DOCSLIB.ORG

What We Can (And Cannot) Learn from Discourse

Total Page：16

File Type：pdf, Size：1020Kb

Download full-text PDF Read full-text
What We Can (And Cannot) Learn from Discourse Rethinking the Discursive Construction of Terrorism and Counterterrorism: What We Can (and Cannot) Learn from Discourse CHIN-KUEI, TSUI The National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, PO Box 56, Dunedin 9054, New Zealand E-mail:[email protected]; [email protected] Author’s Note: A paper prepared for the International Studies Association (ISA) 55th Annual Convention, 26-29 March, 2014, Toronto, Canada. PLEASE DO NOT CITE OR DISTRIBUTE WITHOUT AUTHER’S PERMISSION. Introduction The aim of the present research is to analyse and explain how the counterterrorism ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 2002) in America was constructed and constituted through the process of discursive practice. The conception of ‘regime of truth,’ according to Foucault (2002: 131), can be understood as a type of discourse which is perceived as, and functions as, truth, a specific mechanism or instance that enables human beings to distinguish between true and false interpretations, and the status of those who have the authority to affect public opinion and decide what is true. It can be argued that through the way that discourse is framed and comprehended—that is, discursive practice—the common understanding, or the common ‘grid of intelligibility’ (see Milliken, 1999), of terrorism is shaped and constituted. Specifically, through the production and reproduction of discourse, ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorists’ are discursively constructed in a specific way, namely, as imminent threats to the United States, its citizens and Western civilisation. As President Reagan claimed, the ‘plague of terrorism’ (quoted in Leeman, 1991: 130) threatens to ‘spread like a cancer, eating away at civilised societies and sowing fear and chaos everywhere’ (Ibid.). That there is no cure for the terrorist threat makes it especially frightening, and thus it must be carefully monitored and controlled. In addition, one of the key consequences of the discursive construction of terrorism is that it comes to function as a ‘negative ideograph’ (see McGee, 1980) and a ‘social taboo’ (see Jackson, 2011b) in American and broader Western society. Moreover, the social construction of the terrorist threat and the language utilised by powerful elites, or the ‘regime of truth’ in Foucault’s (2002) terms, suggests particular ways to address terrorism, either through a law enforcement-based approach or a military approach. Terrorism must be condemned and eliminated, while terrorists must be brought to justice and punished. The terrorism truth regime also implies that any compromise or negotiation is unacceptable because terrorists are inherently evil. This uncompromising rule is clearly articulated in U.S. official documents, such as the annual report on Patterns of Global Terrorism and the National Security Strategy, and adhered to by counterterrorism practitioners. The everyday practice of discourse illustrates that discourse not only produces knowledge of terrorism and terrorists, but also shapes and constrains policy options. That is, it sets clear parameters for how the subject of terrorism should be discussed and understood, and rules out alternative and potentially more effective ways of responding to terrorism such as dialogue and political negotiation. However, a number of questions remain: does discourse always reflect the truth? Further, what can we learn and what can we not learn from discourse? What kinds of ideology and power relations are embedded in discourse? Why is the dominant discourse or ‘regime of truth’ seen as credible and uncritically accepted by the popular majority? Can discourse be changed? How/why can discourse be (or not be) changed? Why do we sometimes need to change discourses? These questions are asked by critical discourse analysts and students. In order to answer these questions, this paper firstly provides an overview of U.S. terrorism and counterterrorism discourse based on the empirical research conducted. In addition, through the method of genealogy, the discursive construction of terrorism and terrorists in the U.S. political arena is explored and examined. The research uncovers a clear continuity in the American-led war on terror, from Ronald Reagan, to Bill Clinton, and through to George W. Bush, in terms of the language used by U.S. presidents and the counterterrorism policies implemented by their administrations. Following a chronological analysis of U.S. discourses on terrorism and counterterrorism, some wider theoretical reflection is provided. It is suggested that Foucault’s (2002) concepts of ‘truth and power’ and ‘subjugated knowledge’ (see also Jackson, 2012) provides a useful framework through which to critically question the dominant discourse and unveil the asymmetric power relations between powerful groups and less powerful minorities. Lastly, this paper argues that critical language awareness (CLA) and ‘emancipatory’ language practice, as introduced by Fairclough (1992a, 1999, 2010) and other critical linguists (Janks & Ivanic, 1992), are necessary for the future study of discourse. In the conclusion, I suggest that although discursive change is extremely difficult to achieve and needs specific conditions to support it, such as a change agent and a particular social and political context (Jackson, 2014), it is still worthwhile for individuals, through the study and practice of language and discourse, to work for ‘change’ and to ‘change’ the world for the better. Reviewing the American-Led War on Terror: A Genealogical Study of U.S. Terrorism and Counterterrorism Discourses In one of his speeches, Michael Foucault said that genealogy is a ‘history