Liberal Unionists The defection of the Liberal Unionists in 1886 was the greatest blow the Liberal Party suffered in the nineteenth century. Tony Little explains what happened and suggests that there are still some unanswered questions. OutOut fromfrom underunder thethe umbrellaumbrella
his, if I understand it, is one of those golden been neglected. And despite the degree of attention, ‘Tmoments of our history, one of those opportu- there remain a number of unanswered questions nities which may come and may go, but which which would repay further study. rarely returns.’ Gladstone was at his most persuasive There are two main theses explaining the great as he wound up the debate on the second reading of disruption of the party. One may be described as the the Government of Ireland Bill on the night of ‘conspiracy theory’. In this haut politique version of June . But his final words, ‘Think, I beseech you; events, the ageing Titan, Gladstone, saw off a two- think well, think wisely, think, not for the moment, pronged attack on his leadership by Hartington for but for the years that are to come, before you reject the Whigs and Chamberlain for the Radicals but was this bill’ betrayed that he knew he faced defeat. unexpectedly outmanoeuvred by Churchill and Salisbury for the Tories. We were heavily beaten on the nd Reading, by to . A scene of some excitement followed the declara- The alternative ‘great forces’ explanation argues tion of the numbers: one or two Irishmen lost their that the growing democratisation of the political balance. Upon the whole we have more ground to be system inevitably drove the aristocratic elements of satisfied with the progress made, than to be disap- the Liberal Party into the arms of the Tories to pro- pointed at the failure. But it is a serious mischief. tect their landed interests. Meanwhile, the remnants Spoke very long: my poor voice came in a wonderful manner. of the Liberal Party, obsessed with Ireland, took an inordinately long time to discover the need to ap- The stoic note in Gladstone’s cryptic diary suggests peal to the wider electorate through New Liberal- that even after the scale of the defeat was known the ism, creating the frustrations which inevitably led to Liberal leadership were underestimating the damage the formation of the Labour Party. In this theory the done to the party. The split, which was crystallised in defection of Chamberlain was a lucky bonus for the the biggest Commons division to date, was as signifi- opposition. cant as the break up of the Tories in over the A third explanation, which is gaining ground, fo- Corn Laws. Some ninety-three Liberals voted cuses on the unfortunate collision of views over Ire- against the whip and others sympathised with the land without which the party would have had time rebels. The great separation kept the Liberals out of to develop new leaders and policies to succeed power for all but three of the next twenty years and Gladstone. But if Ireland was an accident was it just deprived the party of the leadership of both its waiting to happen? Radical and Whig wings. It created a new party, the Each of these summaries is of course a caricature of Liberal Unionists, which maintained a parliamentary the views held on a complex issue but are offered as presence into the twentieth century. route-maps through the complex pot-pourri of prin- The crisis of is perhaps the most heavily ciples, personalities and power plays which follows. analysed of all incidents in late nineteenth-century politics but attention has been so much on the im- Gladstone’s umbrella plications for the two major parties that the signifi- After several fruitless attempts, the modern Liberal cance of the Liberal Unionists in their own right has Party was formed in out of a coalition of
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 5 Whigs, Radicals and Peelites with an- jointly by Lord Hartington in the domestic reform in a manner which cillary support from Irish members. Al- Commons and Lord Granville in the had not been necessary under his own though the majority of the party, even Lords. However, and perhaps inevitably, leadership of the party. The continuous then, described themselves simply as Gladstone could not keep out of poli- feuding within the cabinet required the Liberals, the terms Whig and Radical tics. The Bulgarian atrocities of continuation of Gladstone’s leadership continued to be used and can be a gave him the excuse he needed. His — only he was able to enjoy the confi- source of confusion in the struggles of return disrupted Hartington’s leader- dence of both sides and he provided the the s. ‘Whig’ was used not only for ship but Gladstone’s loathing for oratorical skills to give cohesion to the the small coterie of aristocratic families Disraeli’s (now Lord Beaconsfield’s) diversity of views within the wider of the ‘Cousinhood’ but more widely foreign policy, expressed through the party, the umbrella under which they all for those with links to the gentry and great Midlothian speechmaking cam- sheltered. land rather than industry, and often in- paign of –, made a second pre- While all concerned recognised the discriminately for any Liberal of mod- miership unavoidable. It also sowed the desirability of sheltering under the erate views. Similarly, ‘Radical’ covered seeds of the secession. umbrella, the tensions of working to- not only those of firm utilitarian views Shannon is highly critical of gether and the jockeying for the suc- but also those who argued vigorously Gladstone’s leadership in – but cession created the initial ingredients for one or more of the single-issue re- argues a convincing case. Gladstone for the crisis. The marked differences form campaigns. performed best leading from the front in in the personality of Gladstone, Despite the diversity of its parliamen- a positive campaign imbued with moral Hartington and Chamberlain are tary membership, the Liberals formed conviction. His victory in was seen as a further but frequently exag- the government between –, achieved on the negative theme of un- gerated complication. – and –. Disraeli’s – doing the evils of Beaconsfieldism. Con- Inevitably for senior Victorian politi- government was seen as a temporary sequently, he failed to give the cabinet a cians, all were rich. Gladstone