singapore 850,000 British Borneo 244,000 Indonesia 2,000,000 Philippines 220,000 Total in Southeast Asia 10,094,000

It was this success that gave many SEATO members pause for thought:

Although the Overseas Chinese represent only about 6 percent of the total population of the region, their influence is far greater than their numbers would imply. In some countries the Chinese have a virtual monopoly over certain key commercial enterprises, which could provide the Communists with a powerful economic tool for subversive activities against the nations of Southeast Asia.3

In addition to this capacity for economic sabotage, their military potential in the event of a communist invasion of Southeast Asia was also significant:

They would constitute a considerable fifth-column element; could provide advancing [Communist] troops with intelligence; the strategic location of their settlements (along main waterways and in urban areas) and their control over communications and repair facilities would be

2 Ibid. 3 CIA/RR GM 60-2, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia”, CIA Office of Research and Reports, 22 January 1960.

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immensely valuable.4

This early emphasis on the “Overseas Chinese” as a potential subversive and military threat to the region should come as no surprise given the circumstances of the time. While the martial ambitions of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam always loomed large in SEATO military planning it was the threat of limited war with the People’s Republic of China that ultimately dominated the deliberations of the MPO. The conventional military might of the Peoples Liberation Army simply dwarfed that of its Southeast Asian neighbours, and it was thus Chinese communist aggression that was to be feared the most. Furthermore, the notion of an ethnic Chinese “Fifth Column” was not one simply born out of a crude racial prejudice on the part of SEATO, but rather observation of contemporary developments. Many ethnic Chinese in the region, as is so often the case with ethnic diasporas in modern history, tended to view events in the “old country” through a prism of romantic nationalism (witness the support amongst much of the Irish Diaspora for the Republican movement throughout the 20th Century). Such tendencies are often compounded where the ethnic group in question is subjected to varying degrees of hostility on the part of the indigenous population. These conditions certainly existed in so far as the Chinese in Southeast Asia were concerned, as illustrated in the case of Thailand dealt with in chapter four. Concentrating on those aspects of Mao Zedong’s victory that appealed to this nationalist sentiment, - the unilateral annulment of the foreign treaties that had so humiliated China over the previous century, and the unification of the country after fifty years of anarchy, Japanese invasion and civil war - the darker portents of communist rule could be easily overlooked, at least initially. As long as the sympathies of the wider ethnic Chinese community were thus engaged it did not really matter how many of them were actually committed communists. The use of a “United Front” was an old tactic as far as communist doctrine was concerned and the possibility that Beijing would prove capable of manipulating this sentiment accordingly could not be ruled out. As it was, an insurgency dominated by “Overseas Chinese” communists had already broken out in the region. This was the Malayan Emergency where, despite

4 Appreciation No 20/1956, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, [?] April 1956, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 2.

182 their names, both the Malayan Communist Party and its armed wing, the Malayan Races Liberation Army, “could not disguise the fact that … [they were] overwhelmingly (about 95 per cent) Chinese”.5 This conflict appeared to reinforce the view that the ethnic Chinese communities of Southeast Asia had to be considered, and monitored, as a potential vehicle of communist expansion in the region. Yet by the turn of the decade the threat potential of the Overseas Chinese had all but disappeared from view as far as SEATO was concerned. The Intelligence Committee continued to monitor the activities of specific ethnic Chinese communist organisations and fronts, but only to the same degree that it did all other regional communist groups and their sympathisers. Certainly the spectre of the ethnic Chinese acting en masse as a fifth column to aid a communist invasion of Southeast Asia appears to have been completely discounted by 1960. The fact was that by that date there was no sign of a general mobilisation of the ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia in support of the People’s Republic of China. Indeed, certain key indicators seemed to suggest that, if anything, there had in fact been a drop in support for the regime in Beijing. A 1960 CIA report noted that cash remittances from ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia to relatives in the People’s Republic had “declined rapidly in recent years”.6 Similarly the long-standing ethnic Chinese practice of sending their children to “mainland” schools to finish their education had also been declining.7 It appears that the first flush of pride in the newly created People’s Republic of China had been tempered over the decade that followed as the full impact of communist policy on domestic life in China began to be realised. While China had undergone massive political upheaval since the Revolution of 1911, the endemic conflict that ensued had allowed little opportunity for real civil reform prior to 1949. Therefore the systemic and effective imposition of communist social and economic policies in the 1950s represented the first substantial challenge to Chinese tradition in these spheres. Ironically these policies, particularly in regard to the collectivisation of property and the elevation of party and state, as opposed to family and clan, as having first call on an individual’s loyalty and labour, served to undermine the very links that

5 Peter Dennis & Jeffrey Grey, Emergency and Confrontation: Australian Military Operations in Malaya and Borneo 1950-1966, Official History of Australia‘s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975, Vol. V (Sydney: Australian War Memorial & Allen & Unwin, 1996), p. 11. 6 CIA/RR GM 60-2, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia”, CIA Office of Research and Reports, 22 January 1960.

183 had nourished the relationship between the Chinese Diaspora and the mainland for so long. Given these tensions, exacerbated by the disastrous “Great Leap Forward” of 1958, the failure of the “Overseas Chinese” threat to materialise is understandable. That is not to say that pro-Beijing organisations and supporters had ceased to exist amongst the ethnic Chinese communities of Southeast Asia - it was not. Nor is it suggested that the KMT was the beneficiary of this diminution of overt support for Beijing - they were not. Rather the majority of Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese simply adopted an apolitical stance and tried to get on with their everyday lives as best they could. The 1960 CIA report concluded thus:

In any case, factors such as self-interest and fear of retaliation by either Communist China or their host country are likely to be the ultimate criteria in determining the allegiance of the pragmatic Chinese businessman.8

The Laotian Problem

As the 1950s drew to a close SEATO had a much more urgent insurgency problem on its hands than hypothetical “Overseas Chinese” fifth columnists. Of the three Protocol States, Laos appeared to be the most unstable and the most vulnerable to communist takeover. The Pathet Lao had proven themselves to be a force to be reckoned with in the small land-locked country and had maintained an active insurgent capability throughout the 1950s. The SEATO Intelligence Committee became increasingly attentive to developments in Laos and it was not long before both the Thais and Americans began to exert pressure upon the rest of SEATO to consider the creation of a contingency plan to counter Pathet Lao successes there. It was not as if SEATO members had hitherto deliberately neglected the problem of communist insurgency in the region. The British, French and Filipinos all had recent operational experience to draw upon, while the rest of SEATO was encouraged to exchange information and attend training programs, seminars and ad

7 Ibid. 8 CIA/RR GM 60-2, “Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia”, CIA Office of Research and Reports, 22 January 1960.

184 hoc conferences on the subject. The question was whether or not SEATO was the best forum through which to plan and mount a counter-insurgency campaign. To direct the MPO to move into this area was to take the alliance into uncharted territory – neither NATO or CENTO had sought to engage in such planning. But one could argue that to have insisted on only planning for limited conventional war contingencies would have simply made a mockery of SEATO’s pledge to protect the Protocol States given the reality of the threats they faced.

The Laotian Problem 1954-1958

The 1954 Geneva Agreements proclaimed the territorial integrity of Laos and recognized the sovereignty of the Royal Laotian Government over the entire country. However the Agreements also allowed the Pathet Lao to regroup all of their military forces in the two northern provinces of Phong Saly and Sam Neua.9 This was intended as the first step in a process that was to end ultimately in the integration of the Pathet Lao into the Royal Laotian Army.10 This process was seen as an essential component of the wider goal of reintegrating the Pathet Lao into the mainstream political structure of the country. Unfortunately the practical result of this move was to consolidate the Pathet Lao’s de facto control over these two provinces, and recognising this the Royal Laotian Government quickly insisted that the restoration of its authority there had to precede settlement of all other outstanding issues.11 For their part, the Pathet Lao leadership, having been gifted a secure base, were loathe to give it up and resisted all attempts to re-establish a Royal Government presence in the two provinces.12 This resistance included renewed, albeit small-scale, armed clashes between Royalist and Pathet Lao troops. Negotiations stalled and the peace settlement outlined by the Geneva agreements slowly, but surely, began to unravel. A general election had originally been scheduled for August 1955 but was repeatedly postponed until, on 10 November, a clearly frustrated Royal Government announced that it was breaking off political negotiations with the Pathet Lao and

9 Arthur J. Dommen, Conflict in Laos: The Politics of Neutralization, revised edition (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 80. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid., p. 99. 12 Paul Langer & Joseph Zasloff, North Vietnam and the Pathet Lao: Partners in the Struggle for Laos (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), p. 60.

185 would hold the general election in December.13 The Pathet Lao responded by boycotting the election, accompanied by a regional communist propaganda campaign to denounce the election which was notable for the fact that, in addition to the usual rhetoric regarding “American Imperialists” and their “lackeys”, specific attacks against SEATO featured prominently for the first time .14 Despite this uniform hostility to the election the result was something of a victory for the Pathet Lao in that the increasingly hardline pro- Western incumbent, Premier Katay Don Sasorith, was defeated. The new Premier, Prince Souvanna Phouma, came to office promising a return to negotiations with the Pathet Lao and a renewed commitment to implementing the Geneva Agreements in full, and a neutral foreign policy ostensibly based on the Indian “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence”. This prompted a change in strategy on the part of the Pathet Lao who clearly saw an opportunity to engage in “united front” politics and manipulate Phouma’s Government to their advantage. A new ceasefire was signed in August 1956 and negotiations over the implementation of the Geneva Agreements resumed. This apparent rapprochement between the two sides culminated some 15 months later in the Vientiane Agreements of December 1957, in which the Pathet Lao finally agreed to return the two northern provinces to the Royal Government’s control, and the integration of their military forces into the Royal Laotian Army. In return the Pathet Lao were allowed to form a legal political party, the “Neo Lao Hak Xat”, which was offered two cabinet posts in a newly-formed “Government of National Union”, of which Phouma remained the Premier. Phouma also agreed to hold “supplementary” national elections within four months in which the Neo Lao Hak Xat would participate in a contest for 20 new seats in the National Assembly (which already contained 40).15 These elections were duly held on 4 May 1958 and produced a resounding victory for the Neo Lao Hak Xat which won nine of the 13 seats it contested.16 This success was compounded by the winning of a further four seats by the left-wing “Santiphab” (Peace) Party.17 Building upon the momentum of this result

13 Dommen, pp. 82-3. 14 Ibid. 15 Dommen, pp. 108-9. 16 Ibid., p. 109. 17 Ibid.

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Souphanouvong was elected Chairman of the new National Assembly.18 Phouma then declared that with the completion of the election the obligations undertaken by the Laotian parties at Geneva had been fulfilled and that the presence of the International Control Commission (ICC), set up to monitor the implementation of the Geneva Agreements, was no longer required.19

SEATO Gets Involved

It was in light of these developments that SEATO’s interest in Laos took on a new urgency and intensity. The strategic importance of Laos in relation to the security of South Vietnam, Cambodia and Thailand had been officially recognised at the First SEATO Staff Planners' Meeting in 1955 and had been a cornerstone of SEATO military planning ever since. Plans 1 through 4 had been aimed at dealing with limited conventional war scenarios, but in mid-1958 there appeared for the first time the very real prospect that one of the three Protocol States was about to succumb to communist subversion a la Eastern Europe circa 1946-48. The collective reluctance of SEATO to get involved in the business of counter-insurgency planning, as confirmed at the Third Staff Planners' Meeting in 1956, clearly needed to be revisited. Strictly speaking this stance had amounted to a policy of non-involvement with counter-insurgency operations undertaken by individual SEATO members in their own territories, but the fact remained that no contingency planning for counter- insurgency operations involving the Protocol States had been contemplated. The United States, with the full support of Thailand, now made sure that the issue was included in the agenda for the Ninth Military Advisor’s Conference.20 In the meantime both SEATO members sought to exert whatever unilateral influence or pressure they could upon the events unfolding in Laos. If the outcome of the May 1958 elections had delivered a shock to the Thais and Americans, the effect upon many of Phouma’s colleagues in the cabinet and national assembly was equally salutary. Under the leadership of Phouma’s Foreign Minister, Phoui Sananikone, a number of ministers and national assembly deputies began to speak out against concessions made to the Neo Lao Hak Xat and Pathet Lao,

18 Ibid. 19 Ibid., p. 110. 20 “Military Measures to Counter Communist Insurgency” - Ninth Military Advisers Conference, NAA:

187 arguing that a policy of neutrality abroad did not “preclude forceful measures at home against communist agents”.21 These voices swiftly coalesced under the banner of a new political party calling itself the “Committee for the Defence of the National Interests” (CDNI), and Phouma was quickly faced with a divided cabinet.22 . The United States added to the pressure by halting all monetary aid to the Royal Government, “using as a pretext the mounting evidence of corruption in the [US- funded] import program and the need for a monetary reform”.23 Phouma’s attempts to pass a reform package failed to win the support of the National Assembly, where he was outmanoeuvred by Phoui and forced to resign as Prime Minister on 23 July after losing a vote of no confidence in his leadership.24 A new CDNI-dominated cabinet under the Prime Ministership of Phoui Sananikone was voted into office by the Assembly on 18 August.25 The fact that it did not include any Neo Lao Hak Xat deputies confirmed that the new government intended to take a tougher line against the Pathet Lao. Phoui insisted that Laos would retain a neutral foreign policy and declared his willingness to integrate the Pathet Lao into the mainstream Laotian political process, but he also made it clear that this integration was not possible as long as the Pathet Lao retained close links with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Such a public ‘outing’ of this connection had never before been made by a Laotian Prime Minister, and it provoked angry denials from the both the Pathet Lao and their allies in Hanoi. Phoui offered further provocation by establishing embassies in both South Vietnam and Taiwan - but not in Beijing or Hanoi.26 The North Vietnamese responded by fomenting a territorial dispute, and in December openly sent two companies of PAVN regulars across the border into Savannakhet Province to occupy the strip of land in question.27 If this was meant to intimidate Phoui it backfired dramatically. Not only did Phoui step up his public condemnation of North Vietnamese intervention in Laotian affairs, he also announced that the Royal Laotian Government would take the border violation to the United Nations. At the same time he placed the Pathet Lao and Neo Lao Hak Xat under increasing pressure to complete their obligations under the 1957

5799/15, 111/58. 21 Dommen, p. 110. 22 Ibid., p.111. 23 Ibid. 24 Ibid., p.112. 25 Ibid. 26 Ibid., p.114.

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Vientiane Agreement, particularly the integration of Pathet Lao military forces into the Royal Laotian Army. Under Phouma the Pathet Lao had nominated two of their battalions as the initial units earmarked for integration, and these had duly marched into cantonments set up for them in the provinces of Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang respectively. There they had remained while the Pathet Lao used negotiations over pay and conditions to stone wall the process.28 On 17 May 1959 the Royal Laotian Government decided to put an end to this farce by issuing the two Pathet Lao battalions with an ultimatum: they either agreed to integration with the Royal Army on Vientiane’s terms or they were to disarm and disband, and they were given 24-hours to respond.29 This action appears to have caught the Pathet Lao off guard as their response was un-coordinated and contradictory. The battalion in Luang Prabang agreed to integrate while the battalion at Xieng Khouang broke out of its cantonment and headed for the hills.30 The Royal Laotian Government duly condemned the men of this unit as deserters and sent Royalist troops after them.31 At this point the Pathet Lao gave up all pretence of trying implement the 1957 Vientiane agreement and moved quickly to mobilise the rest of their forces in Sam Neua and Phong Saly. Attacks against Government outposts followed shortly thereafter and by July 1959 large swathes of northern Laos were once again firmly in Pathet Lao hands.32 Phoui’s government had certainly benefited from the increased political and economic support it had received from both the United States and Thailand during the twelve months following his accession to power, but in terms of military aid Phoui had neither sought nor received a significant increase. The Eisenhower Administration had slightly enlarged its military aid package from US$5.4 million in 1958 to US$7.5 million in 1959 while the Thais had begun to train small numbers of Royal Laotian Army officers.33 Given this comparatively modest investment both SEATO members could feel reasonably pleased with the turn of events in Vientiane. While still adhering to a neutralist foreign policy Phoui had nonetheless stood up to the Pathet Lao and their North Vietnamese backers and had decisively arrested any

27 Ibid. 28 Ibid., p. 118. 29 Ibid. 30 Langer & Zasloff, p. 67. 31 Dommen, p. 118. 32 Langer & Zasloff, pp. 67-70. 33 Dommen, p. 104.

189 move by the Neo Lao Hak Xat to install a communist regime through manipulation of the political process.

Creation of Plan 5

Both the United States and Thailand sought to build upon this change of fortune in Laos by making sure SEATO was prepared to intervene should the internal situation there deteriorate again. Initially this effort was complicated by the fact that the United Kingdom, together with the Soviet Union, had acted as Co-Chair of the 1954 Geneva Conference and was understandably uncomfortable with the idea that it should be involved in anything that undermined the peace agreements that it co- sponsored. This concern was compounded by the fact that two of the three members of the ICC, Canada and India, were both members of the British Commonwealth, and the British were especially wary of doing anything that might further upset their already delicate relationship with India.34 They also raised the prospect that such intervention would provoke a “violent Chinese Communist reaction”, although this last point appears a little disingenuous given that any military action by SEATO was bound to run such a risk.35 The British accepted in the interests of SEATO alliance relations, the drawing up of a concept of operations but they were reluctant to see the plan developed much beyond that.36 Australia and New Zealand’s initial instinct was to side with the British on this issue and both displayed a cautious attitude to the prospect of creating a SEATO counter-insurgency plan for Laos - Plan 5. However they were not so adamant in their opposition to it as the British and adopted a wait-and-see approach, both wanting to gauge just how serious the Americans were in their championing of it. For both countries the lead up to the Eleventh Military Advisers' Conference was crucial in this regard. Once it became apparent that national force contributions were on the agenda for that conference and that the Americans, for the first time, intended to nominate their contribution, both Wellington and Canberra decided to give their full support to Plan 5.37

34 “SEATO Planning to counter Communist insurgency and MPO Plan 2/59”, minute, ANZAM Defence Committee, 5 August 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/27/7 Part 1. 35 Ibid. 36 Ibid. 37 “SEATO Plan 5C/59”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 17 December 1959, NAA: A2031/9,

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Faced with American determination, the British, somewhat grudgingly, threw their weight behind the Plan. As for the other SEATO members, the French had supported the move from the beginning, although they made it clear that the conflict in Algeria prevented them from offering any substantive support beyond the use of Seno airbase and its existing garrison (down to a couple of companies of Senegalese soldiers by 1959). For their part Pakistan and the Philippines were content to follow the US lead, especially when it became clear that neither would be expected to contribute forces to the plan. The initial concept of operations for Plan 5 was delivered by the MPO in time for consideration at the March 1959 Tenth Military Advisers' Conference in Wellington, New Zealand, where it was accepted as Plan 5/59.38 The MPO was then directed to further refine the Plan and attend to the necessary logistic studies in time for the Eleventh Military Advisor’s Conference in September.39 The urgency with which the Plan was being treated may be gauged by the fact that at the Eleventh Conference the revised plan, Plan 5B/59, was approved as the “interim SEATO Plan” before further amendments led to its out-of-session replacement in December 1959 with Plan 5C/59.40 At the same time, with unprecedented swiftness, national force contributions were also confirmed at the Eleventh Conference.41 By the time of the Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference in Washington in May 1960 the MAG, although directing the MPO to continue to refine it, nonetheless agreed that “the plan is an approved plan, ready for implementation, if required, and proposed to advise the Council accordingly”.42 The first objective of Plan 5 was to secure the airfields at Vientiane and Seno and the surrounding Mekong River crossings. This was followed by the need to secure a number of key provincial capitals and communication centres. By doing so it was intended to relieve Royal Laotian Army units of the need to garrison such centres and thus free them up for offensive operations elsewhere. This would also facilitate the third objective, namely, the delivery of a significant increase in materiel and

128/1959. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid. 41 Australian Military Adviser’s Report of the Eleventh Military Advisers Conference, Vice-Admiral R. R. Dowling to Secretary of Defence, 8 October 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/5. 42 Australian Military Adviser’s Report of the Twelfth Military Advisers Conference, Vice-Admiral R.

191 logistic support to the Royal Laotian Army. The final objective called for SEATO forces to assist the Royal Laotian army in offensive operations against the Pathet Lao through the provision of “air support, communications, psychological warfare and other special operations”43. To achieve these objectives Plan 5 called for a ground component of eight SEATO battalions and an air component of three fighter/bomber/recce squadrons plus an air transport detachment. Headquarters for both the air and ground components were to be located at Vientiane while a “Base Area Command” would be also be established to support the field force components with its headquarters in Korat, Thailand.44 The overall SEATO Force Headquarters was to be situated in Bangkok.45 The ground component was divided in to two groups; “Force Alpha” and “Force Bravo”. Force Alpha consisted of two American Marine battalions and one Thai infantry battalion and was responsible for northern Laos, specifically the need to secure Vientiane, Luang Prabang and Xieng Khouang.46 Force Bravo consisted of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade with the British, Australians and New Zealanders thereby each contributing an infantry battalion.47 Force Bravo was responsible for all of southern Laos with a battalion being deployed to each of the provincial capitals of Thakhek, Savanakhet and Pakse.48 A “Central Force Reserve” made up of two Thai battalions and one American was included under 5C/59 and although it was to be stationed at Korat it came under the command of the Field Force Commander at Vientiane rather than Base Command.49 The key command appointments, with the exception of Base Area Command (which was decided out-of-session) were agreed upon at the Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference (see Table 6.2).

R. Dowling to Secretary of Defence, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6, Part 2. 43 Cable, P. R. Heydon, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of External Affairs, and S. Landau, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of Defence, to Tange, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, [?]1961. 44 “SEATO: Location of Headquarters for Plan 5/60”, minute, Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, 1 March 1961, NAA: A8447/6, 6/1961. 45 Ibid. 46 Cable, P. R. Heydon, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of External Affairs, and S. Landau, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of Defence, to Tange, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, [?]1961. 47 “SEATO MPO Plan 5 - Ground Force Command Organisation“, position paper, ANZAM Defence Committee, 17 February 1962. 48 Ibid. 49 “SEATO MPO Plan 5C/59”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 17 December 1959, NAA:

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Table 6.2: Plan 5 Command Appointments50 COMMAND APPOINTMENT APPOINTING NATION Commander, SEATO Force Thailand Deputy Commander, SEATO Force United States Commander, Field Force United States Deputy Commander, Field Force United Kingdom Commander, Force Alpha United States Commander, Force Bravo ‘Commonwealth’ (ANZAM) Nation Commander, Air Component United States Deputy Commander, Air Component Australia Commander, Base Area Command United States Dep. Commander, Base Area Command Thailand

The Australian Military Adviser, Vice-Admiral Sir Roy Dowling, noted in approving tones that “the “Objective” and “Concept of Operations” made it clear that the aim of a SEATO force would be to help the Laotians to help themselves”.51 The disposition of the Field Force into widely separated battalion groups unable to mutually support each other rammed home this point. Plan 5 was aimed at maximizing SEATO’s presence across Laos so as to restore the confidence of Royalist forces and enable them to take the fight to the Pathet Lao. SEATO would assist, but not bear the brunt of that fight. The ultimate success or failure of Plan 5 was thus placed upon the hitherto fragile shoulders of the Royal Laotian Army. At first glance this seemed a rather rash gamble, but by the beginning of 1960 the Americans were confident that their five year military aid effort to Laos was finally beginning to pay off.

A2031/9, 128/1959. 50 Australian Military Adviser’s Report of the Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference, Vice-Admiral R. R. Dowling to Secretary of Defence, 30 May 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/6, Part 2; Command Appointments - SEATO MPO Plan 5/60”, report to UK Chiefs of Staff Committee, 17 April 1961, PRO: DEFE 6/69. 51 Australian Military Adviser’s Report of the Eleventh Military Advisers' Conference, Vice-Admiral R. R. Dowling to Secretary of Defence, 8 October 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/10/5.

