DOCSLIB.ORG

Submission to the Commission on Defence by Former Members of the 21St Infantry Battalion FCA

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
Submission to the Commission on Defence by Former Members of the 21St Infantry Battalion FCA Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA. Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA. Introduction This submission reflects the views of some former members of A and B Companies of the 21st Infantry battalion FCA. All of us served from the inception of the integration of the FCA within the 6- brigade structure introduced in 1959. Subsequently we watched with dismay as the 21st disappeared into a “merger morass” with its former rivals the 20thand 7th Infantry battalions. Our unit identity ended up in the waste skips in Bn. HQ at Rockbrae House, Bray with all the records of our service, our unit pennants, and records of service. In this manner the Irish State, its defence establishment, and its officer corps marked their disdain for the service of volunteer reservists over many decades. The resentment lingers and is the spark for this submission. We are also aware that among the mix of reasons driving the dissolution of the historic FCA units was the unstated but real reason that the openness of recruitment into the 2nd line reserve enabled the training of IRA terrorists (so called volunteers) as sleepers in the force. Rather than sort the wheat from the chaff, the State decided to abandon the loyal members of the reserve in order to deprive subversives of such opportunities. A serving TD from the Wicklow constituency is one such example. There are others. The town of Bray (A Coy.) had active IRA cells throughout the Troubles, including 2 of the 4 crew of the gun smuggling ship Eksund, and makers of mortar shells in local factories for Belfast IRA units, and so on. In the town at the time, young men with military interest had a choice: join the Reserve or join the IRA. We chose to serve our State as citizen soldiers in local units reflective of our territorial attachment and bonds of comradeship. We believe that in a democracy military service is NOT the sole preserve of the full-time professional soldier but rather a patriotic duty available to all citizens. This is NOT an argument for the role of a reserve in providing surge capacity, it IS an argument that in a democracy military service is too important to be the sole concern of the PDF. This argument, that military service is a viable entitlement for citizens, is the correct and appropriate response in a State where the legitimacy of Oglaig na hEireann, is challenged by subversives. It is the duty of all citizens to resist subversion. And the citizen soldier, embedded in the community in many civilian roles, carries the democratic argument into places inaccessible to the career soldier. (For example: schools, sporting organisations, political parties, cultural organisations, local administration, etc.) The rationalization of the PDF into a lesser number of military establishments, has had the consequence of further reducing the exposure of military personnel to their fellow citizens. A full-time career in a barracks near to one’s home place is no longer an option for towns such as Mullingar, Clonmel, Longford, and others. And the reach of the military into civil society is reduced. The Submission Template Section 1 Capabilities is a classic instance of insiders talking to insiders in their own vocabulary. Page 1 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA. In business administration there is a well-known truism that structure follows strategy. The correct order is therefore as follows: • Strategy • Developments in military doctrine, in anticipation of future operations • Force structures (“capability”) to give effect to the strategy and the doctrine (presumably what is meant by “joint force approach”) • Professional military education and training, including capability development. • Hardware, infrastructure, equipment, etc. The Irish Defence Strategy could not be more diffuse, opaque, and obscure than is now the case. It is a fact that the armed conflicts fought on the island of Ireland since independence have been fought between Irishmen themselves, and between Irishmen (including Ulstermen) and the British forces and other Ulstermen. During the height of the troubles the British Army (BA) had deployed forces of up to 30,000 together with police and reservists within NI. At peak the Irish Army could have deployed 5,000 troops in the field, from a total force of 13,00 excluding reserves. It is a fact that the Irish Army was lamentably unprepared for this period and indeed the first reaction of many serving soldiers in 1969 was to retire as they were essentially time serving