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27 September 2017

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Committee on Trade and Environment

REPORT OF THE MEETING HELD ON 20 JUNE 2017

NOTE BY THE SECRETARIAT1

The Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE Regular) met on 20 June 2017, chaired by the Permanent Representative of Kazakhstan, Ambassador Mrs. Zhanar Aitzhanova. The Committee adopted the Airgram, WTO/AIR/CTE/5, issued on 3 May 2017. The latest list of documents of the Committee was circulated on 29 February 2016 in document WT/CTE/INF/5/Rev.12. The Report of the last CTE meeting, held on 14-15 November 2016, is contained in WT/CTE/M/62.

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Contents 1 PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION ...... 4 1.1 Paragraph 32(i) ...... 4 1.1.1 Fisheries ...... 4 1.1.1.1 Presentation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) ...... 4 1.1.1.2 Presentation by Canada ...... 6 1.1.1.3 Presentation by Fiji ...... 8 1.1.1.4 Presentation by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) ...... 9 1.1.1.5 Presentation by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) ...... 11 1.1.1.6 Presentation by the WTO Secretariat ...... 12 1.1.1.7 Presentation by UN Environment (UNEP) ...... 14 1.1.2 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR) ...... 14 1.1.3 International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) work on carbon footprint ...... 16 1.2 Other items of the CTE work programme (Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10) ...... 18 1.2.1 Item 1 ...... 18 1.2.1.1 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol) ...... 18 1.2.1.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) ...... 19 1.2.1.2.1 Presentation by the UNFCCC ...... 19

1 This document has been prepared under the Secretariat's own responsibility and is without prejudice to the positions of Members or to their rights and obligations under the WTO.

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1.2.1.2.2 Presentation on Korea's NDC ...... 20 1.2.1.2.3 Presentation on New Zealand's NDC ...... 21 1.2.1.2.4 Presentation on Peru's NDC ...... 23 1.2.1.2.5 Presentation on renewable energy in China ...... 23 1.2.1.2.6 Presentation by Kazakhstan ...... 25 1.2.1.2.7 Presentation by Chinese Taipei ...... 25 1.2.1.2.8 Presentation on the Workshop on Trade and Climate Change organized by Costa Rica, Canada, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei...... 25 1.2.2 Item 4 ...... 27 2 OTHER BUSINESS ...... 28 2.1 Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations ...... 28 2.2 Update on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies ...... 29 3 BRIEFINGS BY OBSERVER ORGANIZATIONS ...... 30 4 DATE OF NEXT MEETING...... 30 ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME ...... 31 ANNEX 2: PARTS OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION THAT RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE CTE ...... 32

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ACRONYMS

ACP African, Caribbean and the Pacific group on States ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations CETA Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement CFPA Coastal Fisheries Protection Act CH4 Methane CO2 Carbon dioxide COFI Committee on Fisheries CoP Conference of the Parties CTE Committee on Trade and Environment EDB WTO Environmental Database EGA Environmental Goods Agreement ETS Emission Trading Scheme FAO Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations FFSR Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform FSE Fisheries Support Estimate GDP Gross Domestic Product GHG Greenhouse Gas GW Gigawatts HFCs Hydrofluorocarbons IISD International Institute for Sustainable Development IPOA-IUU International Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change ISO International Organization for Standardization IUU fishing Illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing LDC Least developed country MoP Meeting of Parties N2O Nitrous Oxide NDC Nationally Determined Contribution NGO Non-governmental organization NTMs Non-Tariff Measures ODS Ozone Depleting Substances OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development PSMA Port State Measures Agreement PV Photovoltaic RFMOs Regional Fisheries Management Organizations SDG Sustainable Development Goal SMEs Small and medium sized enterprises SPS Sanitary and phytosanitary TBT Technical barriers to trade TIF Transfer to Individual Fisheries TMB Technical Management Board TPR Trade Policy Review UN United Nations UNCLOS United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and Development UNEP United Nations Environment Programme UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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1 PARAGRAPH 32 OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION

1.1 Paragraph 32(i)

"The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries, in particular the least developed among them, and those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and development."

1.1.1 Fisheries

1.1.1.1 Presentation by the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO)

1.1. The representative of FAO updated the CTE on instruments and recent initiatives related to addressing illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) fishing.2 IUU fishing was originally defined in 2001 within the context of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (IPOA-IUU). "Illegal" fishing comprised fishing and related activities conducted in contravention of national, regional and international laws. "Unreported" fishing covered: non-reporting, misreporting, or under-reporting of information on fishing operations and their catches. And "unregulated" fishing included: (i) fishing by stateless vessels; (ii) fishing in convention areas of Regional Fisheries Management Organisations (RFMOs) by non- party vessels; (iii) fishing activities not regulated by states and with monitoring and accounting difficulties; and (iv) fishing in areas or stocks for which there were no conservation or management measures.

1.2. According to an estimate by Agnew et al. (2009), US$10 to 23 billion were lost annually as a result of IUU fishing. However, this baseline was outdated and annual estimations included only illegal and unreported fishing as unregulated fishing was difficult to estimate. Following the request by the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI), FAO was developing technical guidelines on methodologies for the estimation of IUU fishing and indicators. This would enable the formulation of a second, more updated global estimate.

1.3. Moreover, the 32nd COFI meeting had requested the FAO Secretariat to prepare a global study on transhipment to understand the current regulations and the type of operations. This was relevant since IUU fishing activities were carried out by both fishing and transhipments vessels, which transported fish to the harbour on behalf of fishing vessels. IUU fishing occurred everywhere and was found in all types and dimensions of fisheries. It put serious stress on the environment and populations, particularly coastal populations in developing countries that depended on fishing for income or food. Combatting IUU fishing required concerted action, including at the regional level through RFMOs, by flag states, port states, coastal states and market states in order to cover all the gaps.

1.4. International fisheries instruments and tools to combat IUU fishing included: the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS); the United Nations (UN) Fish Stocks Agreement; and the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Instruments within the FAO Code of Conduct included: the International Plan of Actions to Prevent IUU fishing; the Voluntary Guidelines on Catch Documentation Schemes, which would be adopted at the next FAO Conference; strategies on information; the Port State Measures Agreement (PSMA), which entered into force in 2016; the FAO Compliance Agreement (1993), which sought to avoid double flagging in the high seas; and the Global Record of fishing vessels, refrigerated transport vessels and supply vessels (Global Record), an information sharing mechanism to support other instruments.

1.5. Responsibilities of flag states included: general responsibilities such as compliance with international and regional conservation and management measures; fisheries management responsibilities (e.g. effective implementation of conservation and management measures); responsibilities with regard to information sharing, registration and records; responsibilities

2 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/117.

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- 5 - regarding authorization procedures and conditions for fishing and fishing-related activities; monitoring, control, surveillance, and enforcement; and cooperation between flag states and coastal states. Part VI of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement highlighted the crucial importance of international, regional and sub-regional cooperation in enforcement. This was a tool for countries to assess their performance in controlling and monitoring their own fleets.

1.6. The Global Record was a global information system that provided relevant information to fight IUU fishing. The information was publicly available and mainly used to verify information prior to entry into the port. Inspectors in the port could access relevant information to: identify the vessel; conduct risk assessments; and check the legality of the vessels' activities. The Global Record was based on the Unique Vessel Identifier, which was a global unique number assigned to a vessel. The International Maritime Organization number had been endorsed by the COFI as a Unique Vessel Identifier for phase 1 vessels, which were the large scale vessels. FAO's current work on this issue included: a Global Record Working Group that met annually; specialized Core Working Groups on technical matters; the implementation of a pilot project with 11 pilot partners; and the release in April 2017 of the first working version of the Global Record. FAO's next steps on IUU fishing included: the call for inclusion of more countries with more data, with a possible public release before the next COFI of July 2018; and the development of implementation guidelines to enhance the participation of countries in the Global Record.

1.7. The PSMA was the only binding agreement to fight specifically IUU fishing and was an important and effective tool. Its focus was on inspections at the harbors when vessels offloaded their catches. Inspections focused on vessels with higher risk of carrying out IUU fishing and consisted in evaluating the available information on the vessel and of taking actions (e.g. denial of the entry of the fish or fish products into the national or international market). There were 48 parties including the European Union. This was a significant number taking into account that the number doubled from 25 to 48 since the entry into force in 2016. Pursuant to this Agreement, the port state needed to verify the vessel information, which had to be sent 48 hours prior to coming to the port, and take a decision to grant or deny access to the port, for example because of lack of port capacity.

1.8. The PSMA had to be implemented at three levels: policy and legislation; institutional set-up and capacity; and operational, procedures and training. The first meeting of the Parties to the PSMA had taken place in Oslo in May 2017 with decisions on the following aspects: review of responsibilities with agreement on the need for concerted actions; transmittal, electronic exchange and publication of information, with agreement to take a staged approach for data exchange and to establish a technical working group to provide further guidance; requirements of developing States; and on monitoring, review and assessment of implementation of the Agreement, with FAO building a web-based questionnaire. FAO was also broadening its capacity development programme to combat IUU fishing. The PSMA assistance fund allowed Parties and non-Parties to provide funds to different projects.

1.9. Several market measures specifically addressed IUU such as: IUU vessel lists, the IUU regulations of the European Union, the United States Lacey Act, among others. FAO was directly involved in the development and implementation of Catch Documentation Schemes, which had been drafted recently and would be approved in the FAO Conference in July 2017. Combatting IUU fishing required: strong commitment and concerted action among flag states, port states, coastal states and market states together with regional and international organizations; performance monitoring and assessment of states' responsibilities; increased transparency and traceability of information through broad participation in the Global Record; widespread global coverage of the implementation of the PSMA; implementation of the Catch Documentation Schemes; strengthened international cooperation and directed capacity development; and increased advocacy, for example through the International Day for the fight against IUU fishing that was expected to be announced by the UN General Assembly in 2017.

1.10. The representative of the European Union (EU) supported FAO activities in fighting IUU fishing and welcomed the important steps taken by FAO COFI 32. His delegation looked forward to working with all interested parties in implementing these steps and preparing COFI 33 in 2018. The European Union was actively involved in the negotiations of the three major instruments to combat IUU fishing that were mentioned by FAO: the PSMA; the Voluntary Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes; and the Global Record. He highlighted the relevance

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- 6 - of these three instruments in tackling IUU fishing and in the EU ocean governance strategy. The European Union was currently working to ensure their full implementation.

1.11. The representative of Sri Lanka asked how the FAO management system could be linked to WTO discussions on fisheries subsidies.

1.12. The representative of New Zealand considered the three measures mentioned in previous interventions to be highly relevant in the fight against IUU fishing. It was important to make the implementation of the PSMA simple and not overly prescriptive and to encourage non-parties to accede to the Agreement. New Zealand welcomed the adoption of the Voluntary Guidelines for Catch Documentation Schemes, which ensured that all catch documentation schemes met international agreed standards and FAO's work to develop a Global Record. Her delegation supported collaboration and coordination amoung national administrations, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to combat IUU fishing.

1.13. The representative of Mexico took note of the information provided by FAO and said that he would share the information with relevant national agencies.

1.14. The representative of Canada stressed the importance of raising awareness among Members on FAO's work on IUU fishing in light of the ongoing work at the WTO on fisheries subsidies. FAO supported the work at the WTO including through providing informative presentations and answering questions. Canada strongly supported an outcome on fisheries subsidies at the 11th Ministerial Conference (MC 11), including on the prohibition of subsidies to vessels engaged in IUU fishing.

1.15. The representative of Norway noted that Norway had been for years a key supporter of the PSMA, which was a milestone in the fight against IUU fishing. The PSMA was the result of combined efforts involving the FAO and experts from several countries, including Norway. At the first meeting of the Parties to the Agreement in Oslo, Norway's Minister of Fisheries along with other Ministers of Fisheries were present to lay the ground work for future follow-up and implementation of the Agreement. Norway had allocated approximately 1 million euros to support FAO's implementation of the Agreement in developing countries. The number of ratifications was increasing, which meant that fewer ports would be available for landings of illegally caught fish. Norway looked forward to new Members joining the Agreement.