inherited disturbance allowing the Liberal Party strong lead but despite continuously wealth from his merchant father but to recuperate from Gladstone’s great threatening, failed to retire. The failure had to make it work to help rescue his reforms. to lead was exasperated by Irish ob- wife’s family from financial embarrass- Following Palmerston’s death in struction in the Commons and by a di- ment. He had an establishment educa- , Gladstone had become the domi- vided government reaction to various tion and an early entry into politics. He nant personality in the party, and in foreign, especially colonial, events was extremely energetic both physi- spite of a crisis over the reform which forced themselves haphazardly cally and mentally and driven by an bill, its inevitable leader. His reforming onto the agenda. Into the vacuum cre- evangelical need to justify himself to his government of – came to grief ated stepped special-interest groups Maker. His movement from the Tory to over internal disputes on education with a variety of nostrums for reform. the Liberal Party did not undermine his policy and Ireland. Gladstone’s disgust In the cabinet, Joseph Chamberlain and desire to see the aristocracy play its full and, at sixty-five, a longing to spend a Charles Dilke were the spokesmen for part in the leadership of the nation. A retirement in settling accounts with action. The radicalism of Chamberlain high church Anglican, he derived con- God led him to resign the leadership of and Dilke was resisted by Hartington, siderable support from the noncon- the party in . He was succeeded who came to be seen as obstructive to formist masses. An efficient administra- tor and persuasive orator, it was spite- Gladstone addresses the cabinet in 1883, a rather fanciful artist’s impression. Chamber- fully thought that he was always able to lain is recognisable by his monocle, near the pillar. Hartington is second from the right convince himself that his self-interest with Harcourt to his right. was also the interest of the nation. Chamberlain and Hartington were of a younger generation, both in their early fifties in . Lord Hartington was heir to the Duke of Devonshire, one of the largest landowners in the country. Known for his keen interest in horse racing, he enjoyed a full social life, mix- ing with the Malborough House set sur- rounding the Prince of Wales. He con- veyed the impression that his involve- ment in politics was purely noblesse oblige, for which he had to endure endless en- nui. However, Reginald Brett, his former secretary, later Lord Esher, made it clear that ‘apart from politics he has no real interest in life; and cut off from them
6 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 he would be in reality as bored as he ap- pears to be by them’. Very straightfor- ward, with a ‘pulverising style of argu- ment’, he led by virtue of his position rather than through organisation, ora- tory or policy development. Joseph Chamberlain could not have been a greater contrast. His fortune was made in manufacturing in Birmingham. His political fortune grew from his dy- namic mayoralty of the city. He entered national politics through the organisa- tion of nonconformist protests over the Forster Education Act. His strength was in the efficient electoral organisation of Birmingham, which he was attempt- ing to expand into a national grassroots radical campaigning body through the Originally captioned ‘Brains, Birth and Brummagen’, this caricature shows Gladstone, National Liberal Federation (NLF). At Hartington and Chamberlain on the government front bench before the great divide. that time the NLF was very far from na- tional and was perceived more as a cau- • The wider electorate opened up to Gladstone government had lost the will cus forcing radical policies on to resistant Chamberlain and his allies the to live. The government had nearly moderates. While his sharp tongue and prospect of a radical Liberal Party fallen under the public uproar that fol- publicity-seeking gained him enemies, free of the drag of Whig/aristo- lowed General Gordon’s death at Khar- he was a prickly character, easily of- cratic influences. toum in February . Polite but ex- fended. Unlike Hartington, Chamber- • There was stiff competition to woo hausting argument continued over a lain was a complex man prone to ma- the new county electorate with range of issues in the cabinet and the noeuvre and to see plots in the actions of radical policies — particularly the government took the opportunity of a others. Ambitious, he sought leadership provision of municipal allotments budget defeat in June to give up for what he could accomplish and to (popularised as ‘Three Acres and a its seals. Quite why remains a mystery. wean the party away from Whiggish Cow’). As a corollary, Whig fears The Liberal leadership had been leanings. But it is important to recognise and disenchantments intensified, warned of the likelihood of defeat.Why that his differences with Hartington with some of the younger Whigs did they not tighten whipping? Why were purely political and that imperial- acting as a ginger group to offset did Irish Liberals support the rebels and ism was a common bond. the better organised radicals. risk hastening an election which would • The focus on the new electorate lead to their defeat? Why did the gov- The gage of battle seems to have diverted Liberal atten- ernment push the Home Rule Irish Two other key ingredients must be con- tion from the consequences of redis- MPs into the hands of the Tories? sidered — the election and Ireland. tribution on the boroughs and cities. Lord Salisbury formed a minority The Reform Act, which widened The creation of single-member seats Conservative administration with their the franchise in county constituencies, and the elimination of small bor- support and an election was called for was the major Liberal achievement of oughs worked against the Liberals, November but not before the al- – but it was passed only after a creating havens of ‘villa Tories’ in the ready convoluted Irish problem had confrontation with the House of Lords. suburbs. been given another twist. Speaking to the Annual Conference of • Most significantly, it was in no party’s the National Union of Conservative tactical interest to exclude Ireland ‘Ireland, Ireland! that