Q&A How did you become involved in doing research? In spring 2012 I was very fortunate to have the opportunity to participate in Professor Tuozzo’s Philosophy 805 Plato Seminar; the result was twofold. I was able to do extensive research on the subject of Plato’s Republic while applying my work toward the honors departmental requirements. After completing the initial paper at the end of the semester, I continued to further analyze my research and rework the arguments that I had developed; I finished the final version during the spring semester of 2013.

How is the research process different from what you expected? About Christopher The most obvious difference from what I originally expected is simply the sheer Stratman amount of time that is needed to rework and in some cases completely rethink what needs to be done. This is, however, one of the most important parts, or hometown so I have found, in making sure that the quality of research done is the best it Olathe, Kan. can be. Another interesting aspect that I had not originally expected was how so many important issues and topic interrelate; this has caused me to take Major seriously the importance of interdisciplinary work in multiple fields of study. Philosophy What is your favorite part of doing research? academic level My favorite part of doing research is imagining a formidable hypothetical Senior or imaginary opponent, who is essentially my intellectual equal but argues against each point that is raised and each proposition suggested. This part of research mentor the process of doing research, I have found, is very fruitful in strengthening, Thomas Tuozzo or when necessary changing, the argument presented and the research that is Professor of Philosophy associated with that argument. By imagining and taking seriously the possible objections raised against my thesis, the final results of the research are much stronger; this is my favorite part of doing research.

Plato’s Psychological Manifestations of Madness: A Case for a Parallel between Philosophical and Tyrannical Souls in The Republic Christopher Stratman

In this paper, I will argue that there madness with regard to the latter. or those who are now called kings is a philosophically interesting From this key insight we can then and leading men genuinely and comparison to be made between the proceed in taking an essential step in adequately philosophize, that is philosophical and tyrannical souls establishing and agreeing with Plato until political power and philosophy in Plato’s Republic. I will argue for that, indeed, philosophy and political- entirely coincide…cities will have this point with the intent of building rule ought to be fundamentally united. no rest from evils…nor, I think, will a case for a valuable insight into We can imagine a situation the human race” (Republic, V 473cd). Socrates’ and thus Plato’s conception where Plato made the decision to This paradoxical claim concerning of the philosophical soul. Both the write the Republic in the form of a the unity of philosophy and political philosophical and tyrannical souls are systematic philosophy instead of a rule presents for us one of the dominated by a kind of obsession, or dialogue. I can imagine the opening greatest dilemmas born from a careful what I call Platonic madness; a kind line (the first and perhaps most and critical reading of the Republic. of judicious madness in the case of important proposition) stating, “Until Nevertheless, the Republic is not in the former and a kind of injudicious philosophers rule as kings in cities systematic form, yet Plato did choose

Fall 2012 – Spring 2013 | 43 to begin the dialogue with these weakness” (444d-e). Glaucon seems a kind of injudicious madness with words “I went down” (327a). This to be entirely satisfied with giving an regard to the tyrannical soul. But suggests that perhaps he has in mind answer to the question given Socrates’ what I mean by madness needs to be from the very beginning the problem tripartite city and soul; yet, Socrates made clear. Madness is essentially a of how philosophic and political clearly has much more to say (445a-c). manifestation, or so I wish to argue, unification is even possible. We might wonder why Socrates still of the development of Eros, which is It would certainly be helpful, feels they must go on in their inquiry expressed by either a kind of clear- concerning the dilemma of the and to what extent the soul of the sighted and judicious madness or a philosopher-king, if we had a philosopher-king might be central in blinded and injudicious madness. It will more straightforward account of answering these questions (this point be shown that the kind of madness the philosophical soul before we will need to be clarified and supported manifested by the Eros of either attempted to answer the question but it is extremely important for the soul is determined by its relation to concerning why the philosopher purpose of this essay). On the other the Forms. The philosophical soul, should be compelled to rule. We do hand, it could be argued that this is a which has a very explicit relation to not, however, have direct insight into perfect example of Platonic aporia; if the Forms, has a kind of madness the philosophic soul, at least not in so, we might be inclined to think of which is essentially expressed as a such a way as to provide the kind of the paradox of the philosopher-king, kind of clear-sightedness; whereas compelling argument we might hope as well as Socrates’ insistence at the the tyrannical soul, which cannot be for. Of course, this is the very heart of close of book IV that “we mustn’t give said to have a relationship with the the debate, being one of the reasons up” (445b), as something akin to a Forms, has a kind of madness which this paradox of the philosopher-king provocation. is expressed as blindness. Thus, by —as it is often understood—is among According to Mitchell Miller in his establishing the parallel between the most debated issues concerning essay entitled, “Platonic Provocations: philosophical and tyrannical souls, Plato’s Republic. That is why it is the Reflections on the Soul and the we will have a possible explanation current task of this paper to provide Good in the Republic”, at its most or resolution to the philosopher-king a compelling, though indirect, insight fundamental level, this dialogue paradox—why the philosopher-king into the soul of the philosopher-king; is meant “to provoke us, to move should go back down into the cave- such a task, however, is surely much us beneath and beyond its own city in order to rule. easier said than done. explicit content into philosophical The structure of how I will make On one hand, Plato never gives an insight of our own” (Miller 166). I this comparison work in explaining explicit account of the philosophical will generously appeal to Miller’s why the philosopher-king should soul, or at least not an account which insight and argument, as I take him to be compelled to rule is as follows: is as thoroughly developed as the suggest, that Plato’s real genius was I will first attempt to illustrate how timocratic, oligarchic, democratic and in pushing the notion of philosophical the very structure of the Republic especially the tyrannical souls found discourse beyond the mere surface of often provides interesting interwoven in books VIII and IX of the dialogue. any given argument, including those themes or significant parallels which Interestingly, Socrates does give us offered by Socrates in the Republic, so are not accidental. They provide a very brief look at what such a soul as to move us to enter into a kind of both a deeper understanding of the might look like at the conclusion of dialectical investigation of the richer many complex issues as they appear book IV. Once his argument for the elements available in Platonic studies. in the dialogue as well as significant division of the soul into three parts, I will appeal to Miller in order to make points of aporia. From this general corresponding to the division of the the stronger claim that we actually acknowledgement of Plato’s use of city into three parts, is first completed do have a practical, though indirect, parallels, I will then build the parallel and that the rational part ought understanding of the philosophical between philosophical and tyrannical to rule (435c-441e), Socrates then soul by the merits of closely analyzing souls using the notion of judicious proceeds to reintroduce the primary the tyrannical soul and drawing from madness and injudicious madness as question he and his interlocutors this analysis an important parallel. essentially a manifestation of Eros. By have been thus far asking; ‘which is As I stated previously, both the doing so I will then elaborate on the more profitable, to be just or unjust’? philosophical and tyrannical souls are nature of the philosophical soul as “Virtue”, Socrates states, “seems, then, dominated by a kind of obsession, or it can be discovered drawn from the to be a kind of health, fine condition, Platonic madness. Again, what I mean parallel mentioned above and Eros and well-being of the soul, while vice here is a kind of judicious madness in as it functions both in the Republic as is disease, shameful condition, and the case of the philosophic soul and well as its relation to other Platonic

