Title Page Study of Mikhail Bakunin's Concept of Power

TITLE PAGE

STUDY OF MIKHAIL BAKUNIN’S CONCEPT OF POWER AND AUTHORITY

A DISSERTATION PRESENTED TO THE DEPARTMENT OF PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITY OF NIGERIA, NSUKKA IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENT FOR THE AWARD OF A MASTER OF ARTS (MA) DEGREE IN PHILOSOPHY

IJI PAUL IJI PG/MA/06/41372

SUPERVISOR DR. J.O. ENEH

FEBRUARY 2009

DEDICATION

To Almighty God; to my beloved wife Mrs Nina Iji and the entire Iji Awugo Paul’s family with love.

CERTIFICATION

Iji, Paul Iji, a Master of Arts student in the Department of Philosophy, Faculty of the Social

Sciences, University of Nigeria, Nsukka, with Registration Number: PG/MA/06/41372, has satisfactorily completed the requirements (course work and dissertation) for the award of

Master of Arts Degree (M.A) in philosophy.

The dissertation is original and has not been submitted in part or in full for any other degree of this or any other University.

------IJI PAUL IJI DR. J.O ENEH PG/MA/06/41372 SUPERVISOR

------Prof. J.C.A. Agbakoba (Ag. Head of Department)

iii

APPROVAL PAGE

This dissertation has been approved for the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria Nsukka, in partial fulfillment for the award of Master of Arts (M.A) Degree in Philosophy.

------Dr. J. O. Eneh Internal Examiner (Supervisor)

------Prof. J.C.A. Agbakoba External Examiner (Ag. Head of Department)

------Dean of the Faculty.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I sincerely express my profound gratitude to all who in one way or another have contributed to the completion of this work. May God Almighty reward them abundantly. I am particularly grateful to Prof. J.C.A. Agbakoba and Dr. Joseph O. Eneh, my supervisors, for their patience and acceptance to supervise this work as well as for their helpful suggestions. I am also thankful to all my lecturers in the Department of Philosophy, University of Nigeria among whom are Prof. F.U. Okafor, Prof. Egbeke Aja, Dr F.O.C. Njoku, Dr. B.O. Eboh and

Dr. Chukwu Elube for their advice, assistance and contributions in making this work a success.

I am specially grateful to my late father, Iji I Obu, late Mother, Otelahu Iji, Nee

Ogbike, who are not alive to see their son graduated to this level of my academic. I am grateful to entire Iji Obu’s family brothers and sisters for their support, prayers and cooperation. I am grateful to Rev. Dr. J.O. Ikoni, Rev. Dr. N. Chuka, Dr. P.O. Agogo, Rev.

Mrs. Lady Shande M., Mr. Onah Ode, Mr. Ituen Ebong Bassey, my Elder sister, Comfort Ire

Agbike, my late father in-law J.H. Dzungwe, for their tireless financial support in the course of my studies. May God reward them abundantly. My gratitude also goes to Mr. Daniel

Nyamgee, Chuka Okoye, Philip Idachaba, Ichaba Amos, Ogaba Solomon and to all my class mates who have proven to be good friends and companion for this programme. Finally, my thanks go to my room mates; Paul Haaga, Okpanachi Anthony Okpanachi Idoko. I am grateful to Miss Eze, Rita who did the typesetting of this work and to all my friends who gave me moral support during this work. May God bless you all.

ABSTRACT The work centres on the study of Mikhail Bakunin’s concept of Power and Authority. Power and Authority are so central in the organisation of any society. No society can thrive in a situation where nobody is in control. Philosophers all through the ages have advocated for one form of power and Authority or another. In this work, Mikhail Bakunin presents his own concept of power and authority that will enable the society to attain the end or purpose of its existence. Bakunin is seen as an anarchist by some scholars. However, in this work, Bakunins’ concept of power and authority is viewed in what Bakunin identified as secret dictatorship. What this means is that machinery will be put in motion to carry out a broadly based propaganda. By the power of this propaganda, and also by organisation among people themselves then join together separate popular forces in a mighty strength capable of demolishing the state. Invariably, what Bakunin is advocating is a stateless society without any hierarchy or government and every citizen is equal. This work will X-ray in a critical manner the merits and demerits of Bakunins’ view. The work concludes that no society can function well without Power and Authority.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Title Page...... …………………………………………………... …………i Dedication ………………………………………………………………………………..ii Certification Page…………………………………………………………………………....iii Approval Page ……………………………………………………………………………….iv Acknowledgement ………………………………………………………………………..v Abstract ……………………………………………………………………………….vi Table of Contents ………………………………………………………………………vii Chapter One: Introduction ……………………………………………………………..…1 1.1 Background of the Study ………………………………………………………………..1 1.2 Statement of the Problem ………………………………………………………………..2 1.3 Purpose of the Study ………………………………………………………………..2 1.4 Significance of the Study ………………………………………………………………..3 1.5 Scope of the Study ………………………………………………………………..3 1.5 Methodology of the Study ………………………………………………………..3 Chapter Two: Literature Review ……………………………………………………..…5 2.1 Review of Related Literature ……………………………………………………..…5 Chapter Three: Power And Authority in Mikhail Bakunin…………………………….22 3.1 Life and Times of Mikhail Bakunin ………………………………………………22 3.2 Bakunin's Maxian Point of Departure……. ………………………………………23 3.3 Power and Authority in Politics . ………………………………………………25 3.4 Anthropological/Ontological Foundations of Bakunin's Philosophy ………………26 3.5 The Concept of Liberty ………………………………………………………………29 3.6 Natural Law and the Law of Nature ………………………………………………30 3.7 Liberty and Authority in Mikhail ………………………………………………………34 3.8 Man Society and Freedom ………………………………………………………35 3.9 The theory of the State ………………………………………………………………37 3.10 The Ideal Political Arrangement For Bakunin: Influence, not Power ………………38 Chapter Four: Evaluating The Philosophy of Mikhail Bakunin ………………………44 4.1 Preamble ………………………………………………………………………………44 4.2 The Defect of the Anthropological and Ontological Foundations of Bakunin’s Philosophy ………………………………………………………………………44 4.3 Violence, Revolution and Invisible Dictatorship ………………………………………45

vii

4.4 Nationalism …………………………………………………………………..……46 4.5 Anti- Semitism ……………………………………………………………..…………47 4.6 Eurocentricism ………………………………………………………….…………….47 4.7 The Case for Vanguardism in Bakunin ……………………………….……………….48 4.8 The Marxist Critique of Left Anarchism …………………………….………………….51 Chapter Five: Summary and Conclusion …………………………. …………………….55 5.1 Summary ………………………………………………….…………………………….55 5.2 Conclusion ……………………………………...………………………………………..58 Bibliography …………………….………………………………………………….60

viii

CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

1.1 Background of the Study

The issue of how best to manage authority in the state has been the concern of social and political theorists through the history of social and political philosophy. How best to balance authority with liberty has been the concern too. In the light of the above, various traditions on the relationship between liberty and authority have emerged. There are the libertarians who argue that there should be limited authority in the state, upholding the superiority of liberty over authority. The authoritarians argue on the other hand that, all authority should be given to the state and individuals and their liberty have no place at all. The anarchists have the opinion that no authority is needed in the state, that all authority in the state should be abolished.

It is in line with the anarchists that Bakunin presents his case for power and authority. In his opinion,

“men are endowed with a natural instinct for power which has its origin from the basic law of life making every individual… to exercise a continuous struggle to ensure and maintain his existence or…to assert his rights. The struggle for this power began in a crude act of cannibalism and then proceeded throughout the centuries under various religious banners. From these, it moved successfully through all…forms of slavery. Presently the struggle is taking place under the double aspect of exploitation…of wage labour by capital, political, judicial, civil, and military and police oppression by the state, church and state officials”1.

This instinct is universal to all men, and he writes,

“every man carries within himself the germs of this lust for power, and every germ, as we know because of a basic law of life necessary must grow if only it finds in its environment favourable conditions. These conditions in human society are the stupidity, apathy, indifference and service habits of the masses”2.

By implication, one may hold that it is the masses themselves who produce those exploiters, oppressors, despots and executioners of humanity of whom they are victims.

Because of the evil tenets that go with power, Bakunin detests power in all ramifications. He maintains that no one should be entrusted with power in as much as anyone invested with authority must through the force of an immutable social law, become an oppressor and exploiter of society. Power and authority, according to him, corrupt those who exercise them as much as those who are compelled to submit to them.

They use this power and authority for their own benefit and at the detriment of others.

Basically, he presents the case that all authority should be abolished in the state. How credible this position is, is what sets the background for this research.

1.2 Statement of the Problem

In Bakunin’s opinion, all men possess a natural instinct for power and authority which has its origin in the basic law of life. In line with this, he further states that men began to understand their right and subsequently there arose the desire to abolish political power. Based on the above, this work will deal with the following questions: How possible is it that there can be a s state without authority? Is it the case that authority has no place in the state? If it has, what is its extent? Furthermore, following his discourse on the nature of man, can we really argue that man is perverse and leave him to guide himself in the state? Will that not tantamount to enthroning anarchy in that state? When these questions have been dealt with, this research will also try to consider the relevance of Bakunin’s ideas for our time.

1.3 Purpose of the Study

Based on the above, this work will try to demonstrate that Bakunin is not an anarchist in the true sense of the word. This is why some scholars refer to his philosophy as a “closet dictatorship”.

1.4 The Significance of the Study

This will try to show significantly that Bakunin does not advocate a dictatorship.

But rather that he appeals to the ‘socialist instinct’ of the working class which when reformed through education, should power a motion from instinct to thought, which culminates in the ‘invisible dictatorship’ or the ‘leadership of ideas’.

1.5 The Scope of the Study

The research is concerned with the philosophical exposition of the meaning, nature and problem of power and authority with specific reference to Bakunin’s political philosophy. The exposition is further limited by a focus on his work Scientific

Anarchism.

1.6 Research Methodology

In this research, we employ the expository method, for we shall expose the full details of Bakunin’s conception of power and authority. The historical method is used to trace the history of the various conceptions of power and authority through the history of social and political theory from ancient to contemporary times. We also employ the analytical method to do an analysis, both evaluative and critical, of the facts in the philosophy of Bakunin.

This too is basically a library research where data is sourced from library records, journals, periodicals, biographies and even the internet.

Endnotes

1. Mikhail Bakunin, The Commune of Paris and Nation of the State, trans by G.P. H Maximoff (Glencoe: Free Press, 1899) p. 158. 2. Mikhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism, trans by G.P Maximoff (Glencoe: Free Press, 1901) p. 159.

CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1 Review of related Literature

Many scholars of both Western and African origin have written exhaustively about power and authority and how power and authority should be practiced in their societies. It is very pertinent to review the works of some thinkers and how they affect this research. In the book The Republic written by Plato, Plato states “that unless … either philosophers become kings and rulers to be sufficiently inspired with a genuine desire for wisdom, unless, political power and … philosophy meet …there can be no rest from troubles” 1. We can see in this work that political power rests on intellectual power; wisdom must be the criterion for political power. He further tries to understand who the philosopher is and states that the philosopher is the lover of wisdom and “a lover is that who loves the object of his affection as a whole and not merely in parts” 2. So the philosopher, with his passion for wisdom “will be he who desires all of wisdom, not only some part of it” 3. The philosopher is the one who contemplates beauty itself and not particular instances of beauty. “The philosopher is one whose passion is to see the truth”4.

The philosopher is the one “who can apprehend the eternal and unchanging” and this makes them exclusively capable of ruling the state as against those lost in the maze of multiplicity and change. To this end the Republic makes a distinction between three classes in the state: the guardians, soldiers and the artisan (spectators) and this distinction corresponds to the three divisions in the soul: the rational, the spirited and appetitive parts. As reason or the rational parts rules over all, so should the guardian or philosopher king, who is not plagued by the maze of multiplicity and change rule the other classes in the state. The work, argues for a connection between intellectual and political powers.