1.16. The representative of the FAO stated that if disciplines on IUU fishing subsidies were agreed it would be important to take into account: the existence of other actors in IUU fishing besides the fishing vessels (for reference, the Global Record also included information on the beneficial ownership, i.e. the final actor interested in the economic gain from the illegal activity); and the broad variety of criteria to identify IUU activities and the fact that certain fishing activities could be illegal in one country and legal in another, depending on national legislation.

1.1.1.2 Presentation by Canada

1.17. The representative of Canada presented on Canada's efforts to combat IUU fishing.3 The commercial fisheries and aquaculture sectors contributed approximately CAN$9 billion per year to Canada's economy with Canadian fish and seafood exports valued at CAN$6.6 billion in 2016, representing almost 80% of Canada's seafood production, by value. Canada's key export markets included the United States, the European Union and China, and two thirds of its wild captured fisheries were certified as sustainable by the Marine Stewardship Council. This certification not only indicated the sustainability of a fishery but also recognized that there were strong measures in place to prevent IUU fishing.

1.18. Canada's legislative and regulatory framework was designed to manage and protect fisheries resources in a biologically sustainable manner and outlined potential actions to prevent destructive practices while continuing to seek effective international solutions. Legislation on fisheries included: the Department of Fisheries and Oceans Act (1985), the Oceans Act (1996), the

3 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/111.

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Fisheries Act (1985), the Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (1985) and the Species at Risk Act (2002).

1.19. The Fisheries Act and associated regulations (e.g. the Fishery (General) Regulations) provided the authority to set quotas, size and weight limits, and to implement time and area closures, and set the framework to apply penalties for illegal fishing activities. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Act (CFPA) regulated the entry of foreign fishing vessels into Canadian waters for any purpose, including offloading in ports. It also provided the authority for foreign vessels to be inspected by Canadian fishery officers. The Coastal Fisheries Protection Regulations set out the terms and conditions for licences to be issued pursuant to the CFPA. The CFPA required licences for any foreign fishing vessel entering Canadian waters, even if only to offload fish products to a Canadian port. The CFPA was being updated with an expected date of entry into force of end- 2017. The update aimed at enabling Canada to ratify the PSMA, expanding the authority of fisheries officers to conduct inspections and the ability for information sharing related to the identification of illegal fishing activities.

1.20. Turning to international efforts, Canada was committed to protect and conserve the sustainable harvest of fisheries resources around the world. Canada employed over 550 fishery officers to monitor compliance, gather intelligence, enforce laws for domestic fisheries and to participate in regional and international initiatives aimed at combatting IUU fishing. As the fight against IUU fishing was beyond the capacity of any one state, multilateral approaches were required to create effective deterrents that enhanced the likelihood of detection and the effectiveness of sanctions. Canada participated actively in international and multilateral efforts in the fight against IUU fishing, for example in RFMOs, the FAO and the UN. Trade agreements were an important tool to support efforts against IUU fishing, for example the Canada-European Union Comprehensive and Economic Trade Agreement (CETA) recognized the environmental, economic and social importance of conservation and the sustainable and responsible management of fisheries and aquaculture. Canada and the European Union had undertaken to adopt and maintain appropriate measures aimed at the conservation of fish stocks, to prevent overfishing, to combat IUU fishing and to cooperate in regional fisheries management organizations. Canada was playing an active role in the WTO to establish fisheries subsidies disciplines and was also chairing the plurilateral fisheries subsidies negotiations.

1.21. Canada had ratified, and was implementing, national versions of all international agreements identified in the IPOA-IUU, including: UNCLOS, the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing Operations. Canada had signed the PSMA in 2010 and was working on its ratification, which would occur once domestic regulatory updates were finalized. Also, Canada had participated actively in the development of Voluntary Guidelines on Catch Documentation Schemes, which were expected to be adopted at the FAO Conference in July 2017.

1.22. Canada participated in numerous RFMOs, including the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization, the International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas and the North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission. RFMOs set clear measures regarding the management and enforcement of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. In addition to regular implementation of RFMO measures, Canada participated in larger program efforts to address IUU fishing in the Northwest Atlantic and North Pacific Oceans.

1.23. In the North Pacific Ocean, Operation DRIFTNET delivered Canada's participation in multinational efforts to control driftnetting and other forms of IUU fishing, including through surveillance flights by military aircrafts. Canada had also engaged in numerous enforcement- related exchanges to collaborate with partners in combatting IUU fishing. Canada supported the International Monitoring Control and Surveillance Network, including hosting meetings and providing financial support to the organization. Canada offered access to best industry practices and promoted capacity building. Canada actively contributed to INTERPOL's Fisheries Crime Working Group to link fisheries enforcement practitioners from different countries, the focus of which was on intelligence gathering and sharing to combat IUU fishing, and on capacity building in the developing world. Finally, Canada also supported the Safe Oceans Network led by the United States by contributing to joint intelligence initiatives aimed at IUU fishing. His delegation looked forward to continuing engaging domestically, regionally, multilaterally and internationally on IUU initiatives.

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1.24. The representative of the European Union welcomed Canada's efforts in tackling IUU fishing at various levels. The European Union looked forward to continue cooperating with Canada and mentioned the examples of CETA, which included commitments to tackle IUU fishing, and of a recent declaration on IUU fishing signed by the European Union and Canada in April 2017 to advance disciplines on this subject.

1.1.1.3 Presentation by Fiji

1.25. The representative of Fiji, as co-sponsor of the UN Ocean Conference, delivered a joint statement on behalf of the Governments of Fiji and Sweden. Heads of State, ministers and other high-level representatives had met from 5 to 9 June 2017 for the UN Ocean Conference to Support the Implementation of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 14. The Conference was a multi- stakeholder event with three main components.

1.26. The first element was the adoption of a Call for Action on "Our Oceans, Our Future" that reaffirmed the UN member States commitment towards SDG 14. Most members also confirmed the importance of the Paris Agreement and the threat of climate change on oceans, and accentuated the need to take actions for a healthy marine environment. The Call for Action highlighted, among others, the importance of strengthening capacity building and technical assistance to small scale and artisanal fishers in developing countries, and of supporting sustainable ocean-based economies. On fisheries subsidies, members would "act decisively to prohibit certain forms of fisheries subsidies which contribute to overcapacity and overfishing, eliminate subsidies that contribute to illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing and refrain from introducing new such subsidies, including through accelerating work to complete negotiations at the World Trade Organization on this issue, recognizing that appropriate and effective special and differential treatment for developing and least developed countries (LDCs) should be an integral part of the negotiations." There had been some reservations noted on fisheries subsidies.

1.27. The second element of the Conference included seven partnership dialogue sessions on: (i) addressing marine pollution; (ii) managing, protecting, conserving and restoring marine and coastal ecosystems; (iii) minimizing and addressing ocean acidification; (iv) making fisheries sustainable; (v) increasing economic benefits to Small Island Developing States and LDCs and providing access for small-scale artisanal fisheries to marine resources and markets; (vi) increasing scientific knowledge and developing research capacity and transfer of marine technology; and (vii) enhancing the conservation and sustainable use of oceans and their resources by implementing international law as reflected in the UNCLOS.

1.28. The third element of the Conference was the voluntary commitments made by governments, the private sector and NGOs. There were 1372 voluntary commitments, of which 612 were from governments, 111 from UN entities, 277 from NGOs, 79 from the private sector, 18 from philanthropic organizations and 16 from other relevant actors. In addition, more than 130 side events had been organized by international organizations, NGOs and governments. The topics for the side events correlated with the themes of the targets under SDG 14. The Ocean Conference had demonstrated UN members' willingness to collaborate and work together, despite differences, to conserve the oceans. Cooperation was important at the national, regional and international level to ensure implementation of SDG 14. Portugal offered to host a follow-up UN Ocean Conference in 2020 with the same objectives as laid out in UN General Assembly resolution 70/303. This offer was a contribution to the follow-up and review process of the 2030 Agenda. Kenya also expressed willingness to host the next Ocean Conference as it had generated momentum for SDG 14 implementation.4

1.29. The representative of the European Union said that the European Union had participated actively in the preparatory process of the Conference and had submitted 19 voluntary commitments. These commitments reiterated its support to the 2030 Agenda and to achieve SDG 14. Ocean problems could not be solved by any one country, ministry or company. This Conference had brought together all stakeholders and had started the holistic discussions needed on the pressures faced and the solutions required. In this context, the European Union would organize a conference in October 2017 in Malta to continue the discussions started in New York

4 Further information on the Ocean Conference could be accessed from the Ocean Conference website https://oceanconference.un.org/.

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- 9 - and maintain focus on the oceans. It would also prepare for the next UN Ocean Conference in Portugal in 2020.

1.30. The representative of Australia thanked Fiji for its report and for co-hosting the UN Ocean Conference. His delegation was committed to working with its Pacific neighbours to implement UNCLOS. At the Ocean Conference, Australia had announced its commitment of AUS$2 million over three years to support ongoing work of the Pacific island countries on maritime boundary delimitation. This would build on the AUS$5.9 million support by the Australian Government under the Enhancing Ocean Governance Project. Australia had also committed AUS$4.4 million over four years to building capacity in the Pacific to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing.

1.31. The representative of New Zealand commended Fiji and Sweden for successfully co-hosting the Conference which had drawn attention to the state of the world's oceans. New Zealand, like other Pacific countries, placed great importance on taking action to protect and use ocean resources sustainably. With over 1300 voluntary commitments, the legacy of the Conference was already assured. New Zealand had made 22 voluntary commitments and had participated in two side events on the prohibition of fisheries subsidies. The Call for Action called on members to accelerate work to complete the WTO negotiations on fisheries subsidies and New Zealand looked forward to working with other delegations for an outcome at Buenos Aires.

1.32. The representative of Norway congratulated Fiji and Sweden and said that the Conference had successfully showcased global willingness to achieve SDG 14. There was agreement on the main threats to healthy oceans and the international community had been able to find solutions at the Conference. There was a need to keep these issues on the global agenda. Norway would contribute and looked forward to cooperation on this issue in the future.

1.33. The representative of Haiti thanked Fiji and Sweden for the initiative and joint statement. The results of the Ocean Conference were encouraging. The 1300 voluntary commitments demonstrated the will of the UN membership to implement the SDGs, especially Goal 14, to preserve oceans and fisheries resources, and would benefit vulnerable small coastal countries like Haiti.

1.1.1.4 Presentation by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)

1.34. The representative of UNCTAD presented the report "Trade and Environment Review 2016: Fish Trade" and other activities related to the UN Ocean Conference.5 Developing countries were the main exporters of fish since 2010 and accounted for 56% of the total value of exports in 2014. Fish and sea food trade reached the record value of 146 billion USD in 2014 and grew in volume from 15 million tonnes in 1991 to 45 million tonnes in 2014. Aquaculture was the main driver of fish supply with an 8% annual growth rate and was expected to account for 62% of total fish output by 2030. Wild marine fish catch was estimated to remain at its 2010 level of approximately 90 million tonnes.

1.35. The impact of climate change on ocean temperature, salinity, currents, sea levels and seasonal fluctuations was likely to affect fish stock's migration, reproduction and feeding patterns. In particular, higher sea levels, temperature and acidification would affect migratory patterns towards higher latitudes with deeper and cooler waters. Climate change would also affect the location of feeding and reproduction areas. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) had identified that climate effects could be irreversible in some cases, such as the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef. Ocean-based economies and communities had limited margin of manoeuvre besides enhancing their own adaptation and resilience.

1.36. It was important to address the trade related aspects of SDG 14, particularly in relation to overfishing, overcapacity and IUU fishing, which accounted for US$10 to 23.5 billion annually, i.e. US$1 out of US$5 in fisheries trade was illegal, and represented between 11 and 26 million tonnes of fish catch.

5 The presentation is available in RD/CTE/115/Rev.1 and the report at http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1662.

