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CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh Ben Hillmani

Executive Summaryii

Since Indonesia's return to democracy, only national parties with a cross-regional organisational basis have been allowed to contest elections. Local political parties are restricted from contesting even local elections, making Indonesia unique in the world of multiparty democracies. Despite widespread antipathy to local political parties in Indonesia, the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) paved the way for parties representing exclusively local interests to contest provincial legislative elections in Aceh in April 2009. In a major test for Indonesia’s democratic political system, the local party representing the former rebels secured an impressive victory in those elections. CDI PPS 2010/01 PPS CDI

Based on a province-wide survey of voters in Aceh and in-depth interviews with local and national party leaders, this study examines the Aceh Party victory and its implications for Jakarta-Aceh relations. The study finds that, while the introduction of local political parties in Aceh represents a milestone for peace The CDI Policy Paper and democracy in Aceh, new policies are needed if local political parties are to be series focuses on pressing issues of political securely integrated into Indonesia’s broader political party system. governance in the Asia- Pacific region. The series BACKGROUND – THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN ACEH publishes original papers commissioned by CDI, each of which deal with Since Indonesia’s return to multiparty democracy in 1999, only political parties important issues for with a nation-wide organisational basis have been allowed to contest elections. policymakers interested Under the revised Law on Political Parties (Law No 2/2008), a political party must in issues of democracy, governance and political maintain branches in 60 per cent of the country’s provinces as well as offices in at institutions. The papers least 50 per cent of districts and municipalities within those provinces.iii Revisions feature new research and to the law on political parties have made it increasingly tough for new parties to policy recommendations, and aim to forge research- enter the system. to-policy links and provide new insights and analysis Along with an accompanying parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent, the law is on subjects of concern designed to restrict the entry of smaller parties into parliament. These laws have to CDI. been motivated by concerns about fragmentation, but also by a historical fear of

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

local political parties. Since the collapse of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, 2 local parties have been associated with regionalism and disunity. In 1998, when the fall of the Suharto regime energised separatist movements at both ends of the archipelago, lawmakers were particularly determined to ensure that democratic reforms denied entry to local parties with regionally-specific electoral agendas.

In addition to countering secessionism, promoting nationally-focussed parties was also seen as an important component of democratic development. As Benjamin Reilly has argued in the CDI-sponsored book Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies, building national-organised, policy-based parties remains a pre-eminent task for successful national government. Particularly in new democracies, broad- based national parties are “one of the primary channels for building accountable and responsive government”.iv

Yet despite these goals, and the widespread antipathy toward local parties in post- Suharto Indonesia, policymakers were forced to revisit the issue in the context of peace negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Jakarta. Groups connected with the Free Aceh Movement had been fighting the Indonesian state since the 1970s, but a permanent peace looked possible in the first half of 2005. During peace talks brokered by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisari, GAM for the first time indicated a willingness to relinquish demands for independence in return for the right to participate in the governing of an autonomous Aceh. GAM representatives argued that they should be allowed to form a political party to facilitate their entry into the political system. While this idea was initially rejected by the Government of Indonesia, GAM was offering an irresistible prize—an end to the decades-long separatist movement in Indonesia’s westernmost province.

Opposition to the local party idea was strong during the first rounds of negotiations. Former president Megawati Sukarnoputri argued publicly at the time that local parties were a threat to Indonesia’s national integrity. Citing local political parties in Spain and Canada as examples, Megawati argued that local political parties in Indonesia would also be vehicles for separatism.v Her stance was echoed by other prominent national leaders including former president Abdurrahman Wahid, former House Speakers Agung Laksono and Akbar Tanjung, as well as the head of Nahdlatul Ulama Hasyim Muzadi. Centre for Democratic According to a Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) survey, 75.8 per cent of InstitutionsIndonesians also opposed the re-emergence of local political parties.vi A further 76.2Research per Schoolcent of Social Sciences were specifically opposed to local political parties in Aceh. AccordingAustralian to political National analyst Rizal Sukma, the survey results reflected public fears that localUniversity political parties would lead to national disintegration, concern that the governmentCanberra ACT had 0200 AUSTRALIA been too generous in its negotiations with GAM, and lingering suspicion that GAM remained committed to independence for Aceh.vii

Other voices, however, pointed to increasing evidence that local political parties could serve as vehicles for conflict management and prevention. A number of human rights and other civil society groups supported the local political party

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option. iiiiii Acehnese lawmaker and former Minister for Justice and Human Rights Hasballah M. Saad argued that it would be difficult to secure long-term peace if 3

former combatants were forced to join national parties. ivvvivii Because GAM had no linkages with national political parties, he argued that the right to form a local political party in Aceh was the only viable means of extending political rights to viii

GAM and facilitating the former rebels’ stable entry into mainstream politics.