Further more, he asserts criticism of other forms of constitutions signifies those to whom power should be given, i.e. Democracy is the rule of the mob, Plutocracy the leadership by the rich and Aristocracy leadership by honour. In the ideal state, none of these rules is upheld except the leadership by one endowed with knowledge. However, the downside of this work is its advocating of communalism and its idealism, which implies a common ownership.

The Politics by Aristotle also expounds on the theory of power and authority. First this work presents a natural origin of the state and goes on to assert that the state has an end in which he argues that “every state is a partnership and every partnership is formed in order to attain some good” 5. For him, he tries to establish the end for which the state exists and this is the fact that the state exists for the good life. Thus, power and authority rests on the person who can move the state to its end.

For him, he further argues that power can be exercised fully by either “one person as in a monarchy the leadership by a king, leadership by the few as in an aristocracy and leadership by many, democracy. We could equally find a situation whereby one person rules and thereby imposes himself on the people this person is referred to as a tyrant. “A situation where a few people rule well is called aristocracy, or where they misrule it is called oligarchy where the many rule we have political polity and when they misrule we experience democracy” 6. The orientation in this book brings out the realistic nature of this work as against the idealistic nature of The Republic of Plato. In all, The Politics argues that power and authority can be located anywhere (in one person, many or few) provided the end of the state is guaranteed, which is the good life. Despite the above, one problem this work possesses is the fact that the scope of its political prescriptions is limited to just the polis , the city state. However, in the Hellenistic era, politics was already going beyond the polis , towards the empire.

The quest for a universal authority for the empire is what necessitates The

Commonwealth written by Cicero. This work first expounds the three types of government, namely; monarchy, aristocracy and democracy 7. We discover that The

Commonwealth just like The Politics argues for the same types of government democracy should be practice. This authority lies not in the person who posses authority but in the law. Law, The Commonwealth argues, takes their root from reason. Thus, Cicero writes,

“since there is nothing better than reason and since it exists both in man and God, the first common possession of man and God is reason. But those who have reason in common must also have right reason in common. And since right reason is law, we must believe that man must have law also in common with the gods. Further those who share law must also share justice, and those who share these are to be regarded as members of the same commonwealth.” 8 For him, he tries to establish the rule of the universal sovereignty, “Right reason”.

This is the classical articulation of what we can refer to as the natural law doctrine. This law

“applies to all men and is unchangeable and eternal. By its commands this law summons men to the performance of their duties, by its prohibition it restrains them from doing wrong … Neither the senate nor the people can absolve us from our obligation to obey this law, and it requires … no Sextus Achies to expound and interpret it; it will not lay down one rule at Athens and another at Rome nor will it be one rule today and another tomorrow”9. Therefore, The Commonwealth establishes the natural law as the sovereign that empowers men and divests them of power and authority at the same time. The

Commonwealth coming from a pagan background fails to meet the needs of expanding

Christianity in the medieval era.

Coming from the above backdrop, Thomas Aquinas in The Summa Theologica takes over and Christianizes the idea of right reason as discussed above. First, he establishes the fact of the relationship between law and reason and this is premised on the

fact that “the law is the rule and standard of human action.”10 Furthermore The Summa

Theologica argues that “since the law is the rule of human conduct ultimate end of which is happiness, and indeed, the common happiness, it is necessarily always ordained for the common good.”11 Thus, we observe here the combination of the Aristotelian end of the state, laws and authority and Cicero’s idea of the law coming from reason. To further buttress the universal nature of this law, he argues that “since laws ordain the common good, law can be created by reason, not of any individual but of the multitude, or of the prince acting for the multitudes.”12 These laws must be promulgated. The end of these laws is not just for the good life, but for beatific vision.

Further more, the work of De Regime Principium discussed the nature and duties of Royal authorities. The duty of this authority is to guard the state to its end, “for a ship, driven in various directions by the impulse of varying winds, would never reach her destination when she is not guided to the part by the diligence of the helmsman” 13 . As regards which form of government is the best, De Regime Principium argues that this can be ascertained by considering the aim and purpose of government, so it holds that, “the aim of any ruler ought to be the security and the safety of that which he has undertaken to rule.”14 This aim can be achieved by one person rather than a multiple, “for heat is produced most effectively by a body or is in itself hot or a source of heat. Therefore the rule of one man is more beneficial than the rule of many. Moreover, where several rulers disagree completely they cannot control the multitudes” 15 , besides a kingdom ought to be governed primarily with a view to creating happiness. From the general structure of these works (The Summa Theologica and De Regime Principium ), it subjects the state to the church and this becomes a subsequent problem as regards power and authority in political thought. This controversy of the church and the state relationships informs the rest of social and political theory after Aquinas.

Niccolo Machiavelli in his work The Prince, holds that the prince should retain power (absolute power) and authority or control of their territories. That he should employ any means possible to accomplish this end, including deceit. According to him;

“a Prince does not necessarily need to possess all the good qualities, but he should certainly appear to have them” 16 . This implies that rulers should use any available means to achieve their goal hence the end justifies the means. The work was interested in knowing what makes a government strong. It therefore focuses on the particular problems a monarch faces while staying in power rather than more idealistic issues explaining the foundation of political power. As such, it is an expression of government policy based on retaining power rather than pursuing ideas.

Machiavelli’s concept of power and authority can be understood from his analysis of the state and his model of the prince. The work construed the art in which decisions were being determined by political and religious, hence he shifted the base of political thought away from the moral ground prepared by Thomas Aquinas theory of natural law towards a new secular theory of the state. He construed the state “as a single structure closely knit and all controlling all of whose parts respond to the centre” 17 . The Prince observed that the condition of the Italian state in his time was corrupt and vulnerable to external aggression. There was corruption at the highest level of the rulers. He was particularly struck by the general social decadence of Italy in his day. This fact of human corruption was therefore the decisive starting point for Machiavelli’s political thought.

For a corrupt state requires a strong government and preferably one in the hands of a single man. He advocates power for the prince and absolute obedience from the subjects because the focus was on a strong state that impose authority and unify the Italian state.

From the political structure of the work the subjects have no freedom as the prince is expected to be all powerful. The freedom of the citizens for Machiavelli may likely

weaken the authority and power of the ruler and lead to dissension; hence, it is not possible for complete liberty and complete authority to exist together. Therefore, liberty must be severely limited for common good of the society. In summary this work The

Prince divests the church of all authority and gives it to the state as against the postulations of Aquinas in the Summa Theologica .

In another development, Jean Bodin in his Six Books of the Commonwealth further develops the idea of giving all authority to the state rather than the church. But the most distinct contribution of this work to the theme of power and authority is its definition of sovereignty. According to the work, “sovereignty is the supreme power over citizens or subjects, unrestrained by laws” 18 . Furthermore, the work observed that, every member of the state participate in the governance of the state and its affairs. Though sovereignty is here defined as the supreme and perpetual power of the state, it goes on to buttress the fact that this power is supreme because it must be given to one or some people but not perpetually but for a period of time. These cannot be called sovereign rulers, rather they are custodians. The true sovereignty was with the people, for it is at their pleasure that those who hold power operate or to whom they return their authority at the expiration of the period designated. This power is always given to one person at a time. According to Bodin he opines that the function of the sovereign is to give laws to the citizens generally and individually.

The Leviathan of Thomas Hobbes is equally relevant at this juncture for the supreme power of the sovereign that the work advocates. This work begins by considering the state of man in nature (state of Nature). Here, man in the state of nature was vicious and selfish and his only concern was the subject of his desire and this made the state of nature a perpetual state of conflict. To this end, The Leviathan observes that in the state of nature, “the life of man was solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” 19 . The

above chaotic nature of the state of nature was what necessitated the social contract and the product of this contact is the commonwealth and the The Leviathan . The Leviathan takes charge over the commonwealth and therefore ensures that the laws are obeyed.

Justice springs from his will because the people made no contract with him, but made the contract among themselves and decided to make him king. Thus, the work maintains “for it has been already shown that nothing the sovereign representative can do to a subject, on what pretence so ever, can properly be called injustice or injury” 20 . Hobbes observed a giving of excess power to the sovereign in The Leviathan . In another development, the work observes that the sovereign needs a measure of harshness to operate. In line with this Hobbes opines in regard to the power of the law that, “and yet, as absurd as it is, this is it they demand, not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them, without a sword in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those laws to be put in execution” 21 . Here, we observe the level of absolutism which The Leviathan advocates. The problem then is that The Leviathan is not just pessimistic about human nature, but also it has no place for individual liberty, all is given to sovereign that his power and authority becomes absolute.

The Two Treatise on Government by John Locke reacts to the absolutism of The

Leviathan . However, he begins by reconstructing human nature. Therefore, it argues that

“to understand political power rightly and to derive it from its origin, we must consider what state all men were naturally in, and that was a state of perfect freedom to order their activities and dispose of their possession and person as they think fit, within the bounds of the laws of Nature, without asking or depending upon the will of any other man” 22 . Further more, Locke emphasizes that this state was not just a state of freedom, but was also that of equality, where power and jurisdiction reciprocates, no one had more than another. Though it is a state of freedom, it is not a state of license for it is a state where

the laws of nature rule “that all men are naturally free in this state, and remain so till by their own consent, they make themselves members of some political society” 23 . From the above then power and authority rest in the consent of the people and the obvious implication is that once this power has been given to anybody, the people should be his/her prime responsibility. What then necessitates the giving of consent? Or what degenerates this state of perfect freedom and equality?

Within the context of treating the above questions, this work discusses property observing that all God has given in the abundance of nature belongs to all. We can acquire property by appropriation that is, whatever we fix our labour to become ours. But when men started to become self-centered and to gather much more than they need or can be spoilt in their use, there was degeneration from the state of nature to that of war and unrest. To resolve this problem, the civil society is created through the people’s consent for

“the only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty and put on the bound of civil society is by agreeing with other men, to join and unite into a community for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living, in a secure enjoyment of their properties and a greater security against any that are not safe. This any member of men may do because it injures not the freedom of the rest; because they are left as they were, in the liberty of the state of nature” 24 .

By this consent, a community is made and has the power to act as one body, which is only by the will and determination of the majority. Therefore the duty of the sovereign here is not the arbitrary use of power, but the use of power within the bounds of the law.

To this end, the work advocates the separation of power between the legislative, executive and judiciary arms of government and also advocates a revolution in case the use of power becomes arbitrary. One feature of this work is its capitalist or liberal orientation and it is from this background that Karl Marx comes.

The book, on the Social Contract written by Jean Jacques Rousseau, reacted to

Two Treatise of Government of Locke. The work upholds and prefers a Republic, or government of laws guided by the general wills, for without the general will no regime is legitimate. For this reason, the work denounces representative democracy as an

Oligarchical grant of law making power to a small body of individuals. Since power and authority is unreliable, legislative power cannot be legitimately delegated to representatives. It must be exercised continuously by the entire body of citizen or there is no republic. The Social Contract supports the simplest mixed form of government possible. The mix is composed of direct democracy in the legislature and delegation of authority to the smaller executive branch to enforce the general will. The exact sort of executive he recommended depends on the size of the community and how the citizens close the administration.

In with the above, Jean Jacques Rousseau in his On the Social Contract upholds a republican system of government or a government of laws guided by the general wills, for without the general will no regime is legitimate. For this reason, the work denounces representative democracy as an oligarchic, by its granting of law making powers to a small body of individuals. Since power and authority inalienable, legislative power cannot be legitimately delegated to representatives. It must be exercised continuously by the entire body of the citizenry or there is no republic. The work supports the simplest mixed form of government. The mix is composed of direct democracy in the legislature and delegation of authority to the smaller executive branch to enforce the general will.

The exact sort of executive he recommends depends on the size of the community and how the citizens close the administration.