garrison troops with no inclination for active service. The Irish State experienced an existentialist crisis when elements of the ruling party sought to provide arms to Northern nationalists using unorthodox and undemocratic methods. The potential of the Troubles to destabilize the Republic was demonstrated. Given this background the primary task of the Defence Forces is the defence of the State from the enemy within. The IRA has been crushed by the State before, especially during WW2, but is has retained its malignant potential to remobilize. And it has a political wing based on democratic centralism as its organizing principle and a socialist republic as its objective. So the first duty of the DF is to have the capability to apply military coercion so as to crush subversion, usually in aid to the civil power. And to deter any prospect of future intra island armed conflict. Any joint force approach on behalf of the State must meet this criterion. Turning to external threats to the security of the State, the current strategy to deprive belligerents of the use of our territory (an obligation of neutrality) is not to have such a strategy at all. Thus the State avoids the costs and liabilities of defensive arrangements such as those seen in Scandinavia. The 1926 Council of Defence decision to rely on the British to defend our territory collapsed in 1939 when the UKG told us we were on our own and declined to provide us with military equipment. This refusal to provide military equipment was repeated by the British in the post War period and as a result our defence forces languished. The proffer of the State to join NATO, on condition partition was ended, was also rejected. The partition “reason” for not joining NATO is now irrelevant by virtue of the Belfast Agreement, which provides a democratic pathway to ending partition. The political farce of “neutrality because of partition” is thus consigned to history. Page 2 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA. So what is the real basis of Irish neutrality? One argument is that our territory is of no interest to any conceivable belligerent. And even if it were, NATO has access to NI territory and from there could deal with any issues in the Republic territory. (This raises the question what happens if NI votes to join the Republic thus depriving NATO of access to any part of the island.) Up to 1939 the naval defence of the Republic was the responsibility of the British Navy. (Hence the Treaty ports) It still effectively is. Our naval service is a coast guard service with fishery protection and drug interdiction tasks. It has no defensive capabilities. At all. The Air Corps has no defensive capability. The State instead has concluded secret arrangements with the British Government to defend our airspace. Turning to the Army, the current 2 brigade structure is unimplementable and the Army is incapable of conducting battalion level field exercises never mind brigade level exercises. The last time the Army has trained in field brigade formations was during WW2. No training means no capability. The extra territorial role of the Defence Forces is actually the Army’s raison d’etre. It is good at it, it is the reason the Army is professionally run, and we are paid for doing it in the case of the UN. And it provides an operating space where the dead hand of the Irish Department of Defence is absent. So it is a success. But national defence it is not. The Irish State is also missing in action when it comes to European security. Some day the eyes of EU member states will turn towards Ireland and ask: “We stood with you on Brexit, will you stand with us on defense of other member states?” When a neutral member state, in defence of its neutrality asks us for the very assistance we expect in our own case, what will be our answer. This leads to the simplest yet hardest question for the Irish State. Does it intend to have the capability to defend the State or not? And in the event of Ireland (26 or 32 county) being asked to assist in the defence of another EU member state, does it intend to have any such capacity? Or, in a crisis will we rely on the kindness of Britain? 1. Capabilities The Defence Forces needs to commence the integration of our defence into the emerging EU defensive alliance. The entirety of the Capability requirements is simply derived from the European common defence template. Just as the State did in 1926 and 1939 when it modelled its forces on the British Army. The idea that staring from where we are, we could develop our own doctrine and force structures is nonsense. 2. Structures. This author spent 20 years in senior roles Within the public service the toxic, dysfunctional, and narrow mindedness of the Department of Defence is well known and admitted.
