Decisions at the Brink Linguistic Analysis Reveals How Advisers Influenced President Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis 50 Years Ago, Argues David R

COMMENT POLITICS A call for a world BOOKS Nature regulars PROTEST Canadian scientists OBITUARY Phillip Vallentine without the danger of share their tips for who blockaded coal train Tobias, giant of hominin nuclear weapons p.30 holiday reading p.34 call for more direct action p.38 work, remembered p.40 CORBIS

President John F. Kennedy meets the US Executive Committee of the National Security Council in October 1962 to discuss Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Decisions at the brink Linguistic analysis reveals how advisers influenced President Kennedy during the Cuban missile crisis 50 years ago, argues David R. Gibson.

his October is the 50th anniversary The existence of the ExComm record- with the meticulous transcription of conver- of the Cuban missile crisis, when the ings — more than 20 hours’ worth from sation — with all its interruptions, slips and United States and Soviet Union stared these 13 days alone — was known only to hesitations. Assuming that everything that Teach other down after Soviet nuclear missiles Kennedy’s close associates until they came happens does so for a reason, it asks why, were discovered on the island of Cuba. to light during the Watergate investigations when and with what consequences people Much has emerged about these events as in 1973. The tapes were eventually declas- do things such as interrupt, restart sentences successive troves of information have been sified and, with a few excisions, released and repeat others’ words. It also helps to shed uncovered — including records from the to the public in the mid-1990s. Historians light on why particular discussions unfold as Soviet secret service and ruling Presidium1, have looked to them and the transcripts3 they do, from conversations about mundane and from the US Department of State and for insight into the positions taken by the matters, such as about what to have for dinner, Navy2. Perhaps the most remarkable are the dozen or so ExComm members, including to talk of greater moment. hours of audio recordings that US President Robert Kennedy, the attorney general and The Cuban missile crisis is often held up John F. Kennedy made secretly of the delib- president’s brother, and Robert McNamara, as a model of rational decision-making. In erations of the Executive Committee of the the Secretary of Defense at the time4. many accounts, the only decision maker that National Security Council (ExComm), with I am the first to subject the recordings to mattered was Kennedy, and the ExComm’s which he met almost daily during the height scientific scrutiny, using the tools of conversa- contribution is minimized. My study of of the crisis, between 16 and 28 October 1962. tion analysis. This subfield of sociology starts these recordings, however, suggests that

