Barrera, A 2015 The Congo Trap: MONUSCO Islands of Stability in stability the Sea of Instability. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 52, pp. 1–16, DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gn

RESEARCH ARTICLE The Congo Trap: MONUSCO Islands of Stability in the Sea of Instability Alberto Barrera*

2014 was a hopeful year for the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The M23 movement had been defeated in military operations in which one of the last peacekeeping experiments, the UN Force Intervention Brigade, had played a deci- sive role. A third UN stabilization plan, the ‘islands of stability’ was proposed to continue the stabilization of a country considered in a post-conflict phase. However, the number of internally displaced persons (IDPs) has almost tripled in the country since 2007. This article will argue that DRC is still immersed into an old social conflict that existed before the Congo Wars and the roots of which are not being addressed. It will argue that the United Nations Organization Sta- bilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and the ‘islands of stability’ strategy can address some of the secondary causes of the Congo conflict, such as its internationalization, the presence in DRC of foreign armed groups or the ‘blood minerals’, but cannot address its primary causes: land struggles, an old cycle of violence and the fragmentation of the Congolese soci- ety and political elite that is jeopardizing the restoration of the state authority. The huge dimensions of each of these factors make the Congo conflict ‘one of the most complex and intricate environments ever faced by a peacekeeping mis- sion’, for which MONUSCO’s mandate, resources and stabilization strategy do not seem powerful enough. When the UN organized the 2006 elections legitimized a ‘spoiler state’, the bottleneck of all the reforms needed to stabilize the country. The UN fell thus into a trap and became part of the conflict. Lessons learned should be taken for future UN operations.

Introduction in the Democratic Republic of the Congo The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has (MONUSCO), the largest UN peace operation been, during the last decade, a vast laboratory and one of the first to receive a Chapter VII of humanitarian relief, protection of civil- mandate, has deployed, for the first time in ians and statebuilding strategies. The United UN history, unarmed surveillance drones and Nations Organization Stabilization Mission a UN intervention brigade, tasked to carry out offensive operations to neutralize armed groups. The decisive role played by the brigade * ES in the defeat of the M23 rebellion has raised [email protected] new hopes about the stabilization of the Art. 52, page 2 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap country, for which the UN has prepared, after fuelling the Congo conflict and any of its pri- the UN Security and Stabilization Support mary causes. The article will try to contribute Strategy (UNSSSS) and the later version, ISSSS, to the debates about UN peacebuilding and a third strategy: the ‘islands of stability’. This stabilization strategies in complex environ- optimistic perspective bases its hopes in the ments having transformed into a ‘No War, No defeat of the most recent Tutsi rebellion, Peace’ situation (Swart 2011). the weakening of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the From the Congo Wars to MONUC decreasing involvement of armed groups in At the end of the Cold War, the African Great the mines of eastern DRC. According to this Lakes were destabilizing: Zaire was a failing vision, DRC is progressively moving toward state which had suffered a decrease in its stabilization, finding, step by step, answers GDP of about 65 per cent since its independ- to the alleged root causes of the Congo wars: ence in 1960. Museveni’s Popular Resistance foreign intervention, proliferation of armed Army (PRA) had taken the power in Uganda groups and ‘blood minerals’. This perspective, in 1986. The Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), however, does not take into consideration a composed of Tutsi refugees in Southern reliable barometer of the crisis: the number Uganda, was rearming and preparing to of internally displaced persons (IDPs). The invade Rwanda, controlled by a Hutu elite number of IDPs almost tripled from the start since the independence of the country. The of the M23 rebellion to 2014. Rwandan Civil War triggered the genocide of The point of departure of this article is the about 800,000 Tutsi and displaced about one idea that DRC has been destabilizing since million and a half Hutu Rwandese to Eastern 2007, when there were around one million Zaire. Many of the génocidaires Interahamwe IDPs in the country, to 2015, when the IDPs fled to Zaire and took control of the Hutu are almost three million. According to this refugee camps, launching attacks against perspective, DRC is not in a post-conflict Congolese Tutsi in Zaire and the new Tutsi situation, but in the middle of a social con- regime in Rwanda. The arrival of the Hutu flict whose roots could be traced back to the refugees in Eastern Zaire aggravated the colonial times. To argue this, this article will fragile situation in the area, where ethnic review the dynamics of the Congo conflict, tensions existed between dozens of com- trying to differentiate its secondary factors, munities. These facts, combined with Zaire’s which are fuelling the Congo conflict but collapse, triggered the invasion of Zaire in were not at its origins, from the primary fac- 1996 by the troops of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, tors, which existed before and have not yet backed by Rwandese and Ugandan troops, been addressed. The article will review the who wanted to dismantle the Interahamwe material factors of the conflict: the struggle military bases in the country. This invasion is for minerals and land in a country so huge considered the beginning of the First Congo and wild that it deters unity. It will further Qar. Once in power, Kabila