Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 Implementation of the Indus Waters Treaty: The Six Decades Perspective Dr. Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti Associate Professor Department of Politics & International Relations University of Sargodha-Pakistan. Abstract To harness waters of the Indus Rivers System, the British Government established the largest irrigation system of the world to irrigate millions acres of land in the Indus Basin by completing several canal networks, barrages and headworks. It changed barren land into fertile and green fields. But with the partition of Punjab in 1947, the irrigation system was also divided in the manner that headworks at Madhopur and Ferozpur remained in India and irrigated land in Pakistan. Consequently, taking the advantage of its geographic position as an upper riparian, India stopped every drop of water flowing into Pakistan from Madhopur and Ferozepur headworks. That Indian action created a conflict between Pakistan and India over the apportionment of waters of the Indus System. Eventually, the dispute was resolved by signing the Indus Waters Treaty on September 19, 1960. It was hoped that Treaty would permanently solve the long standing dispute between the both riparian but unfortunately, it has been facing serious problems and challenges since 1970 when India initiated Salal Hydropower project on the River Chenab. This paper is an attempt to provide historical analysis of the post Treaty water conflicts and challenges between the two nations. Keywords: Water Dispute, India, Pakistan, Indus Waters Treaty, Emerging Challenges 1. Introduction The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) not only ended the more than ten years long conflict over the apportionment and management of water resources between Pakistan and India, but also opened up new horizons for development and cooperation in the region. For the permanent resolution of the conflict, both sides 302 Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti put aside their conflicting claims and demands and, in the end, the rivers were divided. The World Bank played an important role in organizing financial and technical support for the Basin’s development. Indeed, this division of rivers made possible considerable development in both states. Large-scale development work was completed without interference and obstacles. But just after ten years, water controversies started to re-emerge with new perspectives due to rapid population growth and growing water demand in both countries. The Treaty, which was concluded after intense hard work of over a decade, is now facing various challenges. This paper assesses the conflicts and challenges over the shared use and management of water between the two states in historical perspective in post Treaty period. Article III, sub-clause 2 (d) of the IWT permits India to use the waters of western rivers for non-consumptive, domestic and agricultural purposes, as well as for the generation of hydroelectric energy through run-of the- river plants. Contrary to this, the Treaty also binds India that such use should never cause any damage to Pakistan. Part 3 of Annex D to the Treaty offers a variety of articles on the production of hydroelectric energy from the western rivers within the Indian geographical boundaries. It defines that India shall build run-of-the-river schemes that produce hydel power without live storage as an essential part of the plant except for pondage and surcharge storage1. In operating pool2, maximum allowed pondage3 is twice as much as to the pondage needed for firm power4. India has planned several hydel projects on western rivers which Pakistan has opposed because Indian projects do not meet the technical requirements and criteria established by the treaty. As Abdul Rauf Iqbal said, the Treaty guarantees limited water rights to India over western rivers, but she is clearly exceeding its due water share by abrogating the Treaty5. The first conflict after the Treaty emerged when India tried to launch the Salal hydroelectric project on the River Chenab in 1970. The Salal project is located about 10 km upstream of the 303 Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 Marala headworks on the Chenab River. Six low-level outlets with 49-feet tall spillway doors were included in the original project. Pakistan raised two main objections; the first was on the design of the project and the second on its storage capacity. The issue was formally addressed by the Pakistani Foreign Minister in 1975 during his visit to New Delhi and India agreed to provide the information requested by Pakistan which bridged the gap on various aspects of the project, but some basic problems must still be resolved. Eventually, Pakistan decided to ask the World Bank to appoint a neutral expert, but India made efforts to resolve the problem through bilateral means rather than involving a third party. So, after lengthy deliberations at the commissioner and government levels, India agreed to change the design and storage capacity of the reservoir by reducing the height of the spillway gates from 40 to 30 feet and the problem was eventually resolved by agreement on April 14, 1978. 