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Hezbollah: a Case Study of Global Reach

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Hezbollah: a Case Study of Global Reach Hezbollah: AA CaseCase Study of Global ReachReach By Matthew Levitt, senior fellow in terrorism studiesstudies The Washington InstituteInstitute forfor Near Near EastEast PolicyPolicy Remarks to a conference on "Post-Modern"Post-Modern Terrorism: Trends,Trends, Scenarios,Scenarios, and Future Threats,"Threats," September 8, 2003 InternationalInternational PolicyPolicy Institute forfor Counter-Terrorism,Counter-Terrorism, Herzliya,Herzliya, Israel Thank you veryvery much for your kind introduction. It's aa pleasurepleasure to bebe herehere atat ICT,ICT, an institution thatthat makesmakes suchsuch importantimportant contributionscontributions toto bothboth thethe academicacademic literature available on the critical issue of terrorism and to thethe practicalpractical policypolicy debatesdebates surrounding these issuesissues as well. Examining Hezbollah'sHezbollah's international international terrorist terrorist activity,activity, thatthat is its international presence andand operationsoperations outsideoutside thethe Levant,Levant, notnot onlyonly illuminates the group's proactive and ongoing terrorterror activities but providesprovides a useful case studystudy ofof aa terroristterrorist group of global reach as well. Global Reach and Cross-group Pollination Though the term hashas yet toto bebe officiallyofficially defined,defined, "global"global reach"reach" hashas nonethelessnonetheless become thethe yardstickyardstick forfor determiningdetermining whetherwhether oror not a terroristterrorist group warrants inclusion inin the post-September 11 war on terrorism.terrorism. EvenEven within the "global"global reach"reach" designation there exists an unstated spectrum of priorities.priorities. ForFor example,example, al-Qaedaal-Qaeda is legitimately goinggoing toto receivereceive moremore attentionattention andand resourcesresources thanthan ETAETA in Spain or FARC in in Colombia, Colombia, even even though though both both those those regionalregional terrorist terrorist groups areare known for their linkslinks toto otherother internationalinternational terroristterrorist groups groups andand statestate sponsors.sponsors. To develop aa moremore tellingtelling barometer for measuring the severity ofof aa group'sgroup's globalglobal reach, and thereforetherefore itsits prioritizationprioritization as aa potentialpotential targettarget inin thethe warwar onon terror,terror, it is useful to develop an understanding ofof thethe matrixmatrix of relationships between terroristterrorist operatives, groups, fronts, andand statestate sponsors.sponsors. ToTo be sure, these relationships are what make the threat ofof internationalinternational terrorismterrorism soso acuteacute today, just asas theythey servedserved as the single most critical factor in facilitating thethe successsuccess of the devastating attacks on September 11, 2001. Indeed,Indeed, while terrorist groupsgroups remain thethe central structural unit in internationalinternational terrorism, II believebelieve thethe relationshipsrelationships betweenbetween individual terrorists belongingbelonging to different groupsgroups are even more important. ThisThis crossovercrossover and pollination facilitates cooperation among groups -- in manymany casescases operational, in others logistical and financial cooperation. Such linkslinks existexist even betweenbetween groupsgroups thatthat don't share similar ideologies, leading to cooperation between religiousreligious zealotszealots and secular radicals; between ideologically- oror theologically-driven terrorists and criminal entities (as(as hashas been the case inin severalseveral terroristterrorist attacks in Iraq, wherewhere criminalcriminal elementselements playedplayed critical roles in attacks in return forfor monetarymonetary compensation);compensation); betweenbetween SunniSunni and Shi'a groups; andand betweenbetween individuals whose person-to-person contacts require no agreement between their respectiverespective headquarters. ACLURM001616 A particularly interesting example is the Madrid al-Qaeda cell, perhaps the most important cell broken up since SeptemberSeptember 11.11. Mohammad Zouaydi, a key al-Qaeda financier and the head of the cell,cell, notnot onlyonly fundedfunded thethe HamburgHamburg cellcell butbut dispatcheddispatched a Madrid cell member to collectcollect pre-operational surveillancesurveillance of the Twin Towers and other U.S. landmarkslandmarks a few yearsyears beforebefore the attacks.attacks. At the samesame timetime hehe financedfinanced al-Qaeda operations,operations, Zouaydi also transferred money to Hamas. Similarly, the cellcell established relationships forfor logisticallogistical supportsupport notnot onlyonly withwith otherother al-Qaeda cells but with Basque terrorists (ETA) in the north of Spain. These relationships becomebecome allall thethe more important to terroriststerrorists operatingoperating outsideoutside their homehome regionsregions in their respectiverespective Diasporas. In thethe casecase ofof radicalradical Islamic extremists, DiasporaDiaspora communities in the West often serve as a radical melting pot where like-mindedlike-minded individualsindividuals affiliated withwith differentdifferent groupsgroups fromfrom geographicallygeographically distinct regions assistassist one one another another for for the the sakesake ofof theirtheir largerlarger cause.cause. ItIt is not uncommon toto find a Tunisian membermember of an-Nada helpinghelping a PalestinianPalestinian member of Hamas, oror anyany numbernumber of of other other combinations combinations ofof radicalradical causes.causes. Authorities therefore need to understandunderstand that terroriststerrorists dodo notnot carrycarry membershipmembership cardscards in their wallets identifying themselves as members of a specific terroristterrorist group,group, andand thatthat even if they did that wouldwould notnot capturecapture thethe fullfull scopescope ofof thethe individual'sindividual's terrorist affiliations.affiliations. The case of Abu Musab alal ZarqawiZarqawi (aka Fade!Fadel Nazzal Khalayleh) offers a particular insightful perspective on thethe scope of the informalinformal links,links, personalpersonal relationships,relationships, and organizational crossover betweenbetween disparate terrorist operatives and groups. As the Zarqawi casecase makes abundantlyabundantly clear,clear, suchsuch networksnetworks ofof relationshipsrelationships are bothboth geographically and organizationally diverse. Zarqawi's links span the globe, including strongstrong tiesties toto terrorist networks in Turkey, Lebanon, Iraq,Iraq, Iran,Iran, Jordan,Jordan, Syria,Syria, Afghanistan,Afghanistan, Germany,Germany, Britain,Britain, andand elsewhereelsewhere in Europe. The U.S. Treasury DepartmentDepartment highlightedhighlighted hishis ties to HezbollahHezbollah in its September 24,24, 2003,2003, announcement announcement designating designating himhim and and severalseveral ofof his his associatesassociates as Specially Designated Global TerroristTerrorist (SDGT)(SDGT) entities. Similar links between other HezbollahHezbollah entities and international terrorist members and groups are equally informative of Hezbollah's globalglobal reach.reach. Take,Take, for example, Bilal Khazal, a man nownow believed to bebe thethe seniorsenior al-Qaedaal-Qaeda operativeoperative inin AustraliaAustralia who is also suspected ofof tiesties toto Hezbollah, andand thethe al-Aqsa International Foundation,Foundation, recently banned by thethe United States, Germany and Great BritainBritain (though not the European Union). While al-Aqsa primarily served as a Hamas front organization,organization, Sheikh Moayad, the head of the thethe al-Aqsaal-Aqsa officeoffice in Yemen, was arrested inin Germany and extradited toto thethe UnitedUnited StatesStates forfor providingproviding financialfinancial support to al­al- Qaeda as well. MoayadMoayad proudly told an undercover FBI informant that he notnot onlyonly funded Hamas but alsoalso raisedraised millionsmillions of dollars, recruited operatives, and providedprovided weapons to al-Qaeda. AccordingAccording to one report, oneone ofof thethe foundation'sfoundation's officesoffices inin Europe also raised funds for Hezbollah. Clearly, assessingassessing a group's global presence demandsdemands notnot only noting thethe activities of its operational activists ---- those who pull the trigger, detonatedetonate thethe explosivesexplosives or crash the airplane -- butbut also also thethe logisticallogistical andand financialfinancial supporterssupporters that makemake suchsuch operations possible. IfIf September 11 taughttaught usus nothingnothing else,else, wewe shouldshould all nownow recognize that logisticallogistical and financial support is critical to terrorist operations. ACLURM001617 By any standard, including terrorist operationsoperations from ThailandThailand to Argentina, logistical and financial support operations acrossacross thethe globe,globe, andand linkslinks toto otherother terroristterrorist groups, Hezbollah representsrepresents aa classicclassic exampleexample ofof aa terroristterrorist group of global reachreach and should bebe aa prioritizedprioritized targettarget in the war on terror. Hezbollah's GlobalGlobal Reach Hezbollah holdsholds aa particularlyparticularly disturbing,disturbing, though often overlooked, place in the matrix ofof internationalinternational terror.terror. AA fewfew studiesstudies havehave notednoted Hezbollah'sHezbollah's tiesties toto other groups, like the Treasury Department
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