44 | journal of undergraduate research dialogues, specifically the Phaedrus. the whole city to almost immediate the dark or blindness to the inability Finally, after these crucial points ruin” (417b). The point which I to see clearly. have been established, I hope to want to make in considering this show that the basic reason why the foreshadowed description of the Blindness to light = Injudicious philosopher-king should return to dangers of attaining private material Madness (the soul without relation the cave/city in order to rule as king wealth by the ruling guardian class to the forms). The Tyrant cannot see is not because there is a desire to do is that one of the key aspects of the clearly due to a kind of injudicious so, but because the philosopher, due Republic is the way in which Plato madness that is like a blindness to to judicious madness, is able to clearly weaves the many themes of the the light or blindness to the ability see and understands that, given the dialogue together in such a way that it to see clearly. circumstances, going back down into is possible to find descriptions, of the the cave/city in order to rule is what is tyrant for example, woven into some This dual nature of blindness best for everyone. of the other vital moments such as will be further developed as the When Socrates demands at the this. By using elements of interwoven cornerstone of my argument. It end of Book III that the guardian themes, vital foreshadowing and therefore seems fitting to begin with class, whom he had just established parallels, we can lay the foundation Dorter’s essential description of as being the rightful overseers of for a parallel between the oppositions and parallels. There are the just city, should live austerely, philosophical and tyrannical souls. a number of ways in which Dorter abstaining from touching or being First, however, let us examine further spells out these oppositions; as the at all associated with gold or silver some of the important ways in which title of his book implies, his focus is and that they should have no Plato utilizes these elements generally primarily concerned with the different private property at all beyond what throughout the Republic. forms of transformations the Republic is absolutely necessary (416cd), he Kenneth Dorter, in the very takes. Therefore, I will briefly examine is generally setting the stage for an opening lines of the introduction of some of these oppositions and important objection. Yet, if the task his book titled The Transformations of transformations in light of our larger which Socrates is charged with is to Plato’s Republic, states that: task at hand. prove that justice is always best for The Republic is a book of contrasts, built Dorter describes the Republic either an individual or a city (that is to on oppositions between the just and as having a kind of arch structure say that it is always to your advantage the unjust life, rationality and appetites, to it, which helps define the many to be just and the just person or city necessary and unnecessary appetites, transformations within it. He states, is always the happiest or better off), being and becoming, knowledge and “[N]ot only are the themes of Book then why would Socrates here argue opinion, originals and images, blindness 1 also adumbrations of the themes that the guardian class must not to dark and blindness to light, and the of the dialogue as a whole, but Book have anything which might generally evolution and devolution of political 1 also functions as a symmetrical be considered, both by Socrates’ and psychological constitutions, among counterpart to Book 10, together interlocutors as well as perhaps others (Dorter 1). with it framing the Republic’s arch ourselves, as material wealth? structure” (Dorter 6). He goes on Interestingly, the point Socrates What strikes me as an obvious to argue that the symmetry found seems to be making is that such an point of emphasis here is his throughout the entire dialogue has austere life for the guardians would immediate observation that not only structure which both, metaphorically actually “save both themselves and the is the dialogue one of oppositions, but speaking, ascends and descends; city” (417a). Indeed, the description his descriptions of blindness both to again he claims that it “extends in he gives of a guardian class that is the darkness as well as blindness to both directions the ascending and allowed such adornments sounds the light as being in opposition. We descending trajectory noesis (511b- very much like an early description of might wonder if these sight related c) generally, rising to and returning the tyrant, which he does not directly oppositions could be construed as I from noesis as noesis rises and returns mention until much later in Book VIII have suggested already: judicious and within itself, even as in other respects and IX. Socrates states that if they injudicious madness? the dialogue continually moves do acquire wealth for themselves, forward in its inquiry” (7). Dorter “[T]hey’ll spend their whole lives Blindness to dark = Judicious seems to be indicating that as the hating and being hated, plotting and Madness (the soul in relation to the inquiry into justice, as well as the being plotted against, more afraid of forms). The Philosopher-king can many other modes and themes which internal than external enemies, and see clearly due to a kind of judicious are developed within the discussions they’ll hasten both themselves and madness that is like a blindness to held between Socrates and his

