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Registry Operator's Report REGISTRY OPERATOR’S REPORT December 2006 Public Interest Registry 1775 Wiehle Avenue, Suite 102A Reston, VA 20190 www.pir.org Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 As required by the ICANN/ PIR Registry Agreement (Section 3.15.1) this report provides an overview of PIR activity through the end of the reporting month. The information is primarily presented in table and chart format with text explanations as deemed necessary. Information is provided in order as listed in Appendix T of the Registry Agreement. Report Index Section 1 Accredited Registrar Status Section 2 Service Level Agreement Performance Section 3 ORG Zone File Access Activity Section 4 Completed SRS/System Software Releases Section 5 Domain Names Under Sponsorship - Per Registrar Section 6 Nameservers Under Management Per Registrar Section 7 Domain Names Registered by PIR Section 8 WhoIs Service Activity Section 9 Monthly Growth Trends Section 10 Total Number of Transactions by Subcategory by Month Section 11 Total Number of Failed Transactions by Subcategory by Month Section 12 Daily Transaction Range Section 13 ORG Geographical Registrations Distribution Section 14 ORG Deleted Names Section 15 ORG Restored Names Section 16 ORG Violations of Registrar Restore Report Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 2 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 1 – Accredited Registrar Status Table 1 displays the current number and status of the ICANN accredited registrars. The registrars are grouped into three categories: 1. Operational registrars: Those who have authorized access into the system for processing domain name registrations. 2. Registrars in the Ramp-up Period: Those who have received a password to the PIR Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) environment. The OT&E environment is provided to allow registrars to develop and test their systems with the PIR Shared Registration System (SRS). 3. Registrars in the Pre-Ramp-up Period: Those who have been sent a welcome letter from PIR, but have not yet executed the Registry Confidentiality Agreement and/or have not yet submitted a completed Registrar Information Sheet. December 2006 No. of Status Registrars Operational Registrars 230 Registrars In Ramp-Up Period 87 Registrars in Pre-Ramp-Up Period 296 Total 613 Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 3 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 2 – Service Level Agreement Performance Table 2 compares the SLA requirements with Actual Performance for the reporting month. As required by the ICANN/PIR Registry Agreement, PIR is committed to provide service levels as outlined in Appendix D of the agreement and to comply with the requirements of the SLA Appendix E of the agreement. The SLA is incorporated into the PIR Registry Registrar Agreement that is executed with all operational registrars. Component/Service Availability Performance Required Actual Required Actual DNS Unplanned 300 minutes None 100%< 15 AXFR/IXFR Updates < 15 minutes minutes Planned 600 minutes None Resolution of .org Unplanned 30 minutes None < 300 23 milliseconds domains, each name- milliseconds (Avg.) server Planned 120 minutes None WHOIS Unplanned 90 minutes None < 800 9 milliseconds Singular query/response milliseconds (Avg.) Planned 240 minutes 151 minutes BILLING Unplanned 90 minutes None Account balance < 800 17 milliseconds check/modify milliseconds (Avg.) Planned 240 minutes 151 minutes ADMIN Unplanned 300 minutes None No Update Registrar profile No requirement requirement Planned 600 minutes 151 minutes Unplanned 300 minutes None No Update Registrar status No requirement requirement Planned 600 minutes 151 minutes PROTOCOL INTERFACE Unplanned 30 minutes None < 800 64 milliseconds Write Operations milliseconds (Avg.) Planned 120 minutes 151 minutes Unplanned 90 minutes None < 1600 16 milliseconds Transfer milliseconds (Avg.) Planned 240 minutes 151 minutes Unplanned 30 minutes None < 400 8 milliseconds Query Operations milliseconds (Avg.) Planned 120 minutes 151 minutes Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 4 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 3 – ORG Zone File Access Activity Table 3 summarizes the zone file access activity for the current reporting month. As required by the ICANN/PIR Registry Agreement, PIR provides third parties bulk access to the zone file for the .ORG TLD. Zone file access passwords at the end of the previous month Nov-06 505 New zone file access passwords 0 Total zone file access approvals at the end of the reporting month Dec-06 505 Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 5 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 4 – Completed SRS/System Software Releases As required by the ICANN/ PIR Registry Agreement, Table 4 shows significant releases that have occurred since January, 2003 (it excludes software released only to fix a bug). The PIR SRS is continually being improved to better meet the needs of accredited registrars. Target Complete Release Name Features Date Date 2003-026-1316 Initial release 2003-01-26 Improved connection management capability of web server 2003-027-1530 2003-01-27 2003-01-27 and bug fixes. 