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Atheism” in America: What the United States Could Learn from Europe’S Protection of Atheists
Emory International Law Review Volume 27 Issue 1 2013 Redefining A" theism" in America: What the United States Could Learn From Europe's Protection of Atheists Alan Payne Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr Recommended Citation Alan Payne, Redefining A" theism" in America: What the United States Could Learn From Europe's Protection of Atheists, 27 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 661 (2013). Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.emory.edu/eilr/vol27/iss1/14 This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Emory Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Emory International Law Review by an authorized editor of Emory Law Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected]. PAYNE GALLEYSPROOFS1 7/2/2013 1:01 PM REDEFINING “ATHEISM” IN AMERICA: WHAT THE UNITED STATES COULD LEARN FROM EUROPE’S PROTECTION OF ATHEISTS ABSTRACT There continues to be a pervasive and persistent stigma against atheists in the United States. The current legal protection of atheists is largely defined by the use of the Establishment Clause to strike down laws that reinforce this stigma or that attempt to deprive atheists of their rights. However, the growing atheist population, a religious pushback against secularism, and a neo- Federalist approach to the religion clauses in the Supreme Court could lead to the rights of atheists being restricted. This Comment suggests that the United States could look to the legal protections of atheists in Europe. Particularly, it notes the expansive protection of belief, thought, and conscience and some forms of establishment. -
Hezbollah's Syrian Quagmire
Hezbollah’s Syrian Quagmire BY MATTHEW LEVITT ezbollah – Lebanon’s Party of God – is many things. It is one of the dominant political parties in Lebanon, as well as a social and religious movement catering first and fore- Hmost (though not exclusively) to Lebanon’s Shi’a community. Hezbollah is also Lebanon’s largest militia, the only one to maintain its weapons and rebrand its armed elements as an “Islamic resistance” in response to the terms of the Taif Accord, which ended Lebanon’s civil war and called for all militias to disarm.1 While the various wings of the group are intended to complement one another, the reality is often messier. In part, that has to do with compartmen- talization of the group’s covert activities. But it is also a factor of the group’s multiple identities – Lebanese, pan-Shi’a, pro-Iranian – and the group’s multiple and sometimes competing goals tied to these different identities. Hezbollah insists that it is Lebanese first, but in fact, it is an organization that always acts out of its self-interests above its purported Lebanese interests. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, Hezbollah also has an “expansive global network” that “is sending money and operatives to carry out terrorist attacks around the world.”2 Over the past few years, a series of events has exposed some of Hezbollah’s covert and militant enterprises in the region and around the world, challenging the group’s standing at home and abroad. Hezbollah operatives have been indicted for the murder of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri by the UN Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) in The Hague,3 arrested on charges of plotting attacks in Nigeria,4 and convicted on similar charges in Thailand and Cyprus.5 Hezbollah’s criminal enterprises, including drug running and money laundering from South America to Africa to the Middle East, have been targeted by law enforcement and regulatory agen- cies. -
Germany 2018 International Religious Freedom Report
GERMANY 2018 INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT Executive Summary The constitution prohibits religious discrimination and provides for freedom of faith and conscience and the practice of one’s religion. The country’s 16 states exercise considerable autonomy on registration of religious groups and other matters. Unrecognized religious groups are ineligible for tax benefits. The federal and some state offices of the domestic intelligence service continued to monitor the activities of certain Muslim groups. Authorities also monitored the Church of Scientology (COS), which reported continued government discrimination against its members. Certain states continued to ban or restrict the use of religious clothing or symbols, including headscarves, for some state employees, particularly teachers and courtroom officials. While senior government leaders continued to condemn anti-Semitism and anti-Muslim sentiment, some members of the federal parliament and state assemblies from the Alternative for Germany (AfD) Party again made anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim statements. The federal and seven state governments appointed anti-Semitism commissioners for the first time, following a recommendation in a parliament-commissioned 2017 experts’ report to create a federal anti-Semitism commissioner in response to growing anti-Semitism. The federal anti-Semitism commissioner serves as a contact for Jewish groups and coordinates initiatives to combat anti-Semitism in the federal ministries. In July the government announced it would increase social welfare funding for Holocaust survivors by 75 million euros ($86 million) in 2019. In March Federal Interior Minister Horst Seehofer said he did not consider Islam to be a part of the country’s culture, and that the country was characterized by Christianity. -
