Uzbekistan's Ambiguous Policies in Afghanistan

Home , Abdul Rashid Dostum

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 PO Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Concluding and looking ahead Notes has reportedly requested his northern neighbors to provide weapons and other Human Rights Watch (2011) ‘Uzbekistan: Gov- Uzbekistan’s engagement with military support. For Uzbekistan, Dostum ernment Shuts Down Human Rights Watch Of- Uzbekistan’s ambiguous • Afghanistan is largely driven by its need represents a possibility for access and a fice’. www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/15/uzbekistan- to affirm its relevance to the international chance to influence the very top of the government-shuts-down-human-rights-watch- community. When Uzbek officials Afghan leadership. office continuously represent the country as policies on Afghanistan threatened by unrest in Afghanistan, • The domestic situation in Uzbekistan is Malashenko, Alexey (2014) ‘Exploring Uzbeki- the implicit message is that the country closely connected to the regional context, stan’s potential political transition. Carnegie shares an enemy with the West. Such most notably in the country’s relationship Moscow Center’. carnegieendowment.org/files/ an image of a threat is beneficial to the with Kazakhstan and with Afghanistan. CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf Uzbek government, both in its pursuit If the situation in Afghanistan continues Tolipov, Farkhad (2011) ‘Strategic Uncertainty in of domestic regime security and in to deteriorate, Uzbekistan’s importance Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan policy’. carnegieendow- drawing international legitimacy. Anybody to the international community will be ment.org/files/CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf pursuing a regional commitment to strengthened. On the other hand, the Twitter: PRIOUpdates Facebook: PRIO.org www.prio.org Afghanistan’s stability should maintain current crises in Syria and Iraq have Rado Free Europe (2006) ‘UNHCR leaves Uz- Uzbek officials have for more than dialogue with the Uzbek authorities, yet be placed Afghanistan in the shadow, and as bekistan’. www.rferl.org/content/article/1067722. Brief Points sensitive to how Tashkent may exploit the a consequence diminished Uzbekistan’s html 20 years defined the situation ‘Afghan threat’. significance to the international Uzbekistan has explicitly stated that Radio Free Europe (2015) ‘Uzbek Intelligence • community. What remains certain is that in Afghanistan as the main it wishes to deal with Afghanistan • There is a dire need for more knowledge Uzbekistan has the potential to be playing Agent Claims IS “Planning Series Of Attacks”’. on Uzbekistan’s policy towards a more proactive role in Afghanistan’s www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-fears-islamic- threat to Uzbekistan’s national on a bilateral basis, and has in recent Afghanistan, which is characterized by a future. Whether it will do so remains an state-planning-attacks/26828229.html years kept at a distance from several fundamental insistence on unilateralism open question, and will depend primarily United Nations (2015) ‘The situation in Afghani- security. Even so, Tashkent has that sets it apart from other countries of multilateral regional processes. on domestic developments. stan and its implications for regional and inter- the neighborhood. Effective engagement deliberately limited its involvement national security’. unama.unmissions.org/Portals/ of Uzbekistan is unavoidable, but the Uzbekistan’s policy towards UNAMA/SG%20Reports/SG-report-March2015. • ability to pursue a coherent policy rests on with Afghanistan. How can Afghanistan reflects a wish to balance Recommended readings pdf solid understanding. President Karimov is two major factors: (1) maintaining now 77 years old, and the question of who this paradox be understood? may be his possible successor has already Said Reza Kazemi (2012) ‘A Potential Afghan regime stability at home, and (2)

