Hezbollah: AA CaseCase Study of Global ReachReach

By Matthew Levitt, senior fellow in terrorism studiesstudies The Washington InstituteInstitute forfor Near Near EastEast PolicyPolicy

Remarks to a conference on "Post-Modern"Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends,Trends, Scenarios,Scenarios, and Future Threats,"Threats," September 8, 2003 InternationalInternational PolicyPolicy Institute forfor Counter-Terrorism,Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya,Herzliya, Israel

Thank you veryvery much for your kind introduction. It's aa pleasurepleasure to bebe herehere atat ICT,ICT, an institution thatthat makesmakes suchsuch importantimportant contributionscontributions toto bothboth thethe academicacademic literature available on the critical issue of terrorism and to thethe practicalpractical policypolicy debatesdebates surrounding these issuesissues as well.

Examining Hezbollah'sHezbollah's international international terrorist terrorist activity,activity, thatthat is its international presence andand operationsoperations outsideoutside thethe Levant,Levant, notnot onlyonly illuminates the group's proactive and ongoing terrorterror activities but providesprovides a useful case studystudy ofof aa terroristterrorist group of global reach as well.

Global Reach and Cross-group Pollination

Though the term hashas yet toto bebe officiallyofficially defined,defined, "global"global reach"reach" hashas nonethelessnonetheless become thethe yardstickyardstick forfor determiningdetermining whetherwhether oror not a terroristterrorist group warrants inclusion inin the post-September 11 war on terrorism.terrorism. EvenEven within the "global"global reach"reach" designation there exists an unstated spectrum of priorities.priorities. ForFor example,example, al-Qaedaal-Qaeda is legitimately goinggoing toto receivereceive moremore attentionattention andand resourcesresources thanthan ETAETA in Spain or FARC in in Colombia, Colombia, even even though though both both those those regionalregional terrorist terrorist groups areare known for their linkslinks toto otherother internationalinternational terroristterrorist groups groups andand statestate sponsors.sponsors.

To develop aa moremore tellingtelling barometer for measuring the severity ofof aa group'sgroup's globalglobal reach, and thereforetherefore itsits prioritizationprioritization as aa potentialpotential targettarget inin thethe warwar onon terror,terror, it is useful to develop an understanding ofof thethe matrixmatrix of relationships between terroristterrorist operatives, groups, fronts, andand statestate sponsors.sponsors. ToTo be sure, these relationships are what make the threat ofof internationalinternational terrorismterrorism soso acuteacute today, just asas theythey servedserved as the single most critical factor in facilitating thethe successsuccess of the devastating attacks on September 11, 2001.

Indeed,Indeed, while terrorist groupsgroups remain thethe central structural unit in internationalinternational terrorism, II believebelieve thethe relationshipsrelationships betweenbetween individual terrorists belongingbelonging to different groupsgroups are even more important. ThisThis crossovercrossover and pollination facilitates cooperation among groups -- in manymany casescases operational, in others logistical and financial cooperation. Such linkslinks existexist even betweenbetween groupsgroups thatthat don't share similar ideologies, leading to cooperation between religiousreligious zealotszealots and secular radicals; between ideologically- oror theologically-driven terrorists and criminal entities (as(as hashas been the case inin severalseveral terroristterrorist attacks in Iraq, wherewhere criminalcriminal elementselements playedplayed critical roles in attacks in return forfor monetarymonetary compensation);compensation); betweenbetween SunniSunni and Shi'a groups; andand betweenbetween individuals whose person-to-person contacts require no agreement between their respectiverespective headquarters.

ACLURM001616 A particularly interesting example is the Madrid al-Qaeda cell, perhaps the most important cell broken up since SeptemberSeptember 11.11. Mohammad Zouaydi, a key al-Qaeda financier and the head of the cell,cell, notnot onlyonly fundedfunded thethe HamburgHamburg cellcell butbut dispatcheddispatched a Madrid cell member to collectcollect pre-operational surveillancesurveillance of the Twin Towers and other U.S. landmarkslandmarks a few yearsyears beforebefore the attacks.attacks. At the samesame timetime hehe financedfinanced al-Qaeda operations,operations, Zouaydi also transferred money to Hamas. Similarly, the cellcell established relationships forfor logisticallogistical supportsupport notnot onlyonly withwith otherother al-Qaeda cells but with Basque terrorists (ETA) in the north of Spain.