Kennedy was susceptible to persuasion, reflected a growing determination to reach CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS which was shaped by conversational vicis- consensus on some course of action when TIMELINE situdes and exigencies, yet also motivated the best course remained elusive, and to How events unfolded during the height and constrained by the pace of events in the combat attempts to threaten this consensus. of the crisis in October 1962. outside world. My analysis challenges familiar This in turn allowed President Kennedy to BETTMANN/CORBIS ideas: that Kennedy steadfastly resisted calls make a choice, which he did on the 20 Octo- for military action; that once he expressed a ber, that he could justify in light of recent preference his advisers promptly fell in line; talk — even if it flew in the face of much of that his decisions were the obvious ones given what had been said earlier. the objective logic of the geopolitical situa- This consensus was possible because, for tion; and that the ExComm’s consideration the first week of the crisis, the United States of the options was thorough and balanced. In kept its knowledge of the missiles a closely fact, the recordings reveal a president clearly guarded secret, so the ExComm could revisit swayed by the advice he received — and the the blockade option again and again until 4 OCTOBE manner in which he received it. objections were squelched. When all options Soviet missiles photographed in Cuba. look bad, a decision may hinge on the ability TIME TO TALK of groups to talk in circles until such a time 6 OCTOBE The president learned of the missiles on as the more frightening consequences of one President Kennedy informed; 16 October (see ‘Cuban missile crisis time- course of action disappear from view. ExComm secretly convened. line’). His first major decision was to impose a naval blockade on Cuba, which he announced OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS 22 OCTOBE to the world on 22 October after revealing the Kennedy’s second main decision con- Kennedy announces discovery of missiles discovery of the missiles. According to most cerned the implementation of the blockade. and imposition of naval blockade. accounts, President Kennedy was drawn to Soon after the president made his public the idea of a blockade because it seemed like announcement on 22 October, Khrushchev 23 OCTOBE a strong action that did not involve an imme- ordered Soviet ships carrying weapons to Kremlin orders ships carrying weapons to diate military attack. Certainly the president be diverted away from Cuba2 (although diverted from Cuba. Organization of American States supports blockade, was not eager to begin dropping bombs, but a warhead-laden ship called the Alexsan- lending it important legitimacy. the blockade option itself carried serious drovsk slipped into port in Cuba before the risks. No one thought it would be sufficient blockade was put into effect). Other ships 24 OCTOBE to force Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to were allowed to continue on their course. US Strategic Air Command moves to withdraw the missiles already on the island, Although Kennedy believed that these DEFCON 2 (alert status just short of which meant that an air strike might eventu- ships were not carrying missiles, some felt imminent nuclear war). Premier ally be needed to destroy them. In the interim, that an interception would be needed so that Khrushchev rejects blockade. the Soviets would have time to finish work on Khrushchev would not doubt US resolve. the missiles, some of which could be fired at Four Soviet-bloc ships were put forward as 25 OCTOBE US cities — perhaps by accident or without candidates. Two (the Kimovsk and Grozny) Bucharest and Völkerfreundschaft authorization — in the event that the United were ordered by Khrushchev to turn back allowed past blockade; photographs States attacked. before they could be intercepted. Another dramatically unveiled to United Nations Security Council. How, then, did Kennedy come to choose (the East German Völkerfreundschaft) was a a blockade? I identified and examined every passenger ship that no one had the stomach instance of talk about a blockade and subse- to challenge for fear of loss of life. The only 26 OCTOBE quent air strike in the tapes to see whether serious candidate for interception was the Marucla (Lebanese freighter under Soviet the danger of a missile launch was reiter- Bucharest, a Soviet tanker that, lacking deck charter) intercepted. Khrushchev makes ated, omitted or anticipated but unsuccess- cargo, was almost certainly carrying only oil. rst proposal: to remove missiles in return for US pledge to not invade Cuba. fully articulated. I found a marked shift, The ship turned up at the blockade line early early on 18 October, from frequent warn- on the morning of 25 October and, before ings, particularly from McNamara, about it could be discussed by the ExComm, was 27 OCTOBE the danger of bombing operational missiles permitted to pass after it declared its cargo Khrushchev makes second proposal, demanding withdrawal of Jupiter missiles on the island, to a string of statements (the benign. Thus, the ExComm meeting later from Turkey. U-2 plane shot down over first from Llewellyn Thompson, former US that morning was, in part, about whether to Cuba. Kennedy publicly accepts Khrushchev’s rst proposal and secretly ambassador to the Soviet Union) supporting chase it down and board it belatedly. promises to remove Jupiter missiles. the blockade and air strike but omitting any The standard story is that the president reference to this danger. let the Bucharest go because he wanted to 28 OCTOBE After this shift, whenever someone tries to give Khrushchev more time to back down, Khrushchev accepts. reintroduce the risk of a nuclear response, that or to respond to diplomatic overtures at the person is interrupted, talked over or ignored. United Nations5. Twice, for instance, Robert Kennedy tries to In fact, the tapes reveal a Kennedy who warn about the danger of allowing the Soviets is very worried about appearing weak if he time to finish work on the missiles before a US does not order the ship to be boarded. His attack, but both times he is thwarted. The first hand is stayed by opposition from his more- time, Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint vocal advisers. They assure him that the fail- Chiefs of Staff, talks over him. The second ure to intercept could easily be justified to time, McNamara repeatedly interrupts him domestic and international audiences, even before he can finish his thought. as they thwart attempts to give sustained I believe such efforts at ‘suppression’ consideration to the way that the Soviets COLLECTION/CORBIS HULTON-DEUTSCH

sense. The discussions were undoubtedly beneficial in bringing to light the various options and their associated risks, and in forcing the different factions (the ‘hawks’

