The 'Engine-Coach Car' Dilemma: MAPAI's Discourse on Class, Ethnicity, and Modernization

Chapter 2 The ‘Engine-Coach Car’ Dilemma: MAPAI’s Discourse on Class, Ethnicity, and Modernization

The critical dilemma in which MAPAI was embroiled during the 1950s was characteristic of new nation states during post-WWII decolonization. What we have chosen to title the ‘engine-coach cars’ dilemma posed the following question: should the political leadership of a newly sovereign state aspiring to become a ‘modern society’ reinforce its middle-class ‘engine’ with economic advantage and social prestige—even at the cost of significant, intergenera- tional inequality to the detriment of its proletariat ‘coach cars’? (Todaro 2003) The socio-economic advancement of Israel’s white-collar workers meant acute inequality between an Ashkenazi middle-class, comprised mostly of veteran Israelis and a core group of university-educated professionals, and new oriental Jewish immigrants from Muslim countries in West Asia and North Africa who were quickly expanding the lower strata of Israeli society (Svirsky 1995; Nahon 1993, 50–75; Lissak 1999). The alternative, i.e. supporting the ‘coach cars’ by curbing the ‘engine’s’ progress, would limit inequality between the two increasingly distinct classes. At least in terms of its wage policy, it is quite evident that MAPAI leadership adopted this alternative as a core component of its socio-economic program. Our contention is that in the nation-building context of 1950s Israel, MAPAI grappled with ascertaining the ‘suitable’ degree of inequality between the Ashkenazi middle-class and the oriental proletariat, eventually opting to cur- tail the expansion of social inequality in the wage domain. Discussing the ‘engine-coach cars’ dilemma can elucidate the forma- tive influences on MAPAI’s political and ideological trajectory during early Israeli statehood. Could this Party, which had led the yishuv through the crucial pre-state period as well as its first post-statehood decades, now be characterized as a ‘workers’ party’ in terms of its social composition and post-statehood interests? Did its leaders champion a strictly socialist ideol- ogy, or cultivate a middle-class in pursuit of academic professions? Were MAPAI’s ‘labor-party’ nature and outwardly socialist approach mere tools of the political elite as they established the Jewish nation-state? (Sternhell 1995) If so, was MAPAI a dominant party representing Ashkenazi interests and therefore a vehicle of control over the oriental immigrants from west- ern Asia and North Africa?

The Expansion of MAPAI and the Shift in Its Social Approach

During Israel’s first years of statehood, MAPAI developed into an all-inclusive party of the masses, primarily by penetrating a variety of social and economic organizations (Medding 1972, 19–81), and significantly expanding its membership base and the many socio-economic groups under its auspices.1 It evolved into a party that represented diverse socio-political groups, including indus- trial workers, bureaucratic officials and clerks, white-collar workers, members of agricultural settlements, veteran Israelis, and immigrants from various countries. In the early years of sovereignty, the Party established various de- partments that corresponded with specific social and ethnic groups within its operational headquarters, a development that reflected MAPAI’s evolution into an entity that centralized diverse social interests, and worked to bridge between them (Bareli 2014). Along with its strategic expansion objectives, MAPAI sought to preserve its ‘worker’s party’ orientation by maintaining its ties with the Histadrut. In addi- tion to its core trade-unions base, the Histadrut was comprised of agricultural cooperatives, welfare organizations, cultural and educational organizations, and various industries. A crucial pre-independence umbrella organization, the Histadrut became even more powerful once the State was established. There was a degree of tension between MAPAI’s expansion objectives and its workers party identity and affiliation with the Histadrut. The expansion trend of the early 1950’s drove several Party members and groups to propose that middle-class members (‘working intelligentsia,’ small business-owners, and artisans) be permitted to join the Party and realize the right to autonomous institutional organization. However, even those who employed few workers were barred from membership in the Histadrut and therefore, automatically excluded from MAPAI. In 1950, a proposal was made to nullify the policy stating that only Histadrut members, who do not function as employers, may join MAPAI (see, e.g., LPA June 18, 1950; LPA Feb. 17, 1951). Opponents of the proposal were troubled by the prospect of ‘internal differentiation within the ranks of MAPAI membership, as this might obscure the socialist, proletariat nature of the Party’ (LPA Feb. 17, 1951).2

1 On 1 September 1953, MAPAI had 132,472 members—a growth rate of about 11.5%. During the years 1949–1953, the number of MAPAI members grew more than 340 percent. Bareli (2014). 2 For another example of the opposition that prevailed among MAPAI circles in the field see Fridkin (April 17, 1951, 24).