Ian Hunter examines the Liberal leader’s role as a critic of SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR Sir Archibald Sinclair. Leader of the Liberal Party from 1935 to 1945, was the last Liberal MP to hold a Cabinet position at THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER Westminster, serving as Churchill’s Air Minister from May 1940 to May 1945. He was also one of the first parliamentarians to voice concerns about the National Government’s policy of appeasement during the mid- 1930s. Historians have consistently overlooked the key role played by the Liberal Party between Sinclair 1 n the first volume of his Having then attended Sandhurst, 1936 and 1939. This speaking against war memoirs, The Gather- he became a regular soldier in appeasement ing Storm, Churchill himself 1910, and served with distinction is mainly because at the Central fails to mention the part in the Great War as Churchill’s Hall, Tollcross, th of the focus on the Edinburgh, late played by the Liberal Party, second in command of the 6 1930s. Ipainting instead a self-portrait Royal Scots Fusiliers in Flanders. internal dissent within of enormous vanity in which he He became Churchill’s private the Conservative casts himself as almost the sole secretary in 1919 when Lloyd Party and on the prophet of vision and reason to George appointed Churchill to have been warning of Hitler’s the combined War Office and particular role played threat to European peace. The Air Ministry role (1919–21) to reality was very different – and oversee demobilisation and to by , the Liberal Party, and Sinclair in deal with the anti-Bolshevik from the wilderness particular, played a major role in White Russians. Sinclair contin- developing and proposing clear ued to support his mentor when of the backbenches, alternatives to the Government’s Churchill moved to the Colo- in opposing his party’s foreign policy. nial Office (1921–22) for the last Archibald Sinclair was born in eighteen months of the Coalition international policies. 1890, and was educated at Eton. Government.

30 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER

With Churchill’s encourage- that the League of Nations could our power to deflect the Gov- ment, Sinclair stood for election be relied on to intervene and ernment’s policy from its present as a Liberal in his home constitu- resolve international problems dangerous and wasteful course’.3 ency of Caithness and Sutherland, on Britain’s behalf. The Liberals Sinclair was keen to see the Gov- entering Parliament in 1922. He fought the November 1935 gen- ernment move to a defence policy climbed rapidly through the Lib- eral election on a platform that that was more reliant on the col- eral Parliamentary Party ranks, claimed ‘the national defences lective security offered by the becoming Chief Whip in 1930. must be kept efficient and large League of Nations. The next day He entered the National Govern- enough for the needs of the times, Churchill passed a note to Sinclair ment with Herbert Samuel, the but a colossal, panic expenditure which, while calling his manner of Liberal leader, where he served in upon arms is not the road to peace delivery ‘admirable’, described his the Cabinet as Secretary of State … Through strengthening the argument as ‘false’ and his purpose for Scotland in 1931–32, prior League of Nations, and through as ‘morbid’ and finished by attack- to the resignation of the Liber- international disarmament, and ing Sinclair’s anti-rearmament als over the Ottawa Trade Tariff there alone, the true path to secu- stance as ‘fatal’. Sinclair responded Agreements. When Samuel lost rity lies.’2 Although sympathetic From April to Churchill, claiming that his his seat at the 1935 general elec- to this position, Sinclair became former mentor had misjudged tion Lloyd George nominated increasingly dissatisfied with the 1935 his purpose and that as regards his Sinclair for the parliamentary viability of opposing rearmament onwards arguments Churchill should ‘think party leadership, to which he was in the face of the emergence of it over – surely better than you elected unopposed. undemocratic regimes in conti- Sinclair admit and not wholly separated Sinclair inherited a quarrel- nental Europe. from your own’.4 some, demoralised and dispa- On 14 March 1935, eight shifted his It is not clear whether further rate group of twenty-one MPs. months before the general elec- discussion took place and what, if Between 1935 and 1939 he led tion, a major debate on the naval stance and any, greater role Churchill played an effective internal reorgani- supply estimates took place in the focused in changing Sinclair’s views, but sation, redefining the role and House of Commons; it marked it is apparent that from April responsibilities of the Liberal Par- the last time that Sinclair opposed increas- 1935 onwards Sinclair shifted ty’s central organisation, and initi- increased spending on the armed his stance and focused increas- ated a number of policy reviews. services. Sinclair made a lengthy ingly on ingly on the dangers that political However, the issue on which he speech attacking the Govern- extremism raised in