View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk brought to you by CORE

provided by ScholarBank@NUS

NANJING MASSACRE AND MASSACRE:

SHAPING OF CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES IN

CHINA AND , 1945-2015

CHAN CHENG

(B.A. (Hons.), NUS)

A THESIS SUBMITTED

FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS

DEPARTMENT OF HISTORY

NATIONAL UNIVERSITY OF SINGAPORE

2015

BLANK PAGE

ii

DECLARATION

I hereby declare that this thesis is my original work and it has been written by

me in its entirety. I have duly acknowledged all the sources of information

which have been used in this thesis.

This thesis has also not been submitted for any degree in any university

previously.

______Chan Cheng Lin 03 August 2015 (Amended on 18 December 2015)

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

First and foremost, I would like to express my utmost gratitude to my thesis supervisor, Dr. Masuda Hajimu, for his meticulous guidance throughout my

MA candidature over the past two years. I thank him for helping me to craft and refine my thesis topic, for painstakingly reading my drafts, for providing me with valuable advice to improve and revise my arguments, and for guiding me in the amendment of my thesis. His graduate module, “HY5402:

Reconsidering the Cold War”, which I sat-in for, prodded me into thinking about the multidisciplinary, complex, and controversial nature of the most important historical global event of the latter half of the twentieth century.

Secondly, I would like to thank the two examiners for reading and marking my thesis, as well as, providing suggestions to improve my arguments. Their suggestions served as a useful guide when I amended my thesis.

Thirdly, I am grateful to the Department of History in NUS for giving me the opportunity to pursue my favourite discipline for six enjoyable and rewarding years – four years as an undergraduate and two as a graduate student. Its flexible curriculum has allowed me to explore a wide range of intellectually- stimulating and multi-faceted History modules. I thoroughly enjoyed each and every one of them. Through their fascinating lectures, interactive tutorials, thought-provoking seminars, and eye-opening fieldtrips, my History professors have debunked the widely-held myth that History is boring and useless. They have made History come alive, and have convinced me that

iv without an appreciation of the past, we would not understand the present.

Studying History at NUS has also made me realise that History is probably the only discipline in the world that can complement all other disciplines, from art and philosophy to science and engineering. I have learnt to appreciate the fact that historians do not work alone. They gain a better and deeper understanding of our past by engaging in rich and diverse interdisciplinary research with scholars from other fields. Most importantly, my six years of History education at NUS have equipped me with critical research and writing skills that are highly-valued in today’s globalised and knowledge-based economy. I have never regretted choosing to study History at NUS.

Fourthly, my heartfelt appreciation goes to other professors from the

Department of History. Associate Professor Huang Jianli and Dr. Sai Siew

Min (who left NUS in 2014) were my academic referees when I applied for the MA course, while Associate Professor Teow See Heng (who left NUS in

2013), Associate Professor Bin, and Associate Professor Maitrii V.

Aung-Thwin interviewed me. All of them facilitated my admission into the course. Furthermore, the Heads of Department, Associate Professor Yong

Mun Cheong (HOD till Academic Year 2013/2014 and retired in June 2015), and Professor Brian P. Farrell (HOD from Academic Year 2014/2015), and the Graduate Coordinators, Associate Professor Ian L. Gordon (Coordinator till Academic Year 2013/2014), and Associate Professor Yang (Coordinator from Academic Year 2014/2015), approved my overseas fieldwork applications and other administrative matters relating to my thesis. Associate

Professor Aung-Thwin and Associate Professor Yang also offered me advice

v to improve my topic during the Graduate Students’ Workshop, organised by the Department of History, on 13 February 2015. In addition, Dr. Sai,

Associate Professor Peter Borschberg Jr., Dr. Wang Jinping, and Associate

Professor Gordon deepened my interest in History, exposed me to a wide range of scholarly works, and taught me the art of historical inquiry and research in their graduate modules, namely “HY5210: Approaches to Modern

Southeast Asian History”, “HY5304: Imperialism and Empires: Historical

Approaches”, “HY5401: Historiography on ”, and “HY6770: Graduate

Research Seminar” respectively. Associate Professor Maurizio Peleggi also introduced me to the intricate relationship between History and memory studies in his undergraduate module, “HY3226: Memory, Heritage and

History”, which I sat-in for. His module laid the groundwork for my research by prompting me to view History from a different perspective.

Fifthly, I am grateful to three professors who are not from the Department of

History. Associate Professor Roxana H. Waterson (who retired in 2014) from the NUS Department of Sociology, ignited my interest in memory studies in her Honours module, “SC4212: Social Memory”, which I sat in for. Associate

Professor Kevin P. Blackburn from the National Institute of Education,

Nanyang Technological University, took time off from his busy schedule to attend my presentation during the Graduate Students’ Workshop, and kindly offered me advice on my topic. Moreover, Associate Professor Xu Jingbo from the Center for Japanese Studies, Fudan University in China wrote recommendation letters for me to visit the Second Historical Archives of

vi

China and the Nanjing City Archives (which was unfortunately closed pending its move to a new location) when I carried out my research there in July 2014.

Sixthly, I express my thanks to Associate Professor Anneliese Kramer-Dahl, and Dr. Arlene Bastion for imparting to me the crucial skills of writing a good thesis. I greatly benefitted from their Academic Writing Workshops, which were organised by the Graduate Studies Division of the Faculty of Arts and

Social Sciences in NUS, which I attended during the two years of my MA candidature.

Seventhly, this thesis would not have been possible without the valuable administrative and logistical support of the “people behind the scenes”. I deeply appreciate the help and support that they have rendered me. Ms.

Adeline Loi from the Department of History helped me to handle the various complex administrative issues pertaining to my candidature and thesis throughout these two years. Ms. Susan Khoo, and Ms. Lim Pinxiu from the

Graduate Studies Division at the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences in NUS processed my admission into the MA course, approved my financial claims incurred from my fieldwork in Nanjing, and granted me tuition fee subsidy in

Academic Year 2014/2015. The librarians from the NUS Central and Chinese

Libraries facilitated my loaning, renewing, and returning of research materials.

In particular, research librarians, Mr. Tim Yap Fuan, and Mr. Han Ming

Guang from the NUS Central Library, and Mr. Lee Ching Seng, and Miss

Chow Chai Khim from the NUS Chinese Library, recommended me books and journals for my research. Mr. James Tan from the East Asian Institute

vii

(EAI) at NUS Campus granted me a one-day access to the EAI

Library, while Ms Ng Hui Hoon facilitated my research at the EAI Library.

The staff from The National Archives in London, and the staff from the

Second Historical Archives of China in Nanjing rendered me assistance during my archival research there in February 2014 and July 2014 respectively. In addition, Ms. Joy Chew from the Counselling and Psychological Services

Centre, University Health Centre in NUS provided me with a listening hear and taught me ways to handle stress during the final phase of writing my thesis.

The staff from Campus Supplies assisted me with the use of photocopying machines for my research materials at the NUS Central and Chinese Libraries.

The staff from Goh Bros Enterprise helped me with the binding of this thesis.

Most importantly, the food vendors at The Deck (Arts canteen at NUS), especially from the Chinese Food and Noodles stalls, fuelled my energy needed for my research.

Eighthly, I owe special thanks to my classmates and friends. My graduate classmates, namely Qi Xiang, Joshua, Apicha, Kisho, Beiyu, Yanjie, and

Sander provided me with suggestions to improve my topic when I first presented my preliminary research during the HY6770 class. Other fellow graduate students, like Patrick, Marek, Yu Ching, Phyo Win Latt, Anisur

Rahman, and Sandeep Ray expressed their interests in my topic, raised questions which prodded me to think deeper, and offered me advice, especially during the Graduate Students’ Workshop. Furthermore, my fellow

Tanjong Katong Supervised Homework Group volunteers at the Chinese

Development Assistance Council gave me their moral support. My History

viii undergraduate classmates (Class of 2013) and my friends from my National

Service days encouraged me and were interested in my research.

Last but not least, I am very fortunate to have the moral and material support of my family, namely my parents, my grandmother, and our family pet dog,

Milo, who sustained me during these two years of my MA candidature, as well as, during the previous four years as an undergraduate. I thank my parents for her unwavering moral support and for accompanying me to London and

Nanjing for my fieldwork in 2014, my grandmother for her appetising meals to sustain me with the energy to continue my research, and Milo for his affectionate company. Their loving understanding and their steadfast support have given me the necessary strength to persevere throughout these six years of my tertiary studies.

While credit for this thesis goes to the people and institution mentioned above,

I bear sole responsibility for any mistakes in this thesis.

Chan Cheng Lin August 2015 (Amended in December 2015)

ix

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page Acknowledgements iv Table of Contents x Summary xii List of Tables xiii List of Abbreviations xiv Note on Transliteration xv and Translation

Chapter One Introduction 1 Research Aims 3 Literature Review 6 Overview of Thesis Chapters 19

Chapter Two Chinese Popular Memories of the 22 in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, 1945-Early 1980s Popular Memories of the Nanjing Massacre 23 in China, 1945-1982 Popular Memories of the Sook Ching 33 Massacre in Singapore, 1945-1980 Conclusion 47

Chapter Three Chinese Popular Memories of the 49 Nanjing Massacre in China, 1982-2015 Sino-Japanese Tensions and Chinese 49 Nationalism State-influenced Popular Memories of the 61 Nanjing Massacre Conclusion 68

Chapter Four Chinese Popular Memories of the Sook 70 Ching Massacre in Singapore, 1980-2015 Cordial and Growing Singapore- 70 Relations Diverse Popular Memories of the Sook 74 Ching Massacre Conclusion 89

Chapter Five Conclusion 91 Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity 92 Symbolism of the Nanjing Massacre and the 95 Sook Ching Massacre Influence of Domestic Politics and Foreign 96 Relations with Japan

x

Bibliography 100 Appendix 1 List of First-hand Accounts on the Nanjing 115 Massacre Appendix 2 List of First-hand Accounts on the Sook 117 Ching Massacre Glossary 125

xi

SUMMARY

The Nanjing Massacre in China (December 1937-February 1938) and the Sook

Ching Massacre (February 1942-March 1942) in Singapore were two major cases of Japanese atrocities against Chinese civilians during Japan’s Fifteen-

Year War in Asia-Pacific (1931-1945). Both massacres have formed a significant and inalienable part of the Chinese populace’s memories in the two predominantly ethnic Chinese countries since the war ended. However,

Chinese civilians in China and Singapore have different popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. This thesis thus seeks to assess the differences between Chinese popular memories of both massacres from 1945 to 2015, and account for these differences through the study of ethnic Chinese survivors’ autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews or testimonies. I shall also examine the extent to which the Chinese people in China and Singapore remember the

Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively during this period. I will further discuss the nature of the relationship between Chinese popular memories of each massacre and the corresponding official memories in China and Singapore. Moreover, I shall explore how and why China’s and

Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with Japan between 1945 and 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre.

xii

LIST OF TABLES

Table Description Page 1 Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, 44 Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews on the Sook Ching Massacre (1945-1980) 2 Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, 77 Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews on the Sook Ching Massacre (1981-2015)

xiii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

CCP Chinese Communist Party

DRO Diplomatic Record Office

IMTFE International Military Tribunal for the Far East

KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang, Nationalist Party)

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MCP Malayan Communist Party

OCA Oversea Chinese Association

ODA Official Development Assistance

PAP People’s Action Party

PRC People’s Republic of China

QCC Quality Control Circles

SSVF Volunteer Force

ST

WO War Office

xiv

NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION AND TRANSLATION

The names of Chinese persons, places, organisations, and terms used in this thesis are rendered in hanyu , such as Mao Zedong and Nanjing.

However, for names that are not usually spelt in pinyin, their pinyin versions, whenever appropriate, will be placed in round brackets after their more commonly known forms in the . Examples include Chiang

Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), Kuomintang (Guomindang), and Sook Ching (Suqing).

The Japanese names of persons and places are written in the most commonly known form. However, macrons which indicate long vowels are omitted, like

Koizumi Junichiro and Tokyo.

The names of all Chinese and Japanese persons are spelt in the traditional order, with the family names (surnames) first, followed by their personal names. Exceptions are given to Chinese, Japanese, and Korean scholars and authors who prefer to reverse the order of their names in English language publications.

With the exception of the names of scholars and research materials mentioned in the footnotes and bibliography, the Chinese, Japanese, and Korean characters for the names of selected historical persons, places, and terms mentioned in this thesis are provided in the Glossary.

xv

My translations of the titles of books and articles into the

English language are placed in square brackets [ ], for instance, Wenshi Jiliao

Xuanji [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials].

Nonetheless, commonly known English translations, or translations by scholars, of Chinese names, titles, and terms are placed in round brackets, such as (devils) and Kempeitai (Japanese military police). Alternatively,

Chinese names and terms are placed in round brackets besides the English translations, like Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) and “century of humiliation

(bainian guochi)”.

xvi

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Han Guanzhang was only ten years old in 1937 when the Japanese military invaded China’s national capital of Nanjing where he lived. Like many other residents in the city, he and his family fled their homes and sought refuge in a school. However, Japanese troops, whom Han labelled as “devils (guizi)”, stormed the school and brutally killed several refugees. He witnessed the cold- blooded murders, and the images of mutilated and decomposing corpses were permanently etched in his mind. Han never forgave the Japanese and “hated them to the core (henzhi rugu)”.1 He gave this personal account of the Nanjing

Massacre2 (December 1937-February 1938) during an oral history interview conducted in 1999.3

The Japanese military carried out another bloodbath in Singapore, the Sook

Ching (Suqing)4 Massacre (February 1942-March 1942), soon after the British forces on the island surrendered. A thirteen-year-old teenager, Lau Teng

Chuan, recounted his wartime experiences in Singapore in his autobiography that was published in 2012.5 Unlike many unfortunate Chinese civilians who lost their lives during the massacre, Lau and his family were lucky to be

1 Han Guanzhang 韩贯章, “Han Guanzhang Zhengyan 韩贯章证言 [Han Guanzhang’s Oral Testimony]”, in Qinhua Rijun Najing Datusha Xingcunzhe Zhengyan 侵华日军南京大屠杀幸 存者证言 (A Collection of Survivors’ Testimony of the Nanjing Massacre), ed. Zhu Chengshan 朱成山 (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press (China)), 2005), p. 24. 2 It is known as Nanjing Datusha in the Chinese language. 3 Han, “Han Guanzhang Zhengyan”, pp. 22-24. 4 It literally means “cleansing”, “purging”, or “elimination through purification” in the Chinese language. In the Japanese language, it is called shukusei. 5 Lau Teng Chuan, Lau Teng Chuan: Sportsman, Teacher, Sports Administrator (Singapore: Lau Teng Chuan, 2012), pp. 25-34. 1 spared from the ordeal. He did not mention that he personally witnessed the killings or saw the bodies of massacred victims. Though Lau acknowledged that the war brought suffering to the people of Singapore, he bore no enmity to the former aggressors whom he believed had repented after the war.6 He even praised his Japanese superiors, who employed him during the Japanese

Occupation (1942-1945), as “humane and good” people.7

The contrasts between Han’s and Lau’s accounts are striking. Yet they are representative of the respective Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing

Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. This year, 2015, marks the seventieth anniversary of the end of Japan’s Fifteen-Year War in

Asia-Pacific (1931-1945).8 During this long-drawn conflict, the Imperial

Japanese Army invaded many territories and carried out various atrocities against unarmed civilians. The Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching

Massacre were two major cases of such atrocities. The total numbers of

Chinese civilians who died in both massacres remain disputed,9 but it is sufficient to state that thousands of them lost their lives. On the one hand, the people of China remember the Japanese atrocities even till today, seven decades after the war ended. The reluctance of Japan’s conservative Liberal

Democratic Party (LDP) government to fully acknowledge the country’s wartime past has embedded these war memories and plagued Sino-Japanese relations. On the other hand, the people of Chinese descent in Singapore have

6 Ibid., pp. 28-30. 7 Ibid., p. 34. 8 The Fifteen-Year War encompassed Japan’s invasion of Manchuria (Manzhou) in 1931, the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945), and the (1941-1945). The latter two wars were part of the Second World War in Asia-Pacific (1937-1945). 9 See Chapter Two for the death toll figures of both massacres. 2 largely placed memories of the Sook Ching Massacre behind them, and

Singapore’s bilateral ties with Japan are generally free from this historical burden. Therefore, even though both China and Singapore are predominantly ethnic Chinese societies and had endured the brunt of Japanese war atrocities, why are their popular memories of the respective massacre so different, and how do both countries’ post-war relations with Japan shape these memories?

Research Aims

I aim to address four main issues in this thesis. My first two aims are about

Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching

Massacre. It should be noted that I restrict the term “massacre” to the murder and execution of unarmed civilians, and exclude cases of rape, pillage, and arson. Firstly, I shall examine, through the study of ethnic Chinese civilian survivors’ first-hand accounts, the extent to which the Chinese populace in

China and Singapore remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching

Massacre respectively between 1945 and 2015. These popular memories, which I will define in the Literature Review section below, are important as they contribute to the development of national consciousness and identity in both countries. In addition, I rely on first-hand accounts, including autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews or testimonies, because they are useful primary sources that embody these memories. While I have incorporated some psychological concepts and sociological theories to help me explain how massacre survivors remember the war, an in-depth study of how psychological and sociological phenomena like post-traumatic stress disorder or socio-economic background respectively

3 affect memory is not the main focus of my discussion which remains grounded in historical research.

Secondly, I will compare Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore by discussing their differences and analysing the reasons for these differences. Though numerous scholarly studies have examined the war memories, including popular memories, of the respective massacre in China and Singapore, academics have paid scant attention to the comparison of popular memories of both massacres. Nation-based war memories, for example in China,10 or region-based war memories, for instance in Southeast Asia,11 have traditionally been scholars’ primary concern. There is hence a need to adopt a comparative approach in order to broaden the study of war memories and view them from a transnational and trans-regional perspective. Chinese civilians were the main victims of Japanese belligerence, and both Nanjing and

Singapore were cities with majority ethnic Chinese populations. Moreover, the

Nanjing Massacre was emotionally connected to the Sook Ching Massacre in the minds of the Chinese living in British-ruled Singapore in 1942. Most of them were born in China and remained loyal to their ancestral homeland.

Hence, they perceived the Japanese Occupation of Singapore as an extension of the war in China, and the Sook Ching Massacre reminded them of the

Nanjing Massacre. The large numbers of victims involved in both massacres have also formed a significant and inalienable part of the war memories of the

10 See, for instance, Zheng Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 11 For example, see Kevin Blackburn, and Karl Hack, War, Memory and the Making of Modern and Singapore (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012). 4

Chinese populace in the two countries. It is thus important to compare Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and the Sook Ching

Massacre in Singapore.

My research, however, goes beyond the simple comparison of Chinese popular memories of both massacres. My next two aims will probe deeper by examining the relationship between these popular memories on the one hand and official memories, domestic politics and international relations of China and Singapore on the other hand. Thirdly, I shall explore the nature of the relationship between these popular memories and the corresponding official memories in China and Singapore. Fourthly, I will assess how and why

China’s and Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with post-war

Japan from 1945 to 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing

Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. We need to understand that popular memories do not exist in isolation and are constantly being shaped by other factors in a society. The study of how Chinese popular memories of both massacres are shaped cannot be divorced from China’s and

Singapore’s respective domestic politics and bilateral ties with post-war Japan.

Moreover, it is imperative to recognise how the two countries’ official memories shape popular memories of the massacres. Therefore, this thesis analyses the shaping of Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre in the respective context of China’s and

Singapore’s official memories, domestic politics and international relations. In this way, I aim to build on and contribute to the growing scholarship on war memories in contemporary Asia.

5

Literature Review

This section reviews the existing literature on the various topics that are related to my research. It will first examine how academics from various disciplines approach the study of memory, especially popular memories. It will then proceed to discuss recent scholarship on the use of memory in China and its relationship with Chinese domestic politics and nationalism, before narrowing down to an analysis of academic works on the history and historiography of the Nanjing Massacre. The review of the relevant literature on China will end with a study of current research on Sino-Japanese relations.

This section will move on to assess how scholars approach the study of the history and memory of the Japanese Occupation and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, before concluding with a discussion of present scholarship on

Singapore-Japan ties.

Memory Studies

In order to better appreciate the contents of massacre survivors’ autobiographies, memoirs, and other first-hand accounts, it is essential to understand how various disciplines approach the study of memory. Academic research on memory studies has proliferated over the decades, originating from psychology, before moving on to sociology, cultural studies, political science, and history. From a psychological perspective, Daniel L. Schacter explains how the brain remembers events and provides scientific reasons for common neurological problems, such as amnesia, false memories, and post-

6 traumatic stress disorder.12 Sociologist Maurice Halbwachs argues that collective memories, which are shared within a society, influence individual memories. These collective memories are in turn, shaped by present needs and circumstances. In other words, the past is remembered from the lens of the present.13 Oral historian Valerie Raleigh Yow further classifies both popular memories and official memories as components of collective memories.14

Most scholars now also understand memory as a multidimensional concept and acknowledge the importance of interdisciplinary research in this field.

Through his study of lieux de memoire (sites of memory) in France, Pierre

Nora asserts that history and memory are mutually complementary, rather than contradictory.15 Moreover, Jay Winter and Emmanuel Sivan incorporate historical, psychological, and sociological interpretations of memory to analyse the ways in which individuals and nations remember wars in the twentieth century.16 These scholarly works on memory studies equip me with important theories and concepts of memory which enable me to better understand Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook

Ching Massacre through a multidisciplinary perspective.

12 Daniel L. Schacter, Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past (New York: Basic Books, 1996), and Daniel L. Schacter, The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001). 13 Maurice Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992), pp. 182-183. 14 Valerie Raleigh Yow, Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences, 3rd ed. (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015), pp. 59-60. 15 Pierre Nora, “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, Representations, 26 (Spring 1989), pp. 7-24. See also Pierre Nora, Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past, 3 vols., ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman and trans. Arthur Goldhammer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996-1998). 16 Jay Winter, and Emmanuel Sivan eds., War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). 7

Different disciplines have adopted varying definitions of “popular memories”.17 Political scientist Rafi Nets-Zehngut categorises popular memories and official memories as part of collective memories. He states that popular memories can either be regarded as the collection of the memories of individuals in a group or society, or as the group’s shared memories of the past.

To put it simply, popular memories include both individual memories and group memories. Nets-Zehngut also defines “official memories” as memories sanctioned by the state. They are reflected in government-controlled platforms, such as school history textbooks and public museum exhibitions which portray the past according to the state’s perspective. Thus, official memories are manipulated by the state to serve its own political agenda. Owing to the state’s preponderant influence, official memories shape popular memories and determine a country’s foreign relations, as we shall see in the case of popular memories of the respective massacre in China and Singapore and both states’ post-war ties with Japan.18 The left-leaning Popular Memory Group in Britain offers a more specific definition for the term “popular memory” which it introduced to academia in 1982. It defines “popular memories” as the memories of the working classes, women, and ethnic minorities whose voices are marginalised, but not necessarily suppressed, by the state’s historical narrative. These memories are critical of official memories, and they are usually found in platforms which the state might not have a strong influence in,

17 In this thesis, I have used the plural “popular memories”, rather than the singular “popular memory” which the scholars whom I have cited use. I prefer the term “popular memories” as the memories present among the Chinese masses in China and Singapore are multiple in numbers. Based on the same rationale, I choose to use the term “official memories”, instead of “official memory”, and “collective memories”, instead of “collective memory”. 18 Rafi Nets-Zehngut, “The Israeli Army’s Official Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus, 1949-2004”, War in History, 22, 2 (April 2015), pp. 212-213. 8 such as oral history and autobiographies.19 Although cultural studies practitioner Tara Brabazon agrees with the Popular Memory Group’s definition of “popular memories”, she expands its definition by arguing that popular culture constitutes an integral part of popular memories. According to

Brabazon, popular memories are not limited to oral history and autobiographies. They are also embodied in popular culture, such as songs and films, which should be examined when studying popular memories.20

Nonetheless, historian Paul Cohen offers a more general definition of “popular memories”. Like Halbwachs and Nets-Zehngut, he contends that they are collective memories which are formed by and shared within a community or nation. These memories are adapted and reinforced by both the masses and the state to suit present needs, regardless of the factual accuracy of the historical events being remembered. Therefore, unlike the Popular Memory Group,

Cohen believes that popular memories do not necessarily challenge official memories, but could overlap with them or complement them.21

In this thesis, I shall adopt Nets-Zehgut’s and Cohen’s definitions of “popular memories”. I agree with Nets-Zehgut that popular memories comprise the memories of individuals in a society, and in this case, the private remembrances of individual massacre survivors in China and Singapore.

These memories are also retained in the familial realm as they are passed down from the survivors to their descendants. I also concur with Nets-Zehgut

19 Popular Memory Group, “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method”, in Making Histories: Studies in History-writing and Politics, eds. Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwarz, and David Suttton (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. 205-252. 20 Tara Brabazon, From Revolution to Revelation: Generation X, Popular Memory and Cultural Studies (Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005), pp. 65-78. 21 Paul Cohen, History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis (New York: Columbia University Press, 2014). 9 and Cohen that popular memories can be viewed as memories that are shared collectively by members in a society. For instance, memories of the Nanjing

Massacre have become part of China’s collective consciousness that is shared within Chinese society, even though not every Chinese citizen today was born before the war or had lived in Nanjing. Moreover, I adopt Nets-Zehgut’s definition of “official memories”. I agree with him and Cohen that the distinction between official memories and popular memories is not clear-cut.

As we shall see in China and Singapore, popular memories of the Nanjing

Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively do not always contradict the corresponding official memories. While I agree with Brabazon that the study of popular memories should include films and songs, they would unnecessarily broaden the scope of my research. In the interests of narrowing down my research area, I have decided to adapt the Popular Memory Group’s methodology of using first-hand accounts. However, instead of emphasising the use of oral history interviews which the Popular Memory Group advocates,

I will utilise autobiographies, memoirs, and other written first-hand records which are largely representative of popular memories in both China and

Singapore.

China, the Nanjing Massacre, and China-Japan Relations

Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are a recent phenomenon which is deeply rooted in China’s domestic politics and Chinese nationalism.

Peter Hays Gries argues that since the 1980s, the ruling Chinese Communist

Party (CCP) has been manipulating traumatic memories of Western and

Japanese aggressions in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries to promote

10

Chinese nationalism among the masses. Chinese suffering and victimisation under foreign imperialism are key elements in the official memories of the

“century of humiliation (bainian guochi)”. The CCP government wants its citizens, particularly the young, to remember these traumatic events, including the Nanjing Massacre, in order to inculcate a sense of patriotism among them as China regains its status as a world power after more than one hundred years of being weak and divided.22 Zheng Wang builds on Gries’ argument when he asserts that Chinese nationalism, based on official memories of the “century of humiliation”, has become the main ideology that legitimises the CCP’s authoritarian rule. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, Marxism was discredited as the party’s guiding ideology following paramount leader Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its communist empire in Eastern Europe. Thus, the CCP has to rely on nationalism to remain in power, despite retaining its nominally communist identity.23 In her study of post-war Sino-Japanese relations, Yinan He agrees with Gries and Wang that the Chinese leadership manipulates official memories of Japanese wartime invasion to promote Chinese nationalism which is in turn, used as a tool to exploit China’s bilateral relations with Japan for its own national interests.24 However, James Reilly partially disagrees with the above three scholars. He argues that although the Communist party-state promotes historical consciousness among the Chinese populace, such consciousness contributes to the rise of grassroots history activism and popular

22 Peter Hays Gries, China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004). 23 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation. 24 Yinan He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006, History and Memory, 19, 2 (Fall/Winter 2007), pp. 43- 74. 11 anti-Japanese nationalistic sentiments that are not state-orchestrated.25

Therefore, recognising the reasons for the development of Chinese nationalism is crucial for my understanding on how it shapes popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre and China-Japan ties.