turned on his analyze the cycle of violence at the center of former Rwandese allies, firing his Rwandan the historical dynamics of the country since advisers. The Second Congo War began in its colonization. Finally, it will explore the 1997, when Kabila dismissed his Rwandan political dimensions of the crisis: the absence Chief of Staff, James Kabarebe, triggering of security due to the lack of reforms, which the invasion of DRC by the rebel group Rally are jeopardized by Government officials in for Congolese Democracy (RCD), controlled competition for the State resources. The arti- again by Rwanda and Uganda (Ndayewl 2008; cle will argue that neither MONUSCO nor Braeckman 1999; Van Reybrouck 2008). its stabilization strategy have the resources The Congolese wars were the most destruc- needed to face most of the secondary factors tive and deadliest wars since the end of Barrera: The Congo Trap Art. 52, page 3 of 16

World War II. They killed between three and One year later, the last three armed groups five million persons and destabilized most in Ituri disarmed. The number of IDPs in DRC of Central Africa, involving more than ten had decreased from more than 3 million IDPs African countries in the conflict. In 1999, in 2002 to around a million at the beginning the United Nations deployed to the country of 2007 (IDMC n.d.). Since it seemed that, what was to become its largest peacekeep- finally, peace was arriving to Congo, the UN ing mission: MONUC. The mission arrived in designed its first stabilization strategy, known a country divided into three areas: two con- as the UN Security and Stabilisation Support trolled, respectively, by the Ugandan proxy Strategy (UNSSSS) in late 2006. However, it Mouvement de libération du Congo (MLC) was not implemented due to the deteriora- and the Rwandan proxy RCD, and the third tion of the security in Eastern DRC and the one by the Government and its allies Angola, re-emergence of the CNDP war in North Kivu Namibia and Zimbabwe (Braeckman 1999). in 2008 (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 11). Thanks to the international pressure over Indeed, dozens of Congolese armed the conflict parties a peace settlement was groups still remained active in the Kivus; finally reached in 2003. However, even with the Interahamwe, now Forces Démocratiques the presence of MONUC, wars continued in de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR), contin- the country, such as the ethnic war in the ued to cause instability in the region and Ituri district, which killed more than 50,000 the Congolese Tutsi community defended Iturians (Oga 2009). their grievances through the parallel Army Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple MONUC (CNDP) (Andrew 2008). In 2008, despite The United Nations Organization Mission the support of MONUC troops to the in the Democratic Republic of the Congo national army, the CNDP surrounded the (MONUC), initially deployed for the obser- city of Goma, forcing peace talks. The clashes vation of the ceasefire and disengagement between the CNDP and the Forces Armées of forces, grew in number and in assigned de la République Démocratique du Congo tasks at every UN Security Council resolu- (FARDC) had increased the number of IDPs tion. In late 1999 MONUC had 500 observers in North and South Kivu, but a peace agree- and a protection force of 5,037 soldiers to ment formalized on 23 March 2009 between monitor the implementation of the ceasefire the Congolese Government and the CNDP agreement. Six years later, in 2005, MONUC, seemed to launch a new era of hopes and under Chapter VII mandate, had 16,000 stability. troops engaged in military operations of peace enforcement. The mission’s mandate MONUSCO had been enlarged at every Security Council In 2009, the UNSSSS was transformed into resolution including the support to the dis- the International Security and Stabilization armament, demobilization and reintegra- Support Strategy (ISSSS) (n.d.) ‘to reinforce tion (DDR) of combatants, the protection political progress’ and stabilize the country of civilians, the strengthening of the State following the 2006 elections and the 2009 Authority and the organization, in 2006, of peace agreements between the government the first democratic elections in the country and armed groups. In 2010, ‘to reflect the new since its independence (Zeebroeck 2009; Tull phase reached in the country’ MONUC was 2009). renamed the United Nations Organization The 2006 elections, the organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic of which faced important logistical chal- Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and lenges, were successfully held and were won given a stronger mandate in stabilization by Joseph Kabila, son of Laurent Desiré. (UN, n.d.). Art. 52, page 4 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap

However, in Eastern Congo, the FDLR ‘MONUSCO wants to regain authority–with continued committing massacres and doz- and for the DRC government – over increasing ens of national armed groups continued to parts of the Kivu provinces ‘(Vogel 2014: 5). create instability, financing themselves with Martin Kobler, Special Representative of the control of mining areas. At the end of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for the DRC, 2011, the numbers of IDPs had increased explained that the idea was to liberate and to 1.7 million and, in early 2012, had fur- secure some geographic areas, where state ther increased to around 2 million (IDMC, authority would further be restored, educa- n.d.). These numbers were a clear indicator tion and health provided and economic pros- that the situation in Eastern DRC was again perity promoted (UN 2014). destabilizing, even where the ISSSS activities The islands of stability concept, thus, seems were focused (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 14). to continue the ISSSS strategy, which was The irregular and chaotic Presidential and implemented in six small areas in of North Parliamentary elections of November 2011, Kivu, South Kivu and Oriental Province, won amidst