Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu

Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu

Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu*

Abstract: With Shinzō Abe’s re-election as the president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the LDP regime appears to have entered on a stable trend of long-term governance. This also marks a later phase of the Abe administration has solidified its later phase, following Abe’s second rise to power. The supremacy of the LDP and the administration of the basket of economic policies termed have produced initial effects, and the overall climate of political opinion in Japan remains largely conservative, all factors favorable the continuance of Abe’s regime. A major task in the future to cement Abe’s political legacy would be amendment of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Abe’s political and security policies are likely not to change, namely, the promotion of multilateral cooperation in the US-Japan alliance, a moderate adjustment of Japan’s policy, and a return to utilitarian diplomacy to maximize Japan’s national interests. Thanks to the return of the Sino-Japanese relationship to the right track, the healthy development of bilateral relations depends on the consolidation of the political foundation, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation, and constructively managing and controlling disagreement. Keywords: Japanese politics，Sino-Japanese relationship，Abe administration， foreign strategy

 Wang Shan is a research professor of the Institute for Japanese Studies, CICIR, whose research mainly focuses on Japanese politics, diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese relations; Meng Xiaoxu is a professor from the Department of International Politics, University of International Relations (UIR), whose research mainly focuses on domestic politics and foreign policy of Japan. This paper derives from the initial findings of a research project entitled A Research on Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Responses, funded by the 2018 Basic Research Fund of the Central Universities (Project Number: 3262018T32).

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 96 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

n the September 2018 election for the president of the Liberal IDemocratic Party (LDP) Shinzō Abe won an unsurprising third consecutive victory since his return to power. Barring unforeseen circumstances, Abe will remain in power until September 2021 and become the longest-serving since the end of the Second World War. However, Abe’s term in office has also been the most controversial of that of any Japanese prime minister; his domestic and foreign policies have not only broken free from Japan’s established post-war system, but they have also shown his personal style of governance, characterized as forceful, greedy for power, ably cultivating small and powerful inner circles, and deft in the manipulation of public opinion. The most likely developments in the Abe administration and Japanese politics will lead, the evolution of his diplomatic and security policies will evolve, and what these mean for future Sino-Japanese relations call for intensive study. The LDPWill Likely Remain in Power

It is now the eighth year since Abe came to power again in 2012. The foundation of his administration is relatively solid, witnessing little challenge from the opposition or from within his party. During this period, although it has been beset with scandals of various kinds, Abe has been able to evade serious danger, and the ruling position of the LDP has been consolidated. The factors prompting the LDP government are obviously growing in importance, but they provide a different basis than the internal and external environment that the LDP enjoyed under the Gojugonen Taisei (The 1955 System). The current factors reflect contemporary characteristics, which can be discussed in the following three aspects. I. The political ecology of Japan bears new features that are conducive to the long-term stability of LDP power. First, the opposition parties are shrinking in size, and they have become fragmented, promoting different policies and reflecting varied interests, so they pose little counterweight to the LDP. International study of Japan once commonly referred to the two-party system of Japan. This characterization received a boost in 2009, when the leading opposition

CIR May/June 2019 97 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), came to power. Some scholars went so far as to categorically assert that the LDP and the DPJ would begin to take turns wielding power, leading to a political structure of checks and balances between the two parties that could offer a stable foundation for democratic politics. However, not only have Japanese opposition parties lost the fighting spirit they once had, but they have also become unable to provide any social governance solutions or develop clear policy propositions, resulting in a degraded political embellishment. Second, the environment of social opinion in Japan is, as a whole, tending in a conservative direction, as particularly demonstrated in elections. Voters do not aspire to something new or different, being satisfied with choosing the best of a bad lot, thus inevitably tacitly expressing consent to the chronic illness of the LDP’s politics, as illustrated over a period of years. Third, as the LDP has no strong political rivals, some LDP members of the Diet (Japan’s parliament) keep close watch on the mistakes of the Abe administration, only following Abe out of the need to win a national election, in spite of their awareness that the party has many weaknesses. As a result, the LDP exhibits an overwhelming political complacency,1 which has allowed Abe’s willful determination and headstrong governing style. In the run-up to the most recent presidential election for the LDP, Abe succeeded in persuading inner-party power figures such as and Seiko Noda to give up their intention to run for party presidency. Before the election in September 2018, Abe expressed his willingness to engage in an open-minded debate with his opponents, and regarding the formation of his new cabinet, he promised to maintain as a policy objective that the most talented people be allowed to express their talents. However,

1 The election of the House of Representatives in Japan is based on a system of proportional representation of small constituencies. Any one from the party running for election should obtain recognition of the Central Committee of the LDP and recommendation from the constituency he or she represents. At the same time, they can get funds from the party for their election campaigns, but the right for granting such funds is in the hands of people at top of the LDP. As a result, though the Representatives have the responsibility and mission to represent the public opinion and act in the public interests, they have to keep in line with the party bosses if they want to get elected or reelected. Seiichiro Murakami,“The Era of the National Mobilization Act Comes,”Monthly Nippon, No. 10 (2018)：40.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 98 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship as was discovered by the Japanese news media revealed, those within the party who supported , the former Secretary-General of the LDP and the only contestant against Abe for party presidency, were suppressed by pro-Abe forces, who, for example, threatened to force the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Saitou Ken to resign if he supported Ishiba.1 Abe’s new cabinet includes loyalists who can further strengthen his hand within the party and in national administration. Abe has also placed former Defense Minister Tomomi Inada, who had previously resigned due to her involvement in a cover-up scandal, in a high position within the party, becoming the executive deputy secretary-general of the LDP. Tomomi is a firm supporter of Abe, both sharing similar political ideas with him and in a mutually appreciative relationship. Abe’s placement of Tomomi in a high position within the party was done to capitalize on her influence in the right wing to promote his policy propositions for institutional amendment. To keep his campaign promises, Abe appointed Takashi Yamashita, a member of the Ishiba faction, as the minister of justice, to help balance party factions and resolve disturbances in public opinion. II. Abenomics has produced positive effects in macroeconomic regulation and control. Abe has centered his views of economic policy, often referred to by the shorthand Abenomics. Although these policies have been met with both praise and criticism in academia, it does appear that it was an effective means to bring the economy out of deflation, which is surely its foremost achievement. Statistics produced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate an increase in the consumer price index from August to October of 2018 of 1.2-1.4 percent year-on-year. In addition, corporate earnings have also increased significantly, unemployment improved, and the stock market is soaring. Although the Moritomo Gakuen (Moritomo School) and Kake Gakuen (Kake School) scandals and the data fraud perpetrated by the Ministry of Finance have led to a certain extent of loss in the approval rate