Antipathy toward GAM’s demands for a local political party brought peace negotiations to the brink of collapse because GAM refused to budge on the issue. Eventually, recognising a historical opportunity to end the conflict in Aceh once and for all, Government of Indonesia negotiators led by Vice President Jusuf Kalla and backed by President Bambang Yudhyono conceded to GAM’s demands. In a major victory for GAM negotiators, the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 promised to create “ the political legal conditions necessary for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh ”. ix

THE LAW ON GOVERNING ACEH AND THE NEW LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES

Debates on the local party issue continued to simmer even after the signing of the Helsinki MoU. Jakarta-based opponents warned that local party issue was not a done deal, claiming that it remained a matter for the National Parliament to decide if and how Aceh might establish local political parties. After a series of heated debates, the House of Representatives (DPR) did eventually pass Aceh’s new autonomy law—the Law on Governing Aceh (UUPA), which replaced all previous laws on Aceh. Signed into effect on 1 August 2006, the UUPA contained two critical provisions—the right for independent candidates to contest elections for local heads of government (Pilkada) scheduled for 2006 and the right for Acehnese to form local political parties to contest general (parliamentary) elections at the provincial and district/municipality levels in 2009. x Independent candidates were allowed to contest the 2006 elections because it was clear that local political parties would not be established in time.

The law restricted the participation of local political parties to provincial and district-level elections in Aceh. Local political parties were not permitted to field candidates in general elections for the DPR. However, in order to facilitate communication between local parties and the central government a dual membership clause was added. According to Article 83 of the UUPA, members of local parties were allowed to simultaneously join national parties. This law was followed by a more detailed set of (national) regulations in 2007 and provincial legislation in 2008. xi

While as many as 14 groups initially registered as political parties with the Department of Law and Human Rights, the Aceh Independent Elections Commission (KIP) found that only six parties met eligibility criteria to field candidates in the 2009 general elections. xii The six parties were: In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

1. The Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA) 4 2. Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Aceh, PDA) 3. Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party (Partai Aceh Aman Sejahtera, PAAS) 4. The Independent Voice of the Acehnese People’s Party (Suara Independen Rakyat Aceh, SIRA) 5. The Aceh People’s Party (Partai Rakyat Aceh, PRA) 6. The Aceh United Party (Partai Bersatu Aceh, PA)

Because it represented the former rebels, the Aceh Party naturally attracted the most attention. GAM leaders first launched the party on 7 July 2007 as the GAM Party with a flag closely resembling the flag of their former separatist movement. While GAM Party leaders eventually changed the party’s name to the “Aceh Party” ( Partai Aceh), the circumstances surrounding the founding of the Aceh Party contributed to lingering suspicions about whether GAM was genuinely committed to the unitary state of Indonesia.

THE APRIL 2009 ELECTIONS

The April 2009 parliamentary elections would be a test of GAM’s and other local groups’ commitment to the peace process and democratic politics. In the lead up to the polls, however, the prospects for peaceful elections looked bleak. In 2008 there was a string of arson attacks against party offices in various parts of Aceh, including drive-by shootings and grenade attacks. xiii Five people associated with the Aceh Party or the Aceh Transitional Authority (KPA)—the civilian authority formed to represent former combatants—were murdered under mysterious circumstances. Tensions between Aceh Party supporters and elements of the security forces also continued to simmer. Within the military, many remained suspicious that GAM still harboured independence ambitions.

For its part, the Aceh Party campaigned aggressively. Using the KPA networks of former combatants, the Aceh Party was able to dominate political space at the local level, particularly in rural Aceh. The Aceh Party’s campaign was based on a simple platform of full implementation of the Helsinki MoU, referring to unfulfilled promises of a truth and reconciliation tribunal, transparent distribution of oil and gas revenues, and consultation mechanisms for national laws affecting Aceh. But the Aceh Party also used subtle and overt intimidation to shore up support. Some party slogans equated an Aceh Party victory with a continuation of the peace, signalling to voters that GAM might return to fighting if the Aceh Party lost. Other party placards printed in the Acehnese language were even more menacing—“live together or die together”, according to one sign. xiv Political commentators in Aceh complained that they were being intimidated by Aceh Party representatives if they reported anything remotely critical about the party. xv

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ELECTION RESULTS 5 As with the gubernatorial race in 2006, the results of the April 9 legislative elections in Aceh came as a surprise to most observers. The Aceh Party had dominated the local elections to a degree not seen by any political party in Indonesia since the country’s return to democracy in 1999. While falling short of its own inflated expectations, the Aceh Party won 46.91 per cent of the vote, which translated into 33 seats in the 69 seat legislature and more than a third of all seats up for grabs across 23 district and municipal assemblies. xvi The Aceh Party secured absolute majorities in seven district-level assemblies and became the largest party in another seven. At the national level, Aceh party ally the Democrat Party performed the best of all national parties winning seven out of 13 seats up for grabs in the province.