Fall 2012 – Spring 2013 | 45 interlocutors, evolves, the symmetry an important glimpse of the nature to and knows, but the opposite to between the many interwoven topics, of the tyrant’s soul) prior to actually those he doesn’t know” and again he such as justice and the good, evolve describing it; this same quality, I states, “[W]hen a dog sees someone as well. This symmetry, I suggest, submit, can be said concerning the it doesn’t know, it gets angry before should be kept in mind as a part of philosophical soul as well. Dorter’s anything bad happens to it. But when the background of our analysis as understanding of these transitions it knows someone, it welcomes him, we continue to build a case for the within the Republic helps justify this even if it has never received anything parallel between philosophic and claim; it opens to us the possibility good from him” (375e-376a). It is tyrannical souls. of going beyond the text in order to at this point that Socrates finally After describing what is perhaps see where the parallel can be found. begins to draw out the needed details the most well known of Plato’s similes, With these basic examples in mind, concerning a philosopher’s soul; it the cave, as “not only a general let us now turn to what I feel is a seems rather striking, I would suggest, allusion, but a precise reflection on much more explicit early example of that he then uses the comparison of a the dialogue’s beginning at the heart a parallel between philosophical and well-trained dog. of the cave” and then suggesting how tyrannical souls. He suggests to Glaucon that this we might interpret Plato as using this The example I wish to elaborate odd quality concerning dogs is “truly famous simile as an image of what the on can be thought of as either the philosophical” and claims that the entire dialogue is doing, “the progress friend-enemy parallel or the dog-wolf reason this is so is due to the fact of the prisoners who ascend through parallel. In a discussion with Glaucon that a dog “judges anything it sees stages to a vision of the ultimate in Book II concerning the need for the to be either an enemy, on no other principle and, transformation by that guardian class to be both spirited as basis than that it knows the one vision, return to the cave to benefit well as gentle, Socrates suggests that and doesn’t know the other” and their successors,” Dorter leads into the a well-trained dog is a good model for further implies a dog then is “a lover dialectical nature of these oppositions a “well-born youth” and that, because of learning, if it defines what is its and transformative elements within a well-trained dog seems to have own and what is alien to it in terms the text. He argues that: both intelligence and courage, the of knowledge and ignorance” (376b). Within this larger structure local guardians of the city should share So then it would seem that the need structural principles permeate the these same qualities (375a-c). If a to know one’s friends from one’s argument at every level. The apparent dog were not by nature courageous enemies is an essential part of what it casualness of the conversations is without the correct intellect, there takes to be a philosopher, as Socrates constantly underpinned by ordering would be a serious problem. That suggests. But perhaps the real point patterns so that the narrative becomes is to say, if the guardian class is by of emphasis here is that “knowledge an image of the world itself, in which the nature like a dog then its spirited produces gentleness and ignorance apparently random flow of becoming nature could potentially turn on the produces harshness” (Rosen 85). As implicitly exhibits the ordered rationality citizens; but as a well-trained dog it relates to the two kinds of Platonic of being (9616b-617c) (Dorter 8). that has both knowledge and courage madness that I have thus far discussed, it presumably would not (375c). Yet, judicious and injudicious, clearly The key point here is that Plato this then implies a further problem we could think of the well-trained seems to be working on a much (which is here only addressed as dog as having a kind of judicious more philosophically interesting level, a micro version of what will later madness. Moreover, it seems to me far more complex and challenging become the problem of the possibility that when Socrates describes these than what might simply be noticed of the just city coming into existence characteristics as “truly philosophical” on the mere surface reading of the at all). The question which is asked (376b) he is setting the stage for text. Within these complexities of at this point is how one could unite judicious madness. oppositions and transformations within a guardian both the necessary Aside from the overall topic which Dorter has illustrated is an spirited quality of a well-trained dog which Socrates and his partners implicit argument, or so I wish to and a gentle quality which will ensure are working through at this point suggest, that will provide us the that the guardian never turns on the (which is another example of Plato’s ability to make clear the parallel citizens (376c). use of foreshadowing, in this case between philosopher and tyrant. This The solution which Socrates puts of the solution to the third wave of argument, which was alluded by way forward at this point is simply to look laughter which is not addressed until of an early description of the tyrant, closer at what a well-trained dog later in Book V), we can see from this is that depth of the dialogue allows is like; he claims such an animal is discussion “a link between philosophy us to see important points (such as “gentle as can be to those he’s used and the definition of justice as doing