1 An Exclusive Interview with General Secretary Shigeru Ishiba,“Mr. Abe Can’t Tell the Future,”Asashi Shimbun Weekly AERA, October 8, 2018, 58.

CIR May/June 2019 99 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu of the Abe administration, it has not been seriously damaged, as the stability of the economy and the stock market has played an important part in the administration’s support. Abe’s economic policies have won him support of the owners and executives of enterprises and consortiums, along with the ordinary business class. Despite its limits, Abenomics has certainly helped to consolidate Abe’s administration. III. Security policy was an important breakthrough point on the right for Abe. The Abe administration has put forward a particular series of institutional, policy, and legislative measures, including the establishment of the National Security Conference, the formulation of a new National Security Strategy, the amendment of the New Security Act, the suspension of the ban on the full exercise of the national right to collective self- defense and extending the concept of this self-defense, the relaxation of restrictions on arms exports, a substantial increase in military defense expenditures, the purchase of more offensive weapon systems, and the introduction of the 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines, among other steps. Although opposition parties and some citizens voiced opposition, these measures have been responsive to the security concerns of most Japanese. Of late, due to promotion by right-wing politicians, publicization by the media, and the availability of Japanese security documents, the broad mass of Japanese voters have a distorted view of the security situation in East Asia and have mistakenly located the source of threats to Japan. As a result, the previous reflexive pacifism of the Japanese public that led it to seek peace and development first, along with the previous security concept, which led the public to oppose government attempts to break the constitutional limits and increase Japan’s military power. This change in the perspective on security among Japanese voters echoes Abe’s orientation in security policy. The negative effects of this confluence of views and policy are constantly brewing, and the change in mind of the public has been indirectly transformed into the creation of a firm base of support for Abe. Of course, security voters will not agree entirely with all internal and external policies of the Abe administration, but they do maintain a considerable degree of tacit understanding of the

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 100 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship overall thrust of its security policy. Another factor in Japanese politics is also relatively conducive to the LDP administration, namely, American support. After the DPJ took power in 2009 for the first time, Prime Minister Yakio Hatoyama proposed the construction of a general East Asian community, which was seen by the pro-US forces in the country as an act to expel American influence in East Asia and weaken the US-Japan alliance. In particular, regarding the potential relocation of Futenma Military Base, where the American troops were stationed, Prime Minister Yakio Hatoyama advocated public opposition to the US, which resulted in his resignation in shame, as a result of American action through various means. Generally speaking, the LDP exhibits a relatively strong pro-US orientation. During the , the LDP remained close to the Western capitalist camp, entering into an alliance with the US and rendering Japan’s security to US responsibility, while the US, viewing Japan as the bridgehead for the contest against communism, supported the LDP administration.1 The idea of American policy toward Japan has been to keep the ruling party from deviating from a pro-US orientation. If Japan attempted to break away from its power, the US would not hesitate to exert ruthless suppression or even bring the regime down at any expense. After taking power, Abe has exhibited a strong pro-American tendency, greatly increasing arms purchase from the US and fostering an intimate personal relationship with President Trump and stepping up strategic coordination with the US military. All of these actions conduce to winning Trump’s trust in Abe and his administration. A close relationship between Japan and the US would help promote Abe’s long-term tenure in power. In the immediate future, assuming no drastic changes in the international or regional situation and no major natural disasters in Japan, LDP government will likely continue because no political forces exist in Japan that would be powerful enough to challenge it in an important way. However, this does not imply that the Abe administration can sleep in

1 Zhang Boyu, Riben xuanju zhidu yu zhengdang zhengzhi [Japan’s election system and its party politics] (Zhongguo jingji chubanshe [China economic publishing house], 2013), 214.

CIR May/June 2019 101 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu comfort. During the 2018 LDP presidential election, Shigeru Ishiba publicly ran on a call for the LDP to run an honest government that would administer the country with integrity, a strategy that targeted Abe’s own political conduct and that of his circle. In 2019, Japan will hold elections for the House of Councillors (Japan’s upper house of parliament), and at that point any scandals that Abe has not cleared himself of will certainly be brought to public awareness and act as ammunition to the opposition parties in their own campaigns, using it to attack the incumbent government, while some LDP supporters will likely to cast their votes for candidates of other parties to help maintain balance in the Diet overall and keep the LDP from becoming too powerful. Of course, in the event that the LDP loses the election, Abe will face increasing pressure within his party, and voices within may demand his resignation as a result of the loss. In recent years, natural disasters have provoked an unpredictable public electoral response, especially when some victims are not quickly or properly resettled, and the post-disaster reconstruction remains incomplete. If a major natural calamity occurs, and if the government fails to handle the situation properly, public anger in Japan may boil over and impact the Abe administration if dormant powerful figures within the party take advantage of a changing situation to challenge Abe’s current dominance. Forging a Political Legacy Marked by a Constitutional Amendment