Chinese official memories of the “century of humiliation” and the rise of

Chinese nationalism in recent decades are intricately linked to state-sanctioned memories of the Nanjing Massacre. Much scholarly research has been conducted on the history of the Nanjing Massacre and its accompanying historical controversies.26 However, I am not concerned with the history and the historiography of the massacre. Instead, academic works on official memories of the atrocities are more relevant to my research. Daqing Yang and

Takashi Yoshida, who are prominent historians of the Nanjing Massacre, argue that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been encouraging the remembrance of the massacre in museums and history textbooks to promote

Chinese nationalism among the masses since the early 1980s. As the guardian of the country’s official memories, the CCP regime opened The Memorial

Hall of the Victims in Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders27 (thereafter,

25 James Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012). 26 For a standard history of the Nanjing Massacre, see Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao Bianweihui 侵华日军南京大屠杀史稿编委会 ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao 侵 华日军南京大屠杀史稿 (Draft Manuscript of the History Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1997). For a balanced treatment of the various historical controversies surrounding the Nanjing Massacre, see Daqing Yang, “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing”, The American Historical Review, 104, 3 (June 1999), pp. 842-865, Joshua A. Fogel ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), and Li Fei Fei, Robert Sabella, and David Liu eds., Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002). 27 This is the official English name of the museum. In the Chinese language, it is known as Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Yunan Tongbao Jinianguan. 12 the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall) in August 1985 and incorporated

Chinese popular memories of the atrocities through the production of war films, and the publication of war survivors’ memoirs and oral history testimonies. The party-state’s historical narrative stresses Japan’s undeniable responsibility for the Nanjing Massacre, with the total death toll of 300,000

Chinese victims becoming a symbolic figure that is deeply etched in the country’s official memories. State-endorsed memories of the massacre have become so rigid that Chinese citizens castigate alternative interpretations of the event.28 Notwithstanding Yang’s and Yoshida’s detailed analyses of the official memories of the Nanjing Massacre, they neglect the study of popular memories. There is a clear need to include Chinese popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre to understand the relationship between official memories and ordinary civilians’ remembrances of the atrocities. This is one of my research aims.

The growth of Chinese nationalism and Chinese official memories of the

Nanjing Massacre have a direct impact on China’s bilateral ties with Japan.

The history of post-war Sino-Japanese relations is well-documented.

Academics have contributed much to the study of both countries’ political and economic relations since 1945.29 Nonetheless, scholarly works that are most pertinent to my research are those on historical issues affecting China-Japan

28 Daqing Yang, “The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan”, in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), ed. T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 50- 86, and Takashi Yoshida, The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). 29 Akira Iriye, “Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90”, The China Quarterly, 124 China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects (December 1990), pp. 624-638, and Yoshihide Soeya, Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998). 13 ties, and the mutual images that the Chinese and Japanese have of each other which are linked to China’s war memories. In her research on PRC-Japan relations since the 1980s, Caroline Rose assesses why disagreements over interpretations of historical issues, such as the Nanjing Massacre, plague bilateral ties. She then examines the success of Sino-Japanese reconciliation in overcoming these disagreements.30 Likewise, Daqing Yang observes that the inability to reconcile their different memories and interpretations of the

Nanjing Massacre prevent China and Japan from developing a closer relationship. He proposes that a common historical acknowledgement between both countries that Japanese soldiers committed large-scale atrocities against

Chinese civilians in Nanjing would help to promote mutual understanding.31

Furthermore, Allen S. Whiting analyses the development of positive and negative images which the Chinese and the have of each other, and the impact of these images on bilateral relations. He concludes that negative images of Japan in China, which resulted from the war, are an obstacle to enhanced Sino-Japanese ties.32 In his study of China’s and Japan’s soft power, Jing Sun agrees with Whiting on the importance of images in

China-Japan relations. However, he argues that both the Chinese and Japanese governments place more emphasis on cultivating positive images of each other to enhance diplomatic ties.33 Like Sun, Utpal Vyas focuses on Sino-Japanese soft power, but unlike Sun, he stresses the central roles of sub-state and non-

30 Caroline Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005). 31 Daqing Yang, “The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible?”, in Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations, ed. Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012), pp. 178-204. 32 Allen S. Whiting, China Eyes Japan (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). 33 Jing Sun, Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012). 14 state actors in boosting socio-cultural interactions between the PRC and

Japan.34 This study will henceforth build on the above-mentioned works by providing additional insight into the ways and reasons in which China-Japan bilateral ties between 1945 and 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre.

Singapore, the Sook Ching Massacre, and Singapore-Japan Relations

Academics and popular writers have written several works on the history of the Sook Ching Massacre and that of the Japanese Occupation in Singapore.35

Though these books contain vivid details of the massacre and provide in-depth analysis of the multi-faceted history of the Syonan36 years, they hardly discuss how ordinary remember this dark period in their nation’s history. Furthermore, in contrast to the well-researched field on the

Nanjing Massacre, there is currently a dearth of historiographical studies on the Sook Ching Massacre. Notwithstanding their limitations, historical works on Sook Ching and the Japanese Occupation are still relevant to my research as they provide useful background information on the events.

Scholarship on Singapore’s war memories have emerged over the past fifteen years. These works include studies on official and popular memories which are pertinent to my research. On the one hand, most scholars stress the

34 Utpal Vyas, Soft Power in Japan-China Relations: State, Sub-state and Non-state Relations (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011). 35 For an introduction to the Sook Ching Massacre, see Ian Ward, The Killer They Called a God (Singapore: Media Masters, 1992), and Ralph Modder, The Singapore Chinese Massacre, 18 February to 4 March 1942 (Singapore: Horizon Books, 2004). For a well-researched work on life during the Japanese Occupation, see Paul H. Kratoska, The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History (London: C. Hurst, 1998). 36 During the Japanese Occupation, Singapore was renamed Syonan which means “Light of the South” in the Japanese language. 15 prominence of official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese

Occupation in Singapore. Kevin Blackburn and Karl Hack argue that the

People’s Action Party (PAP) government plays a leading role in the construction of state-sanctioned memories of the Syonan period and the

Japanese atrocities. They point out that the ruling party has cast the Civilian

War Memorial, which buries the remains of Sook Ching victims, as a national and multiracial, instead of a Chinese, war memorial. Its four pillars represent

Singapore’s four main ethnic groups who all underwent common suffering during the Japanese Occupation. Therefore, the memorial embodies

Singapore’s official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre as the PAP wants the atrocities to be remembered as a tragedy which affected all races in the country, not simply the Chinese alone. This means that Chinese Singaporeans’ popular memories of the massacre are subordinated to the state’s official memories.37 Diana Wong agrees with Blackburn and Hack. She adds that after neglecting war memories in the 1970s and 1980s, the PAP administration began spearheading the remembrance of the Sook Ching Massacre and the

Japanese Occupation from the 1990s to promote a sense of national identity among its citizenry.38 Similarly, Hamzah Muzaini contends that war commemoration in Singapore remains a state-driven initiative as ordinary

Singaporeans are interested neither in remembering the war nor visiting the

Civilian War Memorial. Thus, whereas Sook Ching is part of Singapore’s

37 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory. 38 Diana Wong, “Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore”, in Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), eds. Fujitani, T., Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001), pp. 218- 238. 16 official memories, it is not part of its popular memories.39 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif nonetheless rejects the assessment of the above scholars. He claims that memories of the Second World War are “missing” in Singapore because the

Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation do not feature prominently in both the city-state’s official memories and popular memories.40

On the other hand, works on popular war memories of the Sook Ching

Massacre and the Japanese Occupation are comparatively fewer than those on official memories. An important study on popular memories is that by P. Lim

Pui Huen who examines the memoirs and biographies of war survivors in

Singapore, including those of Sook Ching. She observes that the memories of wartime suffering, which is the common theme of these written accounts, remain deeply etched in the survivors’ minds decades after the war ended.41

The subject of Chinese suffering during the war is similarly reflected in Yeo

Song Nian’s and Ng Siew Ai’s research on local Chinese literature in the post- war period.42 Ernest Koh bridges the gap between Singapore’s official memories and popular memories of the war. He acknowledges that while the

PAP government plays a leading role in the construction of the republic’s official war memories, popular memories of the conflict continue to persist in

39 Hamzah Muzaini, “Producing/Consuming Memoryscapes: The Genesis/Politics of Second World War Commemoration in Singapore”, GeoJournal, 66, 3, Heritage, Politics and Identity in Southeast Asia (July 2006), pp. 211-222. 40 Asad-ul Iqbal Latif, “Singapore’s Missing War”, in Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia, ed. David Koh Wee Hock (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), pp. 92-103. 41 P. Lim Pui Huen, “Memories of War in Malaya”, in Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation, ed. Paul H. Kratoska (Singapore: Department of History, National University of Singapore, 1995), pp. 121-147. 42 Yeo Song Nian and Ng Siew Ai, “The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in Singapore- Malayan Chinese Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation (1945-49)”, in War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, eds. P. Lim Pui Huen and Diana Wong (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000), pp. 106-119. 17 the private and familial realms. Yet these popular memories are marginalised by the state due to their incompatibility with the homogeneous national war narrative.43 My research will extend the work done thus far in official memories and popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese

Occupation in Singapore. I shall explore the relationship between both types of memories in Singapore in order to comprehend how the state shapes

Chinese Singaporeans’ memories of the war.

Understanding Singapore’s bilateral ties with post-war Japan is necessary to appreciate its impact on the city-state’s war memories. Several major works in this field cover the various political, economic, and socio-cultural dimensions of Singapore-Japan relations. Junko Tomaru examines Malaya’s and

Singapore’s diplomatic and economic rapprochement with Japan before the republic’s independence in 1965. She stresses that in the late 1950s, Singapore leaders were more eager to seek closer ties with Japan, through economic investments and technological know-how, than to remember the Sook Ching

Massacre. In spite of Chinese Singaporeans’ demands for Japan to compensate the families of Sook Ching victims, the Labour Front government did not want the historical issue to jeopardise mutually beneficial rapprochement with

Japan. Therefore, the state prevented Chinese popular memories of the Sook

Ching Massacre from hindering its foreign relations with Japan.44 Shimizu

Hiroshi and Hirakawa Hitoshi further explain that the interlocking economic ties between Japan and pre-independent Singapore warrant memories of the

43 Ernest Koh, “De-historicising the Second World War: Diaspora, Nation, and the ”, in The Pacific War: Aftermaths, Remembrance and Culture, eds. Christina Twomey, and Ernest Koh (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015), pp. 11-31. 44 Junko Tomaru, The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945-1961: The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia (Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000). 18

Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation to be placed on the back- burner.45 Robin Ramcharan also discusses the warm relations that independent

Singapore has enjoyed with Japan. Many aspects of the PAP government’s policies, such as raising industrial productivity, were adapted from Japan as part of its “Learn from Japan” campaign in the 1980s to boost its economic growth.46 Sociologist Chua Beng Huat nevertheless disagrees with his claim.

Chua offers an alternative interpretation of Singapore-Japan relations by studying Japanese cultural influence in Singapore in the 1980s and 1990s which is roughly the same period as Ramcharan’s study. Chua asserts that despite the ubiquity of Japanese popular culture in Singapore, the assimilation of Japanese culture into Singapore culture remains limited.47 Thus, these multi-faceted works allow me to explore how and why Singapore’s ties with

Japan from 1945 to 2015 shape Chinese Singaporeans’ popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre.

Overview of Thesis Chapters

This thesis will be further divided into four chapters. Chapter Two will examine Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and the

Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore from 1945 to the early 1980s. Between the end of the war in 1945 and the outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982, China’s domestic politics and its foreign policy towards

Japan were important factors in the marginalisation of popular memories of

45 Shimizu Hiroshi, and Hirakawa Hitoshi, Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965 (London: Routledge, 1999). 46 Robin Ramcharan, Forging a Singaporean Statehood, 1965-1995: The Contribution of Japan (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002). 47 Chua Beng Huat, “‘Where got Japanese Influence in Singapore!’”, in Japan in Singapore: Cultural Occurrences and Cultural Flows, eds. Eyal Ben-Ari, and John Clammer (Surrey: Curzon, 2000), pp. 133-149. 19 the Nanjing Massacre. Specifically, the onset of the Cold War and the Chinese

Civil War, the CCP regime’s de-emphasis on Chinese victimhood under the

Japanese, and the PRC’s pursuit of rapprochement with Japan relegated popular memories of the massacre to the private sphere. However, from 1945 to the launch of the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980, Singapore’s domestic politics and its foreign policy towards Japan did not uniformly shape

Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. Notwithstanding the

PAP government’s demands for war reparations from Japan, Singapore sought

Japanese investments to build its economy. As a result, while popular memories of Sook Ching were visible, not all of them contained anti-Japanese sentiments. Chapter Three will analyse Chinese popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre in China between 1982 and 2015. The rise of Chinese nationalism to bolster the CCP’s political legitimacy, and China’s bilateral tensions with Japan over history issues has contributed to the growth of popular memories of the massacre alongside official memories. These popular memories homogeneously embody nationalistic anti-Japanese feelings and are synonymous with the state narrative. Chapter Four will explore Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore from 1980 to

2015. The PAP government does not allow popular memories of the massacre to jeopardise Singapore’s close ties with Japan as exemplified by its “Learn from Japan” campaign. Although popular memories of Sook Ching persist, they are diversified and may not necessarily contain anti-Japanese sentiments or reflect official memories. Chapter Five will conclude my research by reiterating my research aims and discussing the differences between Chinese

20 popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and those of the Sook

Ching Massacre in Singapore.

In summary, I shall attempt to answer the following four questions in this study. Firstly, to what extent do the people of Chinese descent in China and

Singapore remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively from 1945 to 2015? Secondly, what are the differences between

Chinese popular memories of the atrocities in both states, and why are they different? Thirdly, what is the nature of the relationship between Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre and the corresponding official memories in China and Singapore? Fourthly, how and why do China’s and

Singapore’s domestic politics and bilateral ties with Japan between 1945 and

2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre? I shall address these issues in detail in the subsequent chapters.

21

CHAPTER TWO

CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF THE NANJING MASSACRE IN

CHINA AND THE SOOK CHING MASSACRE IN SINGAPORE,

1945-EARLY 1980s

Even though the Chinese civilian populations in China and Singapore experienced similar traumas and suffering during the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively, they remembered the atrocities differently after the war ended in 1945. These differences in Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre persisted until the early 1980s, specifically 1982 in China and 1980 in Singapore. 1982 and 1980 were the respective watershed year in the history of China’s and Singapore’s post-war relations with Japan. The outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982 worsened China-Japan ties, while Singapore embarked on the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980 which ushered in an unprecedented period of close Singapore-Japan cooperation. This chapter will explore the extent to which Chinese civilians in China and Singapore remember the respective massacre, the differences in these memories, and the reasons for these differences. The ways in which China’s and Singapore’s domestic politics, as well as their foreign policies towards Japan shaped these popular memories shall also be analysed.

22

Popular Memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China, 1945-1982

War of Resistance and Nanjing Massacre, 1937-1945

The Second Sino-Japanese War, which is better known in China as the War of

Resistance Against Japan (KangRi Zhanzhen, thereafter, the War of

Resistance), had its roots in the creation of a modern imperial Japanese state in

1868. After overthrowing the feudal Tokugawa shogunate that year, Japan’s new Meiji leaders modelled the country after the Western colonial powers, and they successfully transformed it into a modern and powerful nation through economic, military, and other wide-ranging reforms. Japan displayed its new- found military prowess in the First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895) and easily defeated Qing China. As a result, it gained the Chinese territory of . In

1905, Japan became the first Asian country to defeat a Western power –

Russia, before colonising Korea five years later. Japan henceforth became the only non-Western imperial power in the world. The Japanese military subsequently increased its political influence at the expense of the civilian government, and waged wars in the name of the Emperor. Japan’s imperialist ambitions grew in the 1930s, as demonstrated by its annexation of China’s north-eastern region of Manchuria in 1931.1

Full-scale war broke out between Japan and China in August 1937 following military skirmishes at Marco Polo Bridge (Lugouqiao) in northern China a month earlier.2 The swept southwards to China’s two most important cities, namely the financial hub of Shanghai and the national capital of Nanjing. After Shanghai fell to enemy hands in November 1937, the

1 Peter Duus, Modern Japan, 2nd ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998), pp. 61-220. 2 Ibid., p. 222. 23 ruling Kuomintang (KMT, also known as the Guomindang or Nationalist

Party) decided to shift the capital city to Chongqing in western China. Before he left for Chongqing, KMT leader Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) instructed

General Tang Shengzhi to resolutely defend Nanjing. Yet the Chinese forces under Tang could not resist the Japanese onslaught, and the general himself fled the city on 12 December 1937. Facing no resistance, the Japanese soldiers marched into the fallen capital the next day. For the subsequent six weeks, they wantonly massacred and raped Chinese civilians who were living there.

These atrocities, together with looting and arson, became collectively known in China as the Nanjing Massacre.3 In the English-speaking world, it is also known as the “Rape of Nanking” which is a term popularised by Iris Chang’s bestseller.4

After the war, the Allied-run International Military Tribunal for the Far East

(IMTFE), commonly called the Tokyo Trial, tried and sentenced to death two

Japanese military leaders and one civilian politician for their involvement in the Nanjing Massacre. In liberated Nanjing, the triumphant KMT government arrived at the same verdict in 1947 for another three Japanese military leaders who were accused of the same crime. Though the IMTFE ruled that at least

200,000 died in the massacre, the CCP, which seized power in 1949, claimed that 300,000 had died instead. Since the 1980s, this figure has become the official total death toll in China for the Nanjing Massacre.5

3 Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao Bianweihui ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao, pp. 7-11. 4 Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York: Penguin Books, 1997). 5 Yuma Totani, The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008), pp. 119-141, 24

Forgetting the Nanjing Massacre, 1945-1982

The onset of the Chinese Civil War and the global Cold War soon after

Japan’s unconditional surrender in August 1945 contributed to memories of the Nanjing Massacre taking a back seat in the minds of China’s political leaders and masses. The victorious KMT regime chose not to bring up memories of the massacre as Chiang wanted to cultivate post-war Japan as an anti-communist Cold War ally.6 He thus announced a “magnanimous policy

(kuanda zhengce)” towards Japan to earn the goodwill of the Japanese people.

Based on the principle of “returning good for evil (yide baoyuan)”, he toned down China’s demands for Japanese war reparations.7 With Japan’s defeat, both the KMT and the CCP no longer had a common enemy. Instead, the outbreak of the Chinese Civil War resulted in them perceiving each other as its main adversary. For instance, the Communists repeatedly accused the

Nationalists of perpetuating war crimes, but they de-emphasised memories of

Japanese war crimes.8 During the Cold War, the CCP perceived the United

States, which was the KMT’s main foreign supporter, as China’s new imperialist foe.9 It also claimed that the KMT was an American puppet that exploited the Chinese people.10 Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre

Yang, “The Malleable and the Contested”, p. 53, and Sun Zhaiwei 孙宅巍, Chengqing Lishi – Nanjing Datusha Yanjiu yu Sikao 澄清历史 -- 南京大屠杀研究与思考 [Historical Clarifications: Research and Reflections on the Nanjing Massacre] (Nanjing: Fenghuang Chuban Chuanmei Jituan and Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 255-266. 6 “The Memoirs of Dr. V.K. Wellington Koo”, Wellington Koo Collection, Columbia University Rare Book and Manuscript Library, p. D-61, cited in Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking”, p. 65. 7 Yin Y., Chunichi Senso Baisho Mondai (The Problem of Sino-Japanese War Reparations) (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo, 1996), p. 324, cited in Rose, Sino-Japanese Relations, p. 44. 8 Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking”, p. 66. 9 Ibid., p. 62. 10 Xiaohong Xu, and Lyn Spillman, “Political Centres, Progressive Narratives and Cultural Trauma: Coming to Terms with the Nanjing Massacre in China, 1937-1979”, in Northeast 25 also did not surface in the form of first-hand accounts, such as autobiographies, memoirs, and oral history interviews, during this period of domestic turmoil and international uncertainty. Chinese civilians were more concerned with bread-and-butter issues than with remembering their wartime suffering.

Memories of the Nanjing Massacre remained buried when the CCP came to power and established the PRC in October 1949. Chairman Mao Zedong promoted a new historical narrative of Communist-led victory over both Japan and the KMT to buttress his party’s political legitimacy. He viewed the

Nanjing Massacre, which represented the “century of humiliation” and

Chinese wartime victimisation, as incompatible with the official victor narrative.11 Furthermore, as Nanjing was the KMT stronghold, the CCP played no role in defending it. This meant that the heroic narrative of Communist resistance against the Japanese invaders was inapplicable to Nanjing.12 Thus,

Mao’s government saw no reason to remember the Nanjing Massacre, leading it to ban the publication of a 1962 manuscript on the event by Nanjing

University researchers. The Nanjing city government kept the manuscript which was made available only to Japanese visitors interested in the city’s war history.13 Even Marxist intellectual Guo Moruo, who had been vigorously raising international awareness of the Nanjing Massacre during the War of

Asia’s Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory, eds. Mikyoung Kim, and Barry Schwartz (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), p. 112. 11 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 88. 12 Ian Buruma, “Keynote Speech” (Public Symposium: Competition and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Recognising Challenges, Seizing Opportunities, Department of Japanese Studies and Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 19 November 2014). 13 Mark Eykholt, “Aggression, Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre”, in The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, ed. Joshua A. Fogel (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), pp. 25-26. 26

Resistance, changed his stance after 1949.14 He now claimed that the massacre was merely one of the many atrocities that imperial Japan committed during the Second World War in Asia-Pacific.15 As a result, between 1945 and 1982, the Nanjing Massacre was largely not remembered by Chinese political leaders, scholars, and citizens as one of the most traumatic and brutal cases of

Japanese wartime aggression.16 It was therefore not surprising that the Nanjing

Massacre was hardly mentioned in the CCP’s mouthpiece, the Renmin Ribao

(People’s Daily).17

Nonetheless, it was not true that Maoist China completely marginalised all memories of the Nanjing Massacre before 1982. The CCP occasionally brought up the massacre to attack its Cold War rivals, namely the KMT and the United States. The Communists allowed former Nationalist generals, who were living in the PRC, to publish their memoirs in the 1960s. These writings mentioned the Nanjing Massacre, but they did not emphasise Chinese suffering. Instead, they highlighted the KMT’s failure to defend the city from the Japanese invaders.18 China’s state-controlled press further claimed that

American missionaries in Nanjing were also responsible for the massacre as

14 Xu, and Spillman, “Political Centres”, p. 118. 15 Guo Moruo 郭沫若, “Tuanjie Yixin, Baowei Heping 团结一心，保卫和平 [Unite as One Heart, Defend the Peace]”, Xinhua Yuebao 新华月报, October 1952, pp. 55-58. 16 Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking”, p. 69. 17 J.C. Alexander, and R. Gao, “Remembrance of Things Past: Cultural Trauma, the ‘Nanking Massacre’ and Chinese Identity”, in Tradition and Modernity: Comparative Perspectives, eds. Kang-i Sun Chang and Meng Hua (Beijing: Peking University Press, 2007), cited in Xu, and Spillman, “Political Centres”, p. 116. 18 Daqing Yang, “A Sino-Japanese Controversy: The Nanking Atrocity as History”, Sino- Japanese Studies, 3, 1 (November 1990), p. 16, cited in Eykholt, “Aggression, Victimization”, p. 26. 27 they were accomplices of the Japanese.19 Hence, the CCP regime manipulated memories of the Nanjing Massacre, not because it wanted to stress Chinese victimhood and suffering, but because it wanted to use these official memories to denounce Nationalist incompetence and American imperialism. In this way, memories of the massacre became a tool for the CCP to bolster its political legitimacy.

However, it should be noted that official memories of the Nanjing Massacre mentioned in the preceding paragraph were an exception rather than the rule in

China between 1945 and 1982. The Communist party-state generally opposed any public attempts to remember the atrocities. Yet, a few Chinese intellectuals tried to resist the official policy without avail. In September 1955, an academic from the predecessor of the present-day China University of

Political Science and Law, Xu Dunzhang, urged the Chinese masses to be wary of Japanese conservatives who whitewashed Japan’s war history and undermined Sino-Japanese friendship. More importantly, he called on the

Chinese people to remember the Nanjing Massacre and the Japanese invasion of their country.20 It was likely that the CCP did not accept Xu’s suggestions.

Similarly, the Chinese judge at the IMTFE, Mei Ru’ao, wrote an article which detailed Japanese atrocities in Nanjing and proposed greater historical research on the massacre.21 He was consequently denounced as a traitor during the

19 “Zhuiyi Rikou Nanjing Datusha 追忆日寇南京大屠杀 [Recollections of the Nanjing Massacre by Japanese Invaders]”, Xinhua Ribao 新华日报, 26 February 1951, reproduced in Xinhua Yuebao, March 1951, pp. 989-990. 20 Xu Dunzhang 徐敦璋, “Guanyu RiBen Qiaomin he RiBen Zhanfan Wenti 关于日本侨民和 日本战犯问题 [Regarding the Issues of Japanese Residents and Japanese War Criminals], Guangming Ribao 光明日报 (Guangming Daily), 03 September 1955, p. 4. 21 Mei Ru’ao 梅汝璈, “Guanyu Gu Shoufu, Songjing Shigen he Nanjing Datusha Shijian 关于 谷寿夫、松井石根和南京大屠杀事件 [On Tani Hisao, Matsui Iwane and the Nanjing 28

Cultural Revolution for undermining the amity and goodwill between the

Chinese and Japanese people.22 Therefore, Chinese memories of the Nanjing

Massacre were largely marginalised in the official realm by domestic and foreign considerations.

The PRC’s attempts to forge closer ties with Japan, in spite of the absence of formal diplomatic relations, from 1949 to 1972 contributed to the stifling of both official and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre. Plagued by regional Cold War tensions in the first two decades of its rule, the CCP government sought to counter American hostility. It did so by courting Japan as a political ally, and by portraying the United States as China’s and Japan’s common Cold War enemy.23 More importantly, the Communists blamed a

“small handful of Japanese militarists” for invading China in 1937, but portrayed the Japanese people as peace-loving masses who were innocent

Massacre Incident]”, in Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 22, eds. Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史资料研究委员会 ([Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, n.d.), pp. 16- 36, and Mei Ru’ao 梅汝璈, “Guanyu ‘Nanjing Datusha Shijian’ de Jidian Buzheng 关于《南 京大屠杀事件》的几点补正[Some Corrections regarding the article ‘Nanjing Massacre Incident’]”, in Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 34, eds. Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史 资料研究委员会 ([Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, [1962?]), pp. 265-267. 22 Mei Xiao’ao 梅小璈, “Nanjing Datusha ji Qita – Xianfu Mei Ru’ao de Yixie Kanfa 南京大 屠杀及其他 -- 先父梅汝璈的一些看法 [My Late Father Mei Ru’ao’s Views on the Nanjing Massacre and Others]”, in Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datushashi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji 侵华日军南京大屠杀史国际学术硏讨会论文集 [Collected Essays of the International Conference on the History of the Nanjing Massacre], ed. Chen Anji 陈安吉 (Hefei: Anhui Daxue Chubanshe, 1998), pp. 452-453. 23 Mao Zedong 毛泽东, “Mei Diguo Zhuyi shi ZhongRi Liangguo Renmin de Gongtong Diren 美帝国主义是中日两国的共同敌人 [American Imperialism is China’s and Japan’s Common Enemy] (21 June 1960)”, in Mao Zedong 毛泽东, Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan 毛泽东外 交文选 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs], eds. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu 中华人民共和国外交部 and Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室 (Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe and Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994), pp. 436-443. 29 victims of the militarists.24 Although Washington prevented Tokyo from normalising relations with Beijing, it did not object to them engaging in informal trade which grew gradually between 1949 and 1972.25 Both states also forged closer people-to-people interactions through the Japan-China

Friendship Association that was formed in Japan in 1950.26 Furthermore,

Japanese politico-economic and socio-cultural groups travelled regularly to

Beijing for private discussions with Chinese leaders. For example, from 1950 to 1975, Premier Zhou Enlai met 610 Japanese delegations for a total of 287 times.27 He even brushed off memories of the war and the Nanjing Massacre by telling visiting Japanese parliamentarians in 1954 that the conflict was “a thing of the past” and Sino-Japanese friendship was paramount in the post-war period.28 In addition, the CCP treated Japanese war criminals magnanimously.