The biggest shock of the election was the performance of Aceh’s five other local parties, which won only 6.62 per cent of the provincial vote between them. Only one of the other five parties—the Aceh Sovereignty Party managed to secure a single seat in the provincial assembly. Because each of the five local parties failed to achieve the five per cent threshold, they would be prevented from contesting future elections using the same party name. xvii Representatives of the losing parties cried foul, pointing to intimidation by the Aceh Party as the main reason for their poor polling. The loudest complaints came from the SIRA Party, which performed far below most observers’ expectations. It failed to win a single seat in the provincial assembly. SIRA took its complaints to the Constitutional Court— the court mandated to rule on election disputes in Indonesia, claiming that the Aceh Party had intimidated its voters through text messages, the burning of its paraphernalia and leaflets designed to smear its name. Calling for a repeat election, SIRA charged that the Aceh Party had robbed it of at least one seat in each of Aceh’s 23 districts and municipalities. xviii

ELECTION ANALYSIS

Election results were examined using a combination of quantitative surveys and focus group discussions. A professional polling agency (Polling Center) was contracted to conduct a province-wide survey on voter attitudes one month after the elections. The survey used a multistage random sampling method covering 700 men and 700 women from different socioeconomic backgrounds in 21 districts and municipalities in Aceh. xix Researchers worked with the polling agency to conduct a further six focus group discussions with randomly selected men and women from different age groups and backgrounds (urban and rural). Researchers then conducted a further fifteen interviews with national and local political party representatives in Aceh and Jakarta. The survey and the focus group discussions provided useful data about voter attitudes to the political parties, the candidates and the quality of the elections, while the in-depth interviews yielded important information about political party strategies and attitudes towards future elections. In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

Explaining the Aceh Party’s Victory from Voters’ Perspectives 6 Out of 1399 respondents, 53.5 per cent claimed to have voted for the Aceh Party or an Aceh Party candidate in provincial elections, with 55.8 per cent choosing the Aceh Party or an Aceh Party candidate in district and municipality elections. xx Even allowing for a 2.65 per cent margin of error, the results suggest that between five and ten per cent of respondents might have claimed to vote for the winning party even though they voted for someone else on election day.

Table 1 | Party preferences for Aceh Provincial House of Representatives Sample = 1399

Table 2 | Party preferences for Aceh District and Municipality House of Representatives Sample = 1399

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Respondents who voted for local political parties were asked the reasons for their choice (in the vast majority of cases, a vote for a local party was 7 synonymous with a vote for the Aceh Party). Responses suggested that voters had more faith in the Aceh Party than other parties to represent local interests. This widely held was confirmed in subsequent focus group discussions.

Table 3 | Reasons for Voting for Local Parties in the 2009 Legislative General Election

Conducting the survey a few weeks after the election when preliminary results were already known, we were able to ask respondents why they thought the Aceh Party had outperformed all other political parties—local and national. Respondents indicated that the Aceh Party was more trusted (27 per cent), organizationally strong (24 per cent), and well known (11 per cent).

Table 4 | Reasons for Aceh Party’s Success

In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

The focus group discussions added additional nuance to the reasons for the Aceh 8 Party’s strong polling, especially vis-à-vis other local parties. FGD participants emphasized the organisational strength of the Aceh Party, which many considered essential for governing the restive province and for representing local interests in Jakarta. A number of respondents expressed the view that the Aceh Party appeared more determined than other parties to be a party for all of Aceh. Indeed, many respondents believed that other local political parties represented narrower constituencies. For example, the Aceh People’s Party (PRA) and the SIRA party were perceived to consist primarily of youth and university students, while the Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA) was perceived to represent Muslim clerics (ulama). Many participants admitted that they had either not heard of many of the other local parties, or were largely unfamiliar with them.

Some voters admitted that their choice had been motivated by fear—fear that electoral failure for the Aceh Party could lead to a resumption of conflict. Voters were keenly aware that the GAM had given up its struggle for independence in return for the right to participate in the governance of an autonomous Aceh. Any failure by the Aceh Party to secure an influential number of seats in local assemblies could be interpreted as a failure of GAM’s decision to abandon independence. xxi Despite such fears, however, most Aceh Party supporters believed that the Aceh Party deserved to be given a chance to govern.

