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Thesis Submitted for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Bath PHD Empathy for education: a naturalist utilitarian argument Walters, Timothy Award date: 2016 Awarding institution: University of Bath Link to publication Alternative formats If you require this document in an alternative format, please contact: [email protected] General rights Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the public portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognise and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights. • Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the public portal for the purpose of private study or research. • You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain • You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the public portal ? Take down policy If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact us providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and investigate your claim. Download date: 27. Sep. 2021 Empathy for education: a naturalist utilitarian argument Timothy John Walters A thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Bath Department of Education June 2015 COPYRIGHT Attention is drawn to the fact that copyright of this thesis rests with the author. A copy of this thesis has been supplied on condition that anyone who consults it is understood to recognise that its copyright rests with the author and that they must not copy it or use material from it except as permitted by law or with the consent of the author. This thesis may be available for consultation within the University Library and may be photocopied or lent to other libraries for the purposes of consultation with effect from 1 June 2015. Signed on behalf of the Department of Education of the University of Bath Table of Contents Chapter 1: Introduction 1.1. The core argument 11 1.2. Overview of the scope and sequence of this work: Three EfE accounts 16 1.2.1 Philosophical/normative (“should”) accounts (Chapters 2 – 5) 17 1.2.2. Empirical (“can”) accounts (Chapter 6) 19 1.2.3. Narrative or “how” accounts (Chapters 7 - 9) 21 1.3. A moral life narrative experience in Cambodia 23 1.3.1. History education in Cambodia 25 1.3.2. The workshop: Narrative and empathy 26 1.3.3. Moral autonomy and helplessness 29 1.4. The Perceived Crisis in Moral Education 31 1.5. EfE in Moral Education: the Philosophy of Education Discourse 33 (Five Debates) 1.5.1. Empathy or Virtue as a Core Value for Moral Education? 34 1.5.2. Moral Education for a Multicultural Context 38 2 1.5.3. Moral Inquiry or Moral Formation? 38 1.5.4. The Future of Education: Human, Natural or Neuroscience? 41 1.5.5. Narrative and "Educating the Emotions" 46 Chapter 2: A Pluralist Philosophical Naturalism 2.1. The Role of Philosophical Naturalism in this Research 48 2.2. Philosophical Naturalisms 53 2.2.1. Papineau’s Physicalism 57 2.3. Midgley’s Objections to Naturalism 58 2.4. Supervenience and Reduction 62 2.5. Dewey’s “Half-Hearted Naturalism” 64 2.6. Scruton’s Cognitive Dualism and Aesthetic Experience 67 2.7. Contemporary Pluralist Compromise 69 2.8. Hume’s Naturalism and Relevance to this Research 71 2.8.1. Hume’s Sceptical/Sentimental Project 74 2.9. Contemporary Perspectives on Affect and Intuition 77 2.9.1. Embodied Brains in Embedded Bodies 78 2.10. Reduction and Physicalism 80 3 Chapter 3: Empathy and Moral Realism 3.1. The Role of Moral Realism in this Research 82 3.2. (Moral) Realism and (Philosophical) Naturalism 83 3.3. From Scientific to Moral Realism 84 3.4. Railton’s Ethical Naturalism 85 3.5. Moral Principles and Reality 85 3.6. Pluralist Good and Monist Right 86 Chapter 4: A Classical Utilitarian Normative Ethical Theory 4.1. The Importance of Utilitarian Normative Theory to this Research 90 4.2. Utilitarianism and Empirical Construals of Moral Cognition 91 4.3. Bentham’s Utilitarianism 94 4.4. Against Singer’s Utilitarianism 95 4.4.1. Singer’s Unconditional Proscription of Partiality is Unrealistic 95 4.4.2. Singer’s Account of Moral Psychology is too Ambitious Overall 100 4.4.3. Singer’s Account of Moral Psychology is Unrealistically Rationalist 103 4.4.4. Singer’s Asocial Construal 105 4 4.5. Moral Equality and Partiality in Classical and Contemporary Utilitarianism 106 4.5.1. Bentham and Mill on Moral Equality and Partiality 106 4.5.2. Singer on Moral Equality and Partiality 109 Chapter 5: Objections to Utilitarianism 5.1. The Primary Objections Introduced 111 5.2. Utilitarianism Especially Endorses Pursuit of Base or Superficial Pleasures 112 5.3. Utilitarianism is Unjust and Potentially Tyrannical 116 5.3.1. Some Initial Points on “The Tyranny of the Majority” 116 5.3.2. Nozick’s “Utility Monster” 117 5.4. Tyranny