ISBN: 978-82-7288-648-5 (print) By analyzing the Uzbek policy become a topic of speculation. Most Spill-Over: How Real Are Central Asian Fears?’, gaining international legitimacy analysts suggest the head of the National Afghan Analysts Network. https://www.afghan- 978-82-7288-649-2 (online) towards Afghanistan, this policy by being involved in processes on Security Service, Rustam Inoyatov, as a istan-analysts.org/a-potential-afghan-spill-over- likely candidate to succeed Karimov. All how-real-are-central-asian-fears/ brief aims to reach stakeholders Afghanistan. stakeholders should remain alert to the Kristin Fjæstad & Heidi Kjærnet (2014) ‘Perform- potential risks associated with a political Western states threatened to freeze ing Statehood: Afghanistan as an arena for the working with Afghanistan in a • transition. relations with Uzbekistan in 2005, Central Asian states’, Central Asian Survey, 33(3). neighborhood perspective. Since The special relationship between the following what several international Kristian Berg Harpviken & Shahrbanou Tad- • Uzbek government and the Vice President jbakhsh (forthcoming) ‘A Rock between Hard the Uzbek regime limits access organizations claim was a violent of Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostum, is Places: Afghanistan as an arena for regional also of significance for future engagement. to information, analyses on government crackdown on protestors insecurity’. Dostum has during the last year visited Uzbekistan remain scant. in the city of Andijan. In recent years, Uzbekistan’s key role THE AUTHOR THE PROJECT PRIO • in the NATO reverse transit route Joakim Brattvoll holds an MA in International This policy brief was written as a part of the The Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) is a Relations from the Norwegian University of project ‘Afghanistan in a Neighborhood Per- non-profit peace research institute (estab- Northern Distribution Network (NDN) Life Sciences (2014) and a BA in Russian from spective’, funded by the Norwegian Ministry lished in 1959) whose overarching purpose from Afghanistan has been the main the University of Copenhagen (2012). of Foreign Affairs. is to conduct research on the conditions for driver for improving relations with the peaceful relations between states, groups and people. The institute is independent, interna- West. tional and interdisciplinary, and explores is- sues related to all facets of peace and conflict. Joakim Brattvoll Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO)

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 www.prio.org of terrorism and extremism stemming from Karimov sought to relaunch the ‘6+2’ at the Bu- organizations claim that 300–1000 people were Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations Afghanistan, the country does not participate charest NATO Summit in 2008, but now as 6+3, killed in the events. Following the US call for an Uzbekistan shares a 144 km border with in any form of security cooperation with the with NATO as a new member. Most interna- independent investigation of what had occurred • Afghanistan. The border follows the Amu Afghan authorities. In early 2015, officer Alisher tional stakeholders were sceptical of Karimov’s in Andijan, the Uzbek government asked the River, linked to the Afghan province Balkh Khamdanov, speaking on behalf of the Uzbek initiative, arguing that any peace process on Af- Americans to leave the military base in Kharsi by road via the Hairatan-Termez crossing. National Security Service (SNB) claimed that ghanistan ought to be Afghan-led. Uzbekistan’s Khanabad (K2) within 90 days. Following 2005, Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, reiterated militants from the Islamic State (IS) in Af- the international presence in Uzbekistan has The Uzbek ethnic minority in Afghanistan ghanistan were planning a series of attacks in the wish to relaunch the group at the UN in • diminished. Uzbek authorities asked the United consists of an estimated 2 million people Uzbekistan. In similar assertions, Uzbekistan 2012, but once again the international reception Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN- (some 6–9% of the total population). has voiced concern about a spill-over of Tali- was lukewarm. In addition to excluding Kabul, HCR) to leave the country in 2006, and in 2011, President Karimov maintains a ban militants across its border from northern the 6+3 format fails to include Saudi Arabia and Human Rights Watch was made to shut down • close relationship to Abdul Rashid Afghanistan. Many view this concern as a tool India, undeniably two players with considerable its office in Tashkent. Dostum, currently the vice-president of used to gain political and material benefits from influence on the situation in Afghanistan. Tak- Afghanistan. Western countries. ing into account that Uzbekistan’s influence in Afghanistan is limited, as compared to Pakistan Largely due to NATO’s need to reduce its logisti- • Dostum is the leader of the party This is not to say that terrorism is illusory in or Saudi Arabia for instance, the 6+3 format cal dependence on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan Uzbekistan. The country has had problems seems unlikely to gain any further international Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), rela- (Afghanistan’s National Islamic with domestic militant groups, most notably support. tions between Uzbekistan