claims of vote-rigging by Joseph chosen according to the following crite- Kabila, inflamed the existing tensions in DRC. ria: i) areas having suffered from the armed In January 2012 the Government foiled an conflict; ii) areas where the Government attempted rebellion called Conseil Supérieur would have regained their control from pour la Paix and three months later erupted armed groups; iii) areas around important the March 23 Movement (M23), a rebellion economic axes; iv) areas accessible; and v) composed of former CNDP elements deplor- areas whose stabilization could have a ‘ripple ing the lack of respect by the Government of effect’ over the geographical zone surround- the March 2009 agreement (Stearns 2012). ing these areas (ISSSS n.d.). The objectives of The M23 rebellion, backed again by Rwanda the ISSSS in these areas were to a) improve (UN 2012) launched a series of attacks the security, b) reinforce the State author- against the FARDC, managing to capture the ity, c) support the return, reintegration and city of Goma in November 2012. Again, the recovery process, d) combat sexual violence involvement of UN troops in the fight did not and e) help national and provincial govern- impede the rebel advance. In February 2013, ments to advance peace processes through the UN Security Council was obliged to add political dialogue (UN n.d.). robustness to a yet Chapter VII-mandated Since the SRSG informs that the goal of the multidimensional peacekeeping operation, ‘islands of stability’ is to create a ‘continent of deploying a Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) stability’ it seems that the ISSSS aim of ‘ripple to ‘neutralize all negative forces’ (Cammaert effect’ is maintained. However, new concepts 2013). After months of joint FARDC and have been introduced in the ‘islands’, as the MONUSCO military operations, in which the deployment to them of UN staff ‘to advise FIB played a decisive part (Vogel 2014), in and assist the Government in building up November 2013 the M23 surrendered. The State functions’, as well as the will to progres- number of IDPs in DRC had grown again to sively increase the number of ‘islands’. It is almost three million (IDMC n.d.), as in 2002, obviously too early to examine the results of at the end of the Second Congo War. But the this new strategy. But it is possible to analyze UN presented a new stabilization strategy: whether this strategy gives an answer to the the ‘islands of stability’. root causes of the Congo conflict.

The Islands of Stability The Material Dimensions of the Sea The ‘islands of stability’ concept has never of Instability been clearly articulated (Brown and Boyce When analyzing the UN stabilization strategy 2014), but it seems to be built upon a ‘shape- in Congo, (Oxfam 2014), one of the most impor- clear-hold-build’ military logic, in which tant actors working in development and Barrera: The Congo Trap Art. 52, page 5 of 16 stabilization in that country, expresses fears cobalt world reserves, a third of the cassiter- about the fate of the ‘sea’ surrounding the ite world reserves, one of the fourth biggest ‘islands of stability’ (Cooper 2014). This ‘sea’, reserves of diamonds and the biggest quan- mostly covered by jungles, mountains and tity of copper on Earth (Yawidi 2008). Congo rivers, has dimensions close to the surface also has gold, uranium, titanium and ger- of Western Europe. Without roads and with manium. In all, DRC holds more than 1,100 the highest rates of aircraft related fatalities minerals and precious metals according to in the world, many of the Congolese cities the World Bank (2014). Indeed, the vast num- are almost inaccessible, which is an impor- ber of mining sites has impeded mapping for tant limit to the restoration of state author- a single province (IA 2010: 7). Since most of ity. MONUSCO is unable to provide security the armed groups in DRC finance their activi- to this huge territory. Indeed, even if the UN ties through the exploitation of minerals mission is one of the biggest missions ever (UNSC 2003) Congo seems a very good example­ deployed, it is one of the smallest relative of Paul Collier’s theory of the Natural Resource to the size of the DRC and its population Trap (Collier 2007). (Tull 2009). To change the dynamics of this mining trap Congo’s ‘sea of instability’ has low popu- in DRC is a difficult task. During the Congo lation densities (of about 33 inhabitants wars, the mining sector became artisanal in per square kilometer) and huge natural DRC: according to some reports, sixteen per- resources, but it borders small countries with cent of Congo’s population would rely today strong demographic pressures due to the on mining in some way (SB 2010). The last lack of important natural resources and high example of the difficulties to change mining population densities, as Rwanda or Burundi dynamics is the US 2010 Dodd-Frank law on (with densities close to 400 inhabitants per conflict minerals, which requires US-listed square kilometer). MONUSCO has neither companies to publish information about the mandate nor the capability to control the their purchases of minerals from Congo and 10,730 kilometers of Congolese borders, and its adjoining countries to determine whether it is through these borders that the armed their purchases have benefited armed groups move and that the minerals fuelling groups in eastern DRC. This law has helped the conflict are exported. Almost all of the to reduce the involvement of armed groups mineral resources of the Kivus is illegally in the mines of eastern DRC (Bafilemba, trafficked to the neighboring countries (GW Mueller and Lezhnev 2014), but their void 2009: 7). The Congolese Government has the has been filled by FARDC elements, who primary responsibility to control these bor- have increased their involvement in min- ders and assure the security in the Congolese ing minerals, taxing diggers and facilitating territory (UNSC 2012) but it does not have mineral smuggling (Global Witness 2014). the resources to assume this huge task. Since this law has provoked a sharp decline In fact, even if more than a third of the in the prize of Congolese minerals, it has pro- Congolese State budget has to be funded pelled millions of miners and their families by international donors (Zeebroeck 2009: deeper into poverty (Wolfe 2015). 