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The Achilles Heel - The Royal Laotian Army

In 1957 the Royal Laotian Army had a strength of 25,000 men organised into 26 battalions and two armoured reconnaissance companies.52 This was augmented by a tiny air force (consisting of six C-47 Dakota transports) and an even smaller river- borne ‘marine’ section of 160 men and 28 lightly-armed vedettes.53 They were still trained and largely equipped by the French - under the 1954 Geneva Agreement France had been allowed to maintain a military training mission in the country, as well as retaining the right to station a small garrison at Seno. On the face of it this appeared to be an adequate force with which to contain, if not defeat, the Pathet Lao who were, by comparison, estimated to be incapable of fielding more than 6,000 men in 1957.54 However upon closer inspection the Royal Laotian Army’s advantage in numbers proved to be something of a mirage. Twelve of its 27 battalions were actually battalions in name only and were simply paper devices through which 52 local ‘auto defence units’, each supposedly 100-strong, were grouped into larger provincial units for administrative and supply purposes.55 This left 12 regular infantry battalions, two artillery battalions and one airborne battalion, the latter the only unit with any notable esprit de corps.56 Indeed the quality of the Royal Laotian Army, or rather the lack thereof, was arguably its biggest weakness. Western intelligence reports on the situation in Laos for this period routinely cite the amateurish and half-hearted approach to combat displayed by most units. In the opinion of many observers this simply reflected the nature of Laotian society as a whole - “a charming, indolent, enchanting people, but … just not very vigorous.”57 Even the Pathet Lao, although on the whole more motivated and determined in combat than their fellow countrymen, reflected this national trait on occasion. The US Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, remembered

52 “Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Fourth SEATO Intelligence Meeting”, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 23 October 1957, NAA: 1838/269, TS688/18 Part 5. 53 Ibid. 54 “Brief for the Australian Delegation to the Fourth SEATO Intelligence Meeting”, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, 23 October 1957, NAA: 1838/269, TS688/18 Part 5. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. Dommen blames this on the fact that the Royal Laotian Government forces were recruited almost exclusively from lowland Laotians. The highland tribes had a considerably less benevolent reputation and proved as much when the Americans finally turned to them after 1962. 57 American Ambassador to Laos, Winthrup Brown, cited in Lawrence Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 296.

194 receiving a report describing “how the two opposing sides once left a battlefield to attend a water festival”.58 Yet the Eisenhower Administration was still inclined to believe that the problems bedevilling the Royal Laotian Army were those of inadequate training and poor leadership rather than any supposed inherent national characteristics. This led some within the Administration to question the effectiveness of the French Military Mission to Laos - the assumption being that the Americans would succeed where the French were apparently failing.59 This frustration was at least in part due to the fact that the United States had been supplying Vientiane with military aid since January 1955, apparently to no avail.60 Usually such aid programs were accompanied by the dispatch of a US MAAG to the country in question but this would have constituted a clear violation of the 1954 Geneva Agreements, meaning that the Americans had no ability to determine for themselves the exact correlation between their clients’ wants as opposed to needs; nor could they influence the manner in which such aid was used, or misused, by its Laotian recipients and their French advisors. In an attempt to circumvent the Geneva Agreements and address these issues, the Eisenhower administration authorised the creation of the “Program Evaluations Office” (PEO) in December 1955.61 Housed in the US Embassy in Vientiane, the PEO was a “thinly disguised, but politically defensible, military aid organization …” staffed by “reserve, retired, and former US military personnel who were given US State Department Foreign Service Reserve Officer rank”.62 This gave the Americans the ability to assess the needs of the Royal Laotian Army independently, as well as the efficiency, or otherwise, with which the aid supplied was being utilised. But while the PEO could accurately report on the latter it had no mandate to interfere with such practices - training, doctrine and direct support were all still the exclusive domain of the French. This remained the case until the dismissal of the ICC by Phouma, the rise of Phoui to the Prime Ministership, and the resumption of hostilities with the Pathet Lao completely changed politics surrounding military aid and its delivery to Laos. In May

58 Ibid., p.295. 59 Memorandum from Major-General Robert M. Cannon, Special Assistant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for MDA Affairs, to US Joint Chiefs of Staff, 10 February 1956. (80) 149-A, JCS. 60 Timothy C. Castle, At War in the Shadow of Vietnam: US Military Aid to the Royal Lao Government, 1955-1975 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), p. 15. 61 Ibid., p. 16. 62 Ibid.

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1959 the United States and France signed a memorandum of understanding that dramatically expanded the size and the role of the PEO in Laos. The most important feature of this memorandum was that it authorised American “civilians” to be attached to the French military advisory teams:

The United States could finally get men into the field where, Washington hoped, they could introduce the Force Armée Royale to more effective American training methods. The plan essentially elbowed aside the French Training Mission.63

With Phoui in power, SEATO Plan 5 ready for implementation, and a more or less free hand to train and equip the Royal Laotian Army as they saw fit, the Eisenhower administration had plenty of cause to feel optimistic regarding the situation in Laos as 1960 neared. Thailand, too, had cause to be satisfied with events regarding its northern neighbour, and while the other members of SEATO had, to varying degrees, been carried along by the American and Thai enthusiasm for Plan 5 they had all eventually opted to back it - and by extension the American gamble that it could successfully reform the Royal Laotian Army.

Disaster in Laos - The Kong Le Coup August 1960

The beginning of 1960 was marked by yet more political turmoil in Vientiane. Just before Christmas Phoui was ousted as Prime Minister after his attempt to reduce the dominance of CDNI ministers in his cabinet backfired.64 This sparked a short- lived coup by the military, by now the main backers of the CDNI, led by Brigadier General Phoumi Nosavan.65 The soldiers were persuaded to return to barracks after Phoui resigned and a new interim cabinet was established pending fresh elections in April.66 The CDNI and other right-wing and centrist parties were determined that there would be no repeat of the 1958 election debacle, and mobilised the Army and other government agencies to help them engineer the result through massive vote-

63 Castle, p. 18. 64 Dommen, pp. 125-6. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid.

196 rigging.67 Such blatant electoral fraud, while crude, was nonetheless effective in that no Neo Lao Hak Xat candidate was returned to office.68 A new CDNI dominated cabinet emerged with Prince Somsanith as Prime Minister and marked the political debut of General Phoumi as Defence Minister.69 International observers were rapidly becoming used to the machiavellian politics of Vientiane. The Americans duly concentrated on their training program and the Royal Army expanded its numbers to 29,000.70 Pathet Lao forces, while still active, also concentrated on building up their strength. Nonetheless, as early as July 1959 reports had begun filtering in that the North Vietnamese were providing significant covert support to the Pathet Lao’s renewed guerrilla campaign, and this was confirmed by a UN Security Council Sub-Committee sent to investigate the issue at Vientiane’s invitation in September that year.71 SEATO officially welcomed the UN investigation and continued to monitor the situation closely.72 The appearance of direct, albeit covert, PAVN support for the Pathet Lao, while disturbing, was not an entirely unexpected development so far as SEATO was concerned, and until such time as Royalist forces proved incapable of containing the situation was not, in itself, an automatic trigger for intervention. As part of the Royal Army’s expansion a second airborne battalion had been formed and, under the command of an able young officer, Captain Kong Le, had distinguished itself in recent fighting against Pathet Lao forces in Sam Neua province. After returning to Vientiane having completed its operational tour, the unit became increasingly agitated when complaints over poor pay and living conditions were repeatedly ignored by the government. On 8 August 1960 the now thoroughly disaffected paratroopers, under the leadership of Kong Le, launched a coup.73 By coincidence the entire Cabinet was in Luang Prabang that day to discuss the funeral arrangements of King Sisauang Vong with his heir and successor, King Savang Vatthane.74 Kong Le demanded that Cabinet return to Vientiane and address

67 Castle, p. 19. 68 Ibid. 69 Dommen, p. 126. 70 SEATO Military Intervention - its Likely Effects on the Situation in Laos”, report, Australian Joint Intelligence Committee, [?] November 1959, NAA: A1838/269, TS666/59/72. 71 “Report of the Council Representatives to the [SEATO] Council”, Bangkok, May 1960, NAA: 1838/2, 250/8/20, Part 2. 72 Ibid. 73 Ibid. 74 Ibid., p. 146.

197 his grievances.75 General Phoumi’s reaction was to immediately leave for Thailand where after consultations with the Thai Prime Minister, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, he returned, not to Vientiane, but to Savannakhet. There he rallied 21 ministers and deputies to his side and announced the formation of a “Counter Coup d’État Committee” on 16 August.76 The remaining members of the national assembly did return to Vientiane where they voted to form a new Cabinet and re-install Souvanna Phouma as Prime Minister. Promising to act on all of Kong Le’s concerns Phouma won the young Captain over and on 17 August the paratroopers handed back all government offices to civilian control, but attempts by Phouma to bring Phoumi and his supporters back into the fold failed.77 For the next few weeks confusion reigned as the various Royalist units and provincial governors declared their allegiances to one side or the other, while the first open clashes between “Phoumist” and Government forces took place around Paksane and the Ca Dinh River line.78 The Pathet Lao could obviously see the potential in these events for them to retrieve the gains they had lost since Phouma was last in office. Accordingly they responded positively when Phouma offered to resume negotiations with them on the basis of the 1957 Vientiane Agreement although their terms did not quite match his: “As was their custom the Pathet Lao immediately set about strengthening their hand for these negotiations by a series of military initiatives.”79 Taking advantage of the confusion amongst Royalist forces they re-captured the provincial capitals of Phong Saly and Sam Neua, established new bases in Khammouane Province and launched attacks against Government outposts as far south as Pakse.80 Then on 19 September the Pathet Lao announced that they were imposing a unilateral and informal halt to attacks against troops loyal to Phouma’s government.81 From there the situation quickly escalated into an international crisis. The United States had been caught completely off guard by these events and was at first unsure whether to support Phouma’s constitutional government or Phoumi’s “rebels”. In the end the prospect of Phouma and a return to the days of shared power with the Pathet Lao proved enough to push Washington into favouring Phoumi, although the

75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., p. 147. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid. 79 Ibid., p. 152. 80 Langer & Zasloff, p. 67. 81 Dommen, p. 154.

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US Ambassador to Laos was directed to negotiate with Phouma to see if a peaceful settlement to the crisis could still be salvaged.82 Military aid was diverted from Vientiane to Phoumi’s base at Savannakhet, delivered by C-46 and C-47 transports belonging to Air America, a CIA front company, which also picked up and brought in Royalist troops who had declared for Phoumi from across the country.83 Thailand had no qualms about supporting Phoumi and had imposed a complete economic and military blockade on Phouma’s government.84 Desperate for fuel, Phouma accepted an offer from the Soviet Union to supply his needs and by the end of September he announced that the Royal Laotian Government had agreed to the establishment of a Soviet embassy in Vientiane.85 By the beginning of December last-ditch attempts to negotiate a return of the Phoumist forces into the government broke down and Phoumi ordered his forces to march on the capital.86 Phouma was now in a desperate situation as he had neither the supplies nor the manpower to hold Vientiane for long. On 10 December he dispatched his Foreign Minister to Hanoi where his government agreed that in exchange for a formal alliance between his forces and the Pathet Lao the Soviets would arm and supply his troops to ward off the American-backed Phoumist forces.87 Three days later the Phoumists attacked Vientiane and after a further three days fighting Kong Le’s men abandoned the city to seek refuge with their new allies, the Pathet Lao.88

Impact on SEATO and Plan 5

While these events provoked a flurry of activity on the part of the United States and Thailand, it was not clear whether the situation warranted a full-scale intervention by SEATO. Certainly a three-way civil war was not the contingency for which Plan 5 had been designed. However, the Phoumist capture of Vientiane and Phouma’s alliance with the Pathet Lao meant that by January 1961 the conflict had settled down into something resembling, if not quite squaring with, the anti- communist versus communist scenario originally envisaged. While the Royal Laotian

82 Freedman, p. 294. 83 Castle, pp. 22-3. 84 Ibid. 85 Dommen, p. 155. 86 Castle, p. 24. 87 Dommen, p. 155. 88 By Laotian standards the battle for the capital was a comparatively bloody affair resulting in an

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Army, Kong Le’s paratroopers not withstanding, had hardly enhanced its reputation in the last few months of 1960 the Phoumist forces had managed to take control of a third of the country. Given time and continued US support it was still possible to believe that they might be transformed into a force capable of holding their own against the Pathet Lao. The Pathet Lao had no intention of giving the Phoumists any such opportunity. Having seized control of the Plain of Jars in conjunction with Kong Le’s force, the area became the focus of the Soviet airlift. Ilyushin Il-12 and Il-14 transports flew in around the clock, delivering everything from small arms to heavy artillery and armoured cars.89 Pathet Lao forces made sure they got their full share of this bounty while at the same time Hanoi authorised the deployment of hundreds of PAVN cadres to “stiffen” Pathet Lao units.90 In addition, complete PAVN battalions and specialist companies were also sent to take control of the border areas and safeguard the supply routes from North Vietnam into Laos.91 At the beginning of March the Pathet Lao went on the offensive in Luang Prabang Province.92 The Phoumist forces there offered very little resistance and began a retreat which quickly turned into a rout. Driven out of Luang Prabang altogether, the Phoumist forces finally made a stand at Vang Vieng where they just managed to hold on.93 Thus emboldened, the Pathet Lao and Phouma’s forces launched further attacks across six provinces in which the Phoumists lost ground in all cases.94

SEATO’s lost moment?

It was at this point that SEATO intervention became a plausible option. However Plan 5 needed to undergo serious revision to accommodate the dramatically changed circumstances in Laos. The first major change agreed to was the need to consider the possibility that no matter how serious the insurgent threat became the Royal Laotian Government might not request SEATO intervention. The experience with Phouma and the political instability that had become a hallmark of the Royal

estimated 2,000 casualties, of whom 600 were killed. Ibid., p.165. 89 Ibid., p.167. 90 Zanger & Lasloff, p. 71. 91 “Present Military Implications for Australia of SEATO MPO Plan 5C”, minute, Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee”, 24 march 1961, NAA: 8447/6, 16/1961. 92 Dommen, p.187. 93 Ibid.

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Government had long since made a mockery of this assumption. Thailand found this scenario particularly threatening and first raised the issue at the Thirteenth Military Advisers' Conference in November 1960.95 The Thais pushed for a complete revision of Plan 5 to deal with this scenario but this failed to find favour with the majority of those present.96 A compromise was reached instead with the MPO directed to examine how best to circumvent the absence of an official Laotian request for SEATO intervention.97 Circulated for out-of-session consideration the MPO report put forward the option of stationing SEATO troops in Thailand as either a precursor to unilateral SEATO intervention in Laos or as a deterrent to further communist advances within the country.98 The latter was clearly aimed at deterring the Pathet Lao’s supporters - the Soviet Union, the North Vietnamese, and to a lesser extent China - rather than the Pathet Lao itself. The French, British, Australians and New Zealanders rejected any suggestion of unilateral SEATO intervention as being a clear breach of Article IV of the Manila Treaty, and therefore politically unfeasible.99 The British were also against the idea of stationing SEATO troops in Thailand, arguing that this could have the opposite effect to that intended and simply serve to provoke an escalation of Soviet and North Vietnamese involvement in the conflict.100 Indeed, the British suggested that such a move could goad the Chinese, hitherto bit players in the crisis insofar as events on the ground were concerned, into intervening in strength.101 They also raised the possibility that the political climate in Malaya was such that if Commonwealth troops were moved from Malaya to Thailand the Malayan Government might refuse to allow their return.102 The United Kingdom’s position was complicated by the fact that it had embarked upon a diplomatic offensive aimed at brokering a ceasefire, re-establishing the ICC in Laos and convening a new international conference to replace the 1954

94 Ibid., p.188. 95 “Military Implications of a possible Insurgency Situation in Laos”, report, UK Joint Planning Staff to UK Chiefs of Staff Committee, 15 March 1961, JP(61)30 (Final), PRO: DEFE 6/69. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 “Future SEATO Planning concerning Laos and Thailand”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 4 October 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 12. 99 “SEATO Military Planning”, extract from brief to New Zealand Minister of External Affairs for SEATO Council Meeting, 9 March 1961, ANZ: EA 1, 120/5/10 Part 1. 100 “Military Implications of a possible Insurgency Situation in Laos”, report, UK Joint Planning Staff to UK Chiefs of Staff Committee, 15 March 1961, JP(61)30 (Final), PRO: DEFE 6/69. 101 Ibid.

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Geneva Agreement. This course of action had the backing of both the United States and France and all three powers were now in broad agreement in their wish to secure a neutral, and comparatively stable, Laos.103 Eisenhower was fast losing enthusiasm for orchestrating a pro-Western tilt to the Royal Laotian Government by the time the incoming Kennedy administration came to office, and the new President showed no interest in reviving that policy. That being said the Americans were still willing to countenance the use of force to prevent an outright Pathet Lao victory. The communists could keep Phong Saly, Sam Neua and north-eastern Laos but they had to be kept away from the towns of the Mekong Valley and out of south-eastern Laos and its border with South Vietnam.104 Moscow and Hanoi needed to recognise this position and the seriousness with which Washington would react should Pathet Lao troops be allowed to threaten it. The British argued that introducing Western troops to Thailand, particularly under the SEATO banner, would undermine their attempts to get the Soviets to back a diplomatic solution incorporating this de facto partition of Laos. Thus the Americans and British were at odds over the best means by which to secure such an outcome and gain Soviet and Vietnamese acquiescence to it. The other main point of difference between the British and Americans in their assessment of the political ramifications surrounding the potential deployment of SEATO forces to Thailand was that of the impact of an outright rejection of this suggestion on Thailand. The United States and Australia and New Zealand were acutely aware that the Thais were treating SEATO’s response to the events in Laos as a litmus test of the alliance’s credibility. The scenario outlined by the Thais was entirely plausible and if left unaddressed posed a direct threat to Thailand’s security. After some frank consultation with their ANZAM partners, Australia and New Zealand, not to mention pressure from the Americans, the British relented.105 At their Fourteenth Military Advisers' Conference in March agreement was reached authorising the MPO to revise Plan 5 to cover two separate deployment scenarios: “Situation 1” covered the existing plans for the deployment of SEATO forces into Laos; “Situation 2” covered the contingency whereby SEATO forces would “initially”

102 Ibid. 103 Freedman, p. 295. 104 Cable, P. R. Heydon, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of External Affairs, and S. Landau, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of Defence, to Tange, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, 1961. 105 Ibid.

202 deploy “short of Laos west of the Mekong in north-east Thailand”.106 The emphasis on the geographical area of deployment as constituting the main difference between the two situations provided enough ambiguity to depoliticise them to a degree palatable for all SEATO members to accept. Situation 2 was particularly carefully worded as exemplified by the insertion of the term “initially” into its description. This allowed for the possibility that the deployment was simply being dictated to by operational constraints rather than a rejection of SEATO intervention by the Royal Laotian Government. While the questions surrounding the area and circumstances of deployment were being thrashed out an even more urgent change to Plan 5 was required. In the aftermath of Kong Le’s coup it was painfully clear that the concept of operations for Plan 5 had now been rendered obsolete. Pathet Lao forces had expanded dramatically over the previous twelve months and were estimated to be 19,000 strong by January 1961 and supported by 5,000 PAVN troops.107 Phouma had managed to raise a force (including Kong Le’s) of some 10,000 men although, with the exception of Kong Le‘s battalion, they were generally inferior to their Pathet Lao counterparts in terms of training, discipline and determination.108 Both groups were receiving substantial Soviet military aid and the Pathet Lao were being augmented with PAVN cadres and units. At the same time, although Phoumi was expanding the size of the Royal Laotian Army, it was still a brittle instrument of questionable quality. The idea of “helping the Laotians help themselves” was all but laughable in this context. Far from simply securing key population centres and providing a morale boost to Royalist troops, Task Forces Alpha and Bravo would have a real fight on their hands:

Although movement can still be made unopposed into the main deployment areas (Vientiane and Seno) it could now require much greater military effort to gain and hold the other areas, some of which are under Communist control … SEATO forces could now be involved in actual operations from the outset, leading to a long and costly campaign. SEATO could thus face

106 “Future SEATO Planning concerning Laos and Thailand”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 4 October 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 12. 107 “Relative Military Capabilities of Opposing Forces in Laos”, CIA SNIE, 58-2, 11 January 1961.

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the possibility of contributing considerably more forces than originally planned.109

In light of this sober reassessment the idea of sending six to nine SEATO battalions into Laos in March 1961 to take and occupy positions in complete isolation of each other was an invitation to disaster. Clearly an increase in both the force size, and a revision of the role, of the ground component was needed. The first issue was the most difficult of the two. An American suggestion that the original force contributors to Plan 5C/59 simply attend to any increase themselves, while supported by Thailand (and the Philippines), was not received warmly by either the United Kingdom, Australia or New Zealand. France was adamant that its stance on this issue had not changed and that it was unable to offer any units beyond the garrison at Seno. Pakistan was more forthcoming and offered to place up to a battalion in reserve. Then there was the question of logistical support. One of the original factors used to determine the required force ceilings for Plan 5/59 had been the recognition that such logistical facilities and lines of communication that did exist inside Laos were of a very rudimentary nature. Ongoing work on facilities in north-eastern Thailand had improved the situation slightly but many bottle-necks remained. The assumptions behind the logistic studies supporting Plan 5C/59 would also have to undergo significant revision. As things turned out “Situation 2” quickly proved itself to be more prophetic than its authors doubtless would have liked. Even before the MAG met in Bangkok for the Fourteenth Conference, the offensive launched by the Pathet Lao at the beginning of that month was threatening to overrun the towns earmarked for the deployment of SEATO forces under the Situation 1 version of Plan 5. For Buszynski, and other commentators this was the moment when SEATO finally earned the unflattering sobriquet “Paper Tiger” so beloved of communist propaganda. Neither the SEATO Council Meeting of that month nor the Military Advisers' Conference that immediately preceded it had anything officially to say on Laos beyond bland statements affirming their concern over the events there.110 Instead the Americans,

108 Ibid. 109 Cable, P. R. Heydon, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of External Affairs, and S. Landau, Acting Secretary, Australian Department of Defence, to Tange, Australian Embassy, Bangkok, [?]1961. 110 Buszynski, pp. 79-80.

204 supported by Thailand, took matters into their own hands and delivered a unilateral warning to the Soviets and North Vietnamese. Elements of the 3rd Marine Division and Seventh Fleet - “Task Force 116” - were mobilised and advance elements of a Marine helicopter squadron were dispatched to Udorn airbase in north-eastern Thailand (ironically, the Marine units were those earmarked for Plan 5).111 This seemed to produce the desired effect; on 27 March the Soviets announced their support for a cease-fire in Laos and the rest of the British proposals.112 The ICC was resurrected and all three original members, India, Canada and Poland, agreed to take part again.113 It took another month for Moscow to convince its North Vietnamese allies to follow its lead, but in the end they did so and the Pathet Lao, Phouma’s men and the Phoumist forces all agreed to observe a cease-fire with effect from 3 May.114 Nine days later the international conference convened in Geneva under the co-sponsorship of the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. Invitations to the conference were extended to the thirteen nations that had originally attended the 1954 conference, as well as Thailand, Burma and the three ICC countries.115 It would take 14 months of laborious negotiation before a settlement was reached. In the interim another crisis briefly revived the prospect of SEATO intervention. Violations of the cease-fire, particularly by the Pathet Lao, soon became commonplace but these were generally small-scale in nature - individual villages might be seized or outposts attacked, but nothing to suggest a major resumption of hostilities. This changed in January 1962 when Pathet Lao and PAVN forces prepared to attack the Phoumist garrison of the provincial capital of Nam Tha. This province, which bordered Burma, also lay next to the Pathet Lao stronghold of Phong Saly and was the last remaining Phoumist-held town north of Luang Prabang. US intelligence suggested that the Vietnamese were hoping to stage a mini “Dien Bien Phu” there to deliver a resounding victory to the Pathet Lao without fear of provoking a western intervention - Nam Tha was well away from the Mekong Valley and already arguably in the communist zone of control, bar its capital.116 Upon being informed of this development General Phoumi chose to

111 Castle, p. 29. 112 Dommen, p. 194. 113 Ibid. 114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Freedman, p. 347.

205 dramatically reinforce the garrison rather than evacuate it.117 The Americans were aghast and many suspected that Phoumi, who by that stage was disenchanted with the direction the negotiations at Geneva were heading, was deliberately trying to engineer a situation that would trigger American intervention on his behalf.118 Whatever their original motivations for attacking Nam Tha, the Pathet Lao and their Vietnamese backers could not tolerate such a large Phoumist force being positioned so close to Phong Saly.119 They increased their own preparations and at the beginning of February put the town under siege. After a two-month siege, marked by the dropping of a paratroop battalion to reinforce the garrison (the town’s sole airfield had been quickly shelled out of commission), the communists launched an all-out assault on the battered defences and completely overwhelmed them.120 The American reaction was swift and forceful, but restrained and the Pathet Lao, or perhaps more to the point, the North Vietnamese leadership were not yet prepared to risk a move against the Mekong Valley. The only significant outcome of this latest crisis was to thoroughly discredit Phoumi in the eyes of his former backers. Even his old friend, Marshal Thanarit, abandoned his cause - Thailand was not going to be drawn into a war in Laos on behalf of allies as unreliable as Phomui’s forces had proven themselves. If this was the case for Thailand it was even more so for the other SEATO members. The crisis at Nam Tha confirmed their belief that Laos was not the place for SEATO to make a stand against communist expansion in the region. It is hard to argue that they were wrong to come to this conclusion. Laos itself was beyond salvation. At best the new Coalition government in Vientiane – with the irrepressible Phouma once again holding the Prime Ministership – might provide enough inducements to keep the Pathet Lao out of the Mekong Valley. If not, then the preferred option of both the Americans and Thais would be to seek out and sustain whatever local forces could be found that were capable of holding out against the Pathet Lao. Laos was still worth a covert war, whose sole aim was to deny the enemy outright victory, but no more than that. On 23 July 1962 the negotiations in Geneva finally concluded with the signing of the “Declaration and Protocol on the Neutrality of Laos”.121 As well as restoring

117 The garrison was boosted to just over 5,000 men via a round the clock airlift. Dommen, p. 214. 118 Freedman, p. 347. 119 Ibid. 120 Dommen., p. 217. 121 John J. Syzak, “The International Conference on the Settlement of the Laotian Question and the

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Phouma to power at the head of a three-way coalition government (the Phoumists, or “Right”, Phouma and Kong Le’s forces – the “Neutralists” – and the Pathet Lao), the agreement called for all foreign military personnel to withdraw from Laos within 75 days of the protocol coming into force.122 The Protocol also declared that the Kingdom of Laos would not recognise “the protection of any alliance or military coalition, including SEATO”.123 Despite being singled out in this manner Plan 5 lingered on for another nine months until the MAG “suspended” it at the Eighteenth Military Advisers' Conference in April 1963.124 In all likelihood it would have been suspended earlier were it not for the fact that the initial movement and logistical planning for Plan 5, Situation 2, was utilised as the basis for an interim de facto counter-insurgency contingency plan for Thailand. In the aftermath of Laos the strain on the alliance was palpable and the need to reassure Bangkok of SEATO’s relevance and credibility became paramount.