and Western coun- Movement), which draws its main support the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), tries have improved significantly in recent years. from among the Uzbek population. that pledged its allegiance to IS in April 2015. One of the international initiatives that have NATO signed a deal with Uzbekistan on reverse received most attention in recent years is the Economic relations between Uzbekistan The IMU was behind a series of bombings in transit from Afghanistan in 2012, the same year so-called ‘Istanbul Process’, interchangeably • and Afghanistan are limited, but steadily Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent in 1999 and in that the US lifted its ban on military assistance referred to as the ‘Heart of Asia’ process. Initi- increasing. In 2014, trade between the two 2004. Founded in Uzbekistan in 1998, the IMU to Tashkent. ated in 2011, the Istanbul Process aims to build countries amounted to USD 600.9 million. cultivated a relationship with the Taliban while they were in power in Kabul, and shifted its trust between Afghanistan and its neighboring Both US and NATO military personnel have The gap between rhetoric and practice sanctuary to the border region between Afghan- countries, not least by strengthening economic rebooted their cooperation with the Uzbek mili- interaction, in order to contribute to peace in the istan and Pakistan after 9/11. More recently, tary, which had been put on hold following the Uzbekistan continuously presents itself as country. The Gulf States, the four remaining following a clampdown by the Pakistani army, events in Andijan. This cooperation strength- an active participant in Afghanistan’s recon- Central Asian states, Russia, Iran and Pakistan it has shifted its main base back to northern Cacahuate @ Wikimedia ens both the capacity of the forces to maintain struction. There is a significant discrepancy, all participate in the Istanbul Process. Uzbeki- Afghanistan. The IMU has acquired a global border security, as well as their ability to carry however, between the official rhetoric and the character both in terms of strategy and member stan, however, chose not to sign the 2011 dec- national conferences on Afghanistan. A 2015 them, and is reflective of a zero-sum thinking laration. At the 2012 ‘Heart of Asia’ Ministerial out counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics actual efforts of Uzbekistan. One example is base. The Uzbek regime’s domestic response to UN Secretary General’s report on the situation that dominates Uzbek foreign policy. Conference in Kabul, Uzbekistan declared that operations. It was a significant gesture when, in the country’s economic contributions to Af- Islamic terrorism has been criticized for unlaw- in Afghanistan says that the UN Special Rep- ghanistan, which are limited, and tend to be it preferred bilateral over multilateral involve- July 2015, the US State Department announced fully targeting religious people and for stifling resentative to Afghanistan visited Uzbekistan Balancing the West channelled into projects economically benefi- ment with Afghanistan. An important element that it would give Uzbekistan more than 300 the freedom of speech in the name of security. in February 2015 to discuss regional security. cial to the Uzbek regime. Building the railway of the reconciliation mandate of the Istanbul used Mine-Resistant Armor-Protected (MRAP) However, there is no mention of Uzbekistan’s The main driver for the engagement of Western between Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan and Process as well as other regional initiatives is vehicles. The State Department underlined that Uzbekistan’s ‘own way’ on Afghanistan participation in multilateral initiatives such as states with Uzbekistan following 2001 has been the Uzbek border town of Termez, the Asian negotiating with the Taliban. So far, Uzbeki- these vehicles shall only be used for ‘defensive’ the Istanbul and Kabul processes observed by the international project in Afghanistan. When Development Bank (ADB) provided funding of stan’s attitude towards negotiating with the The ambiguity of Uzbekistan’s policy towards the UN. Moreover, Uzbekistan refused to grant purposes, and that the training of Uzbek officers USD 165 million, the Afghan government pro- Taliban remains unclear. One analyst in Tash- US troops entered Afghanistan in October 2001, Afghanistan especially manifests itself in the access to the UN human rights procedures fol- is conducted with an emphasis on human rights vided USD 5 million. The construction of the kent stated that Uzbekistan opposes sitting at the West gave Uzbekistan increased attention, country’s reluctance to participate in multilat- education. railway was completed