of the present’ (Gutting, 2005: 50). That is to say, the primary intent of genealogy is not to understand the past in its own terms or for its own sake, but to comprehend and evaluate the present (Ibid.). By conducting a genealogical study, this research has traced the discursive origins of the terms ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ in U.S. presidential rhetoric. It demonstrates a distinct continuity in the discourse of the American-led war on terror from Ronald Reagan, to Bill Clinton, and later, to George W. Bush. This finding challenges a dominant theme in the existing literature which suggests that the war and its discourse largely originated with the George W. Bush administration (Collins & Glover, 2002; Silberstein, 2002; Murphy, 2004), and the dramatic foreign-policy revolution following the 2001 World Trade Center bombings (Daalder & Lindsay, 2003; Leffler, 2004; Mann, 2004). As discussed previously, the political usage of the term terrorism can be traced to the 1790s in France (Townshend, 2002; Jenkins, 2003). During the French Revolution, the term ‘terrorism’ was initially utilised to describe the attempts by French revolutionary leaders to eliminate their political opponents. In Russia during the nineteenth century, the ruling party also used the word ‘terrorist’ to describe Russian revolutionaries who pursued their aims through violent methods (Wilkinson, 2012). However, at the end of the nineteenth century, when left-wing and radical rebels were launching violent attacks in European countries, the concept of terrorism came to be perceived as actions mainly carried out by sub-state anarchists, rather than by governments, an idea that was in contrast to the initial eighteenth-century French definition (Ibid.). In the 1940s and 1950s, the term terrorism was more frequently employed to describe the political violence employed by nationalists and anti-colonists in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East (Booth & Dunne, 2012). Until relatively recently, the concept of terrorism was used primarily to refer to the actions of nationalist and ideologically-motivated groups within Western countries, such as the IRA in the United Kingdom, ETA in Spain, the FLQ in Canada (Ibid.), and the Red Army Factions in Germany and Italy. The usage of the term ‘terrorism’ in the U.S. political arena can be traced to the late 1960s, when the Kennedy administration defined its Vietnamese enemies and their actions as ‘terrorists’ and ‘terrorism’ (Winkler, 2006). A similar rhetorical strategy which merged the tactic of terrorism with the ideological objectives of Communism was adopted by both the Johnson and Nixon administrations to portray the Communist and Viet Cong threats. During the Vietnam War, the conceptual definition of ‘terrorism’ and ‘terrorist’ used by U.S. administrations not only referred to the external threats posed by the Soviet Union and the Viet Cong, but also to American citizens who strongly opposed the U.S.-Vietnamese policy. In the late 1970s, during the Iranian Hostage Crisis, the Carter administration employed the same terrorism rhetoric to depict the event and condemned the actions of the so-called terrorists. President Carter defined the hostage crisis as an ‘act of terrorism’ (Carter, 1979) and rhetorically linked the event to ‘international terrorism’ (Carter, 1980). Carter’s discourse on terrorism featured a ‘crime’ frame, in sharp contrast to his successor, Ronald Reagan, who broadly employed a ‘war’ metaphor to structure his ‘war on terrorism’ discourse (see Jackson, 2006; Winkler, 2007). In the 1980s, with the growing confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the U.S. terrorism discourse changed significantly, particularly during the Reagan presidency. President Reagan combined the Cold War narrative and the ‘war’ metaphor to frame his ‘war on terrorism’ discourse. For the Reagan administration, terrorism was the ‘antithesis of democracy’ (Reagan,
Load more

Recommended publications
  • Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
    Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Gray Zone Strategy
    Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt* ince the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself (along with Russia and China) as one of the world’s foremost “gray zone” actors.1 For nearly four decades, however, the United States has struggled to respond effectively to this asymmetric “way of war.” Washington has often Streated Tehran with caution and granted it significant leeway in the conduct of its gray zone activities due to fears that U.S. pushback would lead to “all-out” war—fears that the Islamic Republic actively encourages. Yet, the very purpose of this modus operandi is to enable Iran to pursue its interests and advance its anti-status quo agenda while avoiding escalation that could lead to a wider conflict. Because of the potentially high costs of war—especially in a proliferated world—gray zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come. For this reason, it is more important than ever for the United States to understand the logic underpinning these types of activities, in all their manifestations. Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid “Ways of War” in Iran’s Strategy Gray zone warfare, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid warfare are terms that are often used interchangeably, but they refer neither to discrete forms of warfare, nor should they be used interchangeably—as they often (incor- rectly) are. Rather, these terms refer to that aspect of strategy that concerns how states employ ways and means to achieve national security policy ends.2 Means refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cyber instruments of national power; ways describe how these means are employed to achieve the ends of strategy.