46 | journal of undergraduate research good to one’s friend and harm to the same happen with a leader of the it is vividly clear this paradox can one’s enemies” (85, 86). We can now people who dominates a docile mob be thought of as the unification of use this idea of well-trained dog as a and doesn’t restrain himself from philosophy and political activity or why lover of wisdom—a philosopher who spilling kindred blood? He brings the philosopher who has communion possesses a kind of judicious madness someone to trial on false charges and with the Forms should go back down that allows it to know his enemy murders him (as tyrants so often do), into the cave to rule as king. In his and friend—to see how this, in a and, by thus blotting out a human book, simply titled Philosopher-kings pendulum fashion, can be compared life, his impious tongue and lips taste the Argument of Plato’s Republic, C.D.C. to the much later description of the kindred citizens blood…isn’t a man like Reeve describes the identification of tyrant as a wolf. that inevitably fated either to be killed the philosopher, here in Book V as It seems completely reasonable by his enemies or to be transformed being identical to his name; he states to suggest that if a philosopher is from a man into a wolf by becoming a that, “[T]he key to his identity lies in like a well-trained dog because of its tyrant? (565d-e). his name—wisdom-lover (475b8-9). knowledge concerning friends and Because he is a lover, he loves all of enemies, then the exact opposite—the This is the first explicit parallel what he loves…Because it is wisdom very antithesis—should hold, we which I wish to emphasize, but it he loves, he must love everything might expect, for a non-domesticated is only a partial description of the that one can learn or come to know” wild version of a dog; that is to say a much fuller account I will develop; it (Reeve 191). Now Glaucon seems wolf. As such, we could then conceive should be clear at this point that the unsatisfied with this relatively broad of the wolf, regarding it as the key element in this example is tied description of a philosopher who is antithesis of the well-trained dog, as to the fact that a dog is domesticated a lover of wisdom; he responds to a perfect representation of the tyrant; or well trained whereas the wolf Socrates by saying that: that is if there is indeed a parallel is not. The connection to be made Then many strange people will be between the two. between philosopher and tyrant is philosophers, for the lovers of sights In Book VII, after Socrates has that the former has a very specific seem to be included, since they take proceeded through the devolution kind of education, in the Forms, which pleasure in learning things, and the of each city and the corresponding produces judicious madness, whereas lovers of sounds are very strange people constitutions of each soul and finally the later lacks this relation to the Forms, to include as philosophers, for they gets to the tyrannical city, he makes which produces injudicious madness. would never willingly attend a serious a very insightful claim about this We can now move on to another discussion or spend their time that way, particular city and soul. He compares aspect which will help build a case yet they run around to all the Dionysiac the “beginning of the transformation for a parallel between philosophical festivals, omitting none, whether in from leader of the people to tyrant” to and tyrannical souls derived from the cities or villages, as if their ears were “the man in the story told about the consideration that a tyrant lives life as under contract to listen to every chorus. temple of the Lycaean Zeus (Zeus the if in a dream whereas the philosopher Are we to say that these people—and wolf-god)” (565d). The imagery which is truly awake. Put another way, the those who learn similar things or petty Socrates uses here is quite explicit and philosopher has authentic knowledge, crafts—are philosophers? (475d). it seems to parallel the description of which leads to knowing what to do in the philosopher as a well-trained dog, any given situation. The tyrant, on the Intuitively it would appear as especially when you consider that one other hand, has not only mere opinion, though Glaucon is perfectly justified of the most basic differences between but the kind which is inherently self- in objecting to Socrates’ initial a dog and a wolf is simply the fact destructive. Furthermore, examining description of a philosopher. Socrates that one is domesticated or educated how Socrates describes the difference seems to recognize this apparent properly to have knowledge of friend between living life as if in a dream counter intuitiveness and clarifies his and enemy whereas the wolf is a wild vs. living life fully awake will help original position; he says that these animal with no formal education. identify who the philosopher is; this people who chase after sights and Socrates’ description is quite powerful will then be applied to our analysis of sounds are not true philosophers so I have chosen to quote him at philosopher and tyrant. “but they are like philosophers” length here: It is in Book V that Socrates (475e). The point which Socrates is …anyone who tastes the one piece of fully introduces one of the central making is that the main difference human innards that’s chopped up with paradoxes of the Republic which I between the strange people Glaucon those of other sacrificial victims must have already described as the paradox describes and the true philosophers inevitably become a wolf…doesn’t of the philosopher-king; so that or lovers of wisdom is concerned

