Editor-in-Chief Michael S. Fields October 2018 Issue

Lien guide for the trial attorney A COMPENDIUM ON ATTORNEY LIENS FOR CONTINGENT FEES – INCLUDES APPLICATION OF NEW ETHICS RULES EFFECTIVE NOVEMBER 1

[Editor’s note: This lien guide will be present- Attorney fee sharing agreements – In Mink v. Maccabee (2004) 121 ed in two parts. The second part will be pub- referring attorney’s lien claim Cal.App.4th 835, a referring attorney lished in a future issue of Advocate. The claiming breach of a pure referral fee Pure referral fee: California is one of a entire compendium is available online agreement was allowed to bring a breach few states that permit attorneys to be now at www.advocatemagazine.com.] of action against the second compensated for referring a case to attorney who performed the work. The another attorney, without requiring the This compendium primarily con- court cited compliance with former referring attorney’s participation in case cerns lien claims for attorney contingent CRPC rule 2-200(A), even though the preparation or presentation. The refer- fees. Lien claims for advanced costs are two attorneys did not enter into a writ- ring attorney is not a lien claimant discussed in the last section. ten contract and the client’s written against the client’s recovery. Rather, a informed consent was not obtained until pure referral fee is a contractual right New ethics rules applicable to attorney conclusion of the client’s case. Former created against the second attorney liens for fees and costs CRPC rule 2-200(A) did not require a and perhaps a lien claim against that written agreement between the attor- Attorney ethics rules are officially recovery. neys, nor did it require a time limit to entitled “California Rules of Professional No work on the case need be done obtain the client’s written approval of Conduct” (CRPC). On May 10, 2018, the by the referring attorney to obtain a pure the fee split. California Supreme Court officially referral fee. The objective is to encour- New bar ethics rule affecting pure refer- approved 69 new and revised CRPC age referrals to more competent attor- ral fees: New CRPC rule 1.5.1, is entitled rules. The 112 pages of CRPC rules uti- neys for a particular matter. (See Moran “Fee Divisions Among .” It has lize a new numbering system. The rules v. Harris (1982) 131 Cal.App.3d 913, strict compliance requirements, but the go into effect on November 1, 2018. 921-922, cited by our highest court in new rule continues to allow pure referral Many of the new CRPC rules signifi- Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th 142, fees. It, however, severely modifies for- cantly impact attorney lien claims for 149, 156-157.) mer CRPC rule 2-200(A). fees and costs. The application of the California bar ethics rules allow pure New CRPC rule 1.5.1 states: new CRPC rules to attorney lien claims is referral fees: Pure referral fee sharing is (a) Lawyers who are not in the same explained throughout this compendium, controlled by bar ethics rules. Former firm shall not divide a fee for legal and, where necessary, the new rules are CRPC rule 2-200(A), is entitled services unless: compared to the old CRPC rules. For an “Financial Arrangements Among (1) the lawyers enter into a writ- understanding of disputed attorney lien Lawyers.” Subdivision (A) provided: ten agreement to divide the fee; rights, this writer suggests reading Carroll A member shall not divide a fee (2) the client has consented in v. Interstate Brands Corporation (2002) 99 for legal services with a who is writing, either at the time the lawyers Cal.App.4th 1168. not a partner of, associate of, or share- enter into the agreement to divide the holder with the member unless: Statutory lien definitions fee or as soon thereafter as reasonably (1) The client has consented in writing practicable, after a full written disclo- Civil Code section 2872: “A lien is a thereto after a full disclosure has been sure to the client of: charge imposed in some mode other made in writing that a division of fees (i) the fact that a division of than by a transfer in trust upon specific will be made and the terms of such fees will be made; property by which it is made security or division; and (ii) the identity of the lawyers the performance of an act.” (2) The total fee charged by all lawyers or law firms that are parties to the Civil Code section 2881 states a lien is not increased solely by reason of the division; and is created by contract of the parties or by provision for division of fees and is not (iii) the terms of the division; operation of law. unconscionable as that term is defined and Civil Code section 2883, subdivision in rule 4-200. (3) the total fee charged by all (a), states: “An agreement may be made The requirement that the client con- lawyers is not increased solely by rea- to create a lien upon property not yet sent in writing to the division of fees son of the agreement to divide fees. acquired by the party agreeing to give allows for the client to be assured the fee (b) This rule does not apply to a divi- the lien, or not yet in existence. In that percentage charged is reasonable and sion of fees pursuant to court order. case the lien agreed for attaches from the the attorney representing the client’s The comment to new rule 1.5.1 time when the party agreeing to give it case will be adequately compensated for states: “The writing requirements acquires an interest in the thing, to the competent representation. (Chambers, extent of such interest.” supra.) See Fields, Next Page Michael Fields, continued