These relationships becomebecome allall thethe more important to terroriststerrorists operatingoperating outsideoutside their homehome regionsregions in their respectiverespective Diasporas. In thethe casecase ofof radicalradical Islamic extremists, DiasporaDiaspora communities in the West often serve as a radical melting pot where like-mindedlike-minded individualsindividuals affiliated withwith differentdifferent groupsgroups fromfrom geographicallygeographically distinct regions assistassist one one another another for for the the sakesake ofof theirtheir largerlarger cause.cause. ItIt is not uncommon toto find a Tunisian membermember of an-Nada helpinghelping a PalestinianPalestinian member of Hamas, oror anyany numbernumber of of other other combinations combinations ofof radicalradical causes.causes. Authorities therefore need to understandunderstand that terroriststerrorists dodo notnot carrycarry membershipmembership cardscards in their wallets identifying themselves as members of a specific terroristterrorist group,group, andand thatthat even if they did that wouldwould notnot capturecapture thethe fullfull scopescope ofof thethe individual'sindividual's terrorist affiliations.affiliations.

The case of Abu Musab alal ZarqawiZarqawi (aka Fade!Fadel Nazzal Khalayleh) offers a particular insightful perspective on thethe scope of the informalinformal links,links, personalpersonal relationships,relationships, and organizational crossover betweenbetween disparate terrorist operatives and groups. As the Zarqawi casecase makes abundantlyabundantly clear,clear, suchsuch networksnetworks ofof relationshipsrelationships are bothboth geographically and organizationally diverse.

Zarqawi's links span the globe, including strongstrong tiesties toto terrorist networks in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq,Iraq, Iran,Iran, Jordan,Jordan, Syria,Syria, Afghanistan,Afghanistan, Germany,Germany, Britain,Britain, andand elsewhereelsewhere in Europe. The U.S. Treasury DepartmentDepartment highlightedhighlighted hishis ties to HezbollahHezbollah in its September 24,24, 2003,2003, announcement announcement designating designating himhim and and severalseveral ofof his his associatesassociates as Specially Designated Global TerroristTerrorist (SDGT)(SDGT) entities.

Similar links between other HezbollahHezbollah entities and international terrorist members and groups are equally informative of Hezbollah's globalglobal reach.reach. Take,Take, for example, Bilal Khazal, a man nownow believed to bebe thethe seniorsenior al-Qaedaal-Qaeda operativeoperative inin AustraliaAustralia who is also suspected ofof tiesties toto Hezbollah, andand thethe al-Aqsa International Foundation,Foundation, recently banned by thethe United States, Germany and Great BritainBritain (though not the European Union). While al-Aqsa primarily served as a Hamas front organization,organization, Sheikh Moayad, the head of the thethe al-Aqsaal-Aqsa officeoffice in Yemen, was arrested inin Germany and extradited toto thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates forfor providingproviding financialfinancial support to al­al- Qaeda as well. MoayadMoayad proudly told an undercover FBI informant that he notnot onlyonly funded Hamas but alsoalso raisedraised millionsmillions of dollars, recruited operatives, and providedprovided weapons to al-Qaeda. AccordingAccording to one report, oneone ofof thethe foundation'sfoundation's officesoffices inin Europe also raised funds for Hezbollah.

Clearly, assessingassessing a group's global presence demandsdemands notnot only noting thethe activities of its operational activists ---- those who pull the trigger, detonatedetonate thethe explosivesexplosives or crash the airplane -- butbut also also thethe logisticallogistical andand financialfinancial supporterssupporters that makemake suchsuch operations possible. IfIf September 11 taughttaught usus nothingnothing else,else, wewe shouldshould all nownow recognize that logisticallogistical and financial support is critical to terrorist operations.

ACLURM001617 By any standard, including terrorist operationsoperations from ThailandThailand to Argentina, logistical and financial support operations acrossacross thethe globe,globe, andand linkslinks toto otherother terroristterrorist groups, Hezbollah representsrepresents aa classicclassic exampleexample ofof aa terroristterrorist group of global reachreach and should bebe aa prioritizedprioritized targettarget in the war on terror.

Hezbollah's GlobalGlobal Reach

Hezbollah holdsholds aa particularlyparticularly disturbing,disturbing, though often overlooked, place in the matrix ofof internationalinternational terror.terror. AA fewfew studiesstudies havehave notednoted Hezbollah'sHezbollah's tiesties toto other groups, like the Treasury Department announcement about Zarqawi, while others, likelike a reportreport ofof the the Council Council onon ForeignForeign Relations'Relations' TaskTask ForceForce on Terrorist Financing,Financing, highlight thethe crossovercrossover between Hezbollah institutionsinstitutions andand thosethose ofof otherother terroristterrorist groups. For example,example, thethe CouncilCouncil report report pOints points out out that that "other"other IslamicIslamic terroristterrorist organizations, Hamas and Hezbollah specifically,specifically, oftenoften useuse thethe veryvery same methodsmethods -­-- and even thethe same institutionsinstitutions -- [as al-Qaeda]al-Qaeda] to raiseraise and move their money."