Analysis of election data suggested that a high level of party recognition was an important element in the Aceh Party’s wide margin of victory. Electoral law reforms had made the electoral system an ‘open list’ system, meaning that voters’ could vote for individual candidates on the party ticket and that the party’s candidates with the most votes would be automatically elected. Under the previous closed list system, political parties would allocate seats internally. While the open list generally weakens the power of political parties vis-à-vis candidates, last-minute changes to the voting mechanism reduced the impact. Because of confusion over ballot design, in the lead up to elections the Constitutional Court determined that voters would be entitled to vote for either a) the party, b) the candidate, or c) both. Aceh Party campaigners encouraged their supporters to vote only for the party, and not worry about the candidate. Some Aceh Party candidates appealed to voters to vote for the party if they did not like them as individuals! The strategy appeared to have been successful. Among total votes for the Aceh Party at the provincial level, 55 percent of votes were for the party only. The next highest percentage of votes for party only went to the Democrat Party—the party of popular President Susilo Bambang Yuhoyono. For other parties, the number was much lower, suggesting that party affiliation mattered much more for the Aceh Party and the Democrat Party than for other parties.

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Table 5 | Percentage of votes going to parties versus candidates in Aceh provincial legislative elections (DPRA) 9

Rank Political Party Number of votes Number of votes Total for party only for candidates Votes

1 Partai Aceh (PA) 534,676 472,497 1,007,173 The Aceh Party (53.09%) (46.91%) (46.91%)

2 Partai Demokrat (PD) The 103,316 129,412 232,728 Democratic Party (44.39%) (55.61%) (10.84%)

3 Partai Golkar (Golkar)/The Golkar 20,716 121,695 142,411 Party (14.55%) (85.45%) (6.63%)

4 Partai Amanat Nasional (PAN)/The 15,112 67,948 83,060 National Mandate Party (18.19%) (81.81%) (3.87%)

5 Partai Keadilan Sejahtera 26,018 55,511 81,529 (PKS)/The Prosperous Justice Party (31.91%) (68.09%) (3.80%)

6 Partai Persatuan Pembangunan 15,574 58,855 74,429 (PPP)/The United Development (20.92%) (79.08%) (3.47 %) Party

7 Partai Keadilan dan Persatuan 9,584 31,694 41,278 Indonesia (PKPI)/The Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (23.22%) (76.78%) (1.92%)

8 Partai Daulat Atjeh (PDA)/ the 11,657 28,049 39,706 Aceh Sovereignty Party (29.36%) (70.64%) (1.85%)

9 Partai Suara Independen Rakyat 102 30,055 38,157 Aceh (SIRA)/ the Acehenese People's Independent Aspiration (21.23%) (78.77%) (1.78%) (SIRA)

10 Partai Bulan Bintang (PBB)/The 10,180 27,156 37,336 Crescent Star Party (27.27%) (72.73%) (1.74%)

Despite the large number of voters choosing the party over individual candidates, our study revealed that voter loyalty to the Aceh Party was surprisingly thin. A majority of those voting for the Aceh Party indicated their continued support was contingent on the party’s performance over the term of the next parliament (2009-2014). Only 11 percent of Aceh Party voters said they would support the party no matter what. In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

Implications of Aceh Party victory for centre-local relations 10 During earlier debates over whether Aceh should be allowed to have local political parties, opponents argued that if local parties won a large share of the local vote they would pose a challenge for national unity. The Aceh Party has now won a large share of the vote, presenting a challenge to national parties and to Aceh’s relations with Jakarta. During its campaign, the Aceh Party made it clear that it is not satisfied that national laws have given full expression to the terms of the Helsinki peace agreement. Indeed, the party’s main campaign platform was “full implementation of the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding”. Specifically, the Aceh Party is demanding new regulations on the mechanisms used to determine central and provincial shares of oil and gas revenues, the establishment of a truth and reconciliation commission to deal with human rights abuses from the conflict era, and a formal mechanism for consultation on national laws affecting Aceh. xxii

The Aceh Party’s policies will all require changes to national laws. And yet, the party is not represented at the national level. The Province of Aceh has 13 representatives in the DPR, all of which represent national political parties. The Aceh Party is not represented in the national House of Representatives because local political parties are only allowed to contest local elections. One way to address this would be to allow local political parties to contest seats for the DPR. Our survey revealed strong public support for this option in Aceh. Interestingly, however, these views were not shared by the Aceh Party leadership. Aceh Party Secretary M. Yahya dismissed any idea that his party would seek representation in the DPR. xxiii Neither are national political parties likely to support amendments allowing local political parties to contest national elections.