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Defence Forces Review 2020 Defence Forces Review 2020
    Defence Forces Review 2020 Defence Forces Review 2020 ISSN 1649-7066 DISCLAIMER The material and views expressed in these papers are those of the authors, which have been subject to academic peer review, and do not indicate official approval of the Defence Forces or the Department of Defence. Published for the Military Authorities by the Public Relations Section at the Chief of Staff’s Branch, and printed at the Defence Forces Printing Press, Infirmary Road, Dublin 7. © Copyright in accordance with Section 56 of the Copyright Act, 1963, Section 7 of the University of Limerick Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Dublin University Act, 1989. 1 Launch of the Defence Forces Review In conjunction with an Academic Seminar Dublin City University, 3rd December, 2020 Defence Forces Review 2020 Preface “Not all readers are leaders, but all leaders are readers.” (Harry Truman, US President 1945 – ‘53) Building on the success of last year’s Review, launch and positive reaction 2020’s Review is themed ‘The global island: Strategic implications for Irish defence planning in the evolving geopolitical landscape.’ This is a pertinent topic in light of the Defence Commission proposed in the 2020 Programme for Government, which is set to look at “the medium- and longer term defence requirements of the State…” The Defence Forces Review provides a forum in which contributors can present their research and facilitate discussion on a wide range of defence-related matters for the benefit of the wider Defence Community in Ireland and beyond. Sadly, due to Covid 19 restrictions we will be unable to have a normal launch of the Review.
    [Show full text]
  • MEDALS of the IRISH DEFENCE FORCES MEDALS of the IRISH DEFENCE FORCES
    Óglaigh na hÉireann MEDALS OF THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES MEDALS OF THE IRISH DEFENCE FORCES 1st Edition (October 2010) CONTENTS SECTION TITLE PAGE No. Irish Defence Forces Medals 7 - 26 UN Medals 27 - 67 EU Medals 69 - 80 UN Mandated Medals 81 - 90 War of Independence Medals 91 - 96 Wearing of Medals 97 - 105 Index 106 - 107 Acknowledgements and References 108 INTRODUCTION The award of medals for services rendered is generally associated with the military. Military medals are bestowed in recognition of specific acts or service which can vary in significance from routine duty to bravery and valour. Irrespective of their provenance, military medals are highly valued and are regarded as representing all that is best in the field of human endeavour. They are seen as being earned and merited by the recipient and in the Defence Forces this sense of worth is enhanced by the strict conditions attaching to the awards. Medals in the Defence Forces fall into two broad categories: medals awarded by the Minister for Defence on the recommendation of the Chief of Staff and medals awarded to qualifying personnel for service overseas on Government approved missions. The first category comprises the Military Medal for Gallantry and the Distinguished Service Medal, which can be awarded for acts of bravery, gallantry, courage, leadership or devotion to duty and the Military Star, a posthumous decoration awardable to personnel killed as a direct result of hostile action. These medals may only be awarded following rigorous investigation by a board of officers appointed by the Chief of Staff. Also in this category are the Service Medal, which recognises service in the Defence Forces for a minimum fixed period and the United Nations Peacekeepers Medal, which recognises service overseas with a UN mandated mission.
    [Show full text]
  • Defence Forces Review 2018 Defence Forces Review 2018
    Defence Forces Review 2018 Defence Forces Review 2018 ISSN 1649-7066 Published for the Military Authorities by the Public Relations Section at the Chief of Staff’s Branch, and printed at the Defence Forces Printing Press, Infirmary Road, Dublin 7. Amended and reissued - 29/01/2019 © Copyright in accordance with Section 56 of the Copyright Act, 1963, Section 7 of the University of Limerick Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Dublin University Act, 1989. 1 PEACEKEEPING AND PEACE MAKING INTERVENTIONS Launch of the Defence Forces Review In conjunction with an Academic Seminar National University of Ireland, Galway 22nd November 2018 Defence Forces Review 2018 RÉAMHRÁ Is pribhléid dom, mar Oifigeach i bhfeighil ar Bhrainse Caidreamh Poiblí Óglaigh na hÉireann, a bheith páirteach i bhfoilsiú 'Athbhreithniú Óglaigh na hÉireann 2018’ . Mar ab ionann le foilseacháin sna blianta roimhe seo, féachtar san eagrán seo ábhar a chur ar fáil a bheidh ina acmhainn acadúil agus ina fhoinse plé i measc lucht léite 'Athbhreithniú'. Is téama cuí agus tráthúil an téama atá roghnaithe don eagrán seo - Coimeád na Síochána agus Idirghabhálacha d'fhonn Síocháin a dhéanamh,, mar go dtugtar aitheantas ann do chomóradh 60 bliain ó thug Óglaigh na hÉireann faoi oibríochtaí coimeádta síochána na Náisiún Aontaithe ar dtús chomh maith le comóradh 40 bliain ó imscaradh Óglaigh na hÉireann go UNIFIL den chéad uair. Ba mhaith liom aitheantas a thabhairt don Cheannfort Rory Finegan as an obair mhór a chuir sé isteach agus as a thiomantas chun foilseachán na bliana a chur ar fáil. Tugtar aitheantas freisin don obair thábhachtach agus chóir a rinne comheagarthóirí ‘Athbhreithniú’ .