Associations in , Randolph from the reform or to reduce the cloud in the west, that Churchill, a rising star of his party, de- number of Irish MPs in proportion 17 clared ‘Parliamentary reform is the gage to the population. It was also recog- coming storm’ of battle, and the Party which carries it nised that this would be to the ben- Since , Ireland had been a part but will have power for a quarter of a cen- efit of the Home Rule party at Lib- always an uncomfortable part of the tury’. His opponents shared Churchill’s eral expense. United Kingdom. Its MPs always view and were prepared to allow the To- formed a distinct group but for most of Following a reform act and the redistri- ries a significant part in the redistribu- the period allied to the other British bution, it was the convention that a tion of seats, in order to win a more political parties. Following a brief general election would be held soon af- democratic electorate. Fenian uprising in , Isaac Butt re- ter the preparation of new registers. But There were four important conse- newed efforts to create a constitutional before this happened, the second quences: party to win greater autonomy for Ire-
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 7 land. Under his reasoned leadership, who are forever seeking to some modest electoral success was discredit English rule in achieved. In , some fifty-nine Irish Ireland by the personal MPs were willing to describe them- ruin of the Minister who selves as Home Rulers but of these represents it in the probably thirty could be more appro- House.’ priately described as Liberals, eighteen Gladstone’s policy on previously sat as Liberals. Indeed, Ireland has been catego- McCalmont’s Poll Book, while happily rised by H. C. G. Matthew listing the appropriate MPs as Home as ‘coercion and concilia- Rulers in the constituency results, does tion’, heading off Irish not distinguish these Irishmen from agrarian violence by firm Liberals and Conservatives in the sum- action but seeking to meet mary tables even as late as . Irish grievances with the Charles Stuart Parnell, a Protestant objective of reconciling landlord, succeeded Butt but took time the Irish to their link with to consolidate his hold on the party. England. However, as Even before Butt’s death in , harshly but not inaccu- Home Rule MPs obstructing the House of Commons Parnell had not played by the rules. In rately characterised by during a coercion bill. Parliament, he ignored the conventions Salisbury, ‘every successive of debate, aiming to obstruct the instalment of concession was wrung upon. He will not stick to any mini- progress of any but sympathetic Irish from them by agitation on the other mum even if he could now be induced business. Outside parliament he devel- side, so that even the grace and value of to formulate another.’ Chamberlain’s oped a complex relationship with those their vicarious generosity, whatever it mistrust was shared by his fellow Bir- who preferred direct action and vio- may be, is absolutely lost’. In particular, mingham MP, John Bright, a radical of lence, not condoning the violence but Gladstone, who retained a touching faith an earlier generation. Of a conversation building on the grievances of both the in the paternalistic leadership role of the with Gladstone early in he records poor agricultural labourers and the ten- aristocracy, never succeeded in breaking ‘I thought he placed too much confi- ant farmers. These tactics were critical the link between the nationalist and dence in the leaders of the Rebel Party. I in consolidating agrarian grievances. could place none in them, and the gen- support for the The dissatisfac- eral feeling was and is that any terms Home Rule party Successive secretaries tion with Irish made with them would not be kept, among previous spend unshining hours policy was a signifi- and that, thro’ them, I could not hope Liberal voters and cant source of dis- for reconciliation with discontented in saying No to in the wider elec- content within the and disloyal Ireland.’ torate created by impossible demands, cabinet. Hartington, Lord Salisbury’s short minority ad- the Reform and hunting for plausible whose family were ministration added one more incendiary ingredient to the mix. Lord Carnarvon, Act. Hostility to answers to insoluble important Irish the Irish tactics was landowners, and Salisbury’s Viceroy for Ireland, had a se- crucial in the di- riddles. whose brother died cret meeting with Parnell in which he vide in the Liberal at the hands of Irish created an impression of empathy with Party in . terrorists, favoured the smack of firm Home Rule. (This was unauthorised The Liberal Government of – government. Forster resigned from the and was later repudiated by Salisbury was unprepared for Irish difficulties and government rather than see it brokering when it became public.) Parnell urged perplexed by the task. John Morley, who deals with Parnell. Irish electors on the mainland not to later held office as Irish Secretary, spoke of Chamberlain, unwilling to see coer- support the Liberals in the general elec- Lord Frederick Cavendish, Hartington’s cion as a lasting policy, opened his own tion and raised the ante in negotiations brother, spending the afternoon before channels to Parnell to develop schemes Mrs O’Shea undertook with Gladstone his assassination in ‘that grim apartment for local government. Unfortunately on his behalf. in Dublin Castle, where successive secre- his intermediary, Captain O’Shea, the taries spend unshining hours in saying husband of Parnell’s mistress Kitty, ‘Keep your ranks still, 27 No to impossible demands, and hunting proved to be a source of misinforma- firm and steady’ for plausible answers to insoluble rid- tion, leading Chamberlain to believe The election confounded Lord dles.’ G. O. Trevelyan, who succeeded that he had been double-crossed by Randolph’s prophecy and the expecta- Cavendish, wrote: ‘No-one could un- Parnell. Writing to Gladstone in Octo- tions of the other party leaders for a derstand what it is to be the representa- ber , he complained: ‘I cannot see large Liberal majority. On the back of tive of the central government in the my way at all about Ireland. Parnell has ‘Three Acres and a Cow’, the Liberals face of the false and unscrupulous men shown that he is not to be depended did well among the new county elec-