in 2011, and aimed to in- the table with the Taliban, which consequently lowing the 2005 events in Andijan, which might both in political rhetoric and through an injec- eral processes on Afghanistan. The only such tegrate northern Afghanistan with the regional explains the country’s opposition to regional in part explain the country’s reluctance to par- tion of military aid. Uzbekistan allowed the US process that Uzbekistan appears to engage fully Finally, the unfolding crisis with Russia has giv- economy of Central Asia. Still, Uzbekistan – not processes where dialogue with the Taliban is ticipate in other UN-initiatives. and Germany to establish military bases in the with is the ‘6+3’ talks, which it has itself initi- en former Soviet Republics such as Uzbekistan Afghanistan – gained monopoly on operating considered desirable. south of the country, used to provide logistical Another dimension of Uzbekistan’s hesitancy new significance to Western policy-makers. The the railway. Uzbekistan has further contributed ated, under the auspices of the United Nations support to international military operations in to participate in regional processes may lie in launch of the “C5+1 Contact Group” (consisting to linking its electricity network with that of Af- (UN). The format has its roots from when Presi- Tashkent’s relationship to initiatives under UN Afghanistan. the country’s relationship with Kazakhstan, of the five Central Asian republics and the US) ghanistan, another ADB project which resulted dent Islam Karimov initiated the ‘6+2 talks’ at auspices is also peculiar. As noted, Uzbekistan its main competitor for the position as Central In their relationship to Uzbekistan, Western in September 2015 may also be interpreted in in providing Uzbek electricity to the capital, the UN in 1999, with the aim to provide a peace- has sought to launch its 6+3 initiative through Asia’s regional hegemon. In contrast to Uzbeki- Kabul. ful settlement for the war in Afghanistan. The the UN. The country has supported the UN- actors were met with the challenge of reconcil- the light of the US-Russia tensions. US Secre- contact group included different factions of the mandated military mission – the International stan, Kazakhstan has been a vocal supporter ing their security interests in Afghanistan with tary of State John Kerry followed up by paying a The contradiction between official rhetoric Afghan conflict, Afghanistan’s six neighboring Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghani- of several regional processes on Afghanistan, the encouragement of democratic reforms in visit to all the five ‘-stans’ in October this year, and actual engagement can also be seen in countries (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, stan, and has repeatedly voiced its concerns and hosted the third Ministerial Conference of Uzbekistan. This ‘security versus human rights’ where the Afghan threat remained a key topic in Uzbekistan’s stance with regards to the security Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in addition to over growing instability following the 2014 the Istanbul Process in 2013. The fact that Uz- dilemma came to the fore in 2005, when Uzbek the consultations. situation in Afghanistan. Although the official Russia and the United States. withdrawal of ISAF troops. However, Uzbek bekistan opposes regional initiatives can thus security forces opened fire against thousands of discourse places great emphasis on the threat diplomats have reportedly been absent at inter- be seen in the light of Kazakhstan’s support for protestors in the city of Andijan. Human rights

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 www.prio.org www.prio.org PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 of terrorism and extremism stemming from Karimov sought to relaunch the ‘6+2’ at the Bu- organizations claim that 300–1000 people were Uzbekistan-Afghanistan relations Afghanistan, the country does not participate charest NATO Summit in 2008, but now as 6+3, killed in the events. Following the US call for an Uzbekistan shares a 144 km border with in any form of security cooperation with the with NATO as a new member. Most interna- independent investigation of what had occurred • Afghanistan. The border follows the Amu Afghan authorities. In early 2015, officer Alisher tional stakeholders were sceptical of Karimov’s in Andijan, the Uzbek government asked the River, linked to the Afghan province Balkh Khamdanov, speaking on behalf of the Uzbek initiative, arguing that any peace process on Af- Americans to leave the military base in Kharsi by road via the Hairatan-Termez crossing. National Security Service (SNB) claimed that ghanistan ought to be Afghan-led. Uzbekistan’s Khanabad (K2) within 90 days. Following 2005, Foreign Minister, Abdulaziz Kamilov, reiterated militants from the Islamic State (IS) in Af- the international presence in Uzbekistan has The Uzbek ethnic minority in Afghanistan ghanistan were planning a series of attacks in the wish to relaunch the group at the UN in • diminished. Uzbek authorities asked the United consists of an estimated 2 million people Uzbekistan. In similar assertions, Uzbekistan 2012, but once again the international reception Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UN- (some 6–9% of the total population). has voiced concern about a spill-over of Tali- was lukewarm. In addition to excluding Kabul, HCR) to leave the country in 2006, and in 2011, President Karimov maintains a ban militants across its border from northern the 6+3 format fails to include Saudi Arabia and Human Rights Watch was made to shut down • close relationship to Abdul Rashid Afghanistan. Many view this concern as a tool India, undeniably two players with considerable its office in Tashkent. Dostum, currently the vice-president of used to gain political and material benefits from influence on the situation in Afghanistan. Tak- Afghanistan. Western countries. ing into account that Uzbekistan’s influence in Afghanistan is limited, as compared to Pakistan Largely due to NATO’s need to reduce its logisti- • Dostum is the leader of the party This is not to say that terrorism is illusory in or Saudi Arabia for instance, the 6+3 format cal dependence on the Pakistan-Afghanistan Jombesh-e Melli-ye Islami-ye Afghanistan Uzbekistan. The country has had problems seems unlikely to gain any further international Ground Line of Communication (GLOC), rela- (Afghanistan’s National Islamic with domestic militant groups, most notably support. tions between Uzbekistan and Western coun- Movement), which draws its main support the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), tries have improved significantly in recent years. from among the Uzbek population. that pledged its allegiance to IS in April 2015. One of the international initiatives that have NATO signed a deal with Uzbekistan on reverse received most attention in recent years is the Economic relations between Uzbekistan The IMU was behind a series of bombings in transit from Afghanistan in 2012, the same year so-called ‘Istanbul Process’, interchangeably • and Afghanistan are limited, but steadily Uzbekistan’s capital Tashkent in 1999 and in that the US lifted its ban on military assistance referred to as the ‘Heart of Asia’ process. Initi- increasing. In 2014, trade between the two 2004. Founded in Uzbekistan in 1998, the IMU to Tashkent. ated in 2011, the Istanbul Process aims to build countries amounted to USD 600.9 million. cultivated a relationship with the Taliban while they were in power in Kabul, and shifted its trust between Afghanistan and its neighboring Both US and NATO military personnel have The gap between rhetoric and practice sanctuary to the border region between Afghan- countries, not least by strengthening economic rebooted their cooperation with the Uzbek mili- interaction, in order to contribute to peace in the istan and Pakistan after 9/11. More recently, tary, which had been put on hold following the Uzbekistan continuously presents itself as country. The Gulf States, the four remaining following a clampdown by the Pakistani army, events in Andijan. This cooperation strength- an active participant in Afghanistan’s recon- Central Asian states, Russia, Iran and Pakistan it has shifted its main base back to northern Cacahuate @ Wikimedia ens both the capacity of the forces to maintain struction. There is a significant discrepancy, all participate in the Istanbul Process. Uzbeki- Afghanistan. The IMU has acquired a global border security, as well as their ability to carry however, between the official rhetoric and the character both in terms of strategy and member stan, however, chose not to sign the 2011 dec- national conferences on Afghanistan. A 2015 them, and is reflective of a zero-sum thinking laration. At the 2012 ‘Heart of Asia’ Ministerial out counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics actual efforts of Uzbekistan. One example is base. The Uzbek regime’s domestic response to UN Secretary General’s report on the situation that dominates Uzbek foreign policy. Conference in Kabul, Uzbekistan declared that operations. It was a significant gesture when, in the country’s economic contributions to Af- Islamic terrorism has been criticized for unlaw- in Afghanistan says that the UN Special Rep- ghanistan, which are limited, and tend to be it preferred bilateral over multilateral involve- July 2015, the US State Department announced fully targeting religious