Between June and July 1956, it released over a thousand of them without prosecuting them. The remaining forty-five were jailed, but they were repatriated to Japan eight years later.29 While in prison, these Japanese war criminals were well-treated, and they received political and moral “re-

24 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, p. 47. 25 See Soeya, Japan’s Economic Diplomacy. 26 Franziska Seraphim, War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945- 2005 (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006), pp. 108-134. 27 Wang Yongxiang, and Gao Qiaoqiang eds., Shu Onrai to Nihon: Kuno Kara Hisho he no Seishun (Zhou Enlai and Japan: A Youth from Despair to Soaring) (Tokyo: Hakuteisha, 2002), p. 382, and Qian Jiadong, and Wang Xiaoxian, “Zhou Enlai Zongli he ZhongRi Guanxi 周恩 来总理和中日关系 (Premier Zhou Enlai and Sino-Japanese Relations)”, Renwu Journal 人物, 3 (2008), both cited in Sun, Japan and China, p. 27. 28 Yamaguchi Kikuichiro, Hoshuto Kara Mita Shin Chugoku (The New China Seen from the Conservative Party) (Tokyo: Yomiuri Shimbunsha, 1955), p. 130, cited in Daqing Yang, “Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China”, in ed. Kazuhiko Togo, Japan and Reconciliation in Post-war Asia: The Murayama Statement and its Implications (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), p. 25. 29 Zhao Shemin 赵社民, and Meng Guoxiang 孟国祥, “Zhonggong Shenpan Riben Zhanfan Gongzuo Shuping 中共审判日本战犯工作述评 [An Account and Discussion of the Work of the Chinese Communist Party in Trying Japanese War Criminals]”, Nanjing Shehui Kexue 南 京社会科学 (Social Sciences in Nanjing), 8 (2009), pp. 99-100. 30 education” to ensure that they were remorseful for their wrongdoings.30 When these former war criminals returned to Japan, they became staunch advocates of Sino-Japanese friendship and reconciliation.31 The PRC’s leniency towards

Japanese war criminals clearly showed that its foreign policy towards Japan was largely driven by its pursuit of Sino-Japanese friendship and goodwill.32

Traumatic memories of Chinese suffering and victimhood during the Nanjing

Massacre had no place in China’s cordial interactions with Japan.

The marginalisation of official memories of the Nanjing Massacre during

Mao’s rule brought about a corresponding marginalisation of popular memories in China. When French intellectual Simone de Beauvoir visited

Nanjing in 1950, her Chinese hostess told her that she had learnt to forget the massacre, but her facial expression showed otherwise.33 It was clear that she, like most ordinary Chinese living in the 1950s and 1960s, still retained memories of the atrocities despite being compelled by the state to forget them.

From a sociological perspective, the hostess’ involuntary form of forgetting is known as “repressive erasure”. Paul Connerton argues that this phenomenon is common among authoritarian and revolutionary governments which seek to eradicate memories of past events associated with previous regimes.34 Given that the CCP government considered its revolutionary triumph in 1949 as the birth of a new historical era, it had a valid reason to stifle popular memories of

30 Arai Toshio, “Kyojutsusho wa Koshite Kakareta (Testimonies Were Written as Such)”, Sekai 648 (May 1998), pp. 74, and 76-77, cited in Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking”, pp. 67-68, and Zhao, and Meng, “Zhonggong Shenpan”, pp. 100-101. 31 Zhao, and Meng, “Zhonggong Shenpan”, p. 101, and Yoshida, Making of the “Rape of Nanking”, p. 68. 32 Xu and Spillman, “Political Centres”, p. 115. 33 Simone de Beauvoir, The Long March, trans. Austryn Wainhouse (Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958), p. 438. 34 Paul Connerton, “Seven Types of Forgetting”, Memory Studies, 1, 1 (January 2008), pp. 60- 61. 31 a massacre that happened in the pre-revolutionary era and in the former regime’s capital. Therefore, first-hand accounts of the Nanjing Massacre by

Chinese civilians were publicly marginalised in Maoist China, but most of these memories persisted quietly in the minds of private Chinese citizens, such as de Beauvoir’s hostess.35

The Communist party-state’s attitudes towards memories of the Nanjing

Massacre remained unchanged during the “honeymoon” period from 1972 to

1982 when China and Japan enjoyed warm relations.36 When Japanese Prime

Minister Tanaka Kakuei visited Beijing in September 1972 to normalise relations, Mao unexpectedly thanked him because Japan’s wartime aggression allowed the CCP to build up its strength and eventually defeat the inept

KMT.37 Despite their unhappiness when Tanaka alluded to Japan’s past invasion as “causing great inconvenience (tianle henda mafan)” to China,

Chinese leaders placed priority on improving bilateral ties.38 The PRC also

35 These marginalised popular memories were also revealed in left-wing Japanese journalist Honda Katsuichi’s oral history interviews with Nanjing Massacre survivors in China in the 1970s and 1980s. These interviews were translated into English and published in 1999. See Honda Katsuichi, The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame, ed. Frank Gibney and trans. Karen Sandness (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999). 36 Sun, Japan and China, p. 24. 37 Dangdai Zhongguo waijiao ziliaozu 当代中国外交资料组 ed., Xin Zhongguo Waijiao yu Lingshi Gongzuo 新中国外交与历史工作 [Foreign Affairs and Historical Work of New China], Vol. 3 (Beijing: Dangdai Zhongguo Chubanshe, 1987), pp.127-128, and Mao Zedong de Guoji Jiaowang 毛泽东的国际交往 [Mao Zedong’s International Interactions] (Beijing: Zhonggong Dangshi Chubanshe, 1995), p.41, both cited in Geremie R. Barme, “Mirrors of History: On a Sino-Japanese Moment and Some Antecedents”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (16 May 2005), http://japanfocus.org/-Geremie-Barme/1713/article.html (accessed on 07 July 2015). 38 Liu Jianping, Zhanhou ZhongRi Guanxi: “Buzhengchang” Lishi de Guocheng he Jiegou 战 后中日关系：“不正常”历史的过程和结构 (Postwar Sino-Japanese Relations: The Process and Structure of “Abnormal” History) (Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe, 2010), and Hattori Ryuji, Nitchu Kokko Seijoka: Tanaka Kakue, Ohira Mayayoshi, Kanro Tachi no Chosen (Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Normalization: Challenges of Tanaka Kakue, Ohira Mayayoshi, and Bureaucrats) (Tokyo: Choko Shinso, 2011), both cited in Yang, “Political Apology”, p. 26. 32 decided not to seek war reparations from Japan,39 and both states officially restored ties in August 1978 with the signing of the Sino-Japanese Peace and

Friendship Treaty.40 Yinan He stressed that “[h]istory was simply swept under the carpet” as growing economic and political ties with Tokyo were of paramount importance to Beijing.41 For example, Sino-Japanese bilateral trade rose more than nine times in absolute terms between 1972 and 1981.42

Meanwhile, the CCP government continued to forbid school textbooks and the state-run media to mention the Nanjing Massacre.43 Moreover, China did not protest when Class “A” war criminals, including those responsible for the

Nanjing Massacre, were enshrined at the Yasukuni Shrine in 1978, and when five Japanese prime ministers visited it between 1972 and 1981.44 Improving relations with Japan dictated that popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre remain marginalised in China, but they would soon resurface in 1982 when bilateral ties became less rosy.

Popular Memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, 1945-1980

Japanese Occupation and Sook Ching Massacre, 1942-1945

Japan’s invasion of Southeast Asia in 1941, and its subsequent occupation of

Singapore, was a continuation of the Second Sino-Japanese War. By 1941, the

United States and other Western colonial powers had imposed an economic

39 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia- paci/china/joint72.html (accessed on 07 July 2015). 40 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html (accessed on 07 July 2015). 41 Yinan He, “Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation in Sino-Japanese Relations”, China Perspectives, 4 (December 2013), p. 10. 42 Yinan He, “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict”, Journal of Contemporary China, 16, 50 (February 2007), p. 4. 43 Ibid., p. 6. 44 He, “Forty Years”, p. 10. 33 embargo on Japan in a bid to halt its aggression of China. Japan therefore needed raw materials, such as oil, tin, and rubber, from resource-rich

Southeast Asia to support its war effort in China. After diplomatic negotiations with the United States failed, the Japanese military leadership decided to attack the American naval base at Pearl Harbor, which would paralyse the country’s ability to prevent the Japanese military advance into Southeast Asia.

The Pacific War broke out on the night of 7-8 December 1941 when the

Japanese military simultaneously bombed Pearl Harbor and landed its first troops on the north-eastern coast of . Singapore also came under Japanese aerial bombing for the first time. The well-trained and disciplined Japanese soldiers of the Twenty-fifth Army easily outmanoeuvred the complacent and incompetent British troops who were forced into constant retreat. Lieutenant General Yamashita Tomoyuki’s seventy-day Malayan

Campaign successfully cumulated in the capitulation of the British island- fortress of Singapore on 15 February 1942. The Fall of Singapore, which wartime Prime Minister Winston Churchill bemoaned as “the worst disaster” for the British Empire,45 ushered in three-and-a-half years of the Japanese

Occupation.46

The Sook Ching Massacre began in Singapore soon after the British surrendered. The Imperial Japanese Army renamed the island “Syonan” which became part of Japan’s wartime empire – the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity

Sphere. Nevertheless, Japanese rule brought fear, not prosperity, to the local

Chinese population. Yamashita and his Chief of Planning and Operations,

45 C.M. Turnbull, A , 1819-1975 (: Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 187. 46 Ibid., pp. 162-189. 34

Lieutenant Colonel Tsuji Masanobu, were determined to suppress potential anti-Japanese resistance among the Chinese before the Twenty-fifth Army left

Singapore to invade Dutch-controlled Sumatra. Hence, on 18 February 1942,

Yamashita launched the Sook Ching campaign which Tsuji planned and carried out. The operation primarily aimed to eliminate anti-Japanese Chinese individuals, like armed members of the pro-British Straits Settlements

Volunteer Force (SSVF) and the Chinese-dominated Dalforce, as well as those who belonged to the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) and the China Relief

Fund which financed China’s war effort. Looters, armed civilians, and anyone who was regarded as a threat to Japanese rule were targeted too.47

Sook Ching started when the Japanese military ordered all Chinese males between eighteen and fifty years old to report to twenty-eight screening centres island-wide. These centres included Chinatown, , and

Telok Kurau.48 At these centres, the Kempeitai (Japanese military police) identified and sieved out anti-Japanese individuals. Such mass screening became infamously known to the local Chinese as “jianzheng (identification parade)”.49 The Kempeitai lacked a uniform procedure of organising and interrogating the detainees who were kept at the screening centres without food and water between a day and a week. With the assistance of local

47 Ward, The Killer They Called a God, pp. 47-49, Modder, Singapore Chinese Massacre, pp. 3-5, WO 325/1004: “War Crimes Trial held in Singapore (1947 Mar. 10-1952 May 8), Chinese Massacre Case”, War Office: General Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, (South East Asia) War Crimes Group: Investigation Files, in The National Archives, London, United Kingdom, Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 136-137, and Mamoru Shinozaki, Syonan – My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore (Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975), pp. 20-21. 48 Shinozaki, Syonan, p. 20, and Tan Beng-luan, and Irene Quah, The Japanese Occupation 1942-1945: A Pictorial Record of Singapore during the War (Singapore: Times Editions, 1996), p. 68. 49 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 138. 35 collaborators, the military police randomly selected their victims who might not necessarily be anti-Japanese. For instance, Chinese men who wore glasses, were from Hainan, or were English-educated were singled out as the Japanese perceived them to be patriotic Chinese intellectuals, MCP sympathisers, or

British loyalists respectively.50

Different fates awaited those who “passed” the screening and those who

“failed” it. On the one hand, those who “passed” were deemed to be compliant subjects of the Japanese Empire. They were henceforth released with the

Chinese character “jian (examined)” stamped on a piece of paper and given to them, or on their bodies and clothes. On the other hand, those who “failed” the screening were considered to be subversive anti-Japanese elements. Military trucks drove them to their execution sites where Japanese soldiers killed and buried them on the spot.51 Their remains were only discovered in 1962, and were excavated from thirty-five sites in Singapore, such as in the east and Jurong in the west, between 1963 and 1966.52 The Sook Ching Massacre lasted till 04 March 1942, but the Kempeitai persisted in hunting down alleged anti-Japanese individuals.53 Although Japan claimed after the war that a maximum of only 5,000 Chinese were killed in the massacre,54 the Chinese

50 Turnbull, History of Singapore, p. 193, Ward, The Killer They Called a God, p. 62, and Shinozaki, Syonan, p. 21. 51 Turnbull, History of Singapore, pp. 193-194. 52 Chew Teng How, “Rest in Peace, Our Martyrs: The Entire Process of Evacuating the Remains of Our Martyrs by the Remains Disposal Committee”, in Eternal Vigilance: The Price of Freedom, eds. Foong Choon Hon, Jane Thum Soon Kun, and Duncan Watt, trans. Yuen Chen Ching (Singapore: Asiapac Books, 2006), pp. 268, and 270-271. 53 Modder, Singapore Chinese Massacre, p. vii. 54 Turnbull, History of Singapore, p. 194. 36 community in Singapore estimated the total death toll to be between 20,000 and 50,000 based on the remains found.55

When the Pacific War ended in August 1945, the families of Sook Ching victims were determined to seek justice and compensation from Japan. The victorious British colonial authorities set up many military tribunals to try

Japanese war criminals in Singapore and Malaya. Among them was the

Chinese Massacre Trial which tried Japanese war criminals who were accused of perpetrating the Sook Ching Massacre. It commenced in March 1947 at the

Victoria Memorial Hall with much public attention and media publicity, especially from the local Chinese community. The seven defendants were all military officers.56 However, the masterminds of the massacre were not among those standing trial. Yamashita was executed by the in December

1945 after being found guilty of committing war crimes in the Philippines.57 In contrast, the United States shielded Tsuji from war crimes prosecution as his anti-communist credentials suited its Cold War aim of transforming Japan into an anti-Red bulwark in Asia.58 When the trial ended in April 1947, the British military court found all seven men guilty, but only two were sentenced to death. The remaining five defendants were handed life sentences.59 The

Chinese in Singapore, who had wanted the death penalty to be imposed on all

55 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 40, and 139. 56 Simon C. Smith, “Crimes and Punishment: Local Responses to the Trial of Japanese War Criminals in Malaya and Singapore, 1946-48”, South East Asia Research, 5, 1 (March 1997), pp. 43-44, and 48, and WO 325/1004. 57 Pitt Kuah Wah, and Leong Weng Kee eds., The Liberation: Resisting the Rising Sun and a New Beginning (Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 2012), p. 174. 58 Ward, The Killer They Called a God, pp. 291-304. 59 WO 325/1004. 37 seven defendants, denounced the sentences as too lenient. Their resentment increased when the British authorities insisted on upholding the verdicts.60

Rapprochement with Japan, 1945-1980

Singapore’s post-war rapprochement with Japan began when the American

Occupation authorities allowed Japan to partially recommence private trade with foreign territories in 1947. Such trade became full-fledged by January

1950.61 Singapore-Japan bilateral trade grew between 1949 and 1955 when

Japan exported a range of primary products, such as cotton, vegetables, and cement, to the British colony.62 To counter the spread of communism among the poor and unemployed in Singapore, British colonial officials and the local

Labour Front government sought Japan’s economic and technical assistance to develop Singapore’s industries and thereby create jobs for the people.63

Contrary to the mass anti-Japanese demonstrations which Japanese Prime

Minister Kishi Nobusuke faced in in November 1957, he did not encounter similar protests when he visited Singapore earlier that month. In spite of latent anti-Japanese feelings arising from popular memories of the

Sook Ching Massacre, local Chinese businesses and newspapers, as well as the

Labour Front administration, warmly welcomed Kishi’s visit which aimed to

60 Smith, “Crimes and Punishment”, pp. 48-50. 61 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 154. 62 Commerce and Industry Department, , Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry (Singapore, 1954), and Commerce and Industry Department, Colony of Singapore, Report of the Department of Commerce and Industry (Singapore, 1955), both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, pp. 157-158, Tables 6.1 and 6.2. 63 Diplomatic Record Office (DRO), Tokyo, A’ 1.5.1.5: “Kishi Sori Tonan Ajia Shokoku, Osutoraria, Nyujirando Homon Kankei Ikken (Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to Southeast Asian Countries, Australia, and New Zealand)”, 5 vols., 27 November 1957 and 5 December 1957, and DRO, Tokyo, A’ 1.5.1.5-2: “Kishi Sori Tonan Ajia Shokoku, Osutoraria, Nyujirando Homon Kankei Ikken: Homon Ni Kansuru Hokoku (Prime Minister Kishi’s visit to Southeast Asian Countries, Australia, and New Zealand: Report on his Visit)”, undated November 1957, both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 161. 38 boost Japanese trade and investments in Singapore.64 Chief Minister Lim Yew

Hock (Lin Youfu) even told the prime minister that Japanese companies were welcome to open factories in Singapore “with 100 per cent Japanese capital, and profits can [sic] be remitted to Japan freely”.65 Kishi’s visit was a success as eighteen Japanese firms subsequently set up businesses in Singapore between 1955 and 1959.66

When the PAP government was elected in June 1959, it continued to pursue rapprochement with Japan through economic cooperation. Bilateral ties were enhanced with the signing of the Singapore-Japan Tax Convention in April

1961 to end double taxation and encourage Japanese investments in the city- state.67 Between December 1960 and January 1961, Singapore also sought

Japanese expertise and investments to develop its nascent industries in

Jurong.68 For instance, the Jurong Shipyard was formed in April 1963 through a joint venture between Singapore’s Economic Development Board and

Japan’s Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Limited.69 By 1967, Japan had become the largest foreign investor in Jurong, with a paid-up capital of approximately S$26.5 million.70 It was also the biggest investor in the metal,

64 Tomaru, Postwar Rapprochement, pp. 181, and 188-194. 65 DRO, Tokyo, A’ 1.5.1.5, 27 November 1957, and A’ 1.5.1.5-2, undated November 1957, both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 163. 66 Various company history books, cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 167, Table 6.3. 67 Tomaru, Postwar Rapprochement, p. 211. 68 Tonan Ajia Chosakai, Tonan Ajia Yoran (A Survey of Southeast Asia) (Tokyo: Tonan Ajia Chosakai, 1961), p. 178, and Matsuo Hiroshi, “Keizai Kaihatsu no Tokucho (Main Features of Economic Development)”, in Maraya Shingaporu no Keizai Kaihatsu (The Economic Development of Malaya and Singapore), ed. Matsuo Hiroshi (Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies, 1962), pp. 151-152, both cited in Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, pp. 183-184. 69 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, pp. 197-198. 70 Tao-chang Chiang, The Jurong Industrial Estate: Present Pattern and Future Prospects (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University, 1969), p. 55, Table 17. 39 engineering, wood, paper, and chemical industries there.71 Japanese investments in Singapore were mutually beneficial. Singapore’s economy grew, while Japanese firms were able to find overseas markets for Japanese products.72

However, an obstacle to Singapore-Japan post-war rapprochement was the

“blood debt (xuezhai)” issue. It referred to the moral and financial obligation that the Chinese in Singapore felt Japan “owed” them for killing innocent civilians during the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation. They were determined to seek compensation from Japan for the lives lost.73 Anti-

Japanese sentiments among the local Chinese rose and their war memories were revived when the mass graves of Sook Ching victims were found and unearthed between 1962 and 1966.74 Prime Minister (Li

Guangyao) insisted that the British colonial government, which had signed the

Treaty of San Francisco in September 1951 to resolve the issue of Japanese war reparations, did not represent the people of Singapore.75 Therefore, he expected “a suitable gesture of genuine regret” from Japan for its wartime atrocities in the island.76 The “blood debt” issue was finally resolved after

Singapore gained independence in August 1965. Following the establishment of formal diplomatic relations between both states in April 1966, the republic

71 Ibid., p. 20, Table 8; p. 22, Table 9; and p. 29, Table 14. 72 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 205. 73 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 148. 74 Chew, “Rest in Peace”, p. 268, and 270-271. 75 Lee Kuan Yew, “Remembering the Victims of the Japanese Occupation: Speech at a Meeting of the Memorial Fund Committee at the Victoria Theatre (21 April 1963)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 2: 1963-1965, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 8-9. 76 Ibid., p. 9. 40 accepted S$50 million from Japan as “quasi-reparations”77, consisting of S$25 million in grant and another S$25 million in loan, in October that year.78 The

PAP government used both the grant and the loan to support mainly Jurong’s industrialisation programme.79 Lee accepted the sum as the final settlement for the “blood debt” issue because building cordial ties with Japan and attracting

Japanese investments were his administration’s priorities.80 Besides urging the local Chinese community to accept the closure of the “blood debt” issue, he did not demand an official apology from Japan for its atrocities committed in

Singapore during the war.81 The obstacle to the post-war reconciliation between Singapore and Japan was finally removed.

Singapore forged closer economic ties with Japan after the resolution of the

“blood debt” issue. Notwithstanding the latent Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, economic cooperation took precedence in the city-state’s relations with Japan. When Lee visited Tokyo in 1967,82 he told Prime Minister Sato Eisaku that Singapore welcomed Japanese capital, investments, and technological expertise as it had “no inhibitions as a result of our [sic] experiences in the Second World War. The chapter is [sic] closed,

77 Shimizu, and Hirakawa, Japan and Singapore, p. 214. 78 Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, Tokyo, “The Embassy”, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/tokyo/about_the_embassy/the_embassy. html (accessed on 25 June 2015), and “$25m Grant, $25m Loans Settle Singapore’s Blood Debt”, The Straits Times (thereafter, ST), 26 October 1966, p. 20. 79 Pitt, and Leong eds., The Liberation, p. 246. 80 Lee Kuan Yew, From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 2000), p. 559. 81 “Blood-debt Letter from Lee”, ST, 1 November 1966, p. 20, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 164. 82 Lee Kuan Yew, “Welcoming the Japanese to Singapore: As Investors and Industrialists: Speech at the State Banquet for the Japanese Prime Minister Eisaku Sato (25 September 1967)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 4: 1967- 1968, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 186-189. 41 although not forgotten”. 83 Between 1966 and 1976, thirty-six Japanese economic experts visited Singapore to train and advise its officials, while 116

Singapore bureaucrats underwent further training in Japan.84 Furthermore,

Singapore’s imports of Japanese goods rose six times between 1965 and

1972.85 Japanese investments in the republic meanwhile rose sixteen times between 1967 and 1977. By 1977, fifteen percent of total foreign investments in Singapore belonged to the Japanese.86 In the same year, a major Japanese firm, Sumitomo Chemical Corporation, invested more than US$1 billion in the city-state for a joint petrochemical venture with the Singapore government.87

Remembering the Sook Ching Massacre, 1945-1980

Official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were almost non-existent in

Singapore from 1945 to 1980. Before independence, both the Labour Front and the PAP governments were more concerned with the MCP threat and socio-economic issues as they fought for self-rule from Britain. They also did not want memories of Sook Ching to jeopardise Singapore’s economic rapprochement with Japan. Thus, local politicians neither commemorated the massacre nor promoted an official narrative of the event. When Singapore unexpectedly separated from Malaysia in August 1965, the ruling PAP had to prove to Singaporeans that the city-state could survive and prosper as an independent entity against the odds. The nation’s future, not its past, was the government’s primary concern. It hence suppressed memories of Singapore’s

83 Ibid., p. 187. 84 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 189. 85 Kunio Yoshihara, “Japan’s Economic Relations with Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asian Affairs (1974), p. 59. 86 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 169. 87 Lee, From Third World to First, pp. 565-566. 42 pre-1965 past and abolished history as a primary school subject in 1972.

Singapore’s national identity became firmly rooted in the present. The de- emphasis of history suited the state’s overarching goal of building a robust and sustainable economy through industrialisation and the teaching of mathematics, science, and technical subjects in schools.88 More importantly, the PAP was reluctant to revive memories of the Sook Ching Massacre as Singapore needed

Japanese investments and expertise to help develop its industrial economy.

Although official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were absent, Chinese popular memories of the atrocities persisted in Singapore. Table 1 below shows that a handful of first-hand accounts, such as autobiographies and memoirs, of Sook Ching victims were published in the immediate post-war period, from 1945 to 1960. All of them contained vivid descriptions of

Japanese brutality, with strong anti-Japanese feelings. They showed that popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre were still raw among the island’s Chinese populace. The desire to seek compensation and justice for the victims, and the need to educate future generations on the horrors of the

Japanese Occupation were among the rationale for the writing and publication of these works. Several more works were written and published between 1961 and 1980, as seen in Table 1. However, unlike those published before 1961, these autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews did not homogeneously contain anti-Japanese emotions as the authors remembered Sook Ching differently.

88 Wong, “Memory Suppression”, p. 230, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 294. 43

Table 1: Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews on the Sook Ching Massacre (1945-1980)89

Language of Publication 1945-1960 1961-1980 English Language 2 6 Chinese Language 6 3 Total 8 9

An example of a work that was published between 1945 and 1960 was a

Chinese language commemorative journal which contained first-hand accounts of the Sook Ching Massacre and reflected anti-Japanese sentiments.90

Published in 1947, this journal consisted of numerous articles by massacre survivors and their families who recounted their harrowing war experiences.

Among them was Zheng Guangyu. After he “failed” the screening at a centre near New World Amusement Park in Jalan Besar, the Japanese military brought him and other victims to Changi beach to be machine-gunned. A bullet hit his nose, but he survived. After the shooting, the Japanese soldiers stabbed those who were still alive. Fortunately, they did not stab Zheng because they thought he was already dead. He surreptitiously left the beach after the Japanese departed, and he managed to return home safely the next day.91 In another memoir, a Mr. Chen narrated a similar experience that he underwent. He was supposed to be executed at Katong beach, but he fell into the sea with other victims before he was shot. He managed to untangle himself

89 Refer to the Appendix 2 for the authors, titles, and publication details of these works. 90 Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui 星洲被检者家属妇女互助会 (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families) ed., Xingzhou Beijian Xishengzhe Wuzhounian Jinian Tekan 星洲被检牺牲者五周年纪念特刊 [Special Commemorative Issue for the Fifth Anniversary of the Victims of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore] (Singapore: Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families), 1947). 91 Zheng Guangyu 郑光宇, “Hukou Yusheng Tan 虎口余生谈 [Escaping from the Tiger’s Mouth]”, in ibid., pp. 15-19. 44 and swarm out to the sea before a fisherman rescued him.92 Other Chinese language memoirs likewise contained detailed accounts of Japanese atrocities committed during Sook Ching.93

Furthermore, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre from 1945 to

1960 included the experiences of war survivors who “passed” the screening.