Geneva Agreement of 1962”, American Journal of International Law, April 1963, cited in SEATO Press Release, NAA: A1838, 2798/8 Part 2. 122 Ibid. 123 Ibid. 124 Australian Military Adviser’s Report of the Eighteenth Military Advisers’ Conference, NAA: 1838/346, TS688/10/12 Part 2.

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Chapter 7 SEATO Counter-insurgency Planning for South Vietnam and Thailand 1960-1963

Thai confidence in SEATO was badly shaken by the failure of the alliance to agree on the need to activate Plan 5. They were frustrated and annoyed by opposition of the United Kingdom and France to such action. However the fact that the United States had eventually concurred with the British assessment of the situation in practice, if not in principle, and had committed itself to supporting the Geneva negotiations, left the Thais with limited room to manoeuvre. They certainly made known their dissatisfaction with SEATO and the events in Laos, but they had to be careful lest their criticism was seen as an active attempt to undermine SEATO’s credibility as an ongoing alliance. The fact was that the United States still saw SEATO as having a vital role to play in containing communism in Southeast Asia. The difficulties with the French and British not withstanding, SEATO was still the preferred means by which the US sought to engage in strategic military planning with its allies in the region. It allowed the US to influence the force development and contingency planning of its allies in SEATO, particularly the regional members and Australia and New Zealand, while at the same time being free to keep much of the detail of its own contingency plans for the region to itself. The difference between the two planning tracks may not have been great, and indeed it was not in US interests to have them diverge too far, but it allowed a margin of freedom of action on the part of the US that it would not otherwise have enjoyed had it been forced to enter into bilateral defence planning relationships with the various SEATO members. Thailand would win no favour in Washington by being the one whose actions could be blamed for turning an internal dispute into an open rift that destroyed the organisation. At the same time the Americans were not indifferent to Thailand’s concerns, and, indeed, shared their doubts in regard to the part played by the British and French. The Americans recognised Thailand’s role as the geographical linchpin of SEATO, and knew that without Thailand SEATO’s declared aim of protecting the Protocol

208 states from communist aggression would ring increasingly hollow. Even before the final convulsions of the Laotian Crisis had played themselves out, the Kennedy administration sought to reassure the Thais by issuing a joint communiqué on 6 March 1962 that reaffirmed the United States’ commitment to maintain “the preservation of the independence and integrity of Thailand as vital to the national interest of the United States and to world peace”.1 To meet this commitment the Americans pledged to discharge their obligations to Thailand under the Manila Treaty with or without unanimous agreement from the other SEATO members on the need to act.2 Known as the “Rusk-Thanat Agreement”, this communiqué quickly took on the status of a de facto bilateral defence treaty with the United States as far as most Thais were concerned.3 To that extent it did serve to partially mollify Thailand’s concerns over SEATO. Convinced they now had a direct security guarantee from Washington, the protection offered by a successful appeal for SEATO intervention, hitherto Thailand’s only resort in the face of aggression, could now be safely regarded as desirable, but not essential.4 Accordingly Thai agitation (and with it the potential for dramatic confrontation) over French and British intransigence in SEATO subsided into something more akin to passive annoyance. This was not what the Americans had actually offered - a careful reading of the Agreement makes it clear that all Washington had promised to do was to honour its obligations under Article IV of the Manila Treaty irrespective of the actions, or lack thereof, undertaken by other SEATO members. Thus in the event Bangkok asked for American assistance the United States was merely bound to “consult” with Thailand and thereafter “act in accordance with its constitutional processes” in shaping its response5. The Rusk-Thanat Agreement contained no automatic trigger for American military intervention.

1 Donald E. Weatherbee, Studies In International Affairs No. 8, The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis, (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 25. 2 Ibid. 3 Named after its official authors, the American Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, and Thant Khoman, the Thai Foreign Minister. Ibid. 4 Arne Kislenko, “Bamboo in the Shadows: Relations between the United States and Thailand During the Vietnam War”, in Andreas W. Daum, et al, eds., America, the Vietnam War and the World: Comparative and International Perspectives (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), pp. 206- 7. 5 See Appendix I for a complete transcript of the Manila Treaty.

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Nonetheless the interpretation the Thais chose to put on the Agreement was reasonably sound from a practical point of view. The importance of Thailand to American strategy in Southeast Asia, coupled with the massive amount of American military and economic aid already invested in the country, suggested that the chances of obtaining unilateral American military intervention should Bangkok request it were high. Thai confidence in Washington’s intentions in this regard was undoubtedly boosted by the Kennedy administration’s apparent willingness to increase its unilateral assistance to the increasingly beleaguered South Vietnamese regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem. In the immediate aftermath of the 1954 Geneva agreements North Vietnam had ordered its cadres in the South to refrain from violent action against Diem‘s government. Instead they were to concentrate on building up domestic support networks and assisting the North in establishing supply routes into the country preparatory to a resumption of insurgent operations at a later date. In early 1959 Hanoi decided that the time was right to resume the “armed struggle” in the South and instructed its cadres accordingly. The Viet Cong immediately embarked upon a campaign of targeted assassinations of government officials and other terrorist actions, which by 1960 had evolved into a fully-fledged guerrilla campaign. While from a Thai perspective SEATO and, ultimately, the Americans, had both failed to make a stand against communist aggression in Laos, it was still possible that both parties would seek to rectify that mistake in Vietnam. It was certainly in Thailand’s interests to do all it could to encourage the United States to take a firm line in Vietnam, and if Washington sought to involve SEATO in such a policy then it was in Thailand’s interests to support SEATO’s involvement, too.6 In fact the MPO had already anticipated the possibility of SEATO involvement, and had first raised the question of counter-insurgency planning for South Vietnam two years before the Rusk-Thanat Agreement.

Creation and development of Plan 7

In mid-April 1960 the Senior Planners' Committee, working on its own initiative, directed a planning team to commence a preliminary study of military

6 Kislenko, pp. 211-12.

210 measures against communist insurgency in South Vietnam. This action was noted in the CMPO’s report to the Twelfth Military Advisers' Conference in Washington in May, but it prompted no official response or direction from the MAG at that stage. The following month the planning team completed its first draft and referred it back to the Senior Planners' Committee for discussion. Although it was only four pages in length the report nonetheless contained some significant conclusions. Based on the latest assessment of the situation by the CSE, the report agreed that while there had been a noticeable increase in Viet Cong strength and activity in recent months, it had not yet reached a point where the government in Saigon was in serious danger of being overthrown.7 Furthermore the planners concluded that with a wholesale change in emphasis from conventional to counter-insurgency training on the part of the South Vietnamese security forces, and a comprehensive civic action program on the part of the government, it was still possible for Saigon to contain, if not destroy, the Viet Cong without the need for significant outside intervention.8 To that extent they recommended that a special study by a SEATO joint civil/military team be undertaken to establish exactly how SEATO member states could assist Saigon in implementing such a strategy.9 The planners added that the success of this strategy would naturally preclude the need for “a strictly military anti-insurgency plan on the pattern of Plan 5”.10 But this optimistic note was swiftly qualified by the rejoinder that immediately followed it: “However, because success cannot be guaranteed it is recommended that such a plan be developed as a precaution.”11 The Senior Planners' Committee agreed with the conclusions of the draft but found themselves at odds in regard to the recommendations.12 Some planners felt that as there was apparently no immediate military problem there was no need for any further action. The Pakistani Senior Planner was the most adamant of this group and

7 MS/625/60, “Preliminary Study on the Preparation of an Anti-insurgency Plan for South Vietnam”, first draft, MPO, 14 June 1960, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. 8 Ibid. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 This was a classic example of the clash of responsibilities that the reorganisation of the MPO later that year (see Chapter Three) were designed to avoid. Under the new organisation the planning teams answered to the CMPO only and national political considerations in relation to a draft report of this nature would not be taken into account until it had been passed on to the Military Advisers Representative Committee for comment. Minute, New Zealand Senior Planner to Secretary, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington, 1 July 1960, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1.

211 while he was against endorsing either recommendation, he expressed particular concern in regard to the development of a counter-insurgency plan for South Vietnam, arguing that the Senior Planners' Committee should concentrate on those plans authorised by the MAG rather than seek to initiate new ones.13 The New Zealand Senior Planner reported to Wellington his suspicions that the Pakistani Planner’s stance owed more to Pakistani concern that nothing threaten the emphasis on Plan 4, already second in priority to Plan 5, than anything else.14 A New Zealand suggestion that the draft be developed as a formal MPO paper and referred “to the political side of the house” for comment before circulation to the MAG was rejected.15 Instead it was finally decided that the Committee would merely note the conclusions of the draft and take no further formal action although Senior Planners, as was their right, were free to refer it back to their respective military advisers or other national bodies as they saw fit.16 This would allow the opportunity for an individual military adviser to formally raise the recommendations, conclusions, or indeed any aspect of the draft, for inclusion on the MAG agenda should he wish to do so (or indeed be directed to do so by a higher national authority). None appear to have taken up this opportunity and the preliminary study was effectively shelved for the time being. Nonetheless from this point on the possibility of counter-insurgency planning for Vietnam, and its implications, appeared on the agenda of the ANZAM members of SEATO, both collectively and individually.17 Again, as was so often the case insofar as ANZAM was concerned, much of this deliberation was aimed at trying to second guess the exact intentions of the United States. For its part Washington was already deeply involved in advising and supporting the Diem regime in its response to the Viet Cong. As noted in chapter three, an American MAAG had been operating openly in South Vietnam since 1956. Initially the Americans concentrated on training programs to improve the conventional capabilities of the South Vietnamese armed forces. For example, by 1960 seven ARVN infantry divisions - accounting for nearly all of the Army’s field force - had been organised, trained and equipped to defend against invasion by PAVN forces, and at least four of these divisions were kept in the I Corps

13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Ibid. 16 Ibid. 17 “Further Developments of SEATO Planning”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 16 February

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Area (encompassing the five northernmost provinces) at any given time.18 However this emphasis began to change as the guerrilla campaign launched by Hanoi began to gather momentum. In May 1960 the MAAG had its strength doubled to 685 men and a number of US Army Special Forces teams were deployed to assist in the formation of Vietnamese Ranger battalions, a new addition to the ARVN order of battle and one expressly designed to counter the growing insurgent threat.19 Given this level of American support for South Vietnam and the precedent of Plan 5, there was a strong case to be made for SEATO involving itself in counter- insurgency planning for the country. But it was by no means inevitable. Unlike Laos, the US was already heavily involved in directing, if not overtly prosecuting, the South Vietnamese counter-insurgency effort. As long as this relatively low-key bilateral effort was producing effective results in the field there was no pressing need or advantage to be gained by introducing SEATO into the equation. Indeed, in some quarters in Washington, most notably the State Department, SEATO involvement was opposed on the grounds that it would merely limit American freedom of action in South Vietnam without adding any tangible military benefits to the counter- insurgency effort there. However by 1961 it was becoming clear that this bilateral effort, at least in its current form, was not producing the desired results. As late as April1960 the CSE estimate of the insurgent threat in South Vietnam concluded that, while the upsurge in Viet Cong activity, particularly assassinations of government officials and other terrorist attacks, was a serious development, “the scope of the present insurgent threat is limited by [South Vietnamese] Government operations and by insufficient logistic support from external communist forces”.20 Total Viet Cong combatant strength in III Corps Area (incorporating the Mekong Delta and Saigon), for example, was estimated

1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/317. 18 South Vietnam was divided into three ARVN “Corps Areas” up until November 1962 when a reorganisation saw them replaced with four “Corps Tactical Zones” (CTZ). This involved simply renaming the I and II Corps Areas (basically north and central South Vietnam) but III Corps Area was split into two CTZs. The III CTZ encompassed 17 provinces north of the Mekong Delta while IV CTZ covered the remaining 13 provinces that straddled the river system itself. Saigon was not included in III CTZ but was instead given a separate status as the “Capital Military District”. Robert F. Futrell, The Advisory Years To 1965, Volume I, The United States Air Force in Southeast Asia, (Washington DC: Office of Air Force History, 1981), pp. 57, 154-5. 19 The initial strength ceiling for ARVN Ranger forces was set at 5,000 men. Major-General George S. Eckhardt, Vietnam Studies, Command and Control 1950-1969 (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1974), p. 21. 20 Annex “A”, Section III, “Communist Insurgent Threat”, Report of Fifth SEATO Intelligence Committee Meeting, 14 April 1960, NAA: A1838/269, TS688/18 Part 7.

213 to be around 2,300.21 Apart from small arms their weaponry was thought to consist of nothing more sophisticated than a few light mortars and a mix of civil and military explosives, and nearly all of it was believed to have been sourced from Viet Minh arms caches left over from the war against the French.22 Within 18 months the prognosis was much bleaker. By September 1961 the CSE estimated that the Viet Cong had increased their strength to a total of 12-14,000 active guerrillas.23 Furthermore, Viet Cong operations had intensified to include attacks by company-sized, and even occasionally battalion-sized, units against government forces. These actions were often successful and the Viet Cong had achieved significant levels of local dominance in seven provinces in central and southern South Vietnam.24 Equally worrying was the fact that this new level of aggression was accompanied by the fielding of an increasingly powerful array of Soviet-designed weapons and equipment, including rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) and recoilless rifles.25 As far as the CSE was concerned this new armoury confirmed their suspicions that North Vietnam was fully committed to the Viet Cong campaign, and that it could be expected to do everything within its power to see the insurgency prevail.26 In this respect there was also clear evidence of North Vietnamese efforts to improve and extend their overland supply trails through Laos and Cambodia into the South.27 By the same token the South Vietnamese government appeared to be running out of options. Under American direction 70% of the South Vietnamese Army had been committed to counter-insurgency operations in central and southern South

21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 MS/625/15/61, “Counter Insurgency in South Vietnam - Estimate of the Situation”, MPO, Bangkok, November 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. Barely four months later this estimate was revised upwards by the CSE to a total of 20-25,000 active Viet Cong guerrillas. Cable, New Zealand Ambassador, Bangkok, to New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 24 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. 24 Ibid. According to a British estimate by April 1961 the Viet Cong controlled 30-40% of “rural Cochin-China”. “Viet Cong Insurgency in South Vietnam”, report to British Chiefs of Staff Committee, London, from British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East), 14 April 1961, PRO: DEFE 11/420, COS (61) 125. Derived from a Portuguese hybridisation of the original Chinese name for the region, “Cochin-China” was used by Europeans from the 16th Century onwards. While it was originally used to describe the entire country, under French rule the term Cochin-China was used to refer to only the southern third of Vietnam (roughly corresponding to III Corps Area). Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History (New York: Penguin Books, 1984), p.57. 25 Ibid. At this stage the RPG in question was generally the RPG-2 rather than its more famous successor, the RPG-7. The RPG-2 was the first Soviet weapon of this type and was heavily based on the Second World War-era German Panzer Faust. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid.

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Vietnam.28 The ARVN had expanded to a strength of 150,000 men, but the South Vietnamese air force and navy put together amounted to less than 10,000.29 Lack of adequate air and naval support hindered the ARVN’s mobility and made interdiction of communist supply routes into the country all but impossible. The ARVN itself still suffered from a “garrison mentality” on the part of many of its senior commanders, and political interference from provincial governors reluctant to see “their” troops taken away for operations elsewhere. The resulting inability to concentrate forces in a timely and effective manner was a great hindrance to counter-insurgency operations. To mount such operations without adequate forces, or to take too long in assembling adequate forces, simply gave the Viet Cong the opportunities they needed to evade them. The fact was that militarily the Viet Cong now held the initiative. The possibility that the situation in South Vietnam could deteriorate dramatically as had happened in Laos no longer appeared to be so remote. The Americans were not oblivious to these problems and sought to rectify them through their military aid and advisory programs. In April/May 1961 President Kennedy authorised an increase of the MAAG by 100 personnel and the dispatch of a 400-strong US Army Special Forces group to mobilise, and operate amongst, the Montagnard tribesmen of the Central Highlands.30 American military advisers were authorised to accompany ARVN battalion and company-sized units into combat.31 Kennedy also ordered the CIA to step up its covert operations against North Vietnam.32 In October Kennedy sent General Maxwell D. Taylor to investigate the military situation and to report back personally to the president upon his return. Taylor recommended that the Vietnamese military, particularly the ARVN, be greatly expanded; that the US military aid and advisory effort be stepped up to meet this expansion; and that the US provide combat support (mainly tactical airlift) for South Vietnamese counter-insurgency operations. Kennedy acted quickly on all three

28 MS/625/15/61, “Counter Insurgency in South Vietnam - Estimate of the Situation”, MPO, Bangkok, November 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. 29 Ibid. 30 Futrell, pp. 68-9. 31 Brigadier-General James Lawton Collins, Vietnam Studies, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army 1950-1972 (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1975), p. 26. 32 The CIA had begun to take an active role in helping to direct and organise South Vietnamese manned covert missions against North Vietnam in 1960. Under Kennedy the original intelligence gathering focus of these missions was expanded upon to include sabotage and other paramilitary activities. See Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), pp. 2-21.

215 recommendations. The Americans agreed to underwrite the expansion of the ARVN to a total of 200,000 personnel and two US Army Aviation companies were dispatched to South Vietnam in December.33 The MAAG was never intended to cope with the additional command responsibilities that accompanied these efforts, and thus in November Kennedy upgraded US command arrangements in South Vietnam by authorising the establishment of “Military Assistance Command, Vietnam” (MACV).34 MACV took over responsibility for all US forces in South Vietnam, including the MAAG, which, having been relieved of the aforementioned burden, was able to re-focus on its original training and advisory role.35 Additional options, including overt large-scale unilateral US military intervention, were also debated by Kennedy and his advisers. Chastened by the experience in Laos Kennedy was not about to sanction such intervention lightly and, although he refused to rule out the possibility of such action, he continually baulked at taking this final step. Instead Kennedy continued to opt for a series of incremental increases in both the strength and tempo of the United States military assistance to South Vietnam. With the Kennedy Administration anxious to explore all options in this regard the prospect of a SEATO “Plan 5 for Vietnam” appeared much more inviting than it had the previous summer. Should a large-scale intervention in South Vietnam prove necessary it now appeared that, from Washington’s point of view, both the military and political benefits of involving SEATO in such an operation could outweigh any concomitant loss of American freedom of action. Thus by the middle of 1961 the Americans began to agitate for a SEATO counter-insurgency plan in relation to South Vietnam. In the lead up to the Fifteenth Military Advisers' Conference Admiral Harry D. Felt sounded out his fellow SEATO military advisers on the desirability of developing “a Plan 5 to meet communist insurgency in South Vietnam and indicated that he might raise this matter at MA15C”.36 Felt had in fact been a supporter of SEATO involvement in such planning

33 This program of expansion was completed by September 1962. In addition to the ARVN, paramilitary forces were also expanded under the program: The Civil Guard rose to a strength of 77,000, the Self-Defence Corps to 99,500 and a new force, the Civilian Irregular Defence Group was formed with a strength of 15,000. Another round of US-backed expansion took place the following year, raising ARVN strength to 225,000, the Civil Guard to 86,000 and the Self-Defence Corps to 104,000. Collins, pp. 23, 26, 29. 34 Eckhardt, pp. 26-8. 35 Ibid. 36 “Priorities for the development of SEATO Plans”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 14 September 1961, NAA: A1209/134, 61/1097.

216 for some time and in his capacity as CINCPAC had argued as such in submissions to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Now Washington supported his stance and he lobbied hard for acceptance of the idea by the Military Advisers' Group. Despite some misgivings on the part of the majority of SEATO members given the unfolding debacle over Laos the Military Advisers nonetheless directed the MPO to prepare a new plan - Plan 7 - to counter the communist insurgency in South Vietnam.37 The MPO moved quickly and issued the annexes “A”, “B” and “E”, which dealt with intelligence, the concept of operations and command and organisation, for out-of-session consideration in January 1962.38 These were followed by a further six annexes in February, thus completing the draft plan (Plan 7/61).39 The general strategy behind Plan 7 was broadly similar to Plan 5 in that the aim was for SEATO forces to secure a number of key population and communication centres, thereby freeing up ARVN forces for offensive operations against the Viet Cong. But there the similarities ended. The concept of operations, particularly in relation to the employment of SEATO ground forces, made it quite clear that SEATO would not intervene simply to “show the flag” and bolster ARVN morale. This time the MPO planners were under no illusions as to the scale and nature of the insurgent threat they faced, nor the need for SEATO forces to prepare to play a significant part in combating it. Plan 7/61 called for an initial SEATO Field Force of seven Regimental Combat Teams (an American “RCT” being the equivalent of a British Commonwealth Brigade Group), four Ranger/SAS companies and miscellaneous headquarters, line of communication and other support units.40 One SEATO division (i.e. three RCTs plus a divisional headquarters and supporting troops) would be deployed through Da Nang to release comparable ARVN forces from I Corps Area and assume their responsibilities should PAVN forces attempt to mount overt

37 Cable, Major-General Stephen Weir, New Zealand Military Adviser, 15th Military Advisers Conference, Bangkok, to Minister of External Affairs, Wellington, 6 October 1961, ANZ: EA 120/15/3. 38 The other annexes were: Annex C - Force Requirement; Annex D - Logistics and Administration; Annex F - Communications-Electronics; Annex G - Psychological Warfare; Annex H - Civil Affairs; Annex J - Public Information. “SEATO MPO Plan 7/61”, minute, British Defence Coordination Committee (Far East), 30 January 1962, ANZ: EA 120/15/3. 39 “MPO Plan 7/61”, minute, Major General J. Wilton, CMPO, to MAG, 8 February 1962, ANZ: EA 120/15/3. 40 “Annex C”, ibid.

217 operations across the border.41 One RCT would be deployed to the Saigon area to insure the security of the capital and, again, release an equivalent ARVN force for offensive operations elsewhere.42 Another division, including one airborne or air transportable RCT, would be held as Force Reserve at Nha Trang, in II Corps Area, in readiness for immediate deployment at the discretion of the Commander, SEATO Field Force.43 An additional division was required for inclusion in a General Reserve, where its elements would remain under national command at ten days notice to move upon activation of Plan 7.44 In acknowledgement of the well established American- led effort to equip, train and advise the South Vietnamese military, it was agreed that forces belonging to SEATO members already present in South Vietnam prior to the activation of Plan 7 would remain under national command.45 The SEATO ground forces, in addition to securing key areas and relieving ARVN forces of their responsibility for them, were also expected to “take part in operations designed to isolate the Viet Cong from North Vietnam; participate in operations with Special Forces; [and] assist in the counter-offensive to destroy insurgent forces.”46 The air component required a total (including reserves) of 259 aircraft and helicopters (see Table 7.1). To relieve pressure on the available facilities in South Vietnam extensive use was to be made of the network of modern airbases already established in Thailand. Ten tactical and five all-weather air defence fighters would operate from Takhli, in the Chaophraya River basin; medium transports, RT-33A Shooting Star photo-reconnaissance jets and air-refuelling tankers were to be based at Don Muang, just outside Bangkok; and the light bombers would operate out of Korat.47 The bulk of the remaining aircraft would be concentrated near Saigon at Bien Hoa, Tan Son Nhut and Vung Tau, although a small detachment of light reconnaissance aircraft (i.e. prop-driven Cessna L-19 Bird Dogs, T-6 Texans and T-28 Trojans) and light transports was to be maintained at Nha Trang.48 The exact deployment of the helicopters, all either light or medium models, would be left for the

41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 “MPO Plan 7”, minute, New Zealand Military Adviser’s Representative, MPO, Bangkok, to Secretary, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington, 24 November 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. 47 Annex “C”, MPO Plan 7/61, Major-General John Wilton, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 8 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, w2688, Part 1. 48 Ibid.