The work considers either of two kinds of executive, both realistic and compatible with a republic. Monarchy is best suited to large, wealthy states because the larger the

population, the stronger, relatively, must the government be, if it is to function efficiently 25. Though inconsistent is its believe that, a monarch is the most vigorous of chief executive. As for aristocracy, he regards the hereditary form as the worst and the elective form as the best, if conditions allow for its installation. It is superior for states of medium size population and wealth because of the honesty and wisdom of the rulers. To be objective, if we take the term in strict sense, there never has been a real democracy and there never will be. It is against the natural order for the many to govern and the few to be governed. It is unimaginable, for the people to remain continually assembled to devote their time to public affairs, and it is clear that they cannot set up commission for this purpose without changing the form of administration.” 26

In another development, Marx in the Communist Manifesto advocates for a classless and stateless society. This is because the capitalist orientation developed above

(particularly in Locke) leads to a class society, that is, a class of the bourgeoisie and the proletariats; and this bourgeois class constantly exploits the proletariats and the machinery through which the bourgeoisie arrive at this end is the state. Besides capitalism possesses a crisis point where the preliterate revolts against the system and enthrone the society that is both classless and stateless. This culminates in what the work refers to as the ‘withering of the state’. Here authority is considered detrimental to emancipation.

Benito Mussolini’s work, The Doctrine of Fascism reacts to the anarchic state of affairs envisioned in the postulations of Marx. Here Mussolini argues that fascism is the best government and this is “the type of government where the authority is absolute” 27. It does not surrender any portion of its field to another moral or religious principle which may interfere with the consciousness of the individual. The type of liberty this work grants is the liberty of a whole people freely accepting the rule of a state, which they

should internalize and make the guiding principle of all their conduct. This work further asserts that action is more important than movement. It advocates a movement, which not only accepted violence but also rejected non-violence. It has no patience with parliamentary or advocative methods of changing society. Thus we see that in this work that in its quest for a strong state, it advocates fascism which is a government of strong absolutism and is a situation where there is a strong and vibrant government where power is in the hand of one man, individual liberty is undermined. To this fact H.L.A. Hart reacts in his work: The Concept of Law. Hart construed that a leader or an authority is

“one appointed and certified according to the rules of recognition” 28 . An authority commands obedience from others simply because the rules maintain so much. As such obedience to the leader is reasonable on the basis of the fact that the rules recognizes and regards him as being an authority. He has a legal authority and this may be quiet independent of the fact whether or not he is a good person. His utterances present themselves as authoritative legal reason for action so far as he rules according to the rules of the system, he remains legally correct. Further more, the work observes that, certain expectation of citizens is that the leader appointed under the condition set by the rules directs accordingly. But who becomes the ruler where there is no provision for asserting who is the leader? Or who becomes the ruler when rules are silent? This is the problem, which is not clarified by the work’s model of rules. Whether the law certifies, through the appropriate means of legitimate leader, is the leader whether or not he is a good person.

Thus, in the absence of stipulated rules by the system the member of Hart’s society will be in lot of confusion coming from this background.

Hannah Arendit in her work, “On Totalitarianism ” argues that governmental authority is very often authority under rules to issue instruction to others. The work distinguished this from power and particularly from despotic or tyrannical power. The

later, the work argues in subject to no limits whereas this actually, because it is always denied from rules must therefore, be limited or restrains by rules. But then this is dubious, because the rules may confer as in the case of a sovereign legislator an unlimited power on the sovereign authority to charge rules at will, which form a background.

Michael Foucault on the other vacillates between two positions in setting forth his conception of power. In his earlier works particularly Civilization and its Madness and

Discipline and Punishment , he makes the case for the disindividualization of power. This he does from two different points. In Discipline and Punishment he develops the terms the ‘Panopticon model of power’. Here he argues that the panopticon “is an important mechanism, for it automatizes and disindividualizes power. Power has its principle not so much in a person as in a certain concerted distribution of bodies, surfaces, lights, gazes; in an arrangement whose internal mechanisms produce the relation in which individuals are caught up” 29 . The effect of this tendency to disindividualize power is the perception that power resides in the machine itself (the “panoptic machine”; the “technology” of power) rather than in its operator. For this reason, one can finish reading Foucault's

Discipline and Punish with the paranoid feeling that we are powerless before such an effective and diffuse form of social control.

But in The Subject and Power , he makes the case that individuals possess power as well. Here he defines power as “a way in which certain actions may structure the field of other possible actions. What, therefore, would be proper to a relationship of power is that it be a mode of action upon actions”30 . This work further argues that it is true that contemporary forms of disciplinary organization allow ever larger number of people to be controlled by smaller numbers of “specialists”; however, as Foucault explains in “The

Subject and Power”, “something called Power, with or without a capital letter, which is assumed to exist universally in a concentrated or diffused form, does not exist. Power

exists only when it is put into action” 31 . By this token he brings in the concept of freedom into power, and this makes his turn to the word government very important in understanding his conception of power. As such power in his opinion can only be exercised over free subjects.

Paul Ricoeur’s view of selfhood in his On Oneself as Another , has it that we are utterly reliant upon each other. While Ricoeur emphasizes the importance of the first person perspective and the notion of personal responsibility, he is no philosopher of the radical individual. He emphasizes that we are “mutually vulnerable”, and so the fate

(self-esteem) of each of us is tied up with the fate of others. This situation has a normative dimension: “we have an indebtedness to each other, a duty to care for each other and to engender self-respect and justice, all of which are necessary to the creation and preservation of self-esteem”. 32 It is upon this fundamental anthropology that he bases his philosophy of power in politics. But in his Political Paradox then he also emphasizes the ambivalence of political power, between political power in common and political power that threatens violence. But in his opinion, the defining task for any defensible politics is to learn what justice calls for and to establish and protect the institutions that make justice effective. This is tantamount to saying that the ultimate objective of all defensible political practice is to make power-in-common prevail as far as possible over domination. But because dominations is never wholly eliminable, defensible politics is inherently fragile.” 33 But in all he emphasizes that the focus should be developing the power in common for this is the basis of reliable and reasonable politics.

Nwolise O.B.C. in his work, The Concept of Power And Defence In Political

Thought argues that in the day of Oba Ewuare, “the Great”, the kings word was law, only subject to the influences of his chiefs and advisers to the extend that they are powerful

and he is willing to accept their control. This is to maintain, however, that much has changed between those days of kingdoms and these days of states in the foundational relationship between the citizen and his political organization. The kingdoms of those days and the states of today in the word of Oba Ewuare “the Greats” constitute “a society of individuals submitted, if necessary, by compulsion to a certain way of life” 34. He argues that today, every citizen of the modern world is the subject of a state. He is legally bound to obey orders, and the continuous of his life are set by the norms that are imposed.

These norms are the laws, and it is in the power to enforce them upon all who live within its boundaries that the essence of the state is to be found 35. We must however bear in mind the age-long dictum that the power of a ruler rests upon the consent of the governed and warns autocrats, depots and dictators. Power that he holds is always a trust, and it is always held upon conditions. The will of the state is subject to scrutiny of all who come within the ambit of its decisions because it moulds the substance of their lives.

They have the right to pass judgment upon the quality of its efforts. They have indeed, the duty so to pass judgment; for it is the plain lesson of the instruct record that they wants of men will only secured recognition to the point that they are forcibly articulated.

The state is not ourselves save where we identify ourselves with what it does. It becomes ourselves as it seeks to give expression to our wants and desire. It exerts power over us that it may establish uniformities of behaviour, which make possible the environment of our personality Broadly, that is to maintain, when we know the sources from which governmental acts derive, we know the source of the states will the ruler exercise power of the state, are to use such power to pursue the environment of the common life of the citizens and this includes defence and security as well as welfare of the people.

The reviews of the literature of some political philosophers on this subject matter recognized that individual freedom, (liberty) conflicts with the state power and authority and that a balance has to be struck between them and the value.

Endnotes 1. Plato, The Republic, trans by Francis Macdonald Cornford. (London: Oxford University Press, 1944) p. 179. 2. Plato, The Republic , p. 181. 3. Plato, The Republic , p. 182. 4. Plato, The Republic , p. 183 5. Aristotle, The Politics , trans by A.E. Wardman et al, (New York: American Library 1963) p. 382. 6. Aristotle, Politics , p. 405 7. M. T. Cicero, On The Commonwealth , Trans by G.H. Sabin and B. Smith, (Columbus, Ohio state University Press, 1939) Book II, Chapter XXVI. 8. M. T. Cicero, On The Commonwealth, Book IV, Chapter VIII. 9. M. T. Cicero, On The Commonwealth, Book IV, Chapter XXII. 10. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, First Complete American edition in three volumes. Literally trans. by Fathers of the English Dominican province,(New York: Benziger Brothers, Inc. 1947) Vol II; Chapter I; Question XC, article I 11. Thomas Aquinas, Summon Theologica, Vol. II: Chapter II; Question XC, article II. 12. Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Vol II; Chapter I; Question XC article III. 13. Aquinas, De Regime principum, in Opera Omma Vol. XXVII Pens 1871-1880 Book II chpt I. 14. Aquinas, De Regime Principum Book II chpt I 15. Aquinas, De Regime Principum Book II chpt I 16. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince trans. by George Bull (London Penguin books 1961) p 55. 17. Niccolo Machiavelli The Prince , p. 56. 18. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth, trans. by Knolls Richard (London: Cambridge University Press, 1949) p. 140. 19. Jean Bodin, Six Books of the Commonwealth , p. 140 20. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan in Readings in Political Philosophy (ed.) by Francis William Cook (New York Macmillan Press Ltd1938) p. 449. 21. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 447. 22. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 447.

23. John Locke, Two Treaties of Government in Readings in Political Philosophy , (ed.) by Francis William Cook (New York Macmillan Press Ltd1938) p. 530. 24. Jean Jacques Rousseau, On the Social Contract , Trans by Lowell Bair, (New York, New American Library 1974) p. 127-36. 25. J. J. Rousseau, On the Social contract, p. 239 26. John Locke, Two Treaties of Government, p. 551 27. John Locke, Two Treaties of Government , p. 551 28. Herbart L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law , (Great Britain Oxford University press 1961) p. 90. 29. Michael Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison . Trans. Alan Sheridan. (New York: Pantheon, 1977).p 202 30. Michael Foucault, "The Subject and Power." Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics . 2nd edition. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. (Chicago: University of Chicago) p. 208. 31. Michael Foucault, "The Subject and Power." Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics , p. 219. 32. Paul Ricoeur, Oneself as Another , trans. Kathleen Blamey. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992) pp. 194-95 33. Paul Ricoeur “The Political Paradox,” in History and Truth , trans. Charles A. Kelbley. (Evanston: Northwestern University press. 1965) pp. 247-70. 34. O.B.C. Nwolise The Concept of Power and Defence in Political Thought of Oba Ewuare” the Great”, Benin Kingdom . ( Ibadan: Presence publishers, 2004) p. 332. 35. O.B.C. Nwolise TheCconcept of Power and Defence in Political Thought, p. 333

CHAPTER THREE POWER AND AUTHORITY IN MIKHAIL BAKUNIN

3.1 The Life and Times of Mikhail Bakunin

Mikhail Bakunin was born in Prgamukhino, Northwest of Moscow on 30 May

1814. Born from a family of Russian Nobles, Mikhail at the age of 14 left for St.

Petersburg where he received military training at the Artillery University. In 1832, he completed his studies and in 1834, he was commissioned a junior officer in the Russian

Imperial Guard. Bakunin later in 1835, resigned his commission and proceeded to

Moscow to study philosophy. In Moscow, Mikhail became a friend to a group of former

University students where they engaged in the systematic study of idealist philosophy.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant initially was very fundamental to him, later Bakunin and his group were influenced by the ideas of Shelling, Fichte and Hegel. In the middle of 1835, Bakunin thought of forming a philosophical circle in his hometown,

Prgamukhino. Moreover, early in 1836, Bakunin was back in Moscow where he published translations of Fichte’s work: “Some Lectures Concerning the Scholar’s

Vocation and the Way to Blessed Life which became his favorite book” 1. Bakunin was increasingly influenced by Hegel and this provided the basis for the first Russian translation of his work. He went to Berlin in 1840 where he conceived the idea of becoming a University professor, but then, he recountered and joined some radical students of the so-called Hegelian left” (a socialist movement) in Berhin. In 1842, he wrote an essay, “The Reaction in Germany” where he argued in favour of the revolutionary role of negation as summed up. “The passion for destruction is a creative passion”1.

