Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

Introduction

This submission reflects the views of some former members of A and B Companies of the 21st Infantry battalion FCA. All of us served from the inception of the integration of the FCA within the 6- brigade structure introduced in 1959. Subsequently we watched with dismay as the 21st disappeared into a “merger morass” with its former rivals the 20thand 7th Infantry battalions. Our unit identity ended up in the waste skips in Bn. HQ at Rockbrae House, Bray with all the records of our service, our unit pennants, and records of service. In this manner the Irish State, its defence establishment, and its officer corps marked their disdain for the service of volunteer reservists over many decades. The resentment lingers and is the spark for this submission.

We are also aware that among the mix of reasons driving the dissolution of the historic FCA units was the unstated but real reason that the openness of recruitment into the 2nd line reserve enabled the training of IRA terrorists (so called volunteers) as sleepers in the force. Rather than sort the wheat from the chaff, the State decided to abandon the loyal members of the reserve in order to deprive subversives of such opportunities. A serving TD from the Wicklow constituency is one such example.

There are others. The town of Bray (A Coy.) had active IRA cells throughout the Troubles, including 2 of the 4 crew of the gun smuggling ship Eksund, and makers of mortar shells in local factories for Belfast IRA units, and so on. In the town at the time, young men with military interest had a choice: join the Reserve or join the IRA.

We chose to serve our State as citizen soldiers in local units reflective of our territorial attachment and bonds of comradeship.

We believe that in a democracy military service is NOT the sole preserve of the full-time professional soldier but rather a patriotic duty available to all citizens. This is NOT an argument for the role of a reserve in providing surge capacity, it IS an argument that in a democracy military service is too important to be the sole concern of the PDF.

This argument, that military service is a viable entitlement for citizens, is the correct and appropriate response in a State where the legitimacy of Oglaig na hEireann, is challenged by subversives. It is the duty of all citizens to resist subversion. And the citizen soldier, embedded in the community in many civilian roles, carries the democratic argument into places inaccessible to the career soldier. (For example: schools, sporting organisations, political parties, cultural organisations, local administration, etc.)

The rationalization of the PDF into a lesser number of military establishments, has had the consequence of further reducing the exposure of military personnel to their fellow citizens. A full-time career in a barracks near to one’s home place is no longer an option for towns such as Mullingar, Clonmel, Longford, and others. And the reach of the military into civil society is reduced.

The Submission Template

Section 1 Capabilities is a classic instance of insiders talking to insiders in their own vocabulary.

Page 1 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

In business administration there is a well-known truism that structure follows strategy.

The correct order is therefore as follows:

• Strategy • Developments in military doctrine, in anticipation of future operations • Force structures (“capability”) to give effect to the strategy and the doctrine (presumably what is meant by “joint force approach”) • Professional military education and training, including capability development. • Hardware, infrastructure, equipment, etc.

The Irish Defence Strategy could not be more diffuse, opaque, and obscure than is now the case.

It is a fact that the armed conflicts fought on the island of Ireland since independence have been fought between Irishmen themselves, and between Irishmen (including Ulstermen) and the British forces and other Ulstermen.

During the height of the troubles the British Army (BA) had deployed forces of up to 30,000 together with police and reservists within NI. At peak the Irish Army could have deployed 5,000 troops in the field, from a total force of 13,00 excluding reserves. It is a fact that the Irish Army was lamentably unprepared for this period and indeed the first reaction of many serving soldiers in 1969 was to retire as they were essentially time serving garrison troops with no inclination for active service.

The Irish State experienced an existentialist crisis when elements of the ruling party sought to provide arms to Northern nationalists using unorthodox and undemocratic methods. The potential of the Troubles to destabilize the Republic was demonstrated.

Given this background the primary task of the Defence Forces is the defence of the State from the enemy within. The IRA has been crushed by the State before, especially during WW2, but is has retained its malignant potential to remobilize. And it has a political wing based on democratic centralism as its organizing principle and a socialist republic as its objective.

So the first duty of the DF is to have the capability to apply military coercion so as to crush subversion, usually in aid to the civil power. And to deter any prospect of future intra island armed conflict. Any joint force approach on behalf of the State must meet this criterion.

Turning to external threats to the security of the State, the current strategy to deprive belligerents of the use of our territory (an obligation of neutrality) is not to have such a strategy at all. Thus the State avoids the costs and liabilities of defensive arrangements such as those seen in Scandinavia.

The 1926 Council of Defence decision to rely on the British to defend our territory collapsed in 1939 when the UKG told us we were on our own and declined to provide us with military equipment. This refusal to provide military equipment was repeated by the British in the post War period and as a result our defence forces languished. The proffer of the State to join NATO, on condition partition was ended, was also rejected. The partition “reason” for not joining NATO is now irrelevant by virtue of the Belfast Agreement, which provides a democratic pathway to ending partition. The political farce of “neutrality because of partition” is thus consigned to history.

Page 2 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

So what is the real basis of Irish neutrality? One argument is that our territory is of no interest to any conceivable belligerent. And even if it were, NATO has access to NI territory and from there could deal with any issues in the Republic territory. (This raises the question what happens if NI votes to join the Republic thus depriving NATO of access to any part of the island.)

Up to 1939 the naval defence of the Republic was the responsibility of the British Navy. (Hence the Treaty ports) It still effectively is. Our naval service is a coast guard service with fishery protection and drug interdiction tasks. It has no defensive capabilities. At all.