Abe has a great political ambition, and he is well acquainted with the rules of politics and basic Japanese parliamentary operations. Yamaguchi Prefecture, his birth place, has produced well-known prime ministers for Japan, including Itō Hirobumi, Tarō Katsura, , and Eisaku Sato, the first two of whom played important roles in promoting Japan’s colonial expansion before the Second World War, and the second two were important promoters of capitalist development after the war. Influenced by the local political environment and his upbringing, Abe exhibits strong right-leaning conservative streak in his political actions, calling himself a pragmatic conservative. His ruling style is concerned, shows tenacity that

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 102 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship coexists with an aptitude for compromise flexibly. This combination has provoked the characterization of him in the Japanese media as having the personality of a snake. Abe is also a typical realist, pragmatic in policy, good at grasping policy directions, and prompt in adjusting his tactics. In his near future in office, over the following two years at least, Abe intends to promote the possibility of a constitutional amendment to alter Japan’s post-war order,1 as well as resolving current problems in social security and increasing the consumption tax, to forge a political legacy for himself.2 Abe sees his long-cherished wish for the expansion of Japan’s military role as a part of his construction of a future, more beautiful Japan.3 Beginning with his first cabinet, which was formed in September 2006, Abe has much to promote the prominence of the right in domestic politics, and bringing Japan out of its post-war system in multiple ways, including the aspects of politics, diplomacy, and security, in addition to revising the Basic Law of Education, upgrading defense from a department to a ministry, formulating the Specific Secrets Protection Law, revising the State Civil Service Law, and adding a conspiracy clause to the revised Organized Crime Punishment Act, among other actions. In his adoption and promotion of these measures, together with those already taken, Abe is piloting a comprehensive social reform in all fields of governance, in the name of eradicating the old and fostering the new, which is ultimately

1 In a speech delivered to the UN General Assembly held in September 2018, Abe proposed for the first time Japan would get out of the post-war system, which was different in connotation from the proposition to get free of the post-war system publicized by Japan before, with the former featuring a political concept that Japan would make such an endeavor in both domestic and foreign policies. 2 “Anbei zuihou sannian zenyang dazao zhengzhi yichan? [How would Abe forge his political legacy in the last three years in office?],”October 8,2018,accessed October 16, 2018, http://cn.nikkei.com/politicsaeconomy/politicsasociety/32494-2018-10 -08-05-00-20 .html. 3 As early as July 2006, when preparing for the presidential election of the LDP to be held in September that year, Abe published a series of articles under a general name of Toward a Beautiful Country on Bungeishunjiu, proposing to build a beautiful Japan, which was no less than his election declaration. In January 2013, soon after his second administration was established, Abe edited his published articles into a book by the name of Toward a New Country, in which he systematically explained his concept of new nationalism.

CIR May/June 2019 103 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu intended to destroy Japan’s post-war system. The introduction of these laws has greatly consolidated the legal basis for his social governance, and it has also intensified social tension, offsetting the existing social order. It is well-known that in post-war Japan, the social environment was once relatively relaxed and stable, featuring a low crime rate, and the external security environment in East Asia was also calm, without large concern for the possibility of internal unrest or large-scale conflict. The international community reached the consensus that Japan’s security was the highest in the world. Abe’s laws and regulations clearly target both domestic citizens and foreigners residing in Japan, which has strained the social environment and brought fear and discomposure to the public, including leaving hints of a pending national emergency and inducing speculation about a historical backward turn in social management. Some scholars believe that the laws introduced by Abe have a similar function to the Public Security Law and National General Mobilization Law, promulgated before the Second World War, giving rise to concerns regarding the future of Japanese society repeating the pre-war militaristic rule.1 In particular, the Specific Secrets Protection Law has deprived citizens of their right to know and journalists of their freedom to report, and public opinion is thus suppressed. Furthermore, the law has greatly strengthened penalties to public servants who leak state secrets. The law does not apply only to public officials handling confidential information, but also to those in espionage and those who leak state secrets, under color of an anti-espionage law. Abe’s intention for his public legacy includes amending the existing constitution and removing its pacifism, forming part of what he most values in his political ambitions. This is a major political agenda he has promoted desperately during both of his periods in power. The importance that Abe has attached to this amendment can be understood as having three main aspects. First, the constitutional amendment is the core feature of his attempt to remove Japan from its post-war system, and this also serves as a political

1 Seiichiro Murakami,“The Era of the National Mobilization Act Comes,” Monthly Nippon, No. 10 (2018)：40.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 104 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship basis for his reforms in a variety of fields. Since its founding in 1955, the LDP has promoted the creation of a more autonomous constitution, strenuously advocating abandonment of the constitution“forced upon Japan by others.” Both the Hatoyama Iichirō and the Nobusuke administrations advocated immediate constitutional reform. However, constitutional reform in the early years of post-war was a completely different beast from the proposal on the table now: with the former emphasizing complete change to the constitution, while the later only intends amendments, maintaining the existing structure. Later, as Japan experienced rapid economic development and as its citizens became increasingly well-off, Japan joined the ranks of the developed countries. On the one hand, experience of reality has made Japanese elites well aware that the objectives Japan that did not achieve through invasion and expansion were easily realizable through the democratic transformation guided by the US that occurred after the war. As a result, the broad masses of Japanese gradually became identified with and accepted the political and economic arrangements that were established after the war, including some young LDP congressmen and congresswomen, whose mentality is undergoing quiet changes,1 while“most Japanese citizens embraced the influence of the spirit of the new constitution.”2 On the other hand, innovationist forces in the and in related groups have been engaged in a protracted struggle with the revisionists, headed by the LDP, opposing any amendment to the constitution and protecting its centrality, making it a key node in the battle between retaining the constitution and renovating it that began in the wake of the war. As a result, the constitutional amendment agenda has become a taboo that no major political party dared to touch back then. In addition, successive post-war administrations have adopted moderate security policies, matching its image as a peaceful country—the pacifism of the constitution has played