continental was to find a national voice was ment’s policy of increasing naval the dan- Europe. Certainly this was the his early support for rearmament, spending, arguing that over £660 gers that last occasion on which he was often speaking in Parliament as million had been spent during to attack any government pro- one of the first opponents of the the preceding ten years, to lit- political posal for rearmament. Instead, by National Government’s policy tle value. Concluding his attack, May 1935, Sinclair was arguing of appeasing Hitler’s territorial he argued that ‘in the absence of extremism in support of the Government’s ambitions in Central Europe. any clear relation between this proposals to increase air defences Sinclair inherited from Her- country’s armament policy and a raised in as ‘an emergency contribution bert Samuel a policy position that policy for a collective system, we continental to the collective system of peace opposed rearmament and was on these benches will feel bound under the League of Nations’. over-reliant on the supposition by speech and vote to do all in Europe. This position was to form one of

Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 31 SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER the central planks of party policy Britain’s armed forces. In tandem, June 1936. Incensed by the Gov- under Sinclair. At its simplest, at every available opportunity, ernment’s refusal to stand up to Sinclair threw Liberal support he criticised the Government Italy over its invasion of Abyssinia, behind the need for collective for failing to demonstrate its he made one of the first parlia- security through the Covenant commitment to the League of mentary attacks on what was to of the League of Nations and Nations as the route for curtail- become the policy of appease- pressed the Government to target ing the ambitions of aggressor ment. ‘The Foreign Secretary expenditure on building a first- nations. Sinclair’s outrage at the [Eden] knows that aggression is rate Royal Air Force and secure announcement of the Hoare- an appetite that grows by what it naval defences.5 In this policy the Laval Pact, which overturned feeds on. The Government’s pol- Liberals were offering a genu- Britain’s support for the League icy puts a premium on successful ine alternative to Chamberlain’s of Nations’ policy of applying aggression and makes the world counsels of despair. sanctions to persuade Mussolini safe for dictatorship.’10 Together The Liberals were also able to to withdraw from Abyssinia, was with his colleague Geoffrey offer a policy in distinct contrast trumpeted in the House of Com- Mander, Liberal MP for Wolver- to the refusal of Attlee and the mons on 19 December 1935. hampton East, Sinclair harassed Labour Party to face up to grow- Sinclair claimed that the Govern- the Government for shedding ing threats from abroad. Between ment had failed in its obligations one potential ally after another 1931 and 1937 Labour adopted to give a lead to the League of and for refusing to use the powers what can only be described as a Nations and had turned its back of the League of Nations to resist policy of unilateral disarmament on its original proposals for deal- aggression effectively. and isolation. The Labour Party ing with Italian aggression. He During 1936 Sinclair came Conference in 1932 unanimously asserted that, thanks to Baldwin, under pressure from his colleagues passed a motion pledging the ‘the British Empire is now neuter in the Parliamentary Liberal Party party to ‘take no part in war and in the counsels of the League’.8 to consider forming a closer tie to resist it with the whole force When Sin- He urged that the Government with the Popular Front organi- of the Labour movement’. In the should stand firm in support of sation which had been set up to key defence spending votes of clair took sanctions or else be seen to have encourage non-Conservative the mid-1930s (the March 1935 been party to rewarding aggres- parties to cooperate against the debate on the Defence White over the sion. domestic policy of the National Paper, the 1935 and 1936 army, Liberal The German reoccupation Government. There was much navy and air estimates, and the of the demilitarised Rhineland feeling that the Popular Front 1937 Defence Loans Bill) the leader- in March 1936 and the resulting platform should be extended to Labour Party consistently voted concerns about the extent of Ger- international policy. Sinclair was against building up the country’s ship in man ambitions provided a further very hesitant about this route to military capabilities. As late as July platform for Sinclair to expand Liberal–Labour cooperation, as 1937 the party abstained in the 1935, he on his thinking to the House of he feared that it would lead to the vote over the final appropriation accepted Commons. On 26 March 1936 ultimate absorption of the inde- for defence. This was not a proud he laid out Liberal policy for deal- pendent Liberal Party by Labour. record with which to face a Gov- the posi- ing with the perceived injustices He did, however, cooperate ernment increasingly committed that Germany claimed the Treaty