Fall 2012 – Spring 2013 | 47 with the difference between the kind way to gratify itself. You know that there them and throws them out, until of knowledge they have—opinion is nothing it won’t dare to do at such it’s purged him of moderation and or true knowledge of the Forms a time, free of all control by shame or filled him with imported madness” themselves. reason. It doesn’t shrink from trying to (573a-b). He states that this too is Socrates then describes the lovers have sex with a mother, as it supposes, why “erotic love has long been called of sights and sounds or someone or with anyone else at all, whether man, a tyrant” (See Book I: 329c) (573b). who “believes in beautiful things, but god, or beast. It will commit any foul Socrates summarizes what has just doesn’t believe in the beautiful itself murder, and there is no food it refuses been confirmed by Glaucon that, and isn’t able to follow anyone who to eat. In a word, it omits no act of folly “a man becomes tyrannical in the could lead him to the knowledge of it.” or shamelessness (571c). precise sense of the term when either He says that such a person “is living his nature or his way of life or both of in a dream rather than a wakened Once Socrates has introduced them together make him drunk, filled state” (476c). Glaucon begins to agree the idea that there are such lawless with erotic desire, and mad” (573c). without further objections. Socrates desires in perhaps even the most just The task now has turned to points out that “someone who, to person while they are asleep, he then describing the tyrannical life; the take the opposite case, believes in the goes on to describe what happens issue to be made clear is not only beautiful itself, can see both it and when someone such as a tyrant lives that the tyrannical life is unpleasant the things that participate in it and life chasing after such lawless desires (this is Socrates’ main argument). I doesn’t believe that the participants which are normally in check but submit that the tyrannical life, driven are it or that it itself is the participants” have now become freed and able to by the erotic passion and desires and asks “is he living in a dream or is be expressed. which have become manifested he awake?” (476c-d). Glaucon again He describes the tyrant as having as a kind of madness, has become agrees with Socrates that such a implanted within him “a powerful blinded to what is best and good. person is “very much awake” (476d). erotic love, like a great winged Socrates suggests that the tyrannical It should be noted that here the drone, to be the leader of those idle life, driven by erotic love, spends all discussion concerning a lover of sights desires that spend whatever is at his money, thus “when everything is and sounds, who is like a philosopher hand” (572e). With this description gone” all the lawless desires that are but who is also different in that they of erotic love as motivating force now within him demand even more; are living a dream and do not have within the tyrant, he then claims that “driven by the stings of the other true knowledge, rather only opinion, those “other desires…buzz around desires and especially by erotic love such a person is not identified directly the drone” and make it increase in itself (which leads all of them as its as a tyrant—we should consider such size and intensity; “making it grow bodyguard)” he will “become frenzied a person as being anyone who does as large as possible, they plant the and look to see who possesses not have knowledge of the Forms. sting of longing in it” (573a). So anything that he could take, by either Nevertheless, the interesting point, we have unnecessary and lawless deceit or force” (573e). The tyrannical which I will attempt to examine next, desires which have become freed life is one of a kind of madness which is the idea of a person who is living from a dreaming psyche and an is expressed as something akin to an life as if in a dream and how that does erotic love which has been planted obsession which leads this person in fact relate to the tyrant. within the soul of the tyrant and, to do all kinds of evil actions; as Turning to Book IX, when when it becomes enlarged, creates Socrates elegantly claims: Socrates begins to directly describe what Socrates describes as a “sting of Now, however, under the tyranny of the tyrannical soul, he examines the longing,” presumably referring to the erotic love, he has permanently become desires of the tyrant (571a). He claims intensity of the lawless desires within while awake what he used to become that we all seem to have unnecessary the tyrant’s soul. He then adds to this occasionally while asleep, and he won’t desires which are lawless, “but they what is perhaps the most significant hold back from any terrible murder or are held in check by the laws and description for the argument I wish from any kind of food or act. But, rather, by the better desires in alliance with to put forth; he describes the tyrant’s erotic love lives like a tyrant within him reason” (571b). The desires he is soul as having madness as its leader in complete anarchy and lawlessness referring to here are: and bodyguard. “[T]his leader of the as his sole ruler, and drives him, as if Those that are awakened in sleep, when soul,” he claims, “adopts madness as he were a city, to dare anything that the rest of the soul—the rational, gentle, its bodyguard and becomes frenzied. will provide sustenance for itself and and ruling part—slumber. Then the If it finds any beliefs or desires in the the unruly mob around it…Isn’t this beastly and savage part, full of food and man that are thought to be good or the life that a tyrannical man leads? drink, cast off sleep and seeks to find a that still have some shame, it destroys (574e-575a).