    [Show full text]
  • National University of Ireland St. Patrick's College, Maynooth THE
    National University of Ireland St. Patrick’s College, M aynooth THE ROLE OF IRISH MILITARY INTELLIGENCE DURING WORLD WAR TWO by BRIAN D. MARTIN IN PARTIAL FULFILMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF M A DEPARTMENT OF MODERN HISTORY, ST. PATRICK’S COLLEGE. MAYNOOTH HEAD OF DEPARTMENT : Professor R.V. Comerford Supervisor of Research : Denise Dunne August, 1994 TABLE OF CONTENTS PAGE Acknowledgements ................................................................................ i Abbreviations ii Introduction 1 Chapter 1 Military Intelligence - An Overview......................... 7 Chapter 2 Combat intelligence . 14 Chapter 3 German Agents in Ireland...................................... 37 Chapter 4 G2 Co-operation with Allied Intelligence Services 58 Conclusion 76 Bibliography 80 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS I owe a great debt of gratitude to the following people for their help, advice and support during the writing of this thesis. Firstly to the staff of the Dept, of Modern History, in St. Patrick’s College Maynooth. Especially my supervisor, Denise Dunne, for the time and advice she gave me during the year and also Professor RV Comerford for helping to point me in the right direction during the course of my research on many occasions. Further thanks to the following people, Comdt. Peter Young and Capt. Victor Lang, of the Military Archives for their help, advice and patience! Caroline Martin,for the same, as well as for the proofreading and typing of my interview notes. Richard Mossop, for his help with the wordprocessor everytime I did something wrong. Colin Menton for finding those texts when I was not able to. Dr. Eunan O’Halpin for his advice and help in the preliminary stages of this thesis.
    [Show full text]
  • Service Lists for the Army, Navy and Air Force
    SOCIAL SCIENCES COLLECTION GUIDES OFFICIAL PUBLICATIONS www.bl.uk/subjects/national-and-international-government-publications Service lists for the Army, Navy and Air Force INTRODUCTION This guide is the result of merging two separate checklists. The checklist of Army Lists (British Army lists 1642- : a chronological handlist) is undated and without attribution of authorship. It is believed to have been compiled around 1980 as a collaborative effort by the staff at that time of what was then the Official Publications Library (OPL) of the British Library; the identity of the actual compiler is unknown. The checklist of Navy Lists (Navy lists : a chronological handlist of lists of ships and officers of the Royal Navy since ca 1640) is better documented. It was compiled in 1986 by Joy Tilley, a graduate library trainee, as a project for her work experience training under the supervision of Richard Cheffins who edited the result. No attempt has been made to further edit the original checklists except to update a few pressmarks, to clarify some minor points of uncertainty, to expand somewhat on the current Army and Navy lists and to add a section on Air Force lists. The item numbering of Army Lists has been discontinued but otherwise the inconsistencies of style and layout between, and even within, the two main lists have been left to stand but these should not hinder the use of this guide. The original Navy checklist had a brief introduction which has been incorporated into this one; the Army checklist had none. Both had brief 'further reading' lists which have been combined as the penultimate section of this guide.
