DOCSLIB.ORG

NATO's Triple Challenge

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
NATO's Triple Challenge NATO’s triple challenge STUART CROFT, JOLYON HOWORTH, TERRY TERRIFF AND MARK WEBBER* NATO seems to be the pre-eminent security organization for twenty-first- century Europe. It is moving to reorganize itself to meet the challenges of the post-Cold War world. Arguably, it has fought a war successfully, and played a role in peace-building in south-eastern Europe. And it is the recipient of demands for entry from an increasing number of states. But NATO’s pre- eminence is extraordinarily fragile. Relations with Moscow have been at best strained; questions arise over the military implications of the alliance’s restructuring; and ‘ten years after the Berlin Wall came down, the spectre of decoupling is once again haunting trans-Atlantic relations’.1 The rise of NATO to its current pre-eminence throughout the 1990s is a remarkable tale of survival and development in adverse conditions. Briefly, this pattern can be illustrated by looking at snapshots of the situations faced by senior policy-makers at each of NATO’s fully post-Cold War summits. In November 1991, the Rome summit endorsed a New Strategic Concept and a political direction for NATO which, although conservative, seemed to meet the changed needs of Europe. The Concept was, however, immediately swept away by the Soviet collapse. NATO also appeared increasingly inadequate in *light of a policy of non-differentiation in which it formally sought to treat states such as Poland and Kyrgyzstan on equal terms. By January 1994 the Brussels sum- mit was casting around for a role for NATO, and was unable to form a consensus around immediate enlargement/projection of stability, a substantive role in former Yugoslavia, or a NATO-endorsed policy of counterproliferation.2 By the 1997 Madrid summit the alliance was divided over whom to admit to NATO, and when, and was beginning to recognize the urgency of safeguarding cordial * The authors acknowledge research support provided by the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) for the project on ‘Security governance in Europe’ (Project Grant L213252008), part of the ESRC ‘One Europe or several?’ programme. The authors also acknowledge financial support from the Universities of Bath, Birmingham and Loughborough. This article is based in part on two visits to NATO and the EU at the end of 1999 and the beginning of 2000. Thanks are owed to those who gave of their time during this field work. 1 Ivo H. Daalder, ‘Europe and America aren’t divorcing’, Wall Street Journal Europe, 10 Dec. 1999. 2 Despite the problems in 1994, the summit was still significant in that it launched both ESDI and PfP. On the sense of crisis at the time, see Bruce George and John Borawski, ‘Sympathy for the devil: European security in a revolutionary age’, European Security 2: 4, Winter 1993. International Affairs 76, () ‒ 76_3_05_Croft 495 9/6/00, 1:34 pm Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber relations with Moscow. And the fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington was dominated by ill-concealed divisions over the Kosovo war and an apparent reluctance by the political leadership to accept the military argument that a ground war had to be considered and planned, if not executed. The development of NATO as an institution throughout the 1990s was therefore a tale of evolution against trying external and internal circumstances. It is not possible to tell a story of a clear strategic purpose being identified for the alliance which was then implemented over successive years. The alliance has been rocked by the storms of European politics and security; but, despite that, to date it has avoided being wrecked on the rocks. This seafaring metaphor can be pushed a little further. The reason why the alliance’s pre-eminence is so fragile is that the good ship NATO has not yet been able to sail sufficiently far out to sea to find deep water in which to ride out storms. Trouble, once it inevitably comes, thus always threatens to run the ship on to the rocky shoreline. In other words, each crisis seems to have within it the seeds of NATO’s demise. The key characteristic of NATO as a political organi- zation continues to seem to be, not robustness, but on the contrary, political fragility. This is apparent in the three fundamental challenges facing the alliance at the beginning of the twenty-first century. First, increasingly, NATO is playing a role in developing a zone of security in Europe; but, however unwillingly, the alliance is facing the problem of inclusion (whom, how and when to admit) and, even more problematically, of exclusion. How can Serbia and, of course, more significantly Russia, be engaged fully in the new security politics of Europe? If such states are to be excluded, then NATO will inevitably play a key role in dividing the continent, despite all the pledges by key Western policy- makers to the contrary. Second, while many Europeans might agree, as Kupchan and Zoellick have persuasively argued, that ‘a stronger Europe and a more balanced Atlantic partnership, far from threatening the western alliance, will ensure its integrity and viability’,3 the Europeanization of the alliance is seen by many in Washington as the harbinger of transatlantic decoupling. This is a particular problem for non-EU members of NATO. As Omur Orhun of the Turkish foreign ministry put it, ‘from a Turkish perspective, the preservation of the transatlantic link is of vital importance’.4 Despite Europe’s woeful contri- bution to the Kosovo war in military terms, and despite decades of American badgering over burden-sharing, this is the context of a debate over increasing the military potential of the alliance’s members. Third, how can the alliance appropriately adapt itself in military terms to the new challenges? If the policy of military intensification is unpersuasive, then NATO will be a less effective military instrument in the future. These three challenges faced by NATO at the beginning of the twenty-first 3 Charles A. Kupchan and Robert B. Zoellick, ‘It can be lonely at the top’, Financial Times, 13 Dec. 1999. 