N.I. Low and H.M. Cheng wrote and published one of Singapore’s earliest

English language books on the Japanese Occupation – This Singapore: Our

City of Dreadful Night.94 As its title suggested, the memoir described the hardships faced by civilians throughout the Syonan years. It had a chapter which recounted Low’s and Cheng’s ordeal at the screening centre, and their compatriots’ unlucky fates when they “failed” the screening.95 Similarly, another war survivor, Si Yan was unwell before Sook Ching began, yet he had to report to the screening centre at Chinatown. After being detained there for four days under harsh conditions, his illness worsened. When it was his turn to undergo the screening, the Kempeitai could not tolerate him being sick, and fortunately, released him.96

92 Hong Jintang 洪锦棠, Jiehou Huiyi Lu 劫后回忆录 [Post-war Memoirs] (Singapore: Liulian Chubanshe, 1946), p. 15. 93 For example, see Dazhan yu Nanqiao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 大战与南桥编纂委员会 ed., Dazhan yu Nanqiao: Malaiya Zhibu 大战与南侨：马来亚之部 [The Second World War and the Nanyang Chinese: Malayan Section] (Singapore: Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo Nanmin Zonghui and Xin Nanyang Chubanshe, 1947). 94 N.I. Low, and H.M. Cheng, This Singapore: Our City of Dreadful Night (Singapore: City Book Store, [1947?]). 95 Ibid., pp. 15-22. 96 Si Yan 思严, “Jianzheng Datusha Lijie Ji 检证大屠杀历劫记 [A Record of Turbulent Experiences during the Sook Ching Massacre]”, in Zhaonan Lijie Ji: Cantong de Zhanzheng 昭南历劫记：惨痛的战争 [A Record of Turbulent Experiences in Syonan: A Traumatic War], ed. Luo Hansong 罗汉松 (Singapore: Xin Wenhua Jigou, [1950?]), pp. 16-22. 45

In contrast to the homogeneously anti-Japanese sentiments found in Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre between 1945 and 1960, first- hand accounts of the massacre that were published from 1961 to 1980 contained diverse popular memories which did not necessarily reflect such emotions. On the one hand, war survivors who still stressed Japanese brutality might have been influenced by the “blood debt” issue which gained traction among the local Chinese community after the remains of Sook Ching victims were found in 1962. 97 On the other hand, war survivors who did not emphasise Japanese atrocities highlighted other aspects of the Sook Ching

Massacre which reflected fewer anti-Japanese emotions. For instance, they recalled how they “passed” the screening or avoided the screening centres altogether. Their willingness to remember these less brutal features of Sook

Ching could have been a result of them being influenced by Singapore’s post- war diplomatic and economic reconciliation with Japan.

Among the war survivors who did not have vivid memories of the Sook Ching bloodbath were those who “passed” the screening. However, they clearly remembered their nerve-wrecking experiences at the various screening centres island-wide. For example, in an oral history interview in 1970, a merchant who lived in a rural village during the Japanese Occupation recounted how the

Kempeitai interrogated him at a screening centre there. He said that whether one “passed” or “failed” the screening was dependent on how he answered their questions. When a Japanese officer asked him whether Chiang Kai-shek,

97 See, for example, Chen Su Lan, Remember Pompong and Oxley Rise (Singapore: Chen Su Lan Trust, 1969). 46

Tan Kah Kee (Chen Jiageng),98 and Wang Jingwei99 were “good” or “bad”, the merchant avoided answering the politically sensitive question directly.

Fearing for his life, he wittily replied, “I am a businessman, am only concerned with doing business, [and] do not care who is good or bad!” Hence, he “passed” the screening and saved his own life.100

Moreover, a handful of Chinese civilians in Singapore made the bold decision not to report to the Sook Ching screening centres and safely hid elsewhere.

Teenager Ruth Ho and her kin left their Bukit Timah residence and headed to

Arab Street for the screening. However, due to the large numbers of people walking to the centre, they were unable to reach their destination on that day.

Thus, they decided not to report there and sought refuge at a family friend’s house instead. Ruth’s family was lucky that her fears of being discovered by the Japanese for not reporting to the screening centre did not materialise.101

Conclusion

I have shown in this chapter that Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing

Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore underwent different trajectories from 1945 to the early 1980s. On the other hand, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre were marginalised by the state after the

98 Tan was the leader of the China Relief Fund, who fled to Java days before the Fall of Singapore. 99 Wang was a KMT leader who defected to Japan and established a collaborationist government in Nanjing in 1940. 100 Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun Diaocha Xiaozu 三年零 八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村调查小组 ed., Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun (Chugao) 三年零八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村（初稿） [Three Years and Eight Months: Chinese Villages under Japanese Occupation (Draft Manuscript)] (Singapore: Nanyang Daxue Lishixi, 1970), p. 24. 101 Ruth Ho, Rainbow round my Shoulder (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1975), pp. 155-156. 47 war due to domestic and foreign factors, such as the Chinese Civil War, Mao’s victor narrative, the international Cold War, and the CCP regime’s priority in cultivating China’s friendship with Japan. “Repressive erasure” resulted in popular memories of the massacre becoming largely publicly invisible among the Chinese populace. Civilian survivors of the Nanjing Massacre neither wrote nor published any first-hand accounts of the event between 1945 and

1982. Their memories were hence strictly confined to the private realm. On the other hand, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre persisted and were visible in Singapore from 1945 to 1980, despite Singapore’s courting of

Japanese investments which were urgently needed to boost the city-state’s fledging economy. The “blood debt” issue and the PAP government’s demands for war reparations from Japan encouraged the development of these popular memories. Between 1945 and 1960, massacre survivors clearly expressed their traumatic feelings of having witnessed or survived the

Japanese atrocities in their writings. These first-hand accounts uniformly contained anti-Japanese emotions, and reflected their authors’ common wishes to publicise the atrocities so as to seek justice and compensation for themselves, other Sook Ching victims and their families, as well as to educate the younger generations of Singapore’s traumatic wartime history. However, from 1961 to 1980, Chinese popular memories of Sook Ching became more varied, most likely as a result of Singapore’s economic rapprochement with

Japan. Not all of these memories contained anti-Japanese sentiments as some of them emphasised the less brutal aspects of Sook Ching. Thus, diverse

Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore co- existed with the state’s warming ties with Japan between 1945 and 1980.

48

CHAPTER THREE

CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF

THE NANJING MASSACRE IN CHINA, 1982-2015

The year 1982 was a turning point in China’s relations with Japan. The outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy that year revived

Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre, ended the “honeymoon” period in bilateral ties, and led to subsequent fluctuations in Sino-Japanese relations that persist even today (2015). This surge in Chinese popular memories, as exemplified by the numerous published first-hand accounts of the Nanjing Massacre in the commercial market, has occurred simultaneously with the rise in official memories of the atrocities. In this chapter, I shall examine why and how the ruling CCP has used both official memories and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre to promote Chinese nationalism, inculcate anti-Japanese sentiments among the masses, and serve its domestic political agenda. I will also explain how the PRC’s foreign policy towards

Japan has shaped both types of memories. I shall further explore the mutual relationship between popular memories and official memories of the Nanjing

Massacre in China, and the nature of these popular memories.

Sino-Japanese Tensions and Chinese Nationalism

Notwithstanding their improved relations after diplomatic normalisation in

1972, it was a “thin” reconciliation for China and Japan as history issues soon

49 resurfaced to undermine their bilateral ties.1 Indeed, the “honeymoon” period over the past decade came to an end with the outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982. In June that year, the Japanese press reported that the Ministry of Education had revised high school history textbooks to downplay Japan’s invasion of China. For instance, the phase “shinryaku

(invade and plunder)” was replaced by “shinshutsu (advance)”. The 300,000 death toll of the Nanjing Massacre was also apparently deleted. Though the reports were later proven to be false, China condemned Japan for attempting to resurrect wartime militarism.2 It was the first time since the war ended in

1945 that Beijing had protested to Tokyo over history issues.3 Chinese anger over Japanese attempts to whitewash its war history cumulated in the second half of 1985 when Chinese students protested against Japanese Prime Minister

Nakasone Yasuhiro’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine.4 A young Chinese intellectual angrily claimed that Japan’s war crimes would “be remembered forever” (original emphasis) by his compatriots.5 Another Chinese youth described Japanese atrocities in Nanjing as “bestial”.6 Popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre, which had long been marginalised, were gradually revived as Sino-Japanese relations worsened.

China’s animosity towards Japan continued to increase throughout the 1980s over history issues. Japanese Education Minister Fujio Masayuki earned

1 David A. Crocker, “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework”, Ethics and International Affairs, 13, 1 (March 1999), p. 60. 2 Chalmers Johnson, “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952-1982”, Pacific Affairs, 59, 3 (Autumn 1986), pp. 420-424. 3 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, p. 6. 4 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 53-54, and 66-79. 5 Ibid., p. 78. 6 Ibid., p. 77. 50

Beijing’s wrath in September 1986 when he urged Japanese cabinet ministers to visit the Yasukuni Shrine. He also defended the Imperial Japanese Army’s wartime actions in Nanjing and its invasion of China.7 In the following year,

Chinese fears of a possible revival of Japanese militarism were heightened when Japan’s defence expenditure exceeded one percent of its gross national product.8 Chinese students meanwhile denounced increased Japanese economic penetration of China as “the second invasion”.9 Besides history issues, one reason for the growth of Chinese hostility towards Japan was

China’s tendency to view its relations with Japan through the lenses of the traditional Sino-centric world order. Although this ancient world order no longer existed, the Chinese still perceived themselves to be culturally superior to the Japanese.10 Thus, history issues reminded the Chinese of Japan’s past disrespect for their country, which they resented. Peter Gries sums up the nature of Sino-Japanese relations by stating unambiguously that it was

“decidedly not possible to speak about a genuine Chinese ‘friendship’ for

Japan” (original emphasis).11

Tensions with Japan added political pressure on Deng Xiaoping who faced various domestic challenges that undermined the CCP’s political legitimacy, such as corruption, party conservatives’ opposition to his economic reforms, and the spread of Western liberal values among young Chinese. Hence, he had to adopt a hard-line stance towards Japan, which was detrimental to PRC-

7 Kyodo in English, “Nakasone Fires Fujio”, in United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific, 08 September 1986`, pp. C2-C3, and Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 63-64. 8 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 134-135. 9 Ibid., p. 6. 10 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, pp. 37, and 40. 11 Ibid., p. 10. 51

Japan ties, in order to consolidate his rule, unite the party, and reduce popular dissatisfaction with his government.12 In a speech to Japanese visitors in May

1987, Deng warned against the revival of Japanese militarism by a “very small minority (jishaoshu)” of Japanese who were not representative of the peace- loving and China-friendly population.13 He also put the blame squarely on

Japan for bilateral tensions when he told Japanese politicians one month later that, “[n]ot one of the past and present troubles was caused by China.”14 Deng further reminded Japan in May 1989 that because of Japanese aggression,

“Japan owed China the largest amount of historical debt”.15 Chinese politicians and diplomats followed Deng’s lead by downplaying China-Japan friendship, whilst increasing their criticisms of Japan over its war history.16

As part of his plan to promote Chinese nationalism and oppose Japanese militarism, Deng revived memories of the Nanjing Massacre throughout the latter half of the 1980s. In 1987, which was the fiftieth anniversary of the

Nanjing Massacre and the outbreak of full-scale war between China and Japan, the state-run press gave extensive coverage to the massacre and other Japanese war atrocities. These reports highlighted Chinese suffering and largely reinforced anti-Japanese feelings among the masses.17 The party-state also constructed the Nanjing Massacre Memorial Hall in 1985 in memory of the

12 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, pp. 51-54. 13 Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, “Jingti Riben Jishaoshu Ren Fuhuo Junguo Zhuyi 警惕日本极少数 人复活军国主义 [Be Vigilant against the Revival of Japanese Militarism by a Small Minority of Japanese People], 05 May 1987”, in Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan 邓小 平文选 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping] (: Renmin Chubanshe and Sanlian Shudian (Xianggang) Youxian Gongsi (Joint Publishing (H.K.) Co., Ltd.), 1996), pp. 385-386. 14 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, p. 149. 15 Deng Xiaoping 邓小平, “Jieshu Guoqu, Kaipi Weilai 结束过去，开辟未来 [Ending the Past, Starting the Future], 16 May 1989”, in Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan, p. 423. 16 James Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan”, Modern Asian Studies, 45, 2 (March 2011), p. 472. 17 Whiting, China Eyes Japan, pp. 168-179. 52 massacre victims. In the intellectual field, the CCP regime sponsored the publication of large numbers of books on the Nanjing Massacre. Academic projects were carried out to interview massacre survivors and their testimonies were published for the first time. Documentaries and films on the subject were produced too. These state-supported initiatives merged popular memories of the Japanese atrocities with official memories, making both types of memories indistinguishable from each other.18

The revival of Chinese memories of the Nanjing Massacre became part of the

CCP’s patriotic education campaign. The fall of communism in the Soviet

Union and Eastern Europe in 1989-1991, as well as the pro-democracy student demonstrations at Tiananmen Square in June 1989 severely weakened the party’s political legitimacy. In order to perpetuate its rule, Deng launched the patriotic education campaign in August 1991 to cultivate the loyalty of the

Chinese citizenry. He realised the importance of educating Chinese youths about their country’s “century of humiliation”, and the CCP’s achievements in defeating Japanese imperialism and building a new and strong China. The campaign rejected the old victor narrative but emphasised Chinese victimhood under Japanese militarism. More importantly, by portraying itself as the leading nationalistic force against Japanese imperialists during the War of

Resistance, the CCP was able to re-legitimise its rule.19 Japan henceforth became China’s Number One enemy, and possessing anti-Japanese sentiments

18 Sun, Chengqing Lishi, pp. 370-379. For an example of a state-sponsored publication of Nanjing Massacre survivors’ oral testimonies, see Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Bianji Weiyuanhui 南京大屠杀'史料编辑委员会 ed., Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shiliao 侵华日军南京大 屠杀史料 (Source Materials Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937) (Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1985). 19 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, pp. 93-94, 96-97, 99-100, 102, and 120. 53 was “quintessential patriotism”.20 CCP General Secretary Jiang Zemin had earlier highlighted in July 1990 that the Nanjing Massacre was a good example to teach students the “century of humiliation”. He had also proposed that school textbooks be written on this topic.21 “Education on national humiliation (guochi jiaoyu)” thus became an indispensable component of

China’s education system.22 A major objective of the patriotic education campaign was to create official memories of the Nanjing Massacre which a teachers’ guidebook described as one of Japan’s “bestial crimes against humanity”.23 This state-led campaign instilled a sense of patriotism among the younger generation by exposing them to Japanese atrocities and arousing their emotional hatred of Japan.24 The patriotic education campaign appeared to be successful. The results of an opinion poll published by Zhongguo Qingnian

Bao (China Youth Daily) in February 1997 indicated that eighty-four percent of the respondents associated Japan with the Nanjing Massacre.25

The patriotic education campaign coincided with the replacement of communism with nationalism or patriotism as the CCP’s main ideology. Jiang, who succeeded Deng as paramount leader, formalised the CCP’s transformation from a Marxist party to a nationalistic party. Jiang declared in

20 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, p. 59. 21 Jiang Zemin, “Ren yao you Zhengqi he Guqi 人要有正气和骨气 (People need Righteousness and Backbone)”, Party Documentation Centre (1998), pp. 371-373, cited in Christopher R. Hughes, Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006), p. 58. 22 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 104. 23 Zhongguo Xiandai Lishi: Jiaoshi Zhidao 中国现代历史：教师指导 (Modern Chinese History: A Teacher’s Guide) (Beijing: People’s Education Press, 2002), cited in Reilly, “Remember History”, p. 472. 24 Reilly, “Remember History”, p. 471, and Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 209. 25 Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 中国青年报, 15 February 1997, cited in Daqing Yang, “Mirror for the Future or the History Card?: Understanding the ‘History Problem’”, in Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict, ed. Marie Soderberg (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 13. 54

May 1990 that patriotism and socialism were compatible. Therefore, supporting the ruling party was equivalent to being loyal to China.26 He also proclaimed six years later that the CCP had “made the greatest sacrifices and contributions in the struggle to win national independence and safeguard state sovereignty”.27 He added that being role models, “Chinese Communists are

[sic] the staunchest and most consummate patriots” of the country.28 The CCP abandoned its Marxist ideology in September 1997 when it renounced its long-held tenet of public ownership of land and property.29 Jiang further claimed in February 2000 that the party represented “the fundamental interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people”.30 This meant that it was no longer a proletarian party, but a party for all Chinese regardless of social class.31 In July the following year, Jiang reminded Chinese citizens that the

CCP ended the “century of humiliation”, built a strong and rejuvenated China, and protected its territorial sovereignty. In short, the party deserved full credit, and hence full support from the people, for China’s achievements since

1949.32 Thomas J. Christensen best summarises the change in the CCP’s ideology when he writes,

26 Jiang Zemin, “Patriotism and the Mission of Chinese Intellectuals, May 3, 1990” in Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 1, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2010), pp. 115-118. 27 Jiang Zemin, “Energetically Initiate a New Phase in Promoting Socialist Cultural and Ethnical Progress, October 10, 1996” in Selected Works, Vol. 1, p. 567 28 Ibid., p. 567. 29 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, p. 79. 30 Jiang Zemin, “Better Effectuate the Three Represents under the New Historical Conditions, February 25, 2000” in Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 3, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2013), p. 2. 31 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 125. 32 Jiang Zemin, “Speech at a Meeting Celebrating the 80th Anniversary of the Founding of the Communist Party of China, July 1, 2001”, in Selected Works, Vol. 3, pp. 259-266. 55

[N]ationalism is the sole ideological glue that holds the People’s Republic together and keeps the CCP government in power. Since the Chinese Communist Party is no longer communist, it must be even more Chinese.33

China’s relations with Japan remained largely tense in the 1990s. On 15

August 1995, which was the fiftieth anniversary of the end the Second World

War in Asia-Pacific, Socialist and non-LDP Prime Minister Murayama

Tomiichi offered an official apology for the war. He expressed his “deep remorse” and “heartfelt apology” for Japan’s invasion of Asian-Pacific territories and for the suffering it inflicted upon their people.34 Yinan He describes this apology as “the most unequivocal, unconditional, and complete expression of contrition offered by Japan to date”.35 While Beijing accepted the apology, it remained dissatisfied with Tokyo’s attitude towards history issues. China, which still perceived itself as culturally superior to Japan, remained antagonistic towards inferior Japan for the wartime trauma that it caused to the Chinese. Such long-standing resentment made it difficult “for an apology to heal the wound to Chinese self-esteem”.36 China tried but failed to seek another formal apology from Japan when Jiang visited Tokyo in

November 1998. In anger, Jiang repeatedly lectured the Japanese on history issues throughout his state visit, which soured Sino-Japanese ties.37 For example, he blamed Japan for causing bilateral tensions over history issues,

33 Thomas J. Christensen, “Chinese Realpolitik”, Foreign Affairs, 75, 5 (September-October 1996), p. 46. 34 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama: ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ (15 August 1995)”, http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html (accessed on 16 September 2014). 35 He, “Forty Years”, p. 11. 36 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 92. 37 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, pp. 79-80. Prime Minister Obuchi Keizo was willing to apologise on the condition that China stop harping on history issues and “prioritize a forward- looking relationship”, but Jiang refused. See Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, p. 250, n. 123. 56 warned against right-wing Japanese politicians’ and intellectuals’ denial of the

Nanjing Massacre, and urged Japan to learn from the past.38

PRC-Japan relations hardly improved in the first fifteen years of the twenty- first century. Top Chinese leaders refused to hold any summit meetings with

Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro as they opposed his annual visits to the Yasukuni Shrine from 2001 to 2006.39 It did not help that Jiang and his younger cohort of Chinese leaders were less knowledgeable of Japan than their predecessors, and they did not appreciate the sensitivities and delicacy of

Sino-Japanese ties.40 Moreover, another Japanese history textbook controversy broke out in April 2005 when a new right-wing history textbook only briefly mentioned the Nanjing Massacre in a footnote.41 In protest, the CCP regime sponsored the publication of archival documents, including Nanjing Massacre survivors’ oral history testimonies, to rebut Japanese conservatives’ claims that the massacre was a fabrication.42 The textbook controversy also led to widespread anti-Japanese protests, which were the largest since diplomatic normalisation in 1972, across twenty Chinese provinces. The demonstrations lasted for three weeks with Japanese residents and diplomatic missions

38 Jiang Zemin, “To Develop Sino-Japanese Relations We must Properly Deal with Historical Issues and the Taiwan Question, November 26, 1998” in Jiang Zemin, Selected Works of Jiang Zemin, Vol. 2, trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2012), pp. 237-238. 39 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, p. 44. 40 Ming Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006), pp. 142-143. 41 Nishio et al., eds., Atarashii Rekishi Kyokasho (New History Textbook) (Tokyo: Fusosha, 2005), p. 49, cited in Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, pp. 208-209. 42 Zhang Xianwen 张宪文 ed. et al., Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Ji 南京大屠杀史料集 [Collection of Historical Documents on the Nanjing Massacre], 72 vols. (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe and Fenghuang Chuban Chuanmei Jituan, 2005-2010). 57 becoming targets of mass attacks. 43 Sino-Japanese relations have remained tense since right-wing LDP leader Abe Shinzo became Japan’s Prime Minister in December 2012. Chinese leaders are presently still wary of his reluctance to apologise for Japan’s war atrocities and his attempts to revise the country’s pacifist constitution.44 In response, the ruling CCP designated 13 December

2014, which was the seventy-seventh anniversary of the Nanjing Massacre, as

“National Memorial Day” to reinforce official memories of the atrocities.45 In a state memorial service on that day, President Xi Jinping described the massacre as “a horrendous crime against humanity and a very dark page in the history of mankind”, and he urged Japan to acknowledge its wartime past.46

China’s deteriorating relations with Japan were accompanied by the development of anti-Japanese nationalism among the masses. The patriotic education campaign and the growth in the number of popular anti-Japanese websites increased public awareness of Japanese war atrocities.47 This generated anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese populace, which led to frequent anti-Japanese protests.48 Jiyoung Choi describes the nature of post-

1980s Chinese nationalism as a form of “resistant nationalism” which occurs in countries that experienced foreign imperialism. As a result of the Japanese

43 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 205, and He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, pp. 1-2. 44 Kor Kian Beng, “Much hangs on how China responds to Abe’s WWII stance”, ST, 09 May 2015, p. A36. 45 “The Nanjing massacre: New memorial days in China are a sign of frostiness with Japan”, The Economist, 12 December 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21636115-new- memorial-days-china-are-sign-frostiness-japan-lest-they-forget (accessed on 13 December 2014). 46 “Xi Jinping blasts Japan's wartime atrocities at high-profile Nanking massacre memorial”, South China Morning Post, 13 December 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1661651/xi-jinping-blasts--wartime-atrocities- high-profile-nanjing-massacre (accessed on 13 December 2014). 47 Reilly, “Remember History”, p. 474. 48 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, p. 2. 58 invasion, shared memories of wartime victimhood continue to persist in

Chinese society long after the war ended. This collective consciousness of war suffering thus contributes to an enduring form of Chinese nationalism.49 Some

Chinese intellectuals responded by calling for a restraint in popular anti-

Japanese feelings in the interests of enhancing Sino-Japanese ties. Their ideas became known as the “New Thinking (xin siwei)”. Journalist Ma Licheng and political scientist Shi Yinhong urged the CCP government in 2002 and 2003 respectively to accept past Japanese apologies for the war, put aside history issues, and seek closer economic cooperation with Japan.50 However, the

“New Thinking” advocates earned a backlash from the Chinese citizenry. For instance, Ma was forced to leave for Hong Kong after facing death threats for his alleged disloyalty to China.51 The rise of popular anti-Japanese nationalism was reflected in a survey conducted by the South Korean daily, Kyunghyang

Shinmun, in 2005. Its findings showed that the percentage of Chinese respondents who distrusted Japan rose by sixteen percent from sixty-seven percent in 2003 to eighty-three percent in 2005.52 Furthermore, an annual opinion poll conducted by a Chinese paper, China Daily, and a Japanese think tank, Genron NPO, in 2014 showed that 86.8 percent of Chinese respondents had a negative impression of Japan, which was the second highest figure since the survey started in 2005. Most of these respondents cited “the issue of

49 Choi Jiyoung, “China’s Ideas of Sovereignty in the Discourse of Human Rights and Globalization Issues”, PhD Dissertation, Peking University, China, cited in Jiyoung Choi, “Chinese Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations”, in New Dynamics between China and Japan in Asia: How to Build the Future from the Past?, ed. Guy Faure (Singapore: World Scientific, 2010), pp. 38-39. 50 Hughes, Chinese Nationalism, pp. 148-149. 51 Ibid., p. 149. 52 Kyunghyang Shinmun, 19 June 2005, cited in Choi, “Chinese Nationalism”, p. 47. 59

Japan’s outlook on its history and education” as one of the main reasons for poor PRC-Japan ties.53

On the other hand, though political animosities existed between China and

Japan, both neighbours enjoyed close economic cooperation, and the Chinese populace retained positive impressions of Japan. After Deng launched his economic reforms and opened up China to foreign investments in 1979, Japan provided loans and Official Development Assistance (ODA) to the PRC to help develop Chinese industries and infrastructure. Between 1979 and 1995,

Japan’s total amount of loans to China reached US$10 billion, while the cumulated amount of ODA to China between 1979 and 2002 was worth at least US$19 billion.54 Besides ODA, Japan’s foreign direct investment in the

PRC rose rapidly from US$100 million in 1985 to approximately US$6.9 billion in 2009.55 Sino-Japanese bilateral trade also grew simultaneously, with its total value increasing from around US$19 billion in 1985 to an estimated

US$266.4 billion in 2008.56 Moreover, the Chinese public had not forgotten the importance of Sino-Japanese friendship. Online forums and surveys conducted between 2000 and 2005 indicated that a majority of the Chinese populace had positive perceptions of Japan and supported closer China-Japan

53 Zhang Yunbi, and Hong, “Survey finds pessimism in ties with Japan”, China Daily, 10 September 2014, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-09/10/content_18571059.htm and http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2014-09/10/content_18571059_2.htm (accessed on 17 September 2014). 54 Takashi Shiraishi, and Caroline Sy Hau, “Only Yesterday: China, Japan and the Transformation of East Asia”, in The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, eds. Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi (Leiden: Brill, 2010), pp. 29 and 33. 55 Japan External Trade Organization, various years, cited in Glenn D. Hook, Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson, Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security, 3rd ed. (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012), pp. 508-509, Table 2. 56 Tsusho Sangyosho, Tsusho Hakusho (Tokyo: Okurasho Insatsukyoku, various years), and Japan External Trade Organization, http://www.jetro.go.jp/jpn/stats/trade, both cited in Hook, Gilson, Hughes, and Dobson, Japan’s International Relations, pp. 496-497, Table 1. 60 bilateral ties. The more they knew about Japan, the greater their positive sentiments were.57 Trends from annual opinion polls conducted between 2005 and 2010 indicated that although over half of the Chinese respondents had negative impressions of Japan, these negative impressions declined from 62.9 percent to 55.9 percent, while positive impressions rose from 11.6 percent to

38.3 percent. More than half of the Chinese respondents also believed that history issues would be settled as bilateral relations progressed. The proportion of respondents who shared this view fluctuated between 50.1 percent and 57.7 percent from 2005 to 2010.58 Notwithstanding close economic ties with Japan and positive images of the Japanese, considerable anti-Japanese feelings among the Chinese masses are still present due to the confluence of popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre with official memories and Chinese nationalism.