informally with fellow opponents to the policy of appeasement.6 tion only of Versailles imposed on her. He of the National Government and When Sinclair took over the urged that Britain should take the spoke at the December 1936 Liberal leadership in 1935, he after lead in organising a World Con- ‘Arms and the Covenant’ rally accepted the position only after he had ference to reach a new settlement at the Royal Albert Hall, sharing he had obtained a promise from on colonial and economic issues a platform with Churchill and a his fellow MPs that the party obtained and to provide the basis for a pol- couple of Labour leaders (Citrine would give priority to defence. icy of ‘military and economic dis- and Dalton) to urge the promo- There were five occasions in each a prom- armament, of collective security tion of collective security through parliamentary session when the in which all countries, and not the League of Nations. This event Liberals, as the smaller opposition ise from merely groups of allies, must par- was overshadowed by the same party, could choose the subject for his fellow ticipate, and of justice and equal- day’s breaking news of the rela- debate.7 At each of these opportu- ity for all nations’.9 This became tionship between the King and nities the Liberals raised the issues MPs that the basis for policy proposals from Mrs Simpson. of defence and rearmament, espe- the Liberal benches until the At the end of May 1937 cially in relation to the air force. the party Munich crisis in 1938, when the Chamberlain replaced a weary Throughout 1936 and 1937, need to seek a defensive alliance and dispirited Baldwin as Prime in the face of a significant surge would give with the Soviet Union would Minister. Sinclair was certain that in German rearmament, Sinclair priority to become a major concern. the autocratic and lofty style of urged Chamberlain’s government Sinclair built on his stance in a Chamberlain, who was particu- further to increase spending on defence. powerful speech delivered on 23 larly ruthless with any dissent

32 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER and dismissive of the slightest approved, but the intervention in The Munich an attack this country would at criticism from both the opposi- Spain was being ignored and, in once stand firm in arms by her tion parties and his own back- a further humiliation to Brit- crisis side.’13 Sinclair did not deny that benches, would lead to a split ain, Mussolini was being offered Germany had the right to argue within the Tory party that would access to loans and grants on a allowed for a better settlement than had provide a golden opportunity for promise of future good behav- been imposed at Versailles but he the Liberals. He was right about iour. In the House of Commons Sinclair did not believe that concessions the former but overly optimistic Sinclair asked exactly what Brit- and should be made to Germany about the latter. ain was getting in return for this under duress. When Chamberlain The first signs of open discon- display of incredible largesse. The Churchill met Hitler at Berchtesgaden, Sin- tent over Chamberlain’s premier- answer that nothing had been clair was quick to dismiss the out- ship arose in February 1938 when won by such an approach came to cooper- come of the meetings as a further the tensions between the Prime all too quickly, as it became plain example of a ‘hurried, disorderly, Minister and his Foreign Secretary, that, in addition to Italian expan- ate more and humiliating rout’.14 Cham- Anthony Eden, broke into public sion remaining uncurtailed, Ger- openly. berlain had indeed betrayed the view over the policy to be pursued many was also moving to expand Czechoslovaks at his meeting in against Italy. Eden had become her control in Central Europe, Munich with Hitler. increasingly incensed by Cham- encouraged by Britain’s reluc- The Munich debate at West- berlain’s dabbling in foreign affairs tance to confront aggression. minster took place on 3 October without proper consultation. In With the remilitarisation of and Sinclair was one of the most January 1938 Chamberlain initi- the Rhineland and the March damning commentators on the ated talks with Mussolini with a 1938 with Austria, deep deal. Calling Chamberlain’s for- view to try to detach him from concerns were expressed in all eign policy a ‘policy of successive the German camp. Without agree- British political parties regarding retreats in the face of aggressive ing the details with Eden, Cham- Germany’s territorial ambitions dictatorships’ he made clear that berlain offered Mussolini a deal in Central Europe. Sinclair, Attlee Munich had been a humiliating whereby Britain would recognise and Chamberlain met to see if surrender in the face of threatened Italy’s control over Abyssinia in any joint policy could be devel- force. Sinclair also noted that there return for a promise of withdrawal oped in response to Germany and was a very reliable guide to Hit- of Italian troops from the Spanish Austria’s union but failed to agree ler’s intentions available and that Civil War and the offer of access a united position. In the sum- the Prime Minister would