139) the country has an important part of Extreme poverty and unsatisfied basic the natural resources reserves in the world needs are among the main grievances of (SB 2010). Congo has also one of the three the Congolese population, who have seen biggest forests and some of the largest water a regular decline in their living standards reserves on Earth. And, since the last oil since the independence of the country. At prospections in the Great Lakes, it is con- the end of the Belgian control over Congo, sidered that DRC may possess the biggest the country had 140,000 kilometers of roads oil reserves south of the Sahara, about two- and streets, 300 hospitals, 40 airports, fac- thirds of the coltan world reserves, half of the tories and refineries. Three decades later, at Art. 52, page 6 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap the end of Mobutu’s rule, only 20,000 kilom- conflicts in DRC are linked to identity and eters of routes remained, and the health and to an unfair access to local and provincial education systems had almost collapsed (Van administrations and resources (Autesserre Reybrouck 2008: 408) while the purchasing 2010). Among the natural resources, land, power of the Congolese had been reduced and not minerals, is the primary factor of the to four per cent of what it was in 1960 (Van Congo conflict. Reybrouck 2008: 402). The Congolese Wars Most of Eastern DRC’s ethnic conflicts destroyed most of the remaining infrastruc- are between agriculturalist and cattle raiser ture and services once provided by the State. groups, whose economies use land in oppo- The country’s GDP has decreased about site ways. This is the case, for example, of the 65 per cent since the independence of the old antagonisms between the Hema and country, and in 2011, DRC had the lowest the Lendu in Ituri (Oga 2009), the Tutsi and Human Development Index in the world, the the Hunde in Masisi or the Banyamulenge highest indexes of malnutrition and some of and Babembe in Fizi (Willame 1997), among the worst indexes in life expectancy, poverty many others. As land is associated with iden- and gender inequality (UNDP 2011). tity and power in Congo, the land is consid- The contrast between this extreme pov- ered one of the key causes of the past wars, erty and the country’s richness in natural as well as a factor in the perpetuation of the resources is still the object of most of the Congo conflict (Huggins 2010). In that sense, grievances of the communities, accusing we could consider the presence of foreign their antagonists of monopolizing important armed groups, such as the M23 or the FDLR, positions in the Congolese State to benefit as resulting from the evolution of old ten- from these resources. These economic ten- sions over land resources. These old tensions sions associated with mineral resources will are still alive, and have increased due to the thus prevail in the ‘sea of instability’ but may important displacement movements since be countered by the ripple effect of eco- the Congo wars (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 6). nomic recovery in the ‘islands of stability’. The quantity of registered land conflicts in In that sense, economic recovery can be one DRC is huge: in 2012 alone, the Pooled Fund of the most effective components of the UN managed by UNOCHA identified 355 con- stabilization strategy. flicts in the small district of Ituri (covering around two per cent of the DRC area). The Tensions in the sea: ‘le sol et le reason behind the number of land conflicts is sous-sol‘ the fact that in the DRC, customary, informal Mineral resources and extreme poverty are and statutory land-tenure systems overlap not the only causes of tensions in the ‘sea of geographically. Therefore, a certain parcel of instability’: many Congolese opine that the land can be claimed by different actors under country’s problems are due to Congo’s ‘sol et different systems (RCN 2009). sous-sol’. Aside from minerals (the ‘sous-sol’), The problem, thus, is not confined to a par- there is another natural resource at the core ticular area of the sea of instability. To solve of intercommunity conflicts: land (the ‘sol’). this peacebuilding challenge, it would be nec- Despite the international focus on ‘blood essary to implement a land reform or, at least, minerals’ to explain the Congo conflict (UN to enact legislation to clarify when legal or 2014), land is probably a more important traditional ownership rights apply (Autesserre factor to explain the conflict (IA 2010), since 2010). The UN ‘islands of stability’, thus, can- the intercommunity conflicts existing in not have a ripple effect over this factor of Congo before the colonization were due to instability, which is also beyond MONUSCO’s land problems (Chretien 2000; Djugudjugu mandate. On the contrary, this source of ten- 1979: 159; Weiss 1958: 148) and not to min- sions over the ‘sea of instability’ can jeopard- erals. Indeed, most of the intercommunity ize the UN stabilization strategy. Only the Barrera: The Congo Trap Art. 52, page 7 of 16