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1.37. Regarding fish-related tariff and non-tariff measures (NTMs), tariff levels had decreased over the years with bound tariffs at approximately 33% and applied tariffs at 11.5%. As a consequence, NTMs were increasingly important for future market access discussions. According to UNCTAD's NTMs database, there were 2.5 times more NTMs applicable to fish products than to manufactured products. This could be explained by the perishability of fish products and a very well-developed regulatory environment in the fishery sector in developed countries but also increasingly in developing countries and LDCs. An increasing number of countries were establishing market access regulations on fish, sea food products and non-edible fish products. Currently, about 1250 fish-related sanitary and phytosanitary (SPS) and technical barriers to trade (TBT) measures had been notified to the WTO with an annual growth rate of 11.2%. Even though this sector was becoming increasingly regulated, only a dozen of specific trade concerns related to fish had been brought to the TBT and SPS Committees. He recalled that SDG 14 provided for facilitating small-scale artisanal fisheries access to markets as they faced constraints in terms of capacity, technology and knowledge. He underscored the need to find ways to regulate and enable trade for the weakest in the value chain, and to increase transparency and harmonization.

1.38. The use of voluntary standards and certification schemes was increasing and concerned 14.2% of total sea food market in 2016. These schemes were becoming de facto mandatory because many distribution chains required them, particularly in developed countries. South America was the region with the largest certified production in the world, mostly for shrimp and tuna. Fisheries subsidies were not adequate policies in environmental, social and trade terms and could contribute to: IUU fishing; overfishing and resource depletion; overcapacity; increased greenhouse gases (GHG) emissions through fuel subsidies; trade concerns for unsubsidized operators; and inequality, as most subsidies were allocated to industrial fleets and small scale fishers benefitted from these subsidies only in a ratio of 1 to 5.

1.39. The Call for Action called on UN member States to act decisively in prohibiting certain forms of subsidies that contributed to overcapacity, overfishing and IUU fishing. UNCTAD, FAO and UN Environment had announced their voluntary commitment at the Ocean Conference to support negotiations and the implementation of SDG 14.6 under the following lines of action: provide research; support dialogue related to the Oceans Forum in Geneva during the next three years; and support countries in negotiations or regional and national reforms, upon request.

1.40. The representative of Haiti asked about UNCTAD's activities to support developing countries' implementation of SDG 14.6.

1.41. The representative of Peru thanked UNCTAD for its support to the Permanent Representative of Peru, Ambassador Luis Enrique Chavez Basagoitia, as Chair of the UNCTAD Oceans Forum on Trade-related Aspects of SDG 14, held in March 2017. As Chair of the event, Ambassador Chavez had developed conclusions reflecting the discussions which were communicated to the Ocean Conference. Fiji's presentation at this CTE meeting had shown that the conclusions and suggestions had been taken into account and debated at the Ocean Conference.

1.42. The representative of Chinese Taipei explained that, as a subtropical island with 1200 kilometres of coastline, Chinese Taipei was an important fishery economy and had developed a Plan of Action to prevent, deter and eliminate IUU fishing, in accordance with FAO's IPOA-IUU. Also, particular efforts were being made for the sustainable management of larval fisheries, flying fish, egg fisheries and coral fisheries. There were also management measures that included conservation policies of shark resources, such as prohibiting the catching of whale sharks and restricting shark fin imports.

1.43. The representative of UNCTAD would continue co-organizing for the next three years the Oceans Forum on Trade related Aspects of SDG 14 with FAO, UN Environment, the Commonwealth Secretariat, the African, Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP) group of States, and the International Oceans Institute, among others. The objective was to discuss in an informal setting, provide recommendations and facilitate consensus building. In addition, UNCTAD was planning to start a new project on "Oceans Economy and Trade strategies" in three countries in order to help developing countries optimize the use of marine resources, especially for small-island and coastal states. Small-island states could represent large territories in terms of exclusive economic zone. UNCTAD reaffirmed its commitment to support Members in linking SDG 14 with trade in order to promote sustainable economic growth and called on donors and other Members to support efforts

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- 11 - to diversify and strengthen economies in Small Island Developing States and LDCs. Finally, he said that Chinese Taipei's shark policies were very important and aligned with the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES).

1.1.1.5 Presentation by the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)6

1.44. The representative of the OECD noted that the OECD had made five voluntary commitments at the UN Ocean Conference, including on Measuring Support to Fisheries which was the subject of this presentation.7 The term "support" at the OECD was used in a broader sense; all subsidies were support but not all support were subsidies as defined in the WTO. There was presently no comprehensive and authoritative accounting of support to fisheries in the world. The work done by Professor Sumaila, at the University of British Colombia, who evaluated subsidies at US$35 billion, of which US$20-25 billion were most harmful, was often cited; but it dated back to 2009 and more than half of the data was estimated. Various organizations had been calling for greater understanding and analysis on the effects and impact of support since the 1990s. The OECD Fisheries Committee had started work in this area as there was not enough information to assist international discussions on fisheries support, including in the context of SDG 14.6 and in the WTO.

1.45. OECD had developed the Fisheries Support Estimate (FSE) database8 with data submissions from 31 countries. More than half of all global fishing by landings would be covered once data from seven more countries was added to the database this year. The database was an authoritative and trustworthy source of information largely collected through direct contact with national authorities. It was based on a clear set of definitions and agreed method that were transparent and reflected policies relevant to international discussions. The OECD collected information on fuel support only for countries that were willing to provide it and did not report this information in the totals, indicators or charts presented. The reports were tabulated on an annual basis to allow for tracking progress over time.

1.46. The main goal of the FSE database was to provide a comprehensive global database to help the international community understand the scale and scope of policy effort in fisheries and identify how policies could affect outcomes in fisheries. This would help countries better match policy tools to the objectives set. This was done by classifying policies with a classification system based on implementation criteria. In the database, there were two main types of support reported: Transfers to Individual Fishers (TIF) which was income or other support to fishers as individuals; and General Transfers or General Services and Support Estimate (GSSE), such as port infrastructure for the sector as a whole. He noted that the OECD countries average support amounted to 20% as a share of the value of landings. In terms of decomposition of this support, most of the GSSE was directed towards fisheries management, followed by infrastructure, research and development, and other general services. For TIF, most transfers were based on fishers' income. There was variation in support across countries and time with some move away from TIF support to General Services. Decomposition of support could change as new countries were added to the database.

1.47. For the future, OECD planned to develop indicators on the impact of support on capacity, fishing effort, and fish stocks. OECD would develop a comprehensive bio-economic model that took into account biological aspects of fisheries, policies, management system, production and costs of fishing. This would be a tool for more analysis on the effects of support. The OECD was also interested in increasing the scope and coverage of the FSE database. The objective was to achieve at least representative coverage in most regions of the world. This would include increasing participation by Small Island Developing States and countries from Africa and South-East Asia.

1.48. Finally, the OECD was starting data collection on steps taken by countries to combat IUU fishing in their domestic jurisdictions. This included collecting practical information on the criminal justice system, police enforcement, regulatory vis-à-vis criminal activities, and the actual

6 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/116. 7 The latest OECD report on "Support to Fisheries: Levels and Impacts" is available at http://www.oecd.org/agriculture/fisheries/support-to-fisheries.pdf. 8 http://oe.cd/fse.

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- 12 - outcomes and effects of activities. This work was intended to help countries identify weaknesses or gaps in their systems and to point to ways to make efforts against IUU fishing more effective over time. The IUU fishing project would develop a database of information from OECD members with non-members also encouraged to participate.

1.49. The representative of New Zealand welcomed the work done by the OECD to provide research and data on fisheries and trade. There had been calls for more transparency and understanding on the effects of fisheries support. These calls were motivated by concerns that some forms of support may promote overcapacity and overfishing and affect sustainable management of fisheries. At the WTO, there had never been a complete inventory or common understanding of the impacts of subsidies under discussion. OECD expertise on policy measurement and evaluation could help bridge this gap by providing a process through which information could be disseminated. Filling this information gap would be helpful for some threshold and definitional issues in the ongoing multilateral fisheries subsidies negotiations at the WTO.

1.1.1.6 Presentation by the WTO Secretariat

1.50. The representative of the WTO Secretariat reported on the state-of-play of the ongoing negotiations on fisheries subsidies. She noted that since the beginning of these negotiations launched in 2001 with the Doha Development Agenda, sustainability was underlying the negotiations, i.e. the extent to which certain subsidies contributed to unsustainable fishing practices, overcapacity, overfishing and whether disciplines could be developed to address these effects. She noted that existing subsidies rules addressed trade distortions caused by subsidies and did not reflect the concept of sustainability. SDG 14.6 set a target for eliminating fisheries subsidies that contributed to overcapacity, overfishing and IUU fishing by 2020.

1.51. Subsidies negotiations were reinvigorated by the adoption of the SDG Agenda, with proposals before MC10 in 2015 addressing some aspects of fisheries subsidies. No outcome was reached at MC10 but more proposals had been submitted, in particular since fall 2016. The first proposal was submitted by the European Union, followed by proposals by: a group of Latin American countries; the LDC Group; the ACP Group; Indonesia; and New Zealand, Pakistan and Iceland. All proposals seemed to converge towards the prohibition of IUU fishing subsidies, even though there were on-going technical discussions on the methodology to identify vessels engaged in IUU fishing and the mechanisms for ensuring that subsidies did not support them. There was also some convergence on banning overfishing subsidies. Some proposals were considering that other types of subsidies, such as capital costs subsidies, were also contributing to overcapacity and overfishing.

1.52. An important element of the discussion referred to in SDG 14.6 concerned the need for special and differential treatment for developing Members and the recognition of the key role that the fishing sector played in developing Members. Members were debating on ways to reflect these concerns and whether there was a need for disciplines. There was also the question of small scale operators and activities, which many Members considered should be treated differently than very large scale industrial fishing.

1.53. The negotiating process continued to be based on the submission of proposals by Members. Some revisions and new proposals were expected in the coming weeks, including from the LDC and ACP groups, Norway and Indonesia. There was a sense of urgency in working on these issues and Members were working towards streamlining ideas to reach an outcome at MC11. Proposals were also linked to the 2020 deadline in SDG 14.6.

1.54. The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia noted the CTE was not the appropriate forum to discuss the issue of fisheries subsidies since it was under the Negotiating Group on Rules track.

1.55. The representative of Peru said that in the Negotiating Group on Rules, Argentina, Colombia, Costa Rica, Panama, Peru and Uruguay had submitted a proposal9 to eliminate IUU fishing subsidies and to adopt disciplines on overfishing and overcapacity subsidies, including

9 See document TN/RL/GEN/187 submitted on 29 May 2017.

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- 13 - provisions to deal with small scale and artisanal fisheries. The proposal was the result of a large consultation process. It identified convergences, followed a pragmatic approach and recognized Members' right to economic development. Peru and co-sponsors were engaged in bilateral consultations with other Members to receive comments, suggestions and criticisms to improve the proposal. His delegation looked forward to the circulation in the second half of 2017 of a compilation document with the different proposals on the table in order to achieve a significant outcome at MC11, which could be a starting point for SDG 14.6 and 14.b.

1.56. The representative of Norway said that Norway participated actively in the negotiations on fisheries subsidies in the WTO Negotiating Group on Rules and in the plurilateral discussions. Norway considered that all Members should recognize that fisheries subsidies were related to the environment, trade and development and supported a discussion on this issue in the CTE. Norway appreciated that Members submitted proposals on fisheries and looked forward to a consolidated draft text before the summer break, which would provide a basis for MC11. Norway hoped for a meaningful outcome to implement SDG 14.6 at MC11.

1.57. The representative of Canada underscored the importance of reaching an agreement on disciplining fisheries subsidies and that an outcome at MC11 needed to be the objective. Given the time constraint before MC11, Canada believed Members should take a practical approach, focus on areas where progress was most likely and give priority to the most egregious subsidies. Furthermore, linking progress in one area of the negotiations, such as fisheries subsidies, to progress in other areas of trade rules might result in failure. Canada encouraged Members to consider proposals on their own merits and to avoid linking this issue to outcomes on other issues.

1.58. The representative of Mexico thanked Members for their proposals in the Negotiating Group on Rules and reiterated Mexico's preference for a multilateral and ambitious outcome in this area.

