DOCSLIB.ORG

A Critique of John Mcdowell's Conception of Experience and Nature

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
A Critique of John Mcdowell's Conception of Experience and Nature EXPERIENCE AND THE WORLD OF THE LIVING: A CRITIQUE OF JOHN MCDOWELL’S CONCEPTION OF EXPERIENCE AND NATURE Gregory S. Hakos A Dissertation Submitted to the Graduate College of Bowling Green State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY December 2007 Committee: Michael Bradie, Advisor Cynthia Baron, Graduate Faculty Representative Sara Worley Marvin Belzer ii ABSTRACT Michael Bradie, Advisor John McDowell’s work (in Mind and World and elsewhere) has largely been devoted to two main objectives: 1) defending a non-traditional form of empiricism; and 2) articulating a revised conception of nature. McDowell sees these two objectives as connected. He wants to defend a conception of experience as involving the reception of conceptual “impressions” from the world. But, he sees that such a conception of experience seems to be blocked by a dominant form of naturalism which views nature as devoid of value and meaning. Such a “disenchanted” view of nature makes it impossible to combine the idea that impressions are impacts from the world with the idea that impressions are conceptually structured (by human minds). McDowell’s solution to this problem involves “re-enchanting” or revising naturalism so that nature can be understood as incorporating a “second nature”. McDowell’s notion of second nature is intended to “make room” (in nature) for the idea that the world’s impacts on the sensory faculties of concept-using human beings can be already imbued with intentionality. I agree with McDowell that both our concept of experience and our concept of nature are in need of revision. But, I disagree with (and critique) the revised conceptions that McDowell proposes. McDowell’s view is that experience should be conceived in terms of “subjects” passively receiving conceptual contents (or “impressions”) from the world. I criticize McDowell’s conception of experience for focusing on “subjects” who are passively acted upon by the world. Instead, I argue that experience needs to be conceived as an agential interaction, iii which involves organisms actively doing and undergoing things. Because McDowell conceives of experience in terms of being subject to passive transactions, his revision of naturalism does not challenge the widespread conception of nature as exhausted by passive relations, a conception which, I argue, extrudes agency from nature. Instead, he advocates for the idea of a second nature that simply “makes room” in nature for passive relations to be concept-involving. In this dissertation I charge that McDowell’s re-conception of nature does not go far enough. Nature, I argue, needs to be re-enchanted with more than just concepts; it needs to be re-enchanted with active relations. Thus, I argue for a different idea of second nature, one which includes all living organisms, not just concept-using creatures. I argue that the sort of relations that occur in the world of the living—i.e. my conception of second nature—are fundamentally distinct from the inanimate, passive relations that occur in first nature. Relations in second nature are “active” because they involve organisms doing things to their environment in an effort to utilize energy for the process of living. Experience, accordingly, must be understood as an agential relation; thus I argue that “experience” is a term that essentially refers to the doings and undergoings of living organisms. iv To Michelle and family: for their support and encouragement. v TABLE OF CONTENTS Page INTRODUCTION. NATURALISM, EXPERIENTIAL AGENCY, AND THE WORLD OF THE LIVING................................................................................. 1 CHAPTER I. MAKING IT SAFE FOR INTENTIONALITY: MCDOWELL’S RE- ENCHANTMENT OF NATURE.......................................................................................... 5 Introduction: The Disenchanted View of Nature and the Interminable Oscillation… 5 Traditional Empiricism and the Myth of the Given................................................... 9 Unconstrained Coherentism and Frictionlessness ..................................................... 19 McDowell’s Re-Enchantment of Nature ................................................................... 35 CHAPTER II. MCDOWELL’S CONCEPTION OF THE EXPERIENTIAL RELATION: ABOUTNESS, IMPRESSIONS, AND ANSWERABILITY TO THE WORLD ................ 59 Answerability to the World, Aboutness, and Impressions......................................... 62 Psychological Nominalism and the Naturalistic Fallacy ........................................... 80 The Coherentist’s Route: Non-Relational Content.................................................... 89 McDowell’s Route: Experiential Openness............................................................... 100 vi CHAPTER III. A CRITIQUE OF MCDOWELL’S RE-ENCHANTMENT OF NATURE, PART I: NATURALISM AND EXPERIENTIAL AGENCY.............................................. 130 Introduction: Two Sorts of Naturalism...................................................................... 130 McDowell on Naturalism, Causation, and Passivity ................................................. 139 Agency and the Passivity of Causation: The Dogma of Agent Causation ................ 153 Passivity, Presentationalism, and Knowledge ........................................................... 185 CHAPTER IV. A CRITIQUE OF MCDOWELL’S RE-ENCHANMENT OF NATURE, PART II: FREEDOM AND INTELLIGENCE IN ACTION ............................................... 216 Two Sorts of Skepticism: Threats to the External World and Threats to Freedom……. ............................................................................................................ 