SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965
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SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia 1955-1965 Damien Marc Fenton Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, UNSW@ADFA 2006 Certificate of Originality I hereby declare that this submission is my own work and to the best of my knowledge it contains no materials previously published or written by another person, or substantial portions of material which have been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at UNSW or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by others, with whom I have worked at UNSW or elsewhere, is explicitly acknowledged in the thesis. I also declare that the intellectual content of this thesis is the product of my own work, except to the extent that assistance from others in the project’s design and conception or in style, presentation and linguistic expression is acknowledged. Mr. Damien Marc Fenton Abstract Despite the role played by the South East Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in the defence of Western interests in that region during the Cold War, there has to date been no scholarly attempt to examine the development and performance of the organisation as a military alliance. This thesis is thus the first attempt to do so and as such seeks to take advantage of the recent release of much SEATO-related official material into the public domain by Western governments. This material throws new light upon SEATO’s aims and achievements, particularly in regard to the first ten years of its existence. Because SEATO was eventually rendered irrelevant by the events of the Second Indochina War (1965-1975) a popular perception has arisen that it was always a “Paper Tiger” lacking in substance, and thus easily dismissed. This thesis challenges this assumption by examining SEATO’s development in the decade before that conflict. The thesis analyses SEATO’s place in the wider Cold War and finds that it was part of a rational and consistent response within the broader Western strategy of containment to deter, and if need be, defeat, the threat of communist aggression. That threat was a very real one for Southeast Asia in the aftermath of the First Indochina War and one that was initially perceived in terms of the conventional military balance of power. This focus dominated SEATO’s strategic concepts and early contingency planning and rightly so, as an examination of the strength and development of the PLA and PAVN during this period demonstrates. SEATO developed a dedicated military apparatus, principally the Military Planning Office (MPO), that proved itself to be perfectly capable of providing the level of co-ordination and planning needed to produce a credible SEATO deterrent in this regard. SEATO enjoyed less success with its attempts to respond to the emergence of a significant communist insurgent threat, first in Laos then in South Vietnam, but the alliance did nonetheless recognise this threat and the failure of SEATO in this regard was one of political will rather than military doctrine. Indeed this thesis confirms that it was the increasingly disparate political agendas of a number of SEATO’s members that ultimately paralysed its ability to act and thus ensured its failure to meet its aims, at least insofar as the so- called “Protocol States” were concerned. But this failure should not be allowed to completely overshadow SEATO’s earlier achievements in providing a modicum of Western-backed stability and security to the region from 1955-1965. i Table of Contents Acknowledgements - - - - - Page ii List of Abbreviations - - - - - Page iv Maps - - - - - - Page viii Introduction - - - - - - Page 1 Chapter 1: SEATO’s Place in the Cold War - - Page 7 Chapter 2: The Conventional Military Threat - - Page 32 Chapter 3: SEATO’s Military Organisation 1955-1965 - Page 70 Chapter 4: SEATO’s Strategic Concepts - - - Page 105 Chapter 5: Planning for Limited War - - - Page 142 Chapter 6: Plan 5: The First Foray into Counter-insurgency Page 179 Planning Chapter 7: Counter-insurgency Planning for South - Page 207 Vietnam and Thailand Chapter 8: The Beginning of the End 1964-1965 - - Page 237 Conclusion - - - - - - Page 267 Appendix I - - - - - - Page 273 Appendix II - - - - - - Page 279 Appendix III - - - - - - Page 288 Bibliography - - - - - - Page 291 ii Acknowledgements In keeping with tradition I would firstly like to thank my supervisors, Professor Jeffrey Grey and Professor Peter Dennis, for their support and guidance over the last six years. I consider myself extremely fortunate to have numbered amongst the ranks of their PhD students and a post-graduate with a passion for military history would be hard-pressed to find two better exponents of the field. Their professionalism, knowledge