Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325

Implementation of the : The Six Decades Perspective

Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti Associate Professor Department of Politics & International Relations University of Sargodha-Pakistan. Abstract To harness waters of the Indus Rivers System, the British Government established the largest irrigation system of the world to irrigate millions acres of land in the Indus Basin by completing several canal networks, barrages and headworks. It changed barren land into fertile and green fields. But with the partition of Punjab in 1947, the irrigation system was also divided in the manner that headworks at Madhopur and Ferozpur remained in and irrigated land in Pakistan. Consequently, taking the advantage of its geographic position as an upper riparian, India stopped every drop of water flowing into Pakistan from Madhopur and Ferozepur headworks. That Indian action created a conflict between Pakistan and India over the apportionment of waters of the Indus System. Eventually, the dispute was resolved by signing the Indus Waters Treaty on September 19, 1960. It was hoped that Treaty would permanently solve the long standing dispute between the both riparian but unfortunately, it has been facing serious problems and challenges since 1970 when India initiated Salal Hydropower project on the River Chenab. This paper is an attempt to provide historical analysis of the post Treaty water conflicts and challenges between the two nations. Keywords: Water Dispute, India, Pakistan, Indus Waters Treaty, Emerging Challenges 1. Introduction The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) not only ended the more than ten years long conflict over the apportionment and management of water resources between Pakistan and India, but also opened up new horizons for development and cooperation in the region. For the permanent resolution of the conflict, both sides

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Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti put aside their conflicting claims and demands and, in the end, the rivers were divided. The World Bank played an important role in organizing financial and technical support for the Basin’s development. Indeed, this division of rivers made possible considerable development in both states. Large-scale development work was completed without interference and obstacles. But just after ten years, water controversies started to re-emerge with new perspectives due to rapid population growth and growing water demand in both countries. The Treaty, which was concluded after intense hard work of over a decade, is now facing various challenges. This paper assesses the conflicts and challenges over the shared use and management of water between the two states in historical perspective in post Treaty period. Article III, sub-clause 2 (d) of the IWT permits India to use the waters of western rivers for non-consumptive, domestic and agricultural purposes, as well as for the generation of hydroelectric energy through run-of the- river plants. Contrary to this, the Treaty also binds India that such use should never cause any damage to Pakistan. Part 3 of Annex D to the Treaty offers a variety of articles on the production of hydroelectric energy from the western rivers within the Indian geographical boundaries. It defines that India shall build run-of-the-river schemes that produce hydel power without live storage as an essential part of the plant except for pondage and surcharge storage1. In operating pool2, maximum allowed pondage3 is twice as much as to the pondage needed for firm power4. India has planned several hydel projects on western rivers which Pakistan has opposed because Indian projects do not meet the technical requirements and criteria established by the treaty. As Abdul Rauf Iqbal said, the Treaty guarantees limited water rights to India over western rivers, but she is clearly exceeding its due water share by abrogating the Treaty5. The first conflict after the Treaty emerged when India tried to launch the Salal hydroelectric project on the River Chenab in 1970. The Salal project is located about 10 km upstream of the

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Marala headworks on the . Six low-level outlets with 49-feet tall spillway doors were included in the original project. Pakistan raised two main objections; the first was on the design of the project and the second on its storage capacity. The issue was formally addressed by the Pakistani Foreign Minister in 1975 during his visit to New and India agreed to provide the information requested by Pakistan which bridged the gap on various aspects of the project, but some basic problems must still be resolved. Eventually, Pakistan decided to ask the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert, but India made efforts to resolve the problem through bilateral means rather than involving a third party. So, after lengthy deliberations at the commissioner and government levels, India agreed to change the design and storage capacity of the reservoir by reducing the height of the spillway gates from 40 to 30 feet and the problem was eventually resolved by agreement on April 14, 1978. 2. Problems of Implementation The Salal was not the last project. There are many other controversial projects like Baglihar, Bursar, Chutak, Dumkhar, Kishanganga, Nemo-Bazgo, Rattle and Tulbul Navigation Project, etc., which India is constructing or have completed on Western Rivers. 2.1. Wullar Barrage Dispute The Wullar Barrage Project (Tulbul Navigation Project) is located on the , 25 km north of Srinagar, near Sopor, in the Baramulla district of Indian held Jammu and . India claims that it was proposed to build it at the mouth of Lake Wular to increase the flow of the river in the winters to facilitate navigation. It was designed in 1980 and its construction initiated in 1984 with a proposed storage facility of 0.3 MAF and a power generation capacity of 960 MW.6. Under the provisions of the Treaty, India is required to provide specific information on the design of a plant at least six months before its construction, which is included in Appendix II of Annex D7.