people and for stifling resentative to Afghanistan visited Uzbekistan Balancing the West channelled into projects economically benefi- ment with Afghanistan. An important element that it would give Uzbekistan more than 300 the freedom of speech in the name of security. in February 2015 to discuss regional security. cial to the Uzbek regime. Building the railway of the reconciliation mandate of the Istanbul used Mine-Resistant Armor-Protected (MRAP) However, there is no mention of Uzbekistan’s The main driver for the engagement of Western between Mazar-i-Sharif in Afghanistan and Process as well as other regional initiatives is vehicles. The State Department underlined that Uzbekistan’s ‘own way’ on Afghanistan participation in multilateral initiatives such as states with Uzbekistan following 2001 has been the Uzbek border town of Termez, the Asian negotiating with the Taliban. So far, Uzbeki- these vehicles shall only be used for ‘defensive’ the Istanbul and Kabul processes observed by the international project in Afghanistan. When Development Bank (ADB) provided funding of stan’s attitude towards negotiating with the The ambiguity of Uzbekistan’s policy towards the UN. Moreover, Uzbekistan refused to grant purposes, and that the training of Uzbek officers USD 165 million, the Afghan government pro- Taliban remains unclear. One analyst in Tash- US troops entered Afghanistan in October 2001, Afghanistan especially manifests itself in the access to the UN human rights procedures fol- is conducted with an emphasis on human rights vided USD 5 million. The construction of the kent stated that Uzbekistan opposes sitting at the West gave Uzbekistan increased attention, country’s reluctance to participate in multilat- education. railway was completed in 2011, and aimed to in- the table with the Taliban, which consequently lowing the 2005 events in Andijan, which might both in political rhetoric and through an injec- eral processes on Afghanistan. The only such tegrate northern Afghanistan with the regional explains the country’s opposition to regional in part explain the country’s reluctance to par- tion of military aid. Uzbekistan allowed the US process that Uzbekistan appears to engage fully Finally, the unfolding crisis with Russia has giv- economy of Central Asia. Still, Uzbekistan – not processes where dialogue with the Taliban is ticipate in other UN-initiatives. and Germany to establish military bases in the with is the ‘6+3’ talks, which it has itself initi- en former Soviet Republics such as Uzbekistan Afghanistan – gained monopoly on operating considered desirable. south of the country, used to provide logistical Another dimension of Uzbekistan’s hesitancy new significance to Western policy-makers. The the railway. Uzbekistan has further contributed ated, under the auspices of the United Nations support to international military operations in to participate in regional processes may lie in launch of the “C5+1 Contact Group” (consisting to linking its electricity network with that of Af- (UN). The format has its roots from when Presi- Tashkent’s relationship to initiatives under UN Afghanistan. the country’s relationship with Kazakhstan, of the five Central Asian republics and the US) ghanistan, another ADB project which resulted dent Islam Karimov initiated the ‘6+2 talks’ at auspices is also peculiar. As noted, Uzbekistan its main competitor for the position as Central In their relationship to Uzbekistan, Western in September 2015 may also be interpreted in in providing Uzbek electricity to the capital, the UN in 1999, with the aim to provide a peace- has sought to launch its 6+3 initiative through Asia’s regional hegemon. In contrast to Uzbeki- Kabul. ful settlement for the war in Afghanistan. The the UN. The country has supported the UN- actors were met with the challenge of reconcil- the light of the US-Russia tensions. US Secre- contact group included different factions of the mandated military mission – the International stan, Kazakhstan has been a vocal supporter ing their security interests in Afghanistan with tary of State John Kerry followed up by paying a The contradiction between official rhetoric Afghan conflict, Afghanistan’s six neighboring Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghani- of several regional processes on Afghanistan, the encouragement of democratic reforms in visit to all the five ‘-stans’ in October this year, and actual engagement can also be seen in countries (China, Iran, Pakistan, Tajikistan, stan, and has repeatedly voiced its concerns and hosted the third Ministerial Conference of Uzbekistan. This ‘security versus human rights’ where the Afghan threat remained a key topic in Uzbekistan’s stance with regards to the security Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) in addition to over growing instability following the 2014 the Istanbul Process in 2013. The fact that Uz- dilemma came to the fore in 2005, when Uzbek the consultations. situation in Afghanistan. Although the official Russia and the United States. withdrawal of ISAF troops. However, Uzbek bekistan opposes regional initiatives can thus security forces opened fire against thousands of discourse places great emphasis on the threat diplomats have reportedly been absent at inter- be seen in the light of Kazakhstan’s support for protestors in the city of Andijan. Human rights