and generosity were invaluable – Jeff’s spirited efforts to make sure I got to carry out research in the US and the UK and Peter’s offers to house-sit for him (and thus escape my non-air-conditioned apartment) are but two examples that spring to mind. I should also mention that while I undoubtedly tested the forbearance of both men towards the end of this undertaking, they were never anything but encouraging in their insistence that I could finish it. I would also like to thank my other friends and colleagues from the School of History, now part of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, at UNSW@ADFA for their encouragement and support over the years. In particular Professor Robin Prior and Dr Albert Palazzo, who both offered gainful employment to a struggling student; the School Secretary, Bernadette McDermott, without whose Delphic powers I would never have managed to navigate the labyrinth of university regulations, entitlements and requirements; and my fellow frontschwein, Darren Clifford, John Connor and Luke Auton. As with any serious researcher I owe a great deal of gratitude to the many archivists and librarians who have helped me, although special mention must go to the staffs of the National Office of the National Archives of Australia and the Australian War Memorial Research Centre. Both institutions bore the brunt of my research effort – one that seemed to invoke the laborious process of obtaining access clearance for nearly every SEATO-related document I wished to see. My old friend and present-day Wellingtonian, Peter Connor, provided valuable assistance in preparing the way for a successful summer raid on Archives New Zealand. In a similar vein I am deeply indebted to another Mt. Maunganui old boy, Peter Butler, and his wife Suk, for their gracious offer of a spare room for the duration of my month-long stay in London. That research trip, which also included a month in Washington DC, would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the Australian Army iii History Research Grants Scheme. I spent most of this thesis as a full-time student in part-time employment but end it as a part-time student in full-time employment with the Department of Veterans’ Affairs. To that end I should like to thank my Director, Deborah Rollings, and her predecessor, Nik White, for their sympathetic support and understanding of my extra-curricular activities over the last two years – I know both of them gave me more leeway in this regard than I could rightfully expect from any employer. Thanks is also owed to my friends and colleagues in the Military History Section and Australia-Japan Research Project at the Australian War Memorial: firstly for the employment opportunities that helped me to keep body and soul together for some two and a half years, and secondly for the camaraderie and collegial encouragement offered by the likes of Dr Steve Bullard, Dr Chris Clark, Ian Hodges, Dr Peter Londey, Brad Manera, Dr Robert Nichols, Dr Peter Stanley, and Dr Keiko Tamura. The Canberra experience has not always been an easy one for an ex-pat New Zealander and with that in mind I would like to express my gratitude to Matthew Keene, Dr John Moremon and Tamara Johnston not only for the help and support they have offered me during the course of this thesis, but also for their friendship: my time in Australia would have been immeasurably poorer for their absence. Finally, I would like to thank my family, particularly my parents, Justine and Sel, for their unwavering belief in my ability to do this. iv Abbreviations 1ATF 1st Australian Task Force AA Anti-Aircraft AATTV Australian Army Training Team Vietnam AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines AFV Armoured Fighting Vehicle AMDA Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement ANZAM Australia, New Zealand and Malaya (agreement or area) ANZUK Australia, New Zealand, United Kingdom (division or smaller force) ANZUS Australia, New Zealand, United States (treaty) APC Armoured Personnel Carrier ARVN Army of the Republic of Vietnam ASW Anti-Submarine Warfare BAOR British Army of the Rhine BCFESR British Commonwealth Far East Strategic Reserve BCT Battalion Combat Team BDCC-FE British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East CCP Chinese Communist Party CDNI Committee for the Defence of the National Interests CEFEO Corps Expéditionnaire Française d’Extrême Orient CENTO Central Treaty Organisation CIA Central Intelligence Agency CINCPAC Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (US joint theatre command) CINCUSARPAC Commander-in-Chief, US Army, Pacific v CMPO Chief, Military Planning Office CPI Communist Party of India CPP Communist Party of Pakistan CPT Communist Party of Thailand CPV Chinese People’s Volunteers CSE Committee of Security Experts CTZ Corps Tactical