48 | journal of undergraduate research Again, Socrates declares that looking closely at the devolution of a bit different, for there remains “a “someone with a tyrannical nature constitutions in Book VIII. certain kind of restraint and with lives his whole life without being In a very insightful essay titled the projection of a certain kind of friends with anyone” (576a). This can “Degenerate regimes in Plato’s appearance” which according to be viewed in relation to the parallel Republic,” Zena Hitz recognizes Hitz, “can be seen in part by looking mentioned previously concerning that as the process of degeneration backward from the tyrant” (Hitz 116). the philosopher as a well-trained occurs there is a struggle between It seems as though the democratic dog who is able to recognize and has reason and the appetites. She states constitution also has something akin knowledge of the difference between that “[R]eason is not dispensed with to secretiveness. If we consider that in friend and enemy, whereas the wolf, in the degenerate regimes; rather, it the tyrannical soul the lawless desires who is really a tyrant, cannot. The pursues inadequate objects. Rather are fully realized and expressed as tyrannical person, says Socrates, is than seeking what is genuinely good, a kind of blinding manifestation of “the worst type of man: His waking degenerate reason pursues certain madness, “[T]he democratic character life is like the nightmare we described shadowy appearances of the good; settles a compromise between his earlier…the longer he remains tyrant, honor, constraint, and lawfulness” necessary and unnecessary appetites, the more like the nightmare he (Hitz 113). Her description of under something like a law of becomes” (576b). “shadowy appearances of the good” is equality (572b10-d3). In doing so, the Previously, I stated that the then employed in each constitution democratic character imagines he is madness, which is expressed as which results in, according to my being moderate”; and it is here that an uncontrollable obsession for interpretation of her argument, a we can see how “the democrat has no the lawless desires and will stop at further development of falsehood, real grounds to oppose the pursuit nothing to satisfy them, is also a kind deception and, ultimately, blindness; of lawless desires” (117). Indeed, one of blindness; it was for this reason she claims that, “love of wealth in could view the democrat as being that I described the madness of the the timocracy is the engine of its quite similar to the other constitutions tyrannical soul as injudicious madness. decline” and that the “love of wealth in that, “like the oligarch and the The relevant question that now is secret” (114). This secretiveness timocrat” the democrat inevitably applies is whether or not Socrates should be considered, according to “nurtures appetites hostile to his actually makes the same connection? my interpretation, the beginning of own values while pretending to Perhaps it would be a better reason the coming of blindness which will be himself—and perhaps to others—that if the blindness which is connected maximized by the tyrant. he is in fact safe from them” (117). to the madness of a tyrannical soul, What about the other constitutions, This is clearly a case of both self- injudicious madness, results not only one might wonder? How are they deception and secretiveness; but it is in potentially being unable to know involved? Consider the Oligarchy not yet maximal. Hitz’s insight here, what is best, but, more specifically, in and how they “impoverish their however, shows that these shadow the least pleasant life. In this way it subjects” as Hitz claims; “under the virtues, in relation to the devolution could be argued that the tyrannical guise of restraining petty injustice of constitutions, can be considered as life is by far the most unjust and what such as thievery and temple-robbing proof of a sort of self-blinding quality; Socrates does describe as “totally (552d), the oligarchic rulers maintain ultimately this blindness, I submit, opposite” from the philosophical soul a legal structure which enriches will be completed in the tyrannical or city ruled by a king (576d). With them” (Hitz 116). Going on, she soul as a kind of psychological that said, it seems important to have argues that these rulers must have an manifestation of madness actively a better understanding of how the appearance of being just, or at least expressed in the soul of the tyrant. tyrannical soul becomes maddened trustworthy, in order to make loans It is interesting to notice, prior in such a way as to become blinded which will increase their wealth (116). to moving on, that Plato seems to to what is actually good. For it would Thus, there remains a kind of false have had a great appreciation for this seem unrealistic to suggest that once impression which could be taken notion of blindness, which should be the erotic desires have become freed simply as a secretive reversal of virtue, understood in terms of the inevitable within his soul they automatically i.e. honesty particularly between consequences of hubris or selfishness. or magically are expressed as a kind friends and fellow citizens. This mere In the Ion, for example, Socrates of blindness. Rather, I suggest that façade of virtue of honesty is, as it attempts to describe a passage from the process of becoming blind to were, a furthering of blindness, or so I Homer, in this case from the Odyssey, what is good is a process which wish to claim. which is a worthy example of good can be discovered and described by The democratic constitution is poetry which has been inspired by