    [Show full text]
  • THE MONTHLY AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN 1St– 29Th February 2020
    AFRICAN UNION UNION AFRICAINE UNIÃO AFRICANA اﻻتحاداﻹفريقي ACSRT/CAERT African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism Centre Africain d’Etudes et de Recherche sur le Terrorisme THE MONTHLY AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN 1st– 29th February 2020 Edition No: 02 ABOUT AFRICA TERRORISM BULLETIN In line with its mandate to assist African Union (AU) Member States, Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) to build their Counter-Terrorism capacities and to prevent Violent Extremism, the African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) has developed tools that enable it to collect, analyse, process and disseminate information on terrorism-related incidents occurring in Africa. One of the products of this effort is the monthly Africa Terrorism Bulletin (ATB) that is published by the Centre. The ATB seeks to keep AU Member State Policymakers, Researchers, Practitioners and other stakeholders in the fields of Counter-Terrorism (CT) and the Prevention and Countering Violent Extremism (P/CVE), updated fortnightly, on the trends of terrorism on the Continent. Notwithstanding the lack of a universally accepted common definition of Terrorism, the AU, in its 1999 OAU CONVENTION ONTHE PREVENTION AND COMBATING OF TERRORISM, Article 1 paragraph 3, (a) and (b), and Article 3, defines what constitutes a Terrorist Act. The ACSRT and therefore the ATB defer to this definition. © African Centre for the Study and Research on Terrorism (ACSRT) 2020. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without full attribution.
    [Show full text]
  • German Exploitation of Irish Neutrality, 1939-1945
    University of Montana ScholarWorks at University of Montana Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers Graduate School 1967 German exploitation of Irish neutrality, 1939-1945 Bruce McGowan The University of Montana Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd Let us know how access to this document benefits ou.y Recommended Citation McGowan, Bruce, "German exploitation of Irish neutrality, 1939-1945" (1967). Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers. 2443. https://scholarworks.umt.edu/etd/2443 This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted for inclusion in Graduate Student Theses, Dissertations, & Professional Papers by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please contact [email protected]. GERMAN EXPLOITATION OF IRISH NEUTRALITY 1939 - 1945 By Bruce J, McGowan B. A, University of Montana, I965 Presented In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts University of Montana 1967 Approved by : TAJ,,d T, Chairman, Board of Examiners , -J Deanr7 Graduate School Date UMI Number; EP34251 All rights reserved INFORMATION TO ALL USERS The quality of this reproduction is dependent on the quality of the copy submitted. In the unlikely event that the author did not send a complete manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if material had to be removed, a note will indicate the deletion. UMI UMI EP34251 Copyright 2012 by ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved. This edition of the work is protected against unauthorized copying under Title 17, United States Code.