do well to a loan from Britain on prefer- mer of 1938 Germany pressed to read it: ‘Two sources of enlight- ential terms. This was an offer that its claims for the return of the enment I enjoy about Herr Hit- Mussolini, already safely in control Sudetenland, then part of Czech- ler’s intentions. One is his public of the African country and com- oslovakia, to the Reich. In Par- speeches and the expression of his fortable that he had backed the liament Sinclair initially argued opinions and intentions in pub- winning side in Spain, found it that the Czechoslovaks might lic and in private, and the other is easy to decline. Chamberlain was have to make concessions to Mein Kampf. I prefer Mein Kampf, also reluctant to pursue an offer, avoid conflict but swiftly realised because it has never yet let me favoured by Eden, from President that this would reduce Czecho- down, and I commend it to the Roosevelt to set up an interna- slovakia’s ability to defend itself Prime Minister.’ tional conference to deal with the from further aggression and by The con- Abyssinian crisis. Chamberlain did September had reversed his posi- vinced Sinclair that Germany now not believe that the Americans tion to opposing vigorously any had the upper hand in Europe and would be able to influence the deal over the Sudetenland. In the that Britain’s traditional attitude Italians any more successfully than Commons Sinclair argued that a of maintaining a balance of power could Britain.11 However, this general European settlement was to stop any one country becom- proved to be the final break with necessary and that Britain had to ing too dominant was being fool- Eden. Incensed by Chamberlain’s prove to Germany that aggression ishly abandoned. It would now be unwarranted intervention in the would be resisted. a more difficult task to stop Ger- responsibilities of his own office, On 14 September 1938 Sin- many from dominating Europe Eden resigned from the govern- clair and Lord Crewe12 wrote to than it would have been before. ment on 20 February. Chamberlain offering the Liberal Sinclair was becoming reluctantly Sinclair regarded Eden’s res- Party’s wholehearted support if convinced that war was unavoid- ignation as a calamity for the the Government made it clear able. Dingle Foot observed, in an chances of turning British policy to Germany ‘that an unprovoked unpublished short essay,15 that away from appeasement, and was attack upon Czechoslovakia can- the Munich crisis allowed Sin- appalled by the terms that had not be regarded with indiffer- clair and Churchill to cooper- been offered to Mussolini. Not ence by Great Britain, and that ate more openly. For example, in only was the Italian invasion of an if France were to be involved in November 1938, when Sinclair independent country being tacitly hostilities consequent upon such moved an amendment to set up

Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 33 SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER an immediate Ministry of Sup- arguing for the Liberals to adhere European diplomatic crisis. In a ply in order to speed up rearma- to the ‘traditional’ values of isola- debate on the international situ- ment, Churchill appealed in vain tionism, retrenchment and pacifi- ation on 3 April Sinclair declared for fifty of his fellow Conserva- cism. Within parliament Sinclair that peace would only be possible tive MPs to support the amend- was frequently attacked by Tory ‘if we are to convince Herr Hitler ment to make the Government MPs as a warmonger. It was left of our inflexible determination act. Only two Tory MPs (Brendan to Sinclair, Mander and a hand- to resist aggression henceforward, Bracken and Harold Macmillan) ful of other Liberals such as Sir there must be no hedging in the joined him in the Liberal lobby. Percy Harris (Chief Whip) to policy of His Majesty’s Govern- This incident provoked great oppose the Government and urge ment and no whittling down of resentment on the Conserva- a new approach to dealing with their pronouncements’. Sinclair tive benches and Churchill was Germany. The elder statesman of went on to be scathing about the threatened with an official Con- the party, David Lloyd George, Government’s record in main- servative opponent in the Epping though opposed to the Munich taining its purpose in the face of Division. Although the local agreement, was compromised the action of the dictators. He party did not deselect Churchill by his ill-judged comments pro- reminded the House of every he was told firmly that he was on claiming Hitler as a ‘great man’ retreat that the National Govern- probation. Sinclair and the local after they had met in 1936. Lord ment had presided over. Liberal candidate (who in 1935 Samuel, the former leader, was had polled 12,000 votes) assured more concerned with finding Let us be quite clear about this Churchill that in the event of an a personal route back to office matter. Peace will depend on the early election there would be no within the National Government ability of His Majesty’s Govern- Liberal opposition and that they and sent warm congratulations ment to convince Herr Hitler would do their utmost to induce to