216 “Experience” and Education...................................................................................... 253 Relaxed Naturalism and Second Nature: Experience and the World of the Living… 286 REFERENCES. ............................................................................................................ 320 APPENDIX A. MCDOWELL’S RELAXED NATURALISM VERSUS THE DISENCHANTED VIEW OF NATURE.............................................................................. 324 APPENDIX B. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ...................................................................... 331 1 INTRODUCTION NATURALISM, EXPERIENTIAL AGENCY, AND THE WORLD OF THE LIVING As the title suggests, this dissertation claims only to offer a critique of John McDowell’s conceptions of “experience” and “nature”. But, in my eyes at least, it tries to do much more than that. I think it ought to be seen as something more than a mere critique, that is, as a piece of positive philosophizing. The sort of philosophy it espouses—if it can indeed be seen in that light—is grounded upon a view of nature that can best be seen as a form of pragmatic naturalism.1 Specifically, I have largely been inspired by the work of John Dewey. In fact, the title of this dissertation is intended to allude to what is considered by many to be the greatest work of that American philosophical naturalist: Experience and Nature. I have framed this project in terms of a commentary on and critique of the work of a single contemporary philosopher: John McDowell. I think that John McDowell is the appropriate target because a major theme running throughout his work is the articulation of a new, more liberal naturalism. McDowell has proposed the idea that there can be “Two Sorts of 1 See, e.g., S. Morris Eames, Pragmatic Naturalism: An Introduction, Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1977. Eames generally associates the term “pragmatic naturalism” with the pragmatic philosophy espoused by Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead. However, I have something more specific in mind when I use the term “pragmatic naturalism.” My use of the term is meant to refer to a form of naturalism that is pluralistic about natural relations. By contrast, traditional, scientistic naturalism tends to be monistic about natural relations, seeking to reduce all relations in nature to causal relations. The form of pragmatic naturalism that I defend in this dissertation is “pluralistic” because it admits not only causal relations but also, specifically, agential relations—which I take to be a natural, non-causal relation. I cannot defend this point here; I begin to offer a defense for such a view in Chapter Three. 2 Naturalism,” corresponding to two conceptions of nature: first nature and second nature.2 McDowell critiques a more restrictive, scientistic naturalism which he calls the “disenchanted view of nature.” According to the disenchanted conception of nature, “something’s way of being natural is its position in the realm of law.” McDowell’s complaint is that this picture of nature as exhausted by first nature threatens “to empty it of meaning.” In response to the disenchanted view of nature, McDowell articulates a conception of “second nature”, which is intended to naturalize the space of reasons, or, alternately, the space of concepts. McDowell thinks that intentionality can only be naturalized if the space of concepts is already seen as occupying a part of the space of nature. Hence, when he talks about re- enchanting nature, he means to incorporate into our ordinary understanding of “nature” relations in the space of reasons—relations (or concepts) such as warrant, justification, aboutness, answerability, in short, normative, epistemological notions such as giving and asking for reasons. McDowell describes his re-enchantment of nature as “making room” in nature
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on The
    RicoGutschmidt, Dresden Skepticism, Metaphorsand Vertigo Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition Abstract: The relation of Wittgenstein’slaterphilosophytoskepticism seems to be ambiguous, since he rejects radical skepticism but also highlights the ground- lessness of our beliefs. In this paper,Iam going to discuss Wittgenstein’shinge propositions in this respect.Against the usual view,Iwill show that they do not function as acontextualist or foundationalist refutation of skepticism. Whatis more, they also do not confirm skepticism. In contrast,Iwill arguethat following Wittgenstein skepticism is neither false nor true, but still has apoint,which can be elucidated with Stanley Cavell’sconcept of a truth of skepticism. This concept roughly states that we can not know about the existenceofthe world and the others, but that we have to acknowledge them. With the help of Wittgenstein, Iamgoingtoclarify this position. The key idea is that the problem of skepticism can be understood as ametaphorical wayofpresentingthe finiteness of the human condition and thatvertiginous skeptical irritations lead to an adequate human self-understanding in this respect. Something is obscure with the statusofskepticism. What does it mean for the human to be confronted with unanswerable questions?Should he somehow deal with his incapability of answeringthem?Shouldn’thenonetheless try to find answers?Orare these questions senseless in the end, since they can not be answered anyhow?Inthe following,Iamgoing to discuss this obscure status of skepticism. In the first part of this paper,Iwill the deal with the ambiguous position of Wittgenstein’slater philosophytothe problem of skepticism, which seems neither to reject nor to confirm skepticism. This problem willbeelucidated by referringtoWittgenstein’sconcept of the hinge propositions.