    [Show full text]
  • THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE (ESTABLISHED 1940) OCT-NOV 2007 €2.50 (Stg £1.70)
    00-An Cos-OCT-07 (p1-11) 23/11/2007 14:47 Page 1 THE DEFENCE FORCES MAGAZINE (ESTABLISHED 1940) OCT-NOV 2007 €2.50 (Stg £1.70) Bosnia p.13 PDFORRA p.22 Book Review p.29 ISSN 0010-9460 0 8 9 770010 946001 00-An Cos-OCT-07 (p1-11) 23/11/2007 14:47 Page 2 00-An Cos-OCT-07 (p1-11) 29/11/2007 15:16 Page 3 An Cosantóir VOLUME 67 Number 8 Oct-Nov 2007 MANAGER: News Update 2007 10K Capt Pádraic Kennedy Picture Parade. 4 Results 2 0 Another successful day EDITOR: at the races! Sgt David Nagle Report by Sgt David Nagle JOURNALIST: Terry McLaughlin Wesley Bourke EUFOR – Rebuilding EUFOR – ‘Weeds CONNECT: Bosnia 7 of Death’ 2 2 Sgt Willie Braine Defence Forces personnel play a Defence Forces use their vital role with EUFOR in Bosnia. expertise in de-mining PHOTOGRAPHER: Report by Bosnia. Armn Billy Galligan Wesley Bourke Report by Wesley Bourke SUBSCRIPTIONS: Sgt Rena Kennedy EUFOR – The On Exhibit Profile of Mid-Shipman ADVERTISING: Irish in Butmir 8 2 5 Charles Lucas VC. Killelan Marketing Ltd Senior Irish Soldiers hold Report by Mobile: 086 3842946 key appointments in HQ Col JAV Mortell (Retd) Tel: 01 8042691 EUFOR at Camp Butmir. Email: [email protected] Report by Wesley Bourke Printed by Kilkenny People, OSCE Moving Forward Mission profile in brief. Kilkenny. 1 2 The 2007 PDFORRA 2 6 Report by Conference. The fact that an article Sgt David Nagle Report by appears in this magazine does Sgt David Nagle not indicate official approval of the views expressed by the author.
    [Show full text]
  • The Irish Army Reserve in the Single Force Concept
    The Journal of Military History and Defence Studies Vol 1. Issue 1. (January 2020) Conceptually Ambitious, Hardly Novel, and Currently Failing: The Irish Army Reserve in the Single Force Concept. Jonathan Carroll In 2013 the Irish Defence Forces went under significant reorganisation. Part of this organisation entailed integrating the Irish Army Reserve into the Defence Forces, as part of the ‘Single Force Concept’. Ostensibly, the Single Force Concept sought to provide a more reliable, fit for purpose, reserve force. However, this article argues that the concept has failed and that the Army Reserve is almost unusable. The article evaluates each service corps and provides an analysis of Reserve capabilities. This shows that the training of the force is suboptimal for augmenting the regular army in an emergency, and that a gap exists between what government policy wants the Reserve to do, and what it is actually capable of doing. This has resulted in an unusable reserve force with questionable utility. This article also highlights the difficulty of establishing the qualitative strength of the Army Reserve in the absence of appropriate means of defining what is meant by an ‘effective’ reservist, and explores the detrimental consequences of paltry financial investment in sustaining, developing, or enabling the Reserve as an effective force. It argues that the Single Force Concept has failed because it did not remedy the fundamental pre-existing flaws that plagued the various iterations of the Irish reserve land component prior to 2013, nor did it attempt to bring the Army Reserve into line with international best practice regarding reserve forces.
    [Show full text]
  • Irish Neutrality During World War II and a Consolidated Model Analysis of Its Effects on Anglo-Irish Relations
    The Unknown Ally: Irish Neutrality during World War II and a Consolidated Model Analysis of its Effects on Anglo-Irish Relations Author: Christopher M. Fitzpatrick Persistent link: http://hdl.handle.net/2345/3063 This work is posted on eScholarship@BC, Boston College University Libraries. Boston College Electronic Thesis or Dissertation, 2013 Copyright is held by the author, with all rights reserved, unless otherwise noted. The Unknown Ally Irish Neutrality during World War II and a Consolidated Model Analysis of its Effects on Anglo-Irish Relations by Christopher M. Fitzpatrick Submitted in partial fulfillment of graduation requirements for the degree of Bachelor of Arts Boston College International Studies Program May 2013 Advisor: Second Reader: Prof. Kenneth Kersch Prof. Robert Savage Signature: _______________________ Signature: _______________________ IS Thesis Coordinator: Prof. Hiroshi Nakazato Signature: _______________________ © Christopher M. Fitzpatrick 2013 Abstract There is perhaps no more interesting and complex relationship between states than that of Ireland and the United Kingdom – a matter made all the more complicated by their disagreements during the Second World War. The objective of this thesis was to determine whether Ireland’s policy in the war could accurately be described as neutral and what effects this policy had on Anglo-Irish relations. In order to address these questions, this work studies contemporary government documents, media reporting, and personal correspondence, as well as considering pre-existing scholarship on the matter. The principal conclusion of this work was that Ireland substantially aided the Allied war effort, and that its policies during the conflict did not have any lasting negative implications for the state’s relationship with the United Kingdom.
