CHAPTER XI THE ARMISTICE AND TREATY FOR REGULARIZA- TION OF THE WAR, 1820 T has been already mentioned that Morillo, about the time of Boyacd, was talking loudly about the new expedition which was coming from Spain. He had received notice that there was assembling atJ Cadiz, for the re-conquest of Spanish America, a force consisting of 20,200 infantry, 2800 cavalry, and 1370 artillerymen, with parks and supplies of every sort. When Ferdinand VII. returned from France to his kingdom in 1814, he was resolved to rule absolutely. He abolished the Regency, the Cortes, and every institution incompatible with autocratic rule. These measures being followed by various revolts, Ferdinand thought he might do a good deal towards getting rid of dangerous elements by sending them off on an expedition to South America He was also anxious to leave no opening to the French, who were intriguing for the appointment of a Portuguese prince as King of Buenos Aires. The chief command was given to O'Donnell, but he was the real soul of the conspiracy in favour of constitutional government Presently, he was suspected and replaced by the Conde de Calderon. At this moment there was an outbreak of yellow fever in Cadiz, which helped to fan the fire of discontent in the army, by adding a new terror to the prospect of a voyage to South America, A fresh conspiracy was hatched under the direction of Antonio Quiroga. On Q 24Z 242 SIMON BOLIVAR the 1st January 1820, two battalions, headed by Rafael Riego, broke into revolt and seized Calderon, the commander-in-chief Quiroga was voted leader of the revolution. Ferdinand now thought matters were alarming, and saw the sceptre slipping from his grasp, notwithstanding the suppression! of the revolt and the execution of Riego. He accordingly summoned the Cortes, and no more was heard of the great expedition to South America. Morillo heard of the revolutiçn at Cadiz at the end of March 1820, Bolivar not till late in April. The former naturally said little about it, and equally naturally, Bolivar was delighted at what, it was not difficult to foresee, meant the end of the idea of reinforcements from Spain for the enemy. Leaving Angostura on the 24th December 1819, Bolivar spent most of January. 1820 in Apure and Guadalito, reaching Cócuta on the 8th February. After reviewing the "army of the north," and visiting some of the neighbouring towns in Merida, he went to Socorro where, on the 25th February, he received news that Santander had, on the 12th, proclaimed in Bogota the fundamental law for the union of Venezuela and New Granada. To Santander's compliments he replied in the same strain. Santander, whatever his faults, was not lacking in capacity, and had made much progress in the work of administration in , Bogota and the neigh- bourhood, The Congress which' Bolivar left sitting at Angostura had also been prolific in laws for the government of the republic, and in conferring honours on the Liberator. He was to be called "Liberator- President" on every occasion, his picture was to be hung in the Congress Hall, with his name and titles inscribed in letters of gold, "Bolivar, Liberator of Colombia, Father of his Country, Terror of Despotism." Finally, a law was passed regulating elections to the BOLIVAR RETURNS TO NEW GRANADA 243 General Constituent Congress. The principal business of this Congress would be the final approval of the Constitution of i819, The Congress of Angostura then dissolved itself on the 19th January i82o. Bolivar, on the march once more to Bogota, reached Tunja on the 1st March, Bogota on the 4th. During the eighteen days of his stay there, he discussed with Santander the campaign both in the south and in the north of New Granada. Expeditions were sent out in all directions, and Valdés, who had arrived from the east with a division, was despatched to Neiva on the upper Magdalena, in order to guard the southern provinces, and to prepare for the advance hereafter to the liberation of what is now Ecuador, and of Peru. He had also to eject the royalists under Caizada from Popayan, which they had wrested from Antonio Obando. Cauca was constituted a new province, and Colonel Cordova, a native of Antioquia,' who had recently been employed in raising the people of that province, was now directed to do the same in the plains about Mompox. Mariano Montilla, with the Irish Brigade, had dis- embarked on the 13th March at Rio Hacha on the north coast, whence he had marched on Valle de Upar. Thence, however, fearing attacks on his communications by the Spaniards in Maracaibo and Santa Marta, he had returned to Rio Hacha to refit. At that place, Devereux's 2 Irishmen (óoo out of the total of 1300 'The Province of Antioquia is situated mainly in the Central and Western Cordilleras. Its population has a larger admixture of European blood than any other in the Republic of Colombia of the present day. 