    [Show full text]
  • Lexington Books
    NEW FROM LEXINGTON BOOKS WHITEHEAD AND THE PITTSBURGH SCHOOL: PREEMPTING THE PROBLEM OF INTENTIONALITY By Lisa Landoe Hedrick “Whitehead and the Pittsburgh School: Preempting the Problem of Intentionality is an excellent addition to studies on the relationship between Whitehead and analytic philosophy in general. In particular, it shows how Whitehead’s critique of early trends in analytic thought is relevant to habits that impede progress in analytic thought today.”—Daniel A. Dombrowski, Seattle University “Hedrick makes good on her stated aim: to interpret Whitehead’s epistemology in a new way and to make her own original contribution. This is explosive philosophy!”—Robert Cummings Neville, Boston University “Hedrick is destined to become a leading author on the interpretation of the thought of Whitehead. In this extraordinary debut book, she examines Whitehead’s relevance to recent developments in analytic philosophy epitomized in the ‘Pittsburgh School’ of Robert Brandom and John McDowell and contextualized against the philosophy of Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty. Not since the pioneering work of the late George W. Shields has a Whitehead scholar tackled the critical relation of Whitehead to analytic philosophy. Hedrick does it here in a thoroughly up-to-date and decisive way with a brilliant focus on the meaning of intentionality and the need to make sense of the relationship between mind and world.” —Nancy Frankenberry, Dartmouth College “With a technically precise focus on contemporary epistemology and the problems of normativity and intentionality, Hedrick demonstrates that the TABLE OF CONTENTS sustained critique of prevailing habits of thought within mainstream analytic Acknowledgments philosophy implicitly shares much in common with a similar but long- Introduction forgotten critique of Bertrand Russell’s sensedata theory, launched a century Chapter 1: Reading Plato, Aristotle, and Kant ago by Russell’s erstwhile collaborator, Whitehead.
    [Show full text]
  • Reason and Nature Lecture and Colloquium in Munster¨ 1999
    JOHN MCDOWELL: Reason and Nature Lecture and Colloquium in Munster¨ 1999 Edited by Marcus Willaschek LIT – Verlag Munster¨ Preface John McDowell is one of the most influential philosophers writing to- day. His work, ranging widely from interpretations of Plato and Aris- totle to Davidsonian semantics, from ethics to epistemology and the philosophy of mind, has set the agenda for many recent philosophical debates. In recent years, McDowell’s views have been hotly discussed among students and faculty in Munster,¨ too. Therefore, we were very glad when McDowell agreed to give the third M¨unsteraner Vorlesungen zur Philosophie in 1999. On May 5, McDowell gave a public lecture; on the following two days, he participated in a colloquium where students and faculty from Munster¨ presented brief papers on his philosophy. McDowell listened carefully and responded to questions and criticisms. This volume contains McDowell’s lecture, revised versions of the col- loquium papers and McDowell’s written responses to them. I should like to thank John McDowell for coming to lecture in Munster,¨ for participating in the colloquium, and for putting his re- sponses in writing. Discussing his views with him has been stimulation and pleasure for all of us. Next, I want to thank the participants in the colloquium who worked hard to come up with interesting and chal- lenging presentations. Further, thanks are due to Karsten Wantia and Florian Wessels for putting much effort and time in type-setting and designing this volume. And finally, I want ot thank the Ministerium fur¨ Schule und Weiterbildung, Wissenschaft und Forschung in Nordrhein- Westfalen for funding the 1999 M¨unsteraner Vorlesungen zur Philosophie.