While still in Berlin, Bakunin developed strong interest in socialism. He later abandoned his academic career and promoted Revolution. This made the Russian

government to order him to return to Russia. With his refusal, his property was confiscated. Instead, he went to Zurich, Switzerland. From Switzerland, he went to

Brussels, Dresden and Paris. Paris where he later went, was the centre for radicalism.

Here, he established contacts with Karl Marx and the Anarchist Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who greatly impressed him. In December 1844 Emperor Nicholas issued a decree denying Bakunin of his privileges and civil rights, confiscating his land and condemning him to life long exile in Siberia. Bakunin wrote letters and organized revolt against the emperor and looked forward to “the definitive collapse of despotism in Russia” 2.

Consequently, Bakunin was expelled from France and went to Brussels. At Brussels, he led a revolutionary movement of 1848 and was later compelled to go to Germany.

Bakunin nevertheless, played a leading role in the May 1849 uprising in Dressen. He was arrested and held for thirteen months before being condemned to death by the government of Saxony. After series of death sentence against him, Bakunin was later handed over to the Russian Authorities.

Bakunin was imprisoned, he suffered from ill-health while still in prison and yet he did not give up his radical writings. In the years between 1870 and 1876, he wrote much of his seminar work such as Statism and anarchy” and “God and the State”. In spite of his declining health, he attempted to take part in an insurrection in Bologria, but was forced to return to Switzerland in disguise and settled in Lugano. Mikhail remained active in the Radical movement of Europe until further health problems caused him to be moved to a hospital in Berne Switzerland, where he died in 1876.

3.2 Bakunin’s Marxian Point of Departure

The dispute between Mikhail Bakunin and Karl Marx highlighted the differences between anarchism and Marxism. Bakunin argued – against certain ideas of a number of

Marxists – that not all revolutions need be violent. He also strongly rejected Marx's concept of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", “which Marx's adherents translate in modern terms to mean a "workers democracy" but which also maintains the state in existence during the transition to communism 3 Bakunin, "who had now abandoned his ideas of revolutionary dictatorship", insisted that revolutions must be led by the people directly while any "enlightened elite" must only exert influence by remaining "invisible not imposed on anyone [and] deprived of all official rights and significance". He held that the state should be immediately abolished because all forms of government eventually lead to oppression.

They [the Marxists] maintain that only a dictatorship—their dictatorship, of course—can create the will of the people, while our answer to this is: No dictatorship can have any other aim but that of self-perpetuation, and it can beget only slavery in the people tolerating it; freedom can be created only by freedom, that is, by a universal rebellion on the part of the people and free organization of the toiling masses from the bottom up 4.

While both social anarchists and Marxists share the same final goal, the creation of a free, egalitarian society without social classes and government, they strongly disagree on how to achieve this goal. Anarchists believe that the classless, stateless society should be established by the direct action of the masses, culminating in social revolution, and refuse any intermediate stage such as the dictatorship of the proletariat, on the basis that such a dictatorship will become a self-perpetuating fundament. For Bakunin, the fundamental contradiction is that for the Marxists, anarchism or freedom is the aim, while the state and dictatorship is the means, and so, in order to free the masses, they have first to be enslaved.5

However, Bakunin also wrote his experience of meeting Marx in 1844 that,

As far as learning was concerned, Marx was, and still is, incomparably more advanced than I. I knew nothing at that time of political economy, I had not yet rid myself of my metaphysical observations... He called me a sentimental idealist and he was

right; I called him a vain man, perfidious and crafty, and I also was right 6.

Bakunin found Marx's economic analysis very useful and began the job of translating Das

Kapital into Russian. In turn Marx wrote of the rebels in the Dresden insurrection of 1848 that "in the Russian refugee Michael Bakunin they found a capable and cool headed leader 7."Marx wrote to Engels of his experience meeting Bakunin in 1864 after his escape to Siberia saying "On the whole he is one of the few people whom I find not to have retrogressed after 16 years, but to have developed further 8.

Bakunin was perhaps the first theorist of the "new class", the intellectuals and administrators forming the bureaucratic apparatus of the state. Bakunin argued that the

"State has always been the patrimony of some privileged class: a priestly class, an aristocratic class, a bourgeois class. And finally, “when all the other classes have exhausted themselves, the State then becomes the patrimony of the bureaucratic class and then falls—or, if you will, rises—to the position of a machine 9”.

3.3 Power and Authority in Politics

Concepts like power and authority are fundamental in political analysis; power and authority are therefore central to the concept of politics. A concept or content analysis of the writing of great social and political theorists from Plato to Aristotle, through Machieveli and Hobbes to the contemporary philosophers would no doubt reveal the centrality of power and authority in political discourse.

Power is an ability to enforce obedience through the use of instrument of sanction

(force). Authority on the other hand is the ability of being able to get people to do things or not do things they do not want, because they think the individual or group has the right to tell them to do so. Politics is an authoritative allocation of values in a political system.

It could be defined to mean the struggle for power.

Bakunin maintains that power is a present means to secure some future apparent good life, which invariably is a ceaseless search for power. He started his political inquiry with analysis of human position. According to him, man is essentially selfish motivated by desire and passion, not by intellect or reason. He maintains that because of this selfish tendency motivated by desire and passion, the most ardent revolutionary once vested with absolute power can within one year turn over to be the worst dictator. He argued that if men should live without any common power and authority set over them, it will result to a state of despots.

Bakunin maintains that politics encompasses power so as to subject men to take order and generally to control his behaviour in the society. For him, authority is derived from people given up so much of their natural rights so as to enable the state provide security and solidarity of individual rights. Bakunin argued that power and authority is needed to balance for an authoritative value to be allocated in the political sphere. He remarks that “due to the nature of man, a state that depends on authority alone may not be able to give good life to the people” 10 . He concludes that the state therefore needs power to enforce its will on the people for the common good of the society and its orderliness.

3.4 Anthropological/Ontological Foundations of Bakunin’s Philosophy

As we stated earlier that Bakunin’s political inquiry was built on the analysis of human condition, it will be pertinent to examine Bakunin’s concept of “man” and the nature of “man”.

According to Bakunin, all men possess a natural instinct for power which has its origin in the basic law of life enjoining every individual to wage a ceaseless struggle in order to ensure his existence or assert his right. Inevitably, this cursed element is to be found as natural instinct in every man.

He argues;

That everyone carries within himself the germ of this lust for power and authority, and every germ, as we know because of a very basic law of life necessarily must develop and grow, if only it finds in its environment favourable conditions. No one should be entrusted with power and authority inasmuch as any one invested with authority must, through the force of an immutable social law becomes an oppressor and exploiter of society. 11

For him, he bows authority of special men because it is imposed upon him by his own reason. He maintains that he is conscious of his inability to grasp, in all its details and positive developments any large portion of human knowledge. He questions himself whether he should reject authority. He remarks:

“far from me such a thought. In the matter of boots, I refer to the authority of the bootmaker; concerning houses, canals, railroads, I consult that of architect or engineer.

For such or such special knowledge, I apply to such a servant”. 12

However, in the above situation, he argues, he allows neither the bootmaker nor the architect nor the servant to impose his authority upon him. What he does is that;

I listen to them freely and with all the respect merited by their intelligence, their character, their knowledge, reserving always my incontestable right of criticisms and ensure that I do not context myself with consulting authority in any special branch. I consult several; I compare their opinions and choose that which seems to me the soundest. 13

For him, he does not recognise infallible authority whatever respect he may have for the honesty and sincerity of such or such individual. He has no absolute faith in any absolute person because such a faith would be fatal to his reason, to his liberty, and even to the success of his undertaking. “It would immediately transform me into a stupid slave, an instrument of the will and interest of others.” 14 In his opinion, the results for science as well as for industry, the necessity of divisions and association of labour should be given to human life. This situation would give rise to a situation where each directs and is directed in his turn. The result is that there will be no fixed and constant authority, but a

continual exchange of mutual, temporary and above all, voluntary authority and subordination. First because the agreement is to be understood, they are not obliged by former agreement to anything repugnant here unto. This will lead to an instituted community being thereby bound by government to own the actions and judgements of one who cannot lawfully make a new agreement among themselves to be obedient to any other in anything whatsoever without his permission. As a result of this, Bakunin argues that those that are subject to a ruler cannot without leave cast off monarchy and return to the confusion of a disunity multitude; nor transfer their person from him that beareth it, to another man or other assembly of men.

For they are bound to everyman or other to own and be reputed author of all that he that already is their authority or sovereign power shall do, and judge fit to be done; so that any one man dissenting, all the rest should break their agreement made to that man, which is injustice; and they have also every man given the power and authority to him bearing the person and therefore if they depose him they take from him that which is his own, and so again it is injustice.” 15

However, the problem with this agreement according to Bakunin is that because the right of bearing the person of them all given to him, they make sovereign, they make sovereign by agreement only if one to another, and not of him to any of them, there can happen no breach of agreement on the part of power and authority of the sovereign; and consequently, none of his subjects, by any pretence or forfeiture, can be free from his subjection. For Bakunin, he who is made ruler as in power and authority make no agreement with his subjects before hand, is manifest; either he must make do with the whole multitude as one party to the agreement or he must make a several bidden with everyone.

3.5 The Concept of Liberty

The liberty of man according to Bakunin consist Solely in that he obeys natural laws because he has himself recognized them as such, and not because they have been externally imposed upon him by any extrinsic will whatever, divine or human, collective or individual. For Bakunin “all consenting parties are by nature fundamentally equal, all legitimate acts of the power and authority (sovereignty) must be applied equally to every member of the body politic” 15 . This includes liberty, which encompasses “all those things such as the right of commitment to govern be transferred” No sovereign, (Power and authority) and no Law can repeal the Natural right of each individual to liberty of life. This right is surrendered only conditionally, in exchange for a surer guarantee, when people consent to be governed, its ultimate protection still rests with each person. Again if we take liberty for an exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand for that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives.

According to Bakunin, yet as absurd as it is, this is their demand (total freedom); not knowing that laws are of no power to protect them, since the sovereign does not trust no man. Without a sword(s) in the hands of a man, or men, to cause those Laws to be put in execution. The liberty of a subject lies therefore only in those things which in regulating their actions, the power and authority (sovereign) have permitted: to choose their own abode, their own diet, since man have the liberty of doing what their own reason shall suggest, to be the most profitable to themselves. The right to self-defence may be activated if power and authority is no longer able to enforce the liberty by maintaining the peace. If personal security is threatened, people are then, by definition, back in a state of slavery with no other protection but their individual capacity for self- defence. Since liberty consists in obeying natural law, let us now consider the interplay between the law of nature and natural law in his philosophy.

3.6 Natural Law and the Law of Nature

Bakunin maintains that the great misfortune is that a large number of natural laws, already established as such by science, remain unknown to the masses. Thanks to the solicitous care of these tutelary governments that exist, as we know, only for the good of the people. There also is another difficulty, according to Bakunin; namely, that the greatest number of the natural laws inherent in the development of human society, which are quite necessary, incurable, and inevitable as the laws which govern the physical world, have not been recognized, and established by science itself. These laws that regulate and govern the society have been recognized firstly by science and then by means of an extensive system of popular education and instruction – once they have become part and parcel of the general consciousness – the question of liberty will be solved. Humanity is science, however, “the ruler transform their action into policy for the masses, using polices to regulate the laws of the society for their common selfish means and using the course of hostility to the liberty of individual impose these laws upon the system for their selfish end 16 ”. Bakunin argues that the most recalcitrant authorities will then need to admit henceforth that there will be no need of political organization, administration, or legislation. These three things – whether emanating from the will of the sovereign or issuing from the will of a parliament, elected by universal suffrage, conforming to the system of natural laws (which has never happened and never will happen) – are always painful and hostile to the liberty of the people because they impose upon the latter a system of external and therefore despotic laws.