A more realistic option would be for local parties in Aceh to work in coalition with national parties. Coalition-building is particularly important in post-conflict environments where parties serve as the main vehicle for aggregating and representing the interests of constituencies previously at war. xxiv Architects of the peace agreement understood that it would be important to encourage such coalitions to overcome conflict cleavages and to prevent local parties in Aceh from being isolated from national political parties. To achieve this, a clause was inserted in the Law on Governing Aceh (No. 11/2006) to allow “dual membership”. According to the law, local political party members would be allowed to simultaneously join national political parties. xxv As former Golkar lawmaker Ferry Mursyidan Baidan and head of the House of Representative’s special committee deliberating the Law on Governing Aceh (2006), explained, “we were concerned that national parties would not support local political parties for Aceh without a provision that provided linkages between them and new local parties.” He also said that the provision was designed to prevent “horizontal competition” between local and national parties in local elections. xxvi

Our study found, however, that this provision failed to achieve its intended effect. Inconsistencies in the overall legal framework actually work against

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relationship building between national and local political parties. First, while it is clear that members of local political parties in Aceh may join national parties, the 11 law is silent as to whether members of national political parties can also join local political parties. In fact, the Law on Political Parties (No 2/2008) actually provides that membership in political parties can be annulled when a member “joins another political party”. xxvii Herman Nuriqman, member of the national Star Reform Party (Partai Bintang Reformasi, PBR) and DPRA legislator was sacked by the Star Reform Party’s central executive board after founding the Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Aceh, PDA) in 2007. Herman Nuriqman is now challenging his dismissal from PBR in the Supreme Court (MA). Abdullah Saleh, former member of the United Development Party (Partai Persatuan Pembangunan, PPP) resigned from the United Development Party and from his seat in the Aceh provincial assembly after joining the Aceh Party. Interviews in Banda Aceh with national party members revealed that many interpret the law as effectively preventing dual membership, regardless of provisions in the Law on Governing Aceh. xxviii

Some national lawmakers have actually spoken out against the dual membership provision, arguing that other means of communication between local and national political parties should be explored. xxix But so far there has been little debate on what kind of mechanism can best facilitate policy dialogue. In the lead up to the April 2009 elections, the Aceh Party formed an informal alliance with the Democrat Party, which eventually won seven out of the 13 DPR seats in the province. Because the Democrat Party is the party of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono—a key player in the peace agreement between Government of Indonesia and GAM, the alliance seemed natural. But it remains unclear how meaningful this alliance will prove to be outside of elections. It is unclear, for example, whether the Democrat Party will take up the Aceh Party’s cause in the DPR.

National party leaders such as National Mandate Party founder Amien Rais have warned that if local parties become too big, ties between Aceh and Jakarta will weaken. xxx Building linkages between local parties in Aceh and national political parties will help to strengthen ties, but so far there has been little debate about the kinds of mechanisms that can build linkages between local and national parties. One possibility, and one that would easily find international donor support in an initial phase would be to hold a regular party forum on shared agendas between local parties in Aceh and national parties. The forum could address, among other things, intersections between local and national development priorities. Some of Aceh’s development challenges are unique to Aceh—e.g. the reintegration of former combatants, but most are not—e.g. strengthening government capacity to deliver public services and achieving environmentally sustainable growth. These are just some of the many issues local and national political parties should be able to talk about. In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

IMPLICATIONS FOR INDONESIA’S PARTY SYSTEM 12 The Aceh Party’s victory in provincial and district/municipality general elections in April 2009 has revived debates about the role of local parties in other parts of Indonesia, particularly in Papua where a special autonomy law (Law No 28/2001) grants Papuans the right to form political parties. Enthusiasm for local political parties in other parts of Indonesia remains low among national lawmakers, however. Most national law makers interviewed for this study expressed a concern that local political parties throughout Indonesia could undermine the national party system and threaten national unity. Chair of the United Development Party (PPP) Irgan Chairul Mahfiz said that “local political parties would take votes away from national parties because they would be seen as closer to the people and better able to represent the people’s interests”. Interestingly, however, other groups, including CETRO, DEMOS and Indonesia Human Rights Watch (Imparsial) have used similar reasoning to advocate for local political parties in other parts of the country. Their arguments are supported by a growing body of research indicating the importance of political parties for conflict management and prevention. xxxi

To address concerns about local parties’ threat to national integrity, our survey polled popular perceptions of local party commitment to the unitary state of Indonesia. While rejection of separatism was a condition of the peace accord, there have been lingering concerns within some parts of the security forces and among some national party leaders that the emergence of the Aceh Party takes GAM one step closer to achieving independence by non-violent means. xxxii Our survey and focus group discussions revealed, however, that the overwhelming majority of the Acehnese population is convinced of the Aceh Party’s commitment to autonomy within the Republic of Indonesia.

Table 6 | Local Party Commitment to Unitary State Base: All Respondent, n=1400

Do you agree with the statement "all local parties are committed to NKRI”?