Published reportsreports suggest that Al-QaidaAI-Qaida and Hezbollah have formedformed additional tactical, ad-hoc alliances withwith a variety of terrorist organizationsorganizations toto cooperatecooperate on money laundering and otherother unlawful activities. And yet, the debate persists. Is Hezbollah thethe "A-team"A-team of terrorists," asas DeputyDeputy SecretarySecretary ofof StateState RichardRichard Armitage suggests, or is Hezbollah purelypurely aa "resistance""resistance" organizationorganization whosewhose "role"role isis limitedlimited to the LebaneseLebanese lands," asas Syrian PresidentPresident BasharBashar al-Assadai-Assad insists?insists?

After aa carefulcareful assessmentassessment of Hezbollah'sHezbollah's global presence andand operations,operations, research II conducted inin preparation of an upcoming bookbook onon thethe subject,subject, II suggest that Hezbollah isis indeedindeed aa terroristterrorist group of globalglobal reach.reach. Moreover,Moreover, this conclusion is the consensus amongamong thethe variousvarious intelligenceintelligence professionalsprofessionals I'veI've interviewed, including Israeli,Israeli, Arab,Arab, American,American, AsianAsian andand EuropeanEuropean officials, and is also clearclear fromfrom the documentary evidence I've collectedcollected fromfrom sourcessources asas diversediverse asas FilipinoFilipino andand ChileanChilean law enforcement agencies.agencies.

Take, for example, a map produced by Israeli officials marking the locations of Hezbollah networksnetworks across thethe globe.globe. WhileWhile notnot necessarily indicativeindicative ofof an entire network in each of the highlighted countries (it maymay representrepresent a single operative), the mapmap providesprovides aa disturbingdisturbing snapshotsnapshot ofof Hezbollah'sHezbollah's globalglobal presence.presence.

Moreover, as thethe following surveillance photograph illustrates, HezbollahHezbollah operatives - - likelike thosethose of other professional terroristterrorist groups -- mold intointo theirtheir environmentsenvironments andand can be very difficult toto identify.identify. ThisThis picturepicture waswas takentaken byby CanadianCanadian intelligence,intelligence, and captures a Hezbollah membermember purchasing falsefalse identificationidentification forfor use in procuring dual-use technologies for Hezbollah. Unlike Hezbollah operativesoperatives patrollingpatrolling the Lebanese-Israeli border, these members leaveleave their yellowyellow HezbollahHezbollah bandanasbandanas and flags at home.

According toto U.S. authorities, concernconcern over the threat posedposed byby HezbollahHezbollah is well placed. FBI officialsofficials testifiedtestified in February 20022002 thatthat "FBI investigations to date continue to indicateindicate that manymany HezbollahHezbollah subjectssubjects basedbased in the UnitedUnited States havehave the capability to attempt terroristterrorist attacksattacks herehere shouldshould thisthis bebe aa desireddesired objective of the group." Similarly,Similarly, CIACIA DirectorDirector GeorgeGeorge Tenet testifiedtestified in February 2003 thatthat "Hezbollah, as anan organizationorganization withwith capability and worldwide presence, isis [al­[al- Qaeda's] equal, if not a far moremore capablecapable organization."

ACLURM001618 Hezbollah Modus Operandi

Though Hezbollah cellscells areare notnot allall identical,identical, theythey do tendtend to display similar operational signatures inin thethe form of typical modus operandi.

Consider a few examples:

•-SubtleSubtle Infiltration:Infiltration: Hezbollah operativesoperatives areare expertexpert atat gaininggaining entryentry toto theirtheir target locations throughthrough extremely subtle infiltration. ThisThis shouldshould notnot surprise,surprise, asas many Hezbollah operativesoperatives receivereceive sophisticatedsophisticated training training bothboth in Lebanon andand inin IranIran from Iran'sIran's MinistryMinistry ofof IntelligenceIntelligence andand SecuritySecurity (MOIS)(MOIS) andand IslamicIslamic RevolutionaryRevolutionary GuardGuard Corp (IRGC) al-Quds Brigades. Members ofof a Hezbollah cellcell operatingoperating in Singapore in the latelate 1990s1990s and into 2000 entered using a visa-waiver program similar to the oneone that recentlyrecently suspendedsuspended in the United States. Once theythey arrived,arrived, they quickly married locallocal women to legalizelegalize theirtheir presence.presence. MembersMembers of a HezbollahHezbollah cell in North Carolina, which raised significantsignificant sumssums ofof moneymoney forfor the group from the proceedsproceeds of an elaborate cigarette smuggling scam, entered the U.S.U.S. from SouthSouth AmericaAmerica using false documents, entered into sham marriages in Cyprus, and conducted theirtheir activities under multiple identities.

