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1 Afghanistan Afghanistan – Researched and compiled by the Refugee Documentation Centre of Ireland on 5 July 2013 Whether Taliban members surrendered to General Dostum in Kunduz - whether they were detained in Kalaye Jangi in Mazar Sharif– whether detainees from this prison or indeed the above mentioned conflict/surrender were sent to and detained in Guantanamo Bay in Cuba by the USA. A Boston Herald article refers to the surrender of Taliban fighters in Kunduz in November 2001 as follows: “Thousands of weary fighters laid down their arms in the Taliban's last northern stronghold yesterday after a punishing new round of attacks by U.S. warplanes pounded caves and tunnels in Afghanistan where Osama bin Laden's terrorist henchmen may be lurking. The mass surrender in Kunduz, believed to include some of bin Laden's key al-Qaeda lieutenants, was negotiated over the last few days by Northern Alliance commanders and the Taliban. It provides safe passage for Afghan Taliban fighters, while several thousand foreign fighters - Arabs, Chechens, Pakistanis and others - are to be held for questioning about their suspected links with al-Qaeda. About 600 Taliban headed west out of Kunduz to a surrender site near Mazar-e-Sharif, base of Northern Alliance warlord Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum.” (Boston Herald (25 November 2001) War on Terrorism: Thousands of Taliban surrender at Kunduz) A New York Times article states: “Northern Alliance commanders said Sunday night that their troops had captured the city of Kunduz in the dark, overrunning the last Taliban stronghold in northern Afghanistan. The deputy defense minister of the Northern Alliance, Atiqullah Baryalai, said that his men had taken control of the city and that Taliban troops had fled to the west, straight toward the army of another Northern Alliance general, Abdul Rashid Dostum.” (New York Times (26 November 2001) Taliban Foes Say Kunduz Is Theirs) A Daily Mail article states: “The surrender bought to an end the fiercest battle of the conflict without the feared bloodbath, although uncertainty remained over pockets of Al Qaeda fighters, who by nightfall had still not agreed to give up peacefully. Many Taliban and foreigners scrambled to reach the west of the city, preferring to give up to the forces of Uzbek warlord General Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had brokered the surrender, than to those of General Daoud, a Tajik, pressing from the east. Several of Daoud's commanders had indicated they were not prepared to take any foreign fighters prisoner, raising fears of widespread slaughter. Dostum, whose men 'liberated' the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, triggering the rapid fall of other cities, said his troops would hold back, 1 allowing Daoud's forces the honour of entering the heart of Kunduz first. Some 600 Taliban, including foreigners, surrendered to Dostum's men on Saturday and yesterday a number of Uzbek fighters were among those giving up, although they were allowed to keep their weapons.” (Daily Mail (26 November 2001) Rout of the Taliban: Jubilation as Kunduz is captured) An article from The Australian states: “Chaos swept across northern Afghanistan yesterday as hundreds of Taliban fighters poured out of the Taliban stronghold of Kunduz, amid reports Northern Alliance commander General Abdul Rashid Dostum's troops had taken control of the city, ending a two-week siege. The Pakistan-based Afghan Islamic Press agency, quoting unnamed sources, said the ethnic Uzbek commander had sent one of his top officers into the city and had begun dismantling the surrendering Taliban's defences. It said 2500 Dostum troops had moved into the city overnight Saturday and yesterday morning. Captured Taliban fighters were being shipped west to General Dostam's main headquarters in Mazar-e Sharif after he guaranteed safe passage out of the city.” (The Australian (26 November 2001) Warlord tightens grip on Kunduz) A Philadelphia Inquirer article states: “Six thousand Taliban fighters surrendered late Monday and yesterday, clearing out the last remaining pocket of the radical fundamentalist regime in northern Afghanistan. Northern Alliance officials said the surrender took place at the village of Chahar Darreh, about 6 miles west of Kunduz, as they handed over tanks, artillery and other weapons to forces under the command of Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, an ethnic Uzbek warlord. The prisoners were transported to Dostum's stronghold of Mazar-e Sharif, said Gen. Abdul Basir Khalid.” (Philadelphia Inquirer (28 November 2001) 6,000 Taliban troops give up near Kunduz: It was the militia's last foothold in the north. The Northern Alliance said tanks, artillery and more were surrendered) A New York Times article states: “The prisoners had come to this spot, a way station in the parched vastness of northern Afghanistan, to wait for some word on their final destination. They had run out of Kunduz toward the west as the Northern Alliance rolled in from the east, and it was their misfortune that