For Bakunin, the liberty of man consists solely in obeying natural laws because he has not recognized that as such himself, and not because they have been imposed on him by any external will whatever – divine or human, collective or individual 4. Bakunin queries; suppose a learned academy, composed of the most

illustrious representatives of science. Suppose this academy were charge with legislation for, and the organization of, society, and that, they were inspired only by the purest love for truth, it would come to nothing but laws in absolute conformity with the latest discoveries of science. For him, he maintain that the legislation and that organization would be monstrous and this for some reasons.

“First, human science is always and necessarily imperfect, and comprising what it has discovered, we may say that it is still in its cradle. This is true to the extent that was we to force the practical life of men. Collective as well as individual, into strict and exclusive conformity with the latest dale of science would condemn society as well as individuals to suffer martyrdom on a procrustean bed, which will soon end by dislocating and stifling them, life always remaining an infinitely greater thing than science” 17 .

The second reason: according to Bakunin is that a society obeying legislation emanating from a scientific academy not because it understood the reasonable of this legislation (in which case the existence of that academy would become useless) but because the legislation emanated from the academy and was imposed in the name of science, which was venerated without being understood that society would be a society of brutes and not of men.

Third reason, rendering such a government impossible this reason is that a scientific academy invested, so to speak, with absolute sovereign power, even if it were composed of the most illustrious men, would unavoidably and quickly end by becoming morally and intellectually corrupted. Such has been the history of academies when privileges allowed them were few and rare. For Bakunin,

“a scientific body entrusted with the government of society would soon end by devoting itself no longer to science but to some other effort. And this efforts as is the case with all established powers, would be to try to perpetuate itself by rendering the society entrusted to its care ever more stupid and consequently more in need of its direction and government” 18 .

Bakunin maintains that, that which is true of scientific academic is equally true of all constituent assemblies and legislative bodies even those elected on the basis of universal suffrage. It is true that the make-up of those latter bodies can be changed, but that does not prevent the formation in a few years time of a body of politicians, privileged infact if not in law, and who, devoting themselves exclusively to the direction of the public affairs of a country, end by forming a sort of political aristocracy or oligarchy.

Thus no external legislation and no authority are necessary, for that matter, one is separable from the other, and both tend to enslave society and to degrade mentally the legislators themselves.

In the good old times when the Christian faith, still unshaken and mainly represented by the Roman catholic church, flourished in all its might, God had no difficulty in designating his elect. It was understood that all the sovereigns, great and small, reigned by the grace of God; if only they were not excommunicated, the nobility itself-based its privileges upon benediction of the holy church even Protestanism which contributed powerfully to the destruction of the faith against its will of course, left in this respect at least, the Christian doctrine wholly intact

Arguing further, he asserts; “for there is no power (it repeated the words of St.

Paul) but of God” Protestanism even reinforced the authority of the sovereign by proclaiming that it proceeded directly from God, without needing the intervention of the church, and by subjecting the latter to the power of the sovereign” 19 . Bakunin insists that even since the philosophy even since the philosophy of the last century the eighteenth acting in union with the bourgeois revolution, delivered a mortal blow to faith and overthrew all the institution based on faith, the doctrine of authority has had a hard time re-establishing itself in the consciousness of man. The present sovereign continue of course to designate themselves as rulers “by the grace, of God” but these words which

once possessed a meaning that was real, powerful, and palpitating with life, are now considered by the educated classes and even by a section of the people itself, as an absolute, banal, and essentially meaningless phrase. Napoleon III tried to rejuvenate it by adding to it another phrase: “ and by the will of the people” 20 , which, added to the first one, either annuls its meaning and thereby become annulled in turn, or signifies that God wills whatever the people will.

What remains to be done is to ascertain the will of people and to find out which political organ faith fully expresses that will. The Radical democrats for example, imagine that it is an assembly election on the basis of universal suffrage that will prove to be the most adequate organ for the purpose. Others for example even more radical democrats, add to it the referendum, the direct voting of the whole people upon every more or less important law. All of them – conservatives, liberals, moderates, and extreme radicals – agree on one point, that the people should be governed, whether the people themselves elect their rulers and masters, or such are impose upon them but rulers and masters they should have. Devoid of intelligence, the people should let themselves be guided by those who do possess such intelligence. Whereas in the past continues authority was demanded in the name of God, now the doctrine is in the name of reason.

We recognize, then, the absolute authority of science, for science has for its object only the mentally elaborated production, as systematic as possible, of the natural laws inherent in the material, intellectual, and rural life of both the physical and social worlds; “the absolute authority science” for him should be the truly universal science that would reproduce ideally, to its full extent and in all its infinite detail, the universe, the system or the co-ordination of all the natural laws manifested by the incessant development of worlds.” 21

3.7 Liberty and Authority in Mikhail

With a relevance to ensure freedom of the citizens, Mikhail solicited that power and authority must be forever, undivided, and absolute, for to divide is to limit the authority of the ruler. Since power and authority are there, liberty should not be hurt, which is the freedom to do what a man ought to do and ought not: for to divide or limit the authority of the sovereign, would lead to risk of anarchy, which he dreaded so much.

For him, such a situation would be illogical because it would be inconsistent with the over thrown of the authority and the power of the ruler. The reason Mikhail solicited for the unlimited power and authority of the ruler is that want of it, which is forever war of every man against his fellow human being is worse than having it.” “The safety of the people is the supreme law” 22 and this required complete submission to an absolute power and authority. This authority is the logical consequence of government by consent.

Bakunin maintains that, work maintains that, man by coming together to form a civil society have limited their natural liberty “but as men, for the attaining peace and conservation of themselves thereby have made an artificial man, which we call a society” so have they made artificial chains. Mikhail believed that the liberty of people is guaranteed only within the bound of the laws made by the power and authority, “The liberty of subjects lieth therefore, only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the power and authority permitted. He insists that men by contracting to be under a society have submitted both their obligation and liberty to him”23 . As for other liberties not prescribed by the authority or power, they depend on the silence of law. He drops the unnecessary idea of civil disobedience as supported by John Locke, he noted that the power and authority in virtue of the contract is justified in eliminating dissident citizens.

Mikhail, did not restrict citizen’s liberties to a minute minimal level but of his search for

absolute peace and liberty in the society of which for him is possible only under an absolute power and authority of the honest rulers.” 23

3.8 Man, Society and Freedom

According to Bakunin, the materialistic, realistic, and collective conception of freedom, as opposed to the idealistic, is thus: man becomes conscious of himself and his humanity only in society and only by the collective action of the whole society. He free himself from the yoke of external nature only by collective and social labours, which alone can transform the earth into an abode favourable to the development of humanity.

He asserts; “Without such material emancipation the intellectual and moral emancipation of the individual is impossible 24 . He can emancipate himself from the yoke of his own nature i.e subordinate his instinct and the movement of his body to the conscious direction of his mind, the development of which is fostered by education and training.

But education and training are preeminently and exclusively social … hence the isolated individual cannot possibly become conscious of his freedom. To be free… means to be acknowledged and treated as such by all his fellowmen. Bakunin maintains that the liberty of every individual is only the reflection of his own humanity or his right through the conscience of all tree men, his brother and his equals.

He asserts,

“I can be free only in the presence of and in relationship with other men. In the presence of an inferior species of animal I am neither free nor a man, because this animal is incapable of conceiving and consequent they recognizing my humanity. I am not myself free or human until or unless I recognize the freedom and humanity of all my fellowman only in respecting their human character do I respect my own… I am truly free only when all human beings men and women, are equal free .”25

He argues that the freedom of other men, far from negating or limiting my freedom, is on the contrary, its necessity premises an affirmation.

According to Bakunin, “My dignity as a man, my human right which consists of refusing to obey any other mans and to determine my own acts in conformity with my conviction is reflected by the equal freedom confirmed by the liberty of all, extends to infinity” 26 . The materialistic conception of freedom is therefore a very positive, very complex thing, and above all, eminently social because it can be realized only in society and by the strictest equality and solidarity among all men. The first revolt is against the supremely ranny of the theology, of the phantom of God. As long as we have a master in heaven, we will be slave on earth. We must make a very precise distinction between the official and consequently dictatorial prerogative of society organized as a state and of the natural influence and action of the members of non- official, non artificial society. The first ground is individualism. “Man is by Nature a social animal”. Mikhail Bakunin was well aware of Aristotle dictum, and asked, in reply.

“Do the social animals quarrel among themselves over wealth or precedence? Do the bees rebel against their queen? Do the wasps spend half their time making complicate arrangements to sting each other? Do the ants lock up their houses when they take their air?” 27 The obvious answers to these questions confirmed him in his belief that only fear and cold calculation drive men into society and keep them there.

Bakunin holds that “the entity so created is the commonwealth and that the multitude so united in one person is on the common ground, they feel things can be better. That moral God, to which we own under the immoral God our peace and our defence” 28. Man remains an artificial person even the environment remain polluted, since he does not act in his capacity, as a Nature person. As the Name suggests, the power of the authority is vast and enormous, such great power and authority is necessary to defend men against each other and also against foreign attack since he bears their persons, and is authorized to act on behalf, of their action his action are theirs. The power and authority

of the (sovereign) as the embodiment of the commonwealth is “one person, of whose acts a great multitude, by mutual covenants with one another, have made themselves everyone another the author; to the end, he may use the strength and mean of them all, as he shall think expedient for their peace and common defence, co existence and harmony.

3.9 The Theory of the State

According to Bakunin, the state is an organized authority, domination and power of the possessing classes over the masses the most flagrant, the most cynical, and the most complete negation of humanity. It shatters the universal solidarity of all men on the earth, and bring some of them into association only for the purpose of destroying, conquering and enslaving all the rest. “This flagrant negation of humanity which constitutes the very essence of the state is from the standpoint of the state, its supreme duty and its greatest virtue thus, to offend, to oppress, to despoil man is ordinarily regarded as a crime.” 29 In public life, on the other hand, from the standpoint of patriotism, when this things are done for the greater glory of the state, for the preservation or the extension of its power, it is all transformed into duty and virtue, this explains why the entire history of ancient and modern states is merely a series of revolving crimes, “why kings, and ministers, past and present, of all times and all countries – statesmen, diplomats, bureaucrats, and warriors – if judged from the standpoint of simply morality and human justice, have a hundred, a thousand times over earned their sentence to hard labour or to the gallows.” 30 There is no horror, no cruelty, sacrilege, or perjury, no imposture, no infamous transaction, no cynical robbery, no bold plunder or shabby betrayal that has not been or is not daily being perpetuated by the representatives of the states, under no other pretext than those elastic words, so convenient and yet so terrible” for reason states” if there is a state, then there is domination, and in turn there is slavery, where the state begins, individual liberty ceases.

