Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in Gtlds Final Report
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Statistical Analysis of DNS Abuse in gTLDs Final Report Maciej Korczynski´ ⇤, Maarten Wullink†, Samaneh Tajalizadehkhoob⇤, Giovane C.M. Moura†, Cristian Hesselman† ⇤Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands †SIDN Labs, The Netherlands {Maciej.Korczynski, S.T.Tajalizadehkhoob}@tudelft.nl {Maarten.Wullink, Giovane.Moura, Cristian.Hesselman}@sidn.nl Abstract—Commissioned by the Competition, Consumer Trust, A number of safeguards were built into the Program that and Consumer Choice Review Team with the support of ICANN, were intended to mitigate the rates of abusive, malicious, this study is focused on measuring rates of common forms of and criminal activity in these new gTLDs, such as phishing, abusive activities in the domain name system. We conduct a comprehensive study examining malicious behavior in the global spam, and malware distribution. ICANN is currently engaged DNS and compare abuse rates in new and legacy gTLDs. We in a review of these safeguards and their effects on rates of combine data sets from many sources, including zone files, DNS abuse as an aspect of the Competition, Consumer Trust, domain WHOIS information, data obtained through our active and Consumer Choice Review2. In this paper, we conduct a measurements, and 11 reputable blacklists representing malware, comprehensive study examining rates of malicious and abusive phishing, and spam. We find that the new gTLDs have impacted spam counts of the legacy gTLDs: abused domains in the new behavior in the global DNS and compare abuse rates in gTLDs do not increase the number of total malicious registrations new gTLDs and legacy gTLDs. As the DNS represents a but instead, we observe a decrease in the number of malicious large ecosystem of registries, registrars, privacy/proxy service registrations in legacy gTLDs. While legacy gTLDs collectively providers, etc. the study aims to capture inputs in a represen- had a spam-domains-per-10,000 rate of 56.9, in the last quarter of tative manner from across the multitude of players relevant to 2016, the new gTLDs experienced a rate of 526.6–which is almost one order of magnitude higher. In this study, we also analyze the abusive practices. relationship between the collected security indicators and the Previous research studied the impact of the New gTLD structural properties of new gTLDs, and abuse, at the level of Program on the domain name ecosystem [1]. Halvorson et gTLDs. The results indicate that abuse counts primarily correlate al. concluded that speculative and defensive registrations with stricter registration policies. Our findings suggest that some dominate the growth of registrations in new gTLDs. They new gTLDs have become a growing target for malicious actors. While the analysis of spam blacklists reveals that approximately also found that the new gTLDs have yet to have significant one third of the new gTLDs available for registration did not impact on the legacy gTLDs. Their work, however, provides experience a single incident in the last quarter of 2016, Spamhaus a very little empirical information about the security of new blacklisted at least 10% of all registered domains in 15 new gTLDs. In this paper, we analyze the impact of the New gTLD gTLDs. Program on the DNS abuse landscape and assess if legacy and new gTLDs are seen by miscreants as interchangeable. I. INTRODUCTION Overall, our main contributions can be summarized as follows: As a result of a many-year multi-stakeholder policy devel- We make a comprehensive descriptive statistical compar- • opment process, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names ison of rates of DNS abuse in new and legacy gTLDs as and Numbers (ICANN) introduced the New Generic Top- they pertain to spam, phishing, and malware distribution. Level Domain (gTLD) Program (the Program), which has Using regression modelling we perform inferential sta- • enabled hundreds of new gTLDs to enter the domain name tistical analysis testing the correlation between passively system (DNS) since the first delegations occurred in October and actively measured properties of new gTLDs as pre- 20131. The Program was developed to increase competition dictors of rates of abuse. and choice in the domain name space. More than 1,900 ap- We analyze proportions of abusive domains across other • plications for new gTLDs were filed after the process opened relevant to abusive practices players, i.e. registrars and in 2012. To date, more than 1,200 new gTLDs have been privacy/proxy service providers. delegated to the DNS’ root zone. However, while the New Our findings demonstrate a number of notable trends in gTLD Program may increase the range of available gTLDs relation to the new gTLD landscape and cybercriminal activity. available to consumers, it may also create new opportunities While we find higher concentrations of compromised (hacked) for cybercriminals. domains in legacy gTLDs, miscreants frequently choose to 