8 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 torate, though the new members were 31 as likely to be Whigs as radicals. The To- Table 1: Election Results 1880–1885 ries gained in the cities from the crea- Liberal Conservative Home Rule Majority tion of single-member seats and from 1880 359 238 63 58 Parnell’s boycott of English Liberals. By By-elections –19 17 2 some contemporary estimates – 1885 335 249 86 0 seats were lost to the Liberals by Irish intervention and, while modern com- putations suggest a figure as low as six, plined group than in . Parnell Since the Irish Home Rulers had Parnell had further alienated the party waited to be wooed. been siding with the Conservatives most likely to be sympathetic to his as- For each of the major Liberal lead- and no party had an independent ma- pirations. ers, leaving the Conservatives in and jority in the Commons, Lord Salis- As foreseen by Gladstone, the biggest vulnerable to Liberal votes on impor- bury determined to meet the new gainers were the Irish Nationalists in- tant measures looked the most attrac- House in government. But he too creasing representation from sixty-five tive option. But beyond a shared inter- was content to bide his time and, un- ahead of the election to eighty-six, a est in not renewing their own quarrels like Disraeli in similar circumstances, clear majority of the Irish seats and their motivations were very different. Salisbury neither sought to outflank a majority even within Ulster. Con- Hartington was comfortable with Tory Gladstone in bidding for Irish sup- servatives held eighteen Irish seats in policies and would have been happy to port nor rushed to entice the moder- compared to twenty-six in . back tough Irish coercion proposals. ate Liberals. The Liberals were eliminated. His greatest anxiety following the elec- Who knows what would have hap- T. A. Jenkins argues that Chamber- tion was to obtain a face-to-face meet- pened if Liberal nerves had held but, in lain was the biggest loser. His push to ing of the Liberal leadership to secure a the critical period between the elec- create a Radical party independent of coordinated approach. Chamberlain tion results in November and the the Whigs had failed. Jenkins also makes thought the Irish would be more ame- meeting of the House in January , a good case of continued commitment nable to Liberal proposals when they the course of history was transformed by the aristocratic Whigs to Liberalism had had a sustained taste of Tory rule. by some ill-omened spin doctoring. In during the campaign. Gladstone, already secretly convinced December, Gladstone’s son Herbert, Far from winning an overwhelming of the necessity for Home Rule and apparently concerned by fears of majority, the Liberals had slipped back. believing that the Tories were willing to Chamberlain’s rivalry to his father, Parliament was hung. Table One sum- concede, thought that Tory-led propos- briefed the press on his father’s con- marises the results for the and als supported on an all-party basis version to Home Rule. elections. However, the bare num- would be the best solution. bers are slightly misleading. The Liberal majority for – was generally better than indicated. Firstly, party alle- The Liberal leadership sheltering under the Gladstonian umbrella. Chamberlain is forging giance was sometimes secondary to lo- ahead with the Unauthorised Programme. Hartington, holding Gladstone’s hand, is cal factors and secondly the Home dragging his heels while John Bright brings up the rear. Rulers of were not a homogenous group and some had a stronger alle- giance to the government than to Parnell — only twenty-thee voted for Parnell’s leadership of the party, with eighteen against. The arithmetic suggests that a Con- servative government would not be able to maintain itself in office for any length of time and certainly under modern party disciplines it would have quickly failed. However for Gladstone, who could never rely on the discipline of his own side and whose political maturity had been gained during the confused party poli- tics of the Crimean War, bringing down the Tories would not have been the prime consideration. The Home Rulers of were a better disci-
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 9 keep my counsel’. of the leadership to Hartington. Failure Hoping to exploit would give Hartington the chance to the Liberal divisions, initiate or support a policy more to his the Conservatives own liking. lost the support of By March the ‘enquiry’ had turned the Irish during the into proposals for draft legislation on debate on the Home Rule and a land purchase Queen’s speech, by scheme. Gladstone’s penchant for bold taking up coercion. leadership had reasserted itself. At this In part, they were point Chamberlain and Trevelyan re- outmanoeuvred. signed from the cabinet and the road The Liberals de- to the split was open. Gladstone had feated them not on hoped that a ‘slow fermentation in Ireland but on a many minds, working towards the final ‘Three Acres and a product’ would convince his col- Cow’ amendment leagues of his policy and it can be ar- put down by Cham- gued that for the bulk of the party it berlain’s lieutenant worked. There was little enthusiasm Jesse Collings. for Home Rule but, for most, a Gladstone formed grudging acceptance of Gladstone’s his third govern- proposals and a willingness to trust the ment proposing ‘to old leader were sufficient. examine whether it For Chamberlain it was inadequate. is or not practicable’ His presence in the government had to introduce a ‘Leg- maintained his status in the party and Chamberlain and Hartington resisting the summons of islative body, to sit in he had hoped either to convince the Gladstone at the end of the 1885 election campaign. Dublin’. On this government to return to his scheme of basis he was able to extensive but purely local government entice Chamberlain for Ireland or to promote land purchase ‘Men like these will lead, into office and bought time to further as an alternative, not a supplement, to his party’s education. Home Rule. In this he had failed. not school us’ But not all were taken in. The Whig Despite its crucial importance, Ireland rebellion had begun. Eighteen Liberals ‘In their