Chamberlain after Munich, that this time they really will be Liberal voters to give him their saying ‘any fool can go to war firm. It will not be easy to con- support.16 but it often needs the high- vince him. He will remember In the House of Commons, est qualities of statesmanship to the Government’s pledges at the throughout the rest of 1938 and keep the peace’18. Spender pub- last election about steady and into the spring of 1939, Sinclair licly referred to Sinclair’s policy collective resistance to unpro- and Churchill continued to work as being motivated by personal voked aggression and, four or closely together in condemning hatred of Chamberlain. five weeks later, the Hoare-Laval the Munich agreement, urging the The Munich agreement was negotiations. He will remem- formation of a Ministry of Supply hugely popular with the general ber that the independence of (reflecting their experience of the public and it took great politi- Austria was proclaimed by this Ministry of Munitions in 1918) cal courage for Sinclair to be so Government to be an object of and arguing that Britain’s foreign outspoken in his condemnation. British policy. He will remem- policy must focus on isolating and He was certainly quicker than the ber the speech of the Chancellor encircling Germany by forging an official Labour opposition to real- of the Exchequer at Lanark last understanding with the Russians ise that Hitler must be stopped. August which was universally in the face of a common threat. However, it is only in retrospect interpreted as meaning that we However, no matter how effective that it is clear that Sinclair was should, in the last resort, support Sinclair’s arguments were in the right. At the time many people Czecho-Slovakia against unpro- Commons, he failed to convince in Parliament and in the country voked aggression … Tremendous Sir Archibald many outside the House and, believed that Chamberlain had Sinclair (1890– exertions are called for from the indeed, some of his own back- saved Britain from an unnecessary 1970) Government and this country if benchers remained hostile to his conflict. It was not until the last we are to live down that record policy of opposing appeasement. year of the 1930s that Sinclair’s and convince Herr Hitler that in Even in the two votes at the end views began to chime with those future we will be steadfast. of the Munich agreement, four of the wider public. out of the small group of twenty By April 1939 the European Churchill, speaking next, declared Liberal MPs voted in support of situation was darkening to such that ‘this is a fine hour in the life Chamberlain.17 an extent that Sinclair now won of the Liberal Party, because from Outside the parliamentary widespread support for a scathing the moment when they realised party, Sinclair failed to win sup- attack on Chamberlain and other that rearmament was necessary, port from a small intellectual members of the Cabinet. German they have seemed to seek to bring group centred around Lord demands that Danzig, since 1919 forward together both the mate- Lothian (Philip Kerr) and J. A. a free city under the mandate rial and moral strength of this Spender, a devoted Asquithian of the League of Nations, be country, and I believe that at the Liberal and Chairman of the Lib- returned to German control, moment they represent what is eral Council. Letters appeared in together with other lands of the the heart and soul of the British the press opposing Sinclair and old East Prussia initiated another nation’.19

34 Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 SIR ARCHIBALD SINCLAIR: THE LIBERAL ANTI-APPEASER

It was, of course, too late by election gone ahead as planned issue of public policy – Man- this date to deter Hitler. Although (that is, if war had broken out churia, Abyssinia, Spain, Munich, Britain and France gave guar- twelve months later than it did) Ministry of Supply – dead right antees that they would protect then the Liberal Party might have all the time and all along the line Polish independence, Hitler was seen a significant improvement in – in those crucial, those disastrous ready to risk war to further his its electoral position. In July 1939 pre-war years. Yet our rightness eastern empire. Hitler and Stalin’s the Liberals fought and won their availed us nothing – and it availed deal over Poland and their non- first by-election since 1934 when the country nothing either. We aggression pact sealed the fate of Tom Horabin held North Corn- were right but we were impo- Poland and made war certain. By wall with an increased majority in tent – utterly impotent to avert the summer of 1939 there were a straight fight with a Conserva- the cataclysm we saw approach- few policy options available to tive. Horabin stood as a Liberal ing and which has engulfed us all. Britain other than to prepare to candidate with the support of the We’ve got to make sure that the stand with France and oppose Popular Front and his nomination Liberal Party is not only right but Germany militarily. papers were signed by both Labour great and formidable as well.’21 Sinclair built a high profile in and dissident Conservatives. both Parliament