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While there has so far been little demand for local political parties outside of Aceh, the status of local political parties in Papua remains a challenge for 13 policymakers. As in Aceh, ambiguity remains in the laws governing political party formation in Papua. The law on Special Autonomy for Papua (Law No 28/2001) specifically grants Papuans the right to form political parties, but it does not necessarily grant Papuans the right to form “local” political parties. This is because the autonomy law also requires that Papuan parties be established in accordance with other laws, including the Law on Political Parties, which means parties must maintain chapters in at least half of Indonesia’s provinces. This is likely to become a point of contestation if local political elites in Papuan provinces see advantages in following the Aceh example.

Many national lawmakers interviewed as part of this study agreed that it would be difficult to deny Papuans the right to form local political parties if there was popular demand for them. Papuan member of the Regional Assembly (DPD) and former provincial lawmaker Paulus Yohanes Sumino suggested that the 11 seats added to the provincial assembly by the special autonomy law could be reserved for future local parties in Papua. xxxiii His support for local political parties in Papua was echoed by fellow Papuan DPD member Elion Numberi who admitted to being “a little jealous” of Aceh. xxxiv However, neither of the two Papuan DPD members thought local political parties were a good idea for other regions in Indonesia. According to Paulus Yohanes, “people’s aspirations in other regions can be accommodated by national parties.” xxxv

CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS

Overall, the decision to allow local political parties to contest elections in Aceh can be judged a success. Despite incidents of political violence in the lead up to the polls, the legal framework allowing local political parties to contest elections in Aceh has facilitated the peaceful entry of the former Free Aceh Movement and their supporters into Indonesia’s democratic political system.

In addition, despite widely reported instances of intimidation, this study found the election result to be an accurate reflection of Aceh voters’ preferences. The Aceh Party polled well even in areas that were not its former strongholds, such as the provincial capital Banda Aceh where it received the second largest share of the vote behind the Democrat Party. Voter turnout was high at 75.31 per cent compared with the national average of 70.99 per cent. With 46.91 per cent of the provincial vote and a similar achievement at district levels, the Aceh Party won a clear mandate.

The Aceh Party’s policies, however, are so far largely concerned with the implementation of autonomy arrangements. Because this requires changes to national laws, the Aceh Party will have to seek the cooperation of national parties to achieve its goals. This raises the question of how best to integrate local parties in Aceh into the national party system. While proportional electoral systems are generally conducive to coalition-building, ambiguity in the laws In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

governing political parties remain an obstacle to building linkages between local 14 and national parties.

To prevent the isolation of local parties from national political life, changes to the law will be needed. An opportunity is likely to present itself in 2010 when the Law on Political Parties (No 2/2008) is scheduled for revision. Policymakers should consider combining regulations governing local parties and national parties in one law as a first step towards better integration. The law on “dual membership” must also be revisited. The current ambiguity between the Law on Governing Aceh (No 6/2006) and the Law on Political Parties (Law No 2/2008) has already led to tensions and needless litigation. Lawmakers should seriously consider amending article 16 of the Law on Political Parties to ensure that joining a local political party in Aceh is not grounds for dismissal from a national party.

The performance of the Aceh Party over the coming years will also stimulate debates about the role of political parties in other parts of Indonesia. While demands for local political parties appear to be relatively muted in most other regions, there is a chance that demands for local political parties will emerge in Papuan provinces. If and when such demands arise, national lawmakers should seriously consider accommodating such demands. It could be dangerous to deny Papuans this entry into the political system when such rights have been granted to their special autonomy cousins in Aceh.

As for arguments that local political parties will exacerbate ethnic or regional divisions by institutionalising cleavages in the party system, Aceh is an example of how such risks can be mitigated. So far, Aceh’s experience suggests that, if managed properly, local political parties can help build legitimacy and provide political access to communities that might otherwise not be represented in the political system.

Annex 1: Election Results for the Aceh Provincial Legislature (DPRA)

Rank Party Votes (%)

1 The Aceh Party (PA) 46.91 2 The Democratic Party (PD) 10.84 3 The Golkar Party (Golkar) 6.63 4 The National Mandate Party (PAN) 3.87 5 The Prosperous and Justice Party (PKS) 3.80 6 The United Development Party (PPP) 3.45 7 The Justice and United Indonesia Party (PKPI) 1.92 8 The Aceh Sovereignty Party (PDA) 1.85 9 The Acehnese People's Independent Aspiration (SIRA) 1.78 10 The Crescent Star Party (PBB) 1.74 11 The Reform Star Party (PBR) 1.72 12 The People's Aceh Party (PRA) 1.70 13 The People's Conscience Party (Hanura) 1.43 14 The National Awakening Party (PKB) 1.41 15 The Great Indonesia Movement Party (Gerindra) 1.32