4 Cited in Peter Finn, ‘Six in NATO upset over EU corps plan’, Washington Post, 9 April 2000, p. A16. Orhun is director general of international security affairs in the Turkish ministry of foreign affairs. 496 76_3_05_Croft 496 9/6/00, 1:34 pm NATO’s triple challenge century are profound, and are framed by the political fragility of the alliance, appearances to the contrary notwithstanding. In short, the stakes are high. Apparent failure in any of these three areas will undermine the alliance’s political credibility, a scenario that senior policy-makers have sought to avoid for over fifty years. The good ship NATO is still navigating through the rocks; but if there is apparent success in these three areas, there is every prospect that the ship will be able to steer into those deeper, calmer, although not necessarily safer, waters.5 This article examines the triple challenges that sit on NATO’s agenda. It seeks to identify the parameters of each challenge; the nature of the alliance’s response; and possible ways forward. Alliance membership: inclusion and exclusion NATO’s impact on the ordering of security relations throughout the wider Europe has, in the post-Cold War period, been truly historic. This has brought with it, however, a dual challenge, that of exclusion and inclusion. Two issues are central in this respect: NATO’s relationship with Russia; and a possible further enlargement of the alliance. In the wake of the Kosovo crisis and the ‘first wave’ of enlargement into central Europe, NATO has embraced—at least for the short to medium term—an incremental and consolidationist approach. The management of relations with Russia is among the most difficult of NATO’s current political tasks. Relations have, in fact, been troubled for some time. The circumstances surrounding Russia’s delayed entry into the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme in 1994–5, contradictory interpretations of the significance of the 1997 NATO–Russia Founding Act, and Russia’s condemnation of NATO enlargement created an atmosphere of increasing suspicion and distance even before the 1999 Kosovo crisis. Throughout these difficulties the two sides did manage to maintain some semblance of meaningful interaction. Russia was a real (albeit self-limiting) participant in PfP; it had also undertaken a generally well-regarded role in SFOR in Bosnia; and, although not entirely happy with the operational limitations of the Permanent Joint Council (PJC), it was, through this body, a willing interlocutor with NATO on issues ranging from peacekeeping to international terrorism. The launch of Operation Allied Force in March 1999, however, stalled these efforts as Moscow, in protest, withdrew from both the PJC and PfP. The decisiveness of this Russian response reflected, arguably, a wider dissatisfaction at the state of its relations with the NATO powers more generally over issues as diverse as Caspian basin energy exploitation, the ABM Treaty and sanctions against Iraq. Yet Moscow also, of course, had a number of more specific causes for complaint. These are worth noting here, because they illustrate some of the 5 There are many ways in which NATO could reach such stability, ranging from a consensus behind continued American leadership to accepting a stronger role for the EU, or even the OSCE, and hence an end to NATO predominance in European security structures. 497 76_3_05_Croft 497 9/6/00, 1:34 pm Stuart Croft, Jolyon Howorth, Terry Terriff and Mark Webber weaknesses of NATO’s efforts to establish a meaningful institutional basis for its relations with Russia. Foremost in this respect is the perception that NATO’s action meant a marginalization of Russia’s role in European security.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Nato Enlargement
    Committee Reports POLITICAL SUB-COMMITTEE ON CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE REPORT NATO ENLARGEMENT Bert Koenders (Netherlands) International Secretariat Rapporteur October 2001 CONTENTS I. INTRODUCTION: NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PRIORITIES FOR THE ALLIANCE II. NATO'S LAST ENLARGEMENT ROUND - LESSONS LEARNED A. CONTRIBUTION OF NEW MEMBERS TO EUROPEAN SECURITY B. THE MEMBERSHIP ACTION PLAN (MAP) III. STATUS OF PREPARATIONS OF THE NINE APPLICANT COUNTRIES A. ALBANIA B. BULGARIA C. ESTONIA D. LATVIA E. LITHUANIA F. THE FORMER YUGOSLAV REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA G. ROMANIA H. SLOVAKIA I. SLOVENIA IV. FURTHER NATO ENLARGEMENT AND SECURITY IN THE EURO- ATLANTIC AREA A. RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA B. RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE V. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND EU ENLARGEMENT VI. CONCLUSIONS VII. APPENDIX I. INTRODUCTION: NATO ENLARGEMENT AND PRIORITIES FOR THE ALLIANCE 1. The security landscape in Europe has been radically altered since the fall of the Berlin Wall and the "velvet revolutions" of 1989 and 1990. Though the risk of an all-out confrontation between the Soviet-led Warsaw Pact and NATO no longer exists, pockets of instability, including military conflict, remain on the European continent. The debate on NATO enlargement has to be seen principally in the context of the transformation of NATO from a defence alliance into an organisation additionally charged with providing, or at least contributing to, comprehensive security. 2. NATO's adaptation to the changing security environment is mirrored in its opening up to the countries in Central and Eastern Europe. This has been reflected in the updating of the Strategic Concept, but also in a process that consists of developing and intensifying dialogue and co-operation with the members of the former Warsaw Pact.