•-Fundraising:Fundraising: Hezbollah cellscells areare frequentlyfrequently involved in fundraising activities, eveneven if theythey areare primarilyprimarily operationaloperational cells.cells. HezbollahHezbollah cells raise fundsfunds throughthrough charities acting as front organizations as wellwell asas viavia criminalcriminal activityactivity like cigarette smuggling, drug production and smuggling, and credit card or other typestypes ofof fraud.fraud. HezbollahHezbollah networks organize regular parlor meetingsmeetings heldheld inin members'members' homeshomes where aa collection basket is passedpassed around after watchingwatching HezbollahHezbollah propaganda videos, usually produced by al-Manar, thethe group's satellite television network. ForFor example, the Charlotte networknetwork gatheredgathered onon aa regularregular basisbasis toto watchwatch videosvideos ofof livelive HezbollahHezbollah bombings in southern Lebanon beforebefore thethe IsraeliIsraeli withdrawal then collectedcollected donations to supportsupport suchsuch activities. HezbollahHezbollah operates front companies,companies, andand inin SouthSouth AmericaAmerica the group isis renownrenown for piratingpirating multimediamultimedia andand engagingengaging inin Mafia-styleMafia-style shakedownsshakedowns of local MuslimMuslim businesses.businesses.

•-RecruitingRecruiting Locals:Locals: Contrary to conventionalconventional wisdom, HezbollahHezbollah is extremely adept at recruitingrecruiting membersmembers fromfrom locallocal populationspopulations inin areasareas where they havehave networks on the ground. InIn Russia,Russia, HezbollahHezbollah operatives recruited SunniSunni PalestinianPalestinian students studying atat RussianRussian universities, while inin UgandaUganda they recruitedrecruited UgandanUgandan ShiaShia students and sent themthem to study abroad at an Iranian university wherewhere they alsoalso received military training togethertogether withwith LebaneseLebanese recruits in the use of small arms, making explosives, counter-interrogation techniquestechniques andand escapeescape planning. BeforeBefore returning home,home, thethe UgandansUgandans were provided fictitiousfictitious covers and instructedinstructed to establish an operational network inin Uganda.Uganda.

InIn SoutheastSoutheast Asia, members ofof thethe network thatthat was behind anan attemptattempt to bomb the IsraeliIsraeli embassyembassy in Bangkok inin 1994, as well as aa seriesseries ofof otherother terroristterrorist plots throughout thethe 1990s,1990s, werewere almostalmost entirelyentirely Sunni.Sunni. TheThe leaderleader of thethe network,network, PanduPandu Yudhawitna, was himself recruited by MOISMOIS officers stationed in Malaysia inin the early 1980s, and only laterlater becamebecame the SoutheastSoutheast Asian point-man forfor HezbollahHezbollah operations and support activities there.

ACLURM001619 After realizing that state troopers were frequently pulling their vans over for speeding onon thethe way from NorthNorth CarolinaCarolina to Michigan,Michigan, Charlotte cell members hired Caucasian womenwomen toto drivedrive theirtheir vans to elicitelicit lessless suspicion.suspicion.

•-Multi-functional:Multi-functional: Hezbollah cellscells areare adeptadept multi-taskers,multi-taskers, responsible forfor a variety of logistical, financial and operational duties. They raise funds, recruit new members, conduct preoperational surveillance, provide logistical support, procureprocure weaponsweapons and dual use technologies (for(for both HezbollahHezbollah andand Iran),Iran), andand conduct operations.

InvestigatorsInvestigators inin severalseveral countriescountries havehave concluded independentlyindependently thatthat security services shouldshould avoidavoid lookinglooking forfor cellscells thatthat are strictly engaged in fundraising, logistical support, or terrorist operations.operations. Indeed,Indeed, cellscells knownknown onlyonly toto havehave raisedraised funds have later been found to have played active roles inin terroristterrorist operations,operations, asas was the case, forfor example, in the 19921992 and 1994 suicide bombings in Argentina.Argentina. In the words of oneone U.S. government official, "Hezbollah"Hezbollah cells are always a bit operational."operational. "

Targeting U.S. Interests ---- AA SamplingSampling

Indeed,Indeed, HezbollahHezbollah has conductedconducted aa widewide varietyvariety ofof operationsoperations targetingtargeting not only IsraeliIsraeli andand JewishJewish targets, butbut alsoalso thethe UnitedUnited States.States. Typically,Typically, academicsacademics opine that HezbollahHezbollah has not targeting thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates sincesince itit bombedbombed thethe U.S.U.S. embassyembassy and marine barracks in the 1980's. In fact,fact, therethere areare severalseveral moremore recentrecent instancesinstances of Hezbollah activityactivity targeting the U.S.,U.S., considerconsider the following sampling:

•-InIn 1989,1989, BassamBassam GharibGharib MakkiMakki collected intelligenceintelligence on Israeli,Israeli, JewishJewish andand American targets inin Germany.Germany.