3.10 The Ideal Political Arrangement for Bakunin: Influence, not Power

In a letter to the Nihilist Sergi Nechaev (within which Bakunin indicates exactly how far apart politically they were -- which is important as, from Marx onwards, many of

Bakunin's opponents quote Nechaev's pamphlets as if they were "Bakuninist," when in fact they were not) we find him arguing that:

These [revolutionary] groups would not seek anything for themselves, neither privilege nor honour nor power. . . [but] would be in a position to direct popular movements . . . [via] the collective dictatorship of a secret organisation. . . The dictatorship. . . does not reward any of the members. . . or the groups themselves. . . with any. . . official power. It does not threaten the freedom of the people, because, lacking any official character, it does not take the place of State control over the people, and because its whole aim. . . consists of the fullest realisation of the liberty of the people."This sort of dictatorship is not in the least contrary to the free development and the self-development of the people, nor its organisation from the bottom upward. . . for it influences the people exclusively through the natural, personal influence of its members, who have not the slightest power. . .to direct the spontaneous revolutionary movement of the people towards. . . the organisation of popular liberty. . . This secret dictatorship would in the first place, and at the present time, carry out a broadly based popular propaganda. . . and by the power of this propaganda and also by organisation among the people themselves join together separate popular forces into a mighty strength capable of demolishing the State." 31

The key aspect of this is the term "natural influence." In a letter to Pablo, a Spanish member of the Alliance, we find Bakunin arguing that the Alliance "will promote the

Revolution only through the natural but never official influence of all members of the

Alliance." 32 . This term was also used in his public writings. For example, we find in one of his newspaper articles Bakunin arguing that the

"very freedom of every individual results from th[e] great number of material, intellectual, and moral influences which every individual around him and which society. . . continually exercise on him" and that "everything alive. . . intervene[s]. . . in the life of others. . . [so] we hardly wish to abolish the effect of any individual's or any group of individuals' natural influence upon the masses." 33

Thus "natural influence" simply means the effect of communicating which others, discussing your ideas with them and winning them over to your position, nothing more.

This is hardly authoritarian, and so Bakunin contrasts this "natural" influence with

"official" influence, which replaced the process of mutual interaction between equals with a fixed hierarchy of command and thereby induced the "transformation of natural influence, and, as such, the perfectly legitimate influence over man, into a right." 34

As an example of this difference, consider the case of a union militant (as will become clear, this is the sort of example Bakunin had in mind). As long as they are part of the rank-and-file, arguing their case at union meetings or being delegated to carry out the decisions of these assemblies then their influence is "natural." However, if this militant is elected into a position with executive power in the union (i.e. becomes a full- time union official, for example, rather than a shop-steward) then their influence becomes

"official" and so, potentially, corrupting for both the militant and the rank-and-file who are subject to the rule of the official.

Indeed, this notion of "natural" influence (or authority) was also termed

"invisible" by Bakunin "[i]t is only necessary that one worker in ten join the

[International Working-Men's] Association earnestly and with full understanding of the cause for the nine-tenths remaining outside its organisation nevertheless to be influenced invisibly by it."35 So, as can be seen, the terms "invisible" and "collective" dictatorship used by Bakunin in his letters are strongly related to the term "natural influence" used in his public works and seems to be used simply to indicate the effects of an organised political group on the masses. To see this, it is worthwhile to quote Bakunin at length about the nature of this "invisible" influence:

It may be objected that this. . . [invisible] influence. . . suggests the establishment of a system of authority and a new government. . . [but this] would be a serious blunder. The organised effect of the International on the masses. . . is nothing but the entirely natural organisation -- neither official nor clothed in any authority or political force whatsoever of the effect of a rather numerous group of

individuals who are inspired by the same thought and headed toward the same goal, first of all on the opinion of the masses and only then, by the intermediary of this opinion (restated by the International's propaganda), on their will and their deeds. But the governments. . . impose themselves violently on the masses, who are forced to obey them and to execute their decrees. . . The International's influence will never be anything but one of opinion and the International will never be anything but the organisation of the natural effect of individuals on the masses. 36

Therefore, from both the fuller context provided by the works and letters selectively quoted by anti-anarchists and his other writings, we find that rather than being a secret authoritarian, Bakunin was, in fact, trying to express how anarchists could "naturally influence" the masses and their revolution. As he himself argues:

We are the most pronounced enemies of every sort of official power . . . We are the enemies of any sort of publicly declared dictatorship, we are social revolutionary anarchists. . . if we are anarchists, by what right do we want to influence the people, and what methods will we use? Denouncing all power, with what sort of power, or rather by what sort of force, shall we direct a people's revolution? By a force that is invisible . . . that is not imposed on anyone . . . [and] deprived of all official rights and significance.37

Continually opposing "official" power, authority and influence, Bakunin used the term

"invisible, collective dictatorship" to describe the "natural influence" of organised anarchists on mass movements. Rather than express a desire to become a dictator, it in fact expresses the awareness that there is an "uneven" political development within the working class, an unevenness that can only be undermined by discussion within the mass assemblies of popular organisations. Any attempt to by-pass this "unevenness" by seizing or being elected to positions of power (i.e. by "official influence") would be doomed to failure and result in dictatorship by a party -- "triumph of the Jacobins or the Blanquists

[or the Bolsheviks, we must add] would be the death of the Revolution." 38

This analysis can be seen from Bakunin's discussion on union bureaucracy and how anarchists should combat it. Taking the Geneva section of the IWMA, Bakunin notes that the construction workers' section "simply left all decision-making to their

committees. In this manner power gravitated to the committees, and by a species of fiction characteristic of all governments the committees substituted their own will and their own ideas for that of the membership." 39 To combat this bureaucracy, "the construction workers sections could only defend their rights and their autonomy in only one way: the workers called general membership meetings. Nothing arouses the antipathy of the committees more than these popular assemblies. In these great meetings of the sections, the items on the agenda ware amply discussed and the most progressive opinion prevailed." 40

Given that Bakunin considered "the federative Alliance of all working men's associations would constitute the Commune" made up of delegates with "accountable and removable mandates" we can easily see that the role of the anarchist federation would be to intervene in general assemblies of these associations and ensure, through debate, that

"the most progressive opinion prevailed." 41 Rather than seek power, the anarchists would seek influence based on the soundness of their ideas, the "leadership of ideas" in other words. Thus the anarchist federation "unleashes their peoples will and gives wider opportunity for their self-determination and their social-economic organisation, which should be created by them alone from the bottom upwards. The revolutionary organisation must not in any circumstances ever be their peoples’ master. For Bakunin, what is to be the chief aim and pursuit of this organisation? To help the people towards self-determination on the lines of the most complete equality and fullest human freedom in every direction, without the least interference from any sort of domination. . . that is without any sort of government control."42

Endnotes 1. Mikhail Bakunin, Reaction in Germany, Trans by Vissarion Belinsky, (Glamcoe III free Press, 1836). p 12. 2. Miknail Bakunin, Sceintific Anarchism, Ed. By G. P. Maximoff, (Glamcoe: Free Press 1870). p. 2. 3. George Woodcock, Anarchism , (England: Penguin Books, 1975). p 158. 4. Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchism , on line, 28 th Oct 2008, http://www.gmu.edu/departments/economics/bcaplan/anarfaq.htm 5. Mikhail Bakunin, Statism and Anarchy http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1873/statism- anarchy.htm 6. Brian Morris, Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom , 1993, p14 ] 7. New York Daily Tribune (October 2, 1852) on 'Revolution and Counter Revolution in Germany' 8. Brian Morris, Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom , (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1993) p. 29 9. Mikhail Bakunin, “On the International Workingmen's Association and Karl Marx”, 28 th Oct. 2008. http://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/bakunin/works/1872/karl-marx.htm ) 10. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The matter, form and power of a Commonwealth: Ecclesiastical and Civil, Part I. ( Trans by R. Kirl Chicago: Rennery, 1958) p. 3. 11. Makhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism , p. 59. 12. Makhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism , p. 61. 13. Makhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism , p. 24. 14. Mikhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism, p. 30. 15. Mikhail Bakunin, Solidarity in Liberty: The Work Path to Freedom, 1867. p. 62. 16. Mikhail Bakunin, Prefecture de Police, 1886. p. 6. 17. Mikhail Bakunin, The Path to Freedom , Ed. By G. P. Maximoff 1870). p. 4. 18. Mikhail Bakunin, Solidarity in Liberty , Ed. By Aleksanva Ivanovich 1861). p. 57. 19. Mikhail Bakunin, The Explorers , Ed. By Paoulo Novaresio. 20. Mikhail Bakunin, The Old Order and the New , Ed. By J. Morris Davidson, 1890). p. 2. 21. Makhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism , Ed. By G. P. Maximoff 1870). p. 24. 22. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, p. 344. 23. Mikhail Bakunin, The Path to Freedom, 1890. p. 65. 24. Mikhail Bakunin, Anarchy . Trans by Sam Dolgoff 1971). p. 3. 25. Mikhail Bakunin, Anarchy . Trans by Sam Dolgoff 1971). p. 3 26. Mikhail Bakunin, Anarchy . Trans by Sam Dolgoff 1971). p. 4. 27. Mikhail Bakunin, Anarchy . Trans by Sam Dolgoff 1971). p. 4 28. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan or The matter, form and power of a Commonwealth: Ecclesiastical and Civil, Part I. ( Trans by R. Kirl Chicago: Rennery, 1958) p. 3. 29. J. J. Rousseau, Theory of the State , Dover Publication. p. 6. 30. J. J. Rousseau, Theory of the State. p. 10. 31. A. Lehning ed. Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings , New York: Grove Press, 1974, pp. 193-4. 32. Sam Dolgoff ed. , Bakunin on anarchism , New York : Knopf, 1971. p. 387 33. Robert M. Cutler, ed., The Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871 , New York: Prometheus Books, 1992. p. 140-1. 34. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 46. 35. Robert M. Cutler, ed., The Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871, p. 139.

36. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , pp. 139-40 37. A. Lehning ed. Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings , pp. 191-2 38. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 169. 39. Sam Dolgoff ed. , Bakunin on anarchism , p. 246. 40. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 247. 41. A. Lehning ed. Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings , p. 170-1. 42. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 191.

CHAPTER FOUR

EVALUATING THE PHILOSOPHY OF MIKHAIL BAKUNIN

4.1 Preamble

Here we present critique of Bakunin and also the contribution this work is supposed to make to his philosophy. And we shall do this in the following form. First, we shall look at the nature of the anthropology and ontology upon which his philosophy is based. After which we shall consider some burning issues in his philosophy. Then we shall also, in brief, look at the positive contributions of his philosophy.

4.2 The Defect of the Anthropological and Ontological Foundations of Bakunin’s

Philosophy

As regards Bakunin’s definition of the essence of man, there is an obvious contradiction. He argues that man is by nature perverse, yet he argues that he should not be regulated. Looking closely at this we come to discover the problem here in. For we can only argue for a stateless society where men are naturally good and can be trusted.

Even through the history of social and political theory, we come to discover that the emphasis scholars placed on authority depended on the way they viewed man. “…As such, the likes of Machiavelli 1 will argue that the prince should be a brute because men are by nature brutes”1; “…Hobbes will argue for the Leviathan because the state of nature was a state of perpetual war”2. In these philosophies we see that their political structure was a consequence of their anthropology. To this end, I wonder how Bakunin wants to get a stable social order without authority where men are not naturally good?

Besides questions too can be raised as to his conception of the human person. He makes a case using animals to argue for the case why he rejects the theory that men are

by nature social. He argues that, “man is social yes, but do social animals quarrel among themselves over wealth or precedence? Do the bees rebel against their queen... ” He fails to understand that human and animal natures are two different things altogether. He fails to understand that, if the bees can no longer live together in the hive, they have no other alternative because it is not part of their nature to make rational choices between options.

And even if they do, such an option will be instinctual rather than rational. But man because of the dynamism of his nature is capable of rational options. As such when we say man is by nature social, it is not because he is constantly living in a co-operate existence but because the capacity to do so is constantly there.

4.3 Violence, Revolution and Invisible Dictatorship

Bakunin has been accused of being a closet authoritarian. In his letter to Albert

Richard, he wrote that “…there is only one power and one dictatorship whose organisation is salutary and feasible: it is that collective, invisible dictatorship of those who are allied in the name of our principle” 3. However, Bakunin's supporters argue that this "invisible dictatorship" is not a dictatorship in any conventional sense of the word, as

Bakunin was careful to point out that its members would not exercise any official political power: “…this dictatorship will be all the more salutary and effective for not being dressed up in any official power or extrinsic character” 4.