2 John Devereux, an Irish adventurer of some private means, had assisted Bolivar's expedition from Haiti in ,8i6. He and io of his men still remained with Montilla till Cartagena was taken in 1821. In 1822 he was sent as Colombian envoy to Russia, etc. He became blind, and in 1840 was granted a small pension an Colombia, as he had apparently spent all his fortune in the service of his adopted country. Some of these Irish appear to have been ex-rcbcls of 1798. One Aylmer, at any rate, a rebel com- mander In Wexford, was killed at Rio Ilacha 244 SIMON BOLIVAR with Montilla) mutinied, These poor wretches sacked Rio Hacha (which was probably very poor sport, as it was a wretched place), and getting drunk, fired it. Montilla reported this to the Governor of Jamaica, and the British admiral, though why he should have expected them to manage his Irish mercenaries is not quite clear. Eventually the Irish were shippd off to Jamaica, and Bolivar expressed his satisfaction at getting rid of them. Of course, nothing is too bad to be said of them, according to Larrazabal, but it must be remembered that, after all, they were only mercenaries fighting for Venezuela, against the orders of their own sovereign, and they naturally expected, at least, pay and decent food. They had got neither, nor even plunder, and it is not very surprising that they, having no personal interest in the cause for which they fought, should have striven to help themselves. Rio Macha being an open roadstead, Montilla thought it unadvisable to hold on there, and that he would do better to invade the province of Cartagena. Meanwhile, Morillo the Spanish commander-in-chief had his forces distributed thus :- La Torre, with 1400 men, in Merida, watching Bolivar. Morales, with 2300 men in Calabozo. Real, in Barinas, kept open! the communications between these two. Morillo himself had 2500 at Valencia, San Carlos, and Pao. There were 1300 men in garrbon at Cumana; i 000 in Barcelona ; 4000 were distributed, in small free corps, between Maracaibo and Caracas. Altogether there were about 14,000 men, distributed over an enormous area, under Morillo's command. In addition to these, Sáanorn had 2000 in Cartagena, whilst Calzada, with 3000 in the south, was acting under orders of Aymerich, the President of Quito. The distri- bution was far too wide, and Morillo would have done MORILLO OPENS NEGOTIATIONS 245 better to keep his troops together and make an effort to destroy Bolivar, rather than aim at holding outlying places, which must fall if the Liberator and his army were finally disposed of. Bolivar, with better judgment, decided to concentrate his efforts on only two points, the destruction of Morillo, and, as a minor matter, the defence of the south, which was necessary to protect his own rear. On the 19th April, he issued a short proclamation to his soldiers, reminding them that it was the tenth anniversary of the first effort towards liberty—the deposition of Em- páran at Caracas—and recalling the struggles since then. As for Morillo, he had for a long time deferred pro- claiming the Constitution recently granted to Spain. Now, under positive orders from home, he was com- pelled to do so, and to release the political prisoners. These orders had been followed by instructions to open negotiations with the "disidentes" of Venezuela. The term was, as Larrazabal remarks, a considerable ameliora- tion of those of" sedition mongers," "rebels" or" bandits," which had been generally used hitherto in orders from Spain. Morillo was disgusted, and is reported to have said: "They are fools in Madrid, not understanding what they order ; they know neither this country nor what has occurred, nor the present circumstances. They wish me to condescend to treat with those whom I have fought to undergo the humiliation of calling the sedi- tious my friends, and recognising as brothers those whom, as enemies and rebels, I have wounded in the most sensitive place. Thus all will be lost I will obey, but it is useless to hope any longer for the subjugation of these provinces." The Count of Cartagena certainly concluded rightly. The time for negotiations and paci- fication had long passed, though there had surely been room for it in the days of Monteverde, or before. The struggle had now been too long and too embittered to 246 SIMON BOLIVAR be determined by anything but the complete overthrow of one party or the other by main force. With the prospect of the arrival of more than 20,000 Europeans there had stilt been hopes of the revolutionists being crushed now, since Riego's mutiny had brought about the abandonment of this expedition, there was no hope of reinforcements from Spain, and Morillo must have recognised that it could only be a question of time when his existing army should be worn down, if not defeated, by a hostile nation constantly recruited from the whole of its population.