ranks, spread had not played a dominant part in the voted against Collings’ motion and a wild distraction’ election where on the Conservative further forty-nine abstained or were The revelation of Gladstone’s plans side a low-key approach best preserved absent without a pair. Two Independent opened a vigorous debate. On April freedom of action and, among Liberals, Liberals also abstained. This was a sub- the first reading debate of the Home the greatest debate had been between stantial proportion of the margin of Rule bill began and, unusually by mod- advocates and opponents of Chamber- Liberals over the Conservatives. Sixteen ern standards, was spread over four days. lain’s Unauthorised Programme. In- of the eighteen who voted against, and Within the Liberal Party, the opponents deed, Gladstone’s Irish policy has been both the Independent Liberals, subse- of Home Rule began conspicuously to described as ‘a night cavalry ride around quently also voted against Home Rule organise their resistance. Nevertheless, the flank of his own army’. In defence, and stood as Liberal Unionists. This the period up to the second reading in Shannon has highlighted Mr G’s at- group was predominantly from the the middle of May (deliberately?) pro- tempts to prepare his colleagues, and in moderate end of the party. Twnety-four vided the opportunity for negotiations particular Hartington, for what of the abstainers and two who were and compromise as the scale of the po- Gladstone saw as inevitable. His ob- paired were also Home Rule rebels. Of tential rebellion became known. lique style left Hartington perplexed the previous Liberal cabinet, not only From the beginning, Hartington set and the party in consternation when Hartington but Lord Selborne, Lord his heart against the bill, speaking in the Herbert launched his ‘kite’. The kite Derby, Lord Northbrook (from among first reading debate on April. On also doomed Gladstone’s efforts (always the moderates) and Bright (from the April, he shared a platform with Salis- likely to be futile) to persuade Salisbury, radical wing) declined to serve. bury at the Opera House, Haymarket, through his nephew Arthur Balfour, to Pledged to oppose Home Rule with Peter Rylands to represent the adopt Home Rule. himself, Hartington at least was initially radicals. The meeting was chaired by Extraordinarily, even in January willing to stand on the sidelines while Lord Cowper, a former Liberal Lord , Gladstone tried to maintain the the government tried its experiment. A Lieutenant of Ireland and attended by fiction of ‘freedom of action’ and as ‘an success for Gladstone would open the three other Liberal peers and fourteen old Parliamentary hand’ intended ‘to way for his retirement and a reversion
10 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 dissenting Liberal MPs in addition to a tantly, the moment came and went with sixty-four MPs present and nine selection of Tory luminaries. Three without the concessions Chamberlain letters of regret. This demonstrated the other Liberal peers and three MPs sent had expected. Why? growing collusion between the two apologies. Hartington’s boats were Gladstone remained optimistic unionist wings as Chamberlain at- burnt but joint meetings were too great throughout the process. In mid-April tended with eighteen of those from his a novelty for grassroots Liberals and he was described by Hamilton as ‘full of own meeting and spoke. The extensive there was no repeat. A meeting of dissi- confidence and determination’, arguing and prestigiously Whig, Liberal Union- dent Liberal peers was held in Lord that ‘if the bill is carried by a small ma- ist Committee was unveiled on May, Derby’s house on April attended by jority (say twenty), he will consider it a featuring twenty-five peers, including , with letters of support from a fur- defeat.’ Did this optimism influence five dukes, and twenty-eight MPs. ther . There was a steady stream of Gladstone’s judgement? It is more The proceedings and attendees at Whig resignations from Household ap- likely, he recognised that concessions to these caucus meetings were openly re- pointments. Chamberlain would be ‘treated as an ported in the newspapers and the gov- On April the Liberal Unionists acknowledgement of his superior ernment can have had no illusions as to proved they meant business by estab- greatness & wisdom, the scale of oppo- lishing that sine qua non of British & as fresh point of sition to the bill. politics a ‘Committee’. In addition, an departure accord- ‘Never, never, never’. Following the office was set up, at Spring Gardens, ingly’. Most prob- meeting at Dev- to form, as George Goschen put it to able of all, as Herbert reported to onshire House, The Times thoughtfully Lord Wolmer, ‘a centre whence infor- Labouchere, it was ‘because father had provided a list not only of those attend- mation can be given, and whither not sufficiently mastered the difficulties ing the ‘private’ meeting but also fur- news can be carried.’ Hartington en- which presented themselves to his ther lists of those declared and probable trusted the organisation to three mind.’ Where Gladstone did not want opponents of the government’s bills. young Whig MPs, H. R. Brand (the to make progress, none doubted his According to this report there were son of the Speaker), Craig Sellar and ability to find difficulties in the detail. likely opponents, supporters and Albert Grey. For Chamberlain this was the final thirty Liberals undeclared. The radical wing of the unionists, straw. ‘The attempt at a compromise Gladstone was never an enthusiast hesitated as to an appropriate strategy. having come to an end under circum- for party meetings and it is a measure of The seizure of control of the National stances which almost amounted to a the government’s desperation that he Liberal Federation by Gladstonian ac- breach of faith’, he set about consoli- was persuaded to address a meeting at tivists on May must have acted as dating the opposition among his own the Foreign Office on May. The in- warning of the strength of grass roots supporters. On May a meeting was vitation was extended to those ‘in fa- opinion. Labouchere, a loyalist radical held at Prince’s Gardens, Chamber- vour of the establishment of a legislative MP, an inveterate gossip and deal bro- lain’s South Kensington