    [Show full text]
  • No. 6, July/August
    00-An Cos-july-aug-10 (p1-5 EDITORIAL) 12/07/2010 10:58 Page 3 VOLUME 70 Number 6 July-August 2010 11 18 20 23 28 34 FEATURES 11 Lt Gen Dermot Earley DSM An Eulogy 13 Congo Vets Remember By Wesley Bourke 20 Advance and Overcome By Wesley Bourke 23 The Minister for Defence Interviewed by Wesley Bourke REGULARS 6 On Parade 10 World Strategic Picture 18 Def Tech 25 Tac Aide 26 Overseas 28 Sport 31 Gadgets 32 Noticeboard 33 Reviews 13 34 What I do… AN COSANTÓIR July-August 2010 3 00-An Cos-july-aug-10 (p1-5 EDITORIAL) 12/07/2010 10:58 Page 4 00-An Cos-july-aug-10 (p1-5 EDITORIAL) 14/07/2010 13:16 Page 5 An Cosantóir VOLUME 70 editorial Number 6 July-August 2010 MANAGER: n this issue, our lead article is the printed version of the eulogy given by the Chief of Staff Lt Gen Sean Capt Rory Esler McCann at the Requiem Mass to the late Lt Gen Dermot Earley DSM, who died on June 23rd. It is a [email protected] fitting tribute to a distinguished officer, colleague and friend who epitomised the very essence of EDITOR: professionalism, both as a soldier and as a sportsman. Sgt David Nagle I [email protected] On a personal note, on behalf of everyone in An Cosantóír and Public Relations Section, I would like to JOURNALISTS: extend my deepest sympathies to the Earley family. Lt Gen Earley as Chief of Staff, but also in an earlier Wesley Bourke command as Director of Public Relations Section, was always there – to lead, offer advice and guide.
    [Show full text]
  • Defence Forces Review 2015
    Defence Forces Review Defence Forces 2015 Defence Forces Review 2015 Pantone 1545c Pantone 125c Pantone 120c Pantone 468c DF_Special_Brown Pantone 1545c Pantone 2965c Pantone Pantone 5743c Cool Grey 11c Vol 12 Vol Printed by the Defence Forces Printing Press Jn13715 / Aug 2015/ 2000 Defence Forces Review 2015 ISSN 1649-7066 Published for the Military Authorities by the Public Relations Branch at the Chief of Staff’s Division, and printed at the Defence Forces Printing Press, Infirmary Road, Dublin 7. © Copyright in accordance with Section 56 of the Copyright Act, 1963, Section 7 of the University of Limerick Act, 1989 and Section 6 of the Dublin University Act, 1989. DEFENCE FORCES REVIEW 2015 I II DEFENCE FORCES REVIEW 2015 The material contained in these articles are the views of the authors and do not purport to represent the official views of the Defence Forces. DEFENCE FORCES REVIEW 2015 III IV DEFENCE FORCES REVIEW 2015 PREFACE “ On some positions, Cowardice asks the question ‘Is it safe?’ Expediency asks the question ‘Is it politic?’ And Vanity comes along and asks the question ‘Is it popular?’ But Conscience asks the question ‘Is it right?’ And there comes a time when one must take a position that is neither safe, nor politic, nor popular, but we must do it because Conscience tells us it is right.” Martin Luther King As Officer in Charge of the Defence Forces Public Relations Branch, I am honoured to be involved in the production of the Defence Forces Review and once again it is my pleasure to present our publication for 2015.
    [Show full text]