•-InIn 19891989 andand 1990,1990, authoritiesauthorities caught caught a a Hezbollah Hezbollah cellcell operatingoperating inin Valencia,Valencia, Spain.Spain. The cell was caught smuggling weapons inin a ship fromfrom Cyprus so they could be pre-pre­ positioned and cached inin Europe.Europe. After After trackingtracking thatthat shipment, authorities found additional explosivesexplosives that hadhad alreadyalready beenbeen stashedstashed inin Europe.Europe. TheThe cell was determined to havehave been targeting U.S.U.S. and Israeli targets inin Europe.Europe.

•-InIn 1997,1997, HezbollahHezbollah waswas foundfound toto bebe collectingcollecting intelligenceintelligence onon thethe U.S.U.S. embassyembassy in Nicosia, Cyprus.

•-ThroughoutThroughout the mid- toto late-1990s,late-1990s, HezbollahHezbollah recruitedrecruited PalestinianPalestinian students studying inin Russia,Russia, and collected intelligence on Israeli, Jewish and American targetstargets there.

•-ThroughoutThroughout the 1990s,1990s, HezbollahHezbollah members were active in Singapore, recruiting local Sunnis, collecting intelligence on Israeli andand U.S.U.S. ships in the MalaccaMalacca Straits, and planning attacks. Authorities there uncovereduncovered a suicide speed-boat attack very similar to the oneone that waswas foiled about a year after SeptemberSeptember 11 off Gibraltar.

Hezbollah Terrorist OperationsOperations Abroad

Hezbollah isis wellwell knownknown forfor severalseveral internationalinternational terroristterrorist attacks, most notably the 1992 and 1994 suicide bombings of the Israeli embassyembassy andand Jewish community center (AMIA) respectively in Argentina andand the 19951995 KhobarKhobar Towers attack inin SaudiSaudi

ACLURM001620 Arabia. These, however,however, represent onlyonly twotwo of Hezbollah's foreignforeign terroristterrorist operations.

Europe as a launching pad: Hezbollah has usedused itsits operatives throughout EuropeEurope to helphelp operativesoperatives useuse Europe as aa launchinglaunching padpad forfor enteringentering IsraelIsrael to conductconduct attacks oror collectcollect intelligenceintelligence there.there. HusseinHussein Makdad,Makdad, aa LebaneseLebanese national, entered IsraelIsrael fromfrom SwitzerlandSwitzerland underunder aa forgedforged BritishBritish passportpassport inin 1996.1996. HeHe was critically injured whenwhen aa bombbomb hehe waswas assembling exploded inin his Jerusalem hotelhotel room.room. InIn 1997, a German convert toto Islam, Stefan Smirnak, flew to Israel from Amsterdam using his own passport. FawziFawzi Ayoub, a Canadian ofof LebaneseLebanese decent, decent, infiltrated infiltrated into IsraelIsrael onon aa boatboat travelingtraveling fromfrom Europe Europe inin 2000.2000. DiscardingDiscarding hishis CanadianCanadian passport in Europe, he used aa forgedforged AmericanAmerican passportpassport toto enterenter Israel.Israel. He was laterlater arrested in Hebron, right around the time IsraeliIsraeli authoritiesauthorities foundfound aa roadsideroadside explosiveexplosive devicedevice in Hebron that hadhad previouslypreviously onlyonly beenbeen usedused byby HezbollahHezbollah in Lebanon. In 2001,2001, JihadJihad Shuman, a British citizen of LebaneseLebanese decent,decent, flewflew toto Israel from the U.K.U.K. HeHe flew from LebanonLebanon to EuropeEurope on his Lebanese passport,passport, andand thenthen onon toto IsraelIsrael using his British passport.passport.

InIn somesome ofof thesethese cases, authorities have determined thethe operatives entered IsraelIsrael toto conduct operations, whilewhile in other cases itit remainsremains unclearunclear ifif theythey enteredentered IsraelIsrael justjust to collectcollect pre-operational surveillance, assist other operatives already on thethe ground, or conduct attacks themselves. Significantly, eacheach of these operatives is believed to have been trainedtrained by elements tied directly toto ImadImad Mughniyeh,Mughniyeh, Hezbollah'sHezbollah's chief operations officer.

