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Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo : Wittgenstein and Cavell on The RicoGutschmidt, Dresden Skepticism, Metaphorsand Vertigo Wittgenstein and Cavell on the Human Condition Abstract: The relation of Wittgenstein’slaterphilosophytoskepticism seems to be ambiguous, since he rejects radical skepticism but also highlights the ground- lessness of our beliefs. In this paper,Iam going to discuss Wittgenstein’shinge propositions in this respect.Against the usual view,Iwill show that they do not function as acontextualist or foundationalist refutation of skepticism. Whatis more, they also do not confirm skepticism. In contrast,Iwill arguethat following Wittgenstein skepticism is neither false nor true, but still has apoint,which can be elucidated with Stanley Cavell’sconcept of a truth of skepticism. This concept roughly states that we can not know about the existenceofthe world and the others, but that we have to acknowledge them. With the help of Wittgenstein, Iamgoingtoclarify this position. The key idea is that the problem of skepticism can be understood as ametaphorical wayofpresentingthe finiteness of the human condition and thatvertiginous skeptical irritations lead to an adequate human self-understanding in this respect. Something is obscure with the statusofskepticism. What does it mean for the human to be confronted with unanswerable questions?Should he somehow deal with his incapability of answeringthem?Shouldn’thenonetheless try to find answers?Orare these questions senseless in the end, since they can not be answered anyhow?Inthe following,Iamgoing to discuss this obscure status of skepticism. In the first part of this paper,Iwill the deal with the ambiguous position of Wittgenstein’slater philosophytothe problem of skepticism, which seems neither to reject nor to confirm skepticism. This problem willbeelucidated by referringtoWittgenstein’sconcept of the hinge propositions. In the second part,Iam goingtoclarify the ambiguous role of these propositions. Forthis pur- pose, Iwill show that skepticism can be understood as ametaphorical wayof presentingthe finiteness of the human condition. This will be explicated with the help of Thomas Nagel’smetaphor of the view from nowhereand with John McDowell’sconcept of the sideways-onview.Furthermore, Stanley Cavell’s concept of atruth of skepticism will be discussed in this respect.Finally, refer- ring to Cavell, McDowell comments on afeelingofvertigointhe face of the groundless human situation. This givesrise to my overall claim thatvertiginous skeptical irritations lead to an adequate human self-understanding in the light of the finiteness of the human condition. Konstanzer Online-Publikations-System (KOPS) URL: http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:bsz:352-2-1qrjs8h7eqkdb1 132 Skepticism, Metaphorsand Vertigo 1. The HingePropositionsinOn Certainty Forastart,Iam going to discuss the ambiguous position of Wittgenstein’slater philosophytothe problem of skepticism. On the one hand, Wittgenstein rejects radical skepticism: “Adoubtthat doubted everything would not be adoubt” and “Adoubt withoutanend is not even adoubt.” (OC1969: 450and 625) On the other hand, it is Wittgenstein’soverall concern to highlight the groundlessness of our beliefs: “The difficulty is to realize the groundlessness of our believing” and “At the foundationofwell-founded belief lies belief that is not founded.” (OC1969: 166 and 253) On the one hand,herefers to the self-defeating character of skepticism, on the other hand, he uses the argument of the infinite regress to show that our beliefs are unwarranted in the end. Therefore, Wittgenstein has apeculiarposition between the traditionalat- tempts to refuse skepticism and the confession thatthe problem of skepticism can not be solved. Instead of refusing skepticism as senseless in the line of the pragmatic tradition,¹ Wittgenstein’sposition seems to includeboth, the re- fusal as well as the confirmation of skepticism. Against that, in epistemology Wittgenstein is typicallyconsidered to be anti-skeptical,² whereas for example Kripke discusses Wittgenstein’sskepticism with regardtomeaning³ and Fogelin relates Wittgenstein to Pyrrhonism.⁴ Apossibility to embrace both aspectsin Wittgenstein’sphilosophycan be found in the work of Stanley Cavell, who speaksabout a truth of skepticism and introduces the concept of acknowledgment in this context.This interpretation represents aposition between skepticism and anti-skepticism and hence promises to captureWittgenstein’sambiguous posi- tion more adequately.