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Public Order and Popular Protest in Colonial India: Remembering Jallianwala Bagh Massacre After a Century (Working Paper)

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Public Order and Popular Protest in Colonial India: Remembering Jallianwala Bagh Massacre After a Century (Working Paper) Dr. Javed Iqbal Wani Assistant Professor (Law & Legal Studies) Centre for Law, Governance and Citizenship, Ambedkar University Delhi Public Order and Popular Protest in Colonial India: Remembering Jallianwala Bagh Massacre after a Century (Working Paper) In April 2019, it was the centenary mourning of the Jallianwala Bagh massacre which was led by a British officer General Dyer. The Jallianwala Bagh massacre took place in April 1919 and remains one of the most potent memory of British colonial violence and brutality in India. A quick recounting of a representative set of scholarship and observations about the Amritsar massacre of 1919 is mandatory here. In the popular imagination it is referred to as the ultimate example of the cold-hearted character and blood-thirsty approach of the colonialists who knew nothing but oppression. It has been proposed as ‘the decisive moment when Indians were alienated from British rule’.1 While Indians were shocked, distressed, disturbed and angered at Dyer’s actions, some representative sections of the British were also critical of the excessive use of force at Jallianwala Bagh and termed it as a gross miscalculation but insisted that it was an isolated deviation in the journey of the Empire.2 Though there are numerous examples of colonial violence across continents, but Jallianwala Bagh massacre acquires a peculiar position given its context, politics and scale. A substantial amount of literature has discussed the horrific incident. Scholars have taken diverse approaches to study the incident and the perpetrator General Dyer. Most literature has attempted either to recount ‘Punjab disturbances 1 Taylor, A. J. P. (1965) English History 1914-1945. New York: Oxford University Press, p152. 2 Tuteja, K.L., (1997) ‘Jallianwala Bagh: A Critical Juncture in the Indian Nationalist Movement’, Social Scientist, 25: 1/2, 25-61. 1 of 1919’ by focusing on the Jallianwala Bagh massacre as an isolated incident or have tried to outline the atrocities of the riotous mobs and the violent atmosphere in Amritsar that resulted in this massacre or have discussed intentions of the infamous General Dyer. Rupert Furneaux has attempted to absolve the empire of its crimes and instead have argued that it was Dyers medical condition, his arterio-sclerosis, that was responsible for the impaired judgement on the fateful day.3 Nigel Collett has proposed Dyer as a victim of misinformation that led him to make specific conclusions about the ‘crowd’ and has instead placed the blame on the upper class and the police for providing wrong inputs.4 However, he did place some responsibility on Dyer and has half-heatedly noted the moral bankruptcy of British imperialism. Some scholars have even tried to offer a different opinion which indirectly whitewashes colonial brutality and even-handedly painted a picture suggesting that British embattled officers were operating in a difficult situation.5 Such scholarship has argued that Dyer panicked because he did not know what he was doing and therefore lied about it afterwards at various occasions. Others have highlighted that there were two different opinions about the Massacre in Britain.6 One, the official opinion, condemned the disproportionate use of force by General Dyer, and there was second, the public opinion which resulted in immense support for Dyer as a British military officer. There exist very few scholars who have offered a critical and comprehensive analysis of the situation. Most recently, Kim Wagner has proposed a more balanced approach and has attempted to understand the form and functions of 3 Furneaux, Rupert. (1963) India: Massacre at Amritsar, London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., pp 176-177. 4 Collett, Nigel A., (2011) ‘The O’Dwyer v. Nair Libel Case of 1924: New Evidence Concerning Indian Attitudes and British Intelligence During the 1919 Punjab Disturbances’, Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Third Series, 21:4. 469-483. 5 Lloyd, Nicholas, (2011) The Amritsar Massacre: The Untold Story of One Fateful Day, London: I.B. Taurus., Pages 320. 