Fall 2012 – Spring 2013 | 49 the gods. He chooses to describe the considered as a psychological or not, or any possibility of mastering scene where Theoclymenus warns the manifestation of madness. And this this alleged craft or of practicing it at suitors of their self-deception: madness is essentially born from the same time as the craft of navigation. Ah, wretched men, what bane is this ye within an energizing force of the tyrant’s Don’t you think that the true captain suffer? Shrouded in night. erotic love and desires—ultimately will be called a real stargazer, a babbler, Are your heads and your faces and your making the soul blinded to what is and a good-for-nothing by those who limbs below, best and good and thus a kind of sail in ships governed in that way in And kindled is the voice of wailing, and injudicious madness. We can now ask which such things happen? (488d-e). cheeks are wet with tears. the very important question what And the porch is full of ghosts, the hall does the madness of the tyrant have to Here we have a slight indication is full of them, do with the madness of philosopher? To into how we might consider a Hastening hellwards beneath the answer this question we need to first philosopher as also having a kind of gloom; and the sun see what, if anything, the Republic madness, one which is here described Has perished out of heaven, and an evil has to say about the philosopher with as stargazing, etc. (I will come back mist enfolds the world (Ion 539). regard to madness. to this point in a moment). First, In Book VI, after Socrates has however, there is another important How brilliantly this passage shown that only philosophers have point which Socrates makes following suggests that blindness in the form adequate knowledge to rule the this passage which needs to be of a gloomy evil mist has completely just city, we find an objection which addressed in order to see the full force encompassed the minds of the suitors; does indicate something about how of my argument at its conclusion. might we extrapolate from this just a philosophers are perceived by most After agreeing that the philosopher bit and consider a very similar mist of people; “the greatest number” of or true captain of a ship is considered blindness is what has been planted them we are told “become cranks” by most people as completely useless, in the soul of the tyrant and become and even “vicious, while those who he then states something rather manifested in the form of injudicious seem completely decent are rendered remarkable. He claims that it is not madness? I suggest such a connection useless to the city because of the right for one who is a ruler to beg to is quite reasonable, especially given studies you recommend” (487d). rule; that is to say “[I]t isn’t for the the appreciation Plato seemed to Interestingly, Socrates does not seem ruler, if he’s truly any use, to beg the have both for Homer (to some extent) to disagree with such a claim, which others to accept his rule” (489c). This and for Homer’s hero Odysseus (See only adds to the problem of the remark, it seems to me, is strikingly Republic X: 595b and 620c). philosopher-king paradox; “How, then, similar to what he states much earlier Until this point, one might object, can it be true to say that there will in the dialogue concerning who the all I have merely been building is be no end to evils in our cities until best ruler is: a case for a parallel between the philosophers—people we agree are …good people won’t be willing to rule for tyrannical soul as it exists at different to be useless—rule in them?” (487e). the sake of either money or honor. They times and for different reasons Socrates, in his usual fashion, gives a don’t want to be paid wages openly for throughout the Republic, but not a simile to help describe the situation ruling and get called hired hands, nor to parallel between the philosophical to his audience; the basic force of the take them in secret from their rule and soul and the tyrannical soul. My image he uses, the ship of state, is that be called thieves. And they won’t rule for response would simply be to grant those who dismiss the true ruler of a the sake of honor, because they aren’t this difficulty; that is, as long as it is ship do not recognize or understand ambitious honor-lovers. So, if they’re also granted that there is indeed a the purpose of ruling. Socrates states to be willing to rule, some compulsion philosophically interesting parallel to that they: or punishment must be brought to be made between the different modes …don’t understand that a true captain bear on them—perhaps that is why it is of presentation the tyrannical soul must pay attention to the seasons of the thought shameful to seek to rule before comes to us throughout the course year, the sky, the stars, the winds, and one is compelled to. Now the greatest of the dialogue. Therefore, I will now all that pertains to his craft, if he’s really punishment, if one isn’t willing to rule, turn my attention to what is required to be the ruler of the ship. And they is to be ruled by someone worse than to make this parallel explicit. [those who dismiss him] don’t believe oneself. And I think that it’s fear of this Nevertheless, there is indeed there is any craft that would enable him that makes decent people rule when a very important aspect of the to determine how he should steer the they do (347b-c). tyrannical soul which can be ship, whether the others want him to This claim, of course, was stated