1.59. The representative of New Zealand noted that the WTO had been working over many years on establishing effective multilateral fisheries subsidies prohibitions and an outcome at MC11 was now a realistic prospect. He noted that SDG 14.6 established a political commitment and a sense of urgency and called on UN members to prohibit by 2020 certain forms of subsidies that contributed to overcapacity and overfishing, and to eliminate subsidies that led to IUU fishing. As foreseen in SDG 14.6, the circumstances of developing countries and LDCs needed to be an integral part of the WTO fisheries subsidies negotiations. New Zealand highlighted the importance of engaging effectively and actively to work towards an outcome.

1.60. The representative of the European Union said that only a multilateral outcome could ensure the full implementation of SDG 14. The European Union was actively engaged in the Negotiating Group on Rules and had tabled a proposal. The European Union was currently working on convergence between proposals and intended to table a revised proposal in the near future. He noted that the recent dynamics in the Negotiating Group on Rules injected by the proposals from Iceland, New Zealand and Pakistan, from Indonesia, and from a group of Latin American countries showed that an increasing number of Members had realized the advantages of the multilateral process. The European Union welcomed the fact that some participants in the plurilateral initiative had also engaged in the Negotiating Group on Rules and encouraged all Members to actively engage in discussions to work towards a deliverable for MC11.

1.61. The representative of Haiti, on behalf of the LDC Group, stated that the LDC Group had submitted a proposal and actively engaged in negotiations to achieve an outcome to implement SDG 14.6 and to reflect the needs of the LDC Group.

1.62. The representative of Australia considered the issue to be at the intersection of trade disciplines and global resources sustainability and was particularly relevant to the work of the CTE. Australia was a long-time proponent of an outcome on fisheries subsidies in the WTO. Australia had pushed for the inclusion of fisheries subsidies in the DDA Mandate and was an active proponent since. Australia reaffirmed its commitment to a multilateral outcome and would continue to actively engage in ongoing discussions in the Negotiating Group on Rules.

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1.1.1.7 Presentation by UN Environment (UNEP)

1.63. The representative of UNEP provided an update on recent activities related to fisheries subsidies. In mid-2016, UN Environment, UNCTAD and FAO had jointly submitted a statement on fisheries subsidies, aiming to move forward trade-related targets under the SDGs and signing onto a roadmap to end harmful fisheries subsidies. So far, 91 countries, 4 intergovernmental organizations, and 15 civil society groups had signed on to this global roadmap to eliminate damaging subsidies by 2020. In March 2017, the three organizations had co-hosted an Oceans Forum on the Trade-related Aspects of SDG 14, paving the way for both the high-level Ocean Conference in New York and the WTO Ministerial Meeting in Argentina.

1.64. UN Environment actively participated in the Ocean Conference and convened many events on various topics ranging from fighting plastic pollution in the oceans to promoting the strengthening of regional cooperation. Among these events, UN Environment, UNCTAD and FAO had hosted a High Level Panel on fisheries subsidies. Next steps for accelerating the removal of harmful fisheries subsidies and for converging on a global agreement in Buenos Aires had been discussed. All speakers had highlighted the urgency to find an agreement in Buenos Aires in order to meet SDG 14.6 by 2020. Speakers had also emphasized the importance of strengthening coherence between action-oriented agreements at the Ocean Conference and ongoing WTO negotiations.

1.1.2 Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform (FFSR)

1.65. The representative of New Zealand provided an update on recent developments in FFSR on behalf of Costa Rica, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland and Uruguay.10 Trade was a powerful enabling force that would be indispensable in progress towards sustainable development. The WTO had a key role to play in the reform process of fossil fuel subsidies. The momentum on FFSR had been maintained and advanced across various forums since the last update at the November 2016 meeting of the CTE.

1.66. To build on this momentum, New Zealand had facilitated two events at the WTO to highlight the relationship between FFSR and trade. In November 2016, together with the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), New Zealand had hosted an event entitled "Fossil Fuel Subsidies and International Trade: Worth a closer look" that had brought together high level panellists from a range of international trade and economic institutions and think tanks including the WTO, UNCTAD, the International Trade Centre, OECD, IISD and the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD). Key messages from that event included: (i) fossil fuel subsidies posed a broad range of policy problems, not just for the environment, climate and sustainable development, but also for the international trading system; and (ii) the international lines of efforts supporting FFSR and the implementation of SDG 12 needed to be better coordinated, and the WTO had an important role to play in this regard.

1.67. In May 2017, New Zealand had also facilitated a workshop held at the WTO by Climate Strategies, IISD and the Stockholm Environment Institute entitled "Reforming Fossil Fuel Subsidies through the WTO and International Trade Agreements". The workshop sought to identify the various types of subsidies, their impacts on trade, and more concrete steps that could be taken to advance FFSR at the WTO and within international trade agreements.

1.68. The representative mentioned a few key developments in other areas. First, in the context of the Paris Agreement on climate change, a number of countries addressed FFSR in their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDC). Second, the Addis Agenda inter-agency task force's annual report on financing for development in 2017 stated that "member States of the Addis Agenda reaffirmed their commitment to rationalise inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption" and again recognised the financial potential of FFSR to generate substantial revenues for governments. Third, the G20 Finance Ministers had reaffirmed in March 2017 their long-standing commitment "to rationalise and phase out, over the medium term, inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encourage wasteful consumption, recognising the need to support the poor" and encouraged all G20 countries that had not yet done so, to initiate as soon as feasible, a peer review of inefficient fossil fuel subsidies that encouraged wasteful consumption.

10 The statement is available in document RD/CTE/124.

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1.69. Fourth, individual G20 and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) members continued their engagement with peer review processes. Mexico and Germany's G20 fossil fuel subsidy peer review reports would be released this year, and Indonesia and Italy would begin the process. In the APEC system, reports this year would be released from Chinese Taipei and Viet Nam, and Brunei would begin the process. Fifth, support for the FFSR Communiqué launched in November 2015 continued to grow amongst countries, international institutions, the private sector, and consumer groups. 42 countries had so far endorsed the Communiqué.

1.70. Sixth, the V20 Group of Ministers of Finance (a group of 43 vulnerable developing and LDCs) had called in April 2017 "for market distorting fossil fuel production subsidies to be removed immediately and no later than 2020, and urged the G20 to set such a clear timeframe for fossil fuel subsidy elimination". They had further stated that "fossil fuel consumption subsidies need to be checked rigorously whether they provide an actual benefit to the poor, and subsequently should be replaced worldwide without harm to those relying on them for their basic energy needs". Finally, the private sector had called for the G20 to set "a clear timeline for the full and equitable phase-out by all G20 members of all fossil fuel subsidies by 2020" and to commit "all G20 members to complete fossil fuel subsidy peer review by the end of 2018".

1.71. These developments demonstrated the growing consensus amongst developed and developing countries, the private sector and citizens, that fossil fuel subsidies posed negative implications for sustainable development, the climate, the economy, international trade, and investment, and needed to be reformed, noting the need to protect the poor and the vulnerable.

1.72. The economic costs of fossil fuel subsidies were significant: fossil fuel subsidies amounted to roughly 20% of the value of internationally traded fuels. As made clear in the Paris Agreement, SDGs, and in the Addis Agenda, and as recognised by a growing number of WTO Members in statements as part of G20, V20 or other initiatives, this money could be better spent on other development priorities and in pursuit of renewable energy alternatives. The trade and investment distortions caused by such subsidies also reinforced the need for WTO action.

1.73. The representative of Switzerland, as a member of the friends of FFSR, highlighted the importance of trade for the reform of fossil fuel subsidies. There were different ways of addressing FFSR in a trade agenda. It could take the form of a political declaration or the launch of negotiations for a plurilateral trade agreement. At this point, without prejudging the outcome, Switzerland supported the continuation of discussions on fossil fuel subsidies in the WTO and in the CTE. Switzerland was in favour of deepening the discussions in the CTE for instance on the effects on trade of fossil fuel subsidies and was of the view that the CTE had a role to play in defining the next steps of a discussion on this topic in the WTO.

1.74. The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia noted that the issue of phasing out inefficient fossil fuel subsidies was a voluntary G20 initiative with no link to the WTO process. Saudi Arabia did not agree to discuss this issue in the WTO.

1.75. The representative of Norway explained that many WTO Members were in the process of reducing or eliminating fossil fuel subsidies. Given the large impact of fossil fuel subsidies on climate change, it was important to discuss these issues in the WTO. Norway saw merit in an open and frank discussion in the CTE, which was mandated to carry out discussion on a broad spectrum of environment, trade and development related issues.

1.76. The representative of Venezuela supported Saudi Arabia's statement that the G20 initiative was not related to the WTO.

1.77. The representative of Uruguay reiterated Uruguay's commitment to FFSR as it contributed to climate change mitigation and to achieving the objectives of the Paris Agreement. Uruguay recognized the need to strengthen coherence among the different bodies responsible for the implementation of SDG 12 and the need to explore the links between international trade and fossil fuel subsidies given their impact on trade flows. The WTO had an important role to play and the CTE was the right forum to address these issues.

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1.1.3 International Organization for Standardization's (ISO) work on carbon footprint

1.78. A representative of ISO provided an update on ISO/TS 14067:2013 on the quantification and communication of the carbon footprint of a product.11 The standard was currently under revision and a final publication was expected in October 2018. The most controversial aspect related to the communication part of the standard. There were also some similar concerns with ISO 14046:2014 ("Environmental management - Water footprint - Principles, requirements and guidelines"). The water standard was accompanied by a technical report with illustrative examples on how to apply the standard as requested by industry. The development of ISO 14026 containing the guidelines on communication of carbon footprint was also causing concerns to developing countries.

1.79. Concerns related mainly to the perception that the standards would cause barriers to trade for products from developing countries. There was a broad debate on this topic with no actual evidence to support it. The ISO Technical Committee (TC) 207 agreed to set up an Ad Hoc Group on International Standards and Trade to examine this matter. The Ad Hoc Group carried out its work in 2016 and submitted a report in June 2017 to the Technical Management Board (TMB). In addition to a survey carried out among ISO members to determine the impact of carbon standards on trade, the Ad Hoc Group looked at work on ISO/International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) standards used to support public policy; the OECD's report on ISO's role in international regulatory cooperation, which casted a very positive light on ISO's role; the results of a survey and data on implementation of standards as national standards; the reference to standards in domestic legislation; and the potential impact of legislation on trade (positive or negative). The group was chaired by Canada and India and was comprised of Canada, China, India, Korea, Mexico, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States.

1.80. The results illustrated protectionist concerns from a number of developing countries about barriers to trade which could emerge if ISO 14000 standards and others were adopted as regulations by states and became mandatory requirements for imports. The report highlighted that technical barriers to trade could be wider than just carbon standards. The TMB would review the report and issue recommendations to its technical committees. These recommendations could emphasize, among others, the importance of focusing on standards related to the performance of the product itself (thereby avoiding standards that addressed design or process and production methods), and the need for continuous dialogue with governments. The TMB saw no evidence of barriers to trade.

1.81. At the last ISO/TC 207 technical committee meeting, discrepancies between developed and developing countries continued. Some developing countries, fearing that a lack of international standards would result in the development of national schemes, had said that they would prefer to have a consensus based international standard.

1.82. The representative of India noted that India was a founding member of ISO and had actively participated in ISO activities since its inception. India had been a member in no less than 648 ISO Technical Committees. India's commitment to quality international standards had been recorded since 1947 with the establishment of the Indian Standards Institution as a society. In 1952, the Institution was also given the responsibility of operating a certification marking scheme under an Act of Parliament, which was further strengthened through the Bureau of Indian Standards Act, 1986. India considered positively not only product standards but also process standards, including standards on environment.

1.83. However, India had expressed some concerns on standard-making in ISO. The first concern related to the uncertain and selective science in making measurable, reportable and verifiable standards, as in draft ISO 14067 (Carbon footprint of products - Requirements and guidelines for quantification). This standard, which had moved quickly to the draft inquiry stage, suffered from inherent technical limitations related to life cycle assessment, as laid out in ISO 14044. Draft ISO 14067 attempted to base itself scientifically on IPCC's 5th Assessment Report, but avoided alternate causality and ignored short term GHG sources like carbon black and tropospheric ozone. Some other scientific definitions like "uncertainty" and "arbitrary value" were not harmonized with established ISO definitions. Considering the uncertainty in the scientific basis of the calculation,

11 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/110.

