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Japan's Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu* Abstract: With Shinzō Abe’s re-election as the president of Japan’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the LDP regime appears to have entered on a stable trend of long-term governance. This also marks a later phase of the Abe administration has solidified its later phase, following Abe’s second rise to power. The supremacy of the LDP and the administration of the basket of economic policies termed Abenomics have produced initial effects, and the overall climate of political opinion in Japan remains largely conservative, all factors favorable the continuance of Abe’s regime. A major task in the future to cement Abe’s political legacy would be amendment of Japan’s pacifist constitution. Abe’s political and security policies are likely not to change, namely, the promotion of multilateral cooperation in the US-Japan alliance, a moderate adjustment of Japan’s China policy, and a return to utilitarian diplomacy to maximize Japan’s national interests. Thanks to the return of the Sino-Japanese relationship to the right track, the healthy development of bilateral relations depends on the consolidation of the political foundation, deepening mutually beneficial cooperation, and constructively managing and controlling disagreement. Keywords: Japanese politics，Sino-Japanese relationship，Abe administration， foreign strategy Wang Shan is a research professor of the Institute for Japanese Studies, CICIR, whose research mainly focuses on Japanese politics, diplomacy, and the Sino-Japanese relations; Meng Xiaoxu is a professor from the Department of International Politics, University of International Relations (UIR), whose research mainly focuses on domestic politics and foreign policy of Japan. This paper derives from the initial findings of a research project entitled A Research on Japan’s Indo-Pacific Strategy and China’s Responses, funded by the 2018 Basic Research Fund of the Central Universities (Project Number: 3262018T32). CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 96 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship n the September 2018 election for the president of the Liberal IDemocratic Party (LDP) Shinzō Abe won an unsurprising third consecutive victory since his return to power. Barring unforeseen circumstances, Abe will remain in power until September 2021 and become the longest-serving prime minister of Japan since the end of the Second World War. However, Abe’s term in office has also been the most controversial of that of any Japanese prime minister; his domestic and foreign policies have not only broken free from Japan’s established post-war system, but they have also shown his personal style of governance, characterized as forceful, greedy for power, ably cultivating small and powerful inner circles, and deft in the manipulation of public opinion. The most likely developments in the Abe administration and Japanese politics will lead, the evolution of his diplomatic and security policies will evolve, and what these mean for future Sino-Japanese relations call for intensive study. The LDPWill Likely Remain in Power It is now the eighth year since Abe came to power again in 2012. The foundation of his administration is relatively solid, witnessing little challenge from the opposition or from within his party. During this period, although it has been beset with scandals of various kinds, Abe has been able to evade serious danger, and the ruling position of the LDP has been consolidated. The factors prompting the LDP government are obviously growing in importance, but they provide a different basis than the internal and external environment that the LDP enjoyed under the Gojugonen Taisei (The 1955 System). The current factors reflect contemporary characteristics, which can be discussed in the following three aspects. I. The political ecology of Japan bears new features that are conducive to the long-term stability of LDP power. First, the opposition parties are shrinking in size, and they have become fragmented, promoting different policies and reflecting varied interests, so they pose little counterweight to the LDP. International study of Japan once commonly referred to the two-party system of Japan. This characterization received a boost in 2009, when the leading opposition CIR May/June 2019 97 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu party, the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), came to power. Some scholars went so far as to categorically assert that the LDP and the DPJ would begin to take turns wielding power, leading to a political structure of checks and balances between the two parties that could offer a stable foundation for democratic politics. However, not only have Japanese opposition parties lost the fighting spirit they once had, but they have also become unable to provide any social governance solutions or develop clear policy propositions, resulting in a degraded political embellishment. Second, the environment of social opinion in Japan is, as a whole, tending in a conservative direction, as particularly demonstrated in elections. Voters do not aspire to something new or different, being satisfied with choosing the best of a bad lot, thus inevitably tacitly expressing consent to the chronic illness of the LDP’s politics, as illustrated over a period of years. Third, as the LDP has no strong political rivals, some LDP members of the Diet (Japan’s parliament) keep close watch on the mistakes of the Abe administration, only following Abe out of the need to win a national election, in spite of their awareness that the party has many weaknesses. As a result, the LDP exhibits an overwhelming political complacency,1 which has allowed Abe’s willful determination and headstrong governing style. In the run-up to the most recent presidential election for the LDP, Abe succeeded in persuading inner-party power figures such as Fumio Kishida and Seiko Noda to give up their intention to run for party presidency. Before the election in September 2018, Abe expressed his willingness to engage in an open-minded debate with his opponents, and regarding the formation of his new cabinet, he promised to maintain as a policy objective that the most talented people be allowed to express their talents. However, 1 The election of the House of Representatives in Japan is based on a system of proportional representation of small constituencies. Any one from the party running for election should obtain recognition of the Central Committee of the LDP and recommendation from the constituency he or she represents. At the same time, they can get funds from the party for their election campaigns, but the right for granting such funds is in the hands of people at top of the LDP. As a result, though the Representatives have the responsibility and mission to represent the public opinion and act in the public interests, they have to keep in line with the party bosses if they want to get elected or reelected. Seiichiro Murakami,“The Era of the National Mobilization Act Comes,”Monthly Nippon, No. 10 (2018)：40. CIR Vol. 29 No. 3 98 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino-Japanese Relationship as was discovered by the Japanese news media revealed, those within the party who supported Shigeru Ishiba, the former Secretary-General of the LDP and the only contestant against Abe for party presidency, were suppressed by pro-Abe forces, who, for example, threatened to force the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fishery Saitou Ken to resign if he supported Ishiba.1 Abe’s new cabinet includes loyalists who can further strengthen his hand within the party and in national administration. Abe has also placed former Defense Minister Tomomi Inada, who had previously resigned due to her involvement in a cover-up scandal, in a high position within the party, becoming the executive deputy secretary-general of the LDP. Tomomi is a firm supporter of Abe, both sharing similar political ideas with him and in a mutually appreciative relationship. Abe’s placement of Tomomi in a high position within the party was done to capitalize on her influence in the right wing to promote his policy propositions for institutional amendment. To keep his campaign promises, Abe appointed Takashi Yamashita, a member of the Ishiba faction, as the minister of justice, to help balance party factions and resolve disturbances in public opinion. II. Abenomics has produced positive effects in macroeconomic regulation and control. Abe has centered his views of economic policy, often referred to by the shorthand Abenomics. Although these policies have been met with both praise and criticism in academia, it does appear that it was an effective means to bring the economy out of deflation, which is surely its foremost achievement. Statistics produced by the Ministry of Internal Affairs indicate an increase in the consumer price index from August to October of 2018 of 1.2-1.4 percent year-on-year. In addition, corporate earnings have also increased significantly, unemployment improved, and the stock market is soaring. Although the Moritomo Gakuen (Moritomo School) and Kake Gakuen (Kake School) scandals and the data fraud perpetrated by the Ministry of Finance have led to a certain extent of loss in the approval rate 1 An Exclusive Interview with General Secretary Shigeru Ishiba,“Mr. Abe Can’t Tell the Future,”Asashi Shimbun Weekly AERA, October 8, 2018, 58. CIR May/June 2019 99 Japan’s Political Development in the Later Period of the Abe Administration and the Sino- Japanese Relationship Wang Shan and Meng Xiaoxu of the Abe administration, it has not been seriously damaged, as the stability of the economy and the stock market has played an important part in the administration’s support.
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