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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues

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CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues CHEMICAL WEAPONS CONVENTION BULLETIN News, Background and Comment on Chemical and Biological Warfare Issues ISSUE NO. 28 JUNE 1995 Quarterly Journal of the Harvard Sussex Program on CBW Armament and Arms Limitation THE CWC AND BARRIERS TO CHEMICAL TRADE Ernst Wyszomirski* Consultant to the Verband der Chemischen Industrie, Germany My approach to this subject is not that of a legal expert of regulations, one might even say excessive regulations, is but rather that of a natural scientist formerly working in the accepted as a fait accompli and the present regime for dual- German chemical industry. For many years the German use chemical exports is compared with the CWC regime, chemical industry has given its vigorous support to the real- the Convention can hardly be seen as imposing additional ization of the international Chemical Weapons Convention restrictions in the operational procedures in the chemical in- (CWC). In this article, I will attempt to explain why the dustry. Of course, a pre-condition for this is that the mea- German chemical industry, in close coöperation with asso- sures to which we have been accustomed up to now, which ciate firms and federations worldwide, especially in Eu- concentrate on export controls with obligatory permits, are rope, has displayed such an intensive level of activity, replaced by the CWC regime. which is still continuing. Present export control measures represent genuine oper- In designing the CWC, it was essential to draw on the ational obstacles to chemical trade, requiring as they do the chemical industry’s expertise to ensure that this hopefully submission of applications and the procurement of end-use global convention could be shaped not only in conformity statements or other information regarding customers, as with its objectives, but also in a workable fashion. well as the time sequences and delays involved, and the re- quirement for export permits. Added to this is the fact that The agreement that has emerged achieves a far-reaching the arrangements agreed by the Australia Group have been degree of acceptance with respect to practicability and in implemented in different ways at the national level. As a meeting the requirements of the chemical industry, which is result, considerable distortions of competition have arisen, affected to a considerable extent. quite apart from the fact that the vast majority of states, in- cluding the countries that have emerged from the former All States Parties to the Convention will bear equal re- USSR and the break-up of Yugoslavia, are not members of sponsibility for the outlawing of chemical weapons, includ- the Australia Group, which today numbers 26 countries. ing their development, production, storage and use, and additionally submit to certain rules on the handling of dual- use chemicals. Furthermore, they will allow international The basic principle of international chemical trade in the on-site inspections on their territory to be carried out to ver- dual-use sector has up to now been the assumption of over- ify that they are fulfilling their obligations. all responsibility for the proper use of its consignments by the individual member state of the Australia Group or by The chemical industry sees in this the emergence of new the supplier. This arrangement is acceptable as a stopgap structures in international chemical trade, which allows — or rather compels — a departure from the existing export control oligarchy of industrial states. Considering the Guest Article by Ernst Wyszomirski 1–3 Convention’s Article XI as well as the official statement of the Australia Group during the final phase of the Geneva CWC Non-Signatory States 3 negotiations, additional export control regimes among CWC Ratifications 3 States Parties to the CWC can hardly continue to exist. Progress in The Hague: 10th Quarterly Review 4–12 If freedom of trade is not judged on the basis of pure the- News Chronology: February–May 1995 12–34 ory, which is hardly relevant nowadays, if the large number Forthcoming Events 34 Recent Publications 35 * The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the VCI. News from the Harvard Sussex Program 36 measure, but cannot remain permanently in effect. The pre- that the coming into force of the Convention does not imply dictable consequences of this policy which can now be ob- any changes in their chemical trade, even though their own served are: efforts to achieve chemical self-sufficiency, and home country subjects itself to the controls required by the an increasing number of new procurement channels which Convention? This cannot and will not work out; the Con- are virtually impossible to track, but fortunately do not in- vention will be invalidated before it has even had a chance volve the German chemical industry. to develop the impact which all of us hope for. The CWC has no export restrictions with regard to The CWC has thus been designed so that operational re- chemical trade between States Parties. The basic construc- strictions on chemical trade, as compared with the present tion of the Convention envisages that all members submit to situation, are eliminated. Indeed, it would not have been its rules, i.e. extensive disclosure obligations and produc- possible to reach a favourable consensus of the chemical in- tion controls. In return, they can expect to be regarded in dustry if the CWC had not aimed to achieve the minimum equal measure as members who are responsible and abide obstruction of industrial activities and as little intrusion as by the provisions of the CWC. This applies both to cus- possible during monitoring. tomer and supplier countries. The individual restrictions are as follows. The CWC This new allocation of duties to all CWC member states, forbids all toxic substances and their precursors, except which is safeguarded by a verification regime, is thus the those used for purposes not prohibited by the CWC when of basis, pre-condition and propelling force for the abolition of types and in quantities consistent with such purposes. In the obsolete export control regime or — to be precise — its addition, the use of Schedule 1 substances for large-scale replacement by measures specific to the CWC. industrial purposes, for example the use of nitrogen mustard as a synthetic intermediate, is forbidden, but is permitted up In my estimation, further progress in the ratification pro- to a quantity limited to 100 grams per year for medical and cess is closely linked with the issue of obstructions to the pharmaceutical research. From the practical viewpoint, chemical industry’s business in the widest sense of the term, however, this should not be regarded as a restriction on including technology exchange and industrial plant busi- peaceful activities. ness, by national export regimes not complying with the terms of the Convention. The restrictions on export of chemicals in Schedules 2 and 3 to states that do not join the Convention need have no What advantage are those signatory states which do not effect if, as expected, the home countries of our customers consider themselves threatened by chemical weapons sup- join the CWC. The export restrictions are thus reduced to posed to see in the ratification of the Convention, with all peripheral areas. In borderline cases, this affects prospec- the burdens thereby imposed on them and without any bind- tive customers or countries which are in any case not being ing assurance of the relief promised to them at the same supplied by the German chemical industry. time? Such relief includes the review of national export controls announced by the Australia Group “with the aim of The obligation to tolerate inspections, the duty to dis- removing such measures for the benefit of States Parties to close information, i.e. the opening of data files and the di- the Convention acting in full compliance with their obliga- vulging of confidential business figures, represent a tions under the Convention”. Legal experts will note the restriction of rights, but scarcely an operational restriction. lack of a binding commitment in the wording chosen, but can trustworthy politicians retreat behind such phrases? Under the provisions of the CWC, end-use statements are required only from non-Parties. From the standpoint of Any state can of course impose export restrictions but it the German chemical industry, which at present requires must justify them to the public at large and to those affected. end-use statements even from customers in Germany, the Is mere suspicion that the Convention might not function CWC represents a remarkable facilitation of chemical trade. properly, i.e. distrust of other member states, sufficient rea- son for such measures? Is it not the case that the Convention A final assessment cannot yet be made in each case. To itself will be damaged and undermined by such lack of con- what extent a particular measure will prove to be a burden fidence placed in it? Would it not be much better to will depend, among other things, on the availability of demonstrate confidence in the Convention, and not to apply highly qualified inspectors necessary for the purpose and, national controls again unless irregularities have been of course, on the level of confidentiality applied to informa- proven, and then to do so on a selective basis? tion on the private chemical industry. The qualification of inspectors will depend on how far it is possible in the I am sure that a more confident attitude such as this training courses to acquaint participants with the specific would lend momentum to the ratification process. The ver- conditions and circumstances of chemical production. In ification measures then possible would no doubt quickly in- order that nothing is omitted in this regard, the German dicate whether the member states are observing the chemical industry has offered to provide training courses obligations assumed under this great Convention.
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