⁵ Cavell mainlydeals with the Philosophical Investigations,whereas in the fol- lowing Wittgenstein’srelation to skepticism will be considered with the help of his later work On Certainty. The position between skepticism and anti-skepticism can be explicated here with the concept of the notorious hingepropositions. These propositions can not be doubtedand are substantiating every thinking and questioning,but are themselveswithout reason. They do not have afounda- tion and can even changeovertime. Because of this double-edgedcharacter,the Cf. e.g. the positions of Peirceand James,cf. also McGinn . Forexample in non-epistemic, contextualistic or neomoorean approaches,cf. e.g. Pritchard . Kripke . Fogelin and . Cavell . Skepticism, Metaphors and Vertigo 133 consideration of the statusofthese propositions will shed some light on Wittgen- stein’srelation to skepticism between refusal and confirmation. Wittgenstein’sengagement with skepticism was motivated by his reading of the papers of George EdwardMoore about the DefenceofCommon Sense and the Proof of the External World. Moore’sapproach of refuting skepticism starts with propositions, which can not be doubtedinMoore’sopinion,for example “Hereis one hand,and here is another” or “Ihavealways been on or nearthe surface of the earth.” Wittgenstein alsorefers to these propositions.But while he like Moore argues that they can not be doubted, he claims at the same time that they are groundless and fallible. This peculiardouble-edgedcharacter shall now be in- vestigated more closely. Wittgenstein’sbest known metaphor for the status of the Moorean proposi- tions is that of the hinge, which he uses threetimes in On Certainty: That is to say, the question that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some prop- ositions areexempt from doubt,are as it were likehinges on which those turn. That is to say, it belongs to the logic of our scientific investigations that certain things are in deed not doubted. But it isn’tthat the situation is like this: We just can’t investigateeverything, and for that reason we are forced to rest content with assumption.IfIwant the door to turn, the hingesmust stayput.(OC 1969: 341–343) The mathematical proposition has,asitwere officially, been giventhe stamp of incon- testability.I.e.: “Disputeabout other things; this is immovable – it is ahinge on which your disputecan turn.” (OC1969: 655) Other importantnotions for the same concept are picture of the world, mythol- ogy, rules of agame and riverbed, which alsoshall be cited here: But Idid not getmypictureofthe world by satisfyingmyself of its correctness;nor do I have it because Iamsatisfied of its correctness.No: it is the inherited background against which Idistinguish between true and false. The propositions describingthis world-picture might be part of akind of mythology. And their roleislike that of rules of agame; and the gamecan be learned purelypracti- cally, without learningany explicit rules. It might be imagined that some propositions,ofthe form of empiricalpropositions, werehardened and functioned as channelsfor such empirical propositions as were not hardened but fluid; and that this relation altered with time, in that fluid propositions hard- ened, and hard ones became fluid. The mythology maychange back into astate of flux, the river-bed of thoughts may shift.But Idistinguish between the movement of the waters on the river-bed and the shift of the bed itself; though thereisnot asharp division of the one from the other.(OC 1969: 94–97) 134 Skepticism, Metaphorsand Vertigo Wittgenstein givesawide rangeofdifferent examples of hingepropositions.He refers to the above-quoted Moorean propositions as wellastosuch diverse state- ments as the declaration of one’sown name,the statement that no one has ever been on the moon (this was aplausible assumption twodecades before the first moon landing), or that you’re not dreamingatthe moment (OC1969: 628, 286 and 676).⁶ What is more, the hingepropositions are not isolated from each other,but form anestofpropositions (OC1969: 225). More exactly, they consti- tute aframe of referenceand give one another mutual support (OC1969: 83 and 142).⁷ Moreover,all importantcharacteristics of the hinge propositions can be ex- plicated with the passages cited so far.Itisnot Wittgenstein’spoint thatitisim- possibletoput certain beliefs into question, but thatsome beliefs “belong to the logic of our scientific investigations”.Inthe implementation of ascientific ex- periment,for example, the existence of the apparatus is not taken for granted due to abare assumption. In contrast,Wittgenstein further explicates that it is part of the experiment to belief in the existenceofthe apparatus, since otherwise it would not be an experiment(OC 1969: 337). This is alsotrue for every judg- ment,since following Wittgenstein every judgment presupposes something which is not doubted – otherwise it would not be ajudgment (OC1969: 150 and 232). It simply belongs to the structure of our knowledge that our conclusions relyonhinges or moveinariverbed. In Wittgenstein’sdescription of the struc- ture
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