and the coun- In his maiden speech Horabin Ian Hunter has edited the collected try as a leading opponent of the spoke of the ‘infirmity of purpose correspondence between Archibald Government’s international pol- that many people in this country Sinclair and Winston Churchill icy. His anti-appeasement policy and many people in neutral and 1915–1960 (Politico’s Publishing, centred on a policy of strong allied countries, and certainly I forthcoming). national defence combined with believe, the leaders of the Axis resistance to aggression through powers saw in the British Govern- Further reading: 20 collective agreements and the ment’. He argued that Cham- Gerard De Groot, Liberal Crusader resolution of grievances through berlain had done more harm to – The life of Sir Archibald Sinclair international conferences. Sinclair the world than Hitler, on the (Hurst, 1993) urged the development of a new grounds that the man who lets the Richard S. Grayson, Liberals, foreign policy that would show mad bull out of the field to run International Relations and that aggression would be resisted amok is more responsible than the Appeasement: The Liberal Party, and that just grievances would bull for the damage done. What is 1919–39 (Frank Cass, 2001) be settled through international particularly interesting is the evi- Sinclair R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and conference, rather than secret dence that this by-election sug- Appeasement (Macmillan, 1994) diplomacy. He also argued that should gests that had Sinclair chosen to there must be cooperation across cooperate more with cross-party be given 1 There are exceptions to this rule, and the parties by those opposed to organisations, such as the Popular Richard Grayson’s excellent book Lib- appeasement, and he lent the sup- Front, rather than remain aloof in erals, International Relations and Appease- port of the Liberal Party to anti- credit for fear of jeopardising Liberal inde- ment: The Liberal Party, 1919–39 (Frank appeasement candidates at two fashion- pendence, his anti-appeasement Cass, 2001), is a very clear overview of by-elections (Oxford and Bridg- stance might have been more the development of various strands of Liberal thinking, both in and out of water). He also supported the ing Liberal effective. Certainly, high-profile Parliament, during the interwar years. Conservative MP, the Duchess of Liberal MPs such as Dingle Foot, foreign 2 w w w. l i b d e m m a n i f e s t o. c o m Athol, when she resigned her seat Richard Acland and Megan Lloyd /1935/1935-liberal-manifesto.shtml to fight an unsuccessful by-elec- George felt that Sinclair could 3 Hansard, 14 March 1935, p. 612. tion in protest at Chamberlain’s policy into have positioned the Liberal Party 4 Thurso Papers, THRS II 25/3, Churchill College, Cambridge. handling of appeasement. a coherent as the pivot around which could 5 Interestingly, considering that Sin- However, the campaign against have gathered both Labour and clair is frequently viewed as hav- Munich failed because Munich body that Conservative dissenters from the ing been too much in Churchill’s itself enjoyed enormous support National Government’s foreign pocket, Sinclair’s anti-appeasement throughout the country. The bulk offered policy. But it would have been a stance, with its emphasis on collective security, was significantly different of the British people were over- a clear risky initiative, requiring, at the from the line that Churchill devel- joyed to have avoided another war; very least, electoral cooperation oped. Churchill had little time for Sinclair’s message was not one they alterna- with the Labour Party – a risk that the niceties of collective security. He wanted to hear. Irrespective of this, Sinclair did not feel able to take. wanted a strong independent Britain Sinclair should be given credit for The frustration that the Liberal with armed forces, especially the air tive to the force, capable of resisting any con- fashioning Liberal foreign policy Party felt at having been correct tinental threat. In short, Churchill’s into a coherent body that offered dangerous in its policy but powerless to enact policy was to make sure Britain was a clear alternative to the dangerous its beliefs was articulated by Violet strong enough to ignore the League policy of appeasement. There were policy of Bonham Carter in a speech given of Nations and rely on French power, signs that Sinclair’s policy stance to a Liberal Action Group dinner: backed by British naval and air sup- appease- port, to keep Europe quiet. was turning into a vote-winner ‘For twenty-five years we have and that had the 1940 general ment. been right on almost every great concluded on page 48

Journal of Liberal History 42 Spring 2004 35 A Liberal Democrat History Group Fringe Meeting LIBERALS IN LIVERPOOL: THEIR LEGACY Liverpool has long been a Liberal Democrat success story – but why? Leading figures from the history of Liberalism in Liverpool outline the pioneering campaigning that took the city from Labour, and its continuing legacy.

Speakers: Sir Trevor Jones and Cllr Mike Storey (Leader of Liverpool City Council). Chair: Lord Rennard.