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SEATO Field Force commander to determine according to operational need.49 The SEATO Air Component was tasked with carrying out reconnaissance, interdiction, airlift and direct ground attack missions in support of counter-insurgency operations by ARVN and SEATO ground forces.50 To this was added the additional responsibilities of assisting the SEATO Naval Component in its maritime interdiction mission (see below), and being prepared to support SEATO ground units in III Corps Area in the event of an overt attack across the 17th Parallel by PAVN forces.51 The basing of tactical fighters and bombers in Thailand obviously had potentially negative consequences for the daily sortie rates and operational ranges of those units, but it was anticipated that over the medium term these would be offset by the increased serviceability rates afforded by the superior maintenance and logistic facilities of the Thai bases.52 Furthermore, should the tempo of operations require it, the Thai-based aircraft could always stage through South Vietnamese airbases.53 However the most crucial question was whether SEATO would be granted overflight rights to southern Laos, but until the negotiations at Geneva were concluded and a new government formed in Vientiane it was impossible to predict the likely answer.

Table 7.1: Plan 7/61 Air Force Requirement54 Aircraft Type Number Tactical Fighters 55 All-Weather Air Defence Fighters 10 Transports 80 Helicopters 50 Reconnaissance 29 Light Bombers 30 Air Refuelling Tankers 5 TOTAL 259

The inclusion of a SEATO Naval Component in Plan 7 was another departure

49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid. 54 Appendix, “New Zealand Force Declaration to SEATO Plan 7”, briefing by Air Vice Marshal M. F. Calder, RNZAF, to New Zealand Minister of Defence, Dean Eyre, 13 April 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 3.

219 from Plan 5. This force was to include one squadron of six frigates, 42 coastal patrol and escort vessels divided into seven squadrons, and eight inshore and eight coastal minesweepers plus one headquarters ship divided into two composite minesweeper squadrons.55 Amphibious craft for local reconnaissance and support duties, such as landing ships/craft, would also be required, their numbers to be determined after an in situ assessment of need by the SEATO Field Force Commander.56 The frigates, patrol craft and escort ships were intended to establish an effective patrol of the South Vietnamese coast and the Mekong Delta to halt the Viet Cong’s use of maritime supply routes from North Vietnam and Cambodia into South Vietnam. The ubiquitous Vietnamese fishing junk was a common sight from the Gulf of Tonkin to the Gulf of Thailand and these fleets offered the perfect cover for all sorts of smuggling operations. At that stage the South Vietnamese Navy was simply incapable of mounting the sustained and widespread effort required to monitor and control the activities of this vast coastal trade. To achieve the desired level of geographical coverage the frigate squadron was to be based at Cam Ranh Bay while Da Nang, Xuang Day Bay and Vang Fong Bay would each receive two of the patrol/escort squadrons, with Saigon being allocated the remaining squadron.57 Beyond smuggling operations the only other Viet Cong maritime activity anticipated by the SEATO planners was the possible use of mines. The two minesweeper squadrons were thus charged with keeping the harbours and approaches of Saigon and Cam Ranh Bay free of this threat.58 Saigon and its lengthy waterway to the open sea was felt to be particularly vulnerable to this form of attack. Thus the SEATO Naval Component was dedicated to maritime interdiction and harbour defence operations only. Nonetheless the possibility that opportunities for the employment of heavy naval surface units might arise was not ruled out. Should it become necessary, strong naval and naval air support could be supplied by carrier groups, inshore fire support squadrons and other elements drawn from the navies of SEATO member states. However these forces would remain under national command for the duration of their deployment to the Vietnamese theatre.59 Plan 7/61 received a generally favourable reception from the MAG. Indeed,

55 Annex “C”, MPO Plan 7/61, Major-General John Wilton, CMPO, to MAG, 8 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid.

220 the Americans immediately signalled their intentions by calling for force declarations to Plan 7 to be tabled for discussion at the Sixteenth Military Advisers' Conference scheduled for 2-5 May in Bangkok.60 The only serious objections raised came from the British and the French. The British questioned the need to deploy SEATO ground forces as far north as Da Nang, arguing that to do so might actually provoke overt intervention by PAVN forces.61 They also queried the use of the term “destroy” in relation to the stated aim of the plan in regard to the Viet Cong:

[T]he wholesale destruction of Viet Cong would entail the killing of many people who were forced to serve it and thus alienate rather than gain the support of the indigenous people. We therefore recommend that the word “destroy” should be replaced by “defeat’ throughout.62

Amongst the MAG and MPO this objection was regarded with some frustration and was seen by some, particularly the Thais, as being symbolic of the United Kingdom’s lack of real commitment to SEATO‘s military aims. Colonel H. A. Purcell, the New Zealand MAR, exemplified this frustration in a report to his superiors in Wellington:

I think if you read the whole of the UK paper… they admit in their preamble that the Viet Cong is an organisation. As I see it, the only treatment for an organisation is destruction. To disrupt it only leaves us with the problem at some future date and from memory, I thought this was the aim in Malaya.63

Nonetheless in this instance the British Chiefs of Staff appear to have been more attuned to the political whims of their masters than some of their SEATO colleagues. On the eve of the Sixteenth Military Advisers' Conference the proposed

59 Ibid. 60 Minute, Air Vice Marshal M. F. Calder, Chairman, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, to New Zealand Minister for Defence, 13 April 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 61 “SEATO MPO Plan 7/61”, report, British Defence Co-ordination Committee (Far East), Singapore, to British Chiefs of Staff, London, 30 January 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 62 Ibid. 63 “MPO Plan 7/61”, minute, Colonel H. A. Purcell, New Zealand Military Adviser’s Representative, SEATO HQ, Bangkok, to the Secretary, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington, 9 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1.

221 amendment had gained the formal support of both the French and, Colonel Purcell’s remonstrations notwithstanding, the New Zealand governments.64 Given that this, together with the Da Nang deployment, was all that stood in the way of British acceptance of the Plan the other SEATO members decided not to contest what, in their eyes, was a petty concession to political semantics.65 The question of Da Nang however was a different matter. The fact was that by the beginning of 1962 the only sizeable ARVN field force units not already committed to counter-insurgency operations were those stationed between Da Nang and the border with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (i.e. the three provinces of Quang Nam [including Da Nang], Thua Thien and Quang Tri).66 Deploying the SEATO division earmarked for Da Nang anywhere else would therefore not have the “force multiplier” effect of freeing up an equivalent force of ARVN troops for counter-insurgency operations, nor would it leave SEATO forces in a good position to respond to any PAVN overt aggression. In addition to this the logistical needs of a force the size of a SEATO division were also far more easily met by the facilities at Da Nang than any other South Vietnamese city north of Nha Trang.67 Discussions with their Australian and New Zealand counterparts at the Sixth ANZAM Defence Committee Meeting in April 1962 made it quite clear to the British that both Canberra and Wellington thought the military benefits offered by Da Nang overrode the political risks posed by its proximity to the 17th parallel.68 Furthermore, the Australians and New Zealanders pointed out that the plan did not call for deployment of SEATO forces on the border itself and that a buffer force of ARVN troops could be retained in Quang Tri Province.69 Having failed to convince their ANZAM partners, or garner strong support from elsewhere in SEATO (even the French found the military logic too compelling to do more than stress the need for careful rules of engagement in the border area), for abandoning the northern deployment the British had to settle for these assurances and they did not raise the issue at the MAG

64 Extract from New Zealand Military Adviser’s Report of the Sixteenth Military Advisers’ Conference, 24 May 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 65 Ibid. 66 MPO Plan 7/61”, minute, Colonel H. A. Purcell, New Zealand Military Adviser’s Representative, SEATO HQ, Bangkok, to the Secretary, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington, 9 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 67 “MA16C: Agenda Item B - MPO Plan 7/61”, brief for New Zealand Military Adviser, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, 16 April 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid.

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Conference. The French objections were largely political in nature and were felt by the rest of the MAG to be best addressed by the SEATO Council (see below). However, during the drafting of the first three annexes the French Military Adviser’s Representative, Colonel Jacques P. Britsch, expressed concern that by reacting to covert aggression with overt action SEATO risked provoking, and being branded as the instigator of, an international crisis. Instead, in a minute circulated to his colleagues at the MPO, Britsch suggested an alternative course of action:

At first, the “Top” Secret - no conference, no staff meetings, no press release, no visit - but the silence, and little concealed events such as the following would occur:

By night, SEATO Air Force Squadrons, wearing Vietnamese Colours would land in varied South Vietnamese Airfields and immediately would begin to assist Vietnamese forces. More and more small vessels, under SEATO Command, but with South Vietnamese names and colours, and South Vietnamese crew, would sail and visit the junks along the coasts. The South Vietnamese Government would recruit volunteer’s legion or “foreign legion”, but they would be, in reality, SEATO special units or SEATO Commanded and so on. At last underground actions against Viet Cong’s lines of communications and even Viet Cong’s territory, would have to be forecast. Implementation of such a plan would be accepted probably with more convenience than an overt plan by SEATO political authorities.70

Britsch was careful to point out that “these ideas are only exposed by right of friendship and in order to trace their way in the minds. Besides they are not something new, particularly for the enemy”71. New or not, these ideas found no favour amongst the rest of SEATO (despite the fact that the Americans had already begun to implement covert action along such lines in Laos). Nonetheless Britsch had

70 “Counter-Subversion Plan for South Vietnam”, minute, Colonel J. P. Britsch to Military Advisers’ Representatives, CMPO, DCMPO and Head of Planning, MPO, Bangkok, 24 October 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1.

223 identified the Achilles heal of Plan 7, indeed the Achilles heal of all SEATO counter- insurgency plans, namely the difficulty of securing political agreement from all SEATO members that the conditions requiring intervention had been met. The less esoteric concerns of Colonel Britsch’s superiors centred around the role of Laos in Plan 7. They questioned the assumption that overflight rights would be forthcoming. The Plan had also left open the possibility of not only gaining Laotian cooperation in securing the south-eastern Laotian border with South Vietnam, but of also mounting cross-border operations to actively assist Laotian forces in such a mission. This again assumed that “rightist” or Phoumist forces would retain sufficient power in the aftermath of the Geneva negotiations to enable such cooperation to take place. The French argued that this was an unduly optimistic assumption and that SEATO was better off assuming the worst – in other words the establishment of a non-cooperative “Neutralist” government in Vientiane. The rest of the MAG responded by agreeing that these questions were too overtly political in nature and were best forwarded on to the SEATO Council for their consideration. This decision does appear to have been at odds with what was otherwise arguably SEATO’s most realistic plan to date. The reluctance of the MAG to confront this issue seems to have arisen at the behest of Admiral Felt. It is tempting to speculate that the motivation behind this move lay in an American desire not to see SEATO explicitly rule out a “Laotian factor” that still formed an important part of American unilateral counter-insurgency planning for South Vietnam. Indeed, the United States had already begun to put in place covert measures to insure that the contest for control of south-eastern Laos would continue regardless of the outcome in Geneva. The MPO draft plan specifically requested that SEATO members not nominate forces already earmarked for Plan 5.72 This was because in the view of the CMPO, Major-General John Wilton, until the negotiations in Geneva were resolved it was possible that both plans might have to be implemented concurrently.73 This posed a real problem for the ANZAM members for whom 28th Commonwealth Brigade had always been earmarked as being the vanguard, if not the entire

71 Ibid. 72 MS/625/15/61, “Counter Insurgency in South Vietnam - Estimate of the Situation”, MPO, Bangkok, November 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 73 “MPO Plan 7/61; Counter-Insurgency in South Vietnam”, Sixth ANZAM Defence Committee brief for Rear-Admiral P. Phipps, New Zealand Military Adviser, from New Zealand Chiefs of Staff

224 complement, of British, Australian and New Zealand ground forces nominated for SEATO plans. New Zealand and the United Kingdom insisted that it made no sense for them to with-hold the only available combat-ready ground forces they possessed in the region from Plan 7 on the basis that they might be needed for Plan 5:

[I]n the event of SEATO intervention in Vietnam, but not in Laos, the Commonwealth Brigade would sit idly in Malaya while New Zealand in particular scratched around for forces which could be sent [there].74

New Zealand had good reason for concern as its tiny peacetime Army only had enough regulars to sustain the single infantry battalion already stationed in Singapore.75 In theory the capacity existed for expansion up to brigade group strength based on the Territorial Force, but the reality was that most of the personnel constituting these reserves were poorly-trained and almost completely lacking in modern equipment and weaponry.76 Even if this were not the case the mobilisation of the Territorial Force units was expected to take at least three months (and this was an arguably over-optimistic assessment given the actual state of the Territorial Force).77 If the obligation to provide a separate combat-ready battalion for Plans 5 and 7 was going to be met by Wellington, then the only way the New Zealand government could do so was effectively to double the size of the peacetime New Zealand Army and raise another full-strength Regular infantry battalion capable of rapid deployment overseas. The cost of such an expansion was completely unpalatable from a domestic political perspective.78 By this measure the only credible ground force the New Zealanders

Committee, 16 April 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 74 Minute, [?] to McIntosh, New Zealand Department of External Affairs, 20 December 1961, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 75 This commitment was maintained from 1958-1963 through the inclusion of two Regular battalions, the 1st and 2nd New Zealand Regiments, on the New Zealand Army’s peacetime order of battle, with one relieving the other on a two-year rotation system. Only the battalion assigned to the 28th Commonwealth Brigade was kept at full strength – its counterpart in New Zealand was routinely reduced to a de facto battalion depot. In October 1963 this arrangement was formally recognised as such when, as part of a wider re-organisation of the New Zealand Army, the 1st New Zealand Regiment was retitled the “1st Battalion, Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (RNZIR)” and the 2nd New Zealand Regiment disbanded and its personnel reformed as the “1st Battalion, RNZIR Depot”. Damien Fenton, A False Sense of Security: The Force Structure of the New Zealand Army 1946-1978 (Wellington: Centre for Strategic Studies, 1998), pp. 70-1, 112-3, 117-20. 76 Ibid., pp. 103-16. 77 Ibid. 78 Ibid.

225 could contribute in a timely fashion to either Plan 5 or Plan 7 was the New Zealand battalion in the 28th Commonwealth Brigade. The United Kingdom was not faced with doubling its peacetime Regular Army to meet this challenge but the problems were not completely dissimilar in that the actual pool of combat-ready British infantry battalions was comparatively small and already extensively committed to the BAOR in Europe and Imperial deployments from Gibraltar to Aden to Hong Kong.79 While the British could (in theory at least) concentrate enough strategic airlift to move up to a brigade at short-notice from one part of the globe to another, the logistic chain required to support it in combat could not be established so quickly.80 Taking a British battalion away from internal security duties in Malaya was a possibility, but for political reasons - namely considerations of domestic sensitivities in the fledgling Malayan Federation - it was impossible for the United Kingdom to make a public declaration to this effect.81 Again the cost, both in political and economic terms, of providing another battalion to commit to Plan 7, just did not appear to be justified given the likelihood that a British battalion, already dedicated to supporting SEATO plans, would be standing by in Singapore. Furthermore both the British and the New Zealanders argued that if events had deteriorated to the point where the implementation of both Plan 5 and Plan 7 was being called for, the situation was probably not far from justifying the implementation of Plan 6 or even Plan 4. In which case Laos became a secondary theatre and SEATO’s efforts focussed upon the defence of South Vietnam (and Thailand in the case of Plan 4). The Australians were a little more circumspect and indeed had already investigated the possibility of making a unilateral contribution of Australian forces independent of their Commonwealth allies. This investigation was prompted by concern that, as with Laos, the British might disagree with the United States over the need for SEATO intervention, and that New Zealand might defer to London’s stance as opposed to Washington’s if forced to choose.82 Based on this study the Australian Chiefs of Staff had concluded that they could mobilise and deploy a “reduced battle group” from Australia to Plan 7 and leave their battalion in 28th Commonwealth

79 “SEATO Military Advisers’ Sixteenth Conference: Brief for Agenda item B (Plan 7)”, British Chiefs of Staff Committee, 11 April 1962, PRO: DEFE 6/79, JP(62)49. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 In fact New Zealand shared Australia’s concerns in regard to the United Kingdom on this occasion.

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Brigade untouched.83 They nonetheless made plain their preference for nominating the latter for Plan 7 if possible. Any units dispatched from within Australia would be organised on the Pentropic system adopted by the Australian Army in 1959. This raised serious issues in regards to the ability of such units to operate effectively with their Commonwealth counterparts.84 It was because of such issues that the Australian battalion in Singapore had been specifically exempted from the Pentropic reorganisation in the first place. The Australian Cabinet, although still suspicious of British motives, was persuaded by these arguments to join the United Kingdom and New Zealand in pressing for the declaration of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade to both plans on a “first come, first served” basis. This was the agreed position taken by all three of their respective military advisers at the Sixteenth Military Advisers' Conference in May. 85 In addition to the ground units of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade, the air and naval assets nominated by Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, were also largely drawn in situ from the Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve (see Table 7.2). Faced with this unified approach the other SEATO members did not seek to insist that the CMPO’s recommendation regarding separate force declarations be adhered to.

Table 7.2 ANZUK Air & Naval Force Nominations for Plan 7 - May 1962 United Kingdom Australia New Zealand Air Force Air Force Air Force 1 x Fighter-Bomber Sqn 1 x Light Transport Sqn 1 x Light Bomber Sqn 1 x Short-Range Transport 1 x Medium Transport Sqn Force

Navy Navy Navy 2 x Frigates 2 x Frigates 2 x Frigates 4 x Coastal Minesweepers

83 “SEATO Military Plan 7 – To Counter Communist Insurgency in South Vietnam”, Athol Townley, Australian Minister of Defence, to Cabinet, 26 April 1962, NAA: A5819/2, Volume 5/Agendum 170. 84 Ibid. 85 This position was endorsed beforehand through an out-of-session agreement by the ANZAM Defence Committee. Minute, “SEATO MPO Plan 7 -Nomination of Ground Forces”, ANZAM Defence Committee, 26 April 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1.

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1 x Minesweeper Support Ship

In any event, the other SEATO members, with the exception of the United States, were hardly in a position to criticise the force contributions nominated by Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. American force nominations accounted for most of the remaining SEATO force requirement except for three RCT/Brigade groups.86 Thailand did not nominate any forces for placement under SEATO command but instead declared that Royal Thai Army forces under national command would be deployed along Thailand’s border with Laos “to protect the western flank against communist infiltration and subversion”.87 France and Pakistan declared that they were not yet in a position to make any commitments as did the Philippines, although the latter promised to do so before the next MAG conference.88 The issue of command appointments for Plan 7 was also dealt with at the Conference. The CMPO’s recommendation regarding separate force contributions to allow the concurrent activation of Plans 5 and 7 had the unintended consequence of raising the possibility that, under such circumstances, both operations could be coordinated from the one SEATO headquarters. This had led to some anxiety on the part of the other SEATO members, particularly the Americans and Australians, that the Thais would take up this argument and seek to have the already established SEATO Force command headquarters for Plan 5 fulfil that role for Plan 7 as well. This was to be avoided at all costs as “no one is very keen to see Field Marshal Sarit directing insurgency operations in Vietnam”.89 To everyone’s relief the Thais did not make a serious attempt to include the suggestion on the Conference’s agenda, and it was unanimously agreed that the United States would be the appointed nation for the Plan and would provide both the SEATO Force, and SEATO Field Force, commanders.90 With this formality in place Admiral Felt then announced that the United States had selected General James F.

86 Minute, “MA16C: Force Declarations to Plan 7”, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, 25 May 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 87 Extract from New Zealand Military Adviser’s Report of the Sixteenth Military Advisers’ Conference, 24 May 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 88 Ibid. 89 “MPO Plan 7/61”, minute, Colonel H. A. Purcell, New Zealand Military Advisers’ Representative, SEATO HQ, Bangkok, to the Secretary, New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee, Wellington, 9 February 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1. 90 Extract from New Zealand Military Adviser’s Report of the Sixteenth Military Advisers Conference, 24 May 1962, ANZ: EA1, 120/15/3, Part 1.

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Collins to be the SEATO Force Commander and General Paul D. Harkins to be the SEATO Field Force Commander.91 General Harkins, formerly Deputy Commander, US Army, Pacific (USARPAC), was already in South Vietnam, having been sent there by Kennedy to establish MACV three months earlier.92 With these agreements and some minor amendments to the annexes Plan 7/61 was accepted by the Military Advisers and became Plan 7/62. The signing of the Geneva Agreement in July rendered redundant the need for the SEATO Council to consider the political issues raised by the French at the Sixteenth Conference. In the face of continued British and French pressure over the issue, action on revising the Plan and its assumptions in relation to Laos now became unavoidable. The resulting amendments recognised the neutrality of the coalition government in Vientiane and abandoned any pretence of gaining official Laotian co-operation in securing the border with South Vietnam against communist infiltration. Nonetheless, while these amendments removed the original assumptions in relation to Laos, the possible need for cross-border operations in general was not explicitly ruled out:

The Commander, SEATO Field Forces will be prepared for the following military contingencies, implementation of plans for these contingencies will be subject to prior specific direction by the SEATO Council of Ministers:

…(b) the extension of air and/or ground operations beyond South Vietnam. The successful execution of the SEATO mission may require such an extension to deny the Communists safe havens and lines of communication.93

Insofar as the need to overcome the problem of obtaining Laotian permission for overflight rights was concerned the answer was to simply ignore it. Reference to the need to deploy aircraft to bases in Thailand remained untouched while the

91 Ibid. At that time General Collins was Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific (CINCUSARPAC). Eckhardt, p. 26. 92 Ibid., p. 27-8. 93 MS/627/16/63, “MPO Plan 7/62 – Substantive Amendments”, minute, CMPO to Military Advisers, 23 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13.

229 sentence relating to the overflight issue that originally followed it was removed in its entirety.94 Again the resort to such devices appears to have been driven by the American need to insure that the concept of operations for SEATO’s Plan 7 did not diverge too far from the realities of the American strategy already in play on the ground, a strategy in which control of south-eastern Laos was deemed to be essential. This tension was also reflected in the United State’s attempts to coax unilateral force contributions from the other SEATO members for the American-led counter- insurgency campaign in South Vietnam during this period. These early overtures failed to elicit a positive response with the exception of Australia: In May 1962 Australia agreed to dispatch a 30-strong training unit, the “Australian Army Training Team Vietnam” (AATTV) to assist in the US advisory effort.95 Nonetheless the fact that the Americans were prepared to seek such contributions on a concurrent basis with SEATO planning demonstrated that the United States was no longer prepared to accommodate Alliance sensitivities, at least as far as Vietnam was concerned.

The Creation of Plan 8

Although the 1962 Geneva Agreement’s impact upon Plan 7 was limited, the settlement was indirectly responsible for the creation of SEATO Plan 8 – a counter- insurgency plan for Thailand. Even as Kennedy continued to authorise further increases in American military aid and assistance to South Vietnam, he remained anxious that the deployment of US combat units to north-eastern Thailand not lead Bangkok to assume that the latter was anything but a temporary measure. With the conclusion of the negotiations in Geneva, Kennedy took the opportunity to end the deployment and ordered that the troops be withdrawn. The United Kingdom, Australia and New Zealand soon followed the American lead and began to prepare to withdraw their contingents as well. This action was greeted with dismay by the Thai government which, the Rusk- Thanat Agreement notwithstanding, again accused Washington of wavering in its

94 Ibid. 95 The AATTV arrived in Saigon at the beginning of August. It was initially split into four groups with three going to I CTZ and one going to II CTZ. See Ian McNeil, The Team: Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972 (St Lucia: University of Queensland Press, 1984), pp. 8-16.

230 commitment to defend Southeast Asia from communist aggression.96 The Thais were bitterly disappointed by the outcome in Geneva – Field Marshal Sarit had no faith in Phoma’s ability to prevent the Pathet Lao from dominating his coalition government – and the timing of the American pullout merely added to their sense of despair and isolation over the outcome in Laos and its implications for the region and the alliance. Although somewhat exasperated by the Thai response to the pull-out, the Americans were once again left in a position where the onus was on them to restore Thai confidence in Washington.97 Kennedy even went so far as to revisit the idea of stationing US combat units in Thailand before settling on a less ambitious gesture – persuading the rest of SEATO to agree to the creation of a SEATO counter- insurgency plan for Thailand.98 As it happened this was not a particularly difficult task. Admiral Felt circulated the proposal amongst the other military advisers for out-of-session agreement to proceed in early September 1962.99 The Thais accepted Felt’s proposal and with this endorsement the other SEATO members moved quickly to add their own approval.100 The British, acutely conscious of the fact that their reputation in Bangkok, indeed within SEATO as a whole, had taken a battering over Laos, seized upon the opportunity to restore their credibility with both parties and readily agreed to the American proposal.101 Australia and New Zealand followed suit, again largely as a gesture of support to counter Thai disenchantment with the Alliance.102 Pakistan and the Philippines also agreed, as did France, although the extent to which this agreement was motivated by concern for Thailand’s disillusionment with SEATO is harder to discern. A more cynical explanation for the ease with which the proposal for Plan 8 was accepted could be found in the fact that at that time there was no active, or even imminent, communist insurgent threat to Thailand. The Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), although in existence since 1942 (and outlawed in 1952), had failed to garner

96 Kislenko, p. 209-10. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 “SEATO Planning for Counter-Insurgency In Thailand”, minute, UK Chiefs of Staff Committee Joint Planning Staff, 26 September 1962, PRO: DEFE 6/83, JP(62) Note 17. 100 Ibid. 101 Ibid. 102 “Future SEATO Planning concerning Laos and Thailand”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 4 October 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13.