    [Show full text]
  • 7.1 Defense Spending During the Cold War (1947-1991)
    Influencing NATO Shaping NATO Through U.S. Foreign Policy Justin Sing Masteroppgave Forsvarets høgskole Spring 2020 II *The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the the United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense. Summary An assessment of the influence of United States foreign policy impact on the decision of NATO members to formally accept policies which align with U.S. strategic goals. The assessment looks at the National Security Strategy and Defense Strategic documents of each United States Presidential Administration following the end of the Cold War to determine changes to U.S. commitment to NATO and the resultant changes to Alliance force posture and defense spending agreements. The paper also assesses the impacts of U.S. Administration changes in rhetoric, and of U.S. direct military action in specific NATO-led operations against the resultant decision of NATO members to accede to U.S. demands for increased defense spending. III *The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not reflect the position of the the United States Marine Corps, Department of the Navy, or the Department of Defense. Table of Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 1 2 Method ............................................................................................................................ 3 3 United States Historical Perspective of the
    [Show full text]
  • The Nato-Russia Council and Changes in Russia's Policy
    THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL AND CHANGES IN RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS NATO A THESIS SUBMITTED TO THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES OF MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY BY BEISHENBEK TOKTOGULOV IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS SEPTEMBER 2015 Approval of the Graduate School of Social Sciences Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık Director I certify that this thesis satisfies all the requirements as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı Head of Department This is to certify that we have read this thesis and that in our opinion it is fully adequate, in scope and quality, as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever Supervisor Examining Committee Members Prof. Dr. Meliha Altunışık (METU,IR) Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever (METU,IR) Prof. Dr. Hüseyin Bağcı (METU,IR) Prof. Dr. Fırat Purtaş (GU,IR) Assist. Prof. Dr. Taylan Özgür Kaya (NEU,IR) ii PLAGIARISM I hereby declare that all information in this document has been obtained and presented in accordance with academic rules and ethical conduct. I also declare that, as required by these rules and conduct, I have fully cited and referenced all material and results that are not original to this work. Name, Last name : Beishenbek Toktogulov Signature : iii ABSTRACT THE NATO-RUSSIA COUNCIL AND CHANGES IN RUSSIA’S POLICY TOWARDS NATO Toktogulov, Beishenbek Ph.D., Department of International Relations Supervisor: Prof. Dr. Oktay F. Tanrısever September 2015, 298 pages The objective of this thesis is to explain the changes in Russia’s policy towards NATO after the creation of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) in 2002.