State-influenced Popular Memories of the Nanjing Massacre

The nationalistic CCP has played a leading role in the development of official memories of the Nanjing Massacre since 1982. Anne F. Thurston rightly asserts that “[m]emory has become politicized since 1949. The [Chinese]

Communist Party has served as the official mediator of both collective and individual memory [sic]”.59 The CCP decides what memories should be remembered, what memories should be forgotten, and what narratives should

57 Wan, Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 74-78. 58 Annual Reports presented to the Beijing-Tokyo Forum, cited in Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, pp. 197-198, Table 6.2. 59 Anne F. Thurston, “Community and Isolation; Memory and Forgetting: China in Search of Itself”, in Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia: Issues of Identity in International Relations, ed. Gerrit W. Gong (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001), p. 150. 61 be created to suit the remembered memories.60 In its construction of official memories, the party-state has endorsed the War of Resistance, particularly

Chinese victimhood under Japanese militarism, as one of China’s chosen traumas.61 Vamik Volkan defines “chosen traumas” as a manifestation of a group’s inability to overcome the distressing loss and humiliation which it experienced in the past. Through intergenerational transmission of these traumatic memories, the group subconsciously internalises them into its own identity. This identity is characterised by its attempts to avenge its earlier loss and humiliation.62 The patriotic education campaign’s emphasis on the

“century of humiliation”, the victimisation narrative, and the 300,000 official death toll figure have hence turned the Nanjing Massacre into the PRC’s chosen trauma. Besides being a major symbol of China’s national identity,63 the massacre has become “incomparable and unforgettable” in Chinese historical and national consciousness.64 Ian Buruma sums up China’s official memories and chosen trauma when he describes the Nanjing Massacre as the

“shorthand for the unique barbarity of Japanese militarism”.65 It is a statement which Chinese citizens and their political leaders are likely to agree with.

Official memories of the Nanjing Massacre shape popular memories of the event. According to Volkan, objective facts do not matter in a chosen trauma

60 Reilly, “Remember History”, p. 467. 61 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 48. 62 Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Westview Press, 1997), pp. 48 and 82. 63 David Askew, “The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends”, Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies (April 2002), http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html#_edn3 (accessed on 05 July 2015). 64 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 58. 65 Ian Buruma, “The Nanking Massacre as a Historical Symbol”, in Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, eds. Fei Fei Li, Robert Sabella, and David Liu (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), pp. 4-5. 62 as its main purpose is to stir up emotions among the masses and unite them under the elite leadership in times of conflicts.66 This analysis explains the

CCP regime’s manipulation of the Nanjing Massacre as a chosen trauma to generate popular memories of Japanese wartime atrocities and mobilise the

Chinese masses against Japan whenever history issues plague bilateral ties.

Therefore, anti-Japanese popular nationalism in China has been increasing in scale and frequency since the late 1990s.67 Gries cautions us not to equate popular nationalism with official nationalism as nationalism is no longer the

CCP’s sole domain.68 As China becomes a more open society with rapid dissemination of information, the ruling party is unable to control popular nationalism, and it cannot disregard public opinion which contains strong anti-

Japanese sentiments.69 Such popular anti-Japanese nationalism and public opinion are the result of the development of Chinese popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre, which are in turn shaped by official memories. Popular nationalism has given rise to Internet-savvy Chinese youths, known as

“fenqing (indignant young people)” in popular parlance, who have become the most virulent anti-Japanese nationalists in the PRC.70 They were responsible for mobilising protesters through the Internet to participate in the mass anti-

Japanese demonstrations in April 2005.71 The spread of online information and knowledge has therefore further entrenched China’s chosen trauma and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre.72 Popular nationalism has also forced the CCP to take public opinion into account when formulating its

66 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 26. 67 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, p. 16. 68 Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 20. 69 He, “History, Chinese Nationalism”, p. 17. 70 He, “Remembering and Forgetting”, p. 61. 71 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 233. 72 Ibid., p. 233. 63 foreign policy towards Japan.73 At the same time, the party-state is capable of controlling, and even reversing, public opinion towards Japan.74 Restraining popular nationalism is necessary as the mass anti-Japanese protests in April

2005 had shown that ordinary Chinese nationalists were more radical than the

CCP had expected, as their actions had threatened the country’s stability and were detrimental to PRC-Japan bilateral ties.75

Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are deeply entrenched in Chinese public consciousness. These memories have also been passed down across generations within China’s numerous families. Older generations of Chinese who experienced war suffering have told their stories to younger generations.

Through such intergenerational transmission of memories, Chinese youths are able to relate both to their elders’ memories and the government’s official memories of the massacre that are propagated by the patriotic education campaign.76 These memories have developed into Chinese youths’ own memories even though they personally experienced neither the Nanjing

Massacre nor the War of Resistance. Marianne Hirsch labels such memories as

“postmemories”.77 Thus, popular memories of Japanese wartime atrocities have become deeply ingrained in the minds of the Chinese populace, and these memories are reflected in Nanjing Massacre survivors’ published oral history testimonies.

73 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, pp. 129-155, and Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/chn/ and http://bbs.fmprc.gov.cn/index.jsp (both accessed on 25 March 2003), cited in Gries, China’s New Nationalism, p. 134. 74 Reilly, Strong Society, Smart State, pp. 179-206. 75 Reilly, “Remember History”, p. 476. 76 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, pp. 140 and 227. 77 Marianne Hirsch, “Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile”, Poetics Today, 17, 4, Creativity and Exile: European/American Perspectives II (Winter 1996), pp. 659-686. 64

Owing to the pervasive influence of official memories which stress Chinese victimhood, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are generally homogeneous and distressing in nature. In their published oral history testimonies, massacre survivors recounted their harrowing encounters with the

Imperial Japanese Army, the physical injuries and mental trauma that they suffered, and the atrocities which they witnessed. From a psychological perspective, these traumatic war memories would be deeply etched in the survivors’ minds for the rest of their lives.78 For instance, Yan Hongliang was able to provide a detailed account of his narrow escape from death in an oral history interview conducted by the Nanjing city government in 1984. After the fall of Nanjing in December 1937, the Japanese military arrested Yan along with 3,000 more Chinese civilians, and brought them to a river bank where there were tens of thousands more civilians. The Japanese soldiers executed most of them using machine guns, before throwing their corpses into the river.

Yan was stabbed in his stomach, but he fortunately survived. He hid near the execution site for several days, before returning home when he felt safe.79

Similarly, sixteen-year-old Xu Qi managed to avoid the Japanese when they came to his neighbourhood. However, he witnessed the soldiers arresting his younger brother and many of his peers. He believed that they were subsequently executed as he heard gun shots and saw countless dead bodies in nearby lakes, which turned the water red. As a result, Xu found it difficult to

78 Schacter, Seven Sins, pp. 173-178. 79 Yan Hongliang 严洪亮, “Nanjing Shi Renyili Jumin Yan Hongliang Zhengyan 南京市仁义 里居民严洪亮证言 [Oral Testimony of Resident of Renyili, Nanjing, Yan Hongliang]”, in Nanjing Datusha 南京大屠杀 [Nanjing Massacre], eds. Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央档案 馆, Zhongguo Di’er Lishi Dang’anguan 中国第二历史档案馆, and Jilinsheng Shehui Kexueyuan 吉林省社会科学院 (Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1995), pp. 904-905. 65 forgive the Japanese, and continued to harbour hatred towards them.

Nonetheless, being influenced by official memories, he echoed the CCP government in urging Japan to acknowledge its wartime past and stressed the importance of Sino-Japanese friendship.80

Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are so deeply embedded in

Chinese society that even those who were barely a year old in 1937 were able to animatedly describe the suffering which their parents and other family members underwent at the hands of the Japanese military. An example is

Wang Changhua who wrote down his family’s war experiences in 1995.

Although he was only three months old in 1937, Wang was able to vividly describe how the Japanese “devils” brutally killed his father.81 From a psychological viewpoint, it was probably not possible for him to remember the

Japanese atrocities from such a young age. Research has shown that people are capable of remembering events only upon reaching three to five years of age when the parts of the brain responsible for retaining memories develop. This means that people do not have any memories when they are younger than three to five years old.82 Therefore, it was likely that Wang heard the story of his father being murdered from his mother, his father’s friends, or his

80 Xu Qi 徐琦, “Cong Chuangkou Kandao Rijun ba Suoyou Nianqingren dou cong Dafangxiang Daizou le 从窗口看到日军把所有年轻人从大方巷带走了 [From the Window, I saw Japanese Soldiers Rounding Up All Youths from Dafang Lane]”, in Nanjingzhan: Beigelie de Shouhaizhe zhi Hun: Nanjing Datusha Shouhaizhe 120 Ren de Zhengyan 南京战： 被割裂的受害者之魂： 南京大屠杀受害者 120 人的证言[The Souls of the Victims during the Battle of Nanjing: Testimonies of 120 Victims of the Nanjing Massacre], ed. Matsuoka Tamaki 松冈环, trans. Shen Weifan 沈维藩 (Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 2005), pp. 168-172. 81 Wang Changhua 王昌华, “Wang Changhua Zhengyan 王昌华证言 [Wang Zhenghua’s Oral Testimony]”, in Qinhua Rijun Najing Datusha Xingcunzhe Zhengyan, ed. Zhu, pp. 123- 124. 82 Schacter, Seven Sins, pp. 126-127. 66 neighbours. This case study reflects the intergenerational transmission of war memories from the older generation to the younger generation in China, which helps to keep popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre alive.

In addition, as further evidence of the pervasiveness of popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in the PRC, war survivors, despite having not resided in

Nanjing in 1937, could claim to “remember” the massacre, or recount

Japanese atrocities in the fallen capital based on second-hand or even third- hand knowledge. Yan Qihua told her oral history interviewers in 2006 that she was a peasant who lived in Anhui province in 1937. She moved to Nanjing, which borders Anhui, only after she was married in 1943. Hence, she neither experienced nor witnessed the Nanjing Massacre. However, based on what she heard from her neighbour, Yan could narrate the cruel manner in which

Japanese soldiers executed ordinary civilians by machine guns.83 Her recollections exemplify Maurice Halbwachs’ argument that individuals construct their own memories based on the collective memories in the group or society which they belong to.84 Therefore, every war survivor in China has his or her own individual memories of the Nanjing Massacre, which collectively form popular memories that are shared within the larger Chinese society.

83 Yan Qihua 严齐华, “Yan Qihua Koushu 严齐华口述 [Yan Qihua’s Oral Testimony]”, in Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Ji 南京大屠杀史料集 [Collection of Historical Documents on the Nanjing Massacre], Vol. 39, eds. Zhang Xianwen 张宪文, Zhang Sheng 张生, Wu Fengzhao 吴凤照, and Fei Zhongxing 费仲兴 (Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe and Fenghuang Chuanmei Jituan, 2007), pp. 1434-1435. 84 Halbwachs, On Collective Memory, p. 22. 67

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the CCP government has been relying on both official memories and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre since 1982 to serve its domestic political agenda and influence its foreign policy towards

Japan. The outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in 1982 ended the decade-long “honeymoon” period in PRC-Japan relations, reignited

Chinese nationalism among the masses, and revived popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre. Facing internal political pressure, the CCP took the opportunity presented by the textbook controversy to oppose a return of

Japanese militarism and imperialism. Following the collapse of the Soviet

Union and its Eastern European satellite states between 1989 and 1991, communism was rejected as a viable political ideology internationally. As a result, the Chinese party-state was forced to stress official and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre through the patriotic education campaign that was launched in 1991. The campaign’s focus on the “century of humiliation” and Chinese wartime victimisation under the Japanese promoted

Chinese nationalism among the people. This has contributed to the growth of anti-Japanese feelings in China which directly shape popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre. They have become largely indistinguishable from official memories, and are generally homogeneous in emphasising Chinese victimhood and suffering. More importantly, the CCP regime’s championing of Chinese nationalism has given it the legitimacy to continue governing

China. Nevertheless, anti-Japanese sentiments among the Chinese populace have worsened China’s bilateral ties with Japan. As of 2015, unresolved

68 history issues, such as the Nanjing Massacre, remain a major obstacle to closer

Sino-Japanese relations.

69

CHAPTER FOUR

CHINESE POPULAR MEMORIES OF

THE SOOK CHING MASSACRE IN SINGAPORE, 1980-2015

The launch of the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980 was an important milestone in Singapore’s relations with Japan. Cordial and warm bilateral ties have continued to develop even after the campaign ended by 1990.

Nonetheless, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre have persisted in Singapore from 1980 to 2015, with an increasing number of first- hand accounts of the atrocities and the Japanese Occupation being published.

The PAP government has also developed official memories of Sook Ching and the Syonan years from 1984 to promote a sense of national identity among

Singaporeans. This chapter will therefore assess the development of popular memories and official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore, the differences between both types of memories, the reasons for these differences, and the extent to which official memories shape popular memories. The influence of the ruling party’s nation-building agenda, its “Learn from Japan” campaign, and Singapore’s foreign relations with Japan on the nature of these popular memories shall also be discussed.

Cordial and Growing Singapore-Japan Relations

The “Learn from Japan” campaign deepened Singapore-Japan post-war relations throughout the 1980s. After undergoing a recession in the 1970s,

Singapore had to restructure its economy by abandoning its labour-intensive and low value-added industries in favour of capital-intensive and high value-

70 added ones. The PAP administration decided to model its economic restructuring after Asia’s economic powerhouse – Japan.1 Lee Kuan Yew personally felt that Japan was “still equivocal and evasive” 2 in apologising for its war atrocities, and he urged it to do so in order to build trust and advance its bilateral relations with other Asian countries.3 Nevertheless, his admiration for Japan and its post-war economic miracle outweighed his concerns about Japanese attitudes towards history issues.4 He extolled the

Japanese people as “disciplined, hardworking, united and efficient”.5 He was particularly keen to learn from Japan to improve Singapore’s industrial productivity as part of the city-state’s economic restructuring. Lee thus initiated the “Learn from Japan” campaign in 1980, a year after visiting

Japan.6 Besides adopting Japan’s Quality Control Circles (QCC) to raise productivity through positive work attitudes and team effort, Singapore accepted a grant of US$20 million from Japan to finance the Productivity

Movement from 1983 to 1990.7 Besides increasing productivity, Japan advised

Singapore in 1980 to build a knowledge-based and technologically-driven economy, as exemplified by the setting up of the Singapore-Japan Institute of

1 Thang Leng Leng, and S. K. Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign in Singapore”, in Japan and Singapore: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Tsu Yun Hui (Singapore: McGraw- Hill, 2006), p. 260. 2 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 573 3 Ibid., p. 578. 4 Ibid., pp. 557-558. 5 Ibid., p. 581. 6 Lee Kuan Yew, “Press Conference held in Tokyo, Japan (23 October 1979)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 8: 1978-1980, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 384-387, and Lee Kuan Yew, “Interview with Mr. Kazuo Nishi, Managing Editor of Mainichi Shimbun, at the Istana, Singapore (12 September 1980)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew, Vol. 8, pp. 498-499. 7 Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, p. 269, and National Productivity Board, “Strategies for Productivity Improvement: Learning from the Japanese Experience – an NPB Paper”, in Productivity Statement 1992 (Singapore: National Productivity Board, 1992), p. 81. 71

Software Technology in the following year.8 In 1981, the National University of Singapore established the Department of Japanese Studies to nurture local

Japan specialists.9 The total number of Japanese Studies majors rose annually, from fifty-four in academic year 1981/1982 to 639 in 2000/2001.10 The “Learn from Japan” campaign was so ubiquitous that Robin Ramcharan claims that

“no other country surpasses Singapore in its public admiration of Japan”.11

The “Learn from Japan” campaign ended by 1990 when the Japanese economy entered a long-drawn recession, and it was therefore no longer a viable model for Singapore. Moreover, the implementation of the QCC was not as successful as the PAP government envisioned it to be due to differences in culture, work ethics, and educational levels between Singapore and Japan.12

The city-state had also begun to cultivate economic relations with other Asian states. Nonetheless, Singapore and Japan still maintained close economic and cultural ties. In 1995, Japanese investments in the republic cumulated to

S$933 million (US$644 million) which was the largest after American investments.13 The number of Japanese firms in Singapore also grew from around 900 in 1989 to 2,600 in the late 1990s.14 Furthermore, the number of

Japanese tourists visiting the city-state increased from about 682,000 in 1988

8 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 189. 9 Guo Junhai, “Teaching and Learning Japanese in Singapore”, in Japan and Singapore: A Multidisciplinary Approach, ed. Tsu Yun Hui (Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2006), p. 288. 10 Handbook of Department of Japanese Studies, National University of Singapore, cited in ibid., p. 296, Table 11.4. 11 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, back cover. 12 Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, pp. 271-272. 13 “Japanese presence on the rise” in “Country Spotlight: Japan: Commemorating the Birthday of H.M. Emperor Akihito”, “Sunday Review” section, The Sunday Times, 17 December 1995, p. 6. 14 “Japan-S’pore ties on an even keel” in “Country Report: Japan” section, The Sunday Times, 30 July 1989, p. 3, and Thang, and Gan, “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign”, p. 278. 72 to approximately 1,094,000 in 1997.15 Bilateral economic ties were also enhanced with the signing of the Japan-Singapore Economic Agreement for a

New Age Partnership in January 2002. This free trade agreement contributed to a rise in two-way trade reaching S$47.6 billion in 2013, with Japan becoming Singapore’s ninth largest trading partner.16 Furthermore, Japanese culture remained prevalent in the city-state. For example, there were as many as 12,000 Singaporeans, including students and adults, learning the Japanese language in 2003.17 The popularity of learning Japanese among young

Singaporeans could be attributed to an influx of Japanese popular culture, ranging from fashion and food to songs and manga.18 Young Singaporeans’ love of all things Japanese was revealed in a local sociological survey in

December 1999. 8.2 percent of Chinese secondary and tertiary students who participated in the study indicated that they would prefer to be ethnic Japanese instead.19

Singapore’s relations with Japan since 1990 are best described by Prime

Minister Lee Hsien Loong (Li Xianlong) as “excellent”.20 Both nations have

15 , Singapore Annual Report on Tourism Statistics 1997 (Singapore: Singapore Tourism Board, 1997), p. 24. 16 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “Japan: Bilateral Relations”, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/countries_and_region/northeast_asia/japan.html (accessed on 16 December 2014). 17 Japan Foundation, 2003 Survey of Overseas Organizations Involved in Japanese-Language Education (Tokyo: Japan Foundation, 2003), cited in Guo, “Teaching and Learning Japanese”, p. 289. 18 For a critique of Japanese cultural influences in Singapore, see Chua, “’Where got Japanese Influence in Singapore!’”, pp. 133-149. 19 Sun Chuanwei 孙传炜, “Guoda Wenhua Jiazhiguan Chouyang Diaocha Xianshi: Sifenyi Huazu Xuesheng Buxiangzuo Huaren 国大文化价值观抽样调查显示：四分一华族学生不 想做华人 [National University of Singapore’s Sample Survey on Cultural Values Indicates that a Quarter of ChineseStudents Do Not Wish to be Chinese]”, Lianhe Zaobao, 04 December 1999, p. 11. 20 Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore, “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 19th Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia” (delivered on 23 May 2013), 73 benefited from economic cooperation, and unlike China, Singapore does not raise history issues, such as the Sook Ching Massacre, with Japan. When

Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi visited Singapore in 1994, he was the first

Japanese leader to lay a wreath at the , and he did so voluntarily. The PAP administration appreciated his gesture and accepted his landmark August 1995 apology.21 Although Singapore has regularly expressed its “regret[s]” whenever Japanese prime ministers visit the Yasukuni Shrine, it stops short of condemning these visits.22 Lee Hsien Loong reemphasised

Singapore’s traditional forward-looking foreign policy towards Japan in a speech in Tokyo in May 2013. He stressed that both states should “look forward to a better future together, and not rehash old grievances or reopen old wounds”.23 Hence, both official and popular memories of Sook Ching have not hindered Singapore’s bilateral ties with Japan.

Diverse Popular Memories of the Sook Ching Massacre

Development of Official Memories

The PAP government began developing official memories of the Sook Ching

Massacre and the Japanese Occupation only in 1984 when Singapore celebrated its twenty-fifth anniversary of full self-government.24 By then, the

http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/speech-prime-minister-lee-hsien-loong-19th-nikkei- international-conference-future-asia (accessed on 16 December 2014). 21 Lee, From Third World to First, p. 577. The Memorial was unveiled in February 1967 to commemorate all who died during the Japanese Occupation, including Sook Ching victims. See Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 164-170. 22 For example, see Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “MFA Spokesman's Comments On Visit By Prime Minister Koizumi To The Yasukuni Shrine On 15 August 2006”, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2006/200608/press_2006081 5.html (accessed on 16 December 2014). 23 Prime Minister’s Office, “Speech”. 24 A National Exhibition was held in November 1984 to raise public awareness of Singapore’s history for the first time. See Lee Kuan Yew, “A National Exhibition on Singapore’s 25 Years of Independence: Address at the Opening of the National Exhibition at the World Trade 74 city-state had attained sustained economic growth, and its survival as a sovereign nation was secured. The ruling party realised that remembering the country’s wartime past was important in instilling in young Singaporeans, who grew up in the peaceful post-independence years, a sense of national identity and collective belonging.25 As part of the state’s nation-building project,

Singapore’s national history, which included Sook Ching and the Japanese

Occupation, was introduced to the lower secondary school syllabus in 1984.26

In the history textbooks written since then, the Japanese Occupation has always been portrayed as a “total disastrous period” for the people in

Singapore.27 The creation of official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre did not contradict the PAP leadership’s “Learn from Japan” campaign and its policy of fostering close bilateral ties with Japan. Foreign policy was strictly kept separate from history issues.

Singapore’s “excellent” ties with Japan did not preclude it from launching extensive public commemoration of the Japanese Occupation on the fiftieth anniversary of the Fall of Singapore in 1992, and on the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the Pacific War in 1995. The PAP administration wanted

Singaporeans to remember the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese

Centre (15 November 1984)”, in The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews, and Dialogues, Vol. 9: 1981-1987, eds. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip (Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012), pp. 358-359. 25 Albert Lau, “The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore”, in Imagining Singapore, 2nd ed., ed. Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir, and Tong Chee Kiong (Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004), pp. 38 -41, and Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, p. 294. 26 Kevin Blackburn, “Mary Turnbull’s History Textbook for the Singapore Nation”, in Studying Singapore’s Past: C.M. Turnbull and the History of Modern Singapore, ed. Nicholas Tarling (Singapore: NUS Press, 2012), pp. 73-76. 27 Goh Chor Boon, “Things Japanese in Our History Syllabus: Implications for National Education”, in Securing Our Future: Sourcebook for National Education Ideas and Strategies for Secondary Schools and Junior Colleges, eds. Steven Tan Kwang San, and Goh Chor Boon (Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2003), p. 214. 75

Occupation in order to promote patriotism and national defence.28 Through television programmes and museum exhibitions, the state highlighted the theme of victimisation and common suffering by all races in Singapore under

Japanese rule.29 The Syonan period henceforth became “a truly national

‘collective memory’”.30 Pana News Agency conducted three surveys, namely in 1987, 1990, and 1995, to find out Singapore students’ attitudes towards

Japan and the Japanese Occupation. The results of the 1987 and 1990 surveys indicated a decline in anti-Japanese attitudes among the respondents. However, the 1995 survey revealed that the respondents understood the importance of

Singapore having a strong military to defend its sovereignty and protect its people. The results clearly proved that the government had achieved its objective of situating official memories of Sook Ching within the context of nation-building.31 In addition, popular memories of the Japanese Occupation continue to be passed down across generations in Singapore homes.

Grandparents and parents who lived through the war have transmitted memories of Japanese war atrocities to their grandchildren and children who would retain and pass these memories down to their descendants.32 Like their counterparts in China, Singapore youths have developed postmemories of the war.33 Thus, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the

Japanese Occupation in Singapore have flourished alongside official memories.

28 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, pp. 267-270. 29 Blackburn, and Hack, War, Memory, pp. 301-312. 30 Ibid., p. 301. 31 Pana News Agency, “Opinion Survey”, 1987, 1990, 1995, all cited in Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, pp. 270-274. 32 Ramcharan, Singaporean Statehood, p. 272. 33 Hirsch, “Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile”, pp. 659-686. 76

Popular Memories: Overlap with Official Memories

Between 1981 and 2015, works by Chinese war survivors who lived through the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation were published, as seen in Table 2. Whilst some of these popular memories coincide with official memories, others are distinct from them. Moreover, like autobiographies and memoirs of war survivors that were published between 1961 and 1980, the nature of the first-hand accounts of Sook Ching and the Syonan years that published from 1981 onwards varied. Some of these works emphasised

Japanese atrocities and contained anti-Japanese feelings, but the rest focussed on the less brutal aspects of the event and did not necessarily express emotional hatred towards the Japanese.

Table 2: Number of Published Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews on the Sook Ching Massacre (1981-2015)34

Language of Publication 1981-2000 2001-2015 English Language 23 34 Chinese Language 6 7 Total 29 41

Autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews of Sook Ching survivors proliferated after 1980. For works published between

1981 and 2000, some authors stressed Japanese atrocities and expressed anti-

Japanese sentiments,35 while the rest put the traumatic episode behind them and portrayed the Japanese Occupation in less emotional terms.36 The latter group of survivors might have been influenced by the “Learn from Japan”

34 Refer to the Appendix 2 for the authors, titles, and publication details of these works. 35 See, for example, Qu Rubo 区如柏, Lunxian Suiyue 沦陷岁月 [Years of Occupation] (Singapore: Shengyou Shuju (Seng Yew Book Store), 1993), pp. 45-53. 36 See, for instance, Peter H.L. Wee, From Farm and Kampong (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1989), pp. 2-38. 77 campaign and had thus cultivated a higher regard for Japan and its economic successes.37 As Table 2 has shown, more first-hand accounts by Sook Ching survivors were published in the fifteen years between 2001 and 2015 than in the preceding twenty years from 1981 to 2000, most likely because most war survivors had reached old age, and they felt the need to record their life experiences for posterity. A few of these works still contained anti-Japanese feelings,38 whereas such emotional sentiments were almost non-existent in most of them. The massacre was merely one of the many episodes in these survivors’ life stories, and it was not the most significant.39 All these first-hand accounts reflected Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre which complement our knowledge of Singapore’s official memories of the event. In addition, some popular memories overlap with official memories, while others do not. Popular memories that are similar to state-sanctioned ones belong to families whose kin were among the dead victims, those who survived the massacre, those who “passed” the screening, or those who escaped from the screening centres unharmed. For these survivors, memories of Sook Ching form a predominant part of their autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews. Examples of such popular memories which overlap with official memories are discussed below.