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- 17 - getting a rational number value to be communicated through a label on a product raised concerns. Moreover, if Draft ISO 14067 were published as a standard, it might assume a scientific rationality that it otherwise did not possess. The life cycle approach to calculate carbon footprint could be published only as a guide or a "document", but not as an international standard. This request from India had been dismissed in ISO as a few consultant-members prevailed. And since the carbon footprint of an imported product or a service is likely to be high, a few countries might be prompted to take refuge under this standard to frame a Regulation or a Directive to protect domestic industry.

1.84. An additional concern related to ISO's standards making process, particularly in the environment sector and when tested against the six principles in the WTO TBT Committee's Decision on Principles for the Development of International Standards, Guides and Recommendations with relation to Articles 2, 5 and Annex 3 of the TBT Agreement. Draft ISO 14067 Standard was in conflict with the WTO principle of differentiated obligations for developing countries and LDCs. This standard also militated against the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) principle of "Common but Differentiated Responsibilities". The carbon footprint of a product was calculated and sought to be communicated as a label (through ISO 14026) regardless of the economic stage of development of the producing country. Despite concerns of developing countries, this draft standard managed to move to subsequent stages and this was also due to the system of voting in ISO. Even though ISO was claiming that its standards were based on consensus, this was not the case in its voting process, as abstentions were not counted in the approval ballot, but were considered for disapproval. ISO stakeholder consultations were also dubious as they did not consult consumers directly but only through a few NGOs.

1.85. There were also concerns regarding the neutrality principle. There was a clear and growing bias of ISO standards in areas like management system and environmental management towards the consultant worldview, which eroded neutrality. ISO's discussion and circulated drafts suffered from unitary perspectives and often the output was a unidimensional approach to standardize process, product or service.

1.86. India was not alone in raising concerns with this standard; many other developing countries shared the same understanding. TC207 had constituted an ad-hoc working group to study the possible trade impact of this standard on developing countries. Its report submitted to ISO was wished away summarily and suggested options like a trade disclaimer were sought to be shot down in the recent sub-committee meeting in Halifax, despite the recommendations from all experts in the Working Group.

1.87. The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia noted that environmental footprinting schemes could impose burdensome requirements for developing countries and thereby impede access to important export markets. An assessment of carbon footprint on a life cycle basis was not appropriate because it would raise concerns similar to those related to processes and production methods, and could not provide a basis to distinguish like products. Standards that differentiated products on this basis raised serious concerns under WTO rules and could be used as restrictions on trade. Finally, any environmental requirements should be consistent with applicable WTO rules, be based on appropriate scientific evidence, should follow a transparent and inclusive consultation process and should take into account the special situation and needs of developing countries.

1.88. The representative of Egypt was concerned that carbon and water footprint standards could create barriers to trade and de facto discrimination between products made by producers in developing countries and the same products produced in other countries.

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1.2 Other items of the CTE work programme (Items 1, 2, 3(a), 4, 5, 7, 9, and 10)

1.2.1 Item 1

"The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)."

1.2.1.1 The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer (Montreal Protocol)

1.89. A representative of the Ozone Secretariat (UNEP) briefed the CTE on the Kigali Amendment to the Montreal Protocol, adopted on 15 October 2016 in Kigali (Rwanda).12 He started by noting that 99% of the ozone depleting substances (ODS) covered by the Montreal Protocol had already been phased out, while the Protocol, its amendments and the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer had reached a milestone in 2016, becoming the first treaty in the history of the UN to achieve universal ratification, with 197 parties.

1.90. The inclusion of control measures for hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs) had taken 6 years of negotiations culminating with the adoption of the Kigali Amendment. The amendment had already been ratified by four parties (Rwanda, the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshal Islands and Mali) and the Ozone Secretariat aimed at achieving at least the required 16 additional ratifications before 1st January 2019, when the amendment would enter into force.

1.91. According to the representative, an important aspect of the Kigali Amendment was its expected impact on the climate. It was estimated that, under a "business as usual" scenario, if the provisions agreed upon in the Kigali Amendment were implemented by the parties, four to five gigatons of carbon dioxide (CO2) equivalent emissions from HFCs would be prevented by 2050. Such emissions would otherwise have added up to a 0.5°C temperature increase on top of other climate effects by 2100. With the amendment, the contributions of HFCs to global warming would still increase slightly, peaking mid-century at about 0.07°C.

1.92. Parties to the Montreal Protocol had chosen to regulate the consumption and production of HFCs, even though they were not ODS, because they had been used as replacement chemicals to chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and hydrochlorofluorocarbons (HCFCs). While CFCs had been phased out and HCFCs were on their way to complete phase-out, the consumption of HFCs would now be tackled using the same mechanisms of the Montreal Protocol. Between 1990 and 2010, the phase- down of ODS through the Montreal Protocol had already contributed towards the reduction of an estimated net amount of more than 135 billion tonnes of CO2 equivalent.

1.93. The Kigali Amendment required parties to gradually reduce production and consumption of HFCs listed in annex F of the Montreal Protocol by 80-85% by the late 2040s. According to the representative, non-Article 5 parties (industrialized countries) were divided into two groups: the "earlier starters" and the "later starters". Earlier starters would reduce their production and consumption of HFCs by 10% from 2019, while later starters would do so from 2020. All non- Article 5 parties would gradually increase the percentage reduction up to 85% by 2036. Article 5 parties were also divided into two groups. Group 1 parties would be required to freeze their production and consumption of HFCs from 2024 and gradually reduce it in the following years up to 80% by 2045. Group 2 would freeze its production and consumption from 2028, but would gradually reduce it up to 85% by 2047. In contrast to other chemicals covered by the Montreal Protocol, a complete phase-out of HFCs was not agreed upon due to technological limitations. Finally, along with the Kigali Amendment, parties had adopted a decision on technology transfer, financial provisions and other aspects related to the challenges of phasing down the use of HFCs.

1.94. The representative also briefed the CTE on trade measures included in the Kigali Amendment. Unlike past amendments, Article 4 of the Montreal Protocol, which prohibited imports and exports of covered substances between parties and non-parties to the Protocol, would not enter into force regarding HFCs at the same time as the Kigali Amendment. Due to concerns

12 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/112.

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- 19 - about the effects of such provision expressed by parties during the negotiations, Article 4 would only enter into force regarding HFCs on 1st January 2033 and only if ratified by at least 70 parties. On the other hand, the licensing system for trade in HFCs would enter into force at the same time as the Kigali Amendment, by 1st January 2019 if ratified by at least 20 parties. Data on HFCs consumption and production would be required to be reported to the Ozone Secretariat (Article 7 of the Montreal Protocol), which would evaluate and present such information to the implementation committee of the Meeting of the Parties (MoP) to the Montreal Protocol in order to allow parties to monitor compliance with the provisions of the Kigali Amendment (Article 8 of the Montreal Protocol). Finally, according to the representative, parties would be able to apply for exemptions from the HFCs reduction requirements for a period of time necessary to find appropriate technology solutions.

1.95. The representative of Canada noted that Canada would host the next MoP to the Montreal Protocol in Montreal in November 2017, which would commemorate the 30th anniversary of the Montreal Protocol. Canada continued to be a strong supporter of the Kigali Amendment and intended to ratify the amendment in 2017.

1.96. The representative of the European Union noted that his delegation welcomed the adoption of the Kigali Amendment. Global action on HFCs was a substantial contribution to reaching the objectives of the Paris Agreement and the European Union and its member States had started the ratification process. The European Union urged all other parties to ratify soon in order to ensure that the amendment came into force on 1 January 2019.

1.97. The representative of Norway said that her delegation was delighted that Parties to the Montreal Protocol had managed to reach an agreement in Kigali in 2016. The amendment marked a significant step in the fight against climate change and was also an example of mutual supportiveness by ensuring that actions taken to phase out ODS did not undermine the fight to address climate change. The Norwegian parliament had approved a decision to ratify the Kigali Amendment on 14 June 2017. Norway would be depositing its instrument of ratification in the following weeks and urged all parties to follow suit.

1.98. The representative of Mexico informed that Mexico was willing to ratify the Kigali Amendment as soon as possible.

1.99. The Ozone Secretariat (UNEP) welcomed the positive comments and expressions of intent to ratify the Kigali Amendment in the following months, which was a very welcome development. He noted that Canada had been very supportive of the implementation of the Montreal Protocol from the start, and hosted a number of meetings, including the upcoming meeting marking the 30th anniversary of the Protocol. Finally, the Ozone Secretariat urged parties to ratify the amendment.

1.2.1.2 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)

1.2.1.2.1 Presentation by the UNFCCC

1.100. A representative of the UNFCCC briefed delegations on recent developments regarding the climate change negotiations.13 The 22nd Conference of the Parties (CoP 22) to the UNFCCC, held in November 2016 in Marrakech, Morocco, marked an important milestone with the rapid entry into force of the Paris Agreement. As a consequence, CoP 22 also hosted the first meeting of the CoP serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the Paris Agreement (CMA1). In Marrakech, parties had agreed on a clear and ambitious deadline to complete the work programme for the implementation of the Paris Agreement by the end of 2018. Some progress had also been achieved in other areas, including on climate finance, adaptation, capacity building for developing countries, technology, gender responsiveness, and on indigenous peoples.

1.101. The Kingdom of Morocco, as host country, had convened Heads of State and Government of several countries around the "Marrakech Action Proclamation for Our Climate and Sustainable Development". The Paris Agreement had already been ratified by 148 parties and a new phase of negotiations was starting on the work programme to ensure the implementation of the

13 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/118.

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Paris Agreement and of the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs). Other stakeholders were also involved in implementation as recognized by the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action, a sector-based framework for continuous engagement of all actors involved in implementation. The sectors covered were land-use, oceans, water, human settlements, transport, energy and industry.

1.102. The representative also briefed delegations on the results of the intersessional meetings that had taken place in May 2017, in Bonn (Germany). Once again, negotiations had focused on further defining certain aspects of the Paris Agreement and towards completing the work programme by the end of 2018. Although the process involved highly complex issues, the negotiations had confirmed that parties were on track to respect the set deadline. One essential step in the climate negotiations in 2018 would be the "facilitative dialogue", the first stocktaking exercise. The dialogue would be the first opportunity for parties to look at collective progress made towards the long-term objectives of the Paris Agreement, culminating at CoP 24, hosted by Poland, at the end of 2018.

1.103. Finally, the intersessional meetings clearly indicated a desire by countries to scale up climate action, as promoted by the work of the "High-Level Champions" for climate action, who provided the bridge between the negotiations and the action agenda. The champions were representatives from the current presidency of the UNFCCC process, Morocco, and from the incoming presidency, Fiji. The presidency of Fiji also offered a significant opportunity for a small island state to chair such an important event and to indicate its priorities in the process.

1.104. The representative of the European Union stressed that the European Union would continue its efforts to keep up the momentum and global ownership of the Paris Agreement, including by supporting and working with developing countries and by participating actively in the negotiations to establish a detailed rulebook for the Agreement. There was still significant technical work to do, but the latest intersessional meeting in May 2017 had been an important step towards delivering the rulebook, demonstrating a steady progress in turning the commitments made in Paris into concrete action. Finally, the 2018 "facilitative dialogue" would be a key political moment and the first opportunity since Paris to look at collective efforts to limit global warming and at what parties had done concretely in terms of delivering on the commitments made. The European Union strongly encouraged all the parties to the Paris Agreement to work together towards establishing a detailed rulebook for implementing the Paris Agreement before the deadline of 2018.

1.2.1.2.2 Presentation on Korea's NDC

1.105. The representative of Korea14 presented Korea's NDC submitted to the UNFCCC in June 2015.15 Korea's objective was to reduce its GHG emissions by 37% from the business as usual level by 2030 across all economic sectors. The pledge was economy-wide and covered energy, industrial processes and product use, agriculture and waste. A decision on whether to include land use, land use change and forestry would be made at a later stage. The NDC covered six gases: CO2, methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), HFCs, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride. Korea intended to use carbon credits from international market mechanisms to achieve its 2030 mitigation target.