Operations in Southeast Asia: Hezbollah operationsoperations in Southeast Asia throughoutthroughout the 1990s1990s are almost tootoo many toto count. Like thethe infiltrations intointo IsraelIsrael fromfrom EuropeEurope noted above, Hezbollah infiltratedinfiltrated at least one Malaysian operativeoperative intointo IsraelIsrael to collect intelligence. After being recruited andand undergoingundergoing Hezbollah training,training, Zinal Bin-Talib entered Israel, collected intelligence, and returnedreturned home withoutwithout the knowledge of Israeli authorities whowho onlyonly discovereddiscovered thethe successfulsuccessful penetration much later. HezbollahHezbollah has conducted significantsignificant fundraisingfundraising in Southeast Asia; nearly succeeded toto bombbomb thethe Israeli embassy in Bangkok in 1994; andand collectedcollected intelligence onon synagoguessynagogues inin ManilaManila and Singapore. HezbollahHezbollah members procured and cached weapons inin ThailandThailand and thethe Philippines, and checked on themthem periodically to make sure they were still workingworking inin casecase they were called upon to conduct an attack at anyany givengiven time.time. TheyThey collectedcollected intelligence on the El-AlEI-AI office in Bangkok, on ships arriving in Singapore,Singapore, and on U.S. Navy and IsraeliIsraeli merchant ships in the MalaccaMalacca Straits. The Southeast Asian Hezbollah networknetwork recruited many local Sunni Muslims, and sent several toto Lebanon forfor training.training. They procuredprocured falsefalse and stolen passports, and recruited and trained local operatives to conduct potential attacks in Israel and in Australia.

Operations in Africa: Hezbollah operativesoperatives in Africa help finance the group's activities byby dealingdealing inin conflictconflict diamondsdiamonds inin SierraSierra LeoneLeone andand Liberia,Liberia, a practicepractice nownow conducted by al-Qaeda using the model and contacts established by Hezbollah.Hezbollah. According to David Crane, the prosecutor for the SpecialSpecial Court inin SierraSierra Leone,Leone, "Diamonds fuelfuel thethe war on terrorism. CharlesCharles TaylorTaylor isis harboringharboring terroriststerrorists from the Middle East, including al-Qaeda andand Hezbollah, andand hashas beenbeen forfor years."years." A tellingtelling example of the personality types involved in this activity isis IbrahimIbrahim Bah.Bah. BahBah isis an affiliate ofof deposeddeposed LiberianLiberian strongman CharlesCharles Taylor, as well as a commander with the RUFRUF rebelsrebels inin SierraSierra Leone.Leone. Bah Bah underwent underwent military military andand terrorist terrorist trainingtraining in

ACLURM001621 Libya, Lebanon (where(where he foughtfought with Hezbollah units),units), and in Afghanistan. Over the course of his career BahBah also served as a personal bodyguard to Libya'sLibya's Muamar Qadaffi and fought with HezbollahHezbollah units in the Beka'aBeka'a Valley in the 1980s.1980s.

Hezbollah conductsconducts extensiveextensive fundraisingfundraising operationsoperations inin AfricaAfrica ---- as itit does in other corners ofof the globe likelike SouthSouth andand NorthNorth AmericaAmerica -- -- notnot onlyonly throughthrough tradingtrading inin illicit diamonds butbut by raising funds fromfrom the local Shi'a expatriate community as well.well. In some cases Shi'aShi'a donorsdonors areare unwittinglyunwittingly conned into funding Hezbollah,Hezbollah, while in others they areare knowingknowing and willing participantsparticipants inin Hezbollah'sHezbollah's financing efforts.

As noted above, in one particularly interestinginteresting casecase inin 2002,2002, UgandanUgandan officials disrupted a cell of Shi'a students who were recruited by Iranian intelligenceintelligence agents and sent on scholarships toto study at thethe RizaviRizavi University inin Mashhad,Mashhad, Iran. UponUpon their return,return, oneone studentstudent recruit,recruit, ShafriShafri Ibrahim,Ibrahim, waswas caught,caught, whilewhile another, Sharif Wadulu, is believed to have escaped toto one of the Gulf States. The two were trained by the MOIS,MOIS, together withwith newnew LebaneseLebanese Hezbollah recruits,recruits, and sent home with fictitious coverscovers to establishestablish an operational infrastructure inin Uganda.Uganda.