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of paragraphs (a)(1) and (a)(2) may be are not exclusive, so long as the client is (ii) identity of the lawyers is set out satisfied by one or more writings.” informed of the existence and nature of in the written agreement; Violation of rule 1.5.1 may bring discipli- the arrangement. Such a reciprocal refer- (iii) terms of the fee split division are nary action by State Bar: The “Executive ral arrangement does not comport with set out in the written agreement; Summary” that accompanied new rule the fee split requirements of new CRPC (iv) the client consents in writing to 1.5.1, when it was a “proposed” rule, rule 1.5.1. Most likely, therefore, such the prospective fee split either on the states that rule 1.5.1 would establish a arrangement does not have a contractual written agreement executed by the disciplinary standard. That disciplinary component or lien right without the per- lawyers or on a separate writing with the standard is set forth in new CRPC Rule formance of work on the referred case by terms of the fee split and identification of 8.4, entitled “Misconduct.” New rule 8.4 the referring attorney. the lawyers set out; states in part: “It is professional miscon- Complying with new CRPC rule 1.5.1 (v) all of the requirements must be duct for a lawyer to: (a) violate these most likely allows the referring attorney to met early-on in the referral process; and rules or the State Bar Act . . ..” enforce breach-of-contract and lien rights (vi) the gross fee charged by all In Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 claims for a pure referral fee: Under lawyers is not increased solely by reason Cal.App.4th 219, 226, fn. 4, the court prior CRPC rule 2-200(A), courts recog- of the fee split agreement. acknowledged that former CRPC rule 2- nized that compliance with that rule For attorney lien rights, see Carroll v. 200 does not specify any penalty for its created a contractual right between the Interstate Brands Corporation (2002) 99 violation, but under the California Rules referring attorney and the client’s Cal.App.4th 1168. Carroll is a commonly of Professional Conduct, violation of the retained attorney. cited case requiring rule can subject an attorney to State Bar Compliance with former CRPC rule between the claiming lawyer and the disciplinary action (presumably for 2-200(A) did not require the fee-split client. Carroll further holds a pure refer- failing to obtain client consent before agreement between attorneys to be in ral fee contract should be found to exist fee-splitting.) writing. The only writing required was a if the lawyers follow the requirements of Referring attorney can receive a monetary knowing consent by the client to the new CRPC rule 1.5.1. gift for a case referral without complying identifiable attorney’s fee split. That con- It seems unlikely that a referring with rule 1.5.1: Prior CRPC rule 2- sent could be obtained at any time, even lawyer seeking enforcement of a pure 200(B) allowed a referring lawyer to after representation of the client. Thus, referral fee needs to file a declaratory receive a “gift or gratuity” for making a under former CRPC rule 2-200 an oral relief action against the client to estab- recommendation to another lawyer “pro- agreement between attorneys to share lish the referring lawyer’s lien claim vided the gift or gratuity was not offered fees was ethical, contractual and enforce- amount, as required in Mojtahedi v. in of any promise, agree- able if the client properly consented in Vargas (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 974. ment, or understanding that such a gift writing. (Mink, 121 Cal.App.4th 835.) Mojtahedi, concerns a non-pure referral or gratuity would be forthcoming or that Margolin v. Shemaria (2000) 85 fee case. A declaratory relieve action was referral would be made or encouraged in Cal.App.4th 891, 903, involves a pure required in Mojtahedi to establish the the future. referral fee. The client orally agreed to validity and value of complaining attor- New CRPC rule 7.2(b)(5) has a simi- the fee split. An oral consent was held ney’s lien claim. In a pure fee referral lar provision. It states: not in compliance with the written matter that fully comports with new [A] lawyer may . . . offer or give a consent requirement of former CRPC CRPC rule 1.5.1, the amount of the gift or gratuity to a person or entity rule 2-200 (A), and such noncompliance referring lawyer’s lien claim is predeter- having made a recommendation result- “rendered the fee sharing agreement mined by written agreement. ing in the employment of the lawyer or [contractually] unenforceable.” The court the lawyer’s law firm, provided that the upheld the trial court finding that “. . . Client’s consent in writing to a pure gift or gratuity was not offered or given plaintiffs do not have a viable contract fee split is mandatory in consideration of any promise, agree- [with defendant] for fee sharing because ment, or understanding that such a gift the contract does not comply