home, at- body in Dublin for the management of ker, appointed himself intermediary tended by fifty to sixty MPs, plus ten affairs specifically and exclusively between Chamberlain and the govern- letters of sympathy, out of sixty to sev- Irish’ — discouraging to hard-line ment. Chamberlain cleverly focused enty invited. opponents but flexible to waverers. the debate on retaining Irish members Two days later Lord Hartington ar- responded. The conciliatory tone, effec- at Westminster, an ancestor of the West ranged a meeting at Devonshire House tively killing land reform while keeping Lothian question. Cleverly, because the presence of the Irish MPs at Westmin- Chamberlain gains the backing of his local, Birmingham, party to butcher Gladstone’s ster was the key symbol of Imperial Irish bills. unity and more cynically, getting rid of the Irish members and their obstructive tactics was possibly the most attractive feature of the whole bill to uncommit- ted Liberals. A concession to Chamber- lain would probably have alienated as many as it reconciled. Nevertheless, at one time, it was believed that Gladstone would make sufficient concessions to prevent Chamberlain’s group slipping into opposition. Gladstone opened the second reading debate on May. It is generally agreed that this speech did not match the standards either of his first reading contribution or the June winding-up speech but more impor-
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 11 the door open to Irish representation at defeat, simply abandoning the policy, solution?’ ‘He had no doubt that an im- Westminster, and the offer to recast the could not be reconciled with any mediate appeal, attended as it might be bill after a second reading vote of prin- Victorian sense of honour. with risks, was preferable to any appear- ciple won over some of the doubters. • Retirement to allow the reformation ance of “showing the white-feather” … Two days later, in a moment of of a Liberal government under The Tories might gain more seats than Thatcherite vehe- Hartington would they would lose … but Mr G would mence, the game ‘All the world over I will have appealed to come back at any rate with a more was lost. Baited the dissidents. Be- united party of his own.’ This argu- across the chamber back the masses against fore the event, it ment gelled well with Gladstone’s own by Michael Hicks the classes.’ was the outcome thoughts as expressed in a letter to Sir Beach and Lord they imagined. But Joseph Pease a few days earlier: ‘… the Randolph it was not in keep- body of the nation, so far as we can Churchill that in order to stay in office ing with the fighting character dis- judge, has hailed our imperfect efforts the government would ‘reconstruct’ the played by Gladstone throughout his with enthusiasm.’ Hamilton, a senior Home Rule bill, Gladstone responded: career. civil servant, himself put the case ‘Never, never, never’. • Resignation would have bought against dissolution and for delay, as late Chamberlain called another meeting time. The Tories, even if backed by as June, without success. Gladstone of his supporters on May in Com- the dissidents, would need time to was, as Churchill declaimed a few mittee Room of the House where establish a minority government weeks later, ‘an old man in a hurry’. he put the choice of walking out or and formulate a policy before call- The contemporary Gladstonian voting against. He then read a letter ing an election. If the Conservatives view of the election is summarised by from John Bright, announcing the old could not form a government, Morley. ‘No election was ever fought radical leader’s decision to vote against, Gladstone would have bought time more keenly, and never did so many though apparently advocating others to and demonstrated that there was no powerful men fling themselves with abstain and ward off dissolution. alternative. livelier activity into a great struggle … Bright’s action spoke louder than his • An immediate dissolution would test Mr Gladstone’s plume waved in every words. Only three of the fifty-five the public popularity of Home Rule part of the field … The incomparable present were willing to support the bill, and optimisti- thirteen voted for abstention and cally drive the One of the key factors behind the break up of the party in 1886 thirty-nine to oppose. No further talks dissidents into was Gladstone’s reluctance to retire. or pleas prevailed. the wilderness. ‘Every man in combat Clear evidence ex- ists that the alterna- straining’ tives were can- The cabinet met the day after the defeat vassed. On and resolved to ask the Queen to dis- April, Hamilton solve parliament. An election was called records a conversa- for July. This decision was reached tion with Lord quickly and with little dissent within Rosebery, the government. Historians have passed Gladstone’s even- by equally speedily. Yet it should be tual successor, ‘He considered the most damaging devel- would much prefer opment to Liberal unity in the whole Mr G’s resigning. A dispute. Each of the previous Liberal dissolution would governments, in , and , split the Liberal had been ended by internal rebellion Party into smither- but in each case time was bought for eens.’ On May, the hard feelings to soften, for new Gladstone met rallying calls to be found. On these with the Chief earlier occasions Liberals were not Whip, Arnold called to fight Liberals. Morley, and Francis Characteristically, Gladstone’s case in Schnadhorst, the cabinet was based on precedent and chief agent and constitutional propriety but it is equally ‘arch-wirepuller’. clear that it had a strong political base. Schnadhorst was What were his alternatives? asked directly: ‘dis- • Staying in office after such a major solution or no dis-
