A Neoclassical Realist's Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy
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University of North Dakota UND Scholarly Commons Theses and Dissertations Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects January 2019 A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy Christopher David Fabian Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/theses Recommended Citation Fabian, Christopher David, "A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis Of Sino-U.S. Space Policy" (2019). Theses and Dissertations. 2455. https://commons.und.edu/theses/2455 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses, Dissertations, and Senior Projects at UND Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of UND Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. A NEOCLASSICAL REALIST’S ANALYSIS OF SINO-U.S. SPACE POLICY by Christopher David Fabian Bachelor of Science, United States Air Force Academy, 2013 A Thesis Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the University of North Dakota In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science Grand Forks, North Dakota May 2019 PERMISSION Title A Neoclassical Realist’s Analysis of Sino-U.S. Space Policy Department Space Studies Degree Master of Science In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a graduate degree from the University of North Dakota, I agree that the library of this University shall make it freely available for inspection. I further agree that permission for extensive copying for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor who supervised my thesis work or, in his absence, by the Chairperson of the department or the dean of the School of Graduate Studies. It is understood that any copying or publication or other use of this thesis or part thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University of North Dakota in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis. Christopher David Fabian May 2, 2019 iii TABLE OF CONTENTS I. Background ...................................................................................................................... 1 A. RESEARCH QUESTION ............................................................................................ 1 B. RELEVANCE TO U.S. POLICY................................................................................. 1 C. METHODOLOGY ....................................................................................................... 6 D. LITERATURE REVIEW ............................................................................................. 8 E. ROADMAP ................................................................................................................ 33 II. Modeling for Structural Factors ..................................................................................... 34 A. Building the Game ...................................................................................................... 34 B. Defining Preferences .................................................................................................. 36 a. Cooperate/Cooperate............................................................................................... 38 b. Defect/Defect .......................................................................................................... 47 c. Defect/Cooperate .................................................................................................... 57 d. Cooperate/Defect .................................................................................................... 71 e. Analysis................................................................................................................... 76 C. Testing the zero-sum assumption: .............................................................................. 79 f. Offense/Defense Balance: ....................................................................................... 80 g. Dual-Use Problem ................................................................................................... 84 III. Decisions Under Risk ................................................................................................. 98 A. China under Prospect Theory ................................................................................... 100 iv A. Decisions under risk .............................................................................................. 100 B. China and the “Century of Humiliation” .............................................................. 103 C. Chinese Space Program and Techno-nationalism ................................................. 107 a. Spaceflight and National Prestige ......................................................................... 108 b. Resource Nationalism ........................................................................................... 111 c. The New Space Law Régime ................................................................................ 114 d. Space Weapons for a Revolution in Military Affairs ........................................... 119 B. Availability ............................................................................................................... 122 e. Preemption Meets Deterrence ............................................................................... 125 h. Cultural Differences .............................................................................................. 127 i. Preconceptions ...................................................................................................... 128 IV. Conclusion ................................................................................................................ 131 A. Policy Recommendations ......................................................................................... 133 j. The U.S. military must reduce reliance on space. ................................................. 133 k. Reducing fear of U.S. space domination (Reduce fear of C/D)............................ 135 l. Pursue active cooperation. (Increase benefit of CC) ............................................ 141 B. Summary ................................................................................................................... 144 C. Further Research ....................................................................................................... 145 V. Bibliography ................................................................................................................. 148 v LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1: Simple 2x2 Game Matrix ........................................................................................ 35 Figure 2: 2x2 matrix with ordinal preferences. U.S. preferences are represented by “x” and Chinese preferences are represented by “y”. ................................................................................ 35 Figure 3: China and the U.S.’s utility given a cooperate/cooperate outcome. ........................ 47 Figure 4: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome. ................................... 53 Figure 5: China and the U.S.’s utility given a defect/defect outcome where no KKV threshold has been crossed. ........................................................................................................................... 57 Figure 6: Map of China’s offensive IRBM capabilities.......................................................... 61 Figure 7: China and the U.S.’s utility given a U.S. cooperate/China defect outcome. ........... 70 Figure 8: China and the U.S.’s utility given a Cooperate/Cooperate outcome. ...................... 76 Figure 9: Comparing utility in two scenarios. The 2x2 matrix on the left shows utility when the debris causing threshold has been crossed. The 2x2 matrix shows utility in a sub-threshold conflict. ......................................................................................................................................... 77 Figure 10: Shows ordinal preferences for both scenarios. Ordinal preference does not represent the magnitude of actor preferences, but is a better visual representation of the game. 78 Figure 11: Four worlds created by offense-defense balance and distinguishability, in which the security dilemma operates at different strengths. .................................................................... 80 Figure 12: The ratio of propellant mass to satellite mass required to produce a given ΔV using conventional propulsion. ..................................................................................................... 82 Figure 13: Value function under prospect theory. ................................................................ 101 Figure 14 Game under prospect theory. Prospect theory strengthens the structural security dilemma observed in Chapter II. ................................................................................................. 103 vi LIST OF TABLES Table 1: Total number of U.S. and Chinese satellites by orbital régime and function (as of April 2019). ................................................................................................................................... 46 Table 2: A more complete list of space technologies with their civilian and military uses. 91 Table 3: Privately owned, commercially available high and medium resolution imaging satellites and their capabilities. ....................................................................................................