    [Show full text]
  • Attuning Poetry and Philosophy
    The old quarrel Article Accepted Version De Gaynesford, M. (2020) The old quarrel. Forum For Philosophy. Available at http://centaur.reading.ac.uk/93065/ It is advisable to refer to the publisher’s version if you intend to cite from the work. See Guidance on citing . Published version at: https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/theforum/the-old-quarrel/ All outputs in CentAUR are protected by Intellectual Property Rights law, including copyright law. Copyright and IPR is retained by the creators or other copyright holders. Terms and conditions for use of this material are defined in the End User Agreement . www.reading.ac.uk/centaur CentAUR Central Archive at the University of Reading Reading’s research outputs online ATTUNING POETRY AND PHILOSOPHY Maximilian de Gaynesford on the old quarrel between poetry and philosophy Analytic philosophers may find nothing untoward about the following snippet of autobiography: I stopped writing in the fashion of a poet who puts down what sounds good to him and who needn’t defend his lines (either they resonate with a reader or they don’t). Instead, I tried to ask myself, when writing: precisely what does this sentence contribute to the developing exposition or argument, and is it true? You become analytical when you practise that sort of (frequently painful) self-criticism. The author captures what drew many of us towards this way of doing philosophy, what keeps us at it. Quote this to a wider audience however, and you may find people react with a mixture of recognition and horror. Recognition, because the author captures exactly what keeps them away from analytic philosophy.
    [Show full text]
  • 1 the Disjunctive Conception of Experience As Material for A
    The disjunctive conception of experience as material for a transcendental argument John McDowell University of Pittsburgh 1. In Individuals1 and The Bounds of Sense,2 P. F. Strawson envisaged transcendental arguments as responses to certain sorts of scepticism. An argument of the sort Strawson proposed was to establish a general claim about the world, a claim supposedly brought into doubt by sceptical reflections. Such an argument was to work by showing that unless things were as they were said to be in the claim that the argument purported to establish, it would not be possible for our thought or experience to have certain characteristics, not regarded as questionable even by someone who urges sceptical doubts. So the argument’s conclusion was to be displayed as the answer to a “How possible?” question. That has a Kantian ring, and the feature of such arguments that the formulation fits is the warrant for calling them “transcendental”. Barry Stroud responded to Strawson on the following lines.3 Perhaps we can see our way to supposing that if our thought or experience is to have certain characteristics it does have (for instance that experience purports to be of a world of objects independent of us), we must conceive the world in certain ways (for instance as containing objects that continue to exist even while we are not perceiving them). But it is quite another matter to suggest that by reflecting about how it is possible that our thought and experience are as they are, we could establish conclusions not just about how we must conceive the world but about how the world must be.
    [Show full text]
  • An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons
    An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons PRINCIPIA LXVI (2019): 5–33 PL‑ISSN 0867‑5392 DOI 10.4467/20843887PI.19.001.11634 Susana Cadilha An Unrealistic Account of Moral Reasons1 Nierealistyczne ujęcie racji moralnych Summary In this paper I will analyze John McDowell’s broad account of prac‑ tical rationality and moral reasons, which he displays mainly in his articles “Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?” (1978) and “Might There Be External Reasons?” (1995). My main aim is to argue that from a philosophical perspective, no less than from an empirical one, McDowell’s account of practical rationality is not a realistic one. From a philosophical point of view, I will argue that his intellectualist account is not convincing; and if we consider his virtue‑ethical ideal of practical rationality in light of the model of human cognition, we also realize that moral behavior is not immune to cognitive biases and does not always flow from robust traits of character like virtues. At the same time, this puts at stake his strong thesis of moral autonomy – the idea that with the ‘onset of reason’ moral beings are no longer determined by ‘first nature’ features. Keywords: John McDowell, practical rationality, moral reasons, vir‑ tue ethics, second nature Streszczenie W niniejszym artykule analizuję szerokie ujęcie praktycznej racjo‑ nalności i racji moralnych Johna McDowella, które przedstawia głównie w swoich artykułach „Are Moral Requirements Hypotheti‑ cal Imperatives?” (1978) i „Might There Be External Reasons?” (1995). Moim głównym celem jest pokazanie, że z perspektywy fi‑ 1 This paper is a substantially extended and improved version of my previous paper “John McDowell on Practical Rationality – Is He (Really) Talking about Us?” (2018).