another anti-Taliban warlord, Abdul Rashid Dostum, was waiting for them as they came out. Because these Taliban were foreigners, mostly illiterate young men from Pakistan, they were not being allowed to return to their homes — unlike the Taliban from Afghanistan. The future of the foreign prisoners is murky, with Northern Alliance commanders bickering over whether they should be tried and executed or turned over to the United Nations. General Dostum captured and disarmed this group on Monday, and sent them toward his base at Mazar- i- Sharif. But as he did so, another group of Taliban prisoners was mounting a violent uprising in the fort, at Qala Jangi, where he had intended to send them. Suddenly, Qala Jangi was out of the question, and so the 14 truckfuls of prisoners had come here to wait.” (New York Times (28 N0vember 2011) After Defeat, Journey to Uncertain Fate) A Washington Post article refers to revolt by Taliban prisoners in Qala-i- Jhangi (Qala-i-Jangi, Qala Jangi) prison as follows: 2 “Captured Taliban soldiers overpowered their guards today at a Northern Alliance prison near the northern city of Mazar-e Sharif, triggering a fierce gun battle that killed hundreds and was put down only after U.S. air and ground forces were called in, according to witnesses. The Taliban captives, reported to be Pakistanis, Arabs and other foreign fighters captured Saturday at the contested city of Kunduz, seized assault rifles and other weapons in a surprise attack on Northern Alliance troops who were guarding them at Qala- i-Jhangi, a 19th-century mud fort six miles west of Mazar-e Sharif.” (Washington Post (26 November 2001) Taliban Prisoners Revolt; Hundreds Die in Uprising Quelled by U.S. Air, Ground Forces) This article also states: “The prisoners who staged today's revolt were among several hundred Taliban troops who surrendered Saturday in Kunduz. About 400 had surrendered to the forces of Abdurrashid Dostum, an alliance commander, and were taken by truck to Mazar-e Sharif.” (ibid) A Los Angeles Times report on this incident states: “Tossing grenades into a prison basement in a grisly rout of the last few holdouts, the Northern Alliance on Wednesday quelled a three-day rebellion by Taliban prisoners near this northern Afghan city. Corpses of fighters and horses littered the prison yard at Qala-i-Jangy, where about 500 Taliban fighters had been held in a 19th century fortress that also served as military headquarters for the top Northern Alliance general in northern Afghanistan, Abdul Rashid Dostum. All of the prisoners are believed to have died in the uprising.” (Los Angeles Times (29 November 2001) Response to Terror: Prisoners Overpowered: 3-Day Riot by Taliban Prisoners Quashed; Uprising: All 500 inmates are believed dead, along with 40 Northern Alliance soldiers) An Amnesty International document states: “The prisoners, eighteen of whom are said to be seriously injured, belonged to Taleban forces who had surrendered to the United Front at the besieged city of Kunduz, northern Afghanistan. On 25 November, violent fighting, which reportedly lasted a few days and left hundreds dead, broke out between Taleban prisoners and United Front guards at Qala-i-Jhangi prison, outside the city of Mazar-i Sharif. The circumstances surrounding the fighting inside Qala-i-Jhangi prison remain unclear, but reports indicate that some prisoners overpowered guards and seized firearms. United States air strikes were used against the Taleban prisoners and British and American special forces were also reportedly involved. Initial reports indicated that all those held at the Qala-i-Jhangi prison had been killed. However, on 1 December, approximately 80 Taleban prisoners emerged from the prison's basement after United Front forces regained control.” (Amnesty International (4 December 2001) Risk of extrajudicial execution/ Risk of torture) The 2003 US Department of State country report on Afghanistan, in a section titled “Arbitrary or Unlawful Deprivation of Life”, states: “In November 2001, Taliban prisoners staged a revolt at Qala-i Jangi near Mazar-i Sharif. Approximately 120 prisoners died during the uprising. There 3 were reports that Northern Alliance fighters killed some of the prisoners after the uprising had been brought under control. No action was taken against those reportedly responsible for post-battle executions of prisoners.” (US Department of State (31 March 2003) 2002 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Afghanistan) An Agence France Presse report refers to prisoners being flown to Guantanamo as follows: “A first group of 20 detainees was flown from Kandahar Thursday to a special detention centre at an American base in Guantanamo, Cuba. Others were expected to follow soon.” (Agence France Presse (12 January 2002) Nearly 400 suspects detained at Kandahar airport) A United Press International report states: “Officers under Gen. Abdul Rashid Dostum, currently deputy defense minister of the U.N.-backed interim Afghan government, sought $1 million in ransom to free selected Arab prisoners, according to Dr.
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