8.00pm Friday 19th March 2004 Stanley Room, Prince of Wales Hotel, Southport

the end, the party was willing 1 J. Pinder, The Federal Idea: A Brit- Sir Archibald Sinclair: of this period in DGFT 7/11, to accept the arguments of its ish Contribution Churchill College. 2 M. Pottle (ed.), Daring to Hope: The Liberal Anti- 17 Although twenty-one MPs had leaders that free trade was not Diaries and letters of Violet Bon- Appeaser been elected in 1935, Herbert part of the modern world, but ham-Carter, 1946–1969 (continued from page 35) Holdsworth defected to the Lib- that support for Europe was 3 R. Rhodes James, Anthony Eden eral Nationals in 1936. – and since then the party 4 A. Butt Philip, ‘The Liberals and 6 R. A. C. Parker, Chamberlain and 18 Although a man of principle, Appeasement (Macmillan, 1993) has not really questioned the Europe’, in V. Bogdanor (ed.), Samuel was increasingly desper- Liberal Party Politics provides an excellent record ate to return to Government. In protectionist approach at the 5 Manchester Guardian, 11 April of the alternative policy posi- September 1939 when Sinclair heart of the European Com- 1953 tions adopted by the Labour and declined the offer of a cabinet munity in any public way. 6 J. S. Rasmussen, The Liberal Party Liberal parties to the National seat from Chamberlain, Samuel In part this may have been 7 Liberal News, 1 February 1957 Government’s foreign policy as broke ranks and offered his per- regards . helped by the number of new 8 NLYL/UULS Joint Political sonal services to the Govern- Committee Minutes 1957–1968, 7 The five occasions were moving ment. Chamberlain declined recruits brought into the party Draft Policy Pamphlet 1 Novem- an amendment to the Address at the offer, saying that he had ‘no under Grimond’s leadership. ber 1957 the start of Parliament and the suitable post’ for Samuel. A full In that sense, the change from 9 Liberal News, 1 February 1957 three and a half supply (debat- account of this incident is given free-trade party to European 10 Roy Douglas, History of the Lib- ing) days they were allocated in by Professor John Vincent in the parliamentary calendar. party was significant and eral Party, 1895–1970 ‘Chamberlain, the Liberals and 11 Liberal News, 12 February 1959 8 House of Commons, 19 Decem- the outbreak of war, 1939’, Eng- indicative of a broader change 12 Jeremy Thorpe, In My Own Time ber 1935. lish Historical Review, April 1998. in personnel and attitude that 13 Roy Douglas, The History of the 9 House of Commons, 26 March 19 Hansard, 3 April 1939, col. 2497. marked a major shift in what Liberal Party, 1895–1970 1936. It should also be noted that ear- it meant to be a Liberal. 14 J. S. Rasmussen, The Liberal Party 10 Quoted in Geoffery Mander, We lier in the speech Sinclair had 15 Roy Douglas, The History of the Were Not All Wrong (Victor Gal- called for the restoration of Liberal Party, 1985–1970 lancz, 1941), p. 66. Churchill to the Cabinet, which After reading history at Selwyn 16 Iain Dale (ed.), Liberal Party Gen- 11 For a full account of the various may in part explain Churchill’s College, Cambridge and studying eral Election Manifestos, 1900– factors prompting Eden’s resig- warm reception of Sinclair’s per- for a MA at Lancaster Univer- 1997 nation see D. R. Thorpe, Eden formance. sity, Malcolm Baines completed (Chattos & Windus, 2003), pp. 20 Quoted in Parker, Chamberlain 200–06. a D.Phil. at Exeter College, and Appeasement, p. 269. 12 Liberal Leader in the House of 21 Speech to Liberal Action, 5 Oxford, on The Survival of the Lords. October 1943, Lady Violet Bon- British Liberal Party, 1932– 13 Quoted in the Liberal Magazine, ham Carter papers, Bodleian 1959 in 1989. He has also October 1938. Library, Oxford. Unfortunately published a number of articles on 14 Quoted in the Manchester Guard- the author is unable to provide ian, 22 September 1938. related topics and helped re-found a file reference as he consulted 15 See the file DGFT 7/14 at these papers prior to their formal the Liberal Democrat History Churchill College, Cambridge. cataloguing by the Library. Group. 16 See Dingle Foot’s description