Charles A. Madison claimed that, “He [Bakunin] rejected political action as a means of abolishing the state and developed the doctrine of revolutionary conspiracy under autocratic leadership – disregarding the conflict of this principle with his philosophy of anarchism. Madison contended that it was Bakunin's scheming for control of the First International that brought about his rivalry with Karl Marx and his expulsion from it in 1872. His approval of violence as a weapon against the agents of oppression

led to nihilism in Russia and to individual acts of terrorism elsewhere – with the result that anarchism became generally synonymous with assassination and chaos. Others reject this analysis, arguing that Bakunin never sought to take personal control over the

International, the secret societies he organized were not subject to his autocratic power, and that he condemned terrorism as counter-revolutionary 5.

In summary, any apparent contradiction (a contradiction which Marxists try hard to maintain and use to discredit anarchism by painting Bakunin as a closet dictator) between the "public" and "private" Bakunin disappears once we place his comments into context within both the letters he wrote and his overall political theory. In fact, rather than promoting a despotic dictatorship over the masses his concept of "invisible dictatorship" is very similar to the "leadership of ideas" concept used by many anarchists.

As Brian Morris argues, those who, like Hal Draper, argue that Bakunin was in favour of depotism only come to

these conclusions by an incredible distortion of the substance of what Bakunin was trying to convey in his letters to Richard and Nechaev" and "[o]nly the most jaundiced scholar, or one blinded by extreme antipathy towards Bakunin or anarchism, could interpret these words as indicating that Bakunin conception of a secret society implied a revolutionary dictatorship in the Jacobin sense, still less a 'despotism’ 6

4.4 Nationalism

Anarchist historian Max Nettlau described Bakunin's pan-slavism as being the result of a nationalist psychosis from which few are free. The publication of his

Confession of 1851, written while a prisoner of the Tsar in the Peter-Paul fortress, was used to attack Bakunin because in it he asked the Emperor for forgiveness for his sins and begged him to place himself at the head of the slavs as both redeemer and father.

4.5 Anti-Semitism

Bakunin is often seen as a notable anti-semite since his death 7. Bakunin used

Anti-Semitic arguments during his argument with Karl Marx. He claimed that Jews are

"an exploitative sect, a people of bloodsuckers, one voracious parasite" who serve both

Marx and the Rothschilds 8. Mikhail Bakunin repeated typical anti-semitic positions, imagining, for instance, the Jews as

one exploiting sect, one people of leeches, one single devouring parasite closely and intimately bound together not only across national boundaries, but also across all divergences of political opinion…[Jews have] that mercantile passion which constitutes one of the principle traits of their national character. 9

Bakunin's bigotry was shared by other radical socialists and anarchists of the time 8.

Proudhon's notebooks, for example, contain a passage in which he calls for the expulsion or extermination of the Jews from Europe 10 .

4.6 Eurocentrism

His Eurocentrism manifested itself in his call for a United States of Europe, his support for Russian Colonialism, particularly as practised by his relative and patron

Count Nikolay Muravyov-Amursky and his indifference to Japan and Japanese peasants during and after his brief stay in Yokohama. (Japan was regarded as the most prominent revolutionary country in Asia following the Meiji Restoration of 1866–1869.) All these aspects of his thought however date from before he became an anarchist. Bakunins conversion to anarchism was not till 1865, some years after his exile in Siberia and escape through Japan.

4.7 The Case for Vanguardism in Bakunin’s Philosophy

Some Marxists (including Marx himself) claim that Bakunin held what today would be termed a "vanguardist" position -- namely that working class people can only become socialists by outside influence (in the case of Lenin, by the influence of the vanguard party). Anarchists, on the other hand, argue that rather than being the product of

"outside" influence, (libertarian) socialist ideas are the natural product of working class life. In other words, (libertarian) socialist ideas come from within the working class.

Bakunin was no exception. For example, he constantly referred to the "socialist instinct" of the working classes and argued that the socialist ideal was "necessarily the product of the people's historical experience" and that the worker’s "most basic instinct and their social situation makes them . . . socialists. They are socialists because of all the conditions of their material existence." 11

Needless to say, instinct in itself is not enough (if it was, we would be living in an anarchist society!) and so Bakunin, like all anarchists, stressed the importance of self- liberation and self-education through struggle in order to change "instinct" into "thought."

He argued that there was "but a single path, that of emancipation through practical action.

. . [by] workers' solidarity in their struggle against the bosses. It means trade unions, organisation, and the federation of resistance funds. . . [Once the worker] begins to fight, in association with his comrades, for the reduction of his working hours and for an increase in his salary. . .and become[s] increasingly accustomed to relying on the collective strength of the workers . “. .. The worker thus enlisted in the struggle will necessarily . . . recognise himself [or herself] to be a revolutionary socialist." 12

In addition to recognising the importance of popular organisations (such as trade unions) and of direct action in developing libertarian socialist thought, Bakunin also

stressed the need for anarchist groups to work with these organisations and on the mass of the population in general. These groups would play an important role in helping to clarify the ideas of those in struggle and undermining what Chomsky terms "the

Manufacture of Consent," the process by which the population at large are influenced to accept the status quo and the dominant elites viewpoint via the education system and media. It is this "manufacture of consent" which helps explain why, relatively speaking, there are so few anarchists even though we argue that anarchism is the natural product of working class life. While, objectively, the experiences of life drives working class people to resist domination and oppression, they enter that struggle with a history behind them, a history of education in capitalist schools, of reading pro-capitalist papers, and so on.

This means that while social struggle is radicalising, it also has to combat years of pro-state and pro-capitalist influences. So even if an anarchist consciousness springs from the real conditions of working class life, because we life in a class society there are numerous counter-tendencies that inhibit the development of that consciousness (such as religion, current morality the media, pro-business and pro-state propaganda, state and business repression and so on). This explains the differences in political opinion within the working class, as people develop at different speeds and are subject to different influences and experiences. However, the numerous internal and external barriers to the development of anarchist opinions created by the process of "manufacturing consent" can be, and are, weakened by rational discussion as well as social struggle and self-activity.

And this is where the anarchist group can play a part, for there is an important role to be played by those who have been through this process already, namely to aid those going through it.

The role of the anarchist group, therefore, is not to import a foreign ideology into the working class, but rather to help develop and clarify the ideas of those working class people who are moving from "instinct" to the "ideal" and so aid those undergoing that development. They would aid this development by providing propaganda which exposes the current social system (and the rationales for it) as bankrupt as well as encouraging resistance to oppression and exploitation. The former, for Bakunin, allowed the

bringing [of] a more just general expression, a new and more congenial form to the existent instincts of the proletariat. . . [which] can sometimes facilitate and precipitate development. . . [and] give them an awareness of what they have, of what they feel, of what they already instinctively desire, but never can it give to them what they don't have." The latter "is the most popular, the most potent, and the most irresistible form of propaganda" and "awake[s] in the masses all the social- revolutionary instincts which reside deeply in the heart of every worker" so allowing instinct to become transformed into "reflected socialist thought. 13

Therefore Bakunin cannot be considered a vanguardist in the Leninist sense (or as a precursor to Lenin, as some claim). He recognised that socialist politics derive from working class experience, rather than "science" and from outside the working class (as

Lenin and Karl Kautsky argued). Bakunin, as can be seen, was aware that socialist ideas came from working class experience and the aim of anarchist organisations was to encourage and aid the process by which they became explicit. Indeed, Bakunin (in his discussion of the evils of the idea of god) presents an excellent summary of why Leninist ideas of vanguardism always end up created the dictatorship of the party rather than socialism. As he put it:

[F]rom the moment that the natural inferiority of man and his fundamental incapacity to rise by his own effort, unaided by any divine inspiration, to the comprehension of just and true ideas, are admitted. it becomes necessary to admit also all the

theological, political, and social consequences of the positive religions. From the moment that God, the perfect supreme being, is posited face to face with humanity, divine mediators, the elect, the inspired of God spring from the earth to enlighten, direct, and govern in his name the human race. 14

In What is to be Done ? Lenin argued that socialist "consciousness could only be brought to [the workers] from without. “ the working class, exclusively by its own efforts, is able to develop only trade union consciousness" and that the "theory of socialism" was developed by "the educated representatives of the propertied classes, the intellectuals" and, in so doing, replaced God with Marxism”15 . Hence Trotsky's comments at the

Communist Party's 1921 congress that "the Party [is] entitled to assert its dictatorship even if that dictatorship temporarily clashed with the passing moods of the workers' democracy!" “…and that it is "obliged to maintain its dictatorship. . . regardless of temporary vacillations even in the working class" 16 come as no surprise. They are just the logical, evil consequences of vanguardism (and, of course, it is the Party -- upholders of the correct ideology, of "scientific" socialism-- which determines what is a "passing mood" or a "temporary vacillation" and so dictatorship is the logical consequence of

Leninism). The validity of Bakunin's argument can easily be recognised. “…Little wonder anarchists reject the concept of vanguardism totally”17 .

4.8 The Marxist critique of left-anarchism 18

One of the most famous attacks on anarchism was launched by Karl Marx during his battles with Proudhon and Bakunin. The ultimate result of this protracted battle of words was to split the 19th-century workers' movement into two distinct factions. In the 20th century, the war of words ended in blows: while Marxist-Leninists sometimes cooperated with anarchists during the early stages of the Russian and Spanish revolutions, violent struggle between them was the rule rather than the exception.

There were at least three distinct arguments that Marx aimed at his anarchist opponents.

First: the development of socialism had to follow a particular historical course, whereas the anarchists mistakenly believed that it could be created by force of will alone. "A radical social revolution is connected with certain historical conditions of economic development; the latter are its presupposition. Therefore it is possible only where the industrial proletariat, together with capitalist production, occupies at least a substantial place in the mass of the people." Marx continues: "He [Bakunin] understands absolutely nothing about social revolution ... For him economic requisites do not exist...He wants a

European social revolution, resting on the economic foundation of capitalist production, to take place on the level of the Russian or Slavic agricultural and pastoral peoples ...

Will power and not economic conditions is the basis for his social revolution." Proudhon, according to Marx, suffered from the same ignorance of history and its laws: "M.

Proudhon, incapable of following the real movement of history, produces a phantasmagoria which presumptuously claims to be dialectical “... From his point of view man is only the instrument of which the idea or the eternal reason makes use in order to unfold itself." 18 This particular argument is probably of historical interest only, in light of the gross inaccuracy of Marx's prediction of the path of future civilization; although perhaps the general claim that social progression has material presuppositions retains some merit.

Second, Marx ridiculed Bakunin's claim that a socialist government would become a new despotism by socialist intellectuals. In light of the prophetic accuracy of

Bakunin's prediction in this area, Marx's reply is almost ironic: "Under collective ownership the so-called people's will disappears to make way for the real will of the cooperative." It is on this point that most left-anarchists reasonably claim complete

vindication; just as Bakunin predicted, the Marxist "dictatorship of the proletariat" swiftly became a ruthless "dictatorship over the proletariat."

Finally, Marx stated that the anarchists erroneously believed that the government supported the capitalist system rather than the other way around. In consequence, they were attacking the wrong target and diverting the workers' movement from its proper course. Engels delineated the Marxist and left-anarchist positions quite well: "Bakunin maintains that it is the state which has created capital, that the capitalist has his capital only by the grace of the state. As, therefore, the state is the chief evil, it is above all the state which must be done away with and then capitalism will go to blazes of itself. We, on the contrary, say: Do away with capital, the concentration of the means of production in the hands of the few, and the state will fall of itself." The left-anarchist would probably accept this as a fair assessment of their disagreement with the Marxists, but point out how in many historical cases since (and before) Marx's time governments have steered their countries towards very different aims and policies, whereas capitalists are often fairly adaptive and passive.

On the positive side, we must observe that, his understanding of freedom as being actualized fully in the midst of other men or in co-operation, is quite a position to adopt in our struggle for a much more stable social order in contemporary times. For we must, of necessity, recognize the other as a co-partner in social progress.