    [Show full text]
  • Jolyon Howorth & Vivien Schmidt
    EU GLOBAL STRATEGY 50 ExperT Opinion Jolyon Howorth & Vivien Schmidt Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University Professor of International Relations, Boston University There is a danger in making the strategic review hope to achieve in the neighbourhood – including too complex. There is merit in recalling the par- the neighbours of the neighbours. The geograph- simonious interpretation of the world that has ic focus is important. The EU is a global trading inspired realists: system anarchy; the fundamen- actor and a key partner of the UN; but in terms tal role of states; the centrality of the distribution of the deployment of crisis management power, of power; balance of power. Indeed, power itself. it should not for the foreseeable future aspire to be anything other than a regional power. These basics remain the© crucialEU Institute forelements Security Studies, of 2015. inter | QN-AL-15-00X-2A-N- | ISBN 978-92-9198-258-5 | ISSN 2315-1129 | DOI 10.2815/77528 national relations. The currencies the EU prefers What might the EU hope to achieve in the neigh- – multilateralism, international law, international bourhood? Lucidity about the EU’s real leverage institutions, diplomacy, soft and smart power – is essential. If EU accession is not on the cards, have all come into their own since 1945 and they leverage is massively reduced. The most the EU have a vital role to play. But there should be no can hope to do in the southern neighbourhood is illusions: positive sum aspirations have not re- to assist local and regional political initiatives aimed placed zero-sum realities.
    [Show full text]
  • The Prague Summit and Nato's Transformation
    THE PRAGUE SUMMIT AND NATO’S TRANSFORMATION NATO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY DIVISION 1110 Brussels - Belgium Web site: www.nato.int E-mail: [email protected] A READER’S GUIDE THE PRAGUE SUMMIT AND NATO’S TRANSFORMATION SUMMIT AND NATO’S THE PRAGUE PRARGENG0403 A READER’S GUIDE TABLE OF CONTENTS PREFACE 3 I THE SUMMIT DECISIONS 9 II KEY ISSUES 19 New members: Expanding the zone of security 20 New capabilities: Adapting to modern challenges 26 New relationships: Practical cooperation and dialogue 34 After Prague: The road ahead 67 © NATO 2003 NATO INVITEES Country* Capital Population GDP Defence Active Troop *Data based on (million) (billion expenditures Strength national sources Euros) (million Euros) Bulgaria (25) Sofia 7.8 16.9 494 (2.9% GDP) 52 630 Estonia (27) Tallin 1.4 6.8 130 (1.9% GDP) 4 783 Latvia (33) Riga 2.3 8.8 156 (1.8% GDP) 9 526 Lithuania (34) Vilnius 3.5 14.5 290 (2.0% GDP) 17 474 Romania (36) Bucharest 22.3 47.9 1117 (2.3% GDP) 99 674 Slovakia (38) Bratislava 5.4 24.9 493 (2.0% GDP) 29 071 ★ Slovenia (39) Ljubljana 2.0 22.4 344 (1.5% GDP) 7 927 III DOCUMENTATION 71 Prague Summit Declaration – 21 November 2002 72 Prague Summit Statement on Iraq – 21 November 2002 78 Announcement on Enlargement – 21 November 2002 79 Report on the Comprehensive Review of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace - 21 November 2002 80 Partnership Action Plan Against Terrorism - 21 November 2002 87 Chairman’s Summary of the Meeting of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council at Summit Level – 22 November 2002 94 Statement by NATO
    [Show full text]
  • Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University
    Old Dominion University ODU Digital Commons Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Graduate Program in International Studies Dissertations Spring 2010 Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance Ergodan Kurt Old Dominion University Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds Part of the International Relations Commons Recommended Citation Kurt, Ergodan. "Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance" (2010). Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), dissertation, International Studies, Old Dominion University, DOI: 10.25777/4bgn-h798 https://digitalcommons.odu.edu/gpis_etds/75 This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate Program in International Studies at ODU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Program in International Studies Theses & Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ODU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE by Erdogan Kurt B.A. August 1996, Turkish Military Academy M.A. July 2001, Naval Postgraduate School A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY INTERNATIONAL STUDIES OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY May 2010 Approved by: ©2010 Erdogan Kurt. All rights reserved. ABSTRACT DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE Erdogan Kurt Old Dominion University, 2010 Director: Dr. Regina Karp This dissertation studies NATO expansion as institutional adaptation. More specifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between NATO's new functions and its enlargement.
    [Show full text]
  • A New Institutional Architecture for the Transatlantic Relationship?