231 any significant influence or appeal beyond ethnic Chinese circles.103 Indeed, the CPT’s close association with the ethnic Chinese community in Thailand was one of the main impediments to it gaining support from the wider Thai population - as already noted in chapter four, anti-Chinese sentiment was a powerful force in Thai society. Despite this lack of a concrete threat there was a practical argument to be made in favour of the exercise, namely the close examination of the logistical arrangements and facilities required for a rapid deployment of external SEATO forces into Thailand that the plan would entail:

[T]here would be military value in having under development an active plan for the deployment of SEATO forces to Thailand in various contingencies that might arise.104

Thus the proposal had some merit beyond that of simply shoring up Thai faith in the Alliance, although the Thais were in no doubt as to its prime intention. The out-of-session agreement to the proposal was formally endorsed at the Seventeenth Military Advisers' Conference held in Bangkok on 16-17 October.105 The MAG directed the MPO to draw up a draft plan in time for out-of-session consideration, and its inclusion for approval on the agenda of the Eighteenth Military Advisers' Conference scheduled to take place in Paris the following April.106 The MPO completed the draft – known as Plan 8/63 – in January 1963 and duly dispatched it as directed. 107

PLAN 8

The concept of operations for Plan 8/63 followed the well-worn pattern established by its predecessors, Plans 5 and 7. SEATO ground forces would intervene

103 Donald E. Weatherbee, Studies In International Affairs No. 8, The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1970), p. 61. 104 “Future SEATO Planning concerning Laos and Thailand”, minute, Australian Defence Committee, 4 October 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 105 “SEATO Military Advisers’ Seventeenth Military Conference”, report, Air Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, Australian Military Adviser, 30 October 1962, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 106 Ibid. 107 “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13.

232 to secure key population and communication centres, relieve Royal Thai Army units for offensive operations elsewhere and, having consolidated their hold on those centres, join the Royal Thai Army in counter-insurgency operations as required.108 A SEATO Air Component would assist the Royal Thai Air Force to maintain control of the country’s aerospace and that of the Gulf of Thailand, carry out reconnaissance and interdiction missions, and provide airlift and close air support for the Royal Thai Army and other SEATO ground forces.109 Unlike Plan 7, there was no requirement for a distinct SEATO naval component, although the Plan assumed that significant naval support, including the provision of carrier groups, from SEATO members would be made available, albeit under national command, if required.110 The force requirements were significantly smaller than those envisaged for Plan 7. The SEATO ground component was to initially comprise of just three separate battalion groups.111 However, a further six battalions, together with the appropriate support units, were to be kept in a General Reserve under national command at 15-20 days readiness so as to allow the rapid expansion of the initial SEATO force into three brigade groups should the situation demand it.112 The SEATO Force Commander was given a great deal of latitude in regards to the deployment of these forces. Although centres such as Chiang Mai, Chiang Rai, Udorn, Ubol, Korat and Mukdaharn were all mentioned as possible deployment areas, none were explicitly earmarked as such.113 The only real caveat placed on the deployment was the need for SEATO ground forces to “be in a sound military position to operate in the event of overt aggression”.114 A similar degree of freedom was afforded to the deployment of the SEATO Air Component. The initial size of the component was also comparatively small by the standards of Plan 7, requiring a single fighter squadron, a light transport squadron, a helicopter squadron, an “Air Commando detachment” and a tactical reconnaissance task force.115 To back this force up an additional two fighter squadrons, another

108 Annex “B”, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 109 Ibid. 110 Ibid. 111 Annex “C”, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 112 Ibid. 113 Annex “B”, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 114 Ibid. 115 Annex “C”, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military

233 helicopter squadron, one medium transport squadron and a light bomber squadron air were required for the General Reserve, where they would remain under national command until requested for deployment by the SEATO Force Commander.116 Indeed the only specified deployments in Plan 8/63 related to the location of the main SEATO headquarters. It was agreed that the Commander, SEATO Force, would have his headquarters in Bangkok, the Base Area Command HQ would be located at Korat, and the SEATO Field Force Commander and his subordinate air and ground component commanders would establish their headquarters in the “Udorn area”.117 The latter choice was based on the not unreasonable assumption that while the strength and extent of a possible communist insurgency in Thailand remained unknown quantities, the likely direction from whence it would be supported and supplied did not. Whatever the exact nature of such a conflict, control of the border with Laos would undoubtedly be a key objective for both sides. The small size of the SEATO force requirement and the deliberate vagueness surrounding the deployment of those forces was obviously due in large part to the hypothetical nature of the threat (notwithstanding the ambitions of the CPT). As the intelligence annex of Plan 8/63 noted in its summary of communist insurgent forces:

There are no Communist [insurgent] forces per se in Thailand however there are clandestine Communists in Thailand who would welcome reinforcement and support to carry on subversive and insurgent operations.118

But there were also other factors in play, not the least of which was the need to avoid unduly denigrating the capabilities of the Thai military by suggesting the need for a large influx of external SEATO forces from the outset. In fact, having been presented with the draft of Plan 8/63, the Thais effectively rejected it and instead offered to submit a counter-proposal for out-of-session consideration before the Eighteenth Military Advisers' Conference.119 The Thais

Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 116 Ibid. 117 Enclosure 4, SEATO Force Commander’s Plan, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 118 Annex “A”, “MPO Plan 8/63 (Draft)”, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 31 January 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 119 Progress Report, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 18 February

234 argued that their forces were capable of dealing with the military aspects of a counter- insurgency campaign on their own.120 Instead, Bangkok suggested that the area where Thailand would need external SEATO assistance if faced with an insurgency was in the field of civic action. Indeed, the Thais went further and suggested that the emergence of a full-blown insurgency in Thailand would actually be the “initial stage of Plan 4”.121 Far better, Bangkok argued, to remould Plan 8 into a preventative plan:

[W]hich would call for assistance from other SEATO nations to counter subversion and prevent the emergence of insurgency rather than a plan to counter insurgency.122

The intimation was that the assistance should be in the form of increased economic and development aid for those areas of strategic concern, such as the north-east of Thailand. The Thais clearly saw Plan 8/63 as the political gesture that, by and large, it was, and had no compunction in treating it as such. The somewhat opportunistic Thai response was not what the other SEATO members had intended or expected. The ANZAM nations had always resisted pressure from Pakistan, the Philippines and Thailand to utilise SEATO as a major conduit of civilian aid, preferring to keep such assistance completely divorced from the military alliance. There was no enthusiasm on their part to break with this policy and the Americans, already supplying Thailand with millions of dollars of both military and civil aid, were in no mood for a marked increase on top of their existing programs. Furthermore questions in relation to communist subversive activity had always been considered the remit of the CSE, or in other words the civilian side of SEATO. It was hoped to resolve the differences between the two proposals prior to the Eighteenth Military Advisers' Conference scheduled for April 1963, but this was not achieved.123 Thailand was under no compelling insurgent threat and could therefore afford to treat Plan 8/63 lightly. A compromise was reached at the Conference

1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13. 120 Brief for New Zealand delegation to Ninth SEATO Council Meeting, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 3 April 1964, ANZ: EA1, 120/5/10, Part 1. 121 Ibid. 122 Ibid. 123 Progress Report, Rear-Admiral S. M. Ahsan, CMPO, to SEATO Military Advisers, 18 February 1963, AWM: AWM 122, 3/5 Part 13.

235 whereby the Thai SEATO Council Member was to invite the SEATO Council to consider the overall problem of preventing and countering communist insurgency in Thailand.124 This action was taken with the result that the SEATO Council directed the Secretary-General to undertake studies of various aspects of the problem in cooperation with the Thai Government.125 The Secretary-General was to keep the SEATO Council Representatives informed of his progress, and the CMPO was to be consulted as and when the advice of his office was needed.126 With this process in place all work on Plan 8/63 by the MPO effectively came to a halt. The Thai Government showed no urgency in either cooperating with the Secretary-General’s Special Assistant on Counter-subversion, or driving the work forward themselves.127 The United States, having made what was always primarily intended to be a gesture of support, saw little to be gained in pushing the Thais any further on the matter, and made it clear to the other SEATO members that Washington would not provide any future guidance or initiatives in relation to Plan 8.128 Thus Plan 8, although never officially “suspended” in the manner of Plan 5, was effectively shelved. Nonetheless as 1963 drew to a close SEATO appeared to have recovered from the setback of Laos. The creation and ongoing development of Plan 7, particularly the enthusiastic role of the United States, had gone some way to restoring a sense of confidence in the continued relevance of the alliance. While Plan 8 had played a small, and indeed brief, part in restoring Thai confidence in SEATO, the fact that the other members, even France, had so readily supported the concept suggested that all of them still felt they had a stake in its continued existence. In any event it should not be forgotten that SEATO was the first modern multilateral military alliance to even attempt joint counter-insurgency contingency planning. Despite the problems with such planning, and clearly the issue of French and the British commitment to this aspect of the Alliance remained unresolved, it should also not be forgotten that the development and refinement of Plans 4 and 6 continued unabated during this period. While communist insurgency had emerged as a major threat to the region the conventional communist military threat had not disappeared. SEATO always had

124 Brief for New Zealand delegation to Ninth SEATO Council Meeting, Department of External Affairs, Wellington, 3 April 1964, ANZ: EA1, 120/5/10, Part 1. 125 Ibid. 126 Ibid. 127 Ibid.

236 more than a single military role to play in the region. But it was a fact that SEATO’s signatories accorded different weight to those roles. The issue was whether or not these differences could be contained, managed and, most importantly, offset by the advantages to be found in maintaining SEATO as a credible alliance. The increasing unilateral American commitment to South Vietnam’s security, although instrumental in reviving regional confidence in the West’s willingness to confront communism in Southeast Asia, obviously held great potential for causing another Laotian-style crisis in SEATO. The emergence of the insurgent threat had already dealt a significant blow to SEATO’s unity and it was highly unlikely the alliance could withstand another one.

128 Ibid.

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Chapter 8

The Beginning of the End 1964-1965

As the SEATO alliance moved into its ninth year it still commanded the active support of the United States and as such was still the pre-eminent forum for coordinating Western defence strategy in Southeast Asia. But as 1964 unfolded Washington began to reassess SEATO’s usefulness in this regard in light of the growing unilateral American commitment to assist South Vietnam to defeat the communist insurgency. During this period President Lyndon B. Johnson’s administration became increasingly convinced that it would have to undertake some form of overt armed intervention to arrest the deterioration of the situation in South Vietnam. Faced with the prospect of preparing for a real war in the region the value of SEATO contingency planning and other activities quickly came to be judged by a single measure: what could they add to the American military effort in Vietnam? Despite the increased American military aid and assistance authorised under Kennedy the Viet Cong insurgents had continued to increase in both strength and effectiveness throughout 1963 and into the new year. By 1964 the Viet Cong had an estimated strength of 35,000 regulars and 80,000 irregular, or militia, forces.1 At the same time US military strength in Vietnam grew from 16,000 to 23,000 personnel during 1964, of whom approximately 15,000 were military advisers.2 Yet the impact on the performance of the RVNAF in counter-insurgency operations was negligible. Suggestions that at least part of the problem lay with fundamental flaws in American counter-insurgency doctrine were dismissed by the Pentagon, and instead the focus was placed squarely upon the apparent inability of the RVNAF to execute it properly.3 The inescapable logic that flowed from this premise, of course, was that the introduction of American combat units would ensure the doctrine’s successful application.4 At the same time the growth in domestic support for the Viet Cong within South Vietnam was underestimated, and instead the need to punish the DRVN

1 McNeil, The Team: The Australian Army Advisers in Vietnam 1962-1972, p. 56. 2 Eckhardt, p. 43. 3 Andrew Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986), pp. 131-6. 4 Ibid.

238 into abandoning its support of the insurgency was emphasised as a means to starve the Viet Cong of men and material. Throughout 1964 the Johnson administration absorbed these and other arguments in favour of overt military intervention and began to prepare the ground both domestically and internationally for such action. SEATO’s Plan 7 was intended for just such a scenario, but the Americans never tried officially to activate it. Indeed, compared with the diplomatic and political capital expended by Washington in an effort to reach a consensus within the Alliance on the need to prepare for the possibility of activating Plan 5, the American’s wasted little time or effort in trying to obtain similar backing for Plan 7. While the Laotian crisis had been marked by equivocation from all of SEATO’s members to one extent or another, the developing crisis over Vietnam was characterised by a hardening of positions within the Alliance, and the expectation of reaching a consensus and the commensurate willingness to work towards such a goal were conspicuously absent in 1964-65.

French Opposition to American and SEATO Intervention in Vietnam

The escalation of American unilateral military involvement in South Vietnam was matched by a hardening of French opposition to it. This was exemplified by de Gaulle’s public proposal in August 1963 for an international agreement on the creation of a unified and “neutralised” Vietnam (presumably based on the original 1954 Geneva Accords).5 The new French position was in keeping with de Gaulle’s rejection of the bipolar world of the Cold War as being nothing but a “temporary” arrangement, borne of an ideological conflict which would inevitably fail to suppress or supplant age-old nationalisms for long.6 Under the Gaullist world-view this development was to be welcomed, since a reversion to a more traditional multipolar balance of power would allow France to reassert its presence on the world stage as an independent great power in its own right.7 After finally ending the war in Algeria in 1962 (albeit while provoking great deal of domestic unrest) de Gaulle was ready to

5 Buszynski, p. 97. 6 For more on Gaullist philosophy regarding defence and foreign affairs see Philip H. Gordon, A Certain Idea of France: French Security Policy and the Gaullist Legacy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); Edward Kolodziej, French International Policy under de Gaulle and Pompidou: The Politics of Grandeur (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974); Alfred Grosser, trans. Lois Ames Pattison, French Foreign Policy under de Gaulle (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1967), pp. 13-28.

239 turn French foreign policy to the task of doing whatever it could to hasten this return to a multi-lateral balance of power.8 One such manifestation of this new direction was the official recognition of the PRC by France on 27 January 1964.9 The open opposition to US policy in Vietnam was another. The Gaullist argument posited that the conflict in Vietnam was essentially a nationalist one and that, once united, a neutralist Vietnam would soon be guided by nationalist as opposed to wider ideological issues. Indeed, under such circumstances the French argued that age-old Vietnamese animosity towards China could almost certainly be relied upon to re-surface and act as a bulwark against Beijing’s ambitions in the region. The problem for the French was that they could offer only the vaguest notions as to exactly how and when this transition would took place. An attempt by France to argue the merits of this approach towards Vietnam at the Ninth SEATO Council Meeting (held on 14-15 April 1964 in Manila) failed to win any support.10 The United States and Thailand took particular exception to the notion of a neutralised Vietnam. As far as they were concerned this was simply another way of inviting a communist takeover of South Vietnam.11 With the example of Laos still fresh in everyone’s minds, the idea that Hanoi would actually honour any agreement stipulating the neutralisation of the north, as well as the south, was simply laughable. The French refused to budge from their position and insisted on being allowed to issue a reservation to the official communiqué released at the end of the meeting.12 This episode clearly demonstrated to all concerned that there was no hope of gaining French support for Plan 7 in any shape or form as long as de Gaulle remained in power. Not surprisingly the unilateral commitment of American combat units to South Vietnam in early 1965 saw the French government use SEATO as the stage for further public demonstrations of its opposition to US policy in Vietnam. France sent only an observer to the Tenth SEATO Council Meeting in May, and all but completely removed itself from the military side of the alliance that same month.13 The French withdrew from the SEATO exercise “Sea Horse” scheduled for 1-24 May,

7 Ibid. 8 See Herbert Tint, French Foreign Policy since the Second World War (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972), pp. 195-200. 9 Ibid., pp. 210-11. 10 Buszynski, pp. 98-102. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid.

240 downgraded their presence at the Twenty Second Military Advisers' Conference in London by dispatching a military attaché in place of the French Military Adviser, and recalled the entire French component of the MPO staff, a process completed by the 31 May. 14 The French were careful not to sever all ties, however, and maintained a presence in the MPO by assigning a military attaché from their embassy in Bangkok the task of attending weekly MPO meetings.15 They also continued to fulfil all their roles in the Secretariat, i.e. the civil side of the SEATO organisation.16 France maintained this selective participation in SEATO until its formal dissolution in 1976 and it was a source of continued frustration to many in the alliance, particularly Thailand. As to why France did not simply withdraw altogether, the American embassy in Bangkok summed up Paris’s position thus:

…Continued French participation does not carry connotation of even minimal French cooperation with the alliance in Southeast Asia. On the contrary, it is regarded as an attempt by France to have a very inexpensive entrée into inner circles of the SEATO Alliance which permits maximum opportunity to implement the policy of maximum mischief.17

This blunt and unsympathetic assessment nonetheless captures the essence of the Gaullist logic behind France’s continued membership of SEATO: as a great power with ongoing interests of its own in the region France had the right, indeed the duty, to ensure that it continued to exercise some influence in the only multilateral security forum dedicated to Southeast Asia. The fact that this influence was seen as being almost universally negative from 1965 onwards by the rest of SEATO did not bother Paris in the least.

Despite this feeling no serious attempt was ever made to try and expel France from the organisation. This was due at least in part to the fact that the Manila Treaty

13 Ibid., p. 102. 14 “SEATO Military Advisers’ Twenty Second Conference”, report, Air Chief Marshal Sir Frederick Scherger, Australian Military Adviser, 12 May 1965, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/10/16, Part 2. 15 Buszynski, p. 104. 16 Ibid. 17 Telegram, US Embassy, Bangkok, to State Department, Washington DC, 5 April 1966. NARA: RG 59, Box 3698:General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Records

241 contained no formal mechanism for expulsion - the possibility that a SEATO member state would one day opt for selective participation simply had not crossed anyone’s mind in 1954. Furthermore the United States, amongst others, continued to hold on to the possibility that a post-de Gaulle government might restore to full participation and, indeed, adopt a more co-operative approach to Western defence issues in general.18 Finally, the French themselves were careful not to push the alliance too far. While Paris maintained its stand in regard to American policy in Vietnam it never denounced SEATO’s original raison d’être - as a collective military deterrent against conventional communist aggression in the region - nor did it ever explicitly rule itself out of participating in those SEATO contingency plans designed to counter such aggression, should it occur.

The Emergence of Pakistani Obstructionism 1964-65

If this intransigence had been restricted to France it is just possible that the United States might still have considered it worthwhile to pursue a collective SEATO action in Vietnam. However as 1964 unfolded it became patently clear that France now had a rival in its hitherto uncontested reputation for being the enfant terrible of the alliance. Pakistan’s obsession with the threat from India finally overwhelmed Islamabad’s consideration of other security issues, and continued Pakistani participation in SEATO suddenly became conditional on SEATO’s willingness to involve itself in the Indo-Pakistan conflict that had bedevilled the sub-continent since 1947. Pakistan had adopted a low-key, but nonetheless constructive, approach to the deliberations over Plan 5 during the Laotian Crisis. Content to follow the United States’ lead as to whether or not armed intervention by SEATO might be required to secure the neutralisation of Laos, Pakistan’s conduct appeared to contrast favourably with that of France and the United Kingdom during the episode, although its by now habitual attempts to emphasise (and in the eyes of other SEATO members exaggerate) the threat of a Soviet-dominated Afghanistan to West Pakistan’s security were a continued source of annoyance for most other members. Nonetheless the fact that the

relating to Thailand, 1964-66. 18 Telegram, US Embassy, Bangkok, to State Department, Washington DC, 5 April 1966. NARA: RG 59, Box 3698:General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Records

242 standard response from Bangkok to all these attempts - that while the rest of SEATO did not rate the threat from Afghanistan as highly as Pakistan the alliance would continue to monitor the situation - appeared to be routinely accepted by Islamabad with a minimum of disquiet, suggested that the issue was unlikely to spark a major crisis within SEATO anytime soon. A similar situation seemed to apply to the issue of Kashmir and Pakistan’s fear of India in general. Pakistan had signed the Manila Treaty in the full knowledge that it was directed only against the communist threat to its members and Southeast Asia. The United States, for its part, had made this point explicitly in Article XI of the Manila Treaty (see Appendix I) and the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand and France had resolutely supported this position. Occasional public criticism by Pakistani political leaders of SEATO’s unwillingness to involve itself in the ongoing Indo- Pakistani conflict was generally tolerated by the other SEATO members as a necessary expedient of Pakistani domestic politics, but one that did not reflect the actual understanding of the limits of SEATO’s security umbrella by the Pakistani political elite. Furthermore the President of Pakistan, General Ayub Khan, was considered to be “inflexibly anti-communist and personally pro-American”.19 Thus the fact that by the end of 1965 Pakistan had all but formally withdrawn from SEATO over the issue of Kashmir and the wider Indian threat to its security was a source of some surprise, and certainly no little amount of frustration, to other SEATO members. But while SEATO’s stance on the issue had not changed since 1954 Pakistan’s estimation of the relative importance and nature of the threats to its security most certainly had. India had always loomed large in this regard but the dramatic geo-political shift in the sub-continent’s balance of power as a result of the Sino-Indian War of 1962, and subsequent changes in Pakistan’s political leadership, combined to dominate Pakistan’s immediate security concerns from 1963 onwards. While Pakistan had been able to get Afghanistan placed on SEATO’s security agenda by emphasising the possibility of a pro-Soviet government taking power in Kabul, and the conventional military threat this would then pose to West Pakistan, the prospect of making a similar sort of linkage in relation to India was all but impossible.

relating to Thailand, 1964-66. 19 Ayub had assumed power as a result of a military coup against the government of Ali Mohammed in 1958. A graduate of the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst, Ayub had enjoyed a competent, if modest, career in the Indian Army prior to 1948, briefly commanding a battalion against the Japanese in Burma. Russell Brines, The Indo-Pakistani Conflict (London: Pall Mall Press, 1968), p. 229.

243

Pakistani reports to the CSE routinely stated that the Communist Party of Pakistan (CPP) was effectively a creature of the Communist Party of India (CPI), being dependent upon the latter for training, financial backing and strategic direction.20 To this end, while the objectives of the CPP were noted - forcing Pakistan’s withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO, creating a united front with other opposition parties, etc - a separate list of apparent CPI objectives specifically aimed at Pakistan was also presented.21 These “immediate objectives” included:

a) unseating the present regime;

b) provincial autonomy for East Pakistan; and

c) disintegration of West Pakistan into its former component parts.22

Curiously no mention was made of the CPI’s objectives within India itself (presumably similar to those of the CPP and other regional communist parties), nor where these apparent ambitions for Pakistan sat in relation to their domestic program. Needless to say such transparently disingenuous attempts to suggest an Indian connection to the communist threat to the region were insufficient to convince the rest of SEATO of any such thing, and were simply noted and then generally ignored. Unfazed by these rebuffs Pakistan continued to insert references to the threat it felt it faced from India into SEATO documents and discussions whenever opportunities to do so presented themselves. The Indian seizure of the Portuguese colony of Goa by military force in December 1961 prompted the following Pakistani submission to the CSE on “Other forms of Subversion”:

The failure of Portugal’s NATO and other Western allies to come to her aid to fight India’s unprovoked aggression in Goa has given a handle to Communists to denounce Pakistan’s membership of pro- Western pacts. They assert that when the Portuguese could not be

20 “Nature and Extent of the Communist Subversive (including insurgent) Threat to the Treaty Area”, Agenda item 2 (Pakistani Paper), SEATO Committee of Security Experts, 2 February 1962, NAA: A1838/2, 189/9/5 Part 1. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

244

defended against Indian aggression by their allies how can SEATO and CENTO come to the rescue of Pakistan in case of similar aggression against her.23

Thus the other SEATO members had long been made aware, or perhaps more to the point, wary, of Pakistan’s underlying annoyance with SEATO’s exclusive focus on communist threats. But having reminded the rest of SEATO that Pakistan considered India an ongoing threat to its security, Islamabad was content to let the matter rest insofar as SEATO’s various forums were concerned. As with Afghanistan management of the Indian issue within SEATO appeared to have settled down into something of a ritual where de facto limits to the debate were strictly observed by all parties. This delicate arrangement broke down in the face of a series of dramatic developments on the sub-continent, beginning with the 1962 Sino-Indian War.