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16 The Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) 1.01 17 The National People's Concern Party (PPRN) 0.89 15 18 The Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB) 0.82 19 The United Aceh Party (PBA) 0.77 20 The Patriot Party (Patriot) 0.70 21 The Ulema National Awakening Party (PKNU) 0.69 22 The Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party (PAAS) 0.52 23 The Indonesian Workers and Employers Party (PPPI) 0.48 24 The Regional Unity Party (PPD) 0.45 25 The National Front Party (Barnas) 0.39 26 The National Sun Party (PMB) 0.34 27 The Prosperous Indonesia Party (PIS) 0.25 28 The Prosperous Peace Party (PDS) 0.24 29 The Democratic Nationhood Party (PDK) 0.24 30 The Democratic Reform Party (PDP) 0.21 31 The Indonesian Youth Party (PPI) 0.19 32 The Sovereignty Party (Kedaulatan) 0.18 33 The Indonesian Democratic Care Party (PKDI) 0.17 34 The Indonesia National People Fortress Party (PNBKI) 0.16 35 The Republika Nusantara Party (Republikan) 0.16 36 The Pioneer Party (Pelopor) 0.15 37 The Indonesian Democracy Upholding Party (PPDI) 0.12 38 The Independent Party (Merdeka) 0.12 39 The Marhaenism Indonesian National Party (PNIM) 0.11 40 The Functional Party of Struggle (PKP) 0.09 41 The United Indonesian Nahdlatul Ummah Party (PPNUI) 0.08 42 The Indonesia Unity Party (PSI) 0.05 43 The Labor Party (Partai Buruh) 0.04

Total 100

Notes i Ben Hillman is Lecturer in Political Science at the Crawford School of Economics and Government at the Australian National University (ANU). He teaches graduate courses on comparative government and democracy. In 2006 he headed the United Nations Development Programme's technical support program for Aceh’s first post-conflict elections. He has also worked as an advisor to UNDP and the Indonesian General Elections Commission on implementing local executive elections in Indonesia. ii Research for this policy brief was supported by the Australia Indonesia Governance Research Partnership and the Centre for Democratic Institutions. iii The government’s first draft of the legislation actually proposed that parties be required to maintain offices in 75 per cent of provinces, but civil society groups voiced loud opposition, claiming that the legislation would unfairly disadvantage smaller parties. iv Benjamin Reilly, ‘Introduction’ in Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds), Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development , United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2008, p. 3. v Speech by Megawati Sukarnoputri at the National Resilience Institute, 28 July 2005. During the speech, she criticised President Susilo Bambang Yudhyono and Vice President Jusuf Kalla for offering the local political party option to the free Aceh Movement (GAM) as part of negotiations with the former rebel movement. Megawati also claimed that local political parties were “ideological” in contrast with national parties that were more “managerial”. vi Survey conducted between 28 July and 2 August 2005 in 32 provinces. In

Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

16 vii Survei LSI: Rakyat Tak Dukung Parpol Lokal” LSI Survey: People Do Not Support Local Political Parties), Sinar Harapan, 16 August 2005; “Partai Lokal, Ujian Eksistensi GAM di NAD” Local Parties, Promised to GAM for Aceh), Suara Karya, 22 August 200, cited in Ahmad Farhan Hamid, p 221. viii Interview with Hasballah M. Saad, Banda Aceh, 16 June 2009. ix Art 1.2.1 Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (Helsinki, 2005). x GAM’s integration into mainstream politics got a head start when former GAM combatant Irwandi Yusuf was elected Governor of Aceh in landmark elections in December 2006. On the 2006 elections see Samuel Clark and Blair Palmer, ‘Peaceful Pilkada, Dubious Democracy: Aceh’s Post-Conflict Elections and their Implications’ (Jakarta: The World Bank, 2007), and Ben Hillman, 'Aceh's Rebels Turn to Ruling', Far Eastern Economic Review , Vol. 170, No. 1, January-February 2007, 49-53. xi Government Regulation No 20/2007 on Local Political Parties in Aceh and Qanun Aceh No. 3/2008. xii Most of these parties were knocked out for failing to have enough offices in the districts and sub-districts or the requisite number of members. One of the parties found ineligible to contest elections was the Aceh People’s Alliance for Women’s Concerns (PARA). xiii See “Indonesia: Pre-Election Anxieties in Aceh”, International Crisis Group Briefing No 81, 9 September 2008.” xiv Interview with former Minister for Justice and Human Rights, Hasballah M. Saad, Banda Aceh, 16 June 2009. xv Interview with Fajran Zen, political analyst at the Aceh Institute, Banda Aceh, 16 June 2009. xvi See Annex I for details on parties’ share of the vote in the elections for provincial assembly (DPRA). xvii The relevant law is the provincial Qanun No 3/2007 on Managing General Elections in Aceh. By contrast, the national parliamentary threshold is 2.5 per cent. xviii SIRA’s request was dismissed by the Constitutional Court for lack of evidence. For the court’s ruling see: http://www.mahkamahkonstitusi.go.id/index.php?page=website.BeritaInternalLengkap&id=3235 xix The survey was conducted during a two-week period at the end of May 2009, approximately one month after the elections. The margin of error for 1400 respondents was 2.62 % with a confidence interval of 95%. The survey was conducted by experienced Acehnese enumerators. xx Respondents were first screened to make sure they had participated in the April 2009 elections. However, rather than ask respondents directly which parties they voted for, which can make people uncomfortable, enumerators asked each respondent to remark a secret ballot and enter it into a box or envelope. Only one person in 1400 refused to participate in this exercise. xxi Fieldwork by the World Bank’s conflict monitoring team made similar findings. Report to be published at www.conflictanddevelopment.org xxii Interview with Aceh Party Secretary M. Yahya, Aceh Party campaign headquarters, Banda Aceh, 17 June 2009. According to the Law on Governing Aceh (Law No. 11/2006), which was based on the Helsinki peace accord, Aceh is to retain 80 per cent of revenues from forestry, fisheries, general mining and geothermal energy, which is in line with current policies for all other regions (See Law 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance Between the Central Government and the Regions). In addition, Aceh is to retain 70 per cent of oil and gas revenue. In contrast, other regions in Indonesia are entitled to retain only 15.5 per cent of oil revenues and 30 per cent of gas revenues, with the lion’s share going to the central government. xxiii Ibid. xxiv Benjamin Reilly, ‘Introduction’ in Benjamin Reilly and Per Nordlund (eds), Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Regulation, Engineering and Democratic Development , United Nations University Press, Tokyo, 2008. xxv Article 83, Law on Governing Aceh (Law No. 11/2006).