Congolese State can solve the land problem. of violence and darkness. But these narra- In the meantime, the micro-level conflicts tives rarely presented the causes of the con- of land, identity and power will continue to flict and its historic evolution. Conversely, be transferred to the ‘inter-community’ level authors willing to demystify these narratives (Huggins 2010) and, from this, to the national have often focused their analyses on material level (Autesserre 2010), enflaming the Congo conflict drivers, omitting behavioral dynam- conflict. ics that perpetuate intergenerational cycles Something similar could be said about the of violence. internationalization of the conflict: the ten- In Congo, as in other colonized areas, vio- sions at the intercommunity and national lev- lence increased exponentially during the els in Congo will continue to be transferred to European colonization. Indeed, Congo´s the international level, nourishing the tensions colonization was the most painful in Africa: in Central Africa, which are secondary and not the journalist Adam Hochschild (1998) calcu- primary conflict drivers. The historic tensions lated that the regime set up by the Belgian between Hema, Tutsi and Banyamulenge King killed between six and ten million ­cattle raisers against agriculturalist commu- Congolese. While it is difficult to know how nities were among the main causes of the many people were assassinated and how Congo wars and are still today an important many died because of the diseases brought factor to explain the involvement of Rwanda by the Europeans, it has been estimated that in the Congo conflict. These intercommunity the Congolese population halved between tensions are not new: when Henry Morton 1880 and 1925 (Ndaywel 2008: 318). When Stanley, the first European to cross the Congo King Leopold II transferred his personal basin, arrived in Ituri in 1888, the Hema and African kingdom to the Belgian State before the Lendu were at war (Stanley 1993). Since his death, this installed a type of apartheid that time, clashes between the Hema and the system in the Belgian Congo, continuing Lendu have been reported on more than ten through other means the tradition of struc- occasions before the more recent Ituri war. tural violence (Ndayewl 2008). The colony This is only one example of the dozens of pro- became further independent through ‘the tracted intercommunity conflicts existing in Congolese crisis’, when about 100,000 people Eastern DRC which contribute to conflict at died in a chaotic civil war that included eth- a higher level, covering the ‘sea of instability’, nic conflicts, military mutinies, secessionist where violence has become common practice movements, a Cold War proxy war between (Beaudoin 2013; Ramsbotham 2005). the United States and the Soviet Union, the assassination of Prime Minister Patrice A Story of Violence Lumumba, the deployment of ONUC (the Since Stanley wrote of his expeditions to first UN mission to the country) and the Central Africa in his books Through the Dark death of the UN Secretary General Dag Continent and In Darkest Africa, many other Hammarskjöld (Tournaire and Bouteaud authors have presented central Africa as a 1963). Mobutu managed to reunify the coun- place of darkness, evil and extreme suffer- try, but he did it through violent means and ing. Joseph Conrad novelized the horror of brought Congo to bankruptcy and collapse the colonization in the Heart of Darkness and (Wrong 2001). After Mobutu’s rule, the dead- Hélène Tournaire described a chaotic Congo liest wars since World War II left the country Crisis during the sixties in her Le Livre Noir with more than thirty armed groups, which du Congo. For many Westerners, the narra- continue harassing, killing and raping civil- tives of extreme and irrational violence pre- ians today (UN 2014). sented by Western media about the Rwandan Jason Sterns (2012) estimates that between Genocide and the Congo Wars reinforced the 300,000 and 400,000 people (around five impression that Central Africa was a place per cent of the Congolese population) have Art. 52, page 8 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap passed through the ranks of an armed group, resolution from the local level (Autesserre the national army or the police. This cul- 2010: 263) and a process of national reforms ture of soldiering has reinforced the historic to decrease structural violence would be nec- dynamics of violence in DRC, which has been essary. However, the UN ‘islands of stability’ happening in most of the ‘sea of instability’. strategy neither contributes to the national It would be wrong, thus, to focus conflict reforms nor includes local conflict resolution analysis on interethnic tensions in mineral- approaches. MONUSCO, as the rest of UN rich areas of the Great Lakes. The Congolese peacekeeping missions, does not have the dynamics of violence, which today seem con- mandate or the capability to address most of centrated in Eastern Congo, have erupted the local conflicts in the countries where it in other parts of the country in different is deployed. There is only one way in which historic moments: after the independence MONUSCO can contribute to reduce this there were clashes between the Balua and violence: by decreasing structural violence the Luluba in the southern region of Kasai at the national level through its support to and between the Bakongo and the Bangala in the restoration of state authority. However, Western Congo (Tournaire 1963). During the as it will be analyzed in the following points, Congo Wars there were massacres involving MONUSCO can only support this work, as the Tutsi, Hutu, Hema and dozens of Bantu com- Congolese state has the primary responsibil- munities from Eastern DRC (UN 2010). Today ity to implement these reforms. new clashes have erupted in southern Congo between Pygmy and Balubakat communities The Lack of Monopoly on Violence (UN 2014). According to Max Weber‘s definition of the It would be also a mistake to consider that State as a human community that success- this violence is only interethnic, since it is fully claims the monopoly of the legitimate committed in many other different ways use of physical force within a given territory, and contexts in all the ‘sea of instability’. The there would be no state in DRC. Since the end last example of intraethnic tensions was the of the Congo wars, the number of existing struggle within the M23 between its Kifuafua active armed groups in DRC has never been (Sultani Makenga) and Kimbelembele (Bosco under thirty. Although some armed groups Ntaganda) factions (Vogel 2014: 3). An impor- existed in Congo since independence, as tant part of the recent violence has been Laurent-Désiré Kabila’s Parti de la Révolution gender-based: with thousands of reported Populaire (PRP), most of the Congolese mili- rapes per year, DRC was labeled by the