Firstly, Chinese civilians, especially women, whose close family members died in the Sook Ching Massacre, vividly remembered the trauma which they

37 Pang Cheng Lian, “Gaining from Japan’s experience”, New Nation, 11 January 1974, p. 8. 38 For example, see H. Sidhu, The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories (Singapore: Native Publications, 1991). 39 For instance, see Arthur Lim, and Tan Mei Ching,. From A Doctor’s Diary (Singapore: PG Lim, 1999), pp. 15-36, and Ooi Kee Beng, Serving a New Nation: Baey Lian Peck’s Singapore Story (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011), pp. 5-13. 78 and their kin endured. Lim San Neo, who was only twenty-one years old in

1942, was grief-stricken when her husband, her father, and her eldest brother were killed during the carnage.40 “That was the saddest moment in my life,” the mother of three declared in her autobiography.41 The same fate befell on

Siew Fong Fung whose husband reported to the screening centre at Victoria

School but never came back. Along with her eight children, she waited in vain for his return, sold her possessions to bribe Japanese soldiers for information, and sought Japanese welfare officer Shinozaki Mamoru’s42 help, but to no avail.43 He Shujuan’s husband and her younger brother were also Sook Ching victims. She initially hoped that they were sent elsewhere to do hard labour and would eventually return, but they did not. In order to seek justice for her family, she testified at the 1947 Chinese Massacre Trial as a prosecution witness. At the time of her oral history interview in 1992, He Shujuan still had bitter memories of the Japanese atrocities and had not forgiven the perpetrators.44 Other Chinese civilians who shared similar painful memories of losing their loved ones during the Sook Ching Massacre remained antagonistic towards the Japanese decades after the war ended. 45

Secondly, a few Sook Ching victims, like Zheng Guangyu whom I have mentioned in Chapter Two, managed to survive the massacre and lived to narrate their traumatic experiences. Among them was former SSVF member

40 Lim San Neo, My Life, My Memories, My Story: Recollections of a 75-year old Great- Grandmother (Singapore: Epic Management Services Pte Ltd., [1997?]), pp. 56-58. 41 Ibid., p. 58. 42 Shinozaki was a prominent Japanese civilian officer in Syonan who saved the lives of many potential Sook Ching victims. See Shinozaki, Syonan, pp. 16-24. 43 Wong Moh Keed ed., To My Heart with Smiles: The Love Letters of Siew Fung Fong and Wan Kwai Pik (1920-1941) (Singapore: Landmark Books, 1988), pp. 118-119. 44 Qu, Lunxian Suiyue, pp. 61-65. 45 See, for example, Huang Dali 黄大礼, Xuebei Buyi 血碑补遗 [Addendum to a Blood Stele] (Singapore: Xinjiapo Qingnian Shuju (The Youth Book Company), 2008), pp. 93-103. 79

Chan Cheng Yean who described his escape from an execution site in Bedok in an interview with the Oral History Department in 1992.46 He reported to a screening centre at Tanjong Katong, before being driven to Bedok with eighty- nine other civilians to be killed. Though his knee was shot, he survived the execution. He managed to escape from the pool of corpses after the Japanese firing squad left.47 First-hand accounts such as Chan’s form an integral part of

Singapore’s official and popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. They reflect Japanese brutality and Chinese victimhood which are essential nation- building elements of the state-endorsed historical narrative – the Singapore

Story.

Thirdly, although those who “passed” the Sook Ching screening did not personally experience the Japanese atrocities, they had memories of their apprehensive experiences at the screening centres. Their wit, however, enabled them to emerge safely from these centres. The most well-known account of a

Chinese civilian who “passed” the screening was that of a young Lee Kuan

Yew who later became Singapore’s first prime minister. In his memoirs, he described his experiences at the Jalan Besar screening centre as “a narrow escape”.48 Lee initially “failed” the screening, but a Kempeitai soldier allowed

46 Chan’s oral history interview is representative of most interviews conducted by the Oral History Department (presently known as the Oral History Centre at the National Archives of Singapore). Like other interviewees’ memories of the Sook Ching Massacre, his memories of the event overlap with Singapore’s official memories. Notwithstanding Kevin Blackburn’s criticisms of these state-conducted oral history interviews in Singapore, I believe that they are still relevant in deriving insights into Chinese popular memories of Sook Ching in Singapore. See Kevin Blackburn, “History from Above: The Use of Oral History in Shaping Collective Memory in Singapore”, in Oral History and Public Memories, eds. Paula Hamilton, and Linda Shopes (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008), pp. 31-46. 47 Daniel Chew, and Irene Lim eds., Sook Ching (Singapore: Oral History Department, 1992), pp. 16-18. See also Sidhu, The Bamboo Fortress, pp. 147-159. 48 Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Times Editions, 1998), p. 56. 80 him to return to collect his personal effects before boarding the military truck.

Instead, he hid at the centre for two more days, and then “passed” the screening when a different Kempeitai soldier was on duty.49

Fourthly, some Chinese survivors “passed” the Sook Ching screening as a result of pure luck. , who was Singapore’s Chief Minister from

1956 to 1959, devoted one chapter to the Japanese Occupation in his autobiography. In that chapter, he wrote that he was confined to a screening centre for three days. While he was fortunate that he “passed” the screening, after the Kempeitai merely confiscated his valuable belongings, some of his neighbours were not. He heard that the Japanese executed and buried them in the graves which they were forced to dig.50 He characterised the Sook Ching

Massacre as “horror of the first magnitude”.51 Geoffrey Tan mentioned his cousin’s Sook Ching experience in his memoirs too. His cousin was at the

Chinatown screening centre when the Japanese soldiers randomly placed him on a military truck and drove him to Fort Canning. He was then ordered to clear the ammunition that the British forces left behind. The Japanese subsequently released him which meant that he “passed” the screening.52 Tan alluded to his cousin’s good fortune when he wrote, “He could have ended up being shot at Changi beach, if he had been put in a different truck.”53

49 Ibid., p. 56. 50 Lim Yew Hock, Reflections (Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1986), p. 17. 51 Ibid., p. 17. 52 Geoffrey Tan, Escape from Battambang: A Personal World War II Experience (Singapore: Armour Publishing, 2001), pp. 13 and 16. 53 Ibid., p. 16. 81

Fifthly, unlike the survivors mentioned in the preceding two paragraphs, eight- year-old William Gwee and his family “passed” the Sook Ching screening neither because of wit nor luck, but because his father had worked in Japanese firms before the Pacific War. During the screening, the elder Gwee showed a

Kempeitai officer the photographs that he took with his former Japanese superiors and colleagues. Being convinced that the Gwee family was not anti-

Japanese, the officer stamped the character “jian” on their arms and released them.54 William’s description of Sook Ching in his war memoirs is a unique case. Although it falls within the realm of official memories as he and his family “passed” the screening, his father’s pre-war association with the

Japanese is rare among popular memories that overlap with official ones. The

Singapore Story, which embodies the republic’s official memories, does not condone any discussion of Chinese civilians’ pre-1942 ties with the Japanese.

Such discussion contradicts the state-sanctioned narrative of the local Chinese community’s active involvement in anti-Japanese activities before the Fall of

Singapore, such as raising funds for the China Relief Fund and participating in the Dalforce’s armed resistance against the Japanese invaders.

Sixthly, a handful of lucky Chinese civilians managed to escape unscathed from the Sook Ching screening centres. Lee Kip Lee dedicated an entire chapter of his memoirs to his nerve-wrecking experience at a screening centre located at the field of Telok Kurau English School. Being an English-educated college student, Lee was a likely Sook Ching target, along with his brother and his nephew. Fortunately for them, the Japanese soldier who was guarding

54 William Gwee Thian Hock, A Baba Boyhood: Growing Up during World War 2 (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2013), pp. 136-138. 82 them was nowhere to be seen by the evening. An Indian policeman subsequently released them, and they fled home. When he returned to his house at Amber Road, Lee heard gun shots which he assumed to be Japanese execution of Sook Ching victims at the nearby Katong beach.55 Ho See Beng also feared for the worst when Japanese soldiers forced him into a screening centre, so he quickly and safely made “a discreet exit” when the Kempeitai were not looking.56 Lee’s and Ho’s stories are two of the many local Chinese popular memories which overlap, or are even synonymous, with Singapore’s official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre.

Popular Memories: Distinct from Official Memories

The PAP government tends to cast popular memories of the Sook Ching

Massacre into the above simplified and stereotypical categories that overlap with official memories. Nonetheless, there are many other types of popular memories that are more nuanced than, and are different from, state-endorsed ones. They are rarely mentioned in the Singapore Story because they do not coincide with the state’s emphasis on civilian victimisation by the Japanese occupiers. Yet these popular memories exist in the public domain. They are reflected in the autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews of Chinese war survivors who, for various reasons, did not report to the screening centres, were saved by compassionate Japanese officers, or had been exempted from the screening altogether. Others were too young to remember Sook Ching, while the rest chose not to mention the event in their

55 Lee Kip Lee, Amber Sands: A Boyhood Memoir (Singapore: Federal Publications, 1995), pp. 122-135. 56 Ramachandran Menon, Ho See Beng: The Washerwoman’s Son (Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2015), p. 29. 83 reminiscences because they wanted to forget their traumatic experiences, or because they had suffered memory loss owing to old age. As most of these survivors were spared from undergoing the ordeal of nearly losing their lives, or of losing their loved ones, their memories of the Sook Ching Massacre are merely one of the many episodes of their Japanese Occupation experiences.

Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre which are distinct from official memories are illustrated in the following paragraphs.

Foremost, a handful of Chinese civilians in Singapore made the bold decision not to report to the Sook Ching screening centres but safely hid elsewhere.

Their experiences were similar to that of Ruth Ho whom I have mentioned in

Chapter Two. In her autobiography, Jessie Chan recounted that she and her family had to report to New World Amusement Park which they thought was a household registration centre. Nevertheless, soon after leaving their home, her father had a premonition of worse things to come, and decided to return home instead as it was better for them to “die in our [sic] own house, not in a strange place”.57 Teenager Jessie was relived yet afraid, but her family managed to return and sought refuge in their home.58 Timothy Tow and his brother Tow

Siang Hwa avoided going to the screening centre altogether by hiding in an inaccessible area in rural Singapore throughout Sook Ching.59 Both families were fortunate that the Kempeitai did not notice their absence from the screening centres. However, their memories are marginalised from the

Singapore Story which highlights Chinese victimhood during Sook Ching, and

57 Jessie Chan Pearce, Ah Nya’s Story ([Canberra?]: [Jessie Chan Pearce?], 2011), p. 67. 58 Ibid., pp. 66-67. 59 Timothy Tow, Son of a Mother’s Vow (Singapore: Far Eastern Bible College Press Bookroom, 2001), p. 95, and Tow Siang Hwa, Footprints in the Sands of Time (Singapore: Reformation Banner Publishers, 2009), p. 71. 84 ignores the existence of civilians’ successful attempts to avoid the screening centres.

Furthermore, a few war survivors avoided reporting to the Sook Ching screening centres by pure luck. In his memoirs, former colonial civil servant

Quek Kok Chiang remembered falling sick during the period of Sook Ching.

As he was recuperating in bed, a Japanese soldier came to his house to order all males to head to Beach Road. However, the soldier failed to notice him.

Quek was hence spared from going to the screening centre. Had he reported there, he probably would have been executed. His illness was indeed a blessing in disguise.60 , who later served as Singapore’s first

Interior and Defence Minister, underwent a similar experience. Being a former member of the pro-British SSVF, he was a potential Sook Ching target.

Fortunately, he forgot the date to report to the screening centre, and reported there the next day without being harmed. His friends who reported on the correct date were likely to have been killed.61 These memories shared by Quek and Goh are rarely known, but they reflect the diversity of Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore.

Moreover, compassionate Japanese military officers saved several Chinese civilians from becoming Sook Ching victims. Former SSVF member Ee Peng

Liang was arrested by the Kempeitai on 20 February 1942 which was the third day of the Sook Ching Massacre. Expecting to be killed, he volunteered to be

60 Quek Kiok Chiang, My Thanksgiving Testimonies (Singapore: Far Eastern Beacon Monthly, [2010?]), pp. 383-384. 61 Tan Siok Sun, Goh Keng Swee: A Portrait (Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2007), pp. 41 and 44. 85 executed first. A Kempeitai officer admired Ee’s courage and released him, while his comrades who did not volunteer themselves were shot.62 Victor Seah, who was ten years old in 1942, and his fellow villagers in rural Kio were supposed to report to a screening centre at Sin Min High School, but the

Japanese officer responsible for their neighbourhood exempted them from going out of goodwill.63 Nonetheless, these popular memories of kind-hearted

Japanese soldiers are largely absent from the Singapore Story which perpetuates official memories of inhumane and ruthless Japanese soldiers instead.

In addition, Chinese individuals whose services were of use to the Imperial

Japanese Army were generally spared from the Sook Ching Massacre. The

Kempeitai arrested former banker and SSVF officer Yap Pheng Geck and detained him for two weeks at their Tanjong Pagar office. During this period,

Japanese soldiers took him to a screening centre at Tiong Bahru for two days, but they did not harm him. As the Japanese authorities valued his banking expertise, they ordered him to release blocked credits in local banks to jumpstart Syonan’s economy. As a result, they gave him an armband which exempted him from Sook Ching and protected him from Japanese brutality.64

Chinese business leader Tan Siak Kew was likewise detained by the Japanese.

In exchange for sparing his life, they forced him to join the collaborationist

62 Theresa Ee-Chooi, Father of Charity and… My Father (Singapore: SNP Publishing (Raffles Editions), 1997), pp. 100-102. 63 Victor Seah Tiong Hin, A Life Worth Reliving (Singapore: Victor Seah Tiong Hin, 2002), pp. 20, and 26-27. 64 Yap Pheng Geck, Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier: The Reminiscences of Dr. Yap Pheng Geck (Singapore: Times Books International, 1982), pp. 55-62. 86

Oversea Chinese Association (OCA).65 Besides businessmen, doctors, like He

Wen-Lit, and farmers, such as Tang S.Y., were spared from undergoing the harrowing experiences of Sook Ching as the Japanese military needed them to run medical services and produce food respectively.66 Therefore, collaboration with the Japanese, not the Sook Ching Massacre, figures predominantly in the above recollections. Similar to popular memories of compassionate Japanese military officers, these Chinese popular memories of collaboration with the enemy are frowned upon and marginalised by Singapore’s official memories of the Japanese Occupation.

However, some Chinese civilians who were young children during the

Japanese Occupation did not remember the Sook Ching Massacre. As they were at least five years old in 1942, it is unlikely that they had no memories of the atrocities because of childhood amnesia which only affects children below the age of three.67 Thus, these young war survivors’ lack of memories of Sook

Ching was possibly a result of them being shielded by their protective parents from witnessing or hearing about the massacre.68 For instance, six-year-old

Ong Teng Cheong’s mother hid him and his siblings in a rubber factory

65 Fiona Tan, Tan Siak Kew: Going Against the Grain (Singapore: World Scientific, 2015), pp. 21-25. Through the OCA, the Japanese authorities extorted $50 million from the Chinese in Singapore and Malaya in 1942 to support their war effort. See Y.S. Tan, “History of the Formation of the Oversea Chinese Association and the Extortion by J.M.A. of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya”, Journal of the South Seas Society, 3, 1, English version (September 1946), pp. 1-12. 66 He Wen-Lit, Syonan Interlude (Singapore: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1991), pp. 62-71, and 95- 97, and Pang Yang Huei, “A Tangled Web of Wartime Collaboration and Survival in Singapore: A Chinese Farmer’s Experience”, in Reflections and Interpretations: Oral History Centre 25th Anniversary Publication, ed. Daniel Chew, and Fiona Hu (Singapore: Oral History Centre, National Archives of Singapore, National Heritage Board, 2005), pp. 251-252. 67 Schacter, Seven Sins, pp. 126-127. 68 Lim, “Memories of War”, p. 136. 87 throughout the Sook Ching Massacre.69 Hence, his biography did not contain his personal memories of the event. Similarly, Alfred Wong, who was twelve years old in 1942, recalled in his oral history interview, which was published in 1996, that he “passed” the Sook Ching screening. However, he did not dwell on the episode and instead emphasised that he enjoyed his childhood during the Syonan years. Despite his parents’ fear of the Japanese, he was oblivious to the threats and dangers around him.70

Finally, a group of war survivors did not mention their Sook Ching experiences in their writings, even though they were neither toddlers nor young children during the Japanese Occupation. One plausible reason is that their war experiences were so traumatic that they deliberately chose not to recall their memories. Alternatively, as their works were published several decades after the war, these ageing survivors’ memories might have faded to the extent that the degree of their agony and trauma associated with their war memories was lessened.71 Psychological research has proven that as people age, they suffer from memory loss due to neurological changes in the brain.72

Therefore, elderly survivors might not feel the need to recall what they went through during the Sook Ching Massacre. For example, Lee Siew Mong wrote that he “suffered the same hardships” as those at the Sook Ching screening

69 Xinjiapo Lianhe Zaobao 新加坡联合早报 ed., Wang Dingchang – Zouxiang Zongtongfu zhi Lu 王鼎昌 -- 走向总统府之路 [ – Road to the Istana] (Singapore: Xinjiapo Baoye Konggu Huawenbao Jituan (Chinese Newspapers Division, Singapore Press Holdings Limited), 1994), p. 46. Ong served as Singapore’s first Elected President between 1993 and 1999. 70 Melanie Chew, Leaders of Singapore (Singapore: Resource Press, 1996), p. 258. 71 Lim, “Memories of War”, p. 136. 72 Schacter, Searching for Memory, pp. 284-287. 88 centres,73 while Tan Chee Khoon depicted Singapore as being “fraught with danger” during Sook Ching.74 Both men’s descriptions of what they underwent during the massacre were very brief and ambiguous, but they devoted much space in their autobiographies to their lives after 1945. Other Chinese civilians factually described the Sook Ching Massacre from a third person perspective in their autobiographies and memoirs. They failed to account for their experiences during the atrocities, and they seemed to detach themselves personally from the event despite living in Singapore during that time.75 These cases show that the survivors’ experiences were either too distressing to remember that they concealed them, or that they had forgotten what they went through due to memory loss.

Conclusion

I have shown in this chapter that between 1980 and 2015, Singapore and Japan enjoyed cordial and growing relations, notwithstanding the development of diverse Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. The “Learn from Japan” campaign during the 1980s was a high point in bilateral ties as

Singapore sought Japanese expertise and assistance to raise its industrial productivity and build a knowledge-based economy. Both states have sustained their close economic and cultural ties even after the campaign ended by 1990. Although Singapore started to develop and promote official memories of Sook Ching and the Japanese Occupation in 1984 to inculcate

73 Lee Siow Mong, Words Cannot Equal Experience (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985), p. 27. 74 Tan Chee Khoon, Tan Chee Khoon: From Village Boy to Mr. Opposition: An Autobiography (Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1991), p. 43. 75 See, for instance, Goh Chor Boon, Living Hell: Story of a WWII Survivor at the Death Railway (Singapore: Asiapac Books, 1999), p. 34, and Elizabeth Tong, The Wonders of God’s Grace ([Singapore?]: [Elizabeth Tong?], 2004), p. 103. 89 national belonging among Singaporeans, the PAP government did not allow these memories to affect its foreign policy towards Japan. Since then, more autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and oral history interviews by Chinese war survivors who lived through the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese

Occupation were published. These first-hand accounts showed that popular memories of the atrocities are diverse. Some of these popular memories overlap with official memories of the atrocities and the Syonan period. They stress Japanese brutality and contain anti-Japanese sentiments. However, the rest of these popular memories are distinct from official memories as they emphasise the less brutal aspects of Sook Ching and do not necessarily reflect anti-Japanese feelings.

90

CHAPTER FIVE

CONCLUSION

The Nanjing Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore were two major cases of atrocities committed by the Imperial Japanese Army during the Fifteen-Year War. Popular memories of the respective massacre continue to resonate among the Chinese citizenry in China and Singapore in the seventy years after the conflict ended in 1945. Despite being predominantly ethnic Chinese societies and having enduring the brunt of

Japanese aggression, Chinese civilians in China and Singapore have different popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. Therefore, in this study, I have addressed the extent to which the

Chinese populace in China and Singapore remember the respective massacre from 1945 to 2015. I have also discussed the nature of the relationship between Chinese popular memories of each massacre and the corresponding official memories in China and Singapore. I have further analysed how and why China’s and Singapore’s domestic politics and foreign relations with post-war Japan between 1945 and 2015 shape Chinese popular memories of the respective massacre. I shall conclude this thesis by examining the differences between Chinese popular memories of both massacres, and explain the reasons for these differences.

In addition, I have shown in this study that my contribution to the scholarly field of war memories in China and Singapore is to emphasise the importance of how popular memories are formed, and not simply what popular memories

91 are. My research has also built on and expanded from earlier research on the definitions and theories of popular memories, as well as on official memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre. More importantly, I have provided a transnational and trans-regional perspective in understanding popular memories of both massacres through a comparative approach.

Homogeneity versus Heterogeneity

Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China are more homogeneous than those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Between

1945 and 1982, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre were uniformly marginalised by the Chinese state due to domestic and foreign considerations, such as the Maoist victor narrative and the global Cold War respectively. As a result of such “repressive erasure”, popular memories of the massacre became hardly visible in the public domain and were largely confined to the private realm. However, since 1982, as a result of the pervasive influence of official memories, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in the PRC homogeneously contain strong anti-Japanese sentiments. In their published, state-sponsored oral history interviews and testimonies, massacre survivors recounted their harrowing encounters with the Japanese invaders, and the physical injuries and psychological trauma that they suffered as a result of the massacre. Even those who were barely a year old in 1937 were able to vividly and emotionally describe the wartime victimisation that their parents and other family members endured. It clearly reflects the intergenerational transmission of war memories from the older generation to the younger generation in China.

The uniformity of popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre also explains

92 the success of the patriotic education campaign in promoting nationalism among Chinese youths which further results in them embracing popular anti-

Japanese nationalism. In addition, war survivors, despite having not lived in

Nanjing in 1937, could even claim to “remember” the massacre, or recount

Japanese atrocities in the city based on second-hand or third-hand knowledge.

This proves that popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are deeply embedded in Chinese society, and they echo the CCP government’s official memories of Chinese victimhood under Japanese imperialism.

In contrast to the homogeneous popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in

China, Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore have been heterogeneous in nature since 1945. From 1945 to 1980, the “blood debt” issue encouraged the growth of popular memories which stressed

Japanese brutality and contained anti-Japanese emotions. However, as a likely result of the influence of Singapore’s post-war economic rapprochement with

Japan during the same period, some of these Chinese popular memories did not reflect anti-Japanese sentiments as they focussed on the less brutal aspects of Sook Ching. Even after the PAP government developed official memories of the Sook Ching Massacre and the Japanese Occupation in 1984, popular memories of Sook Ching continue to retain their diversity till today (2015).

Some of these popular memories overlap with official memories by highlighting Japanese atrocities and expressing anti-Japanese feelings.

Nevertheless, the rest of these popular memories are distinct from official memories. They avoid discussing the brutal aspects of Sook Ching and do not necessarily contain anti-Japanese feelings. These popular memories are

93 excluded from the Singapore Story because they do not coincide with the ruling party’s victimisation narrative of the Syonan years.

Two explanations may be used to account for the differences in homogeneity between Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Firstly, the nature of the state shapes these memories. Popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre are largely homogeneous and dovetail with official memories due to the authoritarian nature of the CCP regime. The party-state does not tolerate alternative narratives of the massacre that challenge its version which emphasises Chinese victimhood and the death of 300,000 people under brutal Japanese militarism.

In contrast, popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre are more heterogeneous and distinct from official memories owing to the democratic nature of the Singapore state. As Chinese Singaporeans are not obliged to accept the PAP government’s narrative of the massacre, various alternative types of popular memories have proliferated.

Secondly, the socio-economic backgrounds and political loyalties played a role in influencing Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the

Sook Ching Massacre. Those who had remained in Nanjing in 1937, and had experienced or witnessed the Japanese atrocities largely belonged to the lower socio-economic classes, such as peasants and labourers. Unlike the KMT elites and the upper classes, they might not have the means to flee when the

Japanese military invaded the capital. Thus, they view and remember the

Nanjing Massacre from a common perspective. Although Singapore is a

94 predominantly Chinese city, the Chinese population in 1942 was divided into disparate sub-groups, depending on individuals’ places of birth and their political loyalties. On the one hand, those who were China-born and Chinese- educated were loyal to their motherland, and saw the Japanese Occupation in

Singapore as an extension of the Second Sino-Japanese War. As a result, they are more likely to harbour anti-Japanese sentiments, and emphasise Japanese brutality in their memories of the Sook Ching Massacre.1 On the other hand, even though local-born and English-educated Peranakan Chinese2 shared the same culture as their China-born counterparts, they considered themselves as

British subjects who were politically and emotionally detached from China.

Thus, they were less emotional towards the Japanese, were more open to collaboration with them, and remember the Sook Ching Massacre in a more detached manner.3

Symbolism of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre

The Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre occupy different positions in Chinese popular memories in China and Singapore respectively.

The Nanjing Massacre has become an “incomparable and unforgettable” symbol in Chinese historical and national consciousness.4 In popular memories, which are largely shaped by the CCP regime’s official memories, it

1 The various Sook Ching survivors, whose personal recollections are recorded in Qu, Lunxian Suiyue, are such examples. 2 They were Chinese who were born in Singapore or Malaya, and were descendants of inter- marriages between Chinese immigrants and Malay women. 3 William Gwee’s family is an example. See Gwee, A Baba Boyhood. For a study of the differences among the various sub-divisions of the Chinese in Singapore, see Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), pp. 3-21, and166- 178. For a brief study of the political identity of the , see Kwa Chong Guan, “Great Peranakans: The Community in the Colonial State”, in Great Peranakans: Fifty Remarkable Lives, ed. Alan Chong (Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2015), pp. 16-28. 4 Wang, Never Forget National Humiliation, p. 58. 95 is representative of Chinese victimisation by Japanese imperialists during the

War of Resistance. It has also formed a predominant and inalienable part of massacre survivors’ war memories, as shown in their published oral history testimonies and other first-hand accounts. On the contrary, despite its importance in Singapore’s official memories, the Sook Ching Massacre is not a major event in Chinese Singaporeans’ popular memories. The first-hand accounts of most survivors have indicated that the massacre is one of many episodes in their Japanese Occupation experiences, or even in their lifetimes.

It is noteworthy that the results of a public survey conducted by Singapore’s

Institute of Policy Studies in late 2014 revealed that the Japanese Occupation, not the Sook Ching Massacre in particular, was one of the ten most remembered historical events in Singapore.5 Whereas official memories influence popular memories in China and Singapore, there are nuances between official memories in both countries. For instance, the Nanjing

Massacre Memorial Hall is dedicated solely to the victims of the massacre, but the Civilian War Memorial in Singapore commemorates not only Chinese victims of the Sook Ching Massacre, but also victims of all races who were killed by the Japanese military during the Syonan period.

Influence of Domestic Politics and Foreign Relations with Japan

Nonetheless, my study of the differences between Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and those of the Sook Ching Massacre has revealed an area of similarity. Specifically, Chinese popular memories of both massacres are influenced by China’s and Singapore’s respective domestic

5 Charissa Yong, “Most Singaporeans unaware of Coldstore: Poll”, ST, 26 January 2015, p. A8. 96 politics and their foreign relations with post-war Japan from 1945 to 2015. In

China, popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre were marginalised between

1945 and 1982 due to the Chinese Civil War, Mao Zedong’s heroic victor narrative, the global Cold War, and the CCP regime’s Japan-friendly foreign policy. After the outbreak of the Japanese history textbook controversy in

1982, the Communist party-state revived both official and popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre. Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin manipulated these memories to promote Chinese nationalism and strengthen their party’s political legitimacy as Marxism lost credibility domestically and internationally in the late 1980s and early 1990s. They introduced the patriotic education campaign which emphasised Chinese suffering during the Nanjing

Massacre which in turn, has given rise to anti-Japanese nationalism among the

Chinese masses. Worsening Sino-Japanese tensions since 1982, such as

Chinese opposition to Japan’s reluctance to acknowledge its wartime past has further inflamed popular nationalism in the PRC. Such anti-Japanese nationalism has entrenched Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing

Massacre till today (2015).