12 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 that ‘one more heave’ would resolve the 58 Table 2: Election Results 1886 Irish conundrum was not shattered un- Conservative Liberal Gladstonian Home Rule til Gladstone’s retirement nearly ten Unionist Liberal years later. At the dissolution 251 101 232 86 July 1886 317 77 191 85 ‘And the fight be won’ Gains/Losses 66 –24 –41 –1 The Liberal Unionists had won. They had preserved British imperial unity. effort was in vain. The sons of Zeruiah the dissidents and ,, for the But the consequence was not what were too hard for him, and England Conservatives but since the uncon- they expected. Gladstone neither re- was unconvinced.’ Although unop- tested seats meant that there were tired nor did the loyalist Liberals aban- posed, Gladstone carried out the by ,, fewer votes than in it don his policy. Despite the narrow base now traditional oratorical assault on was not a true test of electoral feeling. of their disagreement with the majority Mid-Lothian. But he extended his The uncontested seats favoured the of the party, the Unionists had been speechmaking to Glasgow, Manchester Conservatives over Liberals by about forced to establish a new electoral or- and Liverpool (where he declared ‘all : though only one seat, Lincolnshire– ganisation at short notice. The dissi- the world over I will back the masses East Lindsey, changed hands by this dents had fought and survived the gen- against the classes’, earning the method. The Liberal Unionists faced no eral election, even holding the balance Queen’s rebuke). He stood for Leith as contest in twenty-nine seats but it was of power in the Commons. This guar- well as Mid-Lothian to drive out W. the Irish Nationalists who faced the anteed their continued importance at Jacks, a dissident who had recanted but fewest contests. Westminster. turned coat a third time. However, Gladstone resigned rather than meet In part their electoral survival re- this frantic activity by a seventy-six the new House. His ambition for one flected the loyalty of constituents to es- year-old leader and his opponents was last great achievement had brought fail- tablished members and in part the elec- not matched by the same dedication in ure, a noble failure, for which Ireland toral pact with the Conservatives. But the constituencies, out of the continues to pay. He had also failed to there are reasons to suggest they had were uncontested compared to thirty- obliterate the dissidents. In the Com- prospects of long-term survival. Geo- nine in . mons the loss was largely numerical. graphically, Unionists were strong in Preparations on the other side had The social background of MPs was not Devon, Cornwall, parts of Scotland begun early. In March, Salisbury and substantially changed. They continued (especially around Glasgow) and East Hartington had opened talks, with to represent every type of constituency Lancashire — areas where a more mili- parallel discussions between Cham- though there had been a retreat from tantly Protestant tradition continued to berlain and Churchill, and by early the high water mark in the counties have an influence. Chamberlain’s or- April had agreed an electoral pact. To- and Liberals would become more reli- ganisational skills ensured a solid block ries would not stand against incum- ant on the Welsh and Scots who also of loyal unionist voters in the West bent Liberal Unionists in exchange for harboured hopes of devolution. The Midlands. But as with so many defect- encouragement for Liberal Unionist desertion of the Whig Lords was im- ing groups of MPs, they lacked both the supporters to vote Conservative else- portant. The residual Liberals could organisational and ideological strength where. With considerable effort by the only muster forty-one for the vote in to hope to form a majority party. To ry whips against the natural inclina- the Lords on the second Home Rule With the editor’s permission, the tion of local Conservative associations, bill. The loss of the peers was also felt in tale of this dilemma will be told in a the deal held. Only three Liberal Un- the wealth of the party both centrally future issue. ionists faced a Tory opponent, includ- and locally. Worse, the election had To ny Little is Secretary of the Liberal ing Salisbury’s son-in-law Lord given the Liberal Party a clear leader- Democrat History Group and a regular con- Wolmer, though as many as eight oth- ship and purpose and had left it tantalis- tributor to the Journal. ers stood down in the face of Con- ingly close to its ambition. The illusion servative hostility. A Radical Union- ist Association was formed on June. In the outcome, parliament was Table 3: Liberal Unionist Results again hung, and while the consolation The Fate of the Rebels Liberal Unionist Victories for Liberals was that even in these most adverse circumstances the Conserva- Returned unopposed 25 Returned for existing seat 62 tives could not quite win a majority, the Returned in contest 37 Abstainers joining LUs 4 Abstainers joining LUs New members replacing LUs balance of power had shifted. The over- Abstainers joining LUs 4 New members replacing LUs 3 Beaten by Gladstonians 12 Won from Gladstonians 7 all results of the election are shown in Beaten by Conservatives 2 Won from Irish Nationalists 1 Table Two. Retired 21 The popular vote was ,, for the Gladstonian Liberals, , for Total 101 Total 77
Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000 13 1 Quoted in J Morley, Life of William Ewart Brack et al Dictionary of Liberal Biography, Po- 1833–1908, Longmans 1911, Vol.II, p95 et Gladstone, 1903. liticos, 1998. seq. Gladstone was equally reluctant to call a 2 Quoted in H C G Matthew, Gladstone 1875– 15 Ld Randolph Churchill, Speech 2 October meeting. 1898, Oxford, 1995, p255. 1883. Cited in P Marsh The Discipline of Popu- 33 J Chamberlain, A Political Memoir, ed C H D 3This thesis is intriguingly set out in A B Cooke lar Government, The Harvester Press, 1978. Howard, The Batchworth Press 1953. and J Vincent The Governing Passion: Cabinet 16 In August 1884, Gladstone estimated that the 34 M R D Foot, The Hawarden Kite, recently re- Government and Party Politics in Britain 1885– Irish ‘so called National Party’ would increase its printed in Journal of Liberal Democrat History, 86 Hassocks 1974 numbers from ‘a little over forty to near eighty’. No. 20, 1998. 4For example see G Goodman Liberal Unionism: H C G Matthew, Gladstone 1875–1898, Oxford 35 T W Heyck, op cit. The Revolt of the Whigs, Victorian Studies, 1995, p 180. 36 R T Shannon, Gladstone, Heroic Minister 1865– 1959. 