1 Sun Zheng, Zhanhou riben xinguojia zhuyi yanjiu [A research on new nationalism in the post-war Japan] (Renmin chubanshe [People’s publishing house], 2005), 135. 2 Osamu Watanabe, Political Reform and Constitutional Amendment: from to Kojima Ichiro, (Aoki Bookstore，June 1994), 249.

CIR May/June 2019 105 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu an indispensable role here. These factors have ensured the post-war constitutional system has remained intact in Japan. In essence, for Japan to depart from its post-war system and for it to adopt a militaristic constitutional amendment are two sides of the same coin for Abe because the core goal of extricating Japan from its post-war system rests with the creation of Abe’s constitutional amendment, and that constitutional amendment would be a major indicator for the elimination of the post-war system. The existing constitution has determined the direction of Japan’s political, diplomatic, and defense policies, in particular its security policy. Although some clauses in the constitution exist only in name, that very existence runs contrary to certain of Abe’s ideas of proper governance. Therefore, with regard to his personal political legacy, Abe insists on being the first person to break the taboo and amend the post-war constitution, no matter how unjustified it is. Second, constitutional amendment could further define the direction of Japan’s security policy and shape the status and role of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the constitution, effectively mitigating the current conflict between established law and practical reality. At present, a focus of the revisionist forces concerns how to harmonize the relations between Article Nine of the constitution and the Self-Defense Forces. Abe’s proposition is to retain its existing two paragraphs and add a third to it, which would define the nature and status of the Self-Defense Forces. Nonetheless, because the existing Article Nine, which are not to be altered, clearly state that the post-war Japan will not maintain any capacity for war and deny Japan the right to enter a war, the third paragraph Abe intends to add would obviously run contrary to the legislative purpose of the existing article. However, this is not the core of the problem. In May 2015, the Abe administration approved a law on security that would lift the ban put by Article Nine on the right to collective self-defense, allowing Japan to send the Self-Defense Forces overseas. From a legal point of view, the conditions and the role of the Self-Defense Forces as defined by the war bill would be in sharp conflict with the existing constitution, thus violating it. Abe’s intention in amending the constitution is to seek constitutional recognition of the right to collective self-defense understood in the

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 106 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

existence of the Self-Defense Forces and of the ability to send these forces overseas with public approval, with would indicate that the War Bill is not in legal conflict with the constitution, and weaken the legal effect of the first two paragraphs of Article Nine. Moreover, the strategy of a retention of the first two paragraphs and an addition of a third reflects that Abe does not openly propose to oppose public wishes. As a result, he would give the Self-Defense Forces a formal status by adding a new paragraph to Article Nine, fundamentally retaining the appearance of keeping the existing constitution intact, merely adding to it. If Abe succeeds in amending the constitution, he has a broader and more diversified explanation basis for the expression of his national security policies. Given this, the amendment would almost certainly divert Japan from its pacifist. Third, the constitutional amendment could cater to the strategic demand of the US and give the Japan-US alliance more prominence. The US’s recent adjustment to its Asia-Pacific strategy calls for the coordination and support of its military allies, but the limits embodied in Japan’s constitution have resulted in an inability for Japan to fully cooperate in US military operations. A constitutional amendment would reflect Abe’s domestic political needs and bear tacit permission and recognition from the US. However, the US does not wish for Japan to entirely leave its sphere in military and security, embarking on the path to complete freedom. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the perspective of US officials and think tanks and the positions found in official documents have all directly or indirectly recognized Article Nine as an obstacle to the Japan-US alliance, stating that “constitutional amendment would permit Japan to participate in the UN- authorized peacekeeping operations in a broader way and make greater contributions in this regard”1 and prompting Japan to break loose from its constitutional limits to assign a larger role to its Self-Defense Forces. Abe has expressed several times that he will personally ensure

1 James Schoff, “A Collective Win for Asia,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, July 1, 2014, accessed August 11, 2018, https://carnegieendowment .org/2014/07/01/collective-win-for-asia-pub-56059.

CIR May/June 2019 107 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu constitutional amendment during his time in office.1 In May 2017, Abe made a clear statement in his speech at Constitutional Memorial Day that he would make sure that the constitutional amendment was in place by 2020 and that he would try to have the amended constitution promulgated for implementation before 2020,2 while also demanding that the LDP propose a draft constitutional amendment in 2018 so that this concrete text could be adopted into a substantive agenda in Diet. This ultimately was not realized, due to being blocked by opposition parties. However, 2019 will witness multiple agendas in both domestic politics and diplomacy in Japan, becoming what Abe called“a year of historical significance”. In addition to the succession of new emperor, the issue of a new reign title, and the unification of local and Senate elections, Japan will host the G20 Summit in Osaka. At his New Year’s press conference, Abe dwelt once again on the agenda of constitutional amendment, demanding that the ruling party submit a solution as soon as possible to deepen the discussion and understanding of the citizens on the issue, while calling on all political parties to transcend their political stances and forge a broad consensus.3 Currently, less than 40 percent of the population support amendment, and 40-50 percent opposes it. Abe’s desire to forge a political legacy that is characterized by a constitutional amendment does not match popular sentiment in Japan. After the election of the House of Representatives in 2017 and the most recent LDP presidential election, Abe’s resolution to pursue constitutional amendment is only the stronger; whenever the issue arises, he vows solemnly to push it forward, no matter what it takes. However, the Komei Party, a part of Abe’s coalition government, has taken a vague position on the issue, and in the opposition camp, the Restoration Party sharply disputes the ruling party’s agenda on many issues although it publicly supports constitutional amendment, and the two parties are