and “Security” 119 5.5. Mill on Tyranny 121 5.6. Bentham on Tyranny 123 5.7. Utilitarianism Entails “Boundless Moral Obligation” 124 Chapter 6: Convergent Construals of Moral Cognition 6.1. The Goals and Design of this Chapter 129 6.2. Defining the “Affective Revolution” (AR) 129 5 6.3. “Revolution” and Hyperbole: “Moral Molecules” and “Mind-Reading” Neurons 130 6.4. The “Revolution” in Historical Context 132 6.5. Moral Cognition and the Possibility of Change 133 6.6. An Interdisciplinary Overview of AR 133 6.6.1. Behavioural Business Ethics/Behavioural Finance 134 6.6.2. Emerging and Traditional Models of Economic Behaviour 135 6.6.3. Rational Models and Efficient Markets 136 6.6.4. A More Social Economic Model 137 6.7. Haidt’s Model of Adaptive Morality 139 6.8. Disgust, “Moral Dumbfounding” and Arational Moral Cognition 139 6.9. Haidt’s Social Intuitionist Ethics 141 6.10. Greene’s Dual Process Model of Moral Cognition 142 6.10.1. Greene on “Me versus Us” and “Us versus Them” 143 6.11. The Normativity of Greene’s “Deep Pragmatism” 146 6.11.1. “Action Tendencies” and Moral Motivation 147 6.12. Moral Narrative and/in Batson’s Empathy-Altruism Hypothesis 148 6.13. Against Batson: Cialdini on Self-in-Other Merging 149 6 Chapter 7: Life as Narrative 7.1. The Goals and Design of this Chapter 153 7.2. Life and Narrative 153 7.2.1. Bruner on Life as Narrative 153 7.2.2. Hardy: Narrative as “Primary Act of Mind” 155 7.3. Nussbaum and Gadamer on Literature, Education and Insight 156 7.4. MacIntyre: Narrative and Life Unity 158 7.5. Lamarque on The Limitations of Narrative 160 7.5.1. “Narratives are Necessarily Selective and Perspectival” 160 7.5.2. “Narrative is often Prosaic and Trivial” 164 Chapter 8: Moral Life Narrative Education 8.1. The Goals and Design of this Chapter 165 8.2. Assessing the “Moral” in Moral Life Narrative 165 8.3. Tappan and Brown on “Authorship” as Moral Development 166 8.4. Stories and Empathy-building: Contemporary examples 168 8.5. The Utilitarian Basis of Empathy 169 7 8.5.1. Utilitarianism and the Moral Emotions 169 8.5.2. Empathy from Utility 170 Chapter 9: Realism, Rationalism and Contemporary Moral Education 9.1. The Goals and Design of this Chapter 173 9.2. Kohlberg’s Model of Cognitive Moral Development 175 9.2.1. “Progress” from Affective to Rational Moral Judgment 177 9.3. (Anti-Realist) Values Clarification 182 9.4. Kirschenbaum on Value Neutrality 183 9.5. Character Education and Socialisation 185 9.6. Gibbs’ New Synthesis 188 9.6.1. Gibbs’ Critique of Haidt 190 9.6.2. From Affect-led to Story-led 197 Chapter 10: Stories for Thinking 10.1. The Goals and Design of this Chapter 199 10.2. “Vivid and Memorable” Learning 200 10.3. Egan on Useful Abstraction 200 8 10.4. Philosophy for Children and “Caring Thinking” 201 10.5. Fisher on Learner Construction and Useful Innuendo 204 10.6. “Humanising Stories” and Empathy 205 11. Conclusions 206 Bibliography 209 9 Abstract In this work I argue that opportunities exist to develop frameworks for moral or empathy education (hereafter EfE) more consistent with emerging understandings of the way we arrive at moral judgments. I argue that a rapidly evolving construal of moral judgment is more accurate than (still influential) rationalist accounts. The essence of this shifting perspective is a construal of moral judgment as characterised by (1) "primacy of affect" and (2) heightened emphasis on the socially embedded nature of moral judgments. While variously compatible with long established traditions in moral philosophy (particularly the moral sense theories of, inter alia, David Hume or Adam Smith) this distinct view of human moral nature is emerging across a range of empirical disciplines with renewed vigour and enhanced empirical support. Moral psychology and neuroscience play leading, but not exclusive, roles in this emphatically interdisciplinary process. Shifting paradigms in economics, anthropology, and moral psychology are converging on strikingly similar construals of human moral nature. I will argue that the potential of these insights to explain and justify particular approaches to teaching and learning have yet to be fully exploited in contemporary moral education discourse. It will be argued that encouraging the development of dispositional empathy in learners is a choice-worthy and attainable goal of EfE. EfE approaches used to elicit affective/empathic responses and social reflection, such as moral life narrative and other storytelling techniques, comport with emerging views of moral experience and judgment. It is argued that these approaches are, therefore, potentially more effective than rationality-centred systems given a goal of increased dispositional empathy.
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