    [Show full text]
  • Surprise, Intelligence Failure, and Mass Casualty Terrorism
    SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM by Thomas E. Copeland B.A. Political Science, Geneva College, 1991 M.P.I.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1992 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Thomas E. Copeland It was defended on April 12, 2006 and approved by Davis Bobrow, Ph.D. Donald Goldstein, Ph.D. Dennis Gormley Phil Williams, Ph.D. Dissertation Director ii © 2006 Thomas E. Copeland iii SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM Thomas E. Copeland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 This study aims to evaluate whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. This study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community.
    [Show full text]
  • Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
    Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:169–181, 2008 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/10576100701878424 Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction DANIEL BYMAN Center for Peace and Security Studies Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA and Saban Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institution Washington, DC, USA This article reviews Iran’s past and current use of terrorism and assesses why U.S. attempts to halt Iran’s efforts have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, it argues that Iran is not likely transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, Tehran is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation. The article concludes by offering recommendations for decreasing Iran’s support for terrorism. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years.1 Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.2 This support remains strong even today: the U.S.
    [Show full text]
  • U.S. Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East
    U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 143, April 2016 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing fromthe publisher. ©2016 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: An F-16 from the Egyptian Air Force prepares to make contact with a KC-135 from the 336th ARS during in-flight refueling training. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Amy Abbott) Contents Acknowledgments V I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 1 James F. Jeffrey 1. Introduction to Part I 3 2. Basic Principles 5 3. U.S. Strategy in the Middle East 8 4. U.S. Military Engagement 19 5. Conclusion 37 Notes, Part I 39 II. RETHINKING U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY 47 Michael Eisenstadt 6. Introduction to Part II 49 7. American Sisyphus: Impact of the Middle Eastern Operational Environment 52 8. Disjointed Strategy: Aligning Ways, Means, and Ends 58 9.
    [Show full text]
  • The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident
    PRESS RELEASE House National Security Committee Floyd D. Spence, Chairman Contact: Maureen Cragin FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Ryan Vaart August 14, 1996 (202) 225-2539 STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FLOYD D. SPENCE ON THE REPORT ON THE BOMBING OF KHOBAR TOWERS “In the wake of the June 25 bombing of the American compound at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the House Committee on National Security sent a delegation of professional staff members to Saudi Arabia to conduct a preliminary investigation of the incident. “Although the professionalism and courage of the men and women who suffered this terrible disaster is apparent and should be a source of pride for all Americans, the bombing raises issues of intelligence failures and operational deficiencies that at least suggest that military leaders and policymakers were unaware of the potential risks that U.S. service personnel faced in Saudi Arabia. “First, as the report indicates, the performance of the troops living in Khobar Towers and stationed in the Dhahran area was superb. As a result of the rapid reaction of the Air Force Special Police who observed the bomb-laden truck and immediately began to evacuate the building, as well as the efforts of doctors, medical personnel and soldiers to save lives, a much larger tragedy was almost certainly averted. “But individual professionalism and heroism during the bombing cannot obscure larger problems that may have contributed to the unpreparedness of U.S. troops in the face of a serious terrorist threat. Intelligence failures left the military personnel in Khobar Towers, as well as the 4404th wing’s leaders, largely unaware of the magnitude of the threat they faced.