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But India never informed Pakistan of its intentions. Saddiqui claimed that Pakistan discovered in February 1985 through an Indian newspaper in which a tender had been published on the construction of a barrage near Sopore, 25 km from Srinagar. The project was named Tulbul Navigation Project8. Pakistan immediately requested details of the project specifications. A year later, in 1986, India provided some details. Pakistan was informed that the dam would be 439 feet long with a 40 foot wide shipping block and a gated wire. Its highest discharge capability would be 50,000 cusecs and would allow the level of the pond in the lake to be raised and maintained at a height of 5,178 feet. Pakistan objected on the grounds that the project constitutes a clear violation of Article I sub-clause 15 (b)9 of the IWT, which requires both countries not to build artificial obstacles that could reduce the daily rivers’ flow. Pakistan also claimed that Article III, sub-clause (4)10 explicitly disallowed India to build any reservoir or storage works on western rivers. While, sub- clause h11 Annex E (8) of the Treaty allowed India to build “accidental storage works ", but the storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 square feet. But the storage capacity of Wullar Barrage is 0, 3 MAF, which is thirty times greater than the permitted capacity. Some other objections related to the project were: • The operation of the Upper Chenab, Upper Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab (Triple Channel Project) and Mangla Dam canals would be negatively affected; • The Wullar Barrage would permit India to control entire water flow of the Jhelum River in dry seasons, particularly in winters; • It could create some threats to the security and sovereignty of Pakistan. Contrary to this, India stated that the project's storage capacity will not exceed the capacity permitted by the Treaty nor will it cause any reduction in the daily flow of the river. Its main objective was to make the river navigable during the dry months (winter season) from Baramulla to Srinagar and it was

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 not against the provisions of the Treaty. India also asserted that the project would actually be more beneficial for Pakistan because it would raise the effectiveness of the canal system in Pakistan during the dry season and improve the power generation capacity at Mangla. Pursuant to Article IX (1) of the IWT, Pakistan used the forum of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) in 1986 for permanent solution. But despite several meetings, the Commission could not solve the problem. As a result, India stopped construction work in September 1987. Negotiations between the two countries at secretary level resumed at the request of India, and around thirteen rounds of talks took place until 2008, but all in vain. In 1990, both sides came very close to signing a separate accord, but dispute could not be settled due to apprehensions of Pakistan12. Currently, construction work is suspended but India still wants to restart construction on the project. The dispute is now part of the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan13. 2.2. Baglihar Hydropower Project The Baglihar hydroelectric project is located in Tehsil Ramban, in the district of Doda, in the state of Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir, about 147 km upstream of the in Pakistan. It has been operating since 2008. It was planned in 1992, approved by the Indian government in 1996, and construction work began in 1999. IWT allows India to build hydroelectric projects on western rivers, according to the criteria established in Annex D, paragraph 8 of the Treaty. In 1999, Baglihar's dispute emerged when Pakistan objected on its design, as permitted by Article IX (1)14. Its objections were related to the level of the pond in the operational pool behind the dam, the location of the power intake, the hole-type discharge channels, the locks and the height of the doors. Pakistan declared it a clear violation of the Treaty and stated that its gated structure would deprive it of 7000 to 8000 cusecs of water per day. In addition, it would allow India to control water flow in any grave situation15.

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Pakistan insisted strongly that the construction works on the site be stopped, but India rejected this request and continued the construction works. Finally, Pakistan sent its "questions" to India regarding the project invoking Article IX, sub-clause 1 of the Treaty as: ● It would be able to raise the water level artificially beyond the level of pond mentioned in the project and would be incompatible with paragraph 8 (a) of Annex D; ● The water level of 37.722 million cubic meters (MCM) in the operating pool surpasses two times the pondage of water level; ● A gated spillway was not necessary because the project site was suitable for the spillway without a gate and it is violation of Article 8, sub-clause (e) of the Annexure D. ● Position of turbine outlets was not at the uppermost levels as indicated in paragraph 8 (f) of Annex D16. In response, India by rejecting all objections made by Pakistan claimed that the Baglihar Project comes under the criteria provided by the Treaty. It was a run-of-the-river project and a reservoir or pond was created to cope with fluctuations in the turbine’s discharges. She also asserted that the scheme would never interrupt the daily water flow because the water would eventually go to Pakistan. She also claimed that the scheme without gates would not be feasible17. The "questions" and "differences" related to the scheme meant that one party deemed it to be a violation, while the second considered it in conformity to the parameters of the Treaty. Since the project dispute could not be resolved through the PIC, Pakistan asked the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert to resolve the dispute under the provisions of the Treaty. After consulting both sides, the Bank appointed Professor Ramond lafitte18 as a Neutral Expert in May 200519. After his appointment, the Neutral Expert discussed with both sides and requested them to join him at Paris in June 2005 for briefing. He organized five meetings with stakeholders and obtained written and oral arguments. He also visited the site

