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bindex 3/1/11 4:56 PM Page 359 Index NOTE: Page numbers in italics refer to photos. Abbott, Kenneth, 217–218 Amoco (American Oil Company), 213, 248 ABC, 70, 98–99, 112, 115, 289 Amos, John, 67, 98 Abileah, Rae, 237, 237–238 Anadarko Petroleum, 11–12, 180, Abraham, David, 227 233–236, 307 AC 360 (CNN), 135 Anchorage Daily News, 253 Advocates for Environmental Human Anderson, Jason, 14, 21–23, 24 Rights, 201 Anderson, Shelley, 14 air quality, monitoring, 132–134 Anderson, Wayne, 52 Alabama Angelle, Scott, 295–297, 296 BP funds to, 193 Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, 213 commercial seafood industry of, 148, Anglo-Persian Oil Company, 213 149, 150–162, 151, 153 Apache, 308 environmental impact, 94 Apex Safety Consultants, 218 oil industry employment statistics, Aravosis, John, 247 286–287 ARCO (Atlantic Richfield Company), 213 Alabama Coastal Foundation, 137 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 224 Alaska Arnesan, David, 123 Arctic National Wildlife Refuge, 224 Arnesen, Aleena, 125 BP in, 216, 219–220 Arnesen, David, Jr., 125 drilling permits, 304 Arnesen, Kindra, 122–125, 124 Allen, Lindsey, 275 Arnold, Kurt, 21 Allen, Thad, 72, 73 Arti’s Sports Bar (Grand Isle, Louisiana), as administration spokesman, 269–270 205 claims and, 201 Asper, Vernon, 65, 111, 113 environmental impact and, 94, 135 Associated Press, 29, 112, 131–132, 135 financial impact/claims, 202 Atlantis oil field, 216–218, 220 initial administration response, 264 Audubon, 146 Macondo well containment and, 240, Aurilio, Anna, 278–279, 302–303 248, 249 COPYRIGHTEDAustralia, MATERIAL oil-related disaster in, 280 media access restrictions and, 136 Avila, Roberta, 203 National Incident Command role, Azerbaijan, 215–216 265–266 Azeri-Chirag-Cuneshi (ACG), 215 Almord, Adam, 206 Americablog.com, 247 Babbitt, Bruce, 223–224 American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU), Balicki, Dana, 237, 237–238 136 Bancroft, Thomas, 145 American Energy Alliance, 277, 283 Barisich, George, 182 American Petroleum Institute (API), 223, Barron, Dan, 26–27 225, 230, 262, 277, 281–284, 285–286 Barton, Joe, 243 359 bindex 3/1/11 4:56 PM Page 360 360 INDEX Bayou Grace Community Services, 187 Bommer, Paul, 53 Bayou Interfaith Shared Community Bonn Convention, 73 Organizing (BISCO), 168, 168–169, booms, 93–96 191, 199 “controlled burns” with, 116 Bayou La Batre (Alabama), 148, 149, defined, 94 157–158, 159–161, 179 use of dispersant vs., 108 Baytown (Texas) refinery, 285 Bosarge, Johnny, 179 Bea, Robert, 56, 309 Bourg, Wes, 38 on BP corporate culture, 220 Boxer, Barbara, 77 on explosion events, 28 “BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Budget: What on MMS oil spill statistics, 257 Happened to the Oil?” (White House), on oil industry regulation change, 305 289–290 on oil industry testimony about BP, 277 BP p.l.c. on Schlumberger role, 20–21 advertising by, 180–181, 213–214 See also Deepwater Horizon Study Group civil lawsuit, 307 (Center for Catastrophic Risk Manage- claims process, 125, 180, 198, 200–204, ment, University of California) 206–210, 242–245 Beachside Resort Hotel (Gulf Shores, cleanup crews and health problems, Alabama), 206 117–132, 119, 124, 128 Beaudo, Daren, 182, 194, 202 on