Operations in other locations:locations: Hezbollah activityactivity inin SouthSouth AmericaAmerica hashas been well documented, including itsits frenetic activity inin thethe Tri-borderTri-border area.area. TheThe group's activities received special attentionattention in the wake of the 1992 bombing of the Israeli embassy in Buenos AiresAires andand thethe 1994 bombing of the AMIAAMIA Jewish community center there. TheThe recently releasedreleased Argentine indictment in thethe AMIAAMIA bombing reveals an extensive HezbollahHezbollah operational presence in South America. What isis lessless well known, however,however, isis thatthat Hezbollah Hezbollah isis alsoalso activeactive inin Chile,Chile, Venezuela,Venezuela, Cuba,Cuba, Panama andand Ecuador.Ecuador. OfOf particularparticular concern toto Law EnforcementEnforcement officialsofficials throughoutthroughout South America is Hezbollah's increasedincreased activityactivity in free trade zones,zones, especially under the cover of import-export companies.companies.

IntelligenceIntelligence officialsofficials areare equallyequally concernedconcerned about HezbollahHezbollah activities inin suchsuch diverse places as Romania, South Africa, CanadaCanada and Thailand.

Hezbollah and Iranian CommandersCommanders

The most significant modus operandi that runsruns throughthrough allall HezbollahHezbollah global operations -- financial,financial, logisticallogistical andand operational -- isis thatthat allall HezbollahHezbollah networksnetworks are overseen byby and areare inin contact withwith senior Hezbollah and/orand/or IranianIranian officials. In Charlotte, NorthNorth Carolina,Carolina, HezbollahHezbollah operatives were responding directlydirectly back to Sheikh Abbas Haraki,Haraki, aa seniorsenior HezbollahHezbollah militarymilitary commander in South Beirut. Members ofof the Charlotte cell received receipts back fromfrom Hezbollah forfor theirtheir donations, including receipts from the officeoffice ofof then-Hezbollahthen-Hezbollah spiritual leaderleader SheikhSheikh Mohammad Fadlallah.

The Charlotte cell was closelyclosely tiedtied toto a sister network in Canada thatthat was primarily engaged in procuring dual-use technologies such as night vision gogglesgoggles and laser range finders forfor HezbollahHezbollah operational squads.squads. The Canadian networknetwork was under the direct command of HajjHajj HassanHassan Hilu Lakis, Hezbollah's chiefchief militarymilitary procurement officer who is also knownknown toto procure materialmaterial forfor Iran.

InIn SoutheastSoutheast Asia, the HezbollahHezbollah network operating therethere throughout thethe 1990s1990s was under the commandcommand ofof aa seniorsenior MughniyahMughniyah deputydeputy namednamed AbuAbu Foul.Foul. As noted above, IranianIranian MOISMOIS agents stationed inin MalaysiaMalaysia originally recruitedrecruited somesome ofof thethe HezbollahHezbollah

ACLURM001622 operatives there. SeniorSenior HezbollahHezbollah operatives and Iranian agents were also involved in the 19951995 KhobarKhobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, in Hezbollah's effortsefforts to smuggle weapons toto Palestinian terroriststerrorists through JordanJordan sincesince 2000, inin HezbollahHezbollah operations in South America (including(including the 1992 and 1994 bombings), and in the recruitment ofof studentsstudents likelike thosethose inin Uganda.Uganda. Throughout these and many other cases, aa keykey commoncommon threadthread is the direct contact each cell maintains to senior Hezbollah and/orand/or Iranian intelligence operatives.

Crossover BetweenBetween Terrorism and "Resistance"

According toto many, HezbollahHezbollah is merely a "resistance" organization responding to IsraeliIsraeli occupationoccupation of disputed land. The distinctiondistinction is,is, appropriately, lost on most Western experts, given that the "resistance""resistance" groupsgroups in question employ acts of terrorism suchsuch asas suicide bombings toto achieve theirtheir goals. But no goal, however legitimate, legitimizeslegitimizes the use of terrorist tacticstactics and the killing ofof innocentinnocent civilians.

Moreover, even by Hezbollah's ownown definitiondefinition thethe group's acts ofof terrorism and resistance are not purely compartmentalized. Indeed,Indeed, thethe samesame HezbollahHezbollah operatives are frequently involved in the group's terroristterrorist activities and its support for Palestinian "resistance""resistance" (i.e.(i.e. terrorist) groupsgroups likelike Hamas.Hamas.