1.106. Korea's NDC had been developed by a government task force composed of relevant ministries (e.g. the Ministry of Environment and Ministry of Trade, Industry, and Energy) and chaired by the Prime Minister's office. Technical analysis was provided by a Joint Working Group of Experts from national research institutions working on climate change issues. Experts from business and civil society had reviewed the findings of the Working Group, and public hearings had been organized. The NDC had been finalized by the Committee on Green Growth in accordance with national authorization procedures.

1.107. On sectoral implementation, the representative explained that the GHG and Energy Target Management System for the industrial sector introduced in 2009 had been enhanced in 2012 to match the 2010 Copenhagen Pledge. In promoting cost-effective measures for mitigation, a

14 The representative of Korea explained that as a member of the Korea Environmental Institute his presentation did not necessarily represent the official views of the Korean government. 15 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/119.

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- 21 - nation-wide emission trading scheme (ETS) had been announced in 2012 and implemented in 2015 for a three year cycle. The ETS covered 525 business entities which accounted for 67.7% of national GHG emissions in 2015, and 602 business entities in 2017. Korea was also pursuing efforts in other sectors, for instance with the adoption of a Green Building Standards Code and Performance Evaluation of Eco-friendly Homes and the introduction of low-carbon standards for fuel efficiency and emissions from automobiles. Together with the sectoral measures for mitigation, Korea had established a domestic measurement, reporting and verification system to monitor businesses with large amounts of GHG emissions in the industry, power generation, building and transport sectors.

1.108. On adaptation, the National Climate Change Adaptation Plan developed in 2010 was currently in its second planning period. Korea was also developing guidance and tools to support the assessment of vulnerability and risks and implementing projects on research and development for quantitative analysis of climate change impacts.

1.109. Korea had set an ambitious target even though it accounted for approximately 1.4% of global GHG emissions. Korea's mitigation potential was limited due to its industrial structure with a large share of manufacturing and the already high energy efficiency of major industries. Korea's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) had a high share of energy-intensive manufacturing (higher than Japan, the United States and the United Kingdom), and Korea was experiencing faster growth in energy consumption than GDP, primarily because of exports. The economy was highly dependent on international energy and natural resource markets, with 96% of the country's energy imported. CO2 emissions had doubled from 1990 to 2007 while economic growth had decreased continuously since the early 1990s. The annual mean temperature in Korea had increased by 2.4°C, three times more than the world average of 0.74°C and annual average damages from extreme weather events had become 3.6 times higher from the 1990s to 2000s.

1.110. The representative explained that new engines for economic growth could be created through technological innovation in the low carbon and green growth sectors. This was supported by the wide-scope planning followed from 2011 to 2015 with the second national sustainable development strategy implementation plan. They were now in the third period of planning.

1.111. The representative stated that climate change and the multilateral trading regime should work together because climate change required global solutions in mitigation and adaptation that included (i) the efficient allocation of resources, goods and services of low carbon contents, (ii) the equitable sharing of loss and benefits from climate change mitigation and adaptation, and (iii) the wider diffusion of green and clean technologies. The representative also expressed the view that the discussion of NDCs being implemented in national legislation fell within work items 1 and 4 of the CTE agenda.

1.2.1.2.3 Presentation on New Zealand's NDC

1.112. The presentation by the representative of New Zealand on the country's NDC began with a video message from New Zealand's Acting Climate Change Ambassador. The Ambassador explained that the preparation of the NDC had involved a broad examination of mitigation options, supported by economic modelling and analytical research, and a wide public consultation process. As a result, a 2030 target to reduce New Zealand's emissions to 30% below the 2005 level had been set. New Zealand was an outlier amongst developed countries, with an emissions profile similar to that of Brazil, where emissions from agriculture accounted for half of the emissions, along with a very high level of renewable electricity generated from hydropower and increasingly from geothermal and wind. Although New Zealand contributed only about 0.1% of total global emissions, the intention was to show leadership on climate action.

1.113. The Ambassador indicated that the Paris Agreement was a game changer, with cities, states, and businesses all joining central governments to factor climate change into their decision making. The climate change narrative used to be negative, e.g. linked to cost and obligations, but it started to change as governments and businesses began to see opportunities from climate- related technologies, investments and behaviour. The concept of circular economy was a more sustainable approach to the economy and promoted technologies that turned waste into energy. Finally, there was increasing evidence demonstrating that climate action would in no way stifle economic growth.

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1.114. Following the video, the representative of New Zealand noted that one of the core principles of the Paris Agreement was national determination, where countries decided their actions with the expectation that it should be as ambitious as possible in its own circumstances, and that it would progress over time.16 As a developed country, New Zealand was expected to table an economy-wide target that showed progression beyond its previous commitments under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC and that did not result in any backsliding in terms of the robust reporting and accounting obligation already applied to developed countries.

1.115. For all other developed countries, the main mitigation challenge was in the energy sector. New Zealand faced a different challenge with 81% of its electricity already coming from renewable resources and half of its emissions concentrated in agricultural production. Therefore, New Zealand planned to meet its 2030 target through a combination of: accessing international carbon markets; domestic emissions reductions; and, increasing carbon removals through forest planting. The key focus areas for domestic reductions would be transport, industrial energy and the farming sector.

1.116. Regarding New Zealand's emissions profile, the share of CH4 and CO2 were identical and the emissions per unit of GDP had shown a consistently declining trend since 1992, despite continuous population and economic growth over the period. In fact, New Zealand relied heavily on the primary sector which constituted about 70% of its exports; there were no technological solutions yet to reduce biological emissions, namely CH4 from cows and sheep. Balanced against that, forestry removal accounted for a third of gross emissions. In addition, New Zealand's population had also increased significantly since 1990, growing over 12% between 2003 and 2015, and the trend was predicted to continue with immigration.

1.117. In order to achieve its target of 30% below the 2005 emissions level by 2030, New Zealand would need to use international carbon markets to supplement domestic reductions, given the limited abatement options. New Zealand's NDC was ambitious and would cost approximately NZ$3.7 billion annually. The 2050 target was to reduce 50% of its emissions below the 1990 level, which was a major challenge. She noted that finding solutions to agricultural emissions would be critical and over NZ$20 million were invested annually in agricultural GHG research. While there were some early promising results related to breeding low emitting sheep, experimenting different types of feed, and developing CH4 inhibitors and even a vaccine, moving from research to commercial deployment would take time. She pointed out that biological emissions would also become a greater focus for other countries as they reduced fossil fuel emissions over time.

1.118. A range of policy initiatives had been taken to meet the NDC target. The main policy was a comprehensive ETS, with surrender obligations for all sectors of the economy other than agricultural production. The ETS was currently under review to ensure that it was aligned to the Paris Agreement target. Even though 80% of New Zealand's electricity was already generated from renewable sources, the target was to increase the share to about 90% by 2025. There was also a programme to reach 64000 electric vehicles by 2021. On forest planting, 17 million new trees were expected to be planted by 2020.

1.119. It was important to enable emissions reductions to occur where they were most cost- effective. The World Bank had calculated that using markets could reduce the cost of meeting the 2030 target by 32%. New Zealand was taking the lead in developing carbon markets with a multi- pronged approach. New Zealand was looking to: partnering with other governments (many of whom had identified carbon markets in their NDCs), and pursuing markets architecture and guidance through the UNFCCC; finding opportunities to link ETSs; and working with others to ensure markets operated on the basis of environmental integrity, without double counting or double claiming of the emission reductions achieved.

1.120. In addition to carbon markets, New Zealand was working on two other initiatives. First, the Global Research Alliance on Agricultural Greenhouse Gases (GRA) had been established by New Zealand and other countries in 2009. The GRA currently had 46 members, both developed and developing countries. It was a mechanism to pool resources to grow more food supplies for an expanding global population, without increasing emissions. The focus sectors were livestock, paddy rice and crops, and there were two cross-cutting groups dealing with soil carbon and data management. The second initiative was the Fossil Fuel Subsidy Reform. Total global subsidies

16 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/120.

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- 23 - accounted for 400 to 700 billion US dollars annually, and only 8% were well targeted, i.e. reaching the poor for whom they were intended. It was illogical to put a price on carbon while at the same time subsidizing fossil fuel that encouraged wasteful consumption and tilted the level playing field against renewable energy investments. Removing such subsidies could result in a 10% reduction in global emissions by 2030. New Zealand, as a developed country, had the responsibility to provide finance to support developing countries to manage the impact of climate change, with a particular focus on clean energy and climate resilient projects in the Pacific.

1.121. New Zealand was preparing for the submission of its long-term low emissions strategy by 2020, as encouraged by the Paris Agreement. The government had established a number of advisory groups with government and external experts and stakeholders, including groups looking at biological emissions and the forestry sector. In addition, a Productivity Commission had been tasked with producing a report by mid-2018 on options for New Zealand's transition to a low emissions future. Additional funding had been allocated to the Ministry of the Environment to develop costed policy options to make the transition.

1.2.1.2.4 Presentation on Peru's NDC

1.122. The representative of Peru presented Peru's NDC submitted to the UNFCCC in July 2016.17 Peru was a megadiverse country with 10% of world flora species. Peru had a population of 30.7 million people. Peru's GHG emissions were equivalent to 0.3% of world emissions. Peru's NDC followed two fundamental principles of Paris Agreement negotiations: (i) a sense of urgency; and (ii) a high-level of ambition. It envisaged a 30% reduction in relation to the GHG emissions of the projected business-as-usual in 2030; 20% would be implemented through domestic investment and expenses and 10% was subject to the availability of international financing. The baseline scenario started in 2010 and the projection included the total emissions of the land use, land use change and forestry sectors.

1.123. Peru's NDC mainly covered CO2, CH4 and N2O, and had an implementation period from January 2021 to December 2030. The principal sector for potential mitigation in 2030 was the land use, land use change and forestry sector. The methodology used corresponded to the 1996 and 2006 International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) practical guidelines.

1.124. On adaptation, Peru fulfilled several of the criteria of Article 4.8 of the UNFCCC on particularly vulnerable parties. With 84 of the 117 different types of living zones in the world, Peru was exposed to some threats: (i) hydro-meteorological dangers, which accounted for 72% of droughts, rains, flooding, frosts, among other emergencies; and (ii) climate impacts of "El Niño", which had affected 1 million people in Peru in the first quarter of 2017. Even in the most moderate climate change scenario, Peru's potential growth would be negatively affected as many activities of high economic potential depended on eco-systemic and biodiversity resources, including the hydropower, agriculture and tourism sectors.

1.125. Peru had identified five priority sectors for adaptation: water, agriculture, fishery, forestry and health. National plans had been developed for these sectors to protect populations vulnerable to climate change (e.g. subsistence agriculture, small scale agriculture, artisanal fishers, native communities, small scale forestry producers, and from a health perspective, infants, women and seniors). Peru's objective was to adapt to adverse effects and take advantage of climate change opportunities. Climate change adaptation policies were implemented in five areas: (i) disaster risk management; (ii) resilient infrastructure; (iii) poverty and vulnerable populations approach; (iv) gender and intercultural approach; and (v) private investment promotion in climate change adaptation. Peru was preparing a multi-sectoral plan in 2017 to implement its NDC. NDCs were dynamic and could be readjusted to each Party's circumstances. Peru was also planning a budget revision and readjustment for the implementation of its NDC.

1.2.1.2.5 Presentation on renewable energy in China

1.126. The representative of China made a presentation on the latest developments in renewable energy in China. He noted that China had been the world's largest investor in renewable energy

17 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/121.

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- 24 - over the last five years. In 2006, China had promulgated its first Renewable Energy Law, which was the foundation for the development of renewable energy. In its 12th Five Year Plan (2011 to 2015) renewable energy development was introduced for the first time as a recommended sector. China established feed-in tariff rate policies for photovoltaic (PV) power generation along with offshore wind power and wastes incineration power plants and continuously improved the renewable energy grid connection and the management system.

1.127. The ongoing 13th Five Year Plan (2016 to 2020) further established a comprehensive development strategy for renewable energy. It set detailed plans and goals, and provided complementary supporting policies for five specific areas, including hydro power, wind power, solar, biomass, and geothermal energy. Currently, China's renewable energy accounted for 12% of primary energy consumption, almost double compared with 2005. The goal was to reach 15% by 2020, and 20% by 2030. Over the last ten years, China's renewable energy growth had accounted for more than 40% of the world's total increase, driven mainly by its fast growing solar and wind power sectors, with respective annual growth of 33% and 120% in the last five years.