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 together with both sides. Finally, on February 12, 2007, he gave his final determination in which he recommended some changes in the design of the project: ● He found that Indian calculations in the free board (wall above the water level) were inaccurate. He determined that the crest elevation should be located at the lowermost level and advised India for reduction of the freeboard from 4.5 meters to 3 meters. ● He decided that the intake site envisaged by India was not at the uppermost level needed by the Treaty. He determined that instead of locating outlets at a height of 818 meters, he should have been at a height of 821 meters. In other words, power intake was raised by 3 meters. ● He also established that the India calculations of pondage were not incompatible with the provisions of the Treaty. He advised India for reduction of the Pondage from 37.722 MCM to 32.56 MCM20. However, Pakistan's objection about the gated spillway was also rejected. Based on state-of-the-art international practices, he asserted that spillway doors were essential for sediment control and flood evacuation. The Neutral Expert did not consider the project as a "dispute", but called it "differences". He instructed India to make some minor modifications in the project, but Pakistan showed complete dissatisfaction on his determination as he did not give much importance to the apprehensions of Pakistan. Pakistan was of the opinion that the Neutral Expert should have made his decision under the provisions of the Indus Water Treaty because other practices and arguments were absolutely irrelevant21. Interestingly, the Neutral Expert sets a precedent for potential explanation of the Treaty. The decision was based on the Vienna Convention on the Laws of the Treaties (1969) and the Expert quoted the latest bulletin of the rules of the International Commission for Large (ICOLD) and state of the art practices22.

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The dispute was resolved by the Neutral Expert, but relations between the parties became hostile again when India filled the dam. Leaving aside the relevant Treaty provisions (Annex E (18) [c]), 23 India started to fill the Baglihar reservoir, which led to the reduction of water from the Chenab river in August and September (2008) at 22,000 cusecs against 55,000 cusecs under the Treaty. Pakistan considered it a serious violation of the Treaty. The Indian action caused serious damage to crops in areas downstream of Chenab24, but India rejected that claim and replied that the withdrawal was made at the appropriate time, as required by the Treaty25. Pakistan claimed that India had withheld up to 0.2 MAF of water during the filling period and requested compensation. India rejected Pakistan's request and refused to pay any compensation. Therefore, after many discussions and negotiations, the dispute over the filling of the reservoir was settled in 2010 at the PIC meeting in the spirit of goodwill and cooperation. 2.3. Controversy over the Kishanganga Hydropower Project The Kishanganga River is a large tributary of the River Jhelum, which originates from Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. It is called in Pakistan. It joins Jhelum River near Muzaffarabad, the capital city of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (the part of Jammu and Kashmir administered by Pakistan). In 1994, India planned a hydroelectric project on the Kishanganga (Neelum) River about 160 km upstream of Muzaffarabad. The project proposed diversion of waters of the Kishanganga River through a 22 km long tunnel; for generation of 330 MW hydroelectric power through a plant near Bonar Madhumati Nala and return water to the Jhelum River through Lake Wular26. India is allowed under the Treaty to construct run-of- the-river projects on Western Rivers, subject to the criteria laid down in part 3 of Annexure D.27 Annex D, paragraph 15 (iii)28 allows India, if necessary, to transfer water from one tributary to the other, but it is subject to existing hydropower or agricultural use in Pakistan. Paragraph

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1029 Annex E prevents India in particular from any kind of construction on a tributary of the Jhelum River which could cause negative effects on existing hydroelectric energy in Pakistan or agricultural uses on that tributary. Here the question can be raised of how "existing uses" will be identified. Does it mean uses at time when Treaty was signed or uses at the time when a new project will be initiated? For Pakistan, it indicates the uses at the time of the start of a new project, but for India, it indicates the uses when the Treaty was signed. Each country interprets the Treaty based on its own interests. India formally intimated Pakistan about the construction in 1992 and Pakistan raised following three objections: ● The provisions of the Treaty do not allow the diversion of water from one tributary to the other and it is necessary to return the extracted water to the same tributary; ● The current uses of Pakistan have been protected by the Treaty, but due to the Indian project, Pakistan will be deprived of 27% of the natural flow of the river and will inflict damage on its 133,000 hectares of agricultural land existing in the Neelum Valley. Pakistan also claimed that the Kishanganga project will adversely affect its 969 MW Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project which was under construction. ● The design of the project does not meet the criteria established by the treaty30. India replied that Pakistan's current agricultural and hydroelectric uses would be protected and that water could be diverted to any other tributary if necessary, but only to the extent that existing agricultural or hydroelectric use in Pakistan would not be negatively affected. India also claimed that diversion between tributaries in the Jhelum basin is allowed by the Treaty31. The Kishanganga project had become a hot topic of discussion on multiple levels. The PIC met several times to resolve the problem, but due to conflicting perspectives and interpretation