cleanup responsibility, 71, 192–200, Bento, Oleander, 29 194, 196, 199 benzene, 90, 133 Daily Operations Reports, 33 Bertone, Steve, 29–30, 31–32, 36 “disaster preparedness plan” of, 93, 180, BHP Billiton, 216 226, 231–233 Biden, Joe, 256 on dispersant, 107 Billiot, Camille, 88 dispersant analysis by, 99 Billiot, James, 88, 117, 176–178, 208 displacement test decision of, 19–21 Billiot, Jamie, 87–89, 88, 117, 169–171, executives on Deepwater Horizon at time 177–178, 186–187, 201 of explosion, 5–7, 8 birds. See environmental impact fines levied against, 270, 305–308 Birds Foot Delta (Louisiana), 69 history of, 213–214 Birnhaum, Elizabeth, 273 Initial Exploration Plan, 27–28, 59 Blanchard, Dean, 166–167 internal investigation, 24, 54 blowout preventer (BOP) Joint Unified Command role, 66 activation of, 23 liability, wildlife, 144 blind shear ram, 78 Macondo well lease of, 11–12, 249 (See blowout, defined, 10–11, 12 also Macondo well) description of, 17 media restricted by, 114–117, 135–136, disaster preparedness, 226 179–185, 197–198 efforts to close, 68–69 oil flow disclosure, 58–64, 64–69, 80 Macondo well containment, 235 oil industry’s “isolate BP” strategy, manufacturer of, 222 275–281, 276, 304 oil flow estimate and, 53–56 public opinion, 211–212, 236, 236–238, recertification regulations, 33 237, 303 riser, 56–58, 60–64, 66, 77, 245–247 “responsible party” designation, 180, role of, 12 264–265 Boat People SOS, 158–161, 172, 186, safety record, 218–219, 226 186–189 Transocean relationship to, 6 Boega, Sherrill, 19 U.S. corporate headquarters of, 221 bindex 3/1/11 4:56 PM Page 361 INDEX 361 Vessels of Opportunity Program, 130, capping stack, 245–247 167, 172, 179, 182, 185–192, 186, Capps, Lois, 270 188, 198 Cardiff, Scott, 276 See also Deepwater Horizon; environmen- Cardin, Stan, 36 tal impact; financial impact; Hayward, Care EMS, 130 Tony; Obama, Barack; oil flow estimate; Carrigan, Pat, 173 regulation, of oil industry Carter, Zack, 173–174, 174 Brewster, Dick, 184 Caspian Sea, 215–216 Brice-O’Hara, Sally, 99 Casstevens, Callie, 126–127 “bridge simulator,” 6–7 Cavaney, Red, 282 British Petroleum Company, 213 Cavnar, Bob, 10 Brown, Douglas, 16, 25, 30–31, 35 CBS, 37, 62–63, 135, 268 Brown, LaTosha, 183, 203 Center for Biological Diversity, 143, 257, Browner, Carol, 62, 253, 264, 288–289 263, 270, 271–272, 278, 279–280. See brown pelican, 69–70, 70, 141 also Suckling, Kieran Buchanan, Brent, 179, 190 Centers for Disease Control (CDC), 133 Buchanan, Wendy, 190 “centralizers,” 15 Bureau of Ocean Energy Management, Chaisson, Kirk, 300 Regulation and Enforcement Chan-Ta Seafood, 152–154, 153 (BOEMRE), 274 Cheney, Dick, 282 Bureau of Safety and Environmental Chevron Corporation, 215, 223, 230 Enforcement, 274 “disaster preparedness plan” of, 231–233 Burkeen, Aaron Dale, 27 on drilling moratorium, 259 Bush, George H. W., 68, 71, 256, 306 drilling permits, 305 Bush, George W., 106 Jones and, 265 drilling moratorium, 260 Macondo well containment, 233–236 Hurricane Katrina response, 251–252, OSHA violations, 285 268 Platform Alpha (Unocal) blowout, 58, Jindal and, 300 255, 256, 292, 308 oil industry regulation, 223, 228, public opinion of, 303 230–231 testimony about BP, 277 oil industry tax breaks, 277 Chiang, Eugene, 77 oil industry wealth and, 260–261 