    [Show full text]
  • Hizbullah Under Fire in Syria | the Washington Institute
    MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Hizbullah Under Fire in Syria by Matthew Levitt, Nadav Pollak Jun 9, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute. Nadav Pollak Nadav Pollak is a former Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation fellow at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony Last month's assassination of a senior Hizbullah commander, apparently by Syrian rebel groups, demonstrates the growing threat the organization faces from fellow Arabs and Muslims. he death of senior Hizbullah commander Mustafa Badreddine in Syria in May left the group reeling, but not for T the reason most people think. True, it lost an especially qualified commander with a unique pedigree as the brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh, with whom Badreddine plotted devastating terror attacks going back to the Beirut bombings in the 1980s. And, at the time of his death, Badreddine was dual-hatted as the commander of both the group's international terrorist network (the Islamic Jihad Organisation or External Security Organisation) and its significant military deployment in Syria. The loss of such a senior and seasoned commander is no small setback for Hizbullah. But the real reason Badreddine's death has Hizbullah on edge is not the loss of the man, per se, but the fact that the group's arch enemy, Israel, was seemingly not responsible. Hizbullah, it appears, now has more immediate enemies than Israel -- and that has the self-described "resistance" organisation tied up in knots.
    [Show full text]
  • Hezbollah and the Use of Drones As a Weapon of Terrorism
    Hezbollah’s Drones Hezbollah and the Use of Drones as a Weapon of Terrorism By Milton Hoenig The international terrorist group Hezbollah, driven by resistance to Israel, now regularly sends low flying drones into Israeli airspace. These drones are launched and remotely manned from the Hezbollah stronghold in Lebanon and presumably supplied by its patron and strategic partner, Iran. On the U.S. State Department’s list of terrorist organizations since 1995, Hezbollah has secured its presence in Lebanon through various phases. It established a strong social services network, and in 2008 it became the dominant political party in the Lebanese government and supported the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War. Hezbollah’s drone flights into Israeli airspace Hezbollah’s first flight of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or drone, into Israeli airspace for reconnaissance purposes occurred in November 2004, catching Israeli intelligence off guard. A Mirsad-1 drone (an updated version of the early Iranian Mohajer drone used for reconnaissance of Iraqi troops during the 1980s Iran-Iraq War), flew south from Lebanon into Israel, hovered over the Western Galilee town of Nahariya for about 20 minutes and then returned to Lebanon before the Israeli air force could intercept it. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah boasted that the Mirsad could reach “anywhere, deep, deep” into Israel with 40 to 50 kilograms of explosives.1 One report at the time was that Iran had supplied Hezbollah with eight such drones, and over two years some 30 Lebanese operatives had
    [Show full text]
  • Iran's Foreign and Defense Policies
    Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies Updated May 8, 2019 Congressional Research Service https://crsreports.congress.gov R44017 SUMMARY R44017 Iran’s Foreign and Defense Policies May 8, 2019 Iran’s national security policy is the product of many overlapping and sometimes competing factors such as the ideology of Iran’s Islamic revolution, perception of threats Kenneth Katzman to the regime and to the country, long-standing national interests, and the interaction of Specialist in Middle the Iranian regime’s factions and constituencies. Iran’s leadership: Eastern Affairs x Seeks to deter or thwart U.S. or other efforts to invade or intimidate Iran or to bring about a change of regime. x Has sought to take advantage of opportunities of regional conflicts to overturn a power structure in the Middle East that it asserts favors the United States, Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Sunni Muslim Arab regimes. x Seeks to enhance its international prestige and restore a sense of “greatness” reminiscent of ancient Persian empires. x Advances its foreign policy goals, in part by providing material support to regional allied governments and armed factions. Iranian officials characterize the support as helping the region’s “oppressed” and assert that Saudi Arabia, in particular, is instigating sectarian tensions and trying to exclude Iran from regional affairs. x Sometimes disagrees on tactics and strategies. Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i and key hardline institutions, such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), oppose any compromises of Iran’s national security core goals. Iran’s elected president, Hassan Rouhani, and Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif support Iran’s integration into regional and international diplomacy.