The Impact of the Sino-Indian War 1962-1964

The Sino-Indian War completely shattered the existing geo-political order in South Asia. Despite the forging of generally good relations between China and India during the 1950s, unresolved questions over the delineation of the Sino-Indian border escalated into an increasingly bitter territorial dispute that, by the beginning of the new decade, overshadowed all other aspects of the relationship. As negotiations over the issue became dead-locked both countries engaged in provocative assertions of sovereignty on the ground: outposts were thrown up, seemingly overnight, in some of the highest and most inhospitable terrain on the planet; the intervening countryside was, wherever possible, subject to aggressive patrolling; and “incidents” began to mount accordingly. Despite the danger surrounding such brinkmanship the government in New Delhi refused to take seriously the possibility that Beijing would seek to escalate the conflict any further. On 20 October 1962 the Indian leadership was rudely disabused of this conviction when China launched two concurrent large-scale conventional military offensives to seize disputed territory in (Indian-held) Kashmir and, 1600 kilometers away, the North East Frontier Agency.24 The scale of the Chinese

23 Ibid. 24 To date no authoritative account of the Sino-Indian War, or indeed for that matter the Indo-Pakistani

245 assaults, involving as they did an estimated 110,000 PLA troops, took India completely by surprise and Indian forces, woefully ill-prepared for such an attack, suffered a series of humiliating defeats on both fronts.25 However, and despite fears to the contrary on the part of many Indians, Beijing was not interested in wholesale invasion and, having achieved its aims in regard to the border, agreed to a cease-fire on 21 November.26 For Pakistan the military implications of the Sino-Indian War were two-fold. On the one hand, the poor performance of the Indian forces had taken many Pakistanis by surprise. Subsequently an element of hubris crept into Pakistani military assessments of the abilities of their Indian counterparts:

Following India’s defeat at the hands of China in 1962, the Pakistani Army considered its potential opponent to be ineffective and incompetent - which in 1962 it was. GHQ analysts in Rawalpindi conducted their annual assessments of the Indian Army’s capabilities in 1963 and 1964 and concluded that little had changed.27

At the same time Pakistanis were alarmed and angered by the alacrity with which Western nations responded to Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s appeals for aid in the face of the Chinese threat. From Pakistan’s point of view India, a self-

wars, exists in English. While the general course of these conflicts has been revealed over the years through various un-official or third-party sources, information regarding casualties, equipment losses and specific actions is often contradictory and still an area of dispute between the governments of India, China and Pakistan. For its part India did commission the compilation of official histories of the Sino-Indian War and the 1965 and 1971 Indo-Pakistan wars in the late 1980s, but, in an indication of how politically sensitive the issue remains, has since refused to release them to the public. Subsequently copies of all three histories have been posted, one presumes illegally, on the internet by various Indian media outlets, including the Times of India. Examination of the two histories relevant to this thesis - Dr P. B. Sinha & Colonel A. A. Athale, History of the Conflict with China, 1962 (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1990), and Dr B. C. Chakravorty, History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965 (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992) - suggests that their formal publication would make a considerable contribution to the historiography of the two wars. The analysis of the Indian military’s performance, particularly its failings, during these conflicts is remarkably frank, and the account of the fighting appears to be balanced, although caution should still be exercised in regards to the treatment of the broader Chinese and Pakistani motives and actions leading up to the outbreak of hostilities. See A. G. Noorani, “Lies and War Histories: A post-script on the Hamoodur Rahman Report”, Frontline, No. 21, Vol. 17, October 14-27, 2000, www.frontlineonnet.com/fl1721/17210580.htm. 25 Brines, p. 193. 26 Ibid. 27 Brian Cloughley, A History of the Pakistan Army: Wars and Insurrections, 2nd edition (Karachi:

246 proclaimed leader of the emerging Non-Aligned movement and a long-time critic of SEATO and other Western military alliances, did not deserve such help and it appeared to make a mockery of Pakistan’s “loyalty” to the Western cause over the previous decade.28 Despite American and British insistence that any aid they supplied was aimed solely at bolstering India’s ability to defend itself against China, Pakistan was convinced that they were simply bolstering India’s ability to attack Pakistan. In fact the British and American aid, estimated to be worth approximately US$127 million for the period October 1962 - September 1965, and consisting largely of small arms, communications and support equipment, was dwarfed by that offered to New Delhi by the Soviet Union.29 Between August 1962 and January 1963 India accepted a Soviet military aid package worth approximately US$234 million. This included a licence-production agreement, plant facilities, and components for the production of 196 MiG-21 jet fighters.30 This was followed up by further packages, including the supply between late 1963 and early 1964 of enough SA-2 SAMs to equip 17 air defence battalions, and a September 1964 deal to supply 255 T-55 medium tanks, 176 PT-76 amphibious light tanks, 389 130mm field guns and an additional 38 MiG-21 fighters.31 The scale of this aid reflected India’s determination to expand and modernise its armed forces in the wake of the 1962 defeat. This expansion posed a serious threat to the qualitative edge Pakistan’s armed forces had established over India’s through Islamabad’s receipt of American, and to a lesser extent British, military aid courtesy of its membership of SEATO and CENTO. Attempts by Pakistan to convince Washington and London to “compensate” Karachi for this erosion by expanding their military aid programs to Pakistan were rejected. Neither the United Kingdom or the United States wanted to get involved in an arms race between Pakistan and India, and certainly not on terms that would effectively require them to side openly with Pakistan and thus push India even further into the arms of the Soviet Union. The result was to create a mindset amongst many Pakistani military planners that, while man for man the Pakistani soldier was braver and better trained than his Indian opponent, the Indian military expansion and modernisation

Oxford, 2000), p. 64. 28 Minute, “Terms of Reference for the SEATO Intelligence Committee”, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 1 April 1966, NAA: 1838/385, 688/18/6. 29 Brines, p. 265. 30 Table 2, “Soviet Military Supply Agreements with India”, The South Asian Military Handbook, Joint Study, CIA/DIA/Department of State, Washington DC, August 1973, p. V-11. 31 Ibid.

247 programs would soon nullify this qualitative advantage. In other words, time was against Pakistan insofar as its military position vis-à-viz India was concerned. Pakistan’s failure to secure significant increases to the bilateral military aid it received from the United States and the United Kingdom prompted Islamabad to renew its call for SEATO to act against “non-communist” threats to the Treaty Area and its members. It is unclear whether this new campaign of agitation was simply intended as a gambit by which to exert pressure on Washington and London to reconsider their refusal to meet Pakistan’s demands for increased military aid, or a serious pursuit of an alternate means by which to redress the military balance with India. What is clear is that Pakistan would no longer settle for the ritualistic treatment of its proposed amendment that had become the norm prior to the Sino-Indian War, and now seemed determined to provoke a confrontation over the issue. At the Eighth SEATO Council Meeting in April 1963 the Pakistani delegation bluntly urged the Council to “take steps to direct the Military Planning Office to prepare a military plan for the defence of Pakistan in the event of Indian aggression”.32 This was immediately rejected as being contrary to SEATO’s longstanding position regarding non-communist regional threats. Undeterred, the Pakistanis then sought to have a section on the CPI included as an integral part of the Intelligence Assessment Committee’s annual Threat Assessment Report for 1964,33 lobbying to have it recognised as a threat to the Treaty Area in its own right rather than in the context of its supposed role in the CPP. This, too, was rejected by the other SEATO members. The Pakistanis responded to these rejections in a manner guaranteed to convince the rest of SEATO of the seriousness with which Pakistan now viewed the Indian issue. In August 1964 the Pakistani Military Adviser told the CMPO that:

my government considers it necessary to inform you that Pakistan will not be in a position to contribute any force towards SEATO plans which do not take into account the threat to Pakistan from India and hereby formally withdraws the offer previously made of our forces

32 Minute, “Terms of Reference for the SEATO Intelligence Committee”, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 1 April 1966, NAA: 1838/385, 688/18/6. 33 Ibid.

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for MPO Plan 5 (Defence of Laos).34

Herein lay the makings of a major crisis for the alliance. The implicit threat contained within this statement was clearly intended as a warning, not notice of an irrevocable breach. Although intimating that Pakistan would not contribute forces to Plans 4 and 6, the fact that only the force contribution to Plan 5 - a plan that had already been officially ‘suspended’ - was to be formally withdrawn reinforces this impression. Nonetheless, having issued this warning Pakistan followed up with a demand of its requirements from SEATO if that breach was to be averted: the out-of-session circulation of the following proposed amendment to the assumptions in Plan 4, for consideration at the Twenty First Military Advisers' Conference scheduled for 14-15 October in Bangkok:

a). In the event of Chinese aggression in the Treaty Area, India will use the opportunity to try and annex as much of Pakistan’s territory as she could and would in particular launch an attack on East Pakistan;

b) India would come to a peaceful settlement of her differences with China if she has not already done so earlier.35

In the face of this brazen gambit the rest of SEATO, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom, were now left with the seemingly insurmountable problem of formulating an adequate response. Both Washington and London remained steadfastly opposed to extending SEATO’s security agenda to cover non- communist threats, fearful not only of involvement in the Indo-Pakistani conflict but also of the precedent it would set, for the Philippines, apparently encouraged by Pakistan’s renewed push, had begun to hint that it would be happy to see its concerns regarding a territorial dispute with Indonesia included on a wider SEATO security agenda.36 Sympathy within SEATO for Pakistan’s plight was tempered to some degree by anger at Islamabad’s concurrent drive to improve its relationship with the PRC in

34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Report of Australian Military Adviser to 26 October 1964, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/10/15.

249 the wake of the Sino-Indian War. President Ayub had in fact sanctioned the initiation of a limited rapprochement with China in 1961 as part of a wider foreign policy initiative to improve Pakistan’s standing in the developing world,37 and from 1962 onwards this bilateral relationship took on a new importance in Islamabad while moves to improve it were accelerated and expanded. In March 1963 a provisional border treaty was signed between the two countries, signifying a new resolve on the part of both China and Pakistan to end their own longstanding territorial disputes over their mutual frontier.38 The most disturbing aspect of this agreement for Indian and Western observers was the fact that under it the PRC had given tacit recognition of Pakistan’s claim over Indian-controlled Kashmir by agreeing to include this part of their border in the negotiations.39 Given that the Chinese had hitherto studiously avoided taking a partisan stand in relation to the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir, this signalled that Beijing clearly welcomed Islamabad’s overtures and was eager to reciprocate in kind. This shift in Pakistan’s strategic direction is largely credited to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister from 1963 to 1966.40 Bhutto’s credentials as a pro-China advocate were longstanding, and he wasted little time in re-orienting Pakistani diplomacy to this end.41 Nonetheless he was appointed by Ayub, and to that end the greater significance of Bhutto’s appointment is that it signified the willingness of Pakistan’s hitherto supposedly pro-Western President to embark on such a course, a function of opportunism rather than any fundamental ideological shift. Given the events of 1962 and the Sino-Soviet split that preceded it, China appeared to be a natural ally for Pakistan against an India that was receiving significant military aid from the Soviet Union - the more so given the reluctance of Islamabad’s Western allies to get involved. For its part Beijing appeared to share this assessment of the new geo-political landscape of South Asia and the opportunities it offered - a landscape it could take much of the credit (or blame) for creating. But while this rationale had a certain logic to it within the confines of South Asian geo-politics, Pakistan’s actions were greeted with incredulity by Ayub’s Western allies, particularly the United States. SEATO had been formed to protect

37 As part of this process Pakistan voted in support of China’s entry into the United Nations on 15 December 1961. Brines, p. 92. 38 Brines, p. 182. 39 Ibid. 40 Ibid., pp. 210-11, 230-1.

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Southeast Asia from communist aggression and the most obvious communist threat to the region was that posed by the conventional military power of the PLA. Yet here was Pakistan apparently intent on making a de facto ally of the PLA in one region, despite having pledged to resist it in another. On 18 September 1964 the American ambassador to Pakistan met with President Ayub to impress upon him the United States’ view that the need for SEATO to maintain a united front was more important than ever in light of the “present acute confrontation taking place in Southeast Asia with the Chinese Communists”.42 Ayub responded by reiterating that Pakistan could no longer meet its SEATO commitments because of the severe pressure it now faced from an Indian military build-up which it was being left to face alone.43 Ayub then questioned whether there was any point in Pakistan’s continued membership of the Alliance under such circumstances.44 The ambassador replied that his government could not agree with this assessment of the situation, but could only stress once again the importance that the United States attached to Pakistan’s role in SEATO.45 Ayub then declared that he appreciated the United States’ position and in that case he would keep Pakistan in SEATO “solely out of regard for the United States”, and in consideration of the need to avoid any action “which in the US view would interfere with the implementation of broad US policy”.46 Insofar as the last point is concerned it should be noted that, overtures to Beijing notwithstanding, at no time during this period (i.e. 1963-1965) did Pakistan join France in engaging in overt criticism of American policy towards Vietnam. This apparently only served to reinforce the impression among many in Washington, not least Kennedy’s successor, Johnson, that Pakistan was either extremely naive or extremely duplicitous in its pursuit of Chinese support against India. In turn these perceptions meant that any sympathy or patience for Pakistan’s latest attempt to draw SEATO into the Indo-Pakistani conflict was strictly limited. Nonetheless, in recognition of Pakistan’s renewed determination over the issue the

41 Ibid. 42 Memorandum, Dean Rusk, US Secretary of State, to CINCPAC and US Embassies: Karachi, London, Paris, Canberra, Wellington, Manila, Bangkok, New Delhi, Ankara, Tehran, Kabul, Rangoon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Saigon, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Moscow, 5 November 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 3698:General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Records relating to Thailand, 1964-66. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid.

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United States took the lead in soliciting agreement from the rest of SEATO, particularly the other British Commonwealth members, that this time an outright rejection of Pakistan’s proposed amendments should be avoided.47 In the first instance the Americans persuaded the other members of SEATO that the best reaction to Pakistan’s note advising of its formal withdrawal of forces from Plan 5 and, more importantly, the implicit threat to do the same for Plans 4 and 6, was to simply ignore it.48 The Americans then argued that Pakistan’s proposed amendments to Plan 4 should be included on the formal agenda for discussion at the Conference.49 Having given Pakistan the opportunity to formally put its case to the MAG, the issue could then be defused by declaring that it clearly required political guidance and as such needed be considered by the SEATO Council first.50 If the Pakistanis did raise it at the next SEATO Council Meeting it could always be referred to an ad hoc study group for further consideration à la Thai insurgency planning. Pakistani attempts to insert their conflict with India onto the agenda would no longer be rejected out of hand, but stonewalled into submission. The Americans appeared reasonably confident that this approach would suffice to contain the problem, albeit not solve it. In response to Australian concerns as to how, having allowed the issue onto the formal agenda for the first time, it would be prevented from remaining on it indefinitely, the Americans responded that:

While not optimistic, we hope Paks (sic) will not keep matter on agenda for future meetings. If they do, we pointed out that we had been coping with similar Pak problem in CENTO where Pak planning assumptions have been kept “under study” for some time.51

The American strategem succeeded, as planned, in defusing the issue raised by

47 Telegram, US State Department, Washington, to US Embassy, Bangkok, 6 October 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 3698:General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Records relating to Thailand, 1964-66. 48 Telegram, US State Department, Washington, to US Embassy, Bangkok, and CINCPAC, 5 November 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 3698:General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Records relating to Thailand, 1964-66. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Telegram, US State Department, Washington DC, to US Embassy, Canberra, 10 October 1964, NARA: RG 59, Box 5: General Records of the Department of State: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs; Office of the Country Director for Australia and New Zealand: Records relating to Australia, New Zealand and Southwest Pacific Islands 1958-1966.

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Pakistan’s proposed amendment to Plan 4. Close co-ordination between the American, British and Australian military advisers immediately beforehand resulted in the Australian Military Adviser, Major-General F. G. Hassett, speaking first and moving the formal motion to refer the amendments to the SEATO Council.52 Initially the Filipino Military Adviser, General Alfredo M. Santos, offered tentative support for the Pakistani amendments only to retract that support when, as the discussion moved around the table, it became clear that he was alone in doing so. Instead the discussion ended with the Pakistani Military Adviser, Air Marshal M. Asghar Khan, reluctantly bowing to the will of the majority and agreeing that the amendments needed to be referred to the SEATO Council.53 Khan almost immediately confirmed the pessimism of many of those present when, under “Other Business” he tabled yet another position paper, this time requesting an amendment to the terms of reference of the Intelligence Committee before that body met again in November.54 Predictably, the proposed amendment sought to remove the word “communist” in relation to the threat estimate study due to be endorsed at that meeting, and it did not take much imagination to guess what would follow in the wake of this amendment if it was accepted.55 Despite support (again) from Santos, the other advisers successfully argued that they could not authorise such a change without referring it to their respective governments - as such it would have to be left for out-of-session comment and was unlikely to be resolved in time for the Tenth Intelligence Committee Meeting in November.56 The Pakistanis responded by attempting to raise the issue at the Intelligence Committee Meeting anyway.57 Again they were supported by the Filipino delegation, and although again rebuffed they insisted that their minority positions be recorded regardless. The Intelligence Committee relented on this point, and included these as an appendix to the threat estimate portion of the Committee’s report.58 As the Alliance entered its tenth year of existence the Americans tried to reassure other concerned SEATO members that resorting to such measures offered the best chance of being able to “ride out” what one State Department minute described as the

52 Report of Australian Military adviser to 26 October 1964, NAA: A1838/346, TS688/10/15. 53 Ibid. 54 Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 Ibid. 57 Minute, “Terms of Reference for the SEATO Intelligence Committee”, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 1 April 1966, NAA: 1838/385, 688/18/6.

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“current cycle of Pak pressures on this subject in SEATO”.59 However, these hopes were all but dashed when it became clear that, far from subsiding, Pakistan’s pre- occupation with India and the Kashmir issue was fast becoming all-consuming.

The 1965 Indo-Pakistani War

In December 1964 the Indian Government announced its intentions to remove the special status granted to Kashmir under the 1950 constitution; henceforth Kashmir would be treated just like any other Indian state.60 Although seemingly innocuous, the symbolism provoked dismay in Islamabad. Pakistan already felt it was losing the battle to keep the issue of Kashmir alive at the international level. Continually stymied in the United Nations, unable to garner significant support for its stance from either the British Commonwealth or the developing world, and unable to enlist the backing of the two Western military alliances it belonged to, Pakistan feared that this Indian move to “normalise” the situation in Kashmir would see it fade from international consciousness altogether. In combination with the shrill confidence of the Pakistani military in its professional superiority over its Indian counterparts - shrill because that confidence came with the caveat that its superiority would soon be nullified by the quantity of Soviet and Western military aid being lavished upon New Delhi - this fear appears to have convinced Ayub and his government that nothing short of military action would redress the situation, and that it was best undertaken sooner than later. The first application of the new Pakistani strategy of direct action was not long in coming. Early in the new year a border incident in the Rann of Kutch, a desolate uninhabited area on the north-western extreme of the Indo-Pakistani frontier, sparked a series of skirmishes between local police and border guard units from both countries. Such incidents were not uncommon and neither was the tit-for-tat response it provoked. However on 9 April 1965, in what appears to have been a deliberate escalation of the situation by Islamabad, regular units of the Pakistani Army intervened in battalion-strength and overran a number of Indian positions.61 India

58 Ibid. 59 Telegram, joint message, US State & Defense Departments, Washington DC, to CINCPAC, 1 March 1965, NARA: RG218, Box 155: Records of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff. 60 Brines, p. 238. 61 Ibid., p. 288.

254 responded by committing similar-sized elements of its own regular army to the area the very next day and three weeks of fighting followed before a cease-fire was agreed on 29 April.62 Although no significant alteration of the border resulted from these clashes the Pakistani Army seems to have had the better of its Indian opponent in these exchanges. Indeed, gaining a measure of their enemy appears to be the only serious rationale behind what may best be described as a probing action by Pakistani forces, and the outcome must have been encouraging from Islamabad’s point of view. The view from SEATO Headquarters, Bangkok, not to mention Washington, London Canberra and Wellington, was anything but encouraging. For the first time since 1948 open conflict, albeit a short-lived and localised one, had broken out between India and Pakistan. Despite Islamabad’s satisfaction with the performance of its troops, the call for SEATO to recognise and incorporate the Indian threat only intensified in the wake of what Pakistan was doing its best to portray to the world as an example of Indian “aggression”. To add to SEATO’s woes Pakistan’s relationship with the PRC appeared to be going from strength to strength. In the month before the fighting in the Rann of Kutch, Ayub had made an official state visit to Beijing, the first for a Pakistani leader, culminating in the signing of a cultural pact and a finalised border agreement on 27 March 1965.63 This proved to be too much for the Americans and, in a demonstration of his administration’s disapproval of the Sino-Pakistani rapprochement, President Johnson unilaterally postponed a visit to Washington by Ayub scheduled for that May.64 In a rather unfortunate coincidence an out-of-session decision on the proposed Pakistani amendment to the terms of reference of the SEATO Intelligence Committee could be delayed no longer and was comprehensively rejected that same month. Pakistan responded by withdrawing from the SEATO maritime exercise “Sea Horse”, scheduled for 8-24 May 1965.65 The Pakistanis declined even to send observers to the exercise, which included naval contingents from all other SEATO nations except France, and indeed would never participate in a SEATO military exercise again. Spurred on by the events in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan now sought to exercise the military option in Kashmir itself. In an ironic imitation of the communist insurgent methods its planners had studied under the auspices of SEATO, Pakistan

62 Ibid. 63 Brines, p. 253. 64 Ibid., p. 279.

255 began a covert operation in August 1965 to infiltrate large numbers of pro-Pakistani insurgents into Indian-controlled Kashmir.66 Islamabad’s apparent intention was to spark a provincial rebellion against Indian rule, thereby creating the conditions for a swift intervention by Pakistani regular forces and the subsequent presentation of a fait accompli to India and the rest of the international community. If so, the results were disappointing in that such a wide-spread revolt failed to materialise and the Indians were able to concentrate their forces on the task of containing the insurgents and cutting their infiltration routes from Pakistan.67 In the course of the latter operations Indian and Pakistani regular forces were inexorably drawn into direct combat with each other as the fighting threatened strategic positions in the mountains along the north-western Kashmir border.68 Artillery duels and close-quarter clashes up to company size became commonplace. The conflict took a dramatic turn for the worse on 1 September when Pakistan launched a major conventional attack against Indian positions on the south-western portion of the Kashmir border.69 The terrain here was favourable to the use of armour and the initial Pakistani attack included at least one tank battalion.70 The Pakistani thrust was well placed in that it threatened to cut the Indian line of communications into north-western Kashmir, and the Indians responded by authorising the use of air strikes against the advancing Pakistani force.71 So began the “war proper”, and the tempo of operations on both sides quickly escalated to a level where entire divisions were being committed to battle. The focus of the fighting also shifted from Kashmir to the Punjab when Indian forces launched a counter-offensive there on 6 September.72 Despite the intensity of the fighting that followed, exemplified by fierce tank battles around Khem Karan and Sialkot, neither side could achieve a decisive victory and a cease-fire was agreed to on 23 September.73 The agreement to end hostilities was due in no small part to pressure applied to both India and Pakistan by the United States and the United Kingdom. Appalled by the conflict and its implications for western interests in the region, both Washington

65 Buszynski, p. 114. 66 Brines, pp. 315-16. 67 Ibid., pp. 308-12. 68 Ibid., p. 318. 69 John Fricker, Battle for Pakistan: The Air War of 1965 (London: Ian Allan Ltd, 1979), pp. 61-7. 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid. 72 Brines, pp. 327-9. 73 Ibid., pp. 342-5.