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 www.prio.org www.prio.org PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 Visiting Address: Hausmanns gate 7 PO Box 9229 Grønland, NO-0134 Oslo, Norway Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) Russia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and Concluding and looking ahead Notes has reportedly requested his northern neighbors to provide weapons and other Human Rights Watch (2011) ‘Uzbekistan: Gov- Uzbekistan’s engagement with military support. For Uzbekistan, Dostum ernment Shuts Down Human Rights Watch Of- Uzbekistan’s ambiguous • Afghanistan is largely driven by its need represents a possibility for access and a fice’. www.hrw.org/news/2011/03/15/uzbekistan- to affirm its relevance to the international chance to influence the very top of the government-shuts-down-human-rights-watch- community. When Uzbek officials Afghan leadership. office continuously represent the country as policies on Afghanistan threatened by unrest in Afghanistan, • The domestic situation in Uzbekistan is Malashenko, Alexey (2014) ‘Exploring Uzbeki- the implicit message is that the country closely connected to the regional context, stan’s potential political transition. Carnegie shares an enemy with the West. Such most notably in the country’s relationship Moscow Center’. carnegieendowment.org/files/ an image of a threat is beneficial to the with Kazakhstan and with Afghanistan. CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf Uzbek government, both in its pursuit If the situation in Afghanistan continues Tolipov, Farkhad (2011) ‘Strategic Uncertainty in of domestic regime security and in to deteriorate, Uzbekistan’s importance Uzbekistan’s Afghanistan policy’. carnegieendow- drawing international legitimacy. Anybody to the international community will be ment.org/files/CP_Uzbekistan_web_Eng2014.pdf pursuing a regional commitment to strengthened. On the other hand, the Twitter: PRIOUpdates Facebook: PRIO.org www.prio.org Afghanistan’s stability should maintain current crises in Syria and Iraq have Rado Free Europe (2006) ‘UNHCR leaves Uz- Uzbek officials have for more than dialogue with the Uzbek authorities, yet be placed Afghanistan in the shadow, and as bekistan’. www.rferl.org/content/article/1067722. Brief Points sensitive to how Tashkent may exploit the a consequence diminished Uzbekistan’s html 20 years defined the situation ‘Afghan threat’. significance to the international Uzbekistan has explicitly stated that Radio Free Europe (2015) ‘Uzbek Intelligence • community. What remains certain is that in Afghanistan as the main it wishes to deal with Afghanistan • There is a dire need for more knowledge Uzbekistan has the potential to be playing Agent Claims IS “Planning Series Of Attacks”’. on Uzbekistan’s policy towards a more proactive role in Afghanistan’s www.rferl.org/content/uzbekistan-fears-islamic- threat to Uzbekistan’s national on a bilateral basis, and has in recent Afghanistan, which is characterized by a future. Whether it will do so remains an state-planning-attacks/26828229.html years kept at a distance from several fundamental insistence on unilateralism open question, and will depend primarily United Nations (2015) ‘The situation in Afghani- security. Even so, Tashkent has that sets it apart from other countries of multilateral regional processes. on domestic developments. stan and its implications for regional and inter- the neighborhood. Effective engagement deliberately limited its involvement national security’. unama.unmissions.org/Portals/ of Uzbekistan is unavoidable, but the Uzbekistan’s policy towards UNAMA/SG%20Reports/SG-report-March2015. • ability to pursue a coherent policy rests on with Afghanistan. How can Afghanistan reflects a wish to balance Recommended readings pdf solid understanding. President Karimov is two major factors: (1) maintaining now 77 years old, and the question of who this paradox be understood? may be his possible successor has already Said Reza Kazemi (2012) ‘A Potential Afghan regime stability at home, and (2)

PRIO POLICY BRIEF 01 2016 www.prio.org