1.128. According to its 13th Five Year Plan, China would continue to expand renewable energy power generation capacity. For example, the total installed capacity of wind power was targeted to increase from 120 gigawatts (GW) to 210 GW, and the total installed capacity of PV power would be raised from 40 GW to 100 GW. At the same time, China would also optimize the utilization of renewable energy resources by making improvements in the allocation of resources, innovating, and perfecting the industrial system, among other measures. For example, in the hydro-electric sector, regional governments would focus on environmental restoration, support for the poor with the income of local hydro power stations, and the construction of new pumped storage power stations. In the wind power sector, the government would improve traditional large windfarms in the northern region while ensuring a balance of utilization of wind power between the mid-east and the southern parts of China. In the PV sector, more resources would be devoted to research and development, with the goal of reducing the price of PV power generation by 50% from the 2015 benchmark.

1.129. The representative presented two examples to illustrate China's progress in developing renewable energy. First, in Yunnan, a water-rich province in the southwest of China, the average annual water runoff was 200 cubic kilometres. To make full use of the abundant water resources, hydropower capacity installed in Yunnan had increased ten-fold to 62 GW from 2000 to 2016. Currently, Yunnan's non-fossil energy accounted for up to 93% of energy consumption. Besides fulfilling its own electricity needs, Yunnan was a major participant in China's West-East Power Transmission Project and provided 56% of the power transmitted from the southern power grid. In addition, in 2016, Yunnan transmitted 14.73 billion kilowatt hours (kWh) to Vietnam, 97 million kWh to Laos and 165 million kWh to Myanmar. Yunnan also launched the "Rural Small Hydropower Poverty Relief Project". The construction of small hydropower projects in remote areas provided jobs for the local people, and part of the power plant income was used to subsidize the poor people and to support the upgrading of the rural power grid.

1.130. Second, he explained that cities were major energy consumers and were undergoing major challenges such as industrial transformation and upgrading, resource depletion and environmental degradation. Making more use of renewable energy was therefore a natural choice in the process. In order to promote renewable energy, China had identified 81 cities and 8 industry parks as Renewable Energy Demonstration Cities in 2012. To be selected, there were two requirements: (i) the renewable energy consumption of the city or industrial park needed to account for more than 6% of the total primary energy consumption; and (ii) there needed to be two or more types of large-scale renewable energy projects. Located on the ancient Silk Road, Dunhuang was one of the Renewable Energy Demonstration Cities. With many historical and cultural sites, Dunhuang received more than one million tourists each year. Today, Dunhuang was on its way to make renewable energy consumption account for 100% of its total energy consumption. This involved the construction of PV power generation projects totalling 3000 million watts, wind power farms of 2000 million watts, the improvement of the power transmission network connecting nearby regions, and the upgrade of the city's heating system. Since 2009, more than 30 domestic and foreign companies had established power plants in Dunhuang Optoelectronic Industry Park, creating China's largest solar power demonstration base. With advanced technology and declined cost, renewable energy would be the natural choice to achieve SDGs.

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1.131. The representative of Kazakhstan noted that her delegation put emphasis on the development of renewable energy. In 2012 Astana had been chosen by the Bureau International des Expositions as the venue to host Expo 2017. More than 100 countries and 10 international organizations were taking part in the event and around 3 million people were expected to visit the international pavilions between 10 June and 10 September 2017. The Expo's theme was "Future Energy"; it would showcase 17 energy-generating projects. Following the Expo, the exhibition complex would become an innovation hub and research and cultural centre. The Ministerial Conference and 8th International Forum on Energy had taken place from 11 to 14 June 2017 in the margins of the Expo. The ministerial dialogues had sought to improve understanding of sustainable energy and the possible policy drivers to achieve a common goal on sustainable energy, promote a policy dialogue, and to raise awareness of different outcomes that could emerge over time. Participants had adopted a ministerial declaration during the event's closing ceremony.18

1.2.1.2.6 Presentation by Kazakhstan

1.132. The representative of Kazakhstan reported on Kazakhstan's commitment to renewable energy. At the 66th Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2011, Kazakhstan had called for inter-regional cooperation in an effort to implement the UN various initiatives on sustainable development and green energy. This idea had been reflected in the text of the Astana Green Bridge Initiative, which had led to the creation of the Green Bridge Partnership Programme for 2011-2020. Building on these ideas and actions, at the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, President Nazarbayev had proposed to open the International Centre for Green Technology and Investment in Astana. The concept note on the Centre had been adopted during the Ministerial Conference held in the margins of the Expo.19 The Centre main goal was to assist in implementing the transition to a green economy by providing a framework for necessary support for renewable energy, green technologies and sustainable development, and by strengthening international cooperation in the Green Bridge Partnership Programme.

1.2.1.2.7 Presentation by Chinese Taipei

1.133. The representative of Chinese Taipei noted that Chinese Taipei's economy was highly dependent on international trade. Demand for energy had increased significantly during the past 20 years in line with rapid economic growth. Being an island with its own electricity grid and the North Gas pipeline, Chinese Taipei relied on imported energy for 98% of total energy demand. Chinese Taipei had implemented the "Greenhouse Gas Reduction and Management Act" in 2015, which provided the legal basis for responding to climate change. A working group had been set up to coordinate measures with a view to enhancing adoption capabilities and reducing social vulnerabilities. In 2010, a policy framework had been introduced in a proposal called "Adoption Strategy to Climate Change". Chinese Taipei had an ambitious target for reducing carbon. In the short and medium terms, Chinese Taipei would deliver significant reductions of GHG emissions.

1.2.1.2.8 Presentation on the Workshop on Trade and Climate Change organized by Costa Rica, Canada, Korea, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei

1.134. The representative of the Republic of Korea on behalf of Costa Rica, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Switzerland, Chinese Taipei and Korea reported on the Workshop on Trade and Climate Change held back-to-back with the CTE on 19 June 2017. He recalled that Korea, Canada, Costa Rica and Mexico had proposed to discuss trade and climate change in June 2016. Norway, Switzerland and Chinese Taipei had joined this initiative at a later stage. In light of some Members' different positions on holding such discussions, the co-sponsors had decided to organize a workshop in order to improve the understanding of the relationship between trade and climate change and to explore ways to further discussions in the WTO and other fora.

1.135. At the workshop, the WTO Director-General stated that climate dialogue could be useful to: inform Members' views on the role the WTO could play in supporting climate action; spark innovation in climate-friendly solutions; and ensure the mutual supportiveness between trade and climate policies. In the first session, speakers informed participants of the IPCC assessment of global warming; the challenges of implementing the Paris Agreement from a national perspective;

18 http://energyministerial.kz/about/outcome-document. 19 The concept note is available in document RD/CTE/114.

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- 26 - and of past climate-related discussions in the WTO. At the second session, trade-related elements in NDCs were highlighted together with analysis of the direct and indirect impacts of climate change on trade. Speakers in this session also highlighted opportunities for green growth and economic diversification as well as a number of policies to support a low carbon transition such as FFSR, standards, labelling and government procurement. In the third session, speakers highlighted lessons from RTAs on environmental provisions, including those with climate-related elements; initiatives on mainstreaming environment into projects to help small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in developing countries succeed; and possible ways to improve synergies between climate measures and trade disciplines. In the wrap-up session, the following next steps were highlighted: (i) climate change was a reality and demanded urgent actions; (ii) there were close interactions between trade and climate change, and trade could play a role in combatting climate change; (iii) unique solutions to tackle the particular challenges of climate change were necessary; and (iv) more Members needed to be engaged in an open-ended dialogue on the relationship between trade and climate change. Korea considered this workshop an opportunity to exchange views on the reasons to discuss this issue at the CTE and on the ways trade could contribute in tackling climate change. The co-sponsors would circulate a reflection note of the workshop and the presentations.

1.136. The representative of Canada noted that Canada considered tackling climate change a priority and was committed to play a role internationally. Canada believed that trade and climate change policies should be mutually supportive and underlined the importance of enhancing the understanding on the relationship between trade and climate change as Members implemented the Paris Agreement. Canada remained open to discussions and encouraged Members to support the joint proposal.

1.137. The representative of Japan said that the workshop had been very useful to understand the relationship between trade and climate change. The informative presentations and comments deepened the understanding of this issue and his delegation looked forward to engage in discussions.

1.138. The representative of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stated that her delegation's position remained unchanged. Saudi Arabia did not support discussing climate change at the WTO as this issue was being addressed under the Paris Agreement, which had a long-term negotiating timeframe from May 2016 to 2020. UNFCCC parties would discuss climate change under the UN system and not in the WTO in the following three years and her delegation continued to believe that the issue of climate change could not be discussed or be open for interpretation under any forum other than the UNFCCC.

1.139. The representative of New Zealand underscored the urgency, trade relevance and need for action. Her delegation believed that the workshop raised awareness on the opportunities and impacts on trade and the need for more coordination between both regimes. New Zealand looked forward to engaging in future discussions.

1.140. The representative of Chinese Taipei, as one of the co-sponsors, supported Korea's statement and believed that climate change was a threat. Her delegation shared the sense of urgency and believed this discussion was timely. Chinese Taipei supported discussing the interface between trade and climate change regimes at the CTE as it was part of the mandate and an important current issue.

1.141. The representative of Switzerland noted that the workshop had shown the linkages between trade and climate change policies and his delegation considered that the climate change and trade communities should reflect on how trade could contribute to the implementation of the Paris Agreement. Agenda 2030 recognized trade as an effective tool to implement sustainable development goals, including combatting climate change. Switzerland believed that there were different ways to address climate change and underlined the need to solve the question of the role of trade in combatting climate change. Switzerland remained open to discuss these complex issues and supported continued discussions in the WTO. Switzerland believed the CTE was the appropriate forum for these discussions and did not pre-judge their format.

1.142. The representative of Norway supported Korea's statement. Her delegation continued to support trade and climate change discussions.

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1.143. The representative of the European Union highlighted the importance of discussions on trade and climate change.

1.144. The representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela stated that this issue should not be discussed in the WTO as the UNFCCC was the only appropriate forum.

1.2.2 Item 4

"The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements which have significant trade effects."

1.145. A representative of the WTO Secretariat introduced the Environmental Database (EDB) for 2014 circulated on 2 May 2017 in document WT/CTE/EDB/14 (and Add.1).20 Over the last two decades, the number of notifications had been growing every year, in particular environment- related ones, which increased from 165 in 1997 to 551 in 2014. Environment-related entries in trade policy reviews (TPRs) had increased too, with 720 entries in 2014. The proportion of environment-related notifications had also increased with fluctuations in some years. The TBT and SPS Agreements accounted for the largest number of environment-related notifications. Support measures in the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures Agreement and the Agreement on Agriculture accounted for an important number of environment-related notifications too, particularly in 2014.

1.146. In 2014, 1277 environment-related measures (contained in the 551 notifications) were identified and included in the EDB. The database enabled users to search through information according to specific criteria such as Member, Agreement, objective, sector and type of measure. Seventy-four Members had submitted environment-related notifications in 2014. The EDB used 25 harmonized categories of environment-related objectives to organize the measures notified and the following five categories were mostly referred to: general environmental protection, natural resources conservation, energy conservation and efficiency, and renewable energy.

1.147. The EDB report included charts illustrating the different sectors, objectives and types of measures. There were two broad types of measures: regulatory measures and support measures. Eighteen TPRs were analysed in 2014, containing 721 environment-related entries. There were a large number of quantitative restrictions (e.g. bans and import and export licensing requirements), TBT measures (e.g. technical regulations or specifications and conformity assessment procedures), price, and market based (e.g. taxes) and support measures.

1.148. Efforts were already being made to prepare the EDB for 2015 with the aim of issuing this document also in 2017 and to enhance the user interface, despite difficulties in securing the necessary resources.

1.149. The representative of Egypt asked whether future EDB documents could provide more details on the most common tariff lines captured in environment-related measures.

1.150. The representative of Switzerland recognized that updating the EDB required a large amount of resources. Switzerland considered the EDB a unique and very useful tool and encouraged further work on the database.