256 and London suspended their economic and military aid programs to both belligerents during the first week of September.74 Pakistan, in particular, was badly affected by the military embargo as its principal weapons systems were by now nearly all American in origin, while the pre-war stockpiles of American ammunition and spare parts were not large enough to sustain a prolonged war with India.75 With no prospect of being able to replenish them or obtain replacements for battlefield losses of tanks and aircraft, Pakistan had little choice but to agree to a cease-fire largely on Indian terms - namely a return to the pre-war de facto border and a withdrawal of support for the Kashmiri insurgents. Pakistan had never intended to become embroiled in a drawn-out war with India - gambling on a swift victory which had already eluded them before the embargo began to bite - but this was unlikely to be admitted by Ayub and his government. Instead the venture was recast by Pakistani propaganda as an instance of defiant Pakistani resistance against Indian aggression, a resistance undermined, if not openly betrayed, by the actions of Pakistan’s supposed allies in Washington and London.76 In a pointed display of Pakistan’s displeasure over the embargo, and lack of support for its position in general, Pakistan effectively boycotted the Twenty Third Military Advisers' Conference held on 14-15 October by sending only an observer. The Pakistanis then made one final attempt to have the terms of reference for the SEATO Intelligence Committee changed to include non-communist threats, though if they were hoping for a more sympathetic hearing in light of having fought India twice that year they were to be bitterly disappointed. No one else’s position on the issue had changed in the intervening twelve months and the amendment was again rejected in the lead up to the Eleventh Intelligence Committee. The Pakistani response had a terse finality to it:

Pakistani Military Adviser feels that it would be futile for Pakistan to take part in the deliberations of the Intelligence Committee Meeting whose terms of reference do not recognise all threats to the Western Region. Since INT11M is proposed to be held under the present terms of reference for the Intelligence Committee, Pakistan

74 Ibid., p. 355. 75 Ibid. 76 Ibid., pp. 334, 343.

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will be represented on INT11M by an observer only.77

Pakistan thus effectively adopted a completely passive role in SEATO from 1966 until it withdrew formally from the alliance under Article X of the Manila Treaty (see Appendix I) in November 1972.78 Pakistan sent an ambassador rather than its foreign minister to the Eleventh SEATO Council Meeting held in Canberra (27-29 June 1966) a practice Islamabad continued until the Seventeenth SEATO Council Meeting in June 1972 when no Pakistani delegation at any level was sent.79 Even this passive role was effectively abandoned on the military side of the alliance when, after renewed attempts to get the United States to lift the arms embargo failed, Pakistan did not even bother sending an observer to the Twenty Fifth Military Advisers' Conference in Washington in 1967.80 Thereafter Pakistan continued to boycott the MAG conferences until its formal withdrawal. Again, as with the French, the Pakistanis chose not to sever all ties to SEATO so long as they retained some interest in the region (an interest that ended with the loss of East Pakistan and the emergence of an independent Bangladesh). Pakistan also hoped that by doing so its strategic relationship with the United States could eventually be improved, if not to the degree that had existed prior to 1965 then at least to a point where the American military embargo might be removed. By the same token the United States and the remaining British Commonwealth members of SEATO saw nothing to be gained by actively pressing for a Pakistani withdrawal from the alliance and reasoned that, as with France, the Pakistanis might one day return to the fold as full participants in SEATO again.

SEATO and Vietnam 1965

By the end of 1964 the critical implication of all this so far as the United States was concerned was that when it came to confronting the Viet Cong insurgency in South Vietnam, SEATO was clearly incapable of mounting a collective action. It would be futile even to try to reach agreement on the need to implement Plan 7 given

77 Minute, Pakistani Military Adviser’s Representative, Group Captain Kamal Ahmad, to CMPO, Bangkok, 4 January 1966, NAA: A1838/385, 688/18/6. 78 Annex H, “Chiefs of the Military planning Office”, SEATO Record: 1954-1977 (Bangkok: SEATO Secretariat, 1977). 79 Buszynski, p. 114.

258 the attitude of both France and Pakistan, and given the momentum that had built up in Washington in favour of overt military intervention in South Vietnam, American patience with SEATO was fast being exhausted. This momentum had received a massive boost because of the now infamous Gulf of Tonkin incident where, on the night of 4 August 1964, two American destroyers mistakenly reported that they had been attacked by North Vietnamese torpedo boats.81 Within hours President Johnson ordered retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnamese torpedo boats and their support facilities at five locations.82 Three days later the United States Congress passed the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution which gave Johnson the authority “to take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defence Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom”.83 The irony, of course, was that by that stage the Johnson Administration had already given up on the possibility of securing collective action through SEATO in relation to Vietnam, but still sought to justify their steady escalation of military involvement there by claiming that they were taking unilateral action in a manner consistent with their Manila Treaty obligations, and the position adopted under the 1962 Rusk-Thanat Agreement. In other words, the United States considered itself free to fulfil its Manila Treaty obligations with or without the unanimous agreement of the rest of SEATO on the need to do so. To that extent, SEATO still had its uses insofar as Vietnam was concerned. The United States now held up the Rusk-Thanat formula as a means by which other SEATO members could cloak their support for American military intervention in Vietnam, and Washington made it clear that the principle of being bound by the collective will of the Alliance would no longer suffice as an excuse for inaction.

80 Ibid. 81 Doubts over whether the Gulf of Tonkin incident actually took place as reported that night surfaced almost immediately and it was later confirmed that no actual attack had taken place. These revelations have left the incident mired in controversy ever since and it did not take long for theories that the whole thing had in fact been deliberately staged by the US Government to become firmly embedded in popular culture. For a complete history of the incident see Edwin E. Moïse, Tonkin Gulf and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1996). Moïse dismisses any suggestion that the incident was staged although he goes on to criticise the Johnson Administration’s subsequent attempts to deny that a mistake had been made after it had become increasingly clear to senior figures in the administration that this was indeed the case. 82 These raids, codenamed “Pierce Arrow”, took place the following day and, while deemed a success, nonetheless resulted in the loss of two American aircraft shot down. One of the pilots was killed and the other taken prisoner. Ibid., pp. 210-25. 83 Ibid., p. 226.

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Under these conditions it proved difficult for those members of SEATO who broadly supported the United States to resist the call to arms once the Americans deployed their first ground combat units to Vietnam. Not that some members needed much encouragement. Australia increased the strength of the AATTV to 83 men in June 1964, and then again to a 100 in January 1965, as well as deploying a Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) detachment with six Caribou light transport aircraft to South Vietnam shortly after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.84 When, on 13 February, Johnson authorised large-scale retaliatory air strikes against North Vietnam - Operation Rolling Thunder - in response to a particularly destructive attack on a joint RVNAF/US base at Pleiku, New Zealand also began to consider what it could offer the United States by way of combat troops. On 8 March the 9th US Marine Expeditionary Brigade landed on the beach at Da Nang and two months later the US Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade began arriving at Vung Tau.85 On 29 April the Australian Government announced its decision to send an infantry battalion group to Vietnam, while the following month New Zealand declared its intention to deploy an artillery battery.86 Both nations made these commitments primarily to buttress their defence relationship with the United States under the ANZUS Treaty, but both also made some reference to SEATO - the New Zealanders more so - in their early public statements regarding their respective commitments.87 Similar pressures eventually led Thailand to contribute combat troops as well (in addition to the covert Thai military involvement in Laos). On 3 January 1967 the Thai Government announced it would raise a 3,300-strong “Royal Thai Army Volunteer Regiment” for service in Vietnam.88 This was later replaced by the 12,000 strong “Black Panther” Division, Royal Thai Army Volunteer Force, in 1968.89 Under the newly-elected President Ferdinand Marcos, the Philippines was reluctant to send combat forces but did agree to the raising of a 2000-strong civic action group for service in South Vietnam. The “Philippines Civic Action Group, Republic of

84 McNeil, pp. 69, 91; Although the deployment of the RAAF flight had been authorised by the Australian government on 29 May they did not arrive in South Vietnam until 8 August. Chris Coulthard-Clark, The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War 1962-1975, Official History of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975, Vol. IV (Sydney: Australian War Memorial & Allen & Unwin, 1995), p. 40. 85 Krepinevich, pp. 141, 151. 86 McGibbon, p. 562. 87 Ibid., p. 564. 88 Stanley Robert Larson & James Lawton Collins, Vietnam Studies, Allied Participation in Vietnam (Washington DC: Department of the Army, 1975), pp. 27-32. 89 Ibid., pp. 40-2.

260

Vietnam” consisted mainly of AFP engineers and medical personnel, but also contained its own security battalion, including a 105mm artillery battery.90 The first elements of the Group arrived in July 1966 and it remained in Vietnam until November 1969.91

The British Response 1964-67

The Johnson administration also tried to coax the United Kingdom into committing a military contingent alongside the “Free World” forces in Vietnam. As with Laos, the British were reluctant to accept that overt military intervention was necessary and, if they could not prevent such intervention from taking place they were, at the very least, determined to avoid becoming involved in such action themselves. For in truth the incoming Labour government of Prime Minister Harold Wilson preferred the neutralisation strategy advocated by France, although they were diplomatic enough to avoid saying so in public.92 The United Kingdom did not wish to commit troops to Vietnam but, unlike France, it saw nothing to be gained by provoking a confrontation with the United States over the issue. The British argued that they were simply not in a position to commit troops on a unilateral basis. To do so would undermine the United Kingdom’s role as Co- Chairman of the Geneva Conference and thus endanger the continued viability of the Geneva Accords - the only regional diplomatic framework recognised by both the Western and Communist powers.93 In London’s view, not only did the Geneva Accords underpin the existing legitimacy of the Protocol States in the eyes of the international community, they also provided an established basis for any future negotiated settlement of conflict in the region.94 Noting that the United States was intervening only to preserve the status quo in the region, the British reasoned that it was in Washington’s interests to ensure that recourse to the diplomatic architecture that created it remained an option into the future.95

90 Ibid., pp. 63-4. 91 Ibid., pp. 60, 73. 92 Donald Maclean, British Foreign Policy Since Suez 1956-1968 (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1970), pp. 322-3. 93 Buszynski, pp. 120-2. 94 Ibid. 95 Ibid.

261

Wilson’s Government also emphasised the point that the United Kingdom was already heavily committed to one conflict in Southeast Asia - Confrontation against Indonesia - and simply did not have the military capacity to commit itself to a second conflict in the region. The number of British service personnel serving in Malaysia and Singapore in 1964 was approximately 50,000, a figure that was equivalent to the strength of the British forces then deployed in West Germany.96 The British were also careful to note that they were prosecuting this conflict without any military assistance from the United States, and that despite obtaining military support from both Australia and New Zealand, the overwhelming bulk of the military effort was being borne by the United Kingdom. In so doing, Wilson sought to the impress upon Washington that just as the United States was the “lead nation” in the military effort to safeguard Western interests in Vietnam, so to was the United Kingdom acting as the “lead nation” in the military effort to safeguard Western interests in Malaysia and Singapore.97 Furthermore the British implied that given the added responsibilities of such a position neither nation could, or should, be expected to contribute to the other’s military campaign in the manner of those SEATO allies free of such burdens. Despite an initially unsympathetic reception by the Johnson administration, the Americans eventually accepted the United Kingdom’s position after a series of high-level diplomatic exchanges on the subject throughout the latter half of 1964.98 A communiqué issued at the end of a meeting between Wilson and President Johnson, held in Washington in December of that year, declared that both leaders

…recognised the particular importance of the military effort which both their countries are making in support of the legitimate governments in Southeast Asia, particularly in Malaysia and South Vietnam.99

While the notion of equivalence between the American-led effort in Vietnam and the British-led effort in Borneo continued to strike many within the administration as unconvincing, Johnson and his advisers recognised the underlying British quid pro quo: continued United States pressure for British military assistance in Vietnam

96 Ibid., p. 244. 97 Ibid., p. 69. 98 Ibid.

262 would lead to British calls for the United States to take a far stronger line against Indonesia than had hitherto been the case. Ever since Indonesia gained independence from the Dutch the Americans, impressed by its regional potential, had been engaged in a delicate diplomatic effort to cultivate good relations with Jakarta, and as such had tried to remain aloof from Indonesia’s ongoing disputes with the region’s former colonial powers. Open calls by London for the United States to take a more active and partisan role over the conflict in Borneo would clearly put Washington in an embarrassing position and damage its already complicated relationship with Jakarta. Thus the United Kingdom successfully resisted the initial call to contribute military forces to South Vietnam without provoking a serious disagreement with the United States. However when the Confrontation with Indonesia was officially ended in August 1966 (by way of the signing of a peace treaty between Malaysia and Indonesia), the British position was in danger of being questioned all over again. Indeed the tempo of operations in Borneo had begun to wind down during the previous year, and both the Australian and New Zealand governments had come under pressure from the United States to increase the size of their forces in South Vietnam as a result. In March 1966 the Australians agreed to increase their commitment by expanding the Australian battalion group into a task force of two infantry battalions plus supporting units. A further round of expansion was sanctioned in December when Canberra agreed that a third infantry battalion plus a tank troop would be sent to join the 1st Australian Task Force (1 ATF) in Phuoc Tuy Province. New Zealand, which had only withdrawn its sole regular infantry battalion from Borneo in October, agreed to contribute first one, then two, infantry companies to 1 ATF in 1967 eventually leading to one of the Australian battalions being designated a joint “Anzac” unit.100 Both Australia and New Zealand also committed SAS units to the conflict in 1966 and 1969 respectively.101 The British pre-empted any suggestion of a re-examination of their own post- Confrontation capability to contribute to the war in Vietnam when the dramatic decision to withdraw all British forces “East of Suez” finally rendered the whole question of British involvement in Vietnam academic. As a possibility this action had

99 Cited in Maclean, p. 69. 100 Ian McNeill and Ashley Ekins, On the Offensive: The Australian Army in the Vietnam War 1967- 1968, Official History of Australia’s involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts 1948-1975, Vol. VIII (Sydney: Australian War Memorial & Allen & Unwin, 2003), pp. 162-3. 101 Ibid., pp. 459, 536 n.

263 in fact been a subject of discussion in British defence and political circles as far back as the Sandys White Paper of 1957. But it did not emerge as a serious policy option until Wilson came to power in 1964 and commissioned a major review of British defence policy. This review was concluded in late 1966 and called for a renewed emphasis on the United Kingdom’s NATO commitments at the expense of a major, albeit phased, reduction of British overseas military commitments in Southeast Asia and, to a lesser extent, the Middle East.102 With the conclusion of hostilities in Borneo the British informed their allies of their intentions, much to the dismay of Australia and New Zealand. At the Twelfth SEATO Council Meeting held in Washington DC in mid-April 1967 the British came under some pressure to re-consider their plans but, to the disappointment of their allies, declared that the fiscal problems faced by the United Kingdom made this impossible.103 On 18 July 1967 the British Defence Minister, Denis Healey, released the Defence White Paper outlining the new strategy and publicly announced the decision to withdraw British forces from Malaysia and Singapore. This document envisaged a complete withdrawal of British forces by the “mid-1970s” but was superseded later that year when the United Kingdom’s financial woes worsened dramatically, culminating in a devaluation crisis in November. This led the British government to announce that, among a host of initiatives to cut public expenditure, the military withdrawal from Southeast Asia would be accelerated and completed by 1971.104 This did not mean that the United Kingdom abandoned its strategic interest in the region altogether. The British did not unilaterally abrogate their responsibilities under the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, but instead negotiated its replacement in 1971 with the more informal Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Under the auspices of the FPDA the United Kingdom would maintain a military role in Southeast Asia, albeit one based around attending annual exercises with its FPDA partners, Malaysia, Singapore, Australia and New Zealand, rather than a large permanent presence.105 But there was no escaping the fact that the British military potential of the United Kingdom’s bases in Malaysia and Singapore had vanished

102 “Statement on The Defence Estimates 1967”, February 1967, pp. 245-337, PRO: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1966-67, Vol. LIII, Microfiche No. 176.554-555, Row 11, Drawer 38, Piece No. 1964-1971. 103 Buszynski, p. 126. 104 “Statement on The Defence Estimates 1967”, February 1968, pp. 245-337, PRO: House of Commons Parliamentary Papers, 1967-68, Vol. XXXIV/V, Microfiche No. 177.416-177.417, Row 11, Drawer 38, Piece No. 1964-1971.

264 forever.

SEATO: The Decline 1966-1977

While the actions of France and Pakistan between 1964-1965 had undoubtedly delivered crippling blows to SEATO’s credibility as a military alliance, the United States’ unilateral military intervention in South Vietnam that year, and the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw nearly all of its forces “East of Suez” 18 months later, delivered the fatal ones. The military machinery of SEATO, centred around the MPO, had, quite deliberately, never been intended to evolve into a standing peacetime operational or theatre headquarters. Instead it had been restricted to a series of planning forums co-ordinated by the MPO and given direction by the Military Advisers Group. While for the most part this mechanism suited France and the United Kingdom, its principal beneficiary and supporter was the United States. Until 1964 it provided the United States with the opportunity to guide the strategic planning and force development of its allies in Southeast Asia without locking itself into a series of rigid bilateral defence arrangements, thus preserving its freedom of action. To that extent SEATO undoubtedly played a part in rendering SEATO members such as Australia, New Zealand and Thailand politically and militarily predisposed to join the United States war effort in South Vietnam. Once the war began in earnest for the United States, SEATO had little more to offer given the impossibility of obtaining collective support from the Alliance as a whole for the American intervention, at which point SEATO began to lose the support and interest of its most important member. After 1965 the work of the MPO, the Intelligence Committee and the other military sub-committees continued, but in a somewhat surreal atmosphere. Although the number of SEATO sponsored seminars and reports on guerrilla warfare and counter-insurgency increased significantly during this period, ironically the MPO found itself concentrating almost exclusively on conventional war planning again. Plan 4 was revised and updated on an annual basis as a precaution against an escalation and expansion of the war in Vietnam. Plan 6 was treated in a similar manner, albeit with a lower priority, presumably because the Americans were

105 Maclean, p. 250.

265 confident that their forces already in situ could contain a conventional attack by PAVN across the 17th parallel. Work was also undertaken to create Plan 9, SEATO’s last as it turned out, which was aimed at protecting Thailand from a conventional invasion by PAVN forces through Laos.106 Finally, Plans 5 and 8 were eventually revived in the face of a further deterioration of the situation in Laos and the emergence of communist guerrilla activity in the border provinces of northeast Thailand.107 Despite this, there was no disguising the increasing irrelevance of the organisation both to the war in Vietnam and the new regional geo-political framework emerging in its wake. SEATO’s decline could be illustrated by the gradual fall in status of the position of CMPO: in 1970 the post was held by a brigadier-general for the first time in ten years, and it fell to a captain to oversee the MPO’s last three months of existence in 1973-74.108 The policy of “Vietnamization” promoted by the Nixon administration, which officially assumed office in January 1969, and indeed the elevation of this policy into the “Nixon Doctrine”, greatly accelerated SEATO’s obsolescence. The essence of the Nixon Doctrine - that it would arm and advise its allies in the developing world but would not sanction direct US military intervention on their behalf - was the antithesis of the Manila Treaty, especially as it related to the Protocol States. This policy, when put alongside the reality of the French, British, and now to some extent, American military withdrawal from the region, effectively sealed SEATO’s fate as a military alliance. On 20 October 1972 the Thirty Seventh and final SEATO Military Advisers’ Conference ended in Bangkok.109 Military planning ceased in September 1973 and the MPO was officially disbanded on 31 January 1974.110 Vague hopes that the organisation’s civilian side might continue to function

106 “MPO Plan 9/67, Annex C, Force Requirements and Initial Deployment“, report, Australian Joint Planning Committee, 17 March 1967, AWM: AWM 122. 107 The first recognised incident of local Communist guerrilla activity inside Thailand occurred on 8 August 1965 when a Thai security forces intercepted an armed group of the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) in the hills of Nakhon Phanom province and suffered three casualties in the ensuing fire-fight. The CPT had in fact announced the formation of a “Thai People’s Front” (TPF) at the beginning of that year, but this incident was the first indication that the hitherto largely ineffectual CPT was now capable of such action. Although the TPF never became a threat on a par with its Indo- Chinese compatriots, nonetheless by September 1969 the Thai government reported that TPF-claimed actions had taken place in 35 of the nations 68 provinces. See Donald E. Weatherbee, The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary Analysis (Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina, 1970), pp. 30-58. 108 Annex H, “Chiefs of the Military planning Office”, SEATO Record: 1954-1977 (Bangkok: SEATO Secretariat, 1977). 109 Annex M, ibid. 110 Ibid.

266 as a forum for inter-governmental discussion of the region’s security issues proved to be short-lived. In the wake of the communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia in 1975 SEATO was condemned as a failed alliance, not only by outside observers but also by its remaining members. Its continued existence in any way, shape or form appeared to offer nothing other than an embarrassing reminder of the failure by the West to protect the Protocol States from communist aggression. Accordingly, at its twentieth meeting, held in New York on 24 September 1975, the SEATO Council agreed to a phased dissolution of the organisation, a process that was finally completed with the official closure of the SEATO Secretariat’s Headquarters in Bangkok on 30 June 1977.111

111 Buszynski, p. 210.

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Conclusion

SEATO did ultimately fail to deter - and was never given the chance to defeat - covert communist aggression against the Protocol States. But this failure needs to be balanced against the other aims, functions, and indeed achievements, of SEATO as a military alliance during its first ten years, if not its entire 23-year life-span. First and foremost is the fact that throughout its existence SEATO was also intended to deter overt communist aggression in Southeast Asia, intend this was its primary focus until the end of the 1950s. Given the events in both North and Southeast Asia in the first half of that decade this is hardly surprising and it would have been utterly irrational of SEATO’s members to ignore or downplay it. Furthermore, if Chinese intervention in the Korean War and France’s defeat in the First Indo-China War were not enough to convince SEATO’s members of the seriousness of this threat, then the extensive re-armament programs undertaken by both Beijing and Hanoi in the aftermath of those conflicts definitely gave good cause for alarm. By the mid-fifties the People’s Republic of China utterly dwarfed all of its regional neighbours as a conventional military power. Nor was this a simply a case of raw numerical strength. At the same time as SEATO was formulating its strategic aims Sino-Soviet relations were at an all-time high. Under the guidance of the pro- Soviet Marshal P’eng Te-huai the PLA had embarked upon a sweeping program of military modernisation that sought to emulate the Soviet model in nearly every respect. A similar course was being followed by the fledgling PAVN to the point where it too had achieved conventional military ascendancy over its immediate neighbours in Southeast Asia by the end of the decade. There is a clear difference between capability and intent of course, but in the context of the Cold War up to that point the countries of the nascent Communist Bloc had given every indication that they would not shy away from using conventional military power to advance their interests wherever a quick and comparatively cheap victory appeared to be on offer (North Korea‘s miscalculation in 1950 being a case in point).1 And in the 1950s the newly emergent (and, in the case of Thailand not so

1 China’s intervention in the Korean War should be considered to be an aberration in this regard, especially when considered against the pattern of overt PLA operations before - i.e. the invasion of

268 new) nation states of Southeast Asia offered easy pickings indeed, certainly insofar as their conventional military capabilities were concerned. It is hard to imagine that the yawning power vacuum created in the wake of the 1954 Geneva Accords would not have proven too great a temptation for Hanoi, if not Beijing, to resort to such a strategem were it not for the deterrent effect of SEATO’s stated aim and preparations to defeat such an attack. Buszynski considers this possibility but concludes that such an interpretation misreads what “was in fact caution induced by the communist’s own experience of Korea”.2 Until the day, should it ever come, that Beijing and Hanoi allow access to their archives from this period these deliberations are fated to remain hostage to speculation on some level. Nonetheless a number of points in this regard need to be remembered. While the Korean War was undoubtedly a chastening experience for the PLA and one it was in no hurry to repeat (not that the United States or its allies were necessarily in disagreement on that score), the prospect of a new limited war against Western and regional forces - a “second Korea” if you will - was exactly the deterrent put forward by SEATO and its Plans 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. The idea that the conventional armed forces of the Protocol States or any other country in Southeast Asia could, on their own or collectively, have acted as a deterrent in this regard is incredulous. The key factor was the potential intervention of Western forces, particularly those of the United States, on the side of those regional forces that had come under attack from the PLA or PAVN. In recognising this one could go further and suggest that it was the specific threat of intervention by United States forces that mattered and that to that extent SEATO was irrelevant: that whether or not SEATO existed the United States would most likely have intervened anyway in the face of overt communist aggression. However this does SEATO a great disservice and ignores the reality that from 1955 to 1965 the United States chose to exercise its conventional military deterrent through SEATO and rejected any attempts by its friends and allies in the region to publicly, or privately, commit itself to intervene on a bilateral or unilateral basis. It is disingenuous to try and separate the two. The deterrent effect of American conventional, and with regard to Plans 2 and 4, nuclear, military power was channelled through SEATO in the same way that it

Tibet in 1950 - and afterwards: Witness the 1962 Sino-Indian War, the occupation of the Paracel Islands in 1974 and the clash with Filipino forces, at that time militarily the weakest of all the ASEAN states, over Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands in 1997.