Endnotes

1. These Ideas are presented in Nocolo Machiavelli’s The Prince.

2. These are presented in Thomas Hobbes’s The Leviathan.

3. On Line, Wikipedia The Free Encyclopedia, 28 th Oct. 2008, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Bakunin. 4. Madison, Charles A. "Anarchism in the United States". Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1), 1946. pp 46–66. 5. Mikhail Bakunin, "Program of the International Brotherhood"(1868), in Bakunin on Anarchism , ed. S. Dolgoff (New York : Knopf, 1971) p. 107. 6. Brian Morris, Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom , (Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1982) p. 144. 7. Paul McLaughlin. Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Theory of Anarchism , ISBN 1892941414, 2002. p .4. 8. Alex Bein, Harry Zohn. The Jewish Question , ISBN 0838632521 1990. p.368. 9. On Line, Wikipedia The Free Internet Encyclopaedia, 28 th Oct. 2008 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mikhail_Bakunin 10. Mikhail Bakunin & Marshall Shatz. Statism and Anarchy , ISBN 0521369738, 1990. p.xxx. 11. Robert Graham, “The General Idea of Proudhon's Revolution” 28 th Oct 2008, http://dwardmac.pitzer.edu/ANARCHIST_ARCHIVES/proudhon/grahamproudho n.html. 12. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , (New York: Dallas Press, 1987) p. 100. 13. Robert M. Cutler, ed., The Basic Bakunin: Writings 1869-1871 , (New York: Prometheus Books, 1992) p. 103. 14. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 107, p. 108 and p. 141. 15. Mikhail Bakunin, God and the State , in Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings , ed. A. Lehning. (New York: Grove Press, 1974) p. 37. 16. Lenin, The Essential Works of Lenin, ed. By p. 74. 17. M. Brinton, The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control , (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000) p. 78. 18. On line, “Was Bakinin a secret authoritarian?” 28 th Oct. 2008. http://struggle.ws/anarchism/writers/anarcho/anarchism/bakunindictator.html.

CHAPTER FIVE

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 5.1 Summary

Every Political thought is influenced in one way or the other by the situation in the society and by the intellectual and social disposition of the theorist. Mikhail

Bakunin’s concept of power and authority was influenced by the life of the theorist who was an avowed revolutionist. Similarly, the economic situation / reality that existed during his time forced him to think of an alternative situation. His time was characterized by excruciating exploitation of the poor by the rich which was occasioned by brute capitalism. He became suspicious of any form of organization imbued with power and authority. This is because the best member can become the worst leader because power and authority corrupts.

In his theory of the state, Bakunin defines the state as an organized authority, domination and power of the possessing classes over the masses; the most flagrant, the most cynical, and the most complete negation of humanity. This institution called the state shatters the universal solidarity of all men on the earth, and brings some of them into association only for the purpose of destroying, conquering, and enslaving the rest.

The state for him is an instrument of oppression and subjugation because the few people that see that oversee the affairs of the state see the ruled (citizens) as being inferior to them. He asserts;

“this flagrant negation of humanity which constitutes the very essence of the state is from the standpoint of the state, its supreme duty and its greatest virtue thus, to offend, to oppress; to despoil man is ordinarily regarded as crime”1.

He maintains that the entire history of ancient and modern states is merely a series of revolving crimes. Kings, and ministers, past and present of all times and all countries, statesmen, diplomats, bureaucrats, and warriors; if judged from the standpoint

of simple morality and human justice, have a hundred, a thousand times over earned their sentence to hard labour or to the gallows. He concludes that if there is as state, then there is domination, and in turn there is slavery; where the state begins, individual liberty ceases. Summarily, the state is not a good instrument for the proper administration of the people.

On the issue of liberty, Bakunin maintains that by coming together, to form a civil society, the natural liberty of the individuals is now limited band that which we call society will always result in artificial claims. The liberty of people is guaranteed only within the bonds of the laws made by the power and authority. He asserts that “…the liberty of subjects lieth therefore, only in those things, which in regulating their actions, the power and authority permitted. As for other liberties not prescribed by the authority or power, they depend on the silence of law”2. He does not support the idea of civil disobedience on the ground that power and authority in virtue of the contract is justified in eliminating dissident citizens. But what is the reason behind the formation of society?

Bakunin’s answer is that only fear and cold calculation drive men into society and keep them there.

Since the emergence of society is inevitable and secondly human beings being social and political animal have that inherent necessity to live in a society under an organized government, how will such government to be vested with power and authority come into place. Other philosophers before and after Bakunin have suggested different approaches. For Bakunin,

“the best way his ideal political system which will be vested with power and authority without oppressing the citizen is what he identified as secret dictatorship through the process of natural influence. According to him, this sort of dictatorship will be made up of revolutionary groups who would not seek anything for themselves neither privilege nor honour power but would be in a position to

direct popular movements through the collective dictatorship of a secret organization 3.

This dictatorship neither rewards the members or the groups themselves with any official position or privilege nor would it threaten the freedom of the people because its sole aim is the fullest realization of the liberty of the people. He maintains that this sort of dictatorship is not in the least contrary to the free development and the self- development of he people, nor its organization from the bottom upward for it influences the people exclusively through the natural personal influence of its members who have not the slightest power to direct the spontaneous revolutionary movement of he people towards the organization of popular liberty. This secret dictatorship would in the first place and at the present time, carry out a broadly based popular propaganda and by the power of this popular propaganda and also by organization among the people themselves join together separate popular forces into a mighty strength capable of demolishing the state. “…This is made possible as we have noted earlier through natural influence.

Natural influence for Bakunin simply means the effect of communicating with others, discussing your ideas with them and wining them over to your own position”4. This is contrasted with official influence which replaced the process of mutual interaction between equals with a fixed hierarchy of command and thereby induced the transformation of natural influence and as such, the perfectly legitimate influence over man into a right. He also qualified natural influence as invisible.

The most significant difference between the anarchist revolutionary theory of

Bakunin and many other anarchists is that Bakunin never supported a violent revolutionary. Much as we appreciate Bakunin’s non-violent anarchist revolution, the feasibility of his theory is very doubtful. It is more utopic than realistic.

5.2 Conclusion

Bakunin, sees to the total reinforcement of human liberty and the restoration of equity. He opined that for society to achieve its objectives, political power should be rejected in all ramifications. “…He said it is necessary to abolish completely, both in principle and in fact, all that which is called political power for, as so long as political power exists, there will be ruler and ruled, masters and slaves, exploiters and exploited”5.

Once abolished, political power should be replaced with an organization of productive forces and economic service. Political power breeds corruption, to this end. There will be no possibility of the existence of a political government, for such government will be transformed into a simple administration of common affairs. Bakunin summed up this program of a free society thus: “peace, emancipation and the happiness of the oppressed”.

The work provides to us a recipe (the means) for a free society with free individuals, with the abolition of political power. sThe construction of society has to provide for the possibility of generating the structures and institutions of society via a continuous process of human action and thought, the foundation of liberal and democratic culture. Also, man according to Aristotle is a socio- political animal with gregarious natural impulse. In line with this assertion, it becomes obvious that for human beings to be called humans they must live together in a society regulated by norms or laws.

Endnotes 1. Mikhail Bakunin, Reaction in Germany , Trans. by Vissarion Belinsky (Glamcoe: III Free Press, 1836) pg. 12. 2. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan , Part I, trans. by R. Kirl, (Chicago: Rennry 1958) pg. 3 3. A. Lehning (ed), Mikhail Bakunin: Selected Writings, (New York: Groove Press, 1974) pg.193-4. 4. Richard B. Saltman, The Social and Political Thought of Mikhail Bakunin , pg. 46. 5. Mikhail Bakunin, Scientific Anarchism, Edited by G. P. Maximoff (Glamcoe: Free Press, 1870) pg. 2.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Aristotle, The Politics , trans. Wardman, New York: New America Library, 1963. Azikiwe N., Onitsha Market crisis, Nsukka: Zik Enterprise Press Ltd., 1976. Bakunin M., on Anarchy (Tran. By Sam Dolgoff 1971) Bakunin M., Path to freedom (Edited by GP Maximoff 1870) Bakunin M., Scientific Anarchism (trans by G.P Maximoff Glencoe, III Free Press) Bakunin M., Socialism is Justice Bakunin M., Solidarity in Liberty (Edited by Aleksandr Ivanovich (1861) Bakunin M., The commune of Paris and Nation of the state (trans. By G.P. Maximo H Glencoe, III Free Press). Bakunin M., The old order and the New , (Edited by J. Morris Davidson, 1890) Bakunin M., The Red Association (1980) Bakunin M.,, Pretecture de police (1886) Bakunin M.,, The Explorers (edited by Paolo Novaresio ISBN 1-55670-495-x) Bakunin, M. "Program of the International Brotherhood"(1868), in Bakunin on Anarchism , ed. S. Dolgoff New York : Knopf, 1971. Bakunin, M. God and the State , in Michael Bakunin: Selected Writings , ed. A. Lehning. New York: Grove Press, 1974 p. 37. Bakunoin M., Statism and Anarchy (Edited by G.P Maximoff Glamcoe, 111: Free press) Bein, A and Zohn, H. The Jewish Question , ISBN 0838632521 1990. Bosah S.I., Ground work of the History and Culture of Onitsha (No. 1 Bosah street self published undate the king in every man) Brinton, M. The Bolsheviks and Workers' Control, Oxford: OUP, 2000. p. 78. Cicero, on the commonwealth, Columbos , (trans Sabin G.H. and Smith B. el al, Ohio state university press Book) Curtls M., The Great Political theories , Vol 2, (New York: Avon books 1961). David S., ed International Encyclopedia of scord sevence . vol 3. New York. Collier- Macmillan published 1972) Ekel J. C., Justice in communalism (Lagos realm communication Ltd 2001). Foucault, M., Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison . Trans. Alan Sheridan. New York: Pantheon, 1977.

Foucault, M., "The Subject and Power." Michel Foucault: Beyond Structuralism and Hermeneutics . 2nd edition. Ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow. Chicago: University of Chicago, 1992. Hart H. A. L., the concept of law, (Great Britain: Oxford University Press, 1964. Henderson R.N., The king in every man (New Hewen: Yale University Press 1972) Hobbes T., Leviathan , edited with an introduction by C.B. Macpherison, (Great Britain: BPCC Hazell Books, 1985). Johnson S. History of the Yoruba (Ibadan, University Press 1970). Kant I., An introduction to modern philosophy , their edition (New York: Macmillam publishing Co. in 1976) Korner S., Metaphysics : its structure and functions (Cambridge: University press 1984) Lock J., Two Treatise on Government in Reading in political philosophy , Machiavelli N., The prince London penguine Book (trans. George B,) 1961. Madison, C. A. "Anarchism in the United States". Journal of the History of Ideas 6 (1), 1946. Mbiti J. S., Africa’s and philosophy (London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd, 1969) . McLaughlin, P. Mikhail Bakunin: The Philosophical Basis of His Theory of Anarchism , ISBN 1892941414, 2002. Morris, B. Bakunin: The Philosophy of Freedom , Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1982. Nwala T. U., Igbo philosophy (Ikeja, Lagos Literam publications Nigeria Ltd 1985) Nwolise O.B.C. The concept of power and defence in political thought of Oba Ewuare the Great of Bini Kingdom . (trans by Francis O. 10,000BC to the present published 2004 Ibadan Nigeria. Oladipo O., the idea of African philosophy (Ibadan Hope publications, 1998) Plamenatz J., Man and Society, Political and Social Theories From Machiavelli to Marx , (London: Longman, 1992) Plato, The Republic , Concord, Lond: (trans Macdonald F.) Oxf. Univ. Press. Ralph Igbala Aleje, Igede people’s Names and theory social significance, (Igede Gedegede) Enterpress. Ltd (Igede Gedegede. Enter. Press Ltd (1986) Ricoeur, P., Oneself as Another , trans. Kathleen Blamey. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992. Ricoeur, P., “The Political Paradox,” in History and Truth , trans. Charles A. Kelbley. Evanston: Northwestern University press. 1965.

Saltman, R. B. The Social and Political Thought of Michael Bakunin , p. 107, p. 108 and p. 141. Wolff J., An Introduction to Political Philosophy 1996.