For example, Yousuf AljouniAljouni andand AbuAbu ai-Foul,al-Foul, twotwo ofof thethe masterminds of the failed 1994 effort toto bombbomb thethe IsraeliIsraeli embassyembassy inin Thailand,Thailand, werewere subsequentlysubsequently apprehended inin JordanJordan forfor smugglingsmuggling weaponsweapons toto PalestinianPalestinian terrorists terrorists inin 2001.2001. In another case, Mohammad Dbouk,Dbouk, thethe one-time head of the CanadianCanadian procurement cell, underwent terrorist trainingtraining in in camps camps inin IranIran before before serving serving Hezbollah Hezbollah inin CanadaCanada and, upon his return toto LebanonLebanon from Canada,Canada, provided pre-operational surveillancesurveillance for HezbollahHezbollah attack squads working under the cover of Hezbollah'sHezbollah's satellite al-Manar television station. TheThe pre-operationalpre-operational footagefootage hehe tooktook waswas usedused toto planplan HezbollahHezbollah attacks on Israeli positions prior to the IsraeliIsraeli withdrawalwithdrawal fromfrom Lebanon,Lebanon, and the live footage of the actualactual attack waswas thenthen usedused toto produceproduce propagandapropaganda videos ofof thethe type seized inin thethe homes of the Charlotte cell members. Perhaps thethe mostmost blatant example of this crossovercrossover between terrorism andand resistanceresistance is the case of the Karine-Karine­ A weapons smugglingsmuggling ship.ship. TheThe failed failed effort effort toto supplysupply 5050 tonstons ofof military grade weapons toto Palestinian terroriststerrorists was subcontracted to Hezbollah by Iran andand was overseen by Hajj Bassem,Bassem, a senior Mughniyah deputy.

West Bank Foothold andand InternationalInternational PlotsPlots

Recently, Hezbollah hashas proactivelyproactively mixedmixed itsits "resistance""resistance" andand terroristterrorist activities by establishing a network ofof itsits ownown PalestinianPalestinian cellscells inin thethe WestWest Bank.Bank. Hezbollah'sHezbollah's West Bank footholdfoothold notnot onlyonly threatensthreatens IsraelIsrael withwith terroristterrorist attacks there, but in at leastleast one case aa PalestinianPalestinian HezbollahHezbollah recruit recruit sought sought to to supplementsupplement hishis terrorterror activities in IsraelIsrael with attacksattacks abroad.abroad.

Ghulam Mahmud Qawqa waswas arrestedarrested inin 20032003 forfor his role in al-Aqsaal-Aqsa Martyrs BrigadeBrigade bombings in Jerusalem. Subsequent investigationinvestigation determined he was also behind two international plots that werewere set inin motion inin latelate 2002.2002. InIn one,one, hehe taskedtasked aa Lebanese womanwoman livingliving inin Berlin to conduct surveillance ofof the Israeli embassyembassy there in an effort toto targettarget eithereither the the embassy embassy oror thethe IsraeliIsraeli ambassadorambassador toto Berlin,Berlin, ShimonShimon Stein. In aa secondsecond operation, QawqaQawqa asked a Jordanian friendfriend living in China to helphelp facilitate hishis traveltravel toto China,China, and,and, atat thethe samesame time,time, soughtsought thethe assistanceassistance ofof aa

ACLURM001623 Hezbollah operative in planning a missionmission to assassinate thethe Israeli ambassador to China, Yitzhak Shelef.

Avoiding Past Mistakes

Hezbollah maintains ad-hoc, person-to-person contacts withwith al-Qaedaal-Qaeda terrorists, but this is not the main reason for prioritizing thethe groupgroup asas aa targettarget inin thethe war on terror. Its ownown activitiesactivities are farfar moremore significant.significant. AsAs all of the aboveabove casescases and many more make clear,clear, HezbollahHezbollah isis indeed a terroristterrorist groupgroup ofof globalglobal reach. CurrentCurrent intelligenceintelligence assessments fromfrom a variety ofof securitysecurity servicesservices concur thatthat HezbollahHezbollah remains capable and intent on attacking Israeli, American and other Western targets and therefore posesposes a current, seriousserious threat. HezbollahHezbollah officialsofficials likelike SheikhSheikh HassanHassan Nasrallah make this perfectly clear in theirtheir bellicose, threateningthreatening statements.statements. InIn the wake of the IraqIraq war,war, thesethese threatsthreats have have become become eveneven moremore pronounced, pronounced, venomousvenomous and unqualified.

Past experience teachesteaches thatthat failurefailure toto dealdeal withwith thethe real and immediate threat Hezbollah poses todaytoday willwill havehave severesevere and painful consequencesconsequences for for the the future. future. ItIt took the internationalinternational community more than a decade to get upup toto speedspeed on the threat posedposed by al-Qaeda. InIn thatthat time, time, al-Qaeda al-Qaeda successfully successfully builtbuilt anan entrenchedentrenched and sophisticated international logistical andand financial supportsupport networknetwork of the kindkind that eventuallyeventually facilitatedfacilitated the attacks of September 11. ThereThere isis nono questionquestion that Hezbollah is engaged inin exactly the same infrastructure-building today. Given our experience in September 2001 itit shouldshould bebe abundantlyabundantly clearclear thatthat wewe ignoreignore suchsuch activity, and the acuteacute security threat it represents,represents, at ourour peril.peril.

Thank you very much.much.

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