The Air Corps has no defensive capability. The State instead has concluded secret arrangements with the British Government to defend our airspace.

Turning to the Army, the current 2 brigade structure is unimplementable and the Army is incapable of conducting battalion level field exercises never mind brigade level exercises. The last time the Army has trained in field brigade formations was during WW2. No training means no capability.

The extra territorial role of the Defence Forces is actually the Army’s raison d’etre. It is good at it, it is the reason the Army is professionally run, and we are paid for doing it in the case of the UN. And it provides an operating space where the dead hand of the Irish Department of Defence is absent. So it is a success. But national defence it is not.

The Irish State is also missing in action when it comes to European security. Some day the eyes of EU member states will turn towards Ireland and ask: “We stood with you on Brexit, will you stand with us on defense of other member states?” When a neutral member state, in defence of its neutrality asks us for the very assistance we expect in our own case, what will be our answer.

This leads to the simplest yet hardest question for the Irish State. Does it intend to have the capability to defend the State or not? And in the event of Ireland (26 or 32 county) being asked to assist in the defence of another EU member state, does it intend to have any such capacity? Or, in a crisis will we rely on the kindness of Britain?

1. Capabilities

The Defence Forces needs to commence the integration of our defence into the emerging EU defensive alliance. The entirety of the Capability requirements is simply derived from the European common defence template. Just as the State did in 1926 and 1939 when it modelled its forces on the British Army. The idea that staring from where we are, we could develop our own doctrine and force structures is nonsense.

2. Structures.

This author spent 20 years in senior roles

Within the public service the toxic, dysfunctional, and narrow mindedness of the Department of Defence is well known and admitted. It is truly a administrative relic of a time when Ireland was intellectually isolated from modern modes of public administration. The case for the wholesale recasting of the Department is unavoidable and overdue. It this task is avoided the Recommendations of the Commission will be placed in the hands of a failed organisation. Failed organisations are capable of only one thing – repeated failure. So it is

Page 3 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

essential that the Commission address the implementation requirements of its recommendations. In view of the stated incapacity of the Department, the implementation of the Commission’s recommendations needs to be supervised by an Implementation Project Team, separate from the Department and reporting to an interdepartmental group under the Chairmanship of the Dept. of Public Expenditure and Reform. The CoS and the SG of DoD should have equal weight, and both be members of the Implementation Project Team.

Force structures of the Army, the Air Corps, and the Naval Service should be modelled on and integrated into European best practice for a 2-brigade army, a coastal state, and an island airspace.

The abolition of the reservist unit structure has been a failure. Reservists need their own unit identity and there is a strong case for distinct reserve units under command to PDF units. Such units, based on county and city affiliations, loyalties, and rivalries will spur performance and recruitment.

Initial training of all reservists should be fulltime and for a minimum period of 3 months. At the end of this period reservists either pass or fail. Retention in the reserve must be dependent on performance.

The necessity for a reserve officer category is relatively clear in the case of specialists. It is less so in the case of line officers in army units. Promotion of officers from the ranks in forces with university qualified full-time officers is problematic. So the creation of a cadre of reservist officers is akin to an adult education task. The reservist officer should have to achieve the same academic standard as the regular officer but over a longer period. (I obtained my primary and master’s degrees whilst working and did not finish the task until age 32). The ratio of line reservist officers to reservists’ other ranks should reflect the reality that reserve units officer vacancies are less in number that that of a full-time officer who has a career outside the unit and in the wider army.

3. Staffing

Armed forces exist to apply coercion in instances of conflict. As the American Army discovered at the beginning of the Korean War, importing civilian norms of conduct, driven by Congress, into a military organisation resulted in the breakdown of discipline in the American garrison forces based in Japan. These forces, once transferred to the Korean peninsula, were routed. There were not combat ready and amenable to the orders of their officers.

The creation of separate HR functions in military formations is a trap. It creates a way around the strictures of military discipline. It undermines unity of command. From the platoon leader up, HR is a line task of serving officers and NCOs. Military leadership should be fully inclusive of HR practice. All issues should be dealt with through the chain of command. (Exceptionally issues related to sexual misbehavior will require separate pathways).

Remuneration issues for members of the Defence Forces are best dealt with in Conciliation and Arbitration procedures. There is really no alternative. A once off reset of the pay analogues used to relativise DF pay with the wider public service is justified as compensation for a commitment of the representative associations to such a pay determination system.

4. Anything Else.

Professional European Armies have consistently undervalued the capability of reservists. In the inter war years the evolving military doctrines of fire and movement were doubted by professionals who thought

Page 4 Wednesday, June 2, 2021 Submission to the Commission on Defence by former members of the 21st Infantry Battalion FCA.

that reservists were incapable the discipline needed. So they reverted to earlier doctrine. This point is made to emphasize that reservists have always been undervalued by professionals, who hanker after professional legions. This is not reality. Surge capacity comes from reserves. A professional army should be fully professional in the manner in which they recruit, train, and develop reserves forces. This is a major task which needs dedicated effort. Only a reserve unit structure can guarantee such.

5. Summary and Conclusions.

The answers to the Template Questions are those of the author and not those of the 21 Inf. Bn. Members referred to in the introduction.

Page 5 Wednesday, June 2, 2021