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Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti of the text of the Treaty, the conflict could not be resolved. In 2007, India started building the project and Pakistan objected that: ● The Kishanganga project would adversely affect the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project launched by Pakistan; ● To divert the waters of the River Kishanganga to the main Jhelum would have serious consequences on the areas of the Neelum valley downstream of the project in Pakistan. Pakistan also stated that the project does not meet the design criteria referred to in paragraph 11 (a32, (c)33, (e)34, (f)35 and (g)36 of Annex E; ● The project would reduce the total water availability for Pakistan from 154 MAF to around 140 MAF, which will represent an 8-9 percent shortage; ● The project would result in a 16 percent reduction in the power generation capacity of the Neelum-Jhelum hydroelectric project37. Although India has always responded on the same ground that water flow of the River Neelum will eventually return to Pakistan and project would never cause any negative effects in the downstream areas, however some Indian scholars believe that diversion from the Neelum River would create negative consequences in the downstream areas of Pakistan. As Ramaswamy Iyer observed, “India's diversion of a substantial part of Neelum (Kishanganga) will undoubtedly have some downstream impacts. This will affect not only some uses of the water, but also the river regime and the ecological system38. On the other hand, there are many others who reject Pakistan's point of view and have rejected his accusations as "propaganda beatings". They argue that diverting water from the Neelum River to the main Jhelum through a tunnel would improve Pakistan's power generation capacity at the sites of Neelum- Jhelum and Mangla during the lean months. Pakistan has always discarded Indian calculation and claims on the project and claimed that Indian project will put its Neelum- Jhelum project at risk. Having this fear, Pakistan took the case at PIC. As the Commission was unable to produce positive

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 results, Pakistan submitted the case to the ICA on 17 May 2010. The ICA, in its provisional order of February 2013, allowed India to divert the water between the tributaries of Neelum (Kishanganga) in Madhumati. However, it did not provide any details on the deviation ratio and the amount of river flow below the project. The Court issued its final decision on December 20, 2013, which allowed the construction of the Indian Project with the condition of preserving the flow of 9 cumec (cubic meter per second) in the river downstream of the project for the generation of electricity and the sustainability of the Pakistani ecosystem39. It is very interesting that the ICA verdict is claimed by both countries as their victory. Although India was its immediate beneficiary, Pakistan is also satisfied because, in its view, the verdict reversed Baglihar's decision and India cannot use the water in the Kishanganga reservoir under the dead storage40. Furthermore, the verdict will also be applicable to future schemes. On the other hand, India is also satisfied with the Court's judgment. In summary, both states are of the opinion that the verdict is a non-zero sum game. There are also other controversial projects between India and Pakistan, such as Chutak, Dul Hasti, Dumkhar, Nimoo-Bazgo, Ratle, Swalkot and Uri II, etc., which have been contested by Pakistan. Conflicts over these projects can deteriorate political relations between the two nations in the coming years. After the signing of the IWT in 1960, approximately 20% of the disputes arose due to the allocation of water and 80% due to the control of water resources, as shown in the following figure.

Figure1: Nature of the Water Disputes

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The figure above underlines the nature of disputes over international river waters since the inception of IWT. The maximum of conflicts (80%) arose over water control due to intentions of India to build various schemes on Western Rivers, available for unlimited use of Pakistan. Pakistan believes that India is trying to control Western River waters through these so-called run-of-the-river projects and, in the future, India can use them as a negotiating tool to solve other bilateral problems with Pakistan, including the issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The extent to which Pakistan's concerns are reasonable, but two sides have engaged in fierce competition for water. The consequences of ongoing conflicts have not only widened the scope of complexities for future development of the Indus Rivers Basin, but also worsened the already worse and more complicated relations. Despite three wars41, the Indus Water Treaty has survived the past 64 years. It has served both nations, but due to rapid economic development and growing demand for energy, a new set of challenges is emerging. The system is also facing pressure due to the growing demand for water supply. The excessive use of water is not allowed by the treaty. In this critical situation, the PIC is also under strong pressure from the respective states and has not been able to resolve some controversies at its level. 3. Causes of Conflicts First, mostly conflicts over Indian hydroelectric projects on Western Rivers arose due to conflicting interpretations of the various IWT articles. For example, Article III, paragraph 4,42 prohibited India from creating any reservoir to store water from Western Rivers, with the exception of some limited uses which have been mentioned in Annexes D and E. It also provides details about the technicalities of the engineering structure of projects, such as the crest level of the doors, the location of the outlets, the live storage, the dead storage, the water level in the operational pool, the pondage level, etc. Pakistan requires full compliance with the criteria established in the IWT, while this is not a case according to India.

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Second, the IWT is considered to be of a highly technical nature. Its technicalities offer opportunities for differences because the engineers and even the Indus commissioners cannot easily understand it43. Third, some water experts believe that the Treaty has carried out surgeries on the Indus system by dedicating it to groups of eastern and western rivers. The development of the basin requires a high level of cooperation between the two states, but partition of the Indus river system has minimized the scope of goodwill and mutual collaboration. Fourth, the Treaty does not cover new emerging issues such as climate change and environmental degradation.

