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Decisions at the Brink Linguistic Analysis Reveals How Advisers Influenced President Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Ago, Argues David R

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Decisions at the Brink Linguistic Analysis Reveals How Advisers Influenced President Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Ago, Argues David R COMMENT POLITICS A call for a world BOOKS Nature regulars PROTEST Canadian scientists OBITUARY Phillip Vallentine without the danger of share their tips for who blockaded coal train Tobias, giant of hominin nuclear weapons p.30 holiday reading p.34 call for more direct action p.38 work, remembered p.40 CORBIS President John F. Kennedy meets the US Executive Committee of the National Security Council in October 1962 to discuss Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Decisions at the brink Linguistic analysis reveals how advisers influenced President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis 50 years ago, argues David R. Gibson. his October is the 50th anniversary The existence of the ExComm record- with the meticulous transcription of conver- of the Cuban missile crisis, when the ings — more than 20 hours’ worth from sation — with all its interruptions, slips and United States and Soviet Union stared these 13 days alone — was known only to hesitations. Assuming that every­thing that Teach other down after Soviet nuclear missiles Kennedy’s close associates until they came happens does so for a reason, it asks why, were discovered on the island of Cuba. to light during the Watergate investigations when and with what consequences people Much has emerged about these events as in 1973. The tapes were eventually declas- do things such as interrupt, restart sentences successive troves of information have been sified and, with a few excisions, released and repeat others’ words. It also helps to shed uncovered — including records from the to the public in the mid-1990s. Historians light on why particular discussions unfold as Soviet secret service and ruling Presidium1, have looked to them and the transcripts3 they do, from conversations about mundane and from the US Department of State and for insight into the positions taken by the matters, such as about what to have for dinner, Navy2. Perhaps the most remarkable are the dozen or so ExComm members, including to talk of greater moment. hours of audio recordings that US President Robert Kennedy, the attorney general and The Cuban missile crisis is often held up John F. Kennedy made secretly of the delib- president’s brother, and Robert McNamara, as a model of rational decision-making. In erations of the Executive Committee of the the Secretary of Defense at the time4. many accounts, the only decision maker that National Security Council (ExComm), with I am the first to subject the recordings to mattered was Kennedy, and the ExComm’s which he met almost daily during the height scientific scrutiny, using the tools of conversa- contribution is minimized. My study of of the crisis, between 16 and 28 October 1962. tion analysis. This subfield of sociology starts these recordings, however, suggests that 5 JULY 2012 | VOL 487 | NATURE | 27 © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved COMMENT Kennedy was susceptible to persuasion, reflected a growing determination to reach CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS which was shaped by conversational vicis- consensus on some course of action when TIMELINE situdes and exigencies, yet also motivated the best course remained elusive, and to How events unfolded during the height and constrained by the pace of events in the combat attempts to threaten this consensus. of the crisis in October 1962. outside world. My analysis challenges familiar This in turn allowed President Kennedy to BETTMANN/CORBIS ideas: that Kennedy steadfastly resisted calls make a choice, which he did on the 20 Octo- for military action; that once he expressed a ber, that he could justify in light of recent preference his advisers promptly fell in line; talk — even if it flew in the face of much of that his decisions were the obvious ones given what had been said earlier. the objective logic of the geopolitical situa- This consensus was possible because, for tion; and that the ExComm’s consideration the first week of the crisis, the United States of the options was thorough and balanced. In kept its knowledge of the missiles a closely fact, the recordings reveal a president clearly guarded secret, so the ExComm could revisit swayed by the advice he received — and the the blockade option again and again until 4 OCTOBE manner in which he received it. objections were squelched. When all options Soviet missiles photographed in Cuba. look bad, a decision may hinge on the ability TIME TO TALK of groups to talk in circles until such a time 6 OCTOBE The president learned of the missiles on as the more frightening consequences of one President Kennedy informed; 16 October (see ‘Cuban missile crisis time- course of action disappear from view. ExComm secretly convened. line’). His first major decision was to impose a naval blockade on Cuba, which he announced OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 22 OCTOBE to the world on 22 October after revealing the Kennedy’s second main decision con- Kennedy announces discovery of missiles discovery of the missiles. According to most cerned the implementation of the blockade. and imposition of naval blockade. accounts, President Kennedy was drawn to Soon after the president made his public the idea of a blockade because it seemed like announcement on 22 October, Khrushchev 23 OCTOBE a strong action that did not involve an imme- ordered Soviet ships carrying weapons to Kremlin orders ships carrying weapons to diate military attack. Certainly the president be diverted away from Cuba2 (although diverted from Cuba. Organization of American States supports blockade, was not eager to begin dropping bombs, but a warhead-laden ship called the Alexsan- lending it important legitimacy. the blockade option itself carried serious drovsk slipped into port in Cuba before the risks. No one thought it would be sufficient blockade was put into effect). Other ships 24 OCTOBE to force Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to were allowed to continue on their course. US Strategic Air Command moves to withdraw the missiles already on the island, Although Kennedy believed that these DEFCON 2 (alert status just short of which meant that an air strike might eventu- ships were not carrying missiles, some felt imminent nuclear war). Premier ally be needed to destroy them. In the interim, that an interception would be needed so that Khrushchev rejects blockade. the Soviets would have time to finish work on Khrushchev would not doubt US resolve. the missiles, some of which could be fired at Four Soviet-bloc ships were put forward as 25 OCTOBE US cities — perhaps by accident or without candidates. Two (the Kimovsk and Grozny) Bucharest and Völkerfreundschaft authorization — in the event that the United were ordered by Khrushchev to turn back allowed past blockade; photographs States attacked. before they could be intercepted. Another dramatically unveiled to United Nations Security Council. How, then, did Kennedy come to choose (the East German Völkerfreundschaft) was a a blockade? I identified and examined every passenger ship that no one had the stomach instance of talk about a blockade and subse- to challenge for fear of loss of life. The only 26 OCTOBE quent air strike in the tapes to see whether serious candidate for interception was the Marucla (Lebanese freighter under Soviet the danger of a missile launch was reiter- Bucharest, a Soviet tanker that, lacking deck charter) intercepted. Khrushchev makes ated, omitted or anticipated but unsuccess- cargo, was almost certainly carrying only oil. rst proposal: to remove missiles in return for US pledge to not invade Cuba. fully articulated. I found a marked shift, The ship turned up at the blockade line early early on 18 October, from frequent warn- on the morning of 25 October and, before ings, particularly from McNamara, about it could be discussed by the ExComm, was 27 OCTOBE the danger of bombing operational missiles permitted to pass after it declared its cargo Khrushchev makes second proposal, demanding withdrawal of Jupiter missiles on the island, to a string of statements (the benign. Thus, the ExComm meeting later from Turkey. U-2 plane shot down over first from Llewellyn Thompson, former US that morning was, in part, about whether to Cuba. Kennedy publicly accepts Khrushchev’s rst proposal and secretly ambassador to the Soviet Union) supporting chase it down and board it belatedly. promises to remove Jupiter missiles. the blockade and air strike but omitting any The standard story is that the president reference to this danger. let the Bucharest go because he wanted to 28 OCTOBE After this shift, whenever someone tries to give Khrushchev more time to back down, Khrushchev accepts. reintroduce the risk of a nuclear response, that or to respond to diplomatic overtures at the person is interrupted, talked over or ignored. United Nations5. Twice, for instance, Robert Kennedy tries to In fact, the tapes reveal a Kennedy who warn about the danger of allowing the Soviets is very worried about appearing weak if he time to finish work on the missiles before a US does not order the ship to be boarded. His attack, but both times he is thwarted. The first hand is stayed by opposition from his more- time, Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint vocal advisers. They assure him that the fail- Chiefs of Staff, talks over him. The second ure to intercept could easily be justified to time, McNamara repeatedly interrupts him domestic and international audiences, even before he can finish his thought. as they thwart attempts to give sustained I believe such efforts at ‘suppression’ consideration to the way that the Soviets COLLECTION/CORBIS HULTON-DEUTSCH 28 | NATURE | VOL 487 | 5 JULY 2012 © 2012 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved COMMENT sense. The discussions were undoubtedly beneficial in bringing to light the various options and their associated risks, and in forcing the different factions (the ‘hawks’ BETTMANN/CORBIS and ‘doves’) to hone their arguments.
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