UN tias were created during the Second Congo Special Representative on Sexual Violence in War (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001). Conflict as the ‘rape capital of the world’ (BBC The first Mai Mai groups emerged as local 2010). Physical violence is also closely linked defense groups to defend their communi- to the political sphere, as political leaders ties from the external aggression of the RCD maintain armed groups in order to assure movement, but their targets moved progres- their political or economic survival (Hoebeke, sively to other armed groups from histori- Boshoff and Vlassenroot 2009: 119). Violence cal antagonist communities. This was the is a common dynamic in the day-to-day case of the Lendu Front des Nationalistes Congolese life: between neighbors, within the et Intégrationnistes (FNI), which fought the families, in a society plunged into a cycle of Hema Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) violence. The Congolese Professor Jean Paul in Ituri or the Congolese Hutu Coalition Yawidi considers that destruction and refusal des patriotes résistants congolais (PARECO), of the Other are common features of the pre- antagonist of the Tutsi CNDP in North Kivu, sent Congolese mentality (Yawidi 2008). among many others. The national and for- To stop, or at least attenuate, these dynam- eign armed groups resulted from the Congo ics of violence, a bottom up process of conflict Wars soon began to control mining sites Barrera: The Congo Trap Art. 52, page 9 of 16 to finance their activities (GB 2009) and during the military operations, it is not sur- often became the only representatives of prising that the FARDC ‘continue posing a any authority structure in their controlled considerable threat to the civilian population areas (Vlassenroot and Van Acker 2001). The rather than protecting them‘(ECI 2012: 4). armed groups remaining in DRC are thus a The FARDC is responsible for a substantial consequence of the Congo Wars as well as part of the lootings and rapes committed in one of the secondary causes of the perpetua- DRC. In areas not controlled by militias, ‘the tion of the present Congo conflict. FARDC is often the single greatest threat to The problem of proliferating armed groups the Congolese’ (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 6). could have been solved through the national program of DDR. However, the weak position The Spoiler State of the Government during the negotiations Assuring the salaries of the soldiers would be with the armed groups accepted their inte- a first step to end the insecurity created by the gration in the national army, which finally FARDC. To systematically pay these soldiers, provided incentives for the proliferation of they must first be identified and registered, new militias (Stearns, Verweijen and Eriksson but there are not clear figures about the num- 2013). Because of this, today it is commonly ber of soldiers in the National Army or about accepted that military pressure is needed to the budget dedicated to defense in Congo, strengthen the position of the Government as was the case during Mobutu’s rule (Wrong in the disarmament of these groups. 2001: 220), which facilitates diversions of Now, as insecurity is one of the most military funds. The European Union Security important grievances of the communities, Sector Reform Mission and the UN attempted the existence of armed groups in the ‘sea of to register all the Congolese soldiers in order instability’ facilitates the continuing mush- to assure their salaries, but these efforts have rooming of new armed groups, which coun- been undermined on several occasions by state ters any ripple effect coming from the islands representatives. According to several organiza- of stability. Unfortunately, MONUSCO, until tions working in the field, the Security System the deployment of the FIB, has not had the Reform (SSR) in Congo, has been jeopardized strength needed to successfully tackle armed by army commanders and government offi- groups, and the FIB does not have the mili- cials (Oxfam 2012: 35; IA 2012: 32; ECI 2012: tary capacity to tackle all of them at the 9; Trefon 2010). It seems, thus, ‘that the sys- same time (Vogel 2014). This task should be tematic organization of insecurity is preferred ensured by the security forces of the state, to the organization of security’ (Hoebeke, which has the primary responsibility for Boshoff, Vlassenroot 2009). ensuring security in its territory (UN 2014). The problem of soldiers without salaries, Nevertheless, despite this responsibility, the again, is not new in Congo. At the end of national army, the FARDC, is not only incapa- Mobutu’s rule over Zaire, when the economy ble of ensuring this security but, paradoxically, began its collapse, Mobutu had asked his sol- is also responsible for an important part of diers ‘to live from the land’, to earn a living the insecurity reigning in the ‘sea of instabil- by using their weapons (Wrong 2005: 45). ity’. In fact, after the 2002 peace agreements, This idea was significantly very similar to it was decided that the new national army King Leopold’s set up of his Force Publique, would be made up from the different factions which mutilated the locals and burnt entire involved in the Second Congo War. Today, this villages to enforce the rubber quotas of the army of former rebels suffers from lack of colonial administrators (Ndaywel 2008: 314). equipment and training, ill-discipline, weak Since the national army is incapable of command structures and diversion of the ensuring security in Congo. its reform is, for soldiers’ salaries (ECI 2012). As these soldiers stabilization purposes, probably the most often find themselves without food or salaries important. But there are also other important Art. 52, page 10 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap reforms aimed at stabilizing the country that factors perpetuating instability in DRC. have never been seriously undertaken by According to Severine Autesserre (2009) the State. One example is the reform of the this is due to the ‘dominant