Being a lower riparian, Pakistan considers Indian projects on the Western Rivers a great threat to its survival, because combined storage capacity can destroy land and population at any time in Pakistan. Secondly, in Pakistani circles there is also fear that those projects will allow India to stop or reduce river flows in critical moments, especially during the seasons when crops are planted or mature. As John Brisco stated, the cumulative storage capacity of numerous Indian projects will allow serious injuries to be hit in Pakistan44. Meanwhile, India's concern is to generate maximum hydel power to meet the energy requirements of its rapid growth in the agricultural and industrial sectors. India claims to have faced an energy shortage problem since 1947 and that energy projects on Western Rivers are crucial to bridging the gap between supply and demand. In the period 2003 to 2011, India's average peak energy deficit was 12.8 percent, which dropped to 4 percent in 201445. IWT allows India to build run-of-the-river hydroelectric projects on Western Rivers, but does not permit her to build at the cost of Pakistan. In response to Pakistan's apprehensions, India claims that Pakistan's concerns are groundless as it cannot flood it without flooding herself. 4. Water Conflict and Indo-Pak Relations Although India and Pakistan have the same political heritage, cultural roots and economic systems yet they have been in a state of unease and enmity for various uncompromising

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Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti problems, especially over the waters of the Indus system. Technically, water is not a core issue; differences of opinion over the use of water have become a central problem. It has become a focal point in their bilateral relations. Since its inception, the public opinion in both countries was totally against the Treaty. Most people in Pakistan criticized the Pakistani authorities for losing Eastern Rivers. Although, Pakistan was compensated by providing huge financial assistance but the loss of three rivers has created strong ecological and financial consequences for Pakistan46. In 1964, opposition parties severely criticized President Ayub Khan and blamed him for selling Pakistan's historic rights in the Eastern Rivers47. Meanwhile, the Indian public criticized their government for losing three Western Rivers. They stated that, in accordance with the provisions of the IWT, India is unable to use the energy potential of Western Rivers48. Various civil society circles in both countries, such as water experts, academics, agricultural groups and the media, opposed the Treaty. Even the opposition parties of both countries called it unfair and suspicious. This situation eventually politicized the water problem within both states and created strong pressure on their respective governments. The changing tone of political relations between India and Pakistan can easily be understood by examining the controversies over Indian hydroelectric projects being built on the Western Rivers. Pakistan severely criticizes these schemes and regards it as a violation of Treaty. Over the past six and a half decades, the IWT has survived numerous threats related to the political relations of the two countries, but in recent years it has been under stress due to Indian hydroelectric projects being built on Western Rivers, including the Wullar Barrage, Baglihar, Salal, Kishanganga and Nimmo-Bazgo49. Indian water experts have always expressed great frustration at the lengthy procedure of the project approval since ratification of IWT. Pakistan has questioned nearly 27 projects. Indian experts and media consider it an unnecessary delaying tact that Pakistan used in every project started by India. They argue that

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 appointment of neutral expert must be the last choice, not the way out for very individual project50. On the other hand, Pakistan claims that India's position on power projects is worsening the already tense relations. Furthermore, as a result of political mobilization in Indian projects, anti-Indian sentiments have arisen in various parts of society in Pakistan. Some Pakistani security analysts also claim that Indian schemes on Western Rivers will allow it to flood Pakistan in any critical situation and that floods can seriously damage Pakistan's defenses. In addition, Pakistan also has some economic and defensive concerns about Indian projects. In 2008, India filled the Baglihar reservoir and subsequently the downstream flow of water was reduced, the project became the central problem among the political circles of both countries. There are also some political and strategic concerns in Pakistani society regarding the Wullar Barrage, as it would increase the capability of Indian forces to enter Pakistan by closing the doors of Barrage during the war51. In 1960 President Ayub Khan expressed that resolving water disputes would lead to the solution of the Kashmir problem52. Even Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru expressed the same views in the Indian Parliament when he came to Pakistan to sign the IWT. He asserted that India is ready to find a solution to all problems including the Kashmir issue, but unfortunately they could not avoid war. In September 1965, immediately after the five years of the Treaty, India and Pakistan fought a war over Jammu and Kashmir. Until the dispute of Jammu and Kashmir is resolved, both states can never develop cooperative and friendly relationships. If the two nations reach an agreement to resolve the Kashmir dispute, the water conflicts will be automatically resolved, because the two issues are related to each other.

5. Challenges to the Indus Water Treaty Although the IWT is considered to be one of the most successful treatises, some contemporary problems have become a serious threat to its survival. First, the issue of climate change with decreasing water supplies not only poses a threat to the development of the Indus Basin, but has also created new areas