    [Show full text]
  • Quine and Whitehead: Ontology and Methodology 3
    McHENRY I QUINE AND WHITEHEAD: ONTOLOGY AND METHODOLOGY 3 philosophical scene as of late (e.g., deconstructionism, postmodem relativism), the and Whitehead: Ontology and gulf that separates Whitehead and analytical philosophy is not as great as it used to Quine 'be.3 Before I begin to explore the affinities, as well as some contrasts, between Methodology . Quine and Whitehead, a word of caution is in order. It is well known that Quine wrote his doctoral dissertation, "The Logic of Sequences: A Generalization of LeemonMcHenry Principia Mathematica," under Whitehead's direction.4 Quine also took two of Whitehead's seminars at Harvard,"Science and the Modem World" and "Cosmol­ I LEEMON McHENRY reaches philosophy at Loyola Marymount University, Los ogies Ancient and Modem," but he says that he "responded little to these courses" Angeles, CA 90045, E-mail: [email protected] and "took refuge in his relatively mathematical material on 'extensive abstrac­ tion. "'s Despite Quine's statement that he "retained a vivid sense of being in the presence of the great," he does not acknowledge any philosophical influence from · Introduction . the ph!losoph!es o!'W.V . Qu�e an d Whitehead. Rather, Camap and Russell are cited as the inspirations of Quine's The very idea· of a basis for comparing . , mcluding Qume himself. early development. A.N. Whitehead may be surprising to most philosophe� . philosophy two completely Both produced systems of thought that have taken m When Quine overlapped with Whitehead at Harvard, Whitehead was deeply at the forefron: of c�ntemp�­ involved in working out the details of his metaphysics of process--a philosophic different directions.
    [Show full text]
  • Knowledge and the Space of Reasons: the Ideas of John Mcdowell and Paul Hirst Geoffrey Hinchliffe University of East Anglia
    Geoffrey Hinchliffe 107 Knowledge and the Space of Reasons: The Ideas of John McDowell and Paul Hirst Geoffrey Hinchliffe University of East Anglia In this essay I develop an epistemological perspective that argues for the cen- tral role that knowledge plays in education. I do this first of all by elaborating John McDowell’s ideas on the “space of reasons.”1 I then use this concept to reinterpret and develop the concept of the “forms of knowledge” associated with Paul Hirst.2 I argue that the forms of knowledge can be seen as inhabiting the space of reasons. I then show how one of the key features of the space of reasons — the making of judgments — is also a key feature of education and learning. SECOND NATURE AND THE SPACE OF REASONS I will begin by giving a brief account of McDowell’s epistemological position. His exposition is wide-ranging but the force of his argument is lost unless its different strands are held together. His starting point is Immanuel Kant’s well-known remark that “thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind,”3 which McDowell thinks underpins what he sees as a pernicious, oscillating dualism. On the one side is, borrowing from Wilfred Sellars, the “Myth of the Given,” and on the other side is a coherentism that McDowell attributes to Donald Davidson.4 The problem with relying on the “given” is that it is not clear how the relation between sense experience and concept can be considered as one of genuine justification since unalloyed, bare sense data is simply “other” to conceptual thought.