Children’s Health Fund, 160 Butler, Ashley, 60 China National Petroleum Company, 215 Choy, Christopher, 27, 35–36, 45, 47 California, blowout event in, 58, 255, 256, Chu, Steven, 78, 85, 245–246, 248 292, 308 CITGO, 284 Callaway, Casi Citizens United v. Federal Election on environmental impact, 101–104, 103 Commission, 278 on financial impact issues, 183–184, 187, claims process, 125, 180, 182, 198, 200– 198 204, 206–210, 242–245 on oil cleanup, 113, 136–137, 162, 172, Clark, Don, 27 309 Clark, Sheila, 27 Callaway, Coleman, 137 Clean Air Act (1970), 133, 256 Callaway, Jarrett, 162 Clean Water Act (1972), 58, 256, 270, 307 Cameron International, 61, 180, 222 CLEAR Act (Consolidated Land, Energy, Camilli, Richard, 81, 84–85 and Aquatic Resources), 281, 283 Cao, Anh, “Joseph,” 189 climate change legislation, 261–262, Cape Hatteras (research vessel), 110–114 303–304 bindex 3/1/11 4:56 PM Page 362 362 INDEX Clinton, Bill, 223–224, 227, 228, 230, 256, CTD (conductivity, temperature, depth) 306 rosette, 111–112 CNN, 61, 101, 104, 123, 135, 234–235 Curtis, Stephen, 13–14, 21–23, 24 coal, 262 coastal erosion issues, 88, 145, 163, 258. Daily Telegraph (London), 244 See also marshland Damon B. Bankston (cargo ship), 25, coast guard. See U.S. Coast Guard 38–40, 44–45, 48 Cocales, Brett, 15 Dauphin Island (Alabama), 120, 172–174, Code Pink, 237, 237–238 174, 199 cofferdam, 233–236 environmental impact, 3, 96 Columbia University, 77, 160 tourism, 205–206 Commercial Fishermen of America, 163 Davis, Ron, 194–197, 196 commercial seafood industry, 147–178 “deadman switch” (automatic mode BP cleanup and, 122–132 function), 34, 54–56 crab industry, 150–155, 151, 153 “dead zones,” 92 drilling moratorium and, 258 Dean, Scott, 247 economic/social impact in, 159–161, “Deep-Sea Oil Plume Enriches Indigenous 162–171, 164, 165, 168 Oil-Degrading Bacteria” (Lawrence effect of dispersant on, 171–176, 174 Berkeley National Laboratory), 110 employed in oil cleanup, 94, 95 Deepwater Horizon, 5–40 federal/state waters closed after blowout events, 21–23 Deepwater Horizon explosion, 147–150 cement used, 15–21 future of, 176–178 communication blackout following oil cleanup, 105 explosion, 45–49 oyster industry, 104, 155–158 crew evacuation from, 34–37, 38, 44–49 shrimp industry, 158–159, 292–301, 293, dimensions of, 7 296, 299 displacement test, 16–21 Common Loon (Dauphin Island), 206 distress signal sent by, 31–32 ConocoPhillips, 216, 219 documenting disaster of, 1–3 “disaster preparedness plan” of, 231–233 “doghouse” of, 9–11 OSHA violations, 284 early news reports of, 43 “Consolidated Fish and Wildlife Report” emergency disconnect system (EDS), (Joint Unified Command), 142 32–34 “controlled burns,” 102, 114–117, 116, emergency procedures of, 24, 28–31, 32 142–144 federal/state waters closed to fishing, Cook, Kevin, 240 147–150 Cook Inletkeeper (Alaska), 102–103 firefighting effort, 50–53 Cooper, Anderson, 135 Macondo well, role of, 11–14 coral reefs, 138, 144–145 missing crew, 38–40 Corexit, 99–106, 109, 120, 144. See also negative test, 16, 21–24 dispersant sinking of, 49–50, 56–58 CorpWatch, 214 statement signed by crew of, 48–49 Cousteau, Jean-Michel, 135 Deepwater Horizon Joint Information crab industry, 150–155, 151, 153.
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