1.151. The representative of China considered the EDB to be very comprehensive and informative. His delegation would continue using the EDB.

1.152. The representative of the European Union said that the EDB had proven to be useful to his delegation.

20 Documents WT/CTE/EDB/14 and WT/CTE/EDB/14/Add.1 were circulated on 2 May 2017. The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/113. See also WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envdb_e.htm.

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1.153. The representative of the WTO Secretariat thanked Members for the positive feedback. On Egypt's question, the EDB included one column with Harmonized System (HS) references and the WTO Secretariat was making efforts to link the EDB to the Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) database. While the EDB included a HS classification where possible, in some areas there were obstacles in assigning a unique tariff number to measures across different sectors.

2 OTHER BUSINESS

2.1 Update on the Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) negotiations

2.1. The representative of Australia provided an update on the EGA negotiations. In November 2016, EGA participants had been preparing for a meeting of ministers and senior officials designed to explore whether the time was right to move the EGA negotiations towards a final conclusion. Since the launch of the negotiations in 2014, considerable progress had been made. There was a clear understanding among EGA members on the type of products that might be included in the agreement, including many products in the area of renewable energy, and EGA participants well understood each other's priorities and sensitivities. Against that backdrop, EGA ministers had gathered in December 2016 to see whether a consensus agreement on a final EGA list was within reach. It had not been possible for EGA ministers to reach a final conclusion during their meeting in December. The meeting had been very constructive, with ministers and senior officials developing an even clearer understanding of core priorities and sensitivities. While consensus had not been reached, EGA participants had further defined the contours of the EGA, and EGA participants were reflecting on future work. As previously stated and as demonstrated in the Trade and Climate Change Workshop held on 19 June 2017, the EGA would provide significant commercial benefits, boosting exports and providing cheaper access to environmentally beneficial technologies. It would also help efforts to overcome serious environmental challenges. Membership of the EGA had always been open to other WTO Members, and EGA participants urged others to join the EGA process as soon as possible.

2.2. The representative of Norway noted that the Trade and Climate Change Workshop had highlighted the environmental benefits the EGA could provide. Her delegation supported EGA work and looked forward to engage in negotiations.

2.3. The representative of Canada reaffirmed Canada's commitment in concluding an ambitious and future-oriented EGA covering a broad range of goods. The EGA was in line with Canada's progressive trade agenda, which recognized the need for trade policies to contribute to economic, social and environmental objectives. The EGA would: (i) facilitate trade in environmental goods; (ii) create a new market for innovative firms and SMEs; and (iii) contribute to sustainable development creating win-win outcomes. His delegation encouraged renewed engagement in the EGA.

2.4. The representative of Singapore considered the EGA an important initiative that demonstrated the role trade could play in mitigating climate change and environmental protection. Her delegation hoped for an early resumption and outcome to the EGA negotiations.

2.5. The representative of New Zealand echoed other Members in highlighting that the Trade and Climate Change Workshop had clarified that the EGA was an example where the WTO could contribute to tackle climate change. Her delegation considered it important to achieve an ambitious and timely outcome, and supported renewed EGA engagement.

2.6. The representative of the European Union reaffirmed his delegations' commitment to concluding an ambitious and forward-looking EGA. Progress was made in the intersessional period in 2016 on the list of environmental goods and the EGA text. The EGA could contribute in the fight against climate change and the European Union supported re-launching negotiations when participants were ready and circumstances appropriate.

2.7. The representative of Japan stated that Japan was an EGA participant seeking early resumption of negotiations. As mentioned by Australia and other delegations, membership of the EGA had always been open to other WTO Members. His delegation looked forward to early reengagement in negotiations.

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2.8. The representative of Chinese Taipei said that Chinese Taipei was an active EGA participant committed to concluding a list of environmental goods. His delegation hoped early resumption of the EGA negotiations, encouraged other Members to engage in negotiations and remained open to continue EGA work. The EGA would: (i) provide significant commercial and environmental benefits (e.g. boost trade, provide cheaper access to environmentally friendly technologies); and (ii) support efforts to address climate change, implement the Paris Agreement and tackle other environmental challenges.

2.9. The representative of Hong Kong, China echoed Australia and previous delegations and reaffirmed its commitment to continue EGA negotiations and achieving an early and meaningful outcome.

2.10. The representative of Turkey said that Turkey was an EGA participant and that progress had been made at the meeting in December 2016. His delegation believed EGA negotiations would continue and that a meaningful outcome would be achieved both commercially and environmentally.

2.11. The representative of Switzerland joined other Members' statements and reaffirmed Switzerland's commitment towards a meaningful EGA outcome. His delegation supported and encouraged other Members to resume negotiations early.

2.12. The representative of the Republic of Korea said that Korea, as an EGA participant, hoped for early resumption of EGA negotiations.

2.13. The representative of China underlined the importance of the EGA and considered it to be an area where the WTO could contribute to fighting climate change. China believed the EGA was important to achieve triple-win outcomes and said that the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities was essential in combatting climate change and should be reflected in the final outcome.

2.2 Update on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies

2.14. The representative of Canada updated the CTE on the plurilateral negotiations on fisheries subsidies launched in September 2016. Fifteen developed and developing WTO Members representing a broad range of the membership had agreed to launch plurilateral negotiations to eliminate harmful fisheries subsidies. The first round had been held in January 2017 with subsequent rounds in March and May. The fourth round was being held and the fifth round would be held in July 2017. Participants had explored several issues in developing disciplines on IUU fishing, overcapacity and overfishing. Participants were discussing core disciplines, transparency and the agreement form, and reiterated that a Fisheries Subsidies Agreement (FSA) would be open to all WTO Members. Canada considered these negotiations to complement multilateral discussions.

2.15. The representative of Australia reaffirmed Australia's commitment to multilateral fisheries subsidies negotiations and noted that Australia was participating in the FSA negotiations. Her delegation was guided by SDG 14.6 and considered both multilateral and plurilateral discussions to complement each other. Active engagement in both tracks increased the possibility of a meaningful outcome on fisheries subsidies.

2.16. The representative of New Zealand said SDG 14.6 provided a strong political commitment and a sense of urgency in fisheries subsidies negotiations. Her delegation focused on a multilateral outcome and was an active participant in plurilateral discussions. As mentioned by previous delegations, multilateral and plurilateral discussions were complementary and New Zealand's objective was to conclude a high-standard agreement.

2.17. The representative of Singapore looked forward to speeding up EGA negotiations and a timely conclusion of the FSA.

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3 BRIEFINGS BY OBSERVER ORGANIZATIONS

3.1. The representative from UN Environment (UNEP) briefed the CTE on recent activities of the Environment and Trade Hub, which served as the overarching delivery mechanism for UN Environment's work on trade and the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, and provided capacity building and related policy advice on sustainable trade and investment.21 UN Environment and IISD had launched the sustainability toolkit for trade negotiators in Berlin in March 2017 to enhance UN members drafting and negotiating skills on environment-related provisions in regional trade and investment agreements. The toolkit was an online portal that provided: (i) access to over 200 examples from 90 regional trade and investment agreements; (ii) analysis on ways to include environment and trade provisions, process related issues (e.g. environmental impact assessments, public participation, review and reporting) and investment provisions in regional trade agreements. The Hub and the UN Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) had jointly developed an online learning course on Trade and Green Economy within the framework of the Partnership for Action for a Green Economy (PAGE). The interactive and practice-oriented course provided governments, businesses and civil society with basic information on different approaches to profit from sustainable trade opportunities.

3.2. The Environment and Trade Hub had recently undertaken a scoping study and organized two workshops on value chain cooperation and trade in energy efficiency and renewable energy technologies in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) region.22 Technologies had been selected based on their economic importance, energy saving potential, contribution to a low carbon economy and the potential for significant production, trade and regional value chain integration. Technologies included electric motors, distribution transformers, refrigerators for household applications and lighting, among others.

3.3. UN Environment had recently convened a workshop in Mongolia on sustainable development and trade opportunities, consisting of training and a workshop. 150 participants from governments, ministries, associations, the private sector and civil society had attended. The meeting had resulted in concrete recommendations on trade strategies. China had hosted a workshop on 5 June 2017 entitled "Unlocking South-South Trade in Environmental Goods and Services" in Nanjing. The objective of this workshop was to discuss opportunities and challenges of Jiangsu's green trade and value chain cooperation with developing countries as a way to facilitate the transition to an Inclusive Green Economy. UNEP had co-hosted the first national academy for a Green Economy in Burkina Faso bringing together relevant national and international stakeholders. The UN Environment Assembly (UNEA) would be held on 4-6 December in Nairobi, Kenya under the overarching theme of pollution. UNEA aimed to deliver commitments to eliminate pollution of air, land, waterways and oceans and the safe management of chemicals and waste. UNEP was already discussing with governments voluntary commitments on this matter.

3.4. The representative said that the thirteenth meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (COP-13),the eighth meeting of the Parties to the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety (COP MOP 8) and the second meeting of the Parties to the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from their Utilization (COP MOP 2) had taken place in Cancun, Mexico, from 4 to 17 December 2016. A note containing information on relevant decisions taken at these meetings would be circulated to Members after the meeting.23

4 DATE OF NEXT MEETING

4.1. The next meeting of the Committee would take place in November. The precise date would be communicated to Members in due course.

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21 The presentation is available in document RD/CTE/122. 22 The report is available at: www.unep.org/trade. 23 The note is available in document RD/CTE/123.

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ANNEX 1: ITEMS OF THE CTE WORK PROGRAMME

Item 1: The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and trade measures for environmental purposes, including those pursuant to multilateral environmental agreements.

Item 2: The relationship between environmental policies relevant to trade and environmental measures with significant trade effects and the provisions of the multilateral trading system.

Item 3(a): The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and charges and taxes for environmental purposes.

Item 3(b): The relationship between the provisions of the multilateral trading system and requirements for environmental purposes relating to products, including standards and technical regulations, packaging, labelling and recycling.

Item 4: The provisions of the multilateral trading system with respect to the transparency of trade measures used for environmental purposes and environmental measures and requirements which have significant trade effects.

Item 5: The relationship between the dispute settlement mechanisms in the multilateral trading system and those found in multilateral environmental agreements.

Item 6: The effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries, in particular to the least developed among them, and environmental benefits of removing trade restrictions and distortions.

Item 7: The issue of exports of domestically prohibited goods.

Item 8: The relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights.

Item 9: The work programme envisaged in the Decision on Trade in Services and the Environment.

Item 10: Input to the relevant bodies in respect of appropriate arrangements for relations with intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations referred to in Article V of the WTO.

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ANNEX 2: PARTS OF THE DOHA MINISTERIAL DECLARATION THAT RELATE TO THE WORK OF THE CTE

32. We instruct the Committee on Trade and Environment, in pursuing work on all items on its agenda within its current terms of reference, to give particular attention to:

(i) the effect of environmental measures on market access, especially in relation to developing countries, in particular the least developed among them, and those situations in which the elimination or reduction of trade restrictions and distortions would benefit trade, the environment and development;

(ii) the relevant provisions of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights; and

(iii) labelling requirements for environmental purposes.

Work on these issues should include the identification of any need to clarify relevant WTO rules. The Committee shall report to the Fifth Session of the Ministerial Conference, and make recommendations, where appropriate, with respect to future action, including the desirability of negotiations. The outcome of this work as well as the negotiations carried out under paragraph 31(i) and (ii) shall be compatible with the open and non-discriminatory nature of the multilateral trading system, shall not add to or diminish the rights and obligations of members under existing WTO agreements, in particular the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, nor alter the balance of these rights and obligations, and will take into account the needs of developing and least developed countries.

33. We recognize the importance of technical assistance and capacity building in the field of trade and environment to developing countries, in particular the least developed among them. We also encourage that expertise and experience be shared with members wishing to perform environmental reviews at the national level. A report shall be prepared on these activities for the Fifth Session.

51. The Committee on Trade and Development and the Committee on Trade and Environment shall, within their respective mandates, each act as a forum to identify and debate developmental and environmental aspects of the negotiations, in order to help achieve the objective of having sustainable development appropriately reflected.

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