international judiciary. The reform of the justice system is peacebuilding culture’ framing interna- key for the restoration of the state authority. tional interveners’ analyses of the causes of However, ‘despite widespread impunity and a the Congolese conflict. Other analyses from weak justice system, less than 0.1 per cent of studies centers and organizations working the state budget in 2011 was allocated to the in the field agree on the international com- justice ministry’ (IA 2012: 35). Another exam- munity’s misconceptions about the Congo ple is the decentralization process, intended conflict. For International Alert, these wrong to appease local tensions and to help perceptions could be based on the incorrect restore state authority (Liegois 2009: 70). ‘assumption that the Congolese state is weak Nevertheless, even if the decentralization and must be strengthened’, underestimating process was foreseen in the Constitution of that the Congolese state, since its creation, 2005, it has not yet been implemented. A has been patrimonial, clientelistic and preda- similar problem is the holding of local elec- tory (IA 2012: 48; Trefon 2010), maintaining tions, expected in the country since 2006. the ‘patrimonial and predatory method of The Government has also failed to fulfill most governance employed in the Congo since of its electoral promises, such as the impor- it was first created by King Leopold II . . . tant 5 Chantiers plan. Finally, international The primary structural factor of instability NGOs and think tanks have also expressed in DRC is the prevailing method of govern- their concerns about the Government’s will ance employed by state institutions and to support the ISSSS. In 2011, after three Congolese politicians’ which could be due to years of preparation with international part- two factors: corruption and ethnically driven ners, not one of the planned 305 judicial and political competition (IA 2012: 7). corrections officers had been deployed to the According to the Corruption Perceptions ISSSS areas (Paddon and Lacaille 2011: 16), Index, DRC is one of the most corrupt coun- and fifty five percent of police elements tries in the world. The origins of this practice deployed along these areas were not on the could be seen in the violent system of exploi- government payroll (Oxfam 2012: 3). tation of natural resources organized by King Unfortunately, MONUSCO, which has Leopold, which transformed the Congo basin been mandated to support the reforms and into one of the most productive colonies in the restoration of the state authority, does the world (Hochschild 2007). The dynamics not have the mandate to manage these pro- of corruption continued with Mobutu, who cesses. Nevertheless, the contrast between fled the country with a personal fortune MONUSCO’s lack of capacity to manage surpassing the amount of Zaire´s enormous these reforms and the strategic importance debt (Wrong 2005), and persist today: Global of their implementation is vast. The obsta- Witness (2015) investigations have recently cles to these reforms are important factors shown how vast oil blocks have been sold to of perpetuation of insecurity, human rights companies linked to friends of the Congolese abuses and impunity in the ‘sea of instabil- President, whose fortune has been esti- ity’. Since these unaccomplished reforms are mated at fifteen billion dollars (Miniter fuelling the Congo conflict, they will con- 2014). However, corruption alone does not tinue to counter any ripple effect emanating seem enough to explain the boycotts of from the ‘islands of stability’. Government officials to statebuilding, since One question remaining is why MONUSCO a stronger control over the state could facili- continues following a stabilization strategy tate corruption. The remaining factor is, for that has been unsuccessful in the past and International Alert, the ‘ethnically driven that seems not to answer the most important political competition’. Barrera: The Congo Trap Art. 52, page 11 of 16

Fragmentation Dynamics provinces of North Kivu, South Kivu and Ethnicity is an undeniably important Maniema. But the people of South Kivu con- dynamic in Congolese politics: in the 2012 sider their southern part as Sud Sud Kivu. National Elections there were 19,000 can- Something similar occurs in North Kivu, didates from 450 parties (Kavanagh 2012), where its people talk about the Grand Nord which were mostly ethnic. In DRC there are and the Petit Nord. And in the Petit Nord we between 300 and 500 ethnic groups, divided find the Baindru and the Nande, these being in clans, ‘hills’ and families, originated from divided into Southern Nande and Northern the division of previous ethnic groups as, for Nande, which are also divided into Baswagha, example, the Gegere (or northern Hema) or Bahira, Bapakombe and Batangi. the Ngiti (or southern Lendu) in Ituri (Thiry Similar fragmentation dynamics hap- 2004). This phenomenon is known in DRC as pened with the rebel movements of the ‘collinisme’, a kind of tribalism at the scale of Congo wars. Tensions in the rebel army RCD the hill. Humanitarian workers in the field, created two branches: the RCD-G, based in for example, are used to deal with Congolese the city of Goma and the RCD-K, based in communities that have never visited the top the city of Kisangani. New tensions in the of their hills, where another ethnic group RCD-K created the RCD National and later lives. The historical tensions between com- the RCD-Original, the RCD Authentique, munities (IA 2009), which existed before the RCD-Movement de Liberation and the the colonization, were aggravated by the RCD-Congo (UN 2010). In Ituri, a branch of practice of dividing and conquering exerted the RCD-K split into the Union des Patriotes by the Belgian administrators and Mobutu, Congolaises (UPC), a Hema Gegere militia. who controlled large territories by support- The Lendu created their own armed group, ing minoritarian ethnic groups, such as the the Front Nationalise et Intégratif (FNI). But Tutsi in North Kivu (Willame 1997: 53) or the new tensions erupted within