2003-028-1233 Performance optimization and bug fixes 2003-01-28 2003-01-28 2003-036-1622 Bug fixes 2003-02-05 2003-02-05 Enhanced reports and connection management capability of 2003-038-1420 2003-02-07 2003-02-07 whois server Added more transfer notifications for the gaining registrar and 2003-059-1147 2003-02-28 2003-02-28 bug fixes (None in March) 2003-094-1435 Enhanced some SRS components, reports and bug fixes 2003-04-09 2003-04-09 (None in May) (None in June) Improved Billing System, RGP Implementation, Add Storm 2003-175-1543 2003-07-02 2003-07-02 Prevention, Performance Optimization and Minor Bug Fixes. 2003-190-1624 Bug fixes 2003-07-11 2003-07-11 (None in August) (None in September) (None in October) 2003-329-1011 Enhancements made to SRS and Whois components. 2003-11-29 2003-11-29 (None in December) Legacy IDN names may be transferred, db connection pool 2004-023-1159 2004-01-27 2004-01-27 has been revised 2004-027-2326 Whois server bug fix 2004-01-28 2004-01-28 (None in February) (None in March) 2004-090-1201 Bug fix 2004-04-10 2004-04-10 2004-096-1655 Recompiled the SRS components with pg74 postgresql.jar 2004-04-24 2004-04-24 (None in May) (None in June) Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 6 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 4 – Completed SRS/System Software Releases (Continued) Target Complete Release Name Features Date Date RGP Phase II Implementation, separate email address for transfer notifications, customized login ID to the registry 2004-161-2100 2004-07-17 2004-07-17 system, updated the “domain info” command and minor bug fixes. (None in August 04) Enhanced Whois output to display Registrar Name, ID, IANA 2004-258-1445 GUID. ClientRenewProhibited will prevent auto-renewals in 2004-09-18 2004-09-18 the SRS. Registrars to get daily balance email Changes made to enhanced connection handling in the web 2004-268-1338 2004-09-25 2004-09-25 admin tool. (None in October 04) 2004-307-1909-1.2 Implementation of Automated Transfer Dispute Policy 2004-11-13 2004-11-13 Fixed notification email for Transfer Dispute. Balance 2004-348-1744-1.2 2004-12-23 2004-12-23 notifications are now being sent to cc defined. Support for German IDNs, RFC Compliance, support for ‘thin’ 2005-013-2354-1.2 2005-01-15 2005-01-15 data in EPP DomainInfo, additional reporting. (None in February 05) (None in March 05) 2005-090-1890-1.2 Debugging code added for ineligible domain renewals 2005-04-01 2005-04-01 (None in May 05) (None in June 05) 2005-186-2020-1.2 Support for 8 new IDN language tags (Phase 2) 2005-07-23 2005-07-23 Fix for a problem in the transfer logic introduced in IDN 2005-206-1833-1.2 2005-08-10 2005-08-10 promotion 2005-228-1419-1.2 Whois rate-limiting 2005-08-20 2005-08-20 Fix for affecting reload names and help options on whois 2005-250-1616-1.2 command server and also HACMP application failover policy 2005-09-22 2005-09-22 bug fix. (None in October 05) (None in November 05) Last_Updated_On field behavior upgrade, update behavior for contact update, Update reason for IDN exceptions, 2005-339-2108-1.2 2005-12-10 2005-12-10 Nameserver association upgrade,IDN hostname exception upgrade, server certificate upgrade (None in January 06) (None in February 06) Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 7 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 4 – Completed SRS/System Software Releases (Concluded) Target Complete Release Name Features Date Date 2006-076-1624-1.2 ORG PPC Automation/Rate limiting Implementation 2006-03-25 2006-03-25 2006-086-2048-1.2 ORG PPC Automation/Rate limiting Implementation Fix 2006-03-28 2006-03-28 Emails that are sent to registrar contacts are now sent to all 2006-088-2102-1.2 contacts of that group (i.e. all billing contacts, not just the first 2006-04-03 2006-04-03 one). (None in May 06) (None in June 06) 2006-188-2053-1.2 Fix for email support under AIX 2006-07-08 2006-07-08 2006-221-2022-1.2 Fix DBUtils code for thread safe date string parsing 2006-08-23 2006-08-23 (None in September 06) (None in October 06) (None in November 06) 2006-348-1840-1.2 DropZone Implementation 2006-12-16 2006-12-16 2006-351-0402-1.2 Email Client Bug Fix 2006-12-17 2006-12-17 Copyright © 2004-2006 Public Interest Registry Page 8 of 42 Public Interest Registry Monthly Report – December 2006 Section 5 and 6 – Domain Names and Nameservers Under Sponsorship – Per Registrar In accordance with Sections 5 & 6 of Appendix T to the ICANN/PIR Registry Agreement, the following table reports the number of domain names and name servers under sponsorship by each live ICANN Accredited Registrar in the .ORG TLD: Total Total Registrar Registrar Name Domain Name ID Names Servers 5079-OD #1 Domain Names International, Inc.
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