1 Liu Jiangyong,“Lun daxuanhou anbei de xiuxian zhengzhi ji yingxiang [An analysis of Abe’s constitution amendment politics after the election and its impacts],” Riben xuekan [Japanese studies], No. 6 (2017): 2. 2 “A Message from Prime Minister Who Wants to Carry Out Constitutional Amendment before 2020,”Asahi Shimbun, May 4, 2017. 3 “Main Points of Prime Minister Abe’s New Year News Conference,”Yomiuri Shimbun, January 5, 2019.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 108 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship currently drifting apart from one another. Within the Constitutional Democratic Party, opinions on constitutional amendment have begun to diversify. The strategy of the LDP as far as constitutional amendment is concerned is to divide the opposition, by treating constitutional amendment as a demand of the times and a national consensus. Abe’s specific tactics have been rather evasive. He has proposed four amendments to the constitution, beginning with those that are easy to be understood by the masses and are closely related to their lives, such as adding a paragraph on emergencies and eliminating combined constituencies in Senate elections. The intention is to arouse the interest of the masses and create an atmosphere that is friendly constitutional amendment before the amendment to Article Nine is concretely proposed. In addition to achieving a consensus among the parties in the Diet, Abe has must surmount the hurdle of obtaining more than half of the popular vote, if he wants to bring his long-cherished wish to amend the constitution to fruition. Neither of these will be easy for Abe because the public is well aware how the votes that they cast will determine whether Japan will maintain its status as a pacifist state or not. To Balance Diplomacy within the Japan-US Alliance

Over the course of his two periods as prime minister, Abe has been the source of some iconic propositions in diplomacy and security, including the so-called value diplomacy, which takes a panoramic perspective on the world map; proactive diplomacy; strategic diplomacy; active pacifism; and a strategy to achieve a free and open Indo-Pacific, resulting in a dazzling array of various positions. Only one goal is apparent behind all of these propositions, which is to center Japan’s status and influence in the international arena. At the beginning of 2019, Abe made an additional move, proposing a total reassessment of Japan’s postwar diplomacy.1 Because diplomacy is often considered as an extension of domestic politics, the reassessment of Japan’s diplomacy under discussion would be

1 “Main Points of Prime Minister Abe’s News Conference,”Sanke Shimbun, January 5, 2019.

CIR May/June 2019 109 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu related to the total reassessment of Japan’s post-war politics proposed by the Yasuhiro Nakasone administration in the 1980s, and it would be intended to bring about a break from the post-war system, at least in terms of foreign policy. Examination of the development of Japan’s diplomacy in recent years may lead to the discovery that the motivation and objectives of the Abe administration’s diplomacy have centered around strategic gaming with China to exhibit diplomatic moves as part of breaking away from the post-war system. During the Abe administration, Japan has established diplomatic and security consultation mechanisms (termed the 2 plus 2) with Australia, France, and the UK, and it has made other moves to promote its so-called strategic diplomacy. At the same time, Japan has become part of several Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreements with several countries, with the intention of increasing the capacity and level of security cooperation with countries outside East Asia. That is, diplomacy and security have become two major areas for the Abe administration, a signature of Abe’s return to power, and in these initiatives, great breakthroughs have been made. Resulting from these developments, Japan’ s diplomatic and security policies can be expected to unfold in the four following ways. First, it will maintain a sound alliance with the US within the existing framework, while promoting pragmatic diplomacy of its own. The policy of unilateralism and“America First”thinking that has been taken by the Trump administration has not only reduced Japan’s space to maneuver in the alliance between the two powers, but it has also impeded the development of Japan’s diplomacy. Abe has doubts about current US unilateralism and trade protectionism, leading him to propose“to hold high the banner of free trade and lead the establishment of fair rules for the new era.”1 In particular, on issues directly related to Japan’s interests, Abe has held himself slightly aloof rather than following Trump closely, while also attempting to keep proper and balanced relationships with the US and

1“Main Points of Prime Minister Abe’s New Year News Conference,”Yomiuri Shimbun, January 5, 2019.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 110 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

China. In terms of multilateral international affairs, Japan would keep with the Japan-US axis and coordinate its position on these with the US. On particular issues that involve security in the Asia-Pacific region, such as the South China Sea issue, the Taiwan Strait issue, and Indo-Pacific strategy, Japan would support American postures, continuing to play the part of a protector of the international maritime order. In addition, Japan would continue its military and security cooperation with the US, participating profoundly in US-dominated approaches to global and regional security affairs, and further broaden the duties and functions of its Self-Defense Forces to elevate its international stature. Second, it will prioritize achieving substantial progress in the Japan-Russia relationship. A territorial dispute over the Kuril Islands north of Hokkaido and south of Sakhalin has led to protracted tension between Japan and Russia and also served as an important strategic handle for their bilateral relations. Currently, the two countries share the intention of leading the dispute issue in a positive direction by strengthening economic cooperation. In September 2018, at a summit meeting between Abe and Putin, they discussed this and other issues in the context of signing a profound peace accord that would lead the two sides to promote the advancement of Japan-Russia relations over a broad range of. Putin has constructively proposed to promote more detailed negotiations on signing a peace accord, without any preconditions, which would force Japan out of its traditional diplomatic thinking regarding the northern territories. Abe does not appear willing to pursue improvement in relations along the lines set out by Russia, but he has no other effective way to resolve the territorial issue. This dispute is of great significance in the strategy of the major powers and geopolitical structures in East Asia. Although Abe has made it a diplomatic priority to push the Japan-Russia relationship forward in 2019 and has attempted to continue conversation with Russia concerning a peace treaty between the two countries, a certain disparity of expectation persists between Japan and Russia, according to the information published by the Japanese media, and it will be difficult for the two sides to make an immediate breakthrough in their bilateral relations. Third, it will attempt a breakthrough in its relations with North Korea.