Ben Hillman

xxvi Interview with Golkar lawmaker Ferry Mursyidan Baidan, head of the House of 17 Representative’s special committee deliberating the Law on Governing Aceh (2006), 11 October 2009. xxvii According to Article 16 (1) of Law No 2/2008 on Political Parties, membership of a party may be annulled if a member (a) passes away; (b) submits a written letter of resignation; (c) becomes a member of another political party; (d) violates the parties' statutes. xxviii Personal communication between Saifuddin Bantasyam and members of national parties in Aceh, July 2009. xxix Interview with Yasonna H. Laoly, second-term PDIP lawmaker in House of Representatives and Deputy Chairman of the House special committee for deliberating the 2008 election bill, 16 October 2009; and Priyo Budi Santoso, Deputy Speaker of the House of representatives (Golkar), 21 October 2009. xxx Amien Rais speaking at an election day rally for PAN in Yogyakarta and quoted, Media Indonesia, 18 March 2009. xxxi Benjamin Reilly, “Political Engineering and Party Politics in Conflict-Prone Societies”, Democratization , Vol 13, No. 5, pp 811-827, December 2006. xxxii Interview Ryaas Rasyid, Chair Democratic Nationhood Party (PDK), Jakarta, 19 October 2009. xxxiii Interview with Paulus Yohanes Sumino, Jakarta, 19 October 2009. xxxiv Interview with Elion Numberi, Jakarta, 21 October 2009. xxxv Interview with Paulus Yohanes Sumino, Jakarta, 19 October 2009.

18 About the Centre for Democratic Institutions CDI was established in 1998 to assist in the development and strengthening of demo- cratic institutions in developing countries. Its mission is to harness Australian and international best practice in support of developing countries’ needs for democratic governance. CDI’s work combines technical assistance and capacity building programs, networking, and interpersonal and knowledge exchange, including the dissemination of CDI’s original research on democracy and its institutions. Its focus countries comprise Indonesia and Timor-Leste in South East Asia and Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu in Melanesia.

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CDI Policy Paper Series on Political Governance 19 http://www.cdi.anu.edu.au/research/PPS_Home.htm

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Assistant Series Editor | Luke Hambly

2010/02 | Ben Hillman| Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: The Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh

2009/01 | Stephen Sherlock | Indonesia’s 2009 Elections: The New Electoral System and the Competing Parties

2008/01 | Benjamin Reilly, Per Nordlund and Edward Newman | Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies: Encouraging Inclusive Politics and Democratic Development.

2007/02 | Joseph Ketan | The Use and Abuse of Electoral Development Funds and their Impact on Electoral Politics and Governance in Papua New Guinea

2007/01 | Stephen Sherlock | The Indonesian Parliament after Two Elections: What has Really Changed?

2006/02 | Wahidah Zein Br Siregar | Political Parties, Electoral System and Women’s Representation in the 2004-2009 Indonesian Parliaments

2006/01 | Stephen Sherlock | Indonesia’s Regional Representative Assembly: Democracy, Representation and the Regions. A report on the Dewan Perwakilan Daerah (DPD) Centre for Democratic Institutions Research School of Social Sciences Australian National University

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