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Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti of difference. In India, annual per capita availability of fresh water has decreased from 5,000 CM in 1950 to 1,130 CM in 2013, and it has also been estimated that it will decrease further to less than 1,000 CM by 2025. In Pakistan, the situation is also very alarming. In 1951, the annual per capita availability of fresh water was 5,000 CM, which dropped to 1,066 CM in 2015 and is expected to drop to 858 CM by 202553. A comparative study on the availability of water and their growing demand in India and Pakistan shows that both countries are rapidly approaching the state of water scarcity. Due to this critical situation, some socio-economic tensions are rapidly emerging in the two states. If this situation is not handled carefully, it can cause a political crisis between the two states. As a United Nations (UN) working group warned in March 2009 that reducing the amount of water in the Indus Basin can cause serious political conflicts, the IWT will also face great pressure in the coming years. Water scarcity is caused by climatic variability and decreasing amount of water. Climate change has not only changed the pattern of precipitation, but has also become the cause of melting glaciers at an accelerated rate and, consequently, several regions face drought or heavy rain. In the South Asian region, water stress is also caused by uncertain changes in climate, particularly in the Indus Basin. It is greatly dependent on the glaciers of the northern and north-western highlands (Karakoram, the Great Himalaya and the Hinduksh mountain ranges), which act as a fresh water reservoir. They capture rain and snow, retain water and release it in the rivers that feed the Indus plains. Several studies show that climate change is already affecting the Himalayan glaciers and it is estimated that the glaciers will continue to recede for the coming fifty years. Resultantly, the river flow will increase, aggravating the already serious flood problem. But after the estimated fifty-year period, when the glacial basin would be empty, there will be a dramatic reduction of about 30-40 percent in the flow of the river, leading to a drought-like situation in the Indus Basin54. It is very worth noting that IWT does not consider the impact of the changing climatic conditions. It simply obliges India and Pakistan to ensure the flow of the river without any intentional

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 interference. Existing international water laws guarantee the conservation, management and protection of international rivers, but the IWT does not address the problem of water scarcity. The impact of climate change on the general availability of water is of great concern to both India and Pakistan and it is very important that they should cooperate in this regard. If these emerging environmental problems are not carefully addressed through technical and institutional mechanisms, they can further aggravate the already strained relations between the two neighboring states and will generate further pressure for the Treaty. Secondly, the differences over the water utilization are also of serious concern. Under IWT, India can build run-of-the-river projects on the rivers allocated to Pakistan for the generation of hydel energy. So, taking the advantage, India has started building various projects. Pakistan claims that those schemes are not only a violation of the Treaty, but also a permanent threat to its economic safety measures and sovereignty. India can use stored water to flood Pakistan's key terrains or stop it during the sowing seasons. Whereas, India claims that all these projects are under the jurisdiction of the treaty. However, the diverse explanations of the various articles of Treaty and technicalities envisaged by the Treaty are very critical and have aggravated the already strained political and military relations between the two States. Thirdly, the intentions of Afghanistan and China for the use of Kabul and Indus rivers may create some problems for the IWT and hamper relations between Pakistan and India. The Kabul River, a chief western tributary of the Indus, is a common river of Afghanistan and Pakistan. It contributes almost 15% to Pakistan's surface water resources. Now Afghanistan is trying to use the Kabul River and planning to build dams on it and its tributaries. If Afghanistan builds its planned projects in the Kabul Basin, Pakistan will lose a good amount of freshwater and resultantly, its agricultural and energy production will face severe water scarcity, particularly the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. There will be no water for the planned Kalabagh Dam Project. Technical and financial support is being provided by India for the development of the Kabul River Basin. This

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Indian support on the cost of Pakistan can cause a tense relationship between the states concerned, particularly between India and Pakistan, and can pose a serious threat to the IWT. On the other hand, another upper riparian state, China also intends to start building water projects on the Tibetan plateau. It has started a dam in Demchok on the Indus River with an 11 MW power generation capacity. This project has the ability to store a significant amount of water from the Indus River55. Obviously, Chinese projects on the Indus River will reduce river flow and adversely affect energy production and irrigation facilities in the Indus Plains. Reducing the flow of the river is of great concern because it will not only intensify the already strained political relations between India and Pakistan, but also become a challenge to the Treaty56. 6. Conclusion In September 1960, the Indus Water Treaty resolved a long standing dispute between Pakistan and India which not only opened new doors of cooperation and understanding, but also opened the paths of development in both countries. Although the Indus Water Treaty is the most detailed document involving various technical and political processes yet today it is heavily stressed due to various challenges. In the recent past, water disputes continued to pose serious challenges and widened the trust gap between the two neighboring states. Due to differences over the understanding of the Treaty and the use of water, the Indus Waters Treaty has become a more controversial document. In particular, hydroelectric schemes on Western Rivers such as Baglihar, Kishanganga, Dulhasti, Chutak, Dumkhar, Nimoo-Bazgo, Ratle, Swalkot and Uri II have posed serious challenges to the Treaty and due to those schemes; the possibility of severe conflicts at various levels is being expected. The Indus Water Treaty allowed India and Pakistan to develop infrastructure for irrigation and hydroelectric power in their respective parts of the Indus Basin, but keeping in view the current circumstances, it appears that the Treaty is not

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Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 implemented with letter and spirit. Under the Treaty, significant steps must be taken to resolve problems relating to the management and use of water resources, without taking into account political and emotional concerns for durable harmony and peace but unfortunately, both states have failed to resolve their water-related problems under the provisions of the Treaty.