CIR May/June 2019 111 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu

As the US-North Korea continues to improve, North Korea will be a diplomatic focus for the Abe administration, in terms of a policy adjustment North Korea. During the Kouzumi administration, Abe was as Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary involved in resolving the abduction issue with North Korea, and he attended talks in North Korea. So far, there has been no indication of improvement in bilateral relations, as the Abe administration has followed the US closely in sanctions policy against North Korea, while insisting that no talks would be held to improve relations before the abduction issue is settled. As improvement has been seen in the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula, Japan has begun to actively seeking contact with North Korea in a bid to take advantage of the more relaxed political situation on the peninsula to improve its relationship. At the beginning of his return to the premiership, Abe said that he would “take resolving the abduction issue as a mission” of his administration, but he seems to have lowered aim in this respect. This is a natural development because the unresolved peninsular issues beginning in the wake of the Second World War have been quite thorny. Japan intended to dominate the development of relations between the two countries and involve itself by manipulating the abduction issue with the aim of coordinating the US and to put pressure on North Korea. However, when the US and North Korea reached a preliminary agreement on the nuclear question, Japan’s role and influence of Japan were much reduced. In addition, as Japan’s political intentions in manipulating the abduction issue were rather clear, it is not likely that any resolution peninsular issues will proceed along the lines designated by Japan. Fourth, it will promote a framework for multilateral cooperation with an emphasis on both security and economic interest that is founded on its Indo-Pacific strategy, in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy is intended to ensure its own security and act as a strategic hedge against China by means of a four-nation mechanism formed of the US, Japan, India, and Australia, with an intention of building an international order and setting rules for the Indo-Pacific region to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific through shaping norms and maintaining order. Since this strategy was proposed in 2016, Japan has brought its Indo-Pacific strategy

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 112 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship to the wider world and facilitated the improvement of the security environment in the Indo-Pacific region. At the beginning of 2017, Abe stressed that“In times when the future is uncertain, the most important thing is to put ourselves on a firm footing and not waver from it. Japan will work together with countries with which we share fundamental values such as freedom, democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. We will work hand-in-hand with countries such as ASEAN members, Australia, and India to ensure the peace and prosperity of Asia and the region stretching from the Pacific Rim to the Indian Ocean.”2 Abe has promoted the Indo-Pacific strategy as part of a long-term strategy to contain China, an intention that has been echoed by several countries. During the ASEAN Summit of November 2017, Japan, the US, India, and Australia held a directors-level meeting to lead the Indo-Pacific strategy into a cooperative alliance to ensure maritime security.3 In addition to the security significance, Abe’s Indo-Pacific strategy is also intended to hedge against China’s cooperative Belt and Road Initiative and demonstrate its proactive diplomacy. However, in its public statements, Japan has insisted on the Indo-Pacific strategy as a policy initiative for regional peace and prosperity, which is intended to promote regional economic development and revitalization and does not run contrary to the Belt and Road Initiative4 as an interface reserved for economic and trade cooperation with China. In sum, the current international political and economic order is facing challenges and has an uncertain future. During the Abe administration, an adjustment was made to Japan’s foreign policy, and this leaves limited room for him to take further action. Unless drastic changes occur in the international state of affairs, Japan will continue attempting to balance

1 “Statement of Government Policy by Prime Minister Abe in the 193rd Diet,” Kantei [Prime Minister’s official residence], January 20, 2017, accessed October 15, 2018, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/97_abe/statement2/20170120siseihousin.html. 2 The Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA),“Protecting Sea, Connecting Sea, Blessing Sea: Marine Security Issues and Japan’s Reactions,”March 2012, accessed October 18, 2018, http://www.jiia.org.jp/pdf/research/H23_Sea/09_Report.pdf. 3 Quoted from the speech made during a penal discussion by Yoriko Kawaguchi, former foreign minister of Japan at the 7th World Peace Forum held in Tsinghua University on July 14, 2018.

CIR May/June 2019 113 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu policy within an existing diplomatic framework and striving to increase its international influence and the power of its discourse by promoting its Indo-Pacific strategy as part of an Asia-Pacific structure that exhibits with relative checks and balances that can create a favorable strategic space for Japan. The Endogenous Driving Force for Improving Relations with China Is Increasing

As prime minister, Abe made an ice-breaking visit to China in October 2006 to improve bilateral relations, which had become somewhat sour. Twelve years later, in October 2018, he made another visit to China, which was also the first visit by a Japanese prime minister in seven years, a period during which Sino-Japanese relations witnessed ups and downs and passed through wind and storm. Today, the Sino-Japanese relationship has finally stabilized, returning gradually to a track featuring rational and pragmatic development. At the beginning of 2019, Abe expressed a pledged to promote the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship to a new stage. This state of affairs is hard won, and it calls for meticulous care and redoubled attention from both sides. The wake of the Second World War also brought a rapidly changing relationship between the two countries, witnessing cooperation and friendship and friction and contest. In retrospect, the development trajectory of Sino-Japanese relations reveals a certain regularity, in that whenever the international situation passes through dramatic change or major adjustment, China and Japan are prompted to interact on this basis. Over the past two years, the Sino-Japanese relationship has entered a period of relatively stable development, with positive signs of improvement, along with frequent exchanges in various areas. For Japan, the reason for this relates to two main factors. First, during Abe’s second administration, policy adjustments on the part of Japan toward China have produced hardly any expected results. For, the Abe administration has been beset with trouble and scandals of various kinds, whose negative effects have undercut the Japanese democracy, and