    [Show full text]
  • The Pragmatic Century
    The Pragmatic Century Richard J. Bernstein There are many ways of telling the story of the vicissitudes of pragmatism in the United States. I want to begin with a brief account of what may be considered the standard story, because I intend to challenge it. The stan- dard story goes something like this. Pragmatism was popularized primar- ily through the lecturing and writing of William James at the beginning of the twentieth century. We can even date the explicit introduction of the term “pragmatism” by James in his 1898 address, delivered at the Univer- sity of California, Berkeley, “Philosophical Conceptions and Practical Results.” In that address, James generously acknowledged his debt to Peirce, “one of the most original contemporary thinkers,” and he refers to “the principle of practicalism—or pragmatism as he called it, when I first heard him enunciate it at Cambridge in the early 1970s.” James initially gives a rather metaphorical description of “Peirce’s principle”: “the soul and meaning of thought, he says, can never be made to direct itself towards anything but the production of belief, belief being the demica- dence which closes a musical phrase in the symphony of our intellectual life.” Furthermore, “beliefs, in short are really rules of action; and the whole function of thinking is but one step in the production of habits of action” (James 1967: 348). In 1898, Peirce was barely known as a philoso- pher (except to a small group of admirers like James). As James’s popular version of pragmatism spread, Peirce was so appalled and outraged that he renamed his own doctrine of meaning “‘pragmaticism,’ which is ugly enough to be safe from kidnappers” (Peirce 1931: 5.414).
    [Show full text]
  • Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation
    Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation Ulrich Meyer Doctor of Philosophy in Mathematics University of Cambridge, 1995 Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy in partial fulfil- ment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. September 2001 Author: ................................. .. .... Department of Linguistics aKPhilosophy August 10, 2001 Certified by: .......................... Robert C. Stalnaker Professor of Philosophy Thesis Supervisor Accepted by: .............. Vann McGee Professor of Philosophy Chair, Committee on Graduate Students @Ulrich Meyer 2001. All rights reserved. The author hereby grants permission to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to reproduce and distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis in whole or in part. MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY OCT 11 2001 ARCMly LIBRARIES Mathematics, Time, and Confirmation by Ulrich Meyer Submitted to The Department of Linguistics and Philosophy on 10 August 2001 in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy ABSTRACT This dissertation discusses two issues about abstract objects: their role in scientific theories, and their relation to time. Chapter 1, "Why Apply Mathematics?" argues that scientific theories are not about the mathematics that is applied in them, and defends this thesis against the Quine-Putnam Indispensability Argument. Chapter 2, "Scientific Ontology," is a critical study of W. V. Quine's claim that metaphysics and mathematics are epistemologically on a par with nat- ural science. It is argued that Quine's view relies on a unacceptable account of empirical confirmation. Chapter 3, "Prior and the Platonist," demonstrates the incompatibility of two popular views about time: the "Platonist" thesis that some objects exist "outside" time, and A.
    [Show full text]
  • Literary Studies and the Philosophy of Literature Andrea Selleri • Philip Gaydon Editors Literary Studies and the Philosophy of Literature
    Literary Studies and the Philosophy of Literature Andrea Selleri • Philip Gaydon Editors Literary Studies and the Philosophy of Literature New Interdisciplinary Directions Editors Andrea Selleri Philip Gaydon Department of English and Department of Philosophy Comparative Literature University of Warwick University of Warwick Coventry, United Kingdom Coventry, UK ISBN 978-3-319-33146-1 ISBN 978-3-319-33147-8 (eBook) DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-33147-8 Library of Congress Control Number: 2016958287 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2016 The author(s) has/have asserted their right(s) to be identified as the author(s) of this work in accordance with the Copyright, Design and Patents Act. This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub- lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
    [Show full text]
  • Understanding Meaning and World
    Understanding Meaning and World Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty Understanding Meaning and World: A Relook on Semantic Externalism By Sanjit Chakraborty This book first published 2016 Cambridge Scholars Publishing Lady Stephenson Library, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2PA, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2016 by Sanjit Chakraborty All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-9103-7 ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-9103-5 To my Gurudev Hilary Putnam, Who taught me how to love philosophy a little more... Without whom not! CONTENTS Acknowledgements .................................................................................... ix Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Chapter One ................................................................................................. 7 The Internalism-Externalism Debate in Contemporary Philosophy of Language and Mind Introduction (1.1) Contemporary Debate: Internalism Verses Externalism (1.2) Descriptivism of Frege and Russell (1.3) Putnam’s and Kripke’s Theses on Reference (1.4) Putnam on Externalism Concluding Remarks Chapter Two .............................................................................................
    [Show full text]