269 was in NATO. It was Washington’s public and repeated statements in support of SEATO and the organisation’s aims that signalled to the world the American interest in Southeast Asia and the United States likely response to communist aggression there. Without SEATO, and given the reluctance of the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations to enter into bilateral defence treaties with countries in Southeast Asia, it is by no means clear as to what their response would have been to a swift and successful communist invasion of, for example, a destabilised Laos. At the very least enough ambiguity, reminiscent of the situation in Korea in early 1950, may have existed to convince Hanoi or Beijing that it was worth the gamble. If one accepts that the absence of conventional military aggression in Southeast Asia by China and North Vietnam during this period was, at least in part, due to a fear of provoking a conventional military response by the United States, then one must also accept the role that SEATO played in delivering and proclaiming that deterrent to the region. That it did so through a military infrastructure that lacked a standing headquarters in no way rendered SEATO a “Paper Tiger”. As demonstrated in this thesis the plans, studies and briefings produced by the MPO and its attendant sub- committees were not undertaken lightly. The fact that the five contingency plans that were developed to the point of operational readiness - Plans 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7 - were scrutinised so closely and were so often the subject of intense debate amongst the SEATO members provides a sound indication of the seriousness with which the alliance and its work was treated by them. From the debates over force contributions and the role of nuclear weapons in Plan 4 to the allocation of field commands to named individuals for Plans 5 and 7 there was always an underlying tension born of the possibility, however remote, that one or more of these plans might be activated or at least provide the basis for action. Certainly this possibility could not be ruled out while the United States continued to put its weight behind the alliance. As such SEATO provided a guide to what the United States could expect of its allies in the region and vice versa in terms of force contributions and general military preparedness. SEATO contingency planning provided a benchmark for countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Thailand with regard to the development of their respective force structures and helped to establish clear capability priorities within

2 Buszynski, p. 219.

270 those development programs. SEATO was also instrumental in encouraging the Australian and New Zealand political and defence establishments to engage with the wider Southeast Asian region as opposed to the previous narrow focus of their forward defence policies on British Malaya. The SEATO program of annual military exercises were particularly valuable in this regard, and indeed provided all the Western members the beneficial experience of operating alongside their regional Asian allies as equal partners. SEATO also gave coherence to the American military aid and assistance programs to Thailand, Pakistan and the Philippines. SEATO planning provided clear goals for these programs to aim for whilst also helping to manage the expectations and demands of the recipients. Having been part of the annual threat assessment process in SEATO it was not easy for the three regional countries to demand aid and assistance above and beyond that deemed necessary to counter those threats. All of this co-operation helped to prepare and condition the mindset amongst the military and political leaderships of the majority of SEATO members to respond positively, however reluctantly, to the United States call for military assistance in Vietnam. Having discussed, made contingency plans, and trained and equipped their militaries for the defence of Southeast Asia for ten years or more Australia and New Zealand, never mind Thailand and the Philippines, had grown used to the idea of treating the region in its entirety as an area whose fate was vital to the strategic national interest. Contrast this with the almost casual disregard for the region’s fate north of the Kra Isthmus exhibited by Canberra and Wellington prior to 1955. The exceptions to this call, France, the United Kingdom and Pakistan, are to SEATO’s critics, a prime example of the dysfunctional and unrepresentative nature of its membership - a fatal flaw that effectively doomed the organisation from its inception. And so it proved as illustrated by the events of 1964-65. But there was nothing inevitable about this outcome and even a cursory glance at the situation in Southeast Asia in 1954 provides a rational explanation for their inclusion. France and the United Kingdom were still major powers within the region in 1954 and both of these European nations gave every indication that they intended to remain so, even if on terms different to that of their immediate imperial pasts. To have excluded them would have undermined SEATO’s credibility then even as their inclusion ultimately undermined it a decade later. East Pakistan was geographically closer to the region than either Australia or New Zealand, possessing as it did a border with Burma. When

271 taken together with Islamabad’s border with China in West Pakistan and its avowed anti-communist stance, Pakistan could rightfully claim a legitimate interest in an alliance whose aims included containing the threat from Beijing. The United States had originally hoped to entice more Southeast Asian states to join than transpired and the door was always open to such memberships. That such hopes were not realised was a reflection of circumstances beyond SEATO’s control and if the result was an “unbalanced” composition of members it should be remembered that this was never the intention of the organisation. By the same token the fact that by the mid-1960s France and the United Kingdom were no longer capable of sustaining a significant presence in the region was also not a situation of SEATO’s making. Having stabilised to one degree or another the Cold War “frontline” in Europe, North Asia (after a bloody war) and the Middle East (Nasser notwithstanding) the Western powers and their allies found that a new front had opened up in Southeast Asia. In the context of 1954 SEATO represented a rational attempt by the West to deter further communist expansion in the region. The fact that it was a region in the midst of a transition from a colonial to a post-colonial world, and thus clearly susceptible to volatile change, was not lost on SEATO’s founding members. But what were the alternatives if the region’s stability and security was to be guaranteed by something more substantial than blind faith in the Communist Bloc’s adherence to the 1954 Geneva Accords? The United States, the United Kingdom and France were either unwilling or unable to shoulder such a burden on their own. Australia and New Zealand, while both adhering to a strategy of forward defence, would never venture forth into the region without the United States or the United Kingdom at their side. Attempts to modernise and expand the armed forces of regional states such as Thailand without any accompanying security guarantees from the Western powers would have been unlikely to inspire much confidence or appreciation from the recipients. In fact under such circumstances Thailand would no doubt have been tempted to follow its age-old tradition of bending with the wind and could well have become the regional equivalent of Finland. Under such circumstances a multilateral military alliance, for all its possible drawbacks, was surely worth the risk. Indeed for most of the first decade of SEATO’s existence it appeared that the gamble had, on balance paid off. Overt communist aggression against the Protocol States or the wider region did not occur. Thailand was brought firmly into the

272

Western camp and major progress was made in modernising its armed forces and improving its capacity as a base for Western operations in the region. Similar modernisation programs were under way in Pakistan, the Philippines and South Vietnam offering the prospect of a more robust regional ability to resist communist aggression. Australia and New Zealand had fully engaged with the region and were ready and willing to make a military contribution to secure its fate. SEATO’s military machinery, with the MPO at its core, had developed into an effective organisation capable of responding to changes to the strategic environment. This was illustrated in the organisation’s recognition of the rise of the communist insurgent threat and the swift incorporation of that threat into SEATO’s contingency planning. While none of these successes was decisive they nonetheless offered hope and a basis for further gains in the future. In recent years the orthodox interpretation of the Vietnam War that arose in the 1970s and 80s that it was a total disaster for the United States and its allies has begun to be questioned. The passion and partisanship that this conflict provoked amongst an entire generation of the West has begun to subside into a more reflective and proportionate consideration of its place in the wider Cold War. While the communist victories in Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia are undeniable the argument that in strategic terms the war “bought time” for Thailand, if not the rest of non- communist Southeast Asia, is beginning to gain currency. Should it continue to do so both its proponents and critics might like to acknowledge the true importance of the Western military alliance that “bought time” for the region in the decade preceding the introduction of American ground troops into Vietnam: SEATO.

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Appendix I: The South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty (Manila Pact)

SOUTH EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY

The Parties to this Treaty,

Recognizing the sovereign equality of all the Parties,

Reiterating their faith in the purpose and principles set forth in the Charter of the United Nations and their desire to live in peace with all peoples and governments.

Reaffirming that, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, they uphold the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and declaring that they will earnestly strive by every peaceful means to promote self-government and to secure the independence of all countries whose peoples desire it and are able to undertake its responsibilities.

Desiring to strengthen the fabric of peace and freedom and to uphold the principles of democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, and to promote the economic well-being and development of all peoples in the Treaty Area.

I Intending to declare publicly and for collective defence for the preservation of peace and security,

Therefore agree as follows:

ARTICLE I

The Parties undertake, as set forth in the Charter of the United Nations, to settle any international dispute in which they may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered,

274 and to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

ARTICLE II

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack and to prevent and counter subversive activities directed from without against their territorial integrity and political stability.

ARTICLE III

The Parties undertake to strengthen their free institutions and to co-operate with one another in the further development of economic measures, including technical assistance, designed to promote economic progress and social well-being and to further the individual and collective efforts of governments toward these ends.

ARTICLE IV

1. Each Party recognizes that aggression by means of armed attack in the Treaty Area against any of the parties or against any State or territory which the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter designate would endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that it will in that event act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Measures taken under this paragraph shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations.

2. If, in the opinion of any of the Parties, the inviolability or the integrity of the territory or the sovereignty or political independence of any Party in the Treaty Area or of any other State or territory to which the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article from time to time apply is threatened in any way other than by armed attack or is affected or threatened by any fact or situation which might endanger the peace of the area, the Parties shall consult immediately in order to agree on the measures which should be taken for the common defence.

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3. It is understood that no action on the territory of any State designated by unanimous agreement under paragraph 1 of this Article or on any territory so designated shall be taken except at the invitation or with the consent of the government concerned.

ARTICLE V

The Parties hereby establish a Council, on which each of them shall be represented, to consider matters concerning the implementation of this Treaty. The Council shall provide for consultation with regard to military and any other planning as the situation obtaining in the Treaty Area may from time to time require. The Council shall be so organized as to be able to meet at any time.

ARTICLE VI

This Treaty does not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting in any way the rights and obligations of any of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations or the responsibility of the United Nations for the maintenance of international peace and security. Each Party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the Parties or any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

Any other State in a position to further the objectives of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the area may, by unanimous agreement of the Parties, be invited to accede to this Treaty. Any state so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines shall inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.

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ARTICLE VIII

As used in this Treaty, the “Treaty Area” is the general area of South East Asia, including also the entire territories of the Asian Parties, and the general area of the South West Pacific not including the Pacific area north of 21 degrees 30 minutes north latitude. The parties may, by unanimous agreement, amend this Article to include within the Treaty Area the territory of any State acceding to this Treaty in accordance with Article VII or otherwise to change the Treaty Area.

ARTICLE IX

1. This Treaty shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. Duly certified copies thereof shall be transmitted by that Government to the signatories.

2. The Treaty shall be ratified and its provisions carried out by the parties in accordance with their respective constitutional processes. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited as soon as possible with the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall notify all of the other signatories of such deposit.

3. The Treaty shall enter into force between the States which have ratified it as soon as the instruments of ratification of a majority of the signatories shall have been deposited, and shall come into effect with respect to each other State on the date of the deposit of its instrument of ratification.

ARTICLE X

This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely, but any Party may cease to be a Party one year after its notice of denunciation has been given to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which shall inform the Governments of the other Parties of the deposit of each notice of denunciation.

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ARTICLE XI

The English text of this Treaty is binding on the Parties, but when the parties have agreed to the French text thereof and have so notified the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, the French text shall be equally authentic and binding to the Parties.

UNDERSTANDING OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

The United States of America in executing the present treaty does so with the understanding that its recognition of the effect of aggression and armed attack and its agreement with reference thereto in Article IV, paragraph 1, apply only to Communist aggression but affirms that in the event of other aggression or armed attack it will consult under the provisions of Article IV, paragraph 2.

In witness thereof the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

PROTOCOL TO THE SOUTH EAST ASIA COLLECTIVE DEFENCE TREATY

Designation of states and territory as to which provisions of Article IV and Article III are to be applicable:

The Parties to the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty unanimously designate for the purposes of Article IV of the Treaty the States of Cambodia and Laos and the free territory under the jurisdiction of the State of Vietnam.

The Parties further agree that the above mentioned states and territory shall be eligible in respect of the economic measures contemplated by Article III.

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This Protocol shall enter into force simultaneously with the coming into force of the Treaty.

In witness thereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries have signed this Protocol to the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty.

Done at Manila, this eighth day of September, 1954.

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Appendix 2: CMPO BIOGRAPHIES 1957-1965

1 March 1957 - 22 April 1958 *Brigadier-General Alfredo M. Santos (The Philippines)

1 July 1958 - 1 July 1960 Brigadier Leonard W. Thornton (New Zealand)

6 July 1960 - 30 June 1962 Major-General John Gordon Wilton (Australia)

1 July 1962 - 30 June 1964 Rear-Admiral Sayed Mohammed Ahsan (Pakistan)

1 July 1964 - 30 June 1966 *Major-General Hugh Anthony Prince (United Kingdom)

* Unable to locate SEATO career profiles (NAA: A1838/385, 688/25/7).

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Brigadier-General Alfredo M. Santos

Chief Military Planning Office 1 July 1957 – 22 April 1958

- Graduate of Philippines Reserve Officers Training Corps (PROTC), class of 1929.

- As a major of the 1st Filipino Regular Division Santos was awarded the Medal of Valour for actions against the Japanese in 1941/1942.

- Commanded Philippines Army, 1 Aug 1960 - 16 Sept 1962.

- Made first four-star general of the AFP and appointed Chief of Staff, AFP in 1963.

- Buried in Libingan Ng Mga Bay (Cemetery of the Heroes), Manila.

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Brigadier Leonard Thornton, CBE, DSO

Chief Military Planning Office 1 July 1958 – 1 July 1960

Leonard W. Thornton was born in Christchurch, New Zealand, on 15 October 1916. At the age of eighteen Thornton was fortunate enough to join the New Zealand Army in the year that it resumed the practice of sending its most promising officer material to RMC Duntroon in Australia. Thornton made the most of the opportunity that had been given to him and in addition to graduating in 1937 he was also awarded the King’s Medal as the top student of his year. Newly commissioned, Thornton returned to New Zealand as a second lieutenant in the Royal New Zealand Artillery (RNZA). With the outbreak of the Second World War most members of the tiny regular component of the New Zealand Army experienced a dramatic rise in rank and Thornton was no exception. He first saw action as a battery commander with the 4th Field Regiment RNZA in Greece in April 1941. For the next four years Thornton served with distinction throughout both the North African and Italian campaigns and was mentioned in dispatches twice. After serving as the Brigade-Major in the 6th New Zealand Infantry Brigade throughout most of 1942 by June 1943 Thornton had been promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel and given command of the 5th Field Regiment RNZA. In April 1944 he was appointed GSO I, 2nd New Zealand Division, and before the year was out Thornton became the youngest Brigadier in the history of the New Zealand Army. In the aftermath of the German surrender in Italy Thornton briefly held the position of CRA 2nd New Zealand Division before the formation disbanded. Apart from a brief period of service with the New Zealand contingent of the British Commonwealth Occupation Force in Japan, Thornton spent the next six years in New Zealand involved with the re-organisation of the post-war New Zealand Army and the establishment of the Compulsory Military Training scheme that would underpin it. In 1952 Thornton was sent to the Imperial Defence College and subsequently headed the New Zealand Joint Services Liaison Staff in London from 1953 to the end of 1954. On his return to New Zealand Thornton served as Quartermaster-General in 1955 and then as Adjutant-General (1956-58) before taking up the appointment of CMPO in July 1958. Having completed his term as CMPO Thornton was promoted to Major-

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General and appointed CGS in 1960, a post he held until 1965. He then went on to become CDS for six years, attaining the rank of Lieutenant-General in the process, before retiring from the Army in 1972. A brief career as a diplomat followed with Thornton being made the New Zealand ambassador to South Vietnam and Cambodia from 1972 to 1974. Awarded a knighthood in 1967 Lieutenant-General Sir Leonard Thornton, KBE, DSO, died on 10 June 1999 in Wellington, New Zealand, and was buried with full military honours.

SOURCES: Murphy, W. E. 2nd New Zealand Divisional Artillery Official History of New Zealand in the Second World War, (Wellington: Historical Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1966); The New Zealand Herald, Wednesday, 18 June 1999; The Evening Post, 25 April 1998; NAA: A1838/385, 688/25/7.

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Major-General John Gordon Wilton, KBE, DSO

Chief Military Planning Office 6 July 1960 – 30 June 1962

John Gordon Wilton was born in Sydney, NSW, Australia on 22 November 1910. Wilton, like his New Zealand predecessor at the MPO, was a graduate of the Royal Military College (RMC) Duntroon, doing so in 1930. Upon graduating Wilton opted to join the British Army and for the rest of the decade spent much of his career serving in India, an experience that saw him gain some minor operational experience in Burma and a fluency in Urdu. In May 1939 Wilton transferred to the Australian Army with the rank of captain. The outbreak of the Second World war saw him initially assigned to the coastal artillery but the raising of an expeditionary force for overseas service – the 2nd Australian Imperial Force (2nd AIF) – eventually saw him seconded to the 7th Division, a 2nd AIF formation, in time to embark with it for service in the Middle East. Over the course of two years Wilton rose from command of a field battery to become a brigade major before returning to Australia in 1942 as a Lieutenant-Colonel. He then spent the next 12 months as GSO1 to the 3rd Australian Division in New Guinea (which lead to his being awarded the Distinguished Service Order [DSO] for his service there) before joining the Australian Military Mission in Washington DC as its senior staff officer. Apart from a brief period spent as a military observer in the North-West European theatre in late 1944, Wilton remained in the US until March 1945. He returned to Australian that month and was almost immediately posted to the Australian Advanced Land Headquarters in New Guinea where he held a number of staff positions through to the end of the war in the Pacific. In the aftermath of the war and the re-establishment of the Australian Army on a peace-time footing Wilton was made Director of Military Operations and Plans, a position he held for five years. In 1952 he attended the Imperial Defence College after which he was promoted to brigadier and given command of the 28th British Commonwealth Brigade in 1953. Wilton’s operational command was cut short by the signing of the Armistice but he remained in Korea until 1954. Returning to Australia Wilton held a number of staff appointments over the next three years before being promoted to major-general whereupon he was made the commandant of RMC Duntroon, a position he held until his appointment as CMPO in 1960. Upon completion of his term as CMPO Wilton returned to Australia and in

284

1963 he became CGS (and was awarded a knighthood the following year). In May 1966 Wilton was promoted to lieutenant-general and made Chairman of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee. He retired from the Australian Army in October 1970 and subsequently served as Consul-General in New York between 1973-1975. Lieutenant-General Sir John Gordon Wilton, KBE, DSO, died on 10 May 1981.

SOURCE: Peter Dennis, Jeffrey Grey, Ewan Morris, Robin Prior, eds. The Oxford Companion to Australian Military History (Melbourne: Oxford University Press, 1995); NAA: A1838/385, 688/25/7.

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Rear-Admiral Sayed Mohammed Ahsan, SQA, DSC.

Chief Military Planning Office 1 July 1962 – 30 June 1964

Born in November 1920 Sayed Mohammed Ahsan’s military career began on 1 April 1940 when he was commissioned as a Midshipman in the Royal Indian Navy (RIN). The entry of Japan into the Second World War in December 1941 led to the rapid expansion of RIN coastal forces and by late 1942 Ahsan, then a Lieutenant, was given command of ML-441, a locally built Fairmile ’B’-Type motor launch. In January 1943 Ahsan and ML-441 were placed under the control of the newly-formed 55th Motor Launch Flotilla RIN and sent to the Arakan Coast in Burma, where the Flotilla was tasked with supporting the 14th Indian Division’s ground operations on the Mayu Peninsula. This support involved maintaining a blockade of all Japanese coastal traffic in the Arakan and mounting diversionary raids against Japanese strong points up and down the coast. One such raid was carried out against the Japanese- held village of Myebon in Hunter’s Bay on 26 February 1943 by a force of four MLs, including ML-441. In the course of the raid Ahsan took ML-441 and another ML up a nearby river in search of a reported Japanese ship, which he found, engaged and successfully sunk. For this action Ahsan was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross. Ahsan finished the war as a staff officer at RIN Naval Headquarters in New Delhi. In 1946 he returned to sea with a posting to the ‘Bittern’ Class sloop HMIS Narbada before again retuning to New Delhi and a number of staff appointments the following year. That August saw Ahsan effectively leave the RIN when he took up the post of Aide-de-camp to the Governor-General of Pakistan. In 1948 the RIN was officially supplanted by its Indian and Pakistani successors and Ahsan was promoted to the rank of (Acting) Lieutenant Commander in the Pakistan Navy. For the next three years Ahsan served aboard all three of the British ‘Onslow’ Class destroyers acquired by Pakistan during this period and commanded two of them: PNS Tariq (ex-HMS Offa) and PNS Tughril (ex-HMS Onslaught). He was then posted to the Pakistani Naval Headquarters in Karachi where he held the post of Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (Operations) until May 1954 when he left for the United Kingdom to attend the Joint Service Staff College in Latimer. Upon completing the course and being confirmed in the rank of Commander Ahsan went back to Karachi in 1955 and took up the post of DCNS (Supply and Secretariat). Later that year Ahsan

286 was selected to serve as the Pakistani Naval Attache in Washington DC, a position he held from June 1955 to September 1956. Ahsan briefly returned to staff duties in Karachi before being appointed to command the ‘Dido’ Class light cruiser PNS Babur (ex-HMS Diadem) upon its commissioning into Pakistani service in July 1957. On 1 March 1959 Ahsan was promoted to Commodore 2nd Class and appointed Chief of Naval Staff. A year later he was selected to be the first Deputy Chief of the Military Planning Office in SEATO, a position he held for two years before being promoted to Rear-Admiral and succeeding Major-General Wilton to the post of CMPO. Upon his return to Pakistan in 1964 Ahsan’s naval career reached its peak with his promotion to Vice-Admiral and appointment as Chief of Navy, a position he held from October 1966 until August 1969. He then took up the governorship of East Pakistan but was dismissed from the post on 1 March 1971 for advocating a political rather than a military solution to the crisis there. Vice-Admiral Ahsan, SQC, DSC, died in 1989.

SOURCE: NAA: A1838/385, 688/25/7.

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Major-General Hugh Anthony Prince, CBE

Chief Military Planning Office 1 July 1964 – 30 June 1966

Late the 6th Gurkha Rifles and The King's Regiment (Liverpool), died at Arles, France, 6 November, 2005. He was aged 94.

He was born 11 August, 1911, the son of H.T. Prince, FRCS, LRCP, and was educated at Eastbourne College, and the Royal Military College, Sandhurst. Career: Commissioned into the Army in 1931; served in the 6th Gurkha Rifles until 1947; The King's Regiment (Liverpool) 1947.

He was appointed CBE in 1960.

He married in firstly, 1938, Elizabeth, daughter of Dr Walter Bapty, of Victoria BC. His first wife died in 1959. There were 2 sons of the union. He married again, in 1959, Claude-Andree, daughter of Andre Romanet, by whom he had a son.

SOURCES: Who’s Who 1965 (London: Adam & Charles Black, 1965); The Times, death notice section.

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Appendix 3: The SEATO Emblem

The SEATO emblem has an interesting history. Rather than simply commission a professional design, it was decided at the Sixth SEATO Council Representatives meeting in May 1958 to hold an international competition open to the citizens of all the SEATO member states. A month later the SEATO Secretariat- General officially announced the competition after drawing up the rules that would govern it. A first prize of US$500 and a second prize of US$200 were offered and all entries had to be submitted by 31 October 1958. A selection committee was formed to evaluate the entries and choose the winner, and was comprised of: the Secretary- General of SEATO, Pote Sarasin; four Council Representatives (Australia, France, Pakistan, and the Philippines); the CMPO, Brigadier Leonard Thornton; the SEATO Liaison Officer from the United States Information Service in Bangkok; the head of the British Council in Bangkok; and two senior SEATO Secretariat officials, the Director of Cultural Relations and the Public Relations Officer.1 By the time entries closed a total of 240 different designs were submitted by 145 contestants from every member state except France. The Selection Committee met four times during November and eventually narrowed the choice down to four designs (two from the United States, one from the United Kingdom, and one from Thailand). However the Selection Committee decided that none of these finalists was completely satisfactory, and instead opted to incorporate features from all four into an officially commissioned design. In view of this decision the Committee felt that rather than awarding the first and second prizes, it would instead combine the prize money from both and divide it equally among the four competition finalists. A Thai artist, Nai Sithiporn Donavanik, was chosen to complete the official design, and it was publicly unveiled for the first time at a flag-raising ceremony outside SEATO Headquarters in Bangkok on 19 February 1959.2

1 “Selection of an emblem for SEATO”, minute, SEATO Secretary-General Pote Sarasin to Council Representatives, 15 December 1958, ANZ: EA 120/1/12 Part 1; “SEATO Adopts Emblem Symbolizing 8-Nation Defensive Alliance”, SEATO Press Release, 19 February 1959, ANZ: EA 120/1/12 Part 1. 2 Ibid; “SEATO Flag Unfurled”, SEATO Press Release, 19 February 1959, ANZ: EA 120/1/12 Part 1.

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The Meaning of the SEATO Emblem

The shield is the symbol of defence. The globe illustrates the worldwide nature of SEATO membership and the shaded portion indicates the area afforded protection by the South East Asia Collective Defence Treaty. The olive branch denotes peace and the benefits which flow therefrom.3

Approved Versions of the SEATO Emblem

The SEATO emblem had three approved versions: a) as a flag or car pennant (Figure 1); b) as a crest for SEATO stationary, official papers and publications (Figure 2); c) as a shoulder patch or metal-laminate badge for SEATO military personnel (Figure 3).4

3 From the official pamphlet, The SEATO Emblem, Bangkok, SEATO Headquarters, 1959, ANZ: EA 120/1/12 Part 1. 4 Ibid.

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Wearing of the SEATO Badge by Military Personnel

At the Tenth SEATO Military Adviser’s Conference (Wellington, New Zealand, April 1959) a sample metal-laminate SEATO badge was shown to the advisers, prompting unanimous, albeit informal, approval to it being worn by SEATO military personnel. In the wake of this conference the advisers formally clarified the details of this approval and agreed out-of-session that the SEATO badge could be worn on, or near, the right breast pocket by: a) military advisers and their national ADC’s while attending SEATO conferences, exercises, demonstrations and functions; b) all service personnel of the MPO during the period of their appointment on occasions to be specified by Chief, MPO.5

5 “SEATO Badge”, minute, Brigadier Leonard Thornton, CMPO, to Military Advisers, 20 May 1959, ANZ: EA 120/1/12 Part 1.

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