Similarly, Singapore’s domestic politics and its foreign relations with Japan between 1945 and 2015 have shaped Chinese popular memories of the Sook

Ching Massacre. The “blood debt” issue and the PAP government’s demands for war reparations from Japan led to the growth of popular memories of Sook

Ching from 1945 to 1980. These memories largely expressed strong anti-

Japanese feelings. However, Singapore’s concurrent courting of Japanese investments and technical know-how to develop its nascent industrial

97 economy brought about the development of popular memories which did not necessarily contain anti-Japanese emotions. Since 1984, the PAP administration has been relying on official memories of the Sook Ching

Massacre and the Japanese Occupation, as well as on popular memories which overlap with official memories, to promote nation-building and instil a sense of national identity among Singaporeans. At the same time, the ruling party is confident that these memories of Chinese Singaporeans’ wartime victimhood do not complicate the city-state’s bilateral relations with Japan. The “Learn from Japan” campaign between 1980 and 1990 further enhanced Singapore-

Japan ties and helped to reduce anti-Japanese sentiments in Chinese popular memories of the Sook Ching Massacre. These memories have also portrayed the massacre and the Syonan years in a less emotional but more detached manner.

While it may be argued that this thesis has neglected the study of social factors that may influence popular memories, such as race, religion, and culture, I have shown that domestic politics and international relations are important factors in the shaping of Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China and the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. In order to create a sense of national identity among their citizens, both states manipulate memories of the past to promote nationalism and nation-building. In an increasingly interconnected Asian community of nations, China and Singapore also have interlocking diplomatic and economic relations with Japan. As a result, their domestic politics and bilateral ties with Japan shape both official memories and popular memories of the respective massacre. Owing to the strong

98 influence of domestic politics and foreign relations in China and Singapore, official memories shape popular memories too. This has led to the blurring of the distinction between both types of memories in the two countries.

In summary, the above comparison has revealed that Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre in China are more homogenous than those of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore. Furthermore, the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre are symbolically different in Chinese popular memories in China and Singapore respectively. However, in both China and

Singapore, domestic politics and foreign relations with post-war Japan from

1945 to 2015 are common factors that have shaped popular memories of the

Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre respectively. Hence, Chinese popular memories of the Nanjing Massacre and the Sook Ching Massacre are alike yet unique.

99

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. English Language Sources

Primary Sources

Unpublished Records

The National Archives, London, United Kingdom

WO 325/1004 “War Crimes Trial held in Singapore (1947 Mar. 10- 1952 May 8), Chinese Massacre Case”, War Office: General Headquarters, Allied Land Forces, (South East Asia) War Crimes Group: Investigation Files

Published Documents

Jiang, Zemin. Selected Works of Jiang Zemin. Vols. 1-3. Trans. The Bureau for the Compilation and Translation of Works of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin Under the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China. Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2010-2013.

Lee, Kuan Yew. The Papers of Lee Kuan Yew: Speeches, Interviews and Dialogues. Ed. Julia Chee, Fan Wenjun, Ng Yoke Lin, Tan Bee Leng, June Lin, and Joanne Yip. Vols. 2, 4, 8, and 9. Singapore: Gale Asia, 2012.

National Productivity Board. Productivity Statement 1992. Singapore: National Productivity Board, 1992.

Singapore Tourism Board. Singapore Annual Report on Tourism Statistics 1997. Singapore: Singapore Tourism Board, 1997.

Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews and Testimonies

Chen, Su Lan. Remember Pompong and Oxley Rise. Singapore: Chen Su Lan Trust, 1969.

Chew, Daniel, and Irene Lim eds. Sook Ching. Singapore: Oral History Department, 1992.

Chew, Melanie. Leaders of Singapore. Singapore: Resource Press, 1996.

Beauvoir, Simone de. The Long March. Trans. Austryn Wainhouse. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958.

Ee-Chooi, Theresa. Father of Charity and… My Father. Singapore: SNP Publishing (Raffles Editions), 1997.

100

Goh, Chor Boon. Living Hell: Story of a WWII Survivor at the Death Railway. Singapore: Asiapac Books, 1999.

Gwee, Thian Hock William. A Baba Boyhood: Growing Up during World War 2. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2013.

He, Wen-Lit. Syonan Interlude. Singapore: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1991.

Ho, Ruth. Rainbow round my Shoulder. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1975.

Honda, Katsuichi. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame. Ed. Frank Gibney and trans. Karen Sandness. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

Lau, Teng Chuan. Lau Teng Chuan: Sportsman, Teacher, Sports Administrator. Singapore: Lau Teng Chuan, 2012.

Lee, Kip Lee. Amber Sands: A Boyhood Memoir. Singapore: Federal Publications, 1995.

Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, 2000.

Lee, Kuan Yew. The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, 1998.

Lee, Siow Mong. Words Cannot Equal Experience. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985.

Lim, Arthur, and Tan Mei Ching. From A Doctor’s Diary. Singapore: PG Lim, 1999.

Lim, San Neo. My Life, My Memories, My Story: Recollections of a 75-year old Great-Grandmother. Singapore: Epic Management Services Pte Ltd., [1997?].

Lim, Yew Hock. Reflections. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1986.

Low, N.I., and H.M. Cheng. This Singapore: Our City of Dreadful Night. Singapore: City Book Store, [1947?].

Menon, Ramachandran. Ho See Beng: The Washerwoman’s Son. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2015.

Ooi, Kee Beng. Serving a New Nation: Baey Lian Peck’s Singapore Story. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.

Pearce, Jessie Chan. Ah Nya’s Story. [Canberra?]: [Jessie Chan Pearce?], 2011.

101

Quek, Kiok Chiang. My Thanksgiving Testimonies. Singapore: Far Eastern Beacon Monthly, [2010?].

Seah, Tiong Hin Victor. A Life Worth Reliving. Singapore: Victor Seah Tiong Hin, 2002.

Sidhu, H. The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories. Singapore: Native Publications, 1991.

Shinozaki, Mamoru. Syonan – My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore. Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975.

Tan, Chee Khoon. Tan Chee Khoon: From Village Boy to Mr. Opposition: An Autobiography. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1991.

Tan, Fiona. Tan Siak Kew: Going Against the Grain. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015.

Tan, Geoffrey. Escape from Battambang: A Personal World War II Experience. Singapore: Armour Publishing, 2001.

Tan, Siok Sun. Goh Keng Swee: A Portrait. Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2007.

Tong, Elizabeth. The Wonders of God’s Grace. [Singapore?]: [Elizabeth Tong?], 2004.

Tow, Siang Hwa. Footprints in the Sands of Time. Singapore: Reformation Banner Publishers, 2009.

Tow, Timothy. Son of a Mother’s Vow. Singapore: Far Eastern Bible College Press Bookroom, 2001.

Wee, H.L. Peter. From Farm and Kampong. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1989.

Wong, Moh Keed ed. To My Heart with Smiles: The Love Letters of Siew Fung Fong and Wan Kwai Pik (1920-1941). Singapore: Landmark Books, 1988.

Yap, Pheng Geck. Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier: The Reminiscences of Dr. Yap Pheng Geck. Singapore: Times Books International, 1982.

Newspapers

New Nation

The Straits Times

The Sunday Times

102

United States Foreign Broadcast Information Service Daily Report: Asia and Pacific

Secondary Sources

Books

Blackburn, Kevin, and Karl Hack. War, Memory and the Making of Modern Malaysia and Singapore. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012.

Brabazon, Tara. From Revolution to Revelation: Generation X, Popular Memory and Cultural Studies. Aldershot, Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005.

Chang, Iris. The Rape of Nanking: The Forgotten Holocaust of World War II. New York: Penguin Books, 1997.

Chiang, Tao-chang. The Jurong Industrial Estate: Present Pattern and Future Prospects. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asia, Nanyang University, 1969.

Cohen, Paul. History and Popular Memory: The Power of Story in Moments of Crisis. New York: Columbia University Press, 2014.

Duus, Peter. Modern Japan. 2nd Ed. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1998.

Fogel, Joshua A. ed., The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Gries, Peter Hays. China’s New Nationalism: Pride, Politics, and Diplomacy. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2004.

Halbwachs, Maurice. On Collective Memory. Ed. and trans. Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992.

Hook, Glenn D., Julie Gilson, Christopher W. Hughes, and Hugo Dobson. Japan’s International Relations: Politics, Economics and Security. 3rd Ed. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2012.

Hughes, Christopher R. Chinese Nationalism in the Global Era. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2006.

Kratoska, Paul H. The Japanese Occupation of Malaya: A Social and Economic History. London: C. Hurst, 1998.

Li, Fei Fei, Robert Sabella, and David Liu eds. Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.

Modder, Ralph. The Singapore Chinese Massacre, 18 February to 4 March 1942. Singapore: Horizon Books, 2004.

103

Nora, Pierre. Realms of Memory: Rethinking the French Past. 3 Vols. Ed. Lawrence D. Kritzman and trans. Arthur Goldhammer. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996-1998.

Pitt, Kuah Wah, and Leong Weng Kee eds. The Liberation: Resisting the Rising Sun and a New Beginning. Singapore: National Archives of Singapore, 2012.

Ramcharan, Robin. Forging a Singaporean Statehood, 1965-1995: The Contribution of Japan. The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002.

Reilly, James. Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Rose, Caroline. Sino-Japanese Relations: Facing the Past, Looking to the Future? New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2005.

Schacter, Daniel L. Searching for Memory: The Brain, the Mind, and the Past. New York: Basic Books, 1996.

Schacter, Daniel L. The Seven Sins of Memory: How the Mind Forgets and Remembers. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001.

Seraphim, Franziska. War Memory and Social Politics in Japan, 1945-2005. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2006.

Shimizu, Hiroshi, and Hirakawa Hitoshi. Japan and Singapore in the World Economy: Japan’s Economic Advance into Singapore, 1870-1965. London: Routledge, 1999.

Soeya, Yoshihide. Japan's Economic Diplomacy with China, 1945-1978. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998.

Sun, Jing. Japan and China as Charm Rivals: Soft Power in Regional Diplomacy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2012.

Tan, Beng-luan, and Irene Quah. The Japanese Occupation 1942-1945: A Pictorial Record of Singapore during the War. Singapore: Times Editions, 1996.

Tomaru, Junko. The Postwar Rapprochement of Malaya and Japan, 1945- 1961: The Roles of Britain and Japan in South-East Asia. Basingstoke, Hampshire: Macmillan, 2000.

Totani, Yuma. The Tokyo War Crimes Trial: The Pursuit of Justice in the Wake of World War II. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2008.

104

Turnbull, C.M. A History of Singapore, 1819-1975. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1977.

Volkan, Vamik. Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism. New York: Westview Press, 1997.

Vyas, Utpal. Soft Power in Japan-China Relations: State, Sub-state and Non- state Relations. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011.

Wan, Ming. Sino-Japanese Relations: Interaction, Logic, and Transformation. Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006.

Wang, Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991.

Wang, Zheng. Never Forget National Humiliation: Historical Memory in Chinese Politics and Foreign Relations. New York: Columbia University Press, 2012.

Ward, Ian. The Killer They Called a God. Singapore: Media Masters, 1992.

Whiting, Allen S. China Eyes Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Winter, Jay, and Emmanuel Sivan eds. War and Remembrance in the Twentieth Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Yoshida, Takashi. The Making of the “Rape of Nanking”: History and Memory in Japan, China, and the United States. New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.

Yow, Valerie Raleigh. Recording Oral History: A Guide for the Humanities and Social Sciences. 3rd Ed. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2015.

Book Chapters and Journal Articles

Askew, David. “The Nanjing Incident: Recent Research and Trends”, Electronic Journal of Contemporary Japanese Studies (April 2002). http://www.japanesestudies.org.uk/articles/Askew.html#_edn3. Accessed on 05 July 2015.

Barme, Geremie R. “Mirrors of History: On a Sino-Japanese Moment and Some Antecedents”, The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus (16 May 2005). http://japanfocus.org/-Geremie-Barme/1713/article.html. Accessed on 07 July 2015.

Blackburn, Kevin. “History from Above: The Use of Oral History in Shaping Collective Memory in Singapore”, pp. 31-46. In Oral History and Public Memories. Edited by Paula Hamilton, and Linda Shopes. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2008.

105

Blackburn, Kevin. “Mary Turnbull’s History Textbook for the Singapore Nation”. In Studying Singapore’s Past: C.M. Turnbull and the History of Modern Singapore, pp. 65-86. Edited by Nicholas Tarling. Singapore: NUS Press, 2012.

Buruma, Ian. “The Nanking Massacre as a Historical Symbol”. In Nanking 1937: Memory and Healing, pp. 3-9. Edited by Li Fei Fei, Robert Sabella, and David Liu. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 2002.

Chew, Teng How. “Rest in Peace, Our Martyrs: The Entire Process of Evacuating the Remains of Our Martyrs by the Remains Disposal Committee”. In Eternal Vigilance: The Price of Freedom, pp. 267-274. Edited by Foong Choon Hon, Jane Thum Soon Kun, and Duncan Watt. Trans. Yuen Chen Ching. Singapore: Asiapac Books, 2006.

Choi, Jiyoung. “Chinese Nationalism in Sino-Japanese Relations”. In New Dynamics between China and Japan in Asia: How to Build the Future from the Past?, pp. 33-48. Edited by Guy Faure. Singapore: World Scientific, 2010.

Christensen, Thomas J. “Chinese Realpolitik”, Foreign Affairs, 75, 5 (September-October 1996), pp. 37-52.

Chua, Beng Huat. “’Where got Japanese Influence in Singapore!’”. In Japan in Singapore: Cultural Occurrences and Cultural Flows, pp. 133-149. Edited by Eyal Ben-Ari, and John Clammer. Surrey: Curzon, 2000.

Connerton, Paul. “Seven Types of Forgetting”, Memory Studies, 1, 1 (January 2008), pp. 59-71.

Crocker, David A. “Reckoning with Past Wrongs: A Normative Framework”, Ethics and International Affairs, 13, 1 (March 1999), pp. 43-64.

Eykholt, Mark. “Aggression, Victimization, and Chinese Historiography of the Nanjing Massacre”. In The Nanjing Massacre in History and Historiography, pp. 11-69. Edited by Joshua A. Fogel. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000.

Goh, Chor Boon. “Things Japanese in Our History Syllabus: Implications for National Education”. In Securing our Future: Sourcebook for National Education Ideas and Strategies for Secondary Schools and Junior Colleges, pp. 209-219. Edited by Steven Tan Kwang San, and Goh Chor Boon. Singapore: Prentice Hall, 2003.

Guo, Junhai. “Teaching and Learning Japanese in Singapore”. In Japan and Singapore: A Multidisciplinary Approach, pp. 283-317. Edited by Tsu Yun Hui. Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2006.

He, Yinan. “Forty Years in Paradox: Post-normalisation in Sino-Japanese Relations”, China Perspectives, 4 (December 2013), pp. 7-16.

106

He, Yinan. “History, Chinese Nationalism and the Emerging Sino-Japanese Conflict”, Journal of Contemporary China, 16, 50 (February 2007), pp. 1-24.

He, Yinan. “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006, History and Memory, 19, 2 (Fall/Winter 2007), pp. 43-74.

Hirsch, Marianne. “Past Lives: Postmemories in Exile”, Poetics Today, 17, 4, Creativity and Exile: European/American Perspectives II (Winter 1996), pp. 659-686.

Iriye, Akira. “Chinese-Japanese Relations, 1945-90”, The China Quarterly, 124, China and Japan: History, Trends and Prospects (December 1990), pp. 624-638.

Johnson, Chalmers. “The Patterns of Japanese Relations with China, 1952- 1982”, Pacific Affairs, 59, 3 (Autumn 1986), pp. 402-428.

Koh, Ernest. “De-historicising the Second World War: Diaspora, Nation, and the Overseas Chinese”. In The Pacific War: Aftermaths, Remembrance and Culture, pp. 11-31. Edited by Christina Twomey, and Ernest Koh. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2015.

Kwa, Chong Guan. “Great Peranakans: The Community in the Colonial State”. In Great Peranakans: Fifty Remarkable Lives, pp. 16-28. Edited by Alan Chong. Singapore: Asian Civilisations Museum, 2015.

Latif, Asad-ul Iqbal. “Singapore’s Missing War”. In Legacies of World War II in South and East Asia, pp. 92-103. Edited by David Koh Wee Hock. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007.

Lau, Albert. “The National Past and the Writing of the History of Singapore”. In Imagining Singapore. 2nd Ed., pp. 34-53. Edited by Ban Kah Choon, Anne Pakir, and Tong Chee Kiong. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 2004.

Lim, Pui Huen P. “Memories of War in Malaya”. In Malaya and Singapore during the Japanese Occupation, pp. 121-147. Edited by Paul H. Kratoska. Singapore: Department of History, National University of Singapore, 1995.

Muzaini, Hamzah. “Producing/Consuming Memoryscapes: The Genesis/Politics of Second World War Commemoration in Singapore”, GeoJournal, 66, 3, Heritage, Politics and Identity in Southeast Asia (July 2006), pp. 211-222.

Nets-Zehngut, Rafi. “The Israeli Army’s Official Memory of the 1948 Palestinian Exodus, 1949-2004”, War in History, 22, 2 (April 2015), pp. 211- 234.

107

Nora, Pierre. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Memoire”, Representations, 26 (Spring 1989), pp. 7-24.

Pang, Yang Huei. “A Tangled Web of Wartime Collaboration and Survival in Singapore: A Chinese Farmer’s Experience”. In Reflections and Interpretations: Oral History Centre 25th Anniversary Publication, pp. 227- 255. Edited by Daniel Chew, and Fiona Hu. Singapore: Oral History Centre, National Archives of Singapore, National Heritage Board, 2005.

Popular Memory Group. “Popular Memory: Theory, Politics, Method”. In Making Histories: Studies in History-writing and Politics, pp. 205-252. Edited by Richard Johnson, Gregor McLennan, Bill Schwarz, and David Suttton. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982.

Reilly, James. “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan”, Modern Asian Studies, 45, 2 (March 2011), pp. 463-490.

Shiraishi, Takashi, and Caroline Sy Hau. “Only Yesterday: China, Japan and the Transformation of East Asia”. In The Cold War in Asia: The Battle for Hearts and Minds, pp. 25-38. Edited by Zheng Yangwen, Hong Liu, and Michael Szonyi. Leiden: Brill, 2010.

Smith, Simon C. “Crimes and Punishment: Local Responses to the Trial of Japanese War Criminals in Malaya and Singapore, 1946-48”, South East Asia Research, 5, 1 (March 1997), pp. 41-56.

Tan, Y.S. “History of the Formation of the Oversea Chinese Association and the Extortion by J.M.A of $50,000,000 Military Contribution from the Chinese in Malaya”, Journal of the South Seas Society, 3, 1, English section (September 1946), pp. 1-12.

Thang, Leng Leng, and S. K. Gan. “The ‘Learn from Japan’ Campaign in Singapore”. In Japan and Singapore: A Multidisciplinary Approach, pp. 259- 282. Edited by Tsu Yun Hui. Singapore: McGraw-Hill, 2006.

Thurston, Anne F. “Community and Isolation; Memory and Forgetting: in Search of Itself”. In Memory and History in East and Southeast Asia: Issues of Identity in International Relations, pp. 149-172. Edited by Gerrit W. Gong. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2001.

Wong, Diana. “Memory Suppression and Memory Production: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore”. In Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), pp. 218-238. Edited by T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001.

108

Xu, Xiaohong, and Lyn Spillman. “Political Centres, Progressive Narratives and Cultural Trauma: Coming to Terms with the Nanjing Massacre in China, 1937-1979”. In Northeast Asia’s Difficult Past: Essays in Collective Memory, pp. 101-128. Edited by Mikyoung Kim, and Barry Schwartz. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

Yang, Daqing. “Convergence or Divergence? Recent Historical Writings on the Rape of Nanjing”, The American Historical Review, 104, 3 (June 1999), pp. 842-865.

Yang, Daqing. “Mirror for the Future or the History Card?: Understanding the ‘History Problem’”. In Chinese-Japanese Relations in the Twenty-first Century: Complementarity and Conflict, pp. 10-31. Edited by Marie Soderberg. London: Routledge, 2002.

Yang, Daqing. “Political Apology in Sino-Japanese Relations: The Murayama Statement and Its Receptions in China”. In Japan and Reconciliation in Post- war Asia: The Murayama Statement and its Implications, pp. 23-45. Edited by Kazuhiko Togo. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.

Yang, Daqing. “The Malleable and the Contested: The Nanjing Massacre in Postwar China and Japan”. In Perilous Memories: The Asia-Pacific War(s), pp. 50-86. Edited by T. Fujitani, Geoffrey M. White, and Lisa Yoneyama. Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 2001.

Yang, Daqing. “The Nanjing Atrocity: Is Constructive Dialogue Possible?”. Toward a History Beyond Borders: Contentious Issues in Sino-Japanese Relations, pp. 178-204. Edited by Daqing Yang, Jie Liu, Hiroshi Mitani, and Andrew Gordon. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Asia Center, 2012.

Yeo, Song Nian, and Ng Siew Ai “The Japanese Occupation as Reflected in Singapore-Malayan Chinese Literary Works after the Japanese Occupation (1945-49)”. In War and Memory in Malaysia and Singapore, pp. 106-119. Edited by P. Lim Pui Huen, and Diana Wong. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2000.

Yoshihara, Kunio. “Japan’s Economic Relations with Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asian Affairs (1974), pp. 57-85.

Websites

Embassy of the Republic of Singapore, Tokyo, “The Embassy”, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/overseasmission/tokyo/about_the_embass y/the_embassy.html/. Accessed on 25 June 2015.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore, “Japan: Bilateral Relations”, http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/countries_and_region/northeast_asia/japa n.html. Accessed on 16 December 2014.

109

Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Singapore. “MFA Spokesman's Comments On Visit By Prime Minister Koizumi To The Yasukuni Shrine On 15 August 2006”. http://www.mfa.gov.sg/content/mfa/media_centre/press_room/pr/2006/200608 /press_20060815.html. Accessed on 16 December 2014.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Joint Communique of the Government of Japan and the Government of the People’s Republic of China”. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/joint72.html. Accessed on 07 July 2015.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Statement by Prime Minister Tomiichi Murayama: ‘On the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war’s end’ (15 August 1995)”. http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html. Accessed on 16 September 2014.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. “Treaty of Peace and Friendship between Japan and the People’s Republic of China”. http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/china/treaty78.html. Accessed on 07 July 2015.

Prime Minister’s Office, Singapore. “Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 19th Nikkei International Conference on the Future of Asia (23 May 2013)”. http://www.pmo.gov.sg/mediacentre/speech-prime-minister-lee- hsien-loong-19th-nikkei-international-conference-future-asia. Accessed on 16 December 2014.

“The Nanjing massacre: New memorial days in China are a sign of frostiness with Japan”. The Economist, 12 December 2014, http://www.economist.com/news/china/21636115-new-memorial-days-china- are-sign-frostiness-japan-lest-they-forget. Accessed on 13 December 2014.

“Xi Jinping blasts Japan's wartime atrocities at high-profile Nanking massacre memorial”, South China Morning Post, 13 December 2014, http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1661651/xi-jinping-blasts-japans- wartime-atrocities-high-profile-nanjing-massacre. Accessed on 13 December 2014.

Zhang, Yunbi, and Cai Hong. “Survey finds pessimism in ties with Japan”. China Daily, 10 September 2014. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2014- 09/10/content_18571059.htm and http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/2014- 09/10/content_18571059_2.htm. Accessed on 17 September 2014.

Conference Talk

Buruma, Ian. “Keynote Speech”, Public Symposium: Competition and Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Recognising Challenges, Seizing Opportunities, Department of Japanese Studies and Department of Political Science, National University of Singapore, 19 November 2014.

110

B. Chinese Language Sources

Primary Sources

Published Documents

Deng, Xiaoping 邓小平. Deng Xiaoping Wenxuan 邓小平文选 [Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping]. Hong Kong: Renmin Chubanshe and Sanlian Shudian (Xianggang) Youxian Gongsi (Joint Publishing (H.K.) Co., Ltd.), 1996.

Mao, Zedong 毛泽东. Mao Zedong Waijiao Wenxuan 毛泽东外交文选 [Selected Works of Mao Zedong on Foreign Affairs]. Ed. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Waijiaobu 中华人民共和国外交部 and Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi 中共中央文献研究室. Beijing: Zhongyang Wenxian Chubanshe and Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 1994.

Autobiographies, Biographies, Memoirs, and Oral History Interviews and Testimonies

Dazhan yu Nanqiao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 大战与南桥编纂委员会 ed. Dazhan yu Nanqiao: Malaiya Zhibu 大战与南侨：马来亚之部 [The Second World War and the Nanyang Chinese: Malayan Section]. Singapore: Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo Nanmin Zonghui and Xin Nanyang Chubanshe, 1947.

Hong, Jintang 洪锦棠. Jiehou Huiyi Lu 劫后回忆录 [Post-war Memoirs]. Singapore: Liulian Chubanshe, 1946.

Huang, Dali 黄大礼. Xuebei Buyi 血碑补遗 [Addendum to a Blood Stele]. Singapore: Xinjiapo Qingnian Shuju (The Youth Book Company), 2008.

Luo, Hansong 罗汉松 ed. Zhaonan Lijie Ji: Cantong de Zhanzheng 昭南历劫 记：惨痛的战争 [A Record of Turbulent Experiences in Syonan: A Traumatic War]. Singapore: Xin Wenhua Jigou, [1950?].

Matsuoka, Tamaki 松冈环 ed. Nanjingzhan: Beigelie de Shouhaizhe zhi Hun: Nanjing Datusha Shouhaizhe 120 Ren de Zhengyan 南京战：被割裂的受害 者之魂： 南京大屠杀受害者 120 人的证言 [The Souls of the Victims during the Battle of Nanjing: Testimonies of 120 Victims of the Nanjing Massacre]. Trans. Shen Weifan 沈维藩. Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 2005.

111

Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Bianji Weiyuanhui 南京大屠杀'史料编辑委员会 ed. Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shiliao 侵华日军南京大屠杀史料 (Source Materials Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937). Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1985.

Qu, Rubo 区如柏. Lunxian Suiyue 沦陷岁月 [Years of Occupation]. Singapore: Shengyou Shuju (Seng Yew Book Store), 1993.

Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun Diaocha Xiaozu 三年零八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村调查小组 ed. Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun (Chugao) 三年零八个月： 日军统治下的华人乡村（初稿） [Three Years and Eight Months: Chinese Villages under Japanese Occupation (Draft Manuscript)]. Singapore: Nanyang Daxue Lishixi, 1970.

Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui 星洲被检者家属妇女互助会 (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families) ed. Xingzhou Beijian Xishengzhe Wuzhounian Jinian Tekan 星洲被检牺牲者五 周年纪念特刊 [Special Commemorative Issue for the Fifth Anniversary of the Victims of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore]. Singapore: Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families), 1947.