6 Sayer, Derek, (1991) ‘British Reaction to the Amritsar Massacre 1919-1920’, Past & Present, No. 131, 130-164 2 colonial violence through the Amritsar massacre of 1919.7 None of the analysis have matched the sophistication with which Nasser Hussain had discussed ‘martial law’ and therefore unmasked the workings of colonial legality that allowed or made such brutality possible. This article will argue that Jallianwala Bagh did not happen in isolation and must be seen as a continuation of an all India anticolonial mobilisation that had begun a month ago. It will offer two sets of answers. First, it will highlight some analytical insights about public order in colonial India. And second, it will point out that the conduct of officers like General Dyer only reveal the potentiality of sovereign violence. By doing this, it will reveal that Jallianwala Bagh is a great lesson in the study of ‘Public order’ where an exception could be unleashed without a necessity. Legality and moral legitimacy: Satyagraha, martial law and the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh One of the major reasons for the protests that emerged in the year 1919, was the proposed Anarchical and Revolutionary Crimes Act 1919, popularly known as Rowlatt Act or Rowlatt Bills. The ‘Rowlatt Act’ was passed despite the unanimous opposition of all non-official members of the Imperial Council.8 Vast sections of the Indian population and their political leadership became agitated about the Governments’ indifference to their opposition to it. As part of the collective response, Mohan Das Karamchand Gandhi started satyagraha on March 23, 1919, to oppose the Rowlatt Act. It was declared that April 6 would be observed as All India Hartal day with twenty-four hours of fasting and suspension of all business. On March 1, 7 Wagner Kim, (2016) ‘” Calculated to Strike Terror”: The Amritsar Massacre and the Spectacle of Colonial Violence’, Past & Present, No. 233, 185-225 8 The Madras Mail, Wednesday Evening, March 19, 1919, Page 5, “The Imperial Council, Rowllatt Bill Passed, Madras Member Resigns.” 3 1919, Gandhi in a statement to Press had opposed the Rowlatt Bills. The arguments he made are noteworthy. While taking stock of revolutionary crimes in India, the report of the Rowlatt Committee had opined that secret violence was confined to ‘isolated and very small parts of India’ and ‘to a microscopic body of the people.’9 Gandhi responded arguing that although the existence of such men was truly a danger to society, the Rowlatt Bills would in fact affect the whole of India and its people. For Gandhi, the design of the Bill laid bare a colonial conspiracy of arming the Government with powers out of all proportion to its stated aims. For Gandhi, the Rowlatt Bill was a greater danger than the revolutionary crime itself. He believed that millions of Indians were by nature the gentlest people on the earth and considered the Bills to be ‘the unmistakable symptom of the deep-seated disease in the governing body’.10 While pleading with the Government for the use of ‘ordinary laws’ to deal with revolutionary crime, Gandhi exhorted that a strong ‘remedy’ like the Rowlatt Bills should only be prescribed once all the milder ones had been tried. This said, the British surely were not likely to listen to his moral advice; instead they were the makers of an empire which had violence at its heart and legality in its head. The anti-Rowlatt Act political mobilisation resorted to Satyagraha. The Satyagraha vow against ‘Rowlatt Act’ was as follows; Being conscientiously of the opinion that the Bills known as the Indian Criminal Law (Amendment) Bill No. 1 of 1919 and the Criminal Law (Emergency Powers) Bill No. 2 of 1919 are unjust, subversive of the principle of liberty and justice and destructive of the elementary rights of individuals, on which the safety of the community as a whole and the State itself is based, we solemnly affirm that in the event of these Bills becoming law and until they are withdrawn, we shall refuse civilly to obey those laws and such 9 Rowlatt, Sidney Arthur Taylor (1918), Sedition Committee, 1918, Report, Calcutta: Superintendent Government Printing, India, Pages 290. 10 See D.G Tendulkar, Mahatma: Life of Karamchand Gandhi, Vol. 1, Bombay, 1951, Page 251. 4 other laws as a committee to be hereafter appointed may think fit and we further affirm that in this struggle we will faithfully follow the truth and refrain from violence to life, person or property.11 Despite nationwide opposition, the Rowlatt Bill was passed into Law on 18 March 1919. It was carried by the 35 Government votes and opposed by 20 out of 25 non-official Indians There were in total 187 amendments proposed by the Indian Members and the official block defeated every one of them.12 Jinnah, Aiyangar, Mazharul Haque, Khaparde, Sunder Singh, Zulfiqar Ali, who all along strongly protested were absent as a protest on the last day of voting.13 Meanwhile, Gandhi was welcomed in Madras on 18 March and 20 March 1919, by huge mass meeting following his call for satyagraha. Gandhi opposed the Rowlatt Bills but described the character of the western form of Government in a peculiar way in his speech of 20 March, which was read by one Mr. Desai because Gandhi was not feeling well. Gandhi’s message stated: By demonstrating to the party of violence the infallible power of satyagraha and by giving them ample scope for their inexhaustible energy we hope to wean that party from the suicidal method of violence. 14 Gandhi’s message rejected Sir William’s contention that the movement had great potential for evil and retorted that it had only a potential for good. The appeal constituted an attempt to revolutionize politics and to restore significance to moral force.
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