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 114 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

Abe’s integrity has been much questioned. As a result, Abe’s political aura has dimmed somewhat, and he has even now been labelled by the Japanese media as“one of the ten Japanese prime ministers who ruined Japan.”1 Despite all this, Abe has made it difficult for different voices to arise within the LDP, using his superb political skills, which highlight a combination of coercion and conciliation. In addition, in recent years, the LDP has achieved landslide victories in national elections, which have relatively consolidated Abe’s position within the administration, such that he hardly faces any substantial threats or challenges, either from within the party or the opposition. For its part, the Japanese media has also been polarized in its evaluation of his Abe administration. This relatively stable ruling environment is quite conducive to Abe’s policy adjustment toward China. Moreover, the improvement of relations with China may produce additive effects in the coming two years, which would contribute to the consolidation of his political legacy. Second, during his second administration, Abe has foregrounded the South China Sea issue, attempting to hold back China’s relationships with neighboring countries. The fact is, Japan did not hold back China’s development, as China’s cooperation with countries within the South China Sea region has grown even closer, as its Belt and Road Initiative has been warmly received and actively joined by more and more countries in the world. Japanese enterprises have generally developed optimistic views of the initiative, and this is inexorably producing invisible pressure on Abe’s China policy toward China. Abe’s adjustment to Japan’s China policy both complies with the demands made by all walks of life in Japan, but also reflects his pragmatic thinking on diplomacy. Prior to his China visit, Abe made this statement to Chinese media: “China’s development presents a huge opportunity not only to Japan, but to the world as whole.”2 During his visit, he stated that the Belt and Road Initiative had great potential, and Japan was willing to strengthen cooperation with China

1 “Ten of Prime Ministers Who Ruined Japan,”Weekly Post, August 17-24 (2018): 57. 2 Liu Junguo,“Zhongguo de fazhan shi juda de jiyu [China’s development provides a huge opportunity],”Huanqiu shibao [Global times], October 24, 2018.

CIR May/June 2019 115 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu across a variety of areas, including jointly exploiting the third-party market. Japanese Foreign Ministry officials said that“cooperation with [the Belt and Road Initiative] now is in the best interests of Japan.”1 In September 2018, Japanese Foreign Minister Taro Tono averred that“we embrace the benign effects brought about by China’s participation in the global economy,”putting forth the belief that“both Japan and China bear a great common responsibility in ensuring peace, stability and prosperity.”2 From these and other official remarks, it is clear that the broad prospect shown in China’s Belt and Road Initiative is the key factor forcing Abe to adjust Japan’s policy toward China, as will not only create mutual benefit and win-win scenarios through cooperation to exploit third-party markets but will also increase mutual trust and promote increased cooperation, in addition to which Japan will have more room to maneuver in spite of the uncertainty of Trump’s policy toward Japan, as well as having more space for diplomatic action. Therefore, whether in the interest of Japanese enterprises or due to the strategic considerations of the Japanese government, there is a strong endogenous driving force in Japan to improve relations with China. Moreover, because the current international economic order has been negatively affected, Japan is also facing pressure resulting from US trade protectionism, for which Japan must expand its diplomatic room for maneuver and increase its bargaining power against the US while improving relations with China. Deepening economic and trade cooperation with China will undoubtedly reduce the trend of unilateralism and anti-globalization promoted by the US. For most Chinese and Japanese citizens, friendly relations between the two countries are, without a doubt, something to cheer, because the two countries are geographically close, have similar cultures, and attract each other’s interest. Nonetheless, many obstacles must be overcome if the

1“Economic Emphasis on Avoiding Concerns,”Asashi Shimbun, July 20, 2018. 2 “Riben waixiang zai mei muxiao yanjiang, yu shixian richao bangjiao zhengchanghua [Speech made by the Japanese foreign minister at the alma mater in the US, expressing Japan’s intention to normalize relations with North Korea],” Kyodo News, accessed October 15, 2018, https://china.kyodonews.net/news/2018/09 /2dea631f5899.html.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 116 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship

Sino-Japanese relationship is to become solid, which will urge Japanese politicians to aim high and look toward the horizon, staying clear of the clouds that could cover their eyes to ensure that the Sino-Japanese relationship will always continue to sail in the direction indicated by the four political documents. China has always attached great importance to promoting a strategic relationship of reciprocity between China and Japan, which underlines the basic belief that China and Japan should strengthen the development of their mutually beneficial cooperation on the bilateral, regional, and international levels in a comprehensive way, making joint contributions to regional and world peace. Thus, the two countries can pursue their common interest while also achieving their separate goals to advance their bilateral relationship to new heights.1 To reach this goal, China and Japan should focus on the following to develop their relationship. First, it should be a goal to boost mutual political trust and expand areas of communication. Electoral politics and party interests in Japan have led to the fragility and sensitivity of a great many issues between China and Japan, which may have a large impact on their overall bilateral relations if these are handled imprudently. They should autonomously circumvent the political risk that would influence their mutual trust, enhance self-discipline, and broaden the political consensus. Building a constructive Sino-Japanese relationship calls for work from both sides and for refraining from groundless accusations. Not long ago, in the new 2018 National Defense Program Outline issued by the Abe administration, Japan, self-styled as an international spokesman, promoted the so-called China Threat Theory. Moreover, as the tensions in the South China Sea have been relaxing and China’s relationships with the ASEAN countries are improving, with all concerned making efforts to mitigate their disagreements in a constructive way, Abe echoed a US perspective, pointing a finger at China, asserting that“Japan opposes any unilateral change of status quo that threatens the interests of the countries in the

1 Liu Jiangyong, Zhongri guanxi ershi jiang [Twenty lectures on the Sino-Japanese relations] (Zhongguo renmin daxue chubanshe [China Renmin University press], 2007), 326.