BETTMANN/CORBIS and ‘doves’) to hone their arguments. But they were also structured by conversational machinery — based, for instance, on the rules of turn-taking and the expectation that one say something relevant to whatever was said last — that is not easily put to the service of comparing the consequences of compet- ing courses of action. In fact, the need to reach consensus at each stage required the ExComm to avoid, or cease, consideration of some of the risks: the risk of having to bomb operational missiles if the blockade failed; the risk that letting the Bucharest past would leave Khrushchev with the impression that Ken- nedy was weak; and the risk that by accept- Aerial shots of Soviet missile launch sites in Cuba provoked a naval blockade by the United States. ing Khrushchev’s first offer and ignoring his second, the first real path out of the cri- might interpret the move. Kennedy remains boss. Twice, for instance, the president is sis (like-for-like missile withdrawal) would unconvinced. By the end of the meeting he allowed to talk on at length about the futility be sacrificed. still seems inclined to board the ship, but of accepting Khrushchev’s first offer, receiv- The same process could have had a dif- postpones a decision until later in the day. ing no challenge despite providing openings ferent ending. Had a consensus in favour of Before the ExComm reconvened, how- (such as pauses) for disagreement. the blockade been forged even a day sooner, ever, a state-department briefing for legisla- Several times people even suggest that for instance, it might have gone into effect tors leaked the fact that the Bucharest had President Kennedy remove himself from in time for the Navy to intercept the Alek- already crossed the blockade. Rather than the letter-drafting process. Robert Kennedy sandrovsk. Given that this ship was under admit indecision, the Pentagon announced does so most forthrightly. This results in an orders to sink itself rather than be boarded2, that the navy had let it pass after ascertain- explosion of laughter at his audacity, and at that would have sent ing that it carried no contraband. When the the way he is pointing out the elephant in “The same history careering ExComm reconvened later in the afternoon, the room — that the president has become process could down a different path it took the passage of the tanker as irrevers- the primary impediment to consensus as to have had entirely. ible — showing how indecision can be trans- what the president should do. a different The lesson for sci- formed into decision by the pace of events. Finding little support for the position he ending.” entists, advisers and Kennedy’s third big decision concerned has taken, President Kennedy eventually policy-makers is that the deal that resolved the crisis. Late on relents and agrees to the wording of a letter the details and mechanics of conversation 26 October, he received a private letter in that accepts Khrushchev’s first offer, even matter. Talk is useful for decision-making, which Premier Khrushchev offered to with- though it hints at later negotiations over but its conventions do not ensure that sus- draw his missiles in return for a US pledge “other armaments”. tained attention is given to all the things not to invade the island. Before this could be Yet Kennedy remained unconvinced that that could go wrong. Given enough time, discussed by the ExComm the next morn- this would be enough. Following a more all branches of the decision tree might ing, the group received another offer, this intimate meeting off-tape on that night, he receive their due, but during a crisis time one made publicly, demanding that Presi- deployed his brother to secretly deliver a is in short supply, and the hardest deci- dent Kennedy remove the North Atlantic promise that the Jupiter missiles would be sions might require that some branches are Treaty Organization’s nuclear (Jupiter) removed from Turkey within a few months neglected and even wilfully abandoned. ■ missiles from Turkey. The ExComm was of the end of the crisis, on the condition SEE COMMENT P.30 dumbfounded, but Kennedy’s advisers that Khrushchev did not publicize that part quickly converged to recommend that the of the deal. David R. Gibson is a lecturer of sociology president accept the first offer and ignore Khrushchev accepted, having been about at Princeton University in New Jersey. His the second. The president resisted, however, to agree to the terms of Kennedy’s letter book Talk at the Brink: Deliberation and insisting that Khrushchev would never be when he received word of the further con- Decision During the Cuban Missile Crisis content with such a deal, having publicly cession2. This marked the beginning of the (Princeton University Press) is published this proposed a missile trade. end of the crisis. Although there followed month. The group reached an impasse on the several months of tense negotiations about e-mail: [email protected] 1 afternoon of 27 October. Neither side inspections and Soviet nuclear bombers , 1. Fursenko, A. & Naftali, T. One Hell of a Gamble: could muster an argument that the other by Christmas all the offending weapons had Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–1964 side would accept, even though everyone been removed from Cuba. (Norton 1997). 2. Dobbs, M. One Minute to Midnight (Knopf, 2008). felt pressured to respond to Khrushchev’s 3. May, E. R. & Zelikow, P. D. The Kennedy Tapes offer before the end of the day, partly for fear NOT SO RATIONAL (Harvard Univ. Press, 1997). that if there was any delay he would issue The Cuban missile crisis had a good end- 4. Stern, S. M. Averting the ‘Final Failure’: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis additional demands. ing, and the ExComm deliberations deserve Meetings (Stanford Univ. Press, 2003). On the tapes, President Kennedy’s advis- some credit. But this was not a rational 5. Kennedy, R. F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the ers try, in various ways, to work around their decision-making process in any traditional Cuban Missile Crisis (Norton, 1969).