2. Problems of Implementation The Salal Dam was not the last project. There are many other controversial projects like Baglihar, Bursar, Chutak, Dumkhar, Kishanganga, Nemo-Bazgo, Rattle and Tulbul Navigation Project, etc., which India is constructing or have completed on Western Rivers. 2.1. Wullar Barrage Dispute The Wullar Barrage Project (Tulbul Navigation Project) is located on the Jhelum River, 25 km north of Srinagar, near Sopor, in the Baramulla district of Indian held Jammu and Kashmir. India claims that it was proposed to build it at the mouth of Lake Wular to increase the flow of the river in the winters to facilitate navigation. It was designed in 1980 and its construction initiated in 1984 with a proposed storage facility of 0.3 MAF and a power generation capacity of 960 MW.6. Under the provisions of the Treaty, India is required to provide specific information on the design of a plant at least six months before its construction, which is included in Appendix II of Annex D7. 304 Muhammad Nawaz Bhatti But India never informed Pakistan of its intentions. Saddiqui claimed that Pakistan discovered in February 1985 through an Indian newspaper in which a tender had been published on the construction of a barrage near Sopore, 25 km from Srinagar. The project was named Tulbul Navigation Project8. Pakistan immediately requested details of the project specifications. A year later, in 1986, India provided some details. Pakistan was informed that the dam would be 439 feet long with a 40 foot wide shipping block and a gated wire. Its highest discharge capability would be 50,000 cusecs and would allow the level of the pond in the lake to be raised and maintained at a height of 5,178 feet. Pakistan objected on the grounds that the project constitutes a clear violation of Article I sub-clause 15 (b)9 of the IWT, which requires both countries not to build artificial obstacles that could reduce the daily rivers’ flow. Pakistan also claimed that Article III, sub-clause (4)10 explicitly disallowed India to build any reservoir or storage works on western rivers. While, sub- clause h11 Annex E (8) of the Treaty allowed India to build “accidental storage works ", but the storage capacity should not exceed 10,000 square feet. But the storage capacity of Wullar Barrage is 0, 3 MAF, which is thirty times greater than the permitted capacity. Some other objections related to the project were: • The operation of the Upper Chenab, Upper Jhelum, Lower Bari Doab (Triple Channel Project) and Mangla Dam canals would be negatively affected; • The Wullar Barrage would permit India to control entire water flow of the Jhelum River in dry seasons, particularly in winters; • It could create some threats to the security and sovereignty of Pakistan. Contrary to this, India stated that the project's storage capacity will not exceed the capacity permitted by the Treaty nor will it cause any reduction in the daily flow of the river. Its main objective was to make the river navigable during the dry months (winter season) from Baramulla to Srinagar and it was 305 Journal of Historical Studies Vol. VI. No. II (Jul-Dec 2020) PP 302-325 not against the provisions of the Treaty. India also asserted that the project would actually be more beneficial for Pakistan because it would raise the effectiveness of the canal system in Pakistan during the dry season and improve the power generation capacity at Mangla. Pursuant to Article IX (1) of the IWT, Pakistan used the forum of the Permanent Indus Commission (PIC) in 1986 for permanent solution. But despite several meetings, the Commission could not solve the problem. As a result, India stopped construction work in September 1987. Negotiations between the two countries at secretary level resumed at the request of India, and around thirteen rounds of talks took place until 2008, but all in vain. In 1990, both sides came very close to signing a separate accord, but dispute could not be settled due to apprehensions of Pakistan12. Currently, construction work is suspended but India still wants to restart construction on the project. The dispute is now part of the composite dialogue between India and Pakistan13. 2.2. Baglihar Hydropower Project The Baglihar hydroelectric project is located in Tehsil Ramban, in the district of Doda, in the state of Indian occupied Jammu and Kashmir, about 147 km upstream of the Marala Headworks in Pakistan. It has been operating since 2008. It was planned in 1992, approved by the Indian government in 1996, and construction work began in 1999. IWT allows India to build hydroelectric projects on western rivers, according to the criteria established in Annex D, paragraph 8 of the Treaty.