CIR May/June 2019 117 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu region,”and putting forward a commitment to continue providing second-hand defense equipment to countries in the region. Following the promotion of unilateralism and trade protectionism by the US, the uncertainty of the international situation suddenly increased, and negative effects of this suddenly appeared, Japan could hardly hold itself aloof. As a result, China and Japan should face a new international political and economic situation, founded on the basis of the four political documents to build consensus, formulate a cooperative vision that would be of long-term significance to their bilateral relations, and further plan the development of these relations. Second, Japan and China should deepen mutual cooperation in exploiting the third-party market and each give full play to the respective advantages of both. Chinese and Japanese enterprises have already begun cooperating on some autonomous projects in Africa and the , and members of Japanese business circles have positively responded to China’s Belt and Road Initiative on many occasions in recent years, all of which may reasonably be taken as a basis for cooperation. China has upheld the principle of mutual consultation, joint construction, and co-sharing in its initiative, and this should also be taken as the guiding principle for cooperation between the two countries. Both China and Japan enjoy unique comparative advantages of their own in promoting global industrial cooperation, which are best exploited together. Therefore, China and Japan should engage in cooperation, and both will benefit. Meanwhile, the Sino-Japanese cooperation to exploit the third-party market should not be limited to certain individual cases or projects, but concentrate on long-term projects and accumulating actual results instead, gradually mitigating their suspicions of each other, and promote a synergy of their respective strategies for regional cooperation. During Abe’s visit to China, the two countries held a forum on cooperation to jointly exploit the third-party market, in which local governments, financial institutions, and enterprises from both signed more than 50 cooperative agreements among themselves, with a total investment volume of more than US$18 billion. The scale of the cooperation between China and Japan is so large it encompasses so many individual agreements, it has such broad, and there is so much governmental involvement that it is an unprecedented arrangement in the

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 118 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship histories of the two countries. Importantly, the active participation of Japan in China’s Belt and Road Initiative could indicate that Japan would no longer be forced to look to the US for protection and enhancement of its major national interests. Third, mitigation of the contradictions and disputes between China and Japan with a calm and pragmatic attitude should be a priority, and a benign environment should be created for the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship. Person-to-person exchanges between China and Japan are growing. In 2017, there were more than 7 million visitors or tourists who traveled from mainland China to Japan, and if those from Japan to China are included, the number would break the 10 million mark. Currently, positive factors are growing in Sino-Japanese relations, and both side maintain the intention to improve their relationship. However, potential deep contradictions are only in abeyance for the time being, such that it is impossible that the Sino-Japanese relationship will take a substantial turn for the better over the short term. From a long-term point of view, if the Japan-US relationship does not change and Japan’s attitude toward China is not corrected, the strategic contest between the two is not past, and the external factors that affect the Sino-Japanese relationship do not disappear, these will undoubtedly be reflected in the diplomatic and security policies of the Japanese government, making contradiction and frictions remain part of the Sino-Japanese relationship. To respond to this potential, the two sides should strengthen policy communication in a rational and pragmatic manner, consulting with each other on specific issues through various mechanisms of dialogue and constructively managing and controlling disagreements rather than treating them carelessly, to prevent the negativity of certain factors from affecting the overall Sino-Japanese relationship, and maintaining the holistic benign status quo. During the Abe administration, the Sino-Japanese relationship has experienced ups and downs. In the future, whoever takes the reign in Japan must face contradictions and disputes leftover from history, which can hardly be evaded, and maintenance of the political basis for the Sino-Japanese relationship remains a precondition that cannot be evaded. Politicians with a broad strategic vision and a pragmatic are of great importance in this

CIR May/June 2019 119 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship

Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu relation. Of course, one cannot pin one’s hope of the development of the Sino-Japanese relationship on a specific party, or on a small group of politicians, but it can rest on the common interests of both countries. After Premier Li Keqiang’s visit to Japan, Abe said to the media that“the Sino-Japanese relationship is back on the normal track,”1 which is both his judgment of the current status quo and his expectation of the future. This round of adjustment of Abe’s China policy was forced by the situation and coordinately demanded by the interest of his governance, resulting in a positive move to take the initiative and adapt to changes in the internal and external situation that would fully reflect his pursuit of a foreign policy that could highlight actual gains.2 Through this round of policy adjustment, Abe has sought to put Japan’s relations with China back on a pragmatic track, which one hopes will keep the Sino-Japanese relationship relatively stable over the next two years, if not longer.

(edited by Li Xin)

1 “Prime Minister’s Confident about Sino-Japan Relationship: ‘Return to Perfectly Normal Orbit’,”Sanke Shimbun, September 2, 2018. 2 About Abe’s thinking on pragmatic diplomacy, see Wang Shan,“Anbei duihua zhengce de tiaozheng yu zhongri guanxi [Abe’s policy adjustment toward China and the Sino-Japanese relations],”Xiandai guoji guanxi [Contemporary international relations], No. 12 (2006): 49-51.

CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 120