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References

1- Surcharge Storage means uncontrollable storage occupying space above full pondage level (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (2) (d)[e]). 2- Operating pools means the storage capacity between dead storage level and full pondage level (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (2) (d)[f]). 3- Pondage means “Live Storage of only sufficient magnitude to meet fluctuations in the discharge of the turbines arising from variations in the daily and weekly loads of the plant” (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (2) (d)[c]). 4- Firm Power means the hydro-electric power corresponding to the maximum mean discharge at the site of the plant (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (2) (d)[i]). 5- Abdul Rauf Iqbal. "Water Wars and Navigation Peace over the Indus River Basin." Monograph (Institute for Strategic studies, Research & Analysis, National Defence University) 1, no. 2 (2010): 1-22. 6- Priyanka Mallik. Tulbul: The Politics of Water between India and Pakistan. June 30, 2006. www.ipcs.org/article/indo-pak/tulbul-the- politics-of-water--between-india-and-pakistan-2055.html (accessed March 23, 2015). 7- Indus Waters Treaty, Annexure D, Paragraph 9. 8- Iqtidar H. Saddiqui. HydroPolitics and Water Wars in South Asia. Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2010, p. 102. 9- Any man-made obstruction to their flow which causes a change in the volume (within the practical range of measurement) of the daily flow of the waters: Provided however that an obstruction which involves only an insignificant and incidental change in the volume of the daily flow, for example, fluctuations due to afflux caused by bridge piers or a temporary by-pass etc., shall not be deemed to be an interference within the waters (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (2) (b)). 10- Except as provided in Annexures D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on the Western Rivers (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article III (4)). 11- Storage incidental to a barrage on the Jhelum main or on the Chenab main not exceeding 10,000 acre feet (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Annexure E (8)[h]). 12- Suba Chandran. "Harnessing the Indus Waters: Perspectives from India." Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi. 2009. http://www.ipcs.org/pdffile/issue/IB129-Ploughs-hares-Suba.pdf (accessed March 12, 2014). 13- Iqtidar H. Saddiqui. Hydro Politics and Water Wars in South Asia, P.102. 14- Any question which arises between the parties concerning the interpretation or application of this Treaty or the existence of any fact which, if established, might constitute a breach of this Treaty shall first

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be examined by the Commission, which will endeavour to resolve the question by agreement (Indus Basin Water Treaty, Article IX (1)). 15- Arshad H. Abbasi. "Indus Water Treaty betwen Pakistan and India." Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT). December 13, 2012. http://www.pildat.org.pk (accessed February 12, 2014). 16- Syed Shahid Husain. "Pakistan's Perspective: The Baglihar Project." South Asian Journal. April 2005. http:/www.southasianmedia.net/Magzine/Journal/8_baglihar_ project.htm (accessed March 12, 2014). 17- Muhammad Siyad. "Indus Water Treaty and Baglihar Project: Relevance of International Watercourses Law." Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 29 (July 2005): 3145-3154. 18- Raymond Lafitte was a professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology in Lausanne, Chairman of the Committee on Governance of Dam Projects of International Commission on Large Dams (ICOLD), a Member of the Advisory Committee to the President of ICOLD and Member of Dams Safety Committee of ICOLD. He is a supporter of large dams. 19- Iqtidar H. Saddiqui. Hydro Politics and Water Wars in South Asia, P.135. 20- Ibid., 137 21- Gitanjali Bakhshi and Sahiba Trivedi. "The Indus Equation." Strategic Foresight Group. 2011. http://www.strategicforesight.com/publication- pdf/10345110617.pdf (accessed april 13, 2015). 22- Arshad H. Abbasi. "Indus Water Treaty between Pakistan and India." Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency (PILDAT). December 13, 2012. 23- Annexure E (18) of the Indus Water Treaty reads as: The annual filing of Conservation Storage and the initial filling below the Dead Storage Level, at any site, shall be carried out at such times and in accordance with such rules as may be agreed upon between the Commissioners. In case the Commissioners are unable to reach agreement, India may carry out the filling as follows: (c) if the site is on the Chenab, between the 21st June and 31st August at such rate as not to reduce, on account of this filling, the flow in the Chenab Main above Marala to less than 55,000 cusecs. 24- Shaheen Akhtar. Emerging Challenges to the Indus Water Treaty: Issues of Compliance and Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydro Projects on the Western Rivers. Islamabad: Institute of Regional Studies, 2010. 25- Ramaswami R. Iyer. "Indus Water Treaty: A Different View." Journal of Economic and Political Weekly 40, no. 29 (July 2005): 31-40. 26- Dr. Khursheed Ahmad Wani and Prof. P. Moorthy. "Indus Water Treaty: Emerging Flashpoint between India and Pakistan." South Asian Journal of Multidisciplinary Studies. 2014.

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http://www.sajms.com/indus-water-treatyemerging-flashpoint-between- india-and-pakistan (accessed September 17, 2014). 27- Indus Waters Treaty, Article III (2) [d].