50 | journal of undergraduate research way back in Book I, but it has a Eros and Socrates is compelled by it has been previously demonstrated, great deal of importance here as our his conscience, or perhaps fear of is maddened and obsessed with what argument proceeds to its end. We offending the gods, to recant and give its nature corresponds to, namely shall see how it impacts the paradox a second more adequate speech. its own lawless erotic desires; this of the philosopher-king once we In his second speech, Socrates then prevents it from having sound have further examined the relevance now declares that instead of madness judgment and understanding. of madness with regard to the always leading to unsound and Now that this parallel is complete philosophical soul. harmful judgment he instead says that and we can see, to some degree, what As I have mentioned previously, “in reality the greatest blessings come the philosophical soul is like, we there is no good description of the to us through madness, for there is a are in a far better position to give a philosophical soul in the Republic, madness that is given from on high” reasonable solution to the paradox of but Plato does provide a basic (244). Again Socrates praises this the philosopher-king. Why should the understanding of the philosopher as divine kind of madness saying: philosopher go back down into the a lover of wisdom. I will turn now Where the direst maladies and woes cave-city and rule? to a very brief summation of the have fallen upon certain houses through After Socrates has finished relation between Eros and madness as ancestral guilt, there madness has describing the unforgettable simile of Socrates describes it in the Phaedrus; intervened, and with oracular power the cave in Book VII, and states that there Socrates gives two speeches has found a way of deliverance for the philosophers must not remain describing the nature of love (Eros) those who are in need, taking refuge in with the Forms forever but must in connection to madness. In the first supplications to the gods and worship be compelled “through persuasion speech we see Eros as an energizing of them; and thus, through cleansing or compulsion” ( 519e) to rule the force which is manifested as a kind and mystic rites, he who has part in city, he makes what is perhaps the of madness and can be conceived this madness finds safety now and for most difficult yet important point; of as the kind of madness we saw the future; to him who is rightly mad, he suggests that true philosophers related to the tyrannical soul, a kind of rightly possessed, the madness brings “despise political rule” more than injudicious madness. release from his present ills (244). anyone else (521b). This is the main The speeches Socrates gives are point my argument has come to. meant to describe the role Eros plays We can begin to see at this point, In sum, the philosophers will between the older lover and a beloved even with this very brief reference not want to rule. They, of all people, younger boy. In the first speech, to the Phaedrus that there is another will want to rule the least. However, Socrates claims that “the older, stays kind of madness—a judicious madness because the philosophical soul is with the younger, and will not leave and it is precisely this divine and characterized by a judicious madness him, day nor night, if he can help it; judicious version which I wish to which enables clear-sightedness, constraint and mad desire drive him associate with the philosophical soul. the true philosopher will know and onwards; the sting of love allures him Simply put, the soul of the understand best that, given the with the gift of constant joy in seeing, philosopher is paralleled by the situation, what is best for themselves hearing, touching the beloved…” soul of the tyrant exactly at this as well as the happiness of the city as (Phaedrus: 240). Here it seems that the point. The philosophical soul is a whole is for them to rule the city as older lover, driven by a sensual, lustful, maddened and obsessed with what philosopher-kings. Moreover, it would erotic and bodily Eros, has become its nature corresponds to, namely be wrong to consider Socrates’ remarks utterly obsessed with the beloved and the Forms; this enables it to have here as being mistaken or inauthentic. this obsession turns out to be very sound judgment and understanding. When Socrates argues that the harmful to the beloved. Socrates says Moreover this judicious quality of philosophers will not want to rule the to the young boy, “you must know the the philosophical soul is essentially city we must take him seriously. fondness of the lover, what it is. Its one of clear-sightedness, being able If my interpretation of Plato here nature is not that of kindness. No, it to know what is best and good in is correct, then it would be a mistake comes to satisfy its appetite, to devour any given situation and thus moved to argue, as some tend to do, that the you as a sort of food: Like as wolves by the energizing force of Eros, this philosophers actually do want to go adore a lamb, thus do lovers love a judicious madness is able to “bring back down into the cave in order to boy” (241). Yet, this speech turns out release from…present ills” (244). On rule, despite their desire to be with to be an inadequate description of the other hand, the tyrannical soul, as the Forms forever. No, in comparison

Fall 2012 – Spring 2013 | 51 to the madness which they possess, what allows them to see clearly or to our conclusion: there is a parallel and in conjunction with their judge rightly that the situation calls between philosophical and tyrannical obsession of the Forms (which is the for them to rule, though they really souls and the philosopher’s soul is only thing the philosophers are really do not want to. This is why Socrates distinguished by a kind of judicious- concerned with) they will not want to says very early on in Book I that the madness whereas the tyrant’s soul is rule. They will want to stay in the light best kind of rulers (the philosopher- clearly seen to be marked by a kind of of the Forms, forever learning; for kings) are those who do not want to injudicious-madness. they are by nature lovers of wisdom rule but are compelled by a kind of and are maddened by their desire of judicious awareness of what is best, the Forms. However, and this is the both for themselves as well as the city central point, this same madness is at large (347b-c). Thus, we have come

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Cooper, Lane. “Ion.” Plato: Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium, with Passages from the Republic and Laws. New York: Cornell UP, 1938. Print.

Cooper, Lane. “Phaedrus.” Plato: Phaedrus, Ion, Gorgias, and Symposium, with Passages from the Republic and Laws. New York: Cornell UP, 1938. Print.

Dorter, Kenneth. Introduction. The Transformation of Plato’s Republic. Lanham, MD: Lexington, 2006. 1-8. Print.

Hitz, Zena. “Degenerate Regimes in Plato’s Republic.” Web.

Miller, Mitchell. “Platonic Provocations: Reflections on the Soul and the Good in the Republic.” Platonic Investigations (1985): 166. Print.

Plato, C. D. C. Reeve, and G. M. A. Grube. The Republic. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett, 1992. Print.

Reeve, C. D. Philosopher-kings the Argument of Plato’s Republic. Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP, 1992. Print.

Rosen, Stanley. Plato’s Republic: A Study. New Haven: Yale UP, 2005. Print.

52 | journal of undergraduate research