Unrevised Transcript of Evidence Taken Before the Select Committee On
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Unrevised transcript of evidence taken before The Select Committee on Economic Affairs Inquiry on THE ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED KINGDOM OF SCOTTISH INDEPENDENCE Evidence Session No. 12. Heard in Public. Questions 526 - 640 WEDNESDAY 24 OCTOBER 2012 10 am Witnesses: Professor Charlie Jeffery and Jeremy Peat Professor Alex Kemp Rt Hon Alistair Darling MP Ruth Davidson MSP, Patrick Harvie MSP, Johann Lamont MSP and Willie Rennie MSP Owen Kelly and David Nish Elspeth Orcharton, Jeremy Purvis and Professor Jim Gallagher USE OF THE TRANSCRIPT 1. This is an uncorrected transcript of evidence taken in public and webcast on www.parliamentlive.tv. 2. Any public use of, or reference to, the contents should make clear that neither Members nor witnesses have had the opportunity to correct the record. If in doubt as to the propriety of using the transcript, please contact the Clerk of the Committee. 3. Members and witnesses are asked to send corrections to the Clerk of the Committee within 7 days of receipt. 1 Members present Lord MacGregor of Pulham Market (Chairman) Lord Forsyth of Drumlean Lord Hollick Lord Levene of Portsoken Lord McFall of Alcluith Lord Tugendhat ________________ Examination of Witnesses Professor Charlie Jeffery, University of Edinburgh, and Jeremy Peat, David Hume Institute Q526 The Chairman: Good morning, gentlemen. Good morning, everyone. Welcome to the Economic Affairs Committee. This is the first time that we have had a meeting outside London and it is the 12th evidence session of our inquiry into the economic implications for the United Kingdom of Scottish independence. Let me begin by thanking the City of Edinburgh Council and its chief executive for allowing us the use of this splendid meeting room—I am grateful to all those who have helped to arrange it for us. We decided—in fact we have been going since about May—that we should make the subject of our inquiry this one: the economic implications for the United Kingdom as a whole. I stress the United Kingdom as a whole, because there are economic implications for the rest of the United Kingdom, as well as for Scotland, and these we have been exploring too. We have Members of our Committee who come from those areas but who are not here today. The reason for this inquiry is that it is clear to many of us that there should be a full understanding of the economic implications of Scottish independence before the vote on the referendum takes place. When we began this inquiry, we as an economic Committee felt that there had to be a proper investigation of many of these issues in public. That is, to some extent, still the case. We are very anxious to explore these issues in detail so that everyone 2 has a clear understanding of the economic implications. That is the purpose of our inquiry; we are looking not at constitutional, political or legal issues, but purely at the economic issues—I stress, for the United Kingdom as a whole. So we have a fairly intensive two days. Let me begin by very much welcoming Mr Peat and Professor Jeffery for setting the sort of background for the whole of our two days’ inquiry. Is there anything that you would like to say, or would you prefer to go straight into questions? Jeremy Peat: Lord Chairman, I have just one very brief comment. I welcome what you were saying about the importance of spending time now finding out what the issues are and exploring them. We have roughly two years before a potential vote, and it is important that that time be used for that purpose. There are many complex issues to be examined, some of which certainly I have just started examining and identifying. It is too early to look for answers to most of the questions, but it is by no means too early to start determining what the key questions are. Q527 The Chairman: On that, I would say that now we are not only clear what the questions are—and we had a very useful session with Danny Alexander, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury, last week, which raised a number of the questions that we will be exploring in the next two days—but we are beginning to get some understanding of the implications pretty clearly, and that is the purpose of our inquiry. Perhaps I may start by asking you this: the SNP has said that an independent Scotland would continue to use sterling. I know it has sometimes not been clear exactly what the party’s view is about that aspect of the whole issue, and we have looked at four different options for the way that this could happen. What do you think would be the best currency option for an independent Scotland from a Scottish perspective, and even perhaps from the perspective of the rest of the United Kingdom? Professor Charlie Jeffery: Thank you. The debate here is now dominated by that single option—if Scotland votes yes, it will use the pound sterling. That is an option that has 3 attractions for the advocates of independence by providing a sense of reassurance and continuity, but I think it is probably also an option that has significant popular resonance. So I think in both senses, with a special emphasis on popular resonance—we perhaps all too easily lose sight of what citizens think and want—the pound sterling is the best option in an independent Scotland. Jeremy Peat: I agree with that. There are a whole host of interdependencies between the economy of Scotland and the economy of the rest of the United Kingdom. That constitutes a very good reason, at least initially, for the maintenance of exchange rates to create certainty between Scotland and the rest of the UK, and hence continuing with sterling as the currency has advantages. But of course that leads to the key issues of how sterling can be retained and what that implies for other aspects of economic policies. Q528 The Chairman: Can I come to one of the key issues? If an independent Scotland maintained sterling, it would have to be bound by a fiscal pact. Do you agree? Jeremy Peat: If an independent Scotland retained sterling as part of a sterling currency area, then I am sure that there would be negotiations between the new Scottish Government, the Bank of England and the Treasury as to exactly what that meant in terms of constraints on the operation of fiscal policy and our policies in an independent Scotland. So, exactly what outcome would emerge from those discussions is unclear, but particularly given the eurozone crisis, it is increasingly clear that there would be a need for some agreement on constraints on fiscal policy in an independent Scotland, as part of a sterling union. Professor Charlie Jeffery: Might I add a note to that? We have heard from the Scottish Government’s perspective some initial thoughts on how fiscal policy co-ordination might be managed following a yes vote, but not yet in a great deal of detail. What we have not heard, and what we are probably less likely to hear, are the conditions in which the UK Government might approach such a pact. We are in a strange situation in the wider debate, 4 in that the advocates of independence have a strong interest over the next two years in proposing terms under which independence might be operational. There is probably less incentive on the UK Government side to match that, given that that signifies a recognition that independence might happen. So we are probably likely to have a slightly imbalanced debate with more input in due course from the Scottish Government side and perhaps less reciprocal imagining of how this would happen on the UK Government side. Q529 The Chairman: Have you had a chance to look at the evidence that the Chief Secretary to the Treasury gave us last week? Professor Charlie Jeffery: I have not. The Chairman: If you look at that, you will see that he put significant emphasis on the implications for the UK as a whole and, in particular, he draws attention to—as Mr Peat has done—the crisis in the eurozone, which has very real lessons, looking ahead, for this issue as far as Scotland and the rest of the UK are concerned. Q530 Lord Tugendhat: Can I ask this question? I think that you would agree with me that the formation of economic and monetary union and the single currency in the eurozone was perceived by the member states, first, as being irreversible and, secondly, as being a step towards closer union. It remains to be seen what happens, but those were two underlying assumptions and commitments. If we had a pact between a newly independent Scotland on the one hand and the rest of the United Kingdom on the other, surely we would be in the reverse situation. Scotland would have broken off from the United Kingdom, so, whereas the continental countries were coming closer together, in this case Scotland and the rest of the United Kingdom would be going further apart. In view of the fact that the whole drive for independence, as I understand it, is posited on the assumption that Scotland would be able to run its affairs better alone than as part of a United Kingdom, the assumption of outsiders would surely be that, far from being irreversible, this was a temporary 5 accommodation until Scotland could do something of a more independent nature. So it is the mechanisms of the eurozone with all the difficulties that that implies, but, oddly enough, going in the reverse direction.