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REFERENCES Almeder, Robert. 1990. on Naturalizing REFERENCES Almeder, Robert. 1990. On naturalizing epistemology. American Philosophical Quarterly 27 (4): 263– 79. Anglin, Jeremy. 1977. Word, object, and conceptual development. New York: W.W. Norton and Company. Ariew, Roger. 1984. The Duhem thesis. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 35: 313–25. Aristotle. 1941. De anima. In The basic works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon. New York: Random House. Armstrong, D.M. 1973. Belief, truth and knowledge. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Bangu, Sorin. 2006. Underdetermination and the argument from indirect confirmation. Ratio 19 (3): 269–77. Bartsch, Karen, and Henry Wellman. 1995. Children talk about the mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Bedau, Marc. 1991. Can biological teleology be naturalized? Journal of Philosophy 88: 647–55. Ben-Menahem, Yemima. 2005. Black, white and gray: Quine on convention. Synthese 146: 245–82. Bergstrom, Lars. 1990. Quine on underdetermination. In Perspectives on Quine, ed. Robert Barrett and Roger Gibson, 38–54. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. ———. 1993. Quine, underdetermination and skepticism. The Journal of Philosophy 90 (7): 331–58. ———. 2004. Underdetermination of physical theory. In The Cambridge companion to Quine, ed. Roger Gibson, 91–114. New York: Cambridge University Press. Bernier, Paul. 2002. From simulation to theory. In Simulation and knowledge of action, ed. Jerome Dokic and Joelle Proust, 33–48. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Binswanger, Harry. 1990. The biological basis of teleological concepts. Los Angeles: ARI Press. Bishop, Michael, and Stephen Stich. 1998. The flight to reference, or how not to make progress in the philosophy of science. Philosophy of Science 65: 33–49. Block, Ned, and Robert Stalnaker. 1999. Conceptual analysis, dualism, and the explanatory gap. The Philosophical Review 108 (1): 1–46. Bloom, Lois. 1973. One word at a time: the use of single word utterances before syntax. Janua linguarum, series minor, 154. The Hague: Mouton. ———. 1993. The transition from infancy to language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 256 Bloom, Paul, and Tim German. 2000. Two reasons to abandon the false belief task as a test of theory of mind. Cognition 77: B25–B31. Boghossian, Paul. 1990. The status of content. The Philosophical Review 99 (2): 157–84. ———. 1996. Analyticity regained. Nous 30 (3): 360–91. BonJour, Laurence. 1985. The structure of empirical knowledge. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 2000. Toward a defense of empirical foundationalism. In Resurrecting old- fashioned foundationalism, ed. M. DePaul, 21–38.. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield. ———. 2004. In search of direct realism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 69 (2): 349– 67. Bonevac, Daniel. 2001. Naturalism for the faint of heart. In Reality and Humean supervience: essays on the philosophy of David Lewis, eds. G. Preyer and F. Siebelt. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc. Boyd, Richard. 1991. Realism, anti-foundationalism and the enthusiasm for natural kinds. Philosophical Studies 61: 127–48. Brandom, Robert. 1998. Insights and blindspots of reliabilism, Monist 81: 371–92. ———. 2001. Modality, normativity, and intentionality. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (3): 587–609. Bretherton, Inge, Sandra McNew and Marjorie Beeghly-Smith. 1981. Early person knowledge as expressed in gestural and verbal communication: When do infants acquire a “theory of mind”? In Infant Social Cognition, eds. M.E. Lamb and L.R. Sherrod, 333–73. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brewer, Bill. 1999. Perception and reason. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Burge, Tyler. 1979. Individualism and the mental. In Midwest Studies in Philosophy 4, Studies in Metaphysics, eds. Peter French, Theodore Euhling Jr., and Howard Wettstein. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Burr, Jean, and Barbara Hofer. 2002. Personal epistemology and theory of mind: deciphering young children’s beliefs about knowledge and knowing. New Ideas in Psychology 20: 199–224. Chalmers, David. 1996. The conscious mind. New York: Oxford University Press. Chisholm, Roderick. 1977. Theory of knowledge. 2nd ed. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. Churchland, Paul. 1981. Eliminative materialism and the propositional attitudes. Journal of Philosophy, 78: 67–90. 257 ———. 1996. Matter and consciousness. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Crane, Tim. 1998. How to define your (mental) terms. Inquiry 41: 341–54. Cummins, Robert. 1989. Meaning and mental representation. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 1996. Representations, targets and attitudes. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Daniel, Steven. 1999. Why even Kim-style psychophysical laws are impossible. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80: 225–37. Davidson, Donald. 