28- “Where a Plant is located on a Tributary of the Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural use or Hydro-electric use, the water released below the Plant may be delivered, if necessary, into another Tributary but only to the extent that the then existing Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use by Pakistan on the former Tributary would not be adversely affected (Annexure D Paragraph 15 (iii), Indus Water Treaty: 1960). 29- Annexure E Paragraph 10 reads as “Notwithstanding the provisions of Paragraph 7, any storage work to be constructed on a Tributary of the Jhelum on which Pakistan has any Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use shall be so designed and operated as not to adversely affect the then existing Agricultural Use or hydro-electric use on that Tributary. 30- Fraz Ahmad Khan. Deadline set to resolve dispute: Kishanganga Project, Daily Dawn, May 9, 2005). 31- Verghese B. G., Political Fuss over the Indus, The Tribune, May 24,

2005)

32- The Storage Work shall not be capable of raising artificially the water level in the reservoir higher than the designed Full Reservoir Level except to the extent necessary for Flood Storage. If any, specified in the design. 33- The volume between the Full Reservoir Level and the Dead Storage Level of any reservoir shall not exceed the Conservation Storage Capacity specified in the design (Indus Basin Water Treaty Draft, 1960). 34- Outlets or other works of sufficient capacity shall be provided to deliver into the river downstream the flow of the river received upstream of the Storage Work, except during freshers or floods. These outlets or works shall be located at the highest level consistent with sound and economical design and with satisfactory operation of the Storage Work (Indus Basin Water Treaty Draft, 1960). 35- Any outlets below the dead Storage Level necessary for sediment control or any other technical purpose shall be of the minimum size, and located at the highest level, consistent with sound and economical design and with satisfactory operation of the Storage Work (Indus Basin Water Treaty Draft, 1960). 36- If a power plant is incorporated in the Storage Work, the intakes for the turbines shall be located at the highest level consistent with satisfactory and economical construction and operation of the plant and with

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customary and accepted practice of design for the designated range of the plant’s operation (Indus Basin Water Treaty Draft, 1960). 37- Nausheen Wasi. India Pakistan dialogue on Conflict Resolution and Peace Building. New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, 2009. p. 03. 38- Ramaswami R. Iyer. Arbitration & kishanganga project. June 26, 2010. http://www.the hindu.com/opinion/lead/article485555.ece?homepage=true (accessed January 1, 2014). 39 - Mubarak Z. Khan. India told to ensure water flow for Neelum-Jhelum Project. December 22, 2013. http://www.dawn.com/news/1075591/india-told-to-ensure-water-flow- for-neelum-jhelum-project (accessed August 14, 2014). 40- Dead Storage level means that the portion of the Reservoir Capacity which is not used for operational purposes and ‘Dead Storage’ means the corresponding volume of water. 41- India and Pakistan fought three wars (in 1965, 1971 and 1999) during the last six decades. 42 - Article III (4) of the Indus Water Treaty states: except as provided in Annexure D and E, India shall not store any water of, or construct any storage works on, the Western Rivers. 43- Ramaswami R. Iyer. Towards Water Wisdom: Limits, Justice, Harmony. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007. p. 70. 44- Brisco, John. "War or Peace on the Indus." Counter Currents.org. April 5, 2010. http://www.countercurrents.org/print.html (accessed April 18, 2016). 45- India's Demand and Supply Situation. January 2, 2015. http//:www.reliancepower.co.india/power_industry/indian_power_secto r/demand_and_supply.htm (accessed January 21, 2015). 46 - Bashir A. Malik. Indus Waters Treaty in Retrospect. Lahore: Brite Books, 2005. 47- G. W. Choudhury. Pakistan's Relations with India: 1947-1966. London: Pall Mall Press Ltd, 1968. 48- Verghese, B. G. "Its time for Indus- II." The Tribune Chandigarh. May 25, 2005. 49- Ramaswami R. Iyer. "Indus Water Treaty: A Different View. P. 31-40. 50- Suba Chandran. "Harnessing the Indus Waters: Perspectives from India”. 51- Shaheen Akhtar. Emerging Challenges to the Indus Water Treaty: Issues of Compliance and Transboundary Impacts of Indian Hydro Projects on the Western Rivers. p.47. 52- Muhammad Ayub Khan. Friends not Masters: A Political Autobiography. London: Oxford University Press, 1967. p. 113. 53- APP. Per Capita Water Availability to be reduced to 858 M3 by 2025. June 4, 2015.

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http://www.app.com.pk/en_/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=236958&Itemid=2 (accessed August 12, 2015). 54- John Brisco and Usman Qamar. Pakistan's Water Economy Running Dry. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005. 55- Tariq, S. M. (2007). The Indus Water Treaty and Emerging Water Management Issues in Pakistan. In P. I. Cheema, R. A. Khan, & A. R. Malik, Problems and Politics of Water Sharing and Management in Pakistan (pp. 87-94). Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute. 56- Ibid.

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