1https://gnso.icann.org/en/group-activities/inactive/2007/new-gtld-intro 2https://newgtlds.icann.org/en/reviews/cct/dns-abuse 1 register domain names using one of the new gTLDs. We .cat, .com, .coop, .info, .jobs, .mobi, .museum, .name, .net, also find that the new gTLDs have significant impact on .org, .post, .pro, .tel, .travel, and .xxx) for which we were able abuse counts of the legacy gTLDs. Interestingly, maliciously to obtain zone files and WHOIS data. We contrast them with registered spam domains in the new gTLDs do not increase the the new gTLDs. number of total malicious registrations. Instead, we witness a B. New gTLDs decrease in the number of malicious registrations in legacy gTLDs. An analysis of the Spamhaus blacklist reveals that ICANN’s New gTLD Program started in 2012 and expanded in the last quarter of 2016, new gTLDs collectively had the root zone by delegating more than 1,200 new gTLDs approximately one order of magnitude higher spam-domains- since October 2013 [4]. To obtain a new gTLD, applicants per-10,000 rate in comparison to legacy gTLDs. are required to undergo an intensive application and evaluation We also systematically analyze how different structural and process [1] that includes screening the applicants technical and security-related properties of new gTLD operators influence financial capabilities for operating a new gTLD. abuse counts. Our inferential analysis reveals that abuse counts Ultimately, after a new gTLD is assigned to an applicant, primarily correlate with stricter registration policies. Finally, it will then be delegated to the root zone. Following initial the analysis of proportions of abusive domains across new delegation, each new gTLD registry is required to have a gTLDs, registrars, and privacy/proxy service providers reveals “sunrise” period of at least 30 days, during which trademark entities suffering from very high concentrations of abused do- holders have an advance opportunity to register domain names mains. We find new gTLDs and registrars with concentrations corresponding to their marks before names are generally of blacklisted domains above 50%, in particular a registrar available to the public. with over 90% of its domains reported as abusive by SURBL. New gTLDs can be classified into four broad cate- gories [5]3: II. BACKGROUND Standard or generic gTLD [7]: is a gTLD that is gen- • ICANN [2] is responsible for maintaining the root names- erally open for public registration, e.g. .movie, .xyz, or pace and its expansion with new top-level domains (TLDs), .family. While most of these gTLDs are open to public in particular new gTLDs, and delegates the responsibility to registration, some registries may impose restrictions on maintain an authoritative source for registered domain names who or which entities can register in their domains. within a TLD to registry operators. ICANN holds registries Community gTLD [8]: this category covers gTLDs that • responsible for complying with the terms of a registry agree- are restricted to a specific community, such as .thai, .radio ment. Domain registries manage the registration and delegation or .pharmacy. of domain names within their TLDs. Geographic gTLD [9]: this type of gTLD covers cities, • The DNS represents a large ecosystem and several other states, or regions, e.g. .amsterdam or .berlin. Brand gTLD [10]: for companies seeking to have their entities play a role for a domain name to be registered, • secured and maintained on the Web. Domain registrars manage specific brand as a gTLD, such as .google or .hitachi. the registration of Internet domain names. They are gener- In our study, we analyze new gTLDs that are intended for ally accredited by TLD registries and may be accredited by public use. Therefore, we excluded the great majority of brand ICANN. Web hosting providers maintain server infrastructure gTLDs for which domains cannot be registered by regular that is used to host content for the domain. DNS providers users4, in particular for malicious purposes. This study covers operate DNS servers that map domain and host names to the new gTLDs for which registries have submitted their sunrise corresponding IP addresses. The WHOIS Privacy and Proxy date information requested by ICANN. In the first quarter of service providers conceal certain personal data of domain 2014, there were 77 new gTLDs for which the sunrise period name registrants. Registrants are individuals or organisations ended and domain names were available for public registration. that hold or manage domain names. The aim of this study is For comparison, by the end of 2016 the group consisted of 522 to capture inputs in a representative manner from across this new gTLDs. multitude of players relevant to abusive practices. C. Safeguards Against DNS Abuse A. Generic TLDs In preparation for the New gTLD Program, ICANN sought The first group of generic top-level domains (gTLDs) was advice from different DNS abuse and security experts to defined by RFC 920 [3] in October 1984 and introduced a examine the potential for increases in criminal activity in few months later.