these groups. Hema in Ituri (Asadho 1999). Mobutu also The Southern Lendu (Ngiti) created the Force applied this practice to the army, impeding a de Résistance Patriotique en Ituri (FRPI) and unified military command that he perceived the Southern Hema, who disagreed with as a threat to his power (Wrong 2005: 218). the Hema Gegere’s UPC, created the Parti This practice of divide and rule is still a com- pour l’Unité et la Sauvegarde de l’Intégrité du mon practice today, and would be, according Congo (PUSIC) (Oga 2009). to Paddon and Lacaille (2011), one of the rea- However, even if the practice of divide and sons behind the state resistance to reform. rule has reinforced the dynamics of fragmen- The practice of divide and rule seems to tation in the country, we should not think have broken the Congolese society beyond that it is the only origin of this fragmenta- ethnic lines, creating a country in a continu- tion. The primary cause of this dynamic ous process of fragmentation. Territorially, seems to be the lack of cultural and political for example, there have been four provincial unity in DRC, a country of sheer dimensions secessionist movements since the independ- ‘encouraging division over unity’ (Paddon ence: in the Kivus and Ituri during the Congo and Lacaille 2011: 5). Historically, the coun- Wars and in Katanga and South Kasai during try’s borders were delineated by Leopold II, the ‘Congolese Crisis’ after the independ- who never visited his private colony, created ence. But fragmentation goes far beyond the only for economic interests. Moreover, the provincial level. In the North Kivu province, subsequent Belgian administration of the for example, the Hunde have a conflict with colony, where racial restrictions were com- the Banyarwanda, but the Banyarwanda monplace, did not create a sense of unity. are also divided into Hutu and Tutsi, fight- A Congolese intellectual community would ing each other. The former province of Kivu have been useful to promote this idea but, was divided, under Mobutu’s rule, into the at the end of the Belgian rule, only sixteen Art. 52, page 12 of 16 Barrera: The Congo Trap

Congolese were university graduates (Van internationalizing the conflict. The old strug- Reybrouck 2008: 288). Finally, Mobutu, who gle for land has escalated due to the overlap- considered himself the ‘pilgrim of national ping of several land-tenure systems and the unity’ (Michel 1989: 94), maintained he was pressures originated from malnutrition and creating a sense of unity through his politics hunger. Minerals have incentivized fighting of Zaïrisation, intended to ‘reconquer the and violence among the self-defense groups, Zairien soul’. However, considering himself originally aimed at defending their commu- an ‘uncontested and not replaceable leader’, nities from their antagonists or the preda- built his ‘zairisation’ on the cult of his person- tory national army. The deadlock is cemented ality, even changing his name into ‘Mobutu by the fragmentation of the entity that could Sese Seko Kuku Ngbendu Wa Za Banga’, provide security and reforms: the state, in which means ‘Mobutu, the all powerful which different elites compete in a sort of warrior who because of endurance and will prisoner’s dilemma, impeding statebuild- to win, will go from conquest to conquest, ing. The huge dimensions of each of these leaving fire in his wake’. Instead of creating factors make the Congo conflict ‘one of the a sense of unity, Mobutu divided communi- most complex and intricate environments ties and Government officials to maintain his ever faced by a peacekeeping mission’, as a power. As a result, when Zaire collapsed and delegation of the UN Security Council stated the ‘warrior’ fled Zaire, the politics of ‘zairisa- (Neethling 2011). It is also possibly one of tion’ and unity were seen as a masquerade the oldest present conflicts, as we could con- sustaining a kleptocracy. sider its beginning in the Congo Crisis dur- In conclusion, due to the lack of unity and ing the sixties or, since most of the its root the historical phenomenon of fragmenta- causes were present at the colonial times, in tion, it is difficult to talk about a unified state the establishment of King Leopold’s Congo in DRC. Existing parallel administrations and Free State. chains of command in the army continue in MONUSCO is, undoubtedly, doing impor- Congo, resulting from political, economical tant work to alleviate human suffering or customary elites fighting for their self- and contain the Congo conflict. However, preservation at the national, provincial, local MONUSCO’s mandate, resources and sta- and community level (Paddon and Lacaille bilization strategy are not enough to break 2011: 6). It is thus difficult to imagine how the deadlock of the conflict and stabilize the MONUSCO’s mandate of restoration of state country. The last stabilization strategy, the authority can be implemented when the ‘islands of stability’, may bring some security state, corrupted and fragmented, is the main and economic recovery to the chosen areas, spoiler of its reform. Nor can the islands of but these improvements will be counterbal- stability have a ripple effect of stabilization anced by the turbulent ‘sea of instability’. The over this issue. On the contrary, the lack of huge dimensions of most of the dynamics state reforms will probably impede the sur- in this ‘sea’ would be enough to defend the vival, or even the creation, of these ‘islands’. likely failure of the UN strategy. However, the bottleneck of the ‘Spoiler State’, beyond UN The Congo Trap control, transforms this likely failure into a It is difficult to imagine a stabilisation strat- certain one. egy for DRC. 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How to cite this article: Barrera, A 2015 The Congo Trap: MONUSCO Islands of Stability in the Sea of Instability. Stability: International Journal of Security & Development, 4(1): 52, pp. 1–16, DOI: http:// dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.gn

Published: 03 November 2015

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