Why the US Lacks a Federal Climate Policy
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IGES Working Paper-CC-2011-05 Why the United States Lacks a Federal Climate Policy: Collective Action Problems, Tea Parties, and Blue Dogs Eric Zusman1, Koji Fukuda2, Madoka Yoshino3, and Jun Ichihara4 May 2012 Abstract: In 2009, President Barack Obama and a majority Democratic 111th Congress came to office in a favorable position to enact federal climate legislation. But less than two years later prospects for passing that legislation dimmed considerably. Explanations for this quick reversal fault 1) institutional rules requiring bills receive a 60-vote supra-majority to cloture a Senate filibuster; and 2) the Obama administration’s prioritization of health care over climate change. Both of these explanations, however, presume the Democratic Party uniformly backed climate legislation. This presentation uses a logistical regression model on House Bill (H.R.) 2454 (The American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009) to demonstrate Democrats were deeply divided on the issue. Long-standing industrial ties and blue dog allegiances suggest that United States climate policy will consist of subnational clean energy and national air quality programs for the foreseeable future. Keywords: United States Climate Policy; Political Parties; Collective Action Problems; Tea Party Republicans, Blue Dog Democrats The findings, interpretations, views, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those of the author in her personal capacity, and do not necessarily represent the views of IGES. 1 Eric Zusman is a senior climate policy researcher at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) in Hayama, Japan. At IGES, his research focuses on the co-benefits of climate policies in key sectors and the political economy of low carbon development in Asia. 2 Koji Fukuda is a Climate Change Policy Researcher at the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies in Hayama, Japan. His research at IGES focuses on the post-2012 Climate regime and financial mechanisms supporting climate smart development in Asia. 3 Madoka Yoshino is a Climate Change Associate Researcher at IGES. Her research focuses on the future climate regime. 4 Jun Ichihara is a researcher in the Program Management Office at IGES. His research focuses on market mechanisms in developing Asia (with a particular emphasis on India and Indonesia). Table of Contents 1. Introduction ....................................................................................................................... 3 2. Climate Change Legislation: A Collective Action Problem ........................................... 3 2.1 Policymaking Institutions: A Veto Players Argument .......................................... 4 2.2 Critical Moments: What Happened to Obama’s Support? ................................. 5 2.3 Political Parties: Divided over Climate Change .................................................... 6 3. Tests .................................................................................................................................... 7 3.1 Data ........................................................................................................................... 7 3.2 The Model ................................................................................................................. 9 3.3 Results ....................................................................................................................... 9 3.4 Comparing Results and Data ................................................................................. 11 4. Recommendations and the Way Forward..................................................................... 12 Institute for Global Environmental Strategies / Working Paper 3 1. Introduction section concludes with policy recommendations. The paper also draws upon insights gleaned from In 2009, President Barack Obama and a majority stakeholder interviews conducted during the winter Democratic 111th Congress came to office in a of 2011. seemingly favorable position to enact federal climate legislation. That legislation would, in turn, inject 2. Climate Change Legislation: A Collective momentum into international negotiations over a th Action Problem post-Kyoto climate agreement at the 15 Conference of Parties (COP15) to the United Nations Framework The United States’ response to climate change has Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) at the drawn interest for as long as anthropogenic close of 2009. At least this was the prevailing greenhouse gases (GHGs) emissions have been sentiment nearly three years ago (Dickinson, 2010; linked to rising global temperatures. The interest is Merchant, 2010). Today these hopes have faded like justified on several grounds. The United States is the the “yes we can” optimism President Obama rode world’s largest economy and emits nearly one-fourth into office. The question motivating this paper turns of global GHGs. It is also home to the world’s that optimism on its head: why can’t the United second highest levels of per capita GHG emissions States enact federal climate change legislation? and bears the greatest historic responsibility for those emissions (See Table 1). However, as exemplified by Most answers to the above question fault 1) the 2004 withdrawal from the Kyoto Protocol, key institutional rules requiring bills receive a 60-vote elements of the United States government have been supra-majority to avoid a Senate filibuster; and 2) the reluctant to commit to GHG mitigation targets.5 Not Obama administration’s decision to prioritize health surprisingly, a growing chorus of world leaders has care over climate change. Both of these explanations, called for the United States to “do more on climate however, overlook that passing climate legislation change (Reuters, 2007; AFP, 2009).” requires overcoming a collective action problem. This paper uses a logistical regression model on More surprising is the range of stakeholders echoing House Bill (H.R.) 2454 (The American Clean Energy these calls in the United States. For instance, many and Security Act of 2009) to demonstrate that a in the national security community have backed divided Democratic party made resolving this climate legislation intended to curb addictions to th problem particularly challenging during the 111 imported oil (Energy Security Leadership Council, Congress. To make collective action more feasible, 2006). Meanwhile, a growing segment of the supportive Democrats would be well-advised to environmental community has supported climate build coalitions for climate legislation around its policy because its benefits extend beyond a stable non-climate benefits and the costs of the status quo climate to clean air and livable communities fragmented regulatory environment. These (Groosman et al, 2009). Further, some in the concentrated benefits/costs may not only break business community have sought a climate policy fragile ties between pragmatic and tea party promoting low carbon technologies and green collar Republicans. The added political benefits of jobs (USCAP, 2007). The multiple non-climate triangulating Republicans may also strengthen benefits highlighted in the above energy security, incentives for blue dog and green Democrats to find environmental, and eco-business arguments would common cause in climate legislation. presumably appeal to policymakers. But identifying these benefits has thus far proven easier This paper is organized into four sections. The next than crafting policy capable of realizing them. section draws upon theories on collective action to understand the difficulties in enacting climate legislation. The third section tests a theory about the 5 This was partially attributable to President George W. Bush’s role of political parties with a logistical regression determination to keep the United States outside of Kyoto as well as model and analysis of votes for H.R. 2454. A final the requirement that ratifying a treaty requires approval from two-thirds of the Senate. 4 Institute for Global Environmental Strategies / Working Paper Table 1. Basic Data on the United States CO2 emission 5,826.7 Million tons Historical CO2 emissions (1850-2007) 339,174 Mt Per capita CO2 emissions 18.67 ton/capita Per GDP CO2 emissions GDP 2,502.00 USD/GDP Sources: World Resources Institute, “Climate Analysis Indicators Tool,” http://cait.wri.org/ the variation in the supply of public goods; two of The main reason for the difficulties is not benefits the more important are policymaking institutions and per se but the interests to which they accrue. At the critical moments. international level, a longstanding challenge for climate change has been that, because it is inherently difficult to prevent countries from enjoying the 2.1 Policymaking Institutions: A Veto Players benefits of a stable climate, governments are inclined Argument to free ride rather than contribute to this global Most institutional arguments are based on the rules public good (Ostrom, 1990). At the national level, governing lawmaking. The term “veto players” benefits from energy security, environmental quality, succinctly summarizes their impacts. Veto players and eco-business are more concentrated insofar as refer to political actors that can prevent a proposed they accrue to smaller groups of interests. But these policy from moving forward. At the core of the veto benefits also tend to be distributed among many player’s argument lies a simple hypothesis: the more stakeholders over a longer time horizon than GHG veto players, the more difficulties changing policy.