17 Gladstone in a letter to his wife, 12 October 1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, 5For an analysis of the Whig commitment to Lib- 1845 p374 et seq eralism prior to the Home Rule crisis see T A 18 Alan O’Day, Irish Home Rule 1867–1921, Man- 37 House of Commons 21 January 1886. Jenkins Gladstone, Whiggery and the Liberal chester University Press,1988, p38. O’Day 38 Gladstone, memo reprinted in H C G Matthew, Party, 1874–1886, Oxford 1988. The Radical analyses all the attempts to secure Home Rule Gladstone 1875–1898, Oxford 1995, p239. wing of the party is less well served. T W Heyck, up to the creation of the Irish Free State 39 Gladstone to Granville 9 December 1885 in A The Dimensions of British Radicalism, Univer- 19 J Vincent and M Stenton (ed) McCalmont’s Par- Ramm (ed) The Political Correspondence of Mr sity of Illinois Press 1974 contains a useful statis- liamentary Poll Book, reprinted by Harvester Gladstone and Lord Granville, 1876–1886, Ox- tical analysis but hits the wrong tone in its analy- Press 1971. ford, 1962 vol II p414. sis of issues and the complexity of views within 20 Eg in the Land War of 1880/82 from which we 40 A typical response was that of Sir W Harcourt, the party derive the term ‘boycott’. Chancellor of the Exchequer, gossiping with 6For the classic analysis of the composition of the 21 J Morley, The Life of William Ewart Gladstone, Hamilton, a former secretary to Gladstone, 30 party in the mid-century see John Vincent, The 1903 Vol III, p67. January 1886: ‘We none of us believe in Mr.G’s Formation of the British Liberal Party 1858–67, 22 Trevelyan to Gladstone 20 August 1883 quoted plan; but we have no alternative policy to sug- Hassocks 1976. in T W Heyck, op cit gest.’ D W R Bahlman (ed) The Diary of Sir 7 See R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minister 23 H C G Matthew, Gladstone and Ireland, Journal Edward Walter Hamilton, 1885–1906, The Uni- 1865–1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, of Liberal Democrat History, No. 20, 1998. versity of Hull Press, 1993, p21. 1999. For further detail see Shannon Gladstone 24 Ld Salisbury, Speech in Liverpool, April 1882. P 41 The Times 15 April 1886 and the Bulgarian Agitation 1876, Thomas Nel- Marsh, op cit 42 D G Boyce (ed), The Crisis of British Unionism, son, 1963. 25 Letter 26 October 1885. J L Garvin, The Life of The Historians’ Press, 1987, p10. 8R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minister 1865– Joseph Chamberlain, MacMillan 1933, Vol II, p 43 14 April. D W R Bahlman (ed) op cit, p34. 1898, Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1999, pas- 114. 44 Cited in R T Shannon Gladstone, Heroic Minis- sim. 26 20 March 1886. R A J Walling (ed) The Diaries ter 1865–1898, p429 9For a fuller development of this argument see D of John Bright, Cassell, 1930, p537. Later he re- 45 11 May 1886. Cited in J Chamberlain, A Political A Hamer Liberal Politics in the Age of Gladstone fers to Home Rulers as ‘the criminal gang in Memoir, p217–8. and Rosebery, Oxford, 1972. Parlt. and in Ireland.’ p557. 46 Chamberlain, op cit p219. 10 Caught up in the Crawford divorce scandal, 27 This and subsequent sub-headings are taken 47 The Times 13th May reports on Chamberlain’s which effectively ended his political career, from The Liberal March as in the Liberator Song meeting; 15th May on Hartington’s; 24th May on Dilke played a minor part in the crisis. Book 10th Edition 1995. the Liberal Unionist Committee. 11 In October 1891, Lord Salisbury wrote to his 28 Alan O’Day, op cit. 48 J Morley, op cit vol III, p332 nephew ‘Hartington is at Newmarket and all po- 29 T A Jenkins, op cit. 49 Chamberlain’s whip, W S Caine, estimated that litical arrangements have to be hung up till some 30 Chamberlain had forecast ‘The Tories will be after this meeting thirty dissidents were lost or quadruped has run faster than some other smashed and the Whigs will be extinguished.’ shaky. Chamberlain, op cit p 222. quadruped.’ (R H Williams (ed) The Salisbury- To A J Mundella, 7 October 1885 in T W Heyck, 50 J Morley op cit, vol III, p335. Chamberlain, op cit Balfour Correspondence 1869–1892 op cit. p 222. Hertforshire Record Publications, 1988) 31 1880 Figures taken from Alan O’Day op cit. By- 51 For the text of the letter see Chamberlain, op cit 12 M V Brett (ed), Journals and Letters of Reginald election data from McCalmont’s Parliamentary p 224. Viscount Esher, Vol 1, Ivor Nicholson & Watson, Poll Book. 1885 results from The Liberal Year 52 D W R Bahlman (ed) op cit p 35, p37–8. 1934, p125. Book, 1918 cited in McCalmont’s Parliamentary 53 Gladstone to Pease 15 May 1886. Cited in Shan- 13 Op cit Vol 2 p299 Poll Book. non op cit p434. 14. For a fuller profile of the Liberal leaders see D 32 B Holland, Life of the Duke of Devonshire 54 J Morley op cit, vol III, p342–5 55 Jacks remained inconsistent. Gladstone relin- quished Leith for Mid-Lothian. Jacks unsuccess- fully contested the by election as a Liberal Un- ionist but successfully fought Stirlingshire as a Contribute to History Group Gladstonian Liberal in 1892. 56 McCalmont’s Parliamentary Poll Book op cit, In- troduction pxix publications 57 P Marsh op cit p112. Are you interested in helping producethe Journal of Liberal Democrat History, and other 58 For the state of the parties at the dissolution I have added to the Liberal Unionists, who voted Liberal Democrat History Group publications? We are looking for volunteers to help with against Home Rule, known opponents who ab- the following: stained or who later stood as Unionists. Ab- stainers whose allegiance was unknown or who • Book reviews for the Journal – any book of relevance to the histories of the Liberal stood as loyalists were added to the 228 who Democrats, Liberal Party or SDP. voted for the bill. A petition at Ipswich had cost the Liberals two seats in April 1886, preventing • Sources of photos and cartoons for the Journal. Chamberlain’s lieutenant Collings voting against Home Rule. The Liberal Unionist out- • Interviewers, and ideas for interviewees, for a major new publication, Liberal come is sometimes stated as seventy-nine but Century: an oral history of twentieth century Liberalism (due out in 2001 or 2002). this includes two Tories who adopted the Un- ionist label as a convenience. Volunteers are always welcome – please contact the Editor, Duncan Brack, at the 59 For a detailed analysis see W C Lubenow, Parlia- address on page 2. mentary Politics and the Home Rule Crisis, Ox- ford 1988.
14 Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25: Winter 1999–2000