CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance

CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance

centre for democratic institutions www.cdi.anu.edu.au CDI Policy Papers on Political Governance Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh Ben Hillmani Executive Summaryii Since Indonesia's return to democracy, only national parties with a cross-regional organisational basis have been allowed to contest elections. Local political parties are restricted from contesting even local elections, making Indonesia unique in the world of multiparty democracies. Despite widespread antipathy to local political parties in Indonesia, the peace agreement between the Government of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) paved the way for parties representing exclusively local interests to contest provincial legislative elections in Aceh in April 2009. In a major test for Indonesia’s democratic political system, the local party representing the former rebels secured an impressive victory in those elections. CDI PPS 2010/01 PPS CDI Based on a province-wide survey of voters in Aceh and in-depth interviews with local and national party leaders, this study examines the Aceh Party victory and its implications for Jakarta-Aceh relations. The study finds that, while the introduction of local political parties in Aceh represents a milestone for peace The CDI Policy Paper and democracy in Aceh, new policies are needed if local political parties are to be series focuses on pressing issues of political securely integrated into Indonesia’s broader political party system. governance in the Asia- Pacific region. The series BACKGROUND – THE EMERGENCE OF LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES IN ACEH publishes original papers commissioned by CDI, each of which deal with Since Indonesia’s return to multiparty democracy in 1999, only political parties important issues for with a nation-wide organisational basis have been allowed to contest elections. policymakers interested Under the revised Law on Political Parties (Law No 2/2008), a political party must in issues of democracy, governance and political maintain branches in 60 per cent of the country’s provinces as well as offices in at institutions. The papers least 50 per cent of districts and municipalities within those provinces.iii Revisions feature new research and to the law on political parties have made it increasingly tough for new parties to policy recommendations, and aim to forge research- enter the system. to-policy links and provide new insights and analysis Along with an accompanying parliamentary threshold of 2.5 per cent, the law is on subjects of concern designed to restrict the entry of smaller parties into parliament. These laws have to CDI. been motivated by concerns about fragmentation, but also by a historical fear of Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh local political parties. Since the collapse of parliamentary democracy in the 1950s, 2 local parties have been associated with regionalism and disunity. In 1998, when the fall of the Suharto regime energised separatist movements at both ends of the archipelago, lawmakers were particularly determined to ensure that democratic reforms denied entry to local parties with regionally-specific electoral agendas. In addition to countering secessionism, promoting nationally-focussed parties was also seen as an important component of democratic development. As Benjamin Reilly has argued in the CDI-sponsored book Political Parties in Conflict-Prone Societies, building national-organised, policy-based parties remains a pre-eminent task for successful national government. Particularly in new democracies, broad- based national parties are “one of the primary channels for building accountable and responsive government”.iv Yet despite these goals, and the widespread antipathy toward local parties in post- Suharto Indonesia, policymakers were forced to revisit the issue in the context of peace negotiations between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and Jakarta. Groups connected with the Free Aceh Movement had been fighting the Indonesian state since the 1970s, but a permanent peace looked possible in the first half of 2005. During peace talks brokered by former Finnish President Marti Ahtisari, GAM for the first time indicated a willingness to relinquish demands for independence in return for the right to participate in the governing of an autonomous Aceh. GAM representatives argued that they should be allowed to form a political party to facilitate their entry into the political system. While this idea was initially rejected by the Government of Indonesia, GAM was offering an irresistible prize—an end to the decades-long separatist movement in Indonesia’s westernmost province. Opposition to the local party idea was strong during the first rounds of negotiations. Former president Megawati Sukarnoputri argued publicly at the time that local parties were a threat to Indonesia’s national integrity. Citing local political parties in Spain and Canada as examples, Megawati argued that local political parties in Indonesia would also be vehicles for separatism.v Her stance was echoed by other prominent national leaders including former president Abdurrahman Wahid, former House Speakers Agung Laksono and Akbar Tanjung, as well as the head of Nahdlatul Ulama Hasyim Muzadi. Centre for Democratic According to a Lembaga Survei Indonesia (LSI) survey, 75.8 per cent of InstitutionsIndonesians also opposed the re-emergence of local political parties.vi A further 76.2Research per Schoolcent of Social Sciences were specifically opposed to local political parties in Aceh. AccordingAustralian to political National analyst Rizal Sukma, the survey results reflected public fears that localUniversity political parties would lead to national disintegration, concern that the governmentCanberra ACT had 0200 AUSTRALIA been too generous in its negotiations with GAM, and lingering suspicion that GAM remained committed to independence for Aceh.vii Other voices, however, pointed to increasing evidence that local political parties could serve as vehicles for conflict management and prevention. A number of human rights and other civil society groups supported the local political party Ben Hillman option. iiiiii Acehnese lawmaker and former Minister for Justice and Human Rights Hasballah M. Saad argued that it would be difficult to secure long-term peace if 3 former combatants were forced to join national parties. ivvvivii Because GAM had no linkages with national political parties, he argued that the right to form a local political party in Aceh was the only viable means of extending political rights to viii GAM and facilitating the former rebels’ stable entry into mainstream politics. Antipathy toward GAM’s demands for a local political party brought peace negotiations to the brink of collapse because GAM refused to budge on the issue. Eventually, recognising a historical opportunity to end the conflict in Aceh once and for all, Government of Indonesia negotiators led by Vice President Jusuf Kalla and backed by President Bambang Yudhyono conceded to GAM’s demands. In a major victory for GAM negotiators, the Memorandum of Understanding signed in Helsinki on 15 August 2005 promised to create “ the political legal conditions necessary for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh ”. ix THE LAW ON GOVERNING ACEH AND THE NEW LOCAL POLITICAL PARTIES Debates on the local party issue continued to simmer even after the signing of the Helsinki MoU. Jakarta-based opponents warned that local party issue was not a done deal, claiming that it remained a matter for the National Parliament to decide if and how Aceh might establish local political parties. After a series of heated debates, the House of Representatives (DPR) did eventually pass Aceh’s new autonomy law—the Law on Governing Aceh (UUPA), which replaced all previous laws on Aceh. Signed into effect on 1 August 2006, the UUPA contained two critical provisions—the right for independent candidates to contest elections for local heads of government (Pilkada) scheduled for 2006 and the right for Acehnese to form local political parties to contest general (parliamentary) elections at the provincial and district/municipality levels in 2009. x Independent candidates were allowed to contest the 2006 elections because it was clear that local political parties would not be established in time. The law restricted the participation of local political parties to provincial and district-level elections in Aceh. Local political parties were not permitted to field candidates in general elections for the DPR. However, in order to facilitate communication between local parties and the central government a dual membership clause was added. According to Article 83 of the UUPA, members of local parties were allowed to simultaneously join national parties. This law was followed by a more detailed set of (national) regulations in 2007 and provincial legislation in 2008. xi While as many as 14 groups initially registered as political parties with the Department of Law and Human Rights, the Aceh Independent Elections Commission (KIP) found that only six parties met eligibility criteria to field candidates in the 2009 general elections. xii The six parties were: In Political Parties and Post-Conflict Transition: the Results and Implications of the 2009 Parliamentary Elections in Aceh 1. The Aceh Party (Partai Aceh, PA) 4 2. Aceh Sovereignty Party (Partai Daulat Aceh, PDA) 3. Safe and Prosperous Aceh Party

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