1963. Actions, reasons and causes. The Journal of Philosophy 60(23): 685–700. ———. 1968. On saying that. Synthese 19, 139–46. ———. 1983. A coherence theory of truth and knowledge. In Kant oder Hegel?, ed. D. Heinrich: 423–38. Stuggart: Klett-Cotta. ———. 1984. Inquiries into truth and interpretation. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ———. 1990a. Meaning, truth and evidence. In Perspectives on Quine, eds. R. Barrett and R. Gibson: 68–79. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1990b. The structure and content of truth. The Journal of Philosophy 88 (6): 279–328. Davies, Martin, and Tony Stone. 2001. Mental simulation, tacit theory, and the threat of “collapse”. Philosophical Topics 29 (1&2): 127–73. Decety, Jean. 2002. Neurophysiological evidence for simulation of action. In Simulation and knowledge of action, eds. Jerome Dokic and Joelle Proust, 53–72. Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co. Devitt, Michael. 1996. Coming to our senses. New York: Cambridge University Press. Devitt, Michael, and Kim Sterelny. 1999. Language and reality: an introduction to the philosophy of language. 2nd ed. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Dretske, Fred. 1986. Misrepresentation. In Belief: form, content, and function, ed. R. Bogdan, 17–36. NewYork: Oxford University Press. Dummett, Michael. 1973. Frege: philosophy of language London: Duckworth. Ebbs, Gary. 1994. Review of Pursuit of truth. The Philosophical Review 103 (3): 535–41. ———. 2003. Denotation and discovery. In Socializing metaphysics: the nature of social reality, ed. F. Schmitt, 247–68. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Feldman, Richard. 2006. Naturalized epistemology. In The Stanford encyclopedia of philosophy (Fall 2006 Edition), ed. Edward N. Zalta. http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2006/entries/epistemology- 258 naturalized (accessed July 6, 2007). Fodor, Jerry. 1974. Special sciences (or the disunity of science as a working hypothesis). Synthese 28 (2): 97–115. ———. 1987. Psychosemantics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Fodor, Jerry, and Zenon Pylyshyn. 1981. How direct is visual perception?: Some reflections on Gibson’s “ecological approach.” Cognition 9: 139–96. Geach, Peter. 1957. Mental acts: their contents and their objects. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Gibson, James J. 1966. The senses considered as perceptual systems. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin Co. ———. 1986. The ecological approach to visual perception. Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Earlbaum Associates, Publishers. Gibson, Roger. 1986. Translation, physics and facts of the matter. In The philosophy of W.V. Quine, eds. L. Hahn and P. Schilpp, 139–54. La Salle, IL.: Open Court. ———. 1988. Enlightened empiricism: an examination of W.V. Quine’s theory of knowledge. Tampa, FL.: University of South Florida Press. Giere, Ronald. 1985. Philosophy of science naturalized. Philosophy of Science 52: 331–56. ———. 1988. Explaining science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1989. Scientific rationality as instrumental rationality. Studies in the History and Philosophy of Science 20 (3): 377–84. Goldman, Alvin. 1979. What is justified belief? In Justification and knowledge: new studies in epistemology, ed. George Pappas. Boston: D. Reidel Publishing Company. ———. 1986. Epistemology and cognition. Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press. ———. 1993. Epistemic folkways and scientific epistemology. Philosophical Issues 3: 271–85. ———. 1995. Interpretation psychologized. In Folk psychology: the theory of mind debate, eds. M Davies and T. Stone. 74–99. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Originally published in Mind and Language 4, 161–85, 1989. ———. 2006. Simulating minds: the philosophy, psychology, and neuroscience of mindreading. New York: Oxford University Press. Gopnik, Alison and Janet Astington. 1988. Children’s understanding of representational change and its relation to understanding of false-belief and appearance-reality distinction. Child Development 59: 27–37. 259 Gopnik, Alison and Peter Graf. 1988. Knowing how you know: young children’s ability to identify and remember the sources of their beliefs. Child Development 59: 1366–71. Gordon, Robert. 1995a. Folk psychology as simulation. In Folk psychology: the theory of mind debate, eds. M. Davies and T. Stone, 59–73. Oxford: Blackwell. Originally published in Mind and Language 1: 158–70, 1986. ———. 1995b The simulation theory: objections and misconceptions. In Folk psychology: the theory of mind debate, in eds. M. Davies and T. Stone, 100–22. Oxford: Blackwell. Originally published in Mind and Language 7 (1–2): 11–34, 1992. ———. 1995c. Simulation without introspection or inference from me to you. In Mental simulation: evaluations and applications, eds. M. Davies and T. Stone, 53–67. Oxford: Blackwell. ———. 1996. “Radical” simulation. In Theories of theories of mind, eds. P. Carruthers and P. Smith, 11–21. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
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