Xinjiapo Lianhe Zaobao 新加坡联合早报 ed. Wang Dingchang – Zouxiang Zongtongfu zhi Lu 王鼎昌 -- 走向总统府之路 [Ong Teng Cheong – Road to the Istana]. Singapore: Xinjiapo Baoye Konggu Huawenbao Jituan (Chinese Newspapers Division, Singapore Press Holdings Limited), 1994.

Zhang, Xianwen 张宪文 ed. et al. Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Ji 南京大屠杀史 料集 [Collection of Historical Documents on the Nanjing Massacre]. 72 Vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe and Fenghuang Chuban Chuanmei Jituan, 2005-2010.

Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央档案馆, Zhongguo Di’er Lishi Dang’anguan 中 国第二历史档案馆, and Jilinsheng Shehui Kexueyuan 吉林省社会科学院 eds. Nanjing Datusha 南京大屠杀 [Nanjing Massacre]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1995.

Zhu, Chengshan 朱成山 ed. Qinhua Rijun Najing Datusha Xingcunzhe Zhengyan 侵华日军南京大屠杀幸存者证言 (A Collection of Survivors’ Testimony of the Nanjing Massacre). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press (China)), 2005.

Newspapers and Magazines

Guangming Ribao 光明日报 (Guangming Daily)

112

Lianhe Zaobao 联合早报

Xinhua Yuebao 新华月报

Secondary Sources

Books

Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao Bianweihui 侵华日军南京大屠杀史稿 编委会 ed. Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shigao 侵华日军南京大屠杀史稿 (Draft Manuscript of the History Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937). Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1997.

Sun, Zhaiwei 孙宅巍. Chengqing Lishi – Nanjing Datusha Yanjiu yu Sikao 澄 清历史 -- 南京大屠杀研究与思考 [Historical Clarifications: Research and Reflections on the Nanjing Massacre]. Nanjing: Fenghuang Chuban Chuanmei Jituan and Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2005.

Book Chapters and Journal Articles

Mei, Ru’ao 梅汝璈. “Guanyu Gu Shoufu, Songjing Shigen he Nanjing Datusha Shijian 关于谷寿夫、松井石根和南京大屠杀事件 [On Tani Hisao, Matsui Iwane and the Nanjing Massacre Incident]”. In Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 22, pp. 16-36. Edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史资料研究委员会. [Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, n.d.

Mei, Ru’ao 梅汝璈. “Guanyu ‘Nanjing Datusha Shijian’ de Jidian Buzheng 关 于《南京大屠杀事件》的几点补正 [Some Corrections regarding the article ‘Nanjing Massacre Incident’]”, in Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 34, pp. 265- 267. Edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史资料研究委员会. [Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, [1962?].

Mei, Xiao’ao 梅小璈. “Nanjing Datusha ji Qita – Xianfu Mei Ru’ao de Yixie Kanfa 南京大屠杀及其他 -- 先父梅汝璈的一些看法 [My Late Father Mei Ru’ao’s Views on the Nanjing Massacre and Others]”. In Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datushashi Guoji Xueshu Yantaohui Lunwenji 侵华日军南京大屠杀 史国际学术硏讨会论文集 [Collected Essays of the International Conference on the History of the Nanjing Massacre], pp. 446-453. Edited by Chen Anji 陈 安吉. Hefei: Anhui Daxue Chubanshe, 1998.

113

Zhao, Shemin 赵社民, and Meng Guoxiang 孟国祥. “Zhonggong Shenpan Riben Zhanfan Gongzuo Shuping 中共审判日本战犯工作述评 [An Account and Discussion of the Work of the Chinese Communist Party in Trying Japanese War Criminals]”, Nanjing Shehui Kexue 南京社会科学 (Social Sciences in Nanjing)”, 8 (2009), pp. 96-101.

114

APPENDIX 1

LIST OF FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS ON THE NANJING MASSACRE

(Note: This is not an exhaustive list which includes autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews and testimonies that are not stated in the Bibliography.)

A. English Language Accounts

De Beauvoir, Simone. The Long March. Trans. Austryn Wainhouse. Cleveland: World Publishing Company, 1958.

Honda, Katsuichi. The Nanjing Massacre: A Japanese Journalist Confronts Japan's National Shame. Ed. Frank Gibney and trans. Karen Sandness. Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1999.

B. Chinese Language Accounts

Lin, Changsheng 林长生. Nanjing Datusha zhi Tiezheng: Xiang Quanshijie Renmin Mingyuan de Susongzhuang 南京大屠杀之铁证：向全世界人民鸣 冤的诉讼状 [Ironclad Evidence of the Nanjing Massacre: Cry of Injustice for All People in the World]. Beijing: Zhongyang Bianyi Chubanshe (Central Compilation and Translation Press), 2005.

Matsuoka, Tamaki 松冈环 ed. Nanjingzhan Beigelie de Shouhaizhe zhi Hun: Nanjing Datusha Shouhaizhe 120 Ren de Zhengyan 南京战被割裂的受害者 之魂: 南京大屠杀受害者 120 人的证言 [The Souls of the Victims during the Battle of Nanjing: Testimonies of 120 Victims of the Nanjing Massacre]. Trans. Shen Weifan 沈维藩. Shanghai: Shanghai Cishu Chubanshe, 2005.

Mei, Ru’ao 梅汝璈. “Guanyu Gu Shoufu, Songjing Shigen he Nanjing Datusha Shijian 关于谷寿夫、松井石根和南京大屠杀事件 [On Tani Hisao, Matsui Iwane and the Nanjing Massacre Incident]”. In Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 22, pp. 16-36. Edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史资料研究委员会. [Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, n.d.

115

Mei, Ru’ao 梅汝璈. “Guanyu ‘Nanjing Datusha Shijian’ de Jidian Buzheng 关 于《南京大屠杀事件》的几点补正 [Some Corrections regarding the article ‘Nanjing Massacre Incident’]”, in Wenshi Jiliao Xuanji 文史资料选辑 [Selected Compilation of Literary and Historical Materials], Vol. 34, pp. 265- 267. Edited by Zhongguo Renmin Zhengzhi Xieshang Huiyi Quanguo Weiyuanhui 中国人民政治协商会议全国委员会 and Wenshi Jiliao Yanjiu Weiyuanhui 文史资料研究委员会. [Beijing?]: Zhongguo Wenshi Chubanshe, [1962?].

Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Bianji Weiyuanhui 南京大屠杀'史料编辑委员会 ed. Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shiliao 侵华日军南京大屠杀档案 (Archival Documents Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937). Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1987.

Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Bianji Weiyuanhui 南京大屠杀'史料编辑委员会 ed. Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Shiliao 侵华日军南京大屠杀史料 (Source Materials Relating to the Horrible Massacre Committed by the Japanese Troops in Nanjing in December 1937). Nanjing: Jiangsu Guji Chubanshe, 1985.

Wu Guangyi 吴广义 ed. Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Rizhi 侵华日军南京 大屠杀日志 [Journal of the Nanjing Massacre]. Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press (China)), 2005.

Xu, Zhigeng 徐志耕. Nanjing Datusha: Mujizhe Zhengyan 南京大屠杀：目 击者证言 [Nanjing Massacre: Eye-witnesses’ Testimonies]. Taipei: Shibao Wenhua Chuban Qiye Youxian Gongsi, 1989.

Zhang, Xianwen 张宪文 ed. et al. Nanjing Datusha Shiliao Ji 南京大屠杀史 料集 [Collection of Historical Documents on the Nanjing Massacre]. 72 Vols. Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe and Fenghuang Chuban Chuanmei Jituan, 2005-2010.

Zhongyang Dang’anguan 中央档案馆, Zhongguo Di’er Lishi Dang’anguan 中 国第二历史档案馆, and Jilinsheng Shehui Kexueyuan 吉林省社会科学院 eds. Nanjing Datusha 南京大屠杀 [Nanjing Massacre]. Beijing: Zhonghua Shuju, 1995.

Zhu, Chengshan 朱成山 ed. Qinhua Rijun Najing Datusha Xingcunzhe Zhengyan 侵华日军南京大屠杀幸存者证言 (A Collection of Survivors’ Testimony of the Nanjing Massacre). Beijing: Shehui Kexue Wenxian Chubanshe (Social Sciences Academic Press (China)), 2005.

116

APPENDIX 2

LIST OF FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS ON THE

SOOK CHING MASSACRE

(Note: 1. This is not an exhaustive list which includes autobiographies, biographies, memoirs, and published oral history interviews and testimonies that are not stated in the Bibliography. Some of these first- hand accounts also discuss the Japanese Occupation of Singapore and nation-building in post-war Singapore. 2. All the first-hand accounts listed in this Appendix are categorised according to their respective year of publication, as stated in Table 1 and Table 2 of this thesis.)

A. 1945-1960

English Language Accounts

Low, N.I., and H.M. Cheng. This Singapore: Our City of Dreadful Night. Singapore: City Book Store, 1947.

Tan, Thoon Lip. Kempeitai Kindness. Singapore: The Malayan Law Journal, 1946.

Chinese Language Accounts

Dazhan yu Nanqiao Bianzuan Weiyuanhui 大战与南桥编纂委员会 ed. Dazhan yu Nanqiao: Malaiya Zhibu 大战与南侨：马来亚之部 [The Second World War and the Nanyang Chinese: Malayan Section]. Singapore: Nanyang Huaqiao Chouzhen Zuguo Nanmin Zonghui and Xin Nanyang Chubanshe, 1947.

Hong, Jintang 洪锦棠. Jiehou Huiyi Lu 劫后回忆录 [Post-war Memoirs]. Singapore: Liulian Chubanshe, 1946.

Luo, Hansong 罗汉松. Zhaonan Lijie Ji: Cantong de Zhanzheng 昭南历劫记： 惨痛的战争 [A Record of Turbulent Experiences in Syonan: A Traumatic War]. Singapore: Xin Wenhua Jigou, [1950?].

Rijun Baoxing Lu: Zhaonan Xuelei Shi, Malaiya Lunxian Ji 日军暴行录：昭 南血泪史，马来亚沦陷记 [Record of Japanese Military Atrocities: Traumatic History of Syonan and Record of the Occupation of Malaya]. Singapore: Renmin Shuju (People Book Store), [1950?].

Xie, Songshan 谢松山. Xue Hai 血海 [Sea of Blood]. Singapore: Nanyang Baoshe, 1950.

117

Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui 星洲被检者家属妇女互助会 (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families) ed. Xingzhou Beijian Xishengzhe Wuzhounian Jinian Tekan 星洲被检牺牲者五 周年纪念特刊 [Special Commemorative Issue for the Fifth Anniversary of the Victims of the Sook Ching Massacre in Singapore]. Singapore: Xingzhou bei Jianzhe Jiashu Funu Huzhuhui (Singapore Women Mutual Aid Association of Victims’ Families), 1947.

B. 1961-1980

English Language Accounts

Chen, Su Lan. Remember Pompong and Oxley Rise. Singapore: Chen Su Lan Trust, 1969.

Ho, Ruth. Rainbow round my Shoulder. Singapore: Eastern Universities Press, 1975.

Shinozaki, Mamoru. My Wartime Experiences in Singapore. Interviewed by Lim Yoon Lin. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1973.

Shinozaki, Mamoru. Syonan – My Story: The Japanese Occupation of Singapore. Singapore: Asia Pacific Press, 1975.

Tan, Kok Seng. Son of Singapore: The Autobiography of a . Rendered into English by the author in collaboration with Austin Coates. Singapore: University Education Press, 1972.

Thio, Chan Bee. Extraordinary Adventures of an Ordinary Man. London: Grosvenor Books, 1977.

Chinese Language Accounts

Li, Kuanyu 黎宽裕 (Lai Kai Joo). Fusheng Zhuiyi: Yiwei Xinjiaporen zhi Zishu 浮生追忆：一位新加坡人之自述 (Glimpses Of the Past – Memoirs Of A Singaporean). Singapore: Zhonghua Shuju (Chung Hwa Book Company), 1979.

Malaiya Huaren KangRi Shiliao 马来亚华人抗日史料 [Historical Materials on the Malayan Chinese Anti-Japanese Resistance]. Vol. 3. Singapore: n.p., [1978?]

118

Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun Diaocha Xiaozu 三年零八个月：日军统治下的华人乡村调查小组 ed. Sannian Ling Ba ge Yue: Rijun Tongzhixia de Huaren Xiangcun (Chugao) 三年零八个月： 日军统治下的华人乡村（初稿） [Three Years and Eight Months: Chinese Villages under Japanese Occupation (Draft Manuscript)]. Singapore: Nanyang Daxue Lishixi [History Department, Nanyang University], 1970.

C. 1981-2000

English Language Accounts

Chew, Daniel, and Irene Lim eds. Sook Ching. Singapore: Oral History Department, 1992. (Bilingual edition)

Chew, Melanie. Leaders of Singapore. Singapore: Resource Press, 1996.

Choy, Elizabeth. Oral History Interview. Singapore: Oral History Department, 1985.

Ee-Chooi, Theresa. Father of Charity and… My Father. Singapore: SNP Publishing (Raffles Editions), 1997.

Foong, Choon Hon ed. : True Accounts of the Japanese Occupation. Trans. Clara Show. Singapore: Asiapac Books, 1997.

Goh, Chor Boon. Living Hell: Story of a WWII Survivor at the Death Railway. Singapore: Asiapac Books, 1999.

He, Wen-Lit. Syonan Interlude. Singapore: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1991.

Hon, Joan. Relatively Speaking. Singapore: Times Books International, 1984.

Lee, Kip Lee. Amber Sands: A Boyhood Memoir. Singapore: Federal Publications, 1995.

Lee, Kuan Yew. From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, 1965-2000: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, 2000.

Lee, Kuan Yew. The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, 1998.

Lee, Siow Mong. Words Cannot Equal Experience. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1985.

Lim, Arthur, and Tan Mei Ching. From A Doctor’s Diary. Singapore: PG Lim, 1999.

119

Lim, San Neo. My Life, My Memories, My Story: Recollections of a 75-year old Great-Grandmother. Singapore: Epic Management Services Pte Ltd., [1997?].

Lim, Yew Hock. Reflections. Kuala Lumpur: Pustaka Antara, 1986.

Phua, Edward. Sunny Days in Serangoon. Singapore: Pan Pacific Book Distributors in association with Manhattan Press, 1981.

Sidhu, H. The Bamboo Fortress: True Singapore War Stories. Singapore: Native Publications, 1991.

Shu, Yun-Ts’iao, and Chua Ser-Koon eds. Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan, 1937-1945: Selected Source Materials. Singapore: Cultural and Historical Publishing House, 1984. (Bilingual edition)

Tan, Chee Khoon. From Village Boy to Mr. Opposition: An Autobiography. Petaling Jaya: Pelanduk Publications, 1991.

Wee, H.L. Peter. From Farm and Kampong. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1989.

Wong, Moh Keed ed. To My Heart with Smiles: The Love Letters of Siew Fung Fong and Wan Kwai Pik (1920-1941). Singapore: Landmark Books, 1988.

Yap, Pheng Geck. Scholar, Banker, Gentleman Soldier: The Reminiscences of Dr. Yap Pheng Geck. Singapore: Times Books International, 1982.

Zhou, Mei. : More than a War Heroine: A Biography. Singapore: Landmark Books, 1995.

Chinese Language Accounts

Feng, Zhonghan 冯仲汉 (Foong Choon Hon) ed. Heping de Daijia: Malai Bandao Lunxian Qijian, 136 Budui ji Qita Fanqinlue Shili Jishi 和平的代价： 马来半岛沦陷期间 136 部队及其他反侵略势力纪实 [The Price of Peace: A Factual Record of and Other Anti-Japanese Forces during the Japanese Occupation of the Malay Peninsula]. Singapore: Xinjiapo Zhonghua Zongshanghui (Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce and Industry), 1995.

Qiu, Xinmin 邱新民. Zhuang Zhulin Boshi Zhuan: Yidai Zongshi Jiaoyujia 庄 竹林博士传：一代宗师教育家 [Biography of Dr. Zhuang Zhulin: Great Educator of His Generation]. Singapore: Shengyou Shuju (Seng Yew Book Store), 1989.

Qu, Rubo 区如柏. Lunxian Suiyue 沦陷岁月 [Years of Occupation]. Singapore: Sengyou Shuju (Seng Yew Book Store), 1993.

120

Shinozaki, Mamoru 筱崎护. Xinjiapo Lunxian Sannian ban.新加坡沦陷三年 半 [Three and a Half Years of Occupation in Singapore]. 3rd Ed. Trans. Chen Jiachang 陈加昌. Singapore: Fanya Tongxunshe, 1992.

Xinjiapo Lianhe Zaobao 新加坡联合早报 ed. Wang Dingchang – Zouxiang Zongtongfu zhi Lu 王鼎昌 -- 走向总统府之路 [Ong Teng Cheong – Road to the Istana]. Singapore: Xinjiapo Baoye Konggu Huawenbao Jituan (Chinese Newspapers Division, Singapore Press Holdings Limited), 1994.

Xu, Yunqiao 许云樵 (Shu Yun-Ts’iao), and Cai Shijun 蔡史君 (Chua Ser- Koon) eds. Xinma Huaren Kangri Shiliao, 1937-1945 新马华人抗日史料， 1937-1945 (Malayan Chinese Resistance to Japan, 1937-1945: Selected Source Materials). Singapore: Wenshi Chuban (Cultural and Historical Publishing House), 1984. (Bilingual edition)

Zhu, Liwen 朱立文 ed. Cong Gulangyu dao Xinjiapo – Yiwei Waiji Huaren de Licheng: Huang Wangqing Zhuan 从鼓浪屿到新加坡 -- 一位外籍华人的历 程：黄望青传 (A Life Journey from Gulangyu to Singapore: Biography of Mr. Wee Mon-cheng (M.C. Wee)). Xiamen: Xianmen Daxue Chubanshe, 1995.

D. 2001-2015

English Language Accounts

Chan, Kwee Sung. One More Story to Tell: Memories of Singapore, 1930s- 1980s. Singapore: Landmark Books, 2005.

Choi, Siew Hong. I Remember… A Memoir. [Singapore?]: Partridge, 2014.

Chor Yeok Eng, “Chor Yeok Eng: The Branch Secretary”. In We also Served: Reflections of Singapore’s former PAP MPs, pp. 27-39. Edited by Chiang Hai Ding, and Rohan Kamis. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2014.

Chow, Ivan. Chow Chee Yee: Formed by Providence. Singapore: Landmark Books, 2003.

Fong, Chong Pik. Fong Chong Pik: The Memoirs of a Malayan Communist Revolutionary. Trans. Chan Siew Yip. Petaling Jaya: Strategic Information and Research Development Centre, 2008.

Foong, Choon Hon, Jane Thum Soon Kun, and Duncan Watt eds. Eternal Vigilance: The Price of Freedom. Trans. Yuen Chen Ching. Singapore: Asiapac Books, 2006.

Gwee, Thian Hock William. A Baba Boyhood: Growing Up during World War 2. Singapore: Marshall Cavendish Editions, 2013.

121

Latif, Asad-ul Iqbal. Lim Kim San: A Builder of Singapore. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

Lau, Teng Chuan. Lau Teng Chuan: Sportsman, Teacher, Sports Administrator. Singapore: Lau Teng Chuan, 2012.

Lim, S.P. Harold. A Singapore Life. Lincoln, Nebraska: iUniverse, 2006.

Loke, Hoe Yeong. Let the People Have Him: : The Early Years. Singapore: Epigram Books, 2014.

Lucien Wang: Archive, Memory, Biography. Singapore: Nanyang Academy of Fine Arts, 2013.

Lum, Lucy. The Thorn of Lion City: A Memoir. London: Fourth Estate, 2007.

Menon, Ramachandran. Ho See Beng: The Washerwoman’s Son. Singapore: Straits Times Press, 2015.

Ngiam, Tong Dow. A Mandarin and the Making of Public Policy: Reflections of Ngiam Tong Dow. Introduced and edited by Simon S. C. Tay. Singapore: NUS Press, 2006.

Ooi, Kee Beng. In Lieu of Ideology: The Intellectual Biography of Goh Keng Swee. Singapore: ISEAS Publishing, 2010.

Ooi, Kee Beng. Serving a New Nation: Baey Lian Peck’s Singapore Story. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2011.

Pang, Yang Huei. “A Tangled Web of Wartime Collaboration and Survival in Singapore: A Chinese Farmer’s Experience”. In Reflections and Interpretations: Oral History Centre 25th Anniversary Publication, pp. 227- 255. Edited by Daniel Chew, and Fiona Hu. Singapore: Oral History Centre, National Archives of Singapore, National Heritage Board, 2005.

Patchwork of Reminiscences. Singapore: NTU Welfare Services Club, Patchworks, 2010.

Pearce, Jessie Chan. Ah Nya’s Story. [Canberra?]: [Jessie Chan Pearce?], 2011.

Quek, Kiok Chiang. My Thanksgiving Testimonies. Singapore: Far Eastern Beacon Monthly, [2010?]. (Bilingual edition)

Seah, Tiong Hin Victor. A Life Worth Reliving. Singapore: Victor Seah Tiong Hin, 2002.

Si Hoe, Sing Leng. A Young Girl’s Wartime Diary: The Journal of a Teenager Written during the Japanese Occupation of Singapore. Singapore: Lingzi Media, 2007.

122

Tan, Chee Khoon Andrew. Papa As A Little Boy Named Ah Khoon. Singapore: Ring of Light Publishers, 2007.

Tan, Fiona. Tan Siak Kew: Going Against the Grain. Singapore: World Scientific, 2015.

Tan, Geoffrey. Escape from Battambang: A Personal World War II Experience. Singapore: Armour Publishing, 2001.

Tan, Kong Wee. Random Thoughts: Life’s Moments Passed Down Generations. Singapore: Sun Media, 2008.

Tan, Siok Sun. Goh Keng Swee: A Portrait. Singapore: Editions Didier Millet, 2007.

Tong, Elizabeth. The Wonders of God’s Grace. [Singapore?]: [Elizabeth Tong?], 2004.

Tow, Siang Hwa. Footprints in the Sands of Time. Singapore: Reformation Banner Publishers, 2009.

Tow, Timothy. Son of a Mother’s Vow. Singapore: Far Eastern Bible College Press Bookroom, 2001.

Wee, Kim Wee. Wee Kim Wee: Glimpses and Reflections. Singapore: Landmark Books, 2004.

Yeo, Hong Eng. The Little Red Cliff: 1946-1963. Singapore: Trafford, 2013.

Zhou, Yu Chun. Happy Ants: The Memoirs of Zhuo Yu Chun. Trans. Nicholas Koh Li Yong. Singapore: Zhuo Yu Chun, 2008.

Chinese Language Accounts

Chen, Shaobin 陈少斌 ed. Xunlu Jiageng Yeji: Jimei Xiangxian Chen Wenque Chen Liushi Jiazu Zhuanlue 循履嘉庚业迹 : 集美乡贤陈文确陈六使家族传 略 [Following the Tan Kah-kee’s Business Footsteps: The Family Biography of Virtuous Kinsmen in Jimei: Chen Wenque and Tan Lark Sye]. Xiamen: Xiamenshi Jimeiqu Guiguo Huaqiao Lianhehui and Xiamenshi Jimei Chen Jiageng Yanjiuhui, 2003.

Chen, Zhicheng 陈志成 (Chan Chee Seng). Moran Huishou: Chen Zhicheng de Fendou Gushi 蓦然回首：陈志成的奋斗故事 [Sudden Recollections: Chan Chee Seng’s Story of Struggle]. Compiled by Zeng Guiming 曾贵明. Singapore: Lingzi Chuanmei (Lingzi Media), 2015.

He, Naiqiang 何乃强 (Ho Nai Kiang). Fuqin Pingfan de Yisheng 父亲平藩的 一生 [Father’s Ordinary Life]. Singapore: Lingzi Chuanmei (Lingzi Media), 2011.

123

Huang, Dali 黄大礼. Xuebei Buyi 血碑补遗 [Addendum to a Blood Stele]. Singapore: Xinjiapo Qingnian Shuju (The Youth Book Company), 2008.

Li, Yingzhan 李应瞻. Yongbu Wangque: Yiwei Guiguo Huaqiao de Haiwai Qinli 永不忘却 ：一位归国华侨的海外亲历 [Never Forgotten: The Overseas Experiences of an Overseas Chinese who Returned to China]. Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2009.

Qu, Rubo 区如柏. Zhengrong Suiyue 峥嵘岁月 [Extraordinary Years]. Vol. 2. Singapore: Xinjiapo Qingnian Shuju (The Youth Book Company), 2007.

Zhang, Lianhong 张连红. Riqin Shiqi Xinman Huaren Shouhai Diaocha 日侵 时期新马华人受害调查 (Survey of the Chinese Victims in Malaya and Singapore under Japanese Occupation). Nanjing: Jiangsu Renmin Chubanshe, 2004.

.

124

GLOSSARY

A I Abe Shinzo 安倍 晋三 Ishikawajima-Harima Heavy Industries Limited 石川島播磨重 B 工業株式会社 bainian guochi 百年国耻 Beijing 北京 J Jiang Zemin 江泽民 C jian 检 （檢） Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi) 蒋 Jianzheng 检证 介石 jishaoshu 极少数 Chongqing 重庆 K D KangRi Zhanzhen 抗日战争 Deng Xiaoping 邓小平 Kempeitai 憲兵隊 Kishi Nobusuke 岸 信介 F Koizumi Junichiro 小泉 純一郎 fenqing 愤青 kuanda zhengce 宽大政策

Kuomintang (Guomindang) 国民 G 党 guizi 鬼子 Kyunghyang Shinmun 경향신문 Guo Moruo 郭沫若 guochi jiaoyu 国耻教育 L

Lee Hsien Loong (Li Xianlong) 李 H 显龙 Hainan 海南 Lee Kuan Yew (Li Guangyao) 李 henzhi rugu 恨之入骨 光耀

Lim Yew Hock (Lin Youfu) 林有

福

125

Lugouqiao 卢沟桥 Shi Yinhong 时殷弘 Shinozaki Mamoru 篠崎 護 M shinryaku 侵略 马立诚 Ma Licheng shinshutsu 進出 满洲 Manchuria (Manzhou) Sook Ching (Suqing; Shukusei) 肃 漫画 manga 清 毛泽东 Mao Zedong Sumitomo 住友 梅汝璈 Mei Ru’ao Syonan 昭南 Meiji 明治 Murayama Tomiichi 村山 富市 T Taiwan 台湾 N (Chen Jiageng) 陈嘉 南京 Nanjing 庚 南京大屠杀 Nanjing Datusha Tang Shengzhi 唐生智 中曽根 康弘 Nakasone Yasuhiro Tiananmen 天安门

tianle henda mafan 添了很大麻烦 O Tanaka Kakuei 田中 角栄（田中 Obuchi Keizo 小渕 恵三 角榮）

Tojo Hideki 東條 英機 （東条 英 Q 機） Qinhua Rijun Nanjing Datusha Yunan Tongbao Jinianguan 侵华 Tokugawa 徳川 日军南京大屠杀遇难同胞纪念馆 Tokyo 東京 Qing 清 Tsuji Masanobu 辻 政信

R W Renmin Ribao 人民日报 Wang Jingwei 汪精卫

S X Sato Eisaku 佐藤 榮作 Xi Jinping 习近平 Shanghai 上海 xin siwei 新思维

126

Xu Dunzhang 徐敦璋 yide baoyuan 以德报怨 xuezhai 血债 Z Y Zhongguo Qingnian Bao 中国青年 Yamashita Tomoyuki 山下 奉文 报 Yasukuni Shrine 靖国神社（靖國 Zhou Enlai 周恩来 神社）

127