Iran's Gray Zone Strategy
Iran’s Gray Zone Strategy Cornerstone of its Asymmetric Way of War By Michael Eisenstadt* ince the creation of the Islamic Republic in 1979, Iran has distinguished itself (along with Russia and China) as one of the world’s foremost “gray zone” actors.1 For nearly four decades, however, the United States has struggled to respond effectively to this asymmetric “way of war.” Washington has often Streated Tehran with caution and granted it significant leeway in the conduct of its gray zone activities due to fears that U.S. pushback would lead to “all-out” war—fears that the Islamic Republic actively encourages. Yet, the very purpose of this modus operandi is to enable Iran to pursue its interests and advance its anti-status quo agenda while avoiding escalation that could lead to a wider conflict. Because of the potentially high costs of war—especially in a proliferated world—gray zone conflicts are likely to become increasingly common in the years to come. For this reason, it is more important than ever for the United States to understand the logic underpinning these types of activities, in all their manifestations. Gray Zone, Asymmetric, and Hybrid “Ways of War” in Iran’s Strategy Gray zone warfare, asymmetric warfare, and hybrid warfare are terms that are often used interchangeably, but they refer neither to discrete forms of warfare, nor should they be used interchangeably—as they often (incor- rectly) are. Rather, these terms refer to that aspect of strategy that concerns how states employ ways and means to achieve national security policy ends.2 Means refer to the diplomatic, informational, military, economic, and cyber instruments of national power; ways describe how these means are employed to achieve the ends of strategy. -
Middle East Meteorology - H.M
TROPICAL METEOROLOGY- Middle East Meteorology - H.M. Hasanean MIDDLE EAST METEOROLOGY H.M. Hasanean Meteorology Department, Faculty of Meteorology, Environment and Arid Land Agriculture, King Abdulaziz University Keywords: Middle East Meteorology, Arid and sub arid climate, Dust storm, Climate change, Circulation systems. Contents 1. Introduction 1.1 Middle East Definition 1.2 Overview of the Middle East Climate 2. Regional climate in the Middle East climate 2.1 Climate of Egypt 2.2 Climate of the Arabian Peninsula an Overview 2.3 Climate of Syria 2.4 Climate of Lebanon 2.5 Climate Jordan 2.6 Climate of Israel and Palestine 2.7 Climate of Cyprus 2.8 Climate of Iraq 2.9 Climate of Turkey 2.10 Climate of Iran 3. Dust storms over the Middle East 3.1 Types of Dust Storms 3.2 Synoptic Analysis of Dust Storms in the Middle East 4. Climate change over the Middle East climate 5. Climate change impacts on water resources in Middle East 6. Circulation systems affect the climate of the Middle East 6.1 Impact of the North Atlantic Oscillation (NAO) on Middle Eastern Climate 6.2 Impact of the El Nino Southern Oscillation (ENSO) on Middle East Climate 6.3 The Role of Highs Pressure (Siberian and Subtropical High Pressure) and Indian Low Pressure on Middle Eastern Climate 6.4 The roleUNESCO of Jet streams on Middle East – Climate EOLSS 7. Conclusion Acknowledgements Glossary SAMPLE CHAPTERS Bibliography Biographical Sketch Summary The Middle East is a region that spans southwestern Asia, western Asia, and northeastern Africa. Although much of the Middle East region has a Mediterranean climate type, i.e. -
Surprise, Intelligence Failure, and Mass Casualty Terrorism
SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM by Thomas E. Copeland B.A. Political Science, Geneva College, 1991 M.P.I.A., University of Pittsburgh, 1992 Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of The Graduate School of Public and International Affairs in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy University of Pittsburgh 2006 UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH FACULTY OF ARTS AND SCIENCES This dissertation was presented by Thomas E. Copeland It was defended on April 12, 2006 and approved by Davis Bobrow, Ph.D. Donald Goldstein, Ph.D. Dennis Gormley Phil Williams, Ph.D. Dissertation Director ii © 2006 Thomas E. Copeland iii SURPRISE, INTELLIGENCE FAILURE, AND MASS CASUALTY TERRORISM Thomas E. Copeland, PhD University of Pittsburgh, 2006 This study aims to evaluate whether surprise and intelligence failure leading to mass casualty terrorism are inevitable. It explores the extent to which four factors – failures of public policy leadership, analytical challenges, organizational obstacles, and the inherent problems of warning information – contribute to intelligence failure. This study applies existing theories of surprise and intelligence failure to case studies of five mass casualty terrorism incidents: World Trade Center 1993; Oklahoma City 1995; Khobar Towers 1996; East African Embassies 1998; and September 11, 2001. A structured, focused comparison of the cases is made using a set of thirteen probing questions based on the factors above. The study concludes that while all four factors were influential, failures of public policy leadership contributed directly to surprise. Psychological bias and poor threat assessments prohibited policy makers from anticipating or preventing attacks. Policy makers mistakenly continued to use a law enforcement approach to handling terrorism, and failed to provide adequate funding, guidance, and oversight of the intelligence community. -
Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 31:169–181, 2008 Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online DOI: 10.1080/10576100701878424 Iran, Terrorism, and Weapons of Mass Destruction DANIEL BYMAN Center for Peace and Security Studies Georgetown University Washington, DC, USA and Saban Center for Middle East Policy Brookings Institution Washington, DC, USA This article reviews Iran’s past and current use of terrorism and assesses why U.S. attempts to halt Iran’s efforts have met with little success. With this assessment in mind, it argues that Iran is not likely transfer chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons to terrorist groups for several reasons. First, providing terrorists with such unconventional Downloaded By: [Georgetown University] At: 15:20 19 March 2008 weapons offers Iran few tactical advantages as these groups are able to operate effectively with existing methods and weapons. Second, Iran has become more cautious in its backing of terrorists in recent years. And third, Tehran is highly aware that any major escalation in its support for terrorism would incur U.S. wrath and international condemnation. The article concludes by offering recommendations for decreasing Iran’s support for terrorism. Since the Islamic Revolution in 1979, Iran has been one of the world’s most active sponsors of terrorism. Tehran has armed, trained, financed, inspired, organized, and otherwise supported dozens of violent groups over the years.1 Iran has backed not only groups in its Persian Gulf neighborhood, but also terrorists and radicals in Lebanon, the Palestinian territories, Bosnia, the Philippines, and elsewhere.2 This support remains strong even today: the U.S. -
No. 17-15589 in the UNITED STATES COURT of APPEALS
Case: 17-15589, 04/20/2017, ID: 10404479, DktEntry: 113, Page 1 of 35 No. 17-15589 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT STATE OF HAWAII, ET AL., Plaintiffs/Appellees v. DONALD J. TRUMP, ET AL., Defendants/Appellants. ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR HAWAII THE HONORABLE DERRICK KAHALA WATSON, DISTRICT JUDGE CASE NO. 1:17-CV-00050-DKW-KSC AMICI CURIAE BRIEF OF SCHOLARS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY & LAW IN SUPPORT OF NEITHER PARTY ANNA-ROSE MATHIESON BEN FEUER CALIFORNIA APPELLATE LAW GROUP LLP 96 Jessie Street San Francisco, California 94105 (415) 649-6700 ATTORNEYS FOR AMICI CURIAE SCHOLARS OF AMERICAN RELIGIOUS HISTORY & LAW Case: 17-15589, 04/20/2017, ID: 10404479, DktEntry: 113, Page 2 of 35 TABLE OF CONTENTS TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ....................................................................... ii INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE ............................................................. 1 STATEMENT OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 29 ................................. 4 INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................... 5 ARGUMENT ............................................................................................... 7 I. The History of Religious Discrimination Against Mormon Immigrants Demonstrates the Need for Vigilant Judicial Review of Government Actions Based on Fear of Religious Minorities ............................................... 7 A. Mormons Were the Objects of Widespread Religious Hostility in the 19th Century ....................... -
U.S. Military Engagement in the Broader Middle East
U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT U.S. MILITARY ENGAGEMENT IN THE BROADER MIDDLE EAST JAMES F. JEFFREY MICHAEL EISENSTADT THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY WWW.WASHINGTONINSTITUTE.ORG The opinions expressed in this Policy Focus are those of the author and not necessarily those of The Washington Institute, its Board of Trustees, or its Board of Advisors. Policy Focus 143, April 2016 All rights reserved. Printed in the United States of America. No part of this publica- tion may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing fromthe publisher. ©2016 by The Washington Institute for Near East Policy The Washington Institute for Near East Policy 1111 19th Street NW, Suite 500 Washington, DC 20036 Design: 1000colors Photo: An F-16 from the Egyptian Air Force prepares to make contact with a KC-135 from the 336th ARS during in-flight refueling training. (USAF photo by Staff Sgt. Amy Abbott) Contents Acknowledgments V I. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF U.S. MILITARY OPERATIONS 1 James F. Jeffrey 1. Introduction to Part I 3 2. Basic Principles 5 3. U.S. Strategy in the Middle East 8 4. U.S. Military Engagement 19 5. Conclusion 37 Notes, Part I 39 II. RETHINKING U.S. MILITARY STRATEGY 47 Michael Eisenstadt 6. Introduction to Part II 49 7. American Sisyphus: Impact of the Middle Eastern Operational Environment 52 8. Disjointed Strategy: Aligning Ways, Means, and Ends 58 9. -
The Khobar Towers Bombing Incident