    [Show full text]
  • Embattled in Arabia
    CombatingTerrorism Center at West Point ALL FBI INFOPNATIO5 CONTAINED HEPEIN IS UNCLASSIFIED DATE oHO9sO12 BY 65179 DUN./STbJ Occasional Paper Series Shia Militancy Program Embattled in Arabia Shiis and the Politics of Confrontation in Saudi Arabia TobyJones June 2009 ACLURM045257 1bIU441D Preface In the years following the attacks of September 11 2001 the Combating Terrorism Center CTC at West Point has extended significant efforts to understand the ideologies and strategies guiding terrorist groups as well as the tactics and techniques they employ to inflict damage on their adversaries As became painfully evident on 9/11 Al Qaeda and its associated groups and networks Sunni extremist movements posed the most formidable terrorist threat to U.S national security For that reason the CTCs research program focused on analyzing trends pertaining to Sunni militant groups Although there is little reason to believe that threats emanating from Sunni in extremist groups will subside the foreseeable future number of recent international developments suggest that activities involving Shfi state and non- state actors also have the potential to affect U.S national security interests The deliberate strategy pursued by Iran to extend its influence abroad the military build-up of Hizbailah and the global diffusion of its cells sectarian violence in Pakistan Saudi Arabia Yemen the Gulf States and other regions and the emergence of previously unknown militant Shii groups in places such as Iraq are only few examples for why the growing specter of Shia militancy
    [Show full text]
  • “Iran's Destabilizing Role in the Middle East”
    Statement before the House Foreign Affairs Committee “IRAN’S DESTABILIZING ROLE IN THE MIDDLE EAST” A Statement by: Scott Modell Senior Associate, Burke Chair in Strategy Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) July 16, 2014 2172 Rayburn House Office Building Chairman Royce, Members of the Committee, good morning and thank you for this opportunity to testify on Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East. I will briefly describe the “Iran Action Network,” Iran’s long-term foreign policy goals and how they destabilize the region, and current trends, and offer recommendations on how to counter one of our most pressing national security challenges. Introduction U.S. policy toward Iran has focused mainly on addressing the nuclear challenge, but it has overlooked the threat posed by Iran’s global revolutionary network. The U.S. nuclear strategy, which is based on the dual pillars of sanctions and diplomacy, is realistically grounded, well- resourced, and run about as effectively as can be expected. However, Iran’s nuclear program is just the tip of a revolutionary spear that extends across the world and threatens key U.S. interests. Iran’s foreign policy is subversive, sectarian, and set on goals that would come at the expense of U.S. interest in the region. For more than three decades, Iran has sought to preserve the Islamic revolution at home and promote it abroad, through a network of government and nongovernment organizations that I have referred to as the Iran Action Network (IAN). The members of that network are involved in crafting and implementing the covert elements of Iran’s foreign policy agenda, from terrorism, political, economic and social subversion; to illicit finance, weapons and narcotics trafficking; and nuclear procurement and proliferation.
    [Show full text]
  • Critical MASS Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East N I the M N the Iddle E Iddle Ast Andrew F
    CRITI C AL MASS: NU C LEAR PROLIFERATIO CRITICAL MASS NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIddLE EAst N I N THE M IDDLE E AST ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH F. ANDREW 1667 K Street, NW, Suite 900 Washington, DC 20006 Tel. 202-331-7990 • Fax 202-331-8019 www.csbaonline.org ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH CRITICAL MASS: NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION IN THE MIDDLE EAST BY ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH 2013 About the Authors Dr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr. is the President of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, which he joined following a 21- year career in the U.S. Army. He has served in the Department of De- fense’s Office of Net Assessment, on the personal staff of three secretar- ies of defense, the National Defense Panel, the Defense Science Board Task Force on Joint Experimentation, and the Defense Policy Board. He is the author of 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist Explores War in the 21st Century and The Army and Vietnam. A West Point graduate, he holds an M.P.A. and a Ph.D. from Harvard University. Acknowledgments The author would like to thank Eric Edelman, Evan Montgomery, Jim Thomas, and Barry Watts for reviewing and commenting on earlier ver- sions of this report. Thanks are also in order for Eric Lindsey for his re- search and editorial support and to Kamilla Gunzinger for her copyedit- ing. Eric Lindsey also provided graphics support that greatly enhanced the report’s presentation. Any shortcomings in this assessment, however, are the author’s re- sponsibility and the author’s alone. © 2013 Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments.
    [Show full text]