    EuropeEurope VVisionsisions 55 A New Institutional Architecture for the Transatlantic Relationship? Jolyon Howorth June 2009 Ifri-Bruxelles The Institut français des relations internationales (Ifri) is a research center and a forum for debate on major international political and economic issues. Headed by Thierry de Montbrial since its founding in 1979, Ifri is a non governmental and a non-profit organization. As an independent think tank, Ifri sets its own research agenda, publishing its findings regularly for a global audience. Using an interdisciplinary approach, Ifri brings together political and economic decision-makers, researchers and internationally renowned experts to animate its debate and research activities. With offices in Paris and Brussels, Ifri stands out as one of the rare French think tanks to have positioned itself at the very heart of European debate. The opinions expressed in this text are the responsibility of the authors alone. ISBN : 978-2-86592-558-2 © All rights reserved, Ifri, 2009 IFRI IFRI-BRUXELLES 27 RUE DE LA PROCESSION RUE MARIE-THÉRÈSE, 21 75740 PARIS CEDEX 15, FRANCE 1000 - BRUXELLES, BELGIQUE PH. : +33 (0)1 40 61 60 00 PH. : + 32 (0)2 238 51 10 Email : [email protected] Email: [email protected] WEBSITE : Ifri.org Contents THE CRISIS OF TRANSATLANTIC RELATIONS ........................................ 2 NATO: P ART OF THE SOLUTION OR PART OF THE PROBLEM ?.............. 4 HISTORY IN FAST -FORWARD MODE ..................................................... 7 REVISED INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE & R ECOMMENDATIONS
    [Show full text]
  • Ivv), 1913 – 1945
    De Internationale van Amsterdam De Wereld van het Internationaal Vakverbond (IVV), 1913 – 1945. 1 Korte Inhoud Inleiding 1 De Wereld van het Internationaal Vakverbond 13 (Amsterdam, Berlijn, Parijs) De Verscheurende roep naar Internationale Eenheid 67 (De Rode Verleiding van het Internationaal Vakverbond) Ondergeschikte of Partner 96 (De moeilijke relatie tussen het IVV als koepel van nationale centrales en de beroepsinternationalen) Genève 114 (De IAO en het sociale hervormingsprogramma van het IVV) Seeking for Problems 135 (De vrouwenwerking van het IVV) Isolationisme of leiderschap 145 (De American Federation of Labor en het Internationaal Vakverbond) Een vrije vakbeweging in een wereld zonder vrijheid 165 (Het IVV tegen fascisme en nazisme) Voorbij het Internationaal vakverbond 196 (De weg naar het Wereldvakverbond) Under Cover 222 (De geheime diensten van de internationale vakbeweging) Conclusies 243 Acroniemen 252 Bijlagen 255 Bibliografie 257 2 Inleiding “The history of labor internationalism is a history of failure, of dreams disappointed, ideals compromised, and institutions corrupted” (Victor Silverman)1. Edo Fimmen had het al voorspeld in 1933 : “the judgement of history upon the labour movement in the years immediatly following the war, and especially upon the leaders of that movement, is not likely to be a merciful one.”2 In juli 1919 werd in Amsterdam het Internationaal Vakverbond (IVV) opgericht. Deze ‘Internationale van Amsterdam’3 verklaarde de oorlog aan de oorlog en wou de arbeiders bevrijden van het kapitalisme. Voor Edo Fimmen, een van de vaders van het IVV, was het al sinds 1923 duidelijk dat het anders zou lopen en hij drong lang maar tevergeefs aan op een meer daadkrachtige internationale vakbeweging.
    [Show full text]
  • France, NATO and ESDP: the Impossible Balancing
    France, NATO and European Security: Status Quo Unsustainable; New Balance Unattainable? Jolyon HOWORTH∗ In January 1947, British and French officials met to discuss draft versions of the Treaty of Dunkirk. A sticking point emerged over the precise conditions under which the proposed mutual defence clause could be invoked. For the French, the simple threat of territorial invasion should trigger British support. For the British, however, only an actual invasion could warrant the implementation of alliance solidarity. This seemingly arcane distinction already presaged the fundamental difference of strategic approach between Paris and London which was to result in fifty years of stalemate in European defence Cupertino. For the United Kingdom (U.K.), too strong a statement of European resolve risked demotivating the United States (U.S.) and encouraging U.S. isolationism. For France, a strong Europe was the logical prerequisite for a strong Alliance. Europe needed to balance U.S. power—in the interests of both parties. Thus, from the outset of the post-war period, France expressed confidence in Europe's ability to safeguard her own future, whereas Britain worried that the old continent could never be secure without the permanent entanglement of the new1. Contrary to a great deal of mythology, France was never opposed to the “involvement of the new”—indeed the mainstream of the political class, including Charles de Gaulle himself, actively pressed for the creation of NATO and for the construction of an Atlantic partnership. What France in general (and the General in particular) could not accept was an imbalanced alliance in which one of the ∗ Jolyon Howorth is Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics at Bath University and Associate Research Fellow at the French Institute of International Relations (Ifri).
    [Show full text]
  • 'One In, All In?' NATO's Next Enlargement
    ‘One in, all in?’ NATO’s next enlargement TERRY TERRIFF, STUART CROFT, ELKE KRAHMANN, MARK WEBBER AND JOLYON HOWORTH In the wake of the war in Kosovo, and the subsequent downfall of President Milosevic, it was easy to see NATO as the most powerful military organization in the world. A large number of states that are geographically close to the alliance share this assessment and therefore quite naturally seek to benefit from NATO membership. Managing this persistent demand to enlarge, however, has confronted the alliance with a number of difficult political and strategic issues. At NATO’s Madrid summit in 1997, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (the so-called Visegrad Three) were invited to join, and they formally acceded to the alliance shortly before the 1999 Washington summit.1 The alliance also noted at Washington that it would consider further enlargement at its summit º meeting in Prague in November 2002. The NATO secretary-general, Lord Robertson, reiterated this claim in June 2001, saying that ‘NATO hopes and expects, based on current and anticipated progress by the aspiring members, to continue the process of enlargement at the forthcoming Prague summit. In other words, the so-called “zero option” is off the table.’2 There are currently ten official applicants for membership—Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Mace- donia, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia (the so-called Vilnius Nine), plus Croatia— and there is a very real possibility that other states, such as Ukraine,3 might follow in the not too distant future. The question is not whether NATO will invite more states to become members at the Prague summit, but how many it will invite.
    [Show full text]
  • THE NATO PARLIAMENTARY ASSEMBLY from 1955-2005.Pdf
    NATO Parliamentary Assembly 1955-2005 NATO Parliamentary Assembly 1955-2005 This book was produced with the generous assistance of the 50 Years parliaments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Norway, Slovenia, and Turkey. of Parliamentary Diplomacy Editor’s Note n 2004 the Assembly’s Standing Committee decided to There may be slight inconsistencies between articles. I commemorate the Assembly’s 50th anniversary. It was However, as we have aimed for articles based on personal rec- decided to hold a special plenary sitting during the 50th annual ollections, we have not attempted to reconcile occasional dif- session. To that end, during that session, which took place in ferences or discrepancies. Our goal was to retain the original Venice, a special meeting was held involving, for the first time, spontaneity of the authors’ perceptions and memories. the permanent representatives to the North Atlantic Council. This was an outstanding success, as a record number of session As with so many projects of this kind, the book has evolved participants – over a thousand – clearly showed. and become more substantial than was first envisaged. Contributions were generally longer than anticipated and as The Standing Committee also decided that the Assembly we began to see a whole picture of the project emerging, it should produce a commemorative book as an enduring way of became clear that it would merit a more visually appealing marking this important milestone in the Assembly’s history. and enduring format than was foreseen at the outset. This The volume should cover the entire span of the Assembly’s exis- had obvious financial implications, but several delegations tence, but focus specifically on the Assembly’s role from the end came forward with generous offers of assistance.
    [Show full text]
  • MICROCOMP Output File
    S. HRG. 106±144 NATO'S 50TH ANNIVERSARY SUMMIT HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE ONE HUNDRED SIXTH CONGRESS FIRST SESSION APRIL 21, 1999 Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations ( Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE 58±335 CC WASHINGTON : 1999 VerDate 11-SEP-98 14:44 Sep 20, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00001 Fmt 5011 Sfmt 5011 58335 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS JESSE HELMS, North Carolina, Chairman RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware PAUL COVERDELL, Georgia PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts ROD GRAMS, Minnesota RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota CRAIG THOMAS, Wyoming BARBARA BOXER, California JOHN ASHCROFT, Missouri ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey BILL FRIST, Tennessee JAMES W. NANCE, Staff Director EDWIN K. HALL, Minority Staff Director (II) VerDate 11-SEP-98 14:44 Sep 20, 1999 Jkt 549297 PO 00000 Frm 00002 Fmt 5904 Sfmt 5904 58335 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1 CONTENTS Page Cambone, Dr. Stephen A., research director, Institute for National Security Studies, National Defense University, Washington, DC .................................. 32 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 45 Grossman, Hon. Marc, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs ......... 14 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 50 Hadley, Hon. Stephen, partner, Shea and Gardner, Washington, DC ................ 31 Kramer, Hon. Franklin D., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs .................................................................................................... 19 Prepared statement of ...................................................................................... 53 Kyl, Hon. Jon, U.S.
    [Show full text]