PRESS RELEASE House National Security Committee Floyd D. Spence, Chairman Contact: Maureen Cragin FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE Ryan Vaart August 14, 1996 (202) 225-2539 STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN FLOYD D. SPENCE ON THE REPORT ON THE BOMBING OF KHOBAR TOWERS “In the wake of the June 25 bombing of the American compound at Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia, the House Committee on National Security sent a delegation of professional staff members to Saudi Arabia to conduct a preliminary investigation of the incident. “Although the professionalism and courage of the men and women who suffered this terrible disaster is apparent and should be a source of pride for all Americans, the bombing raises issues of intelligence failures and operational deficiencies that at least suggest that military leaders and policymakers were unaware of the potential risks that U.S. service personnel faced in Saudi Arabia. “First, as the report indicates, the performance of the troops living in Khobar Towers and stationed in the Dhahran area was superb. As a result of the rapid reaction of the Air Force Special Police who observed the bomb-laden truck and immediately began to evacuate the building, as well as the efforts of doctors, medical personnel and soldiers to save lives, a much larger tragedy was almost certainly averted. “But individual professionalism and heroism during the bombing cannot obscure larger problems that may have contributed to the unpreparedness of U.S. troops in the face of a serious terrorist threat. Intelligence failures left the military personnel in Khobar Towers, as well as the 4404th wing’s leaders, largely unaware of the magnitude of the threat they faced. -
IRFA (International Religious Freedom Act)
REFUGEE, ASYLUM, AND INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (RAIO) RAIO DIRECTORATE – OFFICER TRAINING RAIO Combined Training Program INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT (IRFA) AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION TRAINING MODULE DATE (see schedule of revisions): 12/20/2019 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and Religious Persecution This Page Left Blank Intentionally , USCIS: RAIO Directorate – Officer Training DATE (see schedule of changes): 12/20/2019 RAIO Combined Training Program Page 2 of 49 International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and Religious Persecution RAIO Directorate – Officer Training / RAIO Combined Training Program INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT (IRFA) AND RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION Training Module MODULE DESCRIPTION: This module introduces you to the International Religious Freedom Act (IRFA) and the responsibilities that the Act creates for adjudicating protection claims. The training you receive will also be useful in adjudicating immigration benefits, petitions, and other immigration-related requests. Through reading and discussing country conditions information, you will increase your awareness of religious freedom issues around the world. Through discussion and practical exercises, you will learn how to conduct an interview and adjudicate a claim with a religious freedom issue. TERMINAL PERFORMANCE OBJECTIVE(S) Given a request for protection (an asylum or refugee application, or a reasonable fear or credible fear screening1) with a religious freedom issue, you will apply IRFA and case law.0) ENABLING LEARNING OBJECTIVES 1. Summarize the IRFA requirements for RAIO officers. 2. Explain the statutory and regulatory requirements for consideration of protection claims and benefits requests involving religious freedom and religious persecution. 3. Summarize legal rulings that must be followed or that provide guidance when making decisions based on religious freedom or religious persecution. -
Hizbullah Under Fire in Syria | the Washington Institute
MENU Policy Analysis / Articles & Op-Eds Hizbullah Under Fire in Syria by Matthew Levitt, Nadav Pollak Jun 9, 2016 Also available in Arabic ABOUT THE AUTHORS Matthew Levitt Matthew Levitt is the Fromer-Wexler Fellow and director of the Reinhard Program on Counterterrorism and Intelligence at The Washington Institute. Nadav Pollak Nadav Pollak is a former Diane and Guilford Glazer Foundation fellow at The Washington Institute. Articles & Testimony Last month's assassination of a senior Hizbullah commander, apparently by Syrian rebel groups, demonstrates the growing threat the organization faces from fellow Arabs and Muslims. he death of senior Hizbullah commander Mustafa Badreddine in Syria in May left the group reeling, but not for T the reason most people think. True, it lost an especially qualified commander with a unique pedigree as the brother-in-law of Imad Mughniyeh, with whom Badreddine plotted devastating terror attacks going back to the Beirut bombings in the 1980s. And, at the time of his death, Badreddine was dual-hatted as the commander of both the group's international terrorist network (the Islamic Jihad Organisation or External Security Organisation) and its significant military deployment in Syria. The loss of such a senior and seasoned commander is no small setback for Hizbullah. But the real reason Badreddine's death has Hizbullah on edge is not the loss of the man, per se, but the fact that the group's arch enemy, Israel, was seemingly not responsible. Hizbullah, it appears, now has more immediate enemies than Israel -- and that has the self-described "resistance" organisation tied up in knots.