with rule 2- Failing to obtain a written consent by or gratuity would be forthcoming or 200 . . ., which prohibits such sharing of the client to a fee split has been the sub- that referrals would be made or fees unless certain specified conditions ject of great consternation and litigation encouraged in the future. are met.” [Italics in original.] (Id. at p. by attorneys who are not paid in accor- Note that a “gift or gratuity” is not a 894.) dance with the fee split agreement. To fee split that would fall under CRPC rule Under new CRPC rule 1.5.1., a pure that end, the California Supreme Court 1.5.1. Thus, most likely, there is no con- referral fee agreement is most likely con- has ruled on this issue three times, as tractual recovery or lien claim by the tractually enforceable if the six basic follows: referring attorney. requirements of new rule 1.5.1 are met: a. Chambers v. Kay (2002) 29 Cal.4th New CRPC rule 7.2(b)(4) allows for (i) the fee split agreement between 142, 150, holds a non-retained attorney reciprocal referral arrangements that the lawyers is in writing; See Fields, Next Page Michael Fields, continued

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(Chambers), assisting a retained attorney an attorney seeking fees Retained attorney’s contingent fee (Kay), may not recover a contracted per- can only recover such fee calculation lien claim against case proceeds centage fee split or a quantum meruit fee from the retained attorney. against case recovery. Neither attorney Charging lien: A retained attorney’s obtained the client’s informed written Equitable may prevent lien for fees and costs against a client’s consent to the pure referral fee split, as retained attorney from denying pure interest is a “charging lien.” In required by former CRPC rule 2-200(A) referral split California, a charging lien can only be Chambers applies former CRPC rule imposed if the client has executed an 2-200(A) beyond a pure referral fee dis- In a pure referral fee case involving informed written retainer consent to fee pute. It holds the rule also requires a a class action, the retained attorney was division, after written disclosure of its client’s informed written consent to a equitably estopped from denying a fee terms; i.e., the creation of a written con- fee split, where work for the client is split agreement with referring attorney. tract. A charging lien is typically found to divided between attorneys. The Court, After new class representatives were be created in contingent fee retainer con- however, allowed a quantum meruit brought into class, retained class-action tracts for personal injury matters. A claim by Chambers against the first attorney failed to obtain new class mem- charging lien can be claimed in certain attorney, Kay. ber consents to fee-split, as then required probate matters involving contingency b. Huskinson & Brown v. Wolf (2004) 32 under former CRPC rule 2-200, refused recoveries for the . In such matters, Cal.4th 453, 456, allowed the first attor- to allow referring attorney to obtain class the probate court is required to order ney to recover quantum meruit fees for clients consent to referral fee split, and payment of the contingency directly to work performed, but not the contracted failed to disclose to court fee-splitting the successful attorney, and the attorney percentage agreed to between the attor- agreement with referring attorney, as is not required to file a creditor’s claim. neys. Percentage fee recovery can only be then required under former CRPC 3.769. (See Novak v. Fay (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th obtained if the attorneys comply with for- In Barnes, Crosby, Fitzgerald & Zeman, 329.) mer CRPC rule 2-200(A) and obtain the LLP v. Ringler et al (2012) 212 Statutory contractual retainer fee client’s informed written consent to the Cal.App.4th 172, the court held that requirements can be found in Business percentage fee split. “[R]ule 2-200 does under the former rule, and Professions Code sections 6146 (med- not preclude quantum meruit recovery [A]n attorney may be equitably mal fee), 6147 ( contingent fee) and when its client disclosure and consent estopped from claiming a fee-sharing 6148 (hourly fee). State Bar ethic rules requirements are not met . . .” contract is unenforceable due to non- also have requirements for contingent Huskinson further states: “Notably . . compliance with [former] rule 2-200 or and hourly fee contract terms. (See new . rule 2-200 does not purport to restrict [former] rule 3.769, where attorney is CRPC rule 1.5 and former CRPC rule 4- attorney compensation on any basis responsible for such noncompliance 200(A).) other than a division of fees. Nor does it and has unfairly prevented another Hourly fee retainer require suggest that attorneys or law firms are lawyer from complying with the rules’ adherence to new CRPC rules 1.5 and categorically barred from making or mandates. [Brackets added.] 1.8.1 [former CRPC rules 4-200 and 3- accepting client referrals, from agreeing 300]. New rule 1.8.1 has restrictions for to a division of labor on a client’s case, or Client must be in privity of contract lawyers who have business dealings with from actually working on a case where to be liable to non-retained attorney clients. (See Fletcher v. Davis (2004) 33 labor is divided.” (Id. at p. 458.) A client is not liable for fees to any Cal.4th 61, 71 for application of former c. Fletcher v. Davis (2004) 33 Cal.4th 61, attorney with whom the client is not in CRPC rule 3-300.) “A charging lien is . . . 64, holds that an oral contingent hourly privity of contract. In Strong v. Beydoun an adverse interest within the meaning fee agreement is a charging lien that cre- (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1398, the first of CRPC rule 3-300 and thus requires ates an adverse interest on the client’s attorney retained attorney Strong to the client’s informed written consent.” property rights and thereby violates for- assist with the case. The first attorney Fletcher refused to enforce an oral contin- mer CRPC rule 3-300 [now rule 1.8.1]. and Strong had a fee sharing agreement gent hourly fee agreement. (Id. at p. 64.) Such a lien, to be enforceable, requires a that was not signed by the client, nor did The Fletcher court held that without a client’s informed written consent. This the client in any way agree to a contract client’s written informed consent to an rule, however, has no application to a with Strong. Strong sued client and first hourly contingent fee agreement, an charging lien that secures payment of a attorney for quantum meruit. Court held adverse interest in the client’s property is contingent fee. (See Plummer v. Day/ no contractual agreement with client; created and former CRPC rule 3-300 is Eisenberg (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38.) client is not obligated to Strong on any of violated. A percentage contingent fee con- In both Chambers and Huskinson, the the stated counts; and Strong’s only claim tractual retainer, however, is not held to client did not consent to the attorneys’ was against the first attorney for provable fall under the requirements of former contractual fee split, and the court found quantum merit fees. See Fields, Next Page Michael Fields, continued

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CRPC rule 3-300. (Plummer v. Day/ by the client and contracting attorney, all the provisions listed under Business Eisenberg (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 38, 49.) the associate attorney was held to be in and Professions Code section 6147(a), A charging lien is typically a “secret contract privity with the client. The con- the discharged attorney is entitled to a lien,” in that it is contractual and typical- tract also supported a conversion cause quantum meruit recovery. Many times ly not publicized. A non-secret lien is typ- of action against a subsequently retained in such matters disputes arise between ically one that is filed with some govern- attorney. (See Plummer, 184 Cal.App.4th a first and second attorney as to the ment body, such as a real estate lien filed 38, 48.) In Plummer, attorney Plummer amount each is legally entitled to receive with a county recorder. was a named payee on the settlement from a client’s recovery. (See Weiss v. Written contract required: Unlike check, yet the subsequent attorney Marcus (1975) 51 Cal.App.3d 590, 598.) other states, where an attorney’s lien for deposited the check in its client trust fees and costs can be created by operation account without Plummer’s endorsement Quantum meruit defined of law, California requires a written con- and failed to distribute any portion of Quantum meruit is a legal principle tract between the attorney and client. the attorney fee to Plummer. that implies a promise to pay for services California does recognize certain liens, that were not gratuitously put forth. The such as mechanics liens and service liens, Attorney lien claimant is an equitable burden is on the party seeking compen- are created by operation of law. (Fletcher, assignee sation to prove value of services rendered supra, at p. 61-62.) An attorney lien on a and that the services were provided at judgment is not automatic, but it may be “While a contingent fee contract with creation of a lien in favor of coun- the request of the party to be charged. created by contract. (Del Conte Masonry Co. “To recover in quantum meurit, a party v. Lewis (1971) 16 Cal.App.3d 678, 680.) sel does not operate to transfer to coun- sel any part of the client’s cause of need not prove the existence of a con- Centenko v. United California Bank tract [citations], but it must show the cir- (1982) 30 Cal.3d 528, 531, holds an action, it does give him a lien upon the recovery, and the attorney is regarded cumstances were such that ‘the services attorney fee contract is usually an express were rendered under some understand- provision in a retainer contract, but “it as an equitable assignee of the judg- ment or settlement to the extent of fees ing or expectation of both parties that may be implied if the retainer agreement compensation therefore was to be between the lawyer and client indicates and costs which are due him for servic- es.” [Citations omitted.]. (Siciliano v. made.”’ (Strong, 166 Cal.App.4th 1398, that the former is to look to the judg- 1404.) ment for payment of his fee.” Centenko Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. (1976) 62 notes that a charging lien can secure Cal.App.3d 745, 752.) This old rule Establishing quantum meruit rights most probably assures that an attorney either an hourly or contingent fee. (Id. of competing attorneys at pp. 531-532.) representing a plaintiff will have the Attorney lien claimant must be privi- attorney’s name placed on a settlement A lien for fees is to be established on ty of contract with client: Associate attor- check issued by the tortfeasor’s insur- a quantum meruit reasonable value basis. ney employed by law firm that contracts ance carrier. The attorney’s lien rights Fracasse v. Brent (1972) 6 Cal.3d 784, is with a client has no lien claim on the are protected, however, even if a lien the seminal case recognizing that a con- recovery, even though the employing notice is not served on the opposing tingent fee attorney discharged prior to attorney and the associate attorney have party or insurance company. recovery of an award or settlement may a mutual contract granting the associate Lien right is best to be specified in recover the reasonable value of services rendered up to the time of discharge. a percentage of the recovery. (Trimble v. retainer contract Steinfeldt (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 646; see “An attorney’s contingent fee con- also Carroll, 99 Cal.App.4th 1168, which Although some cases hold an attor- tract does not operate to transfer part is a commonly cited case requiring privity ney’s lien for fees and costs may be of the cause of action to the attorney of contract between the claiming attorney implied by the general language of a but only gives him a lien on his client’s and client.) retainer contract (Gelfand, Greer, Popko & recovery. . . . Compensation must be In Carroll, a lawyer in the plaintiff Miller v. Shivener (1993) 30 Cal.App.3d sought in an independent action by the attorney’s office sought a lien for fees 364, 371), it is best to explicitly specify attorney against the client, and not by owed by his attorney employer for work an attorney’s lien rights within the application to the court in which litiga- on the underlying plaintiff ’s case. The retainer contract. tion is pending.” [Citations omitted.] claiming lawyer was not in contract with This holding is the basic rule requiring the client and had no enforceable lien Former attorney’s quantum meruit a dismissed attorney to file a separate rights. The Carroll case provides an expla- lien claim action for quantum meruit fees against nation of attorney lien claims and is a Where an attorney is discharged, jus- his/her former client, and it does not good source of information on the issue. tifiably withdraws from representing a permit the attorney to intervene in the Where an associate attorney was client or where the contingency contract underlying case for a fee claim. named in the retention contract executed is voidable due to the failure of including See Fields, Next Page Michael Fields, continued

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(Hendricks v. Superior Court (Sefton) (and probably any Declaratory relief actions are allowed (1961) 197 Cal.App.2d 586, 589.) action) by a dismissed attorney must be under Code of Civil Procedure section But, see Law Offices of Stanley J. Bell brought only against the client with 1060 et seq. for “an actual controversy” v. Shine, et al., (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th whom the complaining attorney had a to seek a judicial declaration of rights 1011, where attorney allowed trial judge contract for attorney services. (See Brown and duties before there is any breach of in underlying case to rule on an attorney v. Superior Court (Cyclone) (2004) 116 an obligation regarding the declaration lien claim. In a separate action to collect Cal.App.4th 320, 328-330, where the sought. The declaratory relief can oper- on the lien claim, the court estopped col- attorney sought lien priority over a ate prospectively in the interests of lection as being barred by res judicata judgement creditor’s lien.) Brown is wide- prospective justice and to establish rights. due to the underlying case judgement. ly cited as authority in contingent fee lien (See Parsons v. Tickner (1995) 31 claim cases. (But see Weiss, 51 Cal.App.3d Cal.App.4th 1531, 1533, holding that a Second attorney liability 590, 598, where the court recognized a declaratory relief action can depend on In Olsen v. Harbison (2010) 191 direct lawsuit by the discharged attorney the outcome of a pending action.) Note Cal.App.4th 325, the court found no against the client’s newly retained attor- that a declaratory relief action is entitled viable right by the first attorney against ney.) to trial setting priority, but a declaratory the second attorney for quantum meruit, relief action combined breach of contract Declaratory relief action against fraud and deceit, interference with con- action is not granted the priority. The tractual relations, breach of contract, client is first step breach action is to be conducted at a or constructive trust – later time. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1062.3) “. . . Compensation must be sought the entire burden for the first attorney’s in an independent action by a complain- Discharged attorney’s rights after fee is upon the client who agreed to the ing attorney against the client, and not fee split and then fired the first attorney. declaratory relief action is second by application to the court in which the A contrary holding can be found in step underlying litigation is pending.” Plummer, 184 Cal.App.4th 38, where the (Hendricks v. Superior Court (Sefton) (1961) Mojtahedi, supra, states: “[T]he [dis- court allowed causes of action for conver- 197 Cal.App.2d 586, 589, which is widely charged] attorney’s lien is only enforce- sion and intentional interference with cited as the basic rule requiring a dis- able after the attorney adjudicates the prospective economic damages against missed attorney to file a separate action value and validity of the lien in a sepa- the second attorney. The second attorney against the client to establish quantum rate action against his client” * * * deposited the settlement check with meruit fees. It does not permit the dis- “Plaintiff provided the services to the Plummer’s name as payee, not obtaining missed attorney to intervene in the clients, not to Defendant [second attor- Plummer’s signature on the check and underlying case for his or her fee claim. ney] . . . Plaintiff must thus litigate with not paying Plummer any portion of the [Citations omitted.]) the clients to determine the reasonable fee. A significant ruling holds that cost of the services provided to them.” Separate action against client required before a first attorney can claim a lien Mojtahedi explains that a declaratory before second attorney can be sued and sue a second attorney for a portion relief action against the former client is of fees obtained on a contingency recognized as a procedure to establish a The cases are clear that a court in an recovery, an action for declaratory relief dismissed attorney’s lien claim and cited underlying case, where a first lawyer seeks must be brought against the client to Brown v. Superior Court (Cyclon),116 to assert a lien claim for fees, has no determine the lien’s validity, value and Cal.App.4th 320, 328-330. Mojtahedi was power to determine the amount of the enforceability. (See, Mojtahedi, 228 not clear whether the new second attor- lien nor to order payment of the lien to Cal.App.4th 974, where the dismissed ney and a paying insurance company or the complaining attorney. That determi- attorney wrongly brought an action defendant in the underlying case can be nation is a separate action by the first against the second attorney to recover a party defendant in the declaratory lawyer against the former client, and the quantum meruit fees instead of against relief action. The court hinted that an former client can assert defenses to the the former client; But see Southern action against the second attorney may dismissed attorney’s lien claim. (Bandy v. California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 be appropriate after the establishment of Mt. Diablo Unified School District (1976) Cal.App.5th 476, 496, where tortfeasor the “existence, amount, and enforceabili- 56 Cal.App.3d 230 and Valenta v. Regents interplead settlement funds and both ty of his lien on the settlement money.” of University of California (1991) 231 client and former attorney were named “If successful in a declaratory relief action Cal.App.3d 1465.) parties; held former attorney’s response regarding the reasonable value of his Unless there is privity of contract to interpleader action with motion for services, Plaintiff ’s fees will be paid out with a second attorney regarding attor- attorney fees was adequate for court to of the clients’ settlement proceeds.” (Id. ney-fee sharing, an action to recover determine validity and value of former at p. 978.) But see Southern California Gas attorney fees in a separate action for attorney’s lien claim.) See Fields, Next Page Michael Fields, continued

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Co. v. Flannery (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th Fee Arbitration Act (MFAA), set forth in In 2015, Michael Fields retired from the 476, 496, where tortfeasor interplead Business and Professions Code section active practice of law after a 47-year career as settlement funds and both client and 6200 et seq. A must reading of an attor- a plaintiff’s personal injury trial attorney. He former attorney were named parties; ney’s travail and loss after successfully remains a licensed member of the California held former attorney’s response to inter- winning an MFAA arbitration award is State Bar. He frequently writes and lectures on pleader action with motion for attorney Loeb v. Record (Bardat & Edwards) (2008) tort liens and other subjects. He has developed fees was adequate for court to determine 162 Cal.App.4th 431. (See also several compendiums on tort liens under the validity and value of former attorney’s Mardirossian & Associates v. Ersoff (2007) general title of “Lien Guide for the Trial lien claim. 153 Cal.App.4th 257, fn.3; see also Attorney.” Mr. Fields was the 2003 CAALA Formal Opinion No. 2009-177 of the president, and he received CAALA’s 2015 Ted Mandatory fee arbitration correlation State Bar Standing Committee of Horn Memorial Award for his many contribu- Be aware that any action against a Professional Responsibility and Conduct tions to the profession. Mr